The recent violation of Thai airspace by a Myanmar MiG-29 fighter jet: Understanding Thailand's unusual response

Abstract

Foreign aircraft trespassing national airspace is considered a violation of state sovereignty and tends to precipitate serious responses, ranging from shooting down offenders to diplomatic protests. In late June 2022, a Myanmar MiG-29 fighter jet flew over Thailand's Phop Phra district, made a low pass, and fired at ethnic-minority armed groups stationed along the border. The incident was a clear-cut airspace incursion, apparently intended to incite retaliation from Bangkok. However, despite the harshly worded initial response in a press release issued promptly by the Royal Thai Air Force, the Prayut government attempted to minimize the seriousness of the Myanmar fighter jet's actions. This unexpected reaction triggered considerable public criticism. Nevertheless, given Thailand's complex positioning in the Thai–Myanmar borderlands, the mitigated response might have had a certain logic, especially if, as some onlookers suggested, the intrusion was intentional.

Keywords

airspace violation Myanmar Myawaddy Phop Phra Thailand

Introduction

“This is not a big deal,” Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha told reporters when a Myanmar military aircraft trespassed on Thai airspace on June 30, 2022. The fighter jet circled over the borderland of Tak province and attacked ethnic minority troops on the Myanmar side. The prime minister then added, “[The Myanmar side] said it was unintentional, but they made a wide turn before breaching into Thailand's territory just a little bit and we have dispatched our fighter jets in response which was in accord with international standards” (cited in Parpart, 2022). His relaxed reaction contradicted the tough and uncompromising press release issued a day earlier by the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). This measured response is surprising, however, as this type of airspace violation has traditionally been deemed highly serious. The intrusion of a foreign aircraft into national airspace immediately threatens the state's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity (Donahue, 1989). Understandably, it is perceived as an extremely grievous act, both politically and legally. Accordingly, trespassing on territorial airspace by non-civilian flying objects can lead to interstate disputes (Geiser, 1988; Scott, 1999).

The RTAF's delayed interception and the Prayut government's downplaying of the intrusion sparked waves of public criticism. Pro-democracy activists, in particular, questioned whether the military-backed government could effectively safeguard sovereign airspace from unexpected threats (Pongsudhirak, 2022; TNR, 2022). According to Surachart Bamrungsuk, Thailand's top specialist in defense affairs, airspace intrusions are “rare” events (TNR, 2022). His opinion was correct as such incidents are unusual in Thailand. Nevertheless, scholars and journalists have missed a crucial piece of the puzzle amid the denunciations. One important question was not asked: Why did the RTAF issue the press release in the first place?

The press release was exceptionally unusual. For example, the missing Malaysia Airlines flight 370 in 2014 made headlines worldwide. However, the RTAF refrained from instant acknowledgment. It was roughly a week before the RTAF reluctantly released “confidential” information about a foreign aircraft trespassing on Thai airspace (AP and AFP, 2014; Kumar, 2014). This was an acceptable response. Information about air traffic activities may be considered confidential due to the sensitive nature of national security. However, addressing security-related matters publicly is not part of Bangkok's diplomatic and security culture. Accordingly, we must make the following distinction. The essence of the recent airspace intrusion incident was not about the Myanmar fighter jet per se. Rather, the key to understanding the event lies in the political message sent by the RTAF in a very unusual press release.

This commentary article offers a brief analysis of the incursion of the Tatmadaw (i.e. Myanmar military) fighter aircraft into Thai airspace. We focus on the press release to analyze what likely occurred and what is behind the Prayut government's prima facie inconsistent responses. We begin by outlining the relevant facts below.

Facts of the case

On June 30, 2022, the Directorate of Civil Affairs–RTAF (DCA–RTAF) issued a press release. The communiqué stated that at 11:16 a.m., an RTAF unit reported an “unidentified” military aircraft. The fighter jet flew into the airspace above Phop Phra district in Thailand's Tak province. It carried out an air strike against ethnic minority militias stationed along the Myanmar border before disappearing from the radar screen. Two RTAF F-16 fighter jets were scrambled to conduct a “combat patrol” (lat tra wen rop) along the border (DCA–RTAF, 2022).

The press release also stated that the RTAF had ordered the Air Force attaché at the Thai Embassy in Yangon to liaise with concerned authorities in Myanmar and caution against future airspace intrusions (DCA–RTAF, 2022). The foreign military aircraft was later identified as a Myanmar Air Force (MAF) MiG-29 fighter jet. The MiG-29 trespassed approximately 5 km inside Thai territory. It circled several times above Ban Wao Lay Tai and Ban Wao Lay Nua villages for approximately 15 min. Then, the jet attacked ethnic minority forces on the Myanmar side (AP, 2022; Pinitwong and Nanuam, 2022). The pilot was a “Russian” national and not “Burmese” (Bangkok Post, 2022).

The low-altitude air-to-ground attack violated Thailand's sovereignty over its airspace, which is a breach of international air law. The fighter jet invaded the Thailand Air Defense Identification Zone (TADIZ) for 15 min. An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is “a special designated airspace of defined dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special identification and/or reporting procedures additional to those related to the provision of air traffic services” (Stewart, 2021: 186). A state has the legal right to establish an ADIZ to regulate its border security. States can enact conditions and procedures that entering aircraft must meet. Any failure to comply—most notably trespassing by a foreign aircraft into national airspace—can result in severe consequences, which include preventive steps by the state, such as shooting down the plane (Donahue, 1989).

Compared with other nations, Thailand has taken exceptionally strict and stringent measures in the past to intercept unidentified and intruding aircraft, such as shooting down trespassing aircraft that disobey the interceptor's orders (Su, 2021). One reason for this cautious approach is that the Thai military plays a politically pivotal role. Concerns about “territorial security” (khwam mankhong haeng dindaen) tend to be uncompromising (Bunyavejchewin et al., 2022). It is indisputable that the intruding Myanmar fighter jet transgressed Thailand's air sovereignty. Consequently, reprisals and punitive measures (e.g. a diplomatic protest) against the Tatmadaw regime should be expected.

However, despite the strong message sent by the RTAF, the Prayut government's response was antithetical. The leader of the RTAF and military elites played down the seriousness of the infiltration. This discrepancy baffled and exasperated the public. Thai citizens criticized the government's seeming reluctance as a craven act. However, the Thai government's efforts led to reassurances of cooperation from Myanmar. Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai told the media that the Burmese Foreign Minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, expressed regret for the unintentional incursion and assured that it would not happen again. The Thai government also received an official apology letter from the regime in Naypyidaw (Nanuam, 2022a).

Complex positioning

Again, the incursion by the Myanmar MiG-29 fighter jet is not the main issue of analysis in this commentary. The fulcrum is the uncompromising press release issued by the RTAF—almost immediately after the airspace violation. The speedy timing and content did not appease the public. Needless to say, the RTAF's heterodox response could have precipitated a public backlash against the Prayut regime, as such was the extent of dissent.

Perhaps that is because the press release was aimed at audiences outside Thai territory. These persons, to be precise, are the militant elites of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and ethnic minority militias fighting the Tatmadaw along the Thai–Myanmar border. They conduct various business activities with domestic “khaki capitalist” institutions in Thailand. Khaki capital is molded mainly from “the military's ability to influence state budgets to distribute financial resources and create pecuniary opportunities for the armed forces to directly or indirectly enhance their dividends institutionally, either at the unit or individual level” (Chambers, 2021b: 497). Khaki capitalism is thus composed of formal and informal economic sectors.

In Thailand, khaki capitalist institutions are not limited to military-related entities. These institutions include a network of civilian elites, such as business entrepreneurs, mafias, and politicians. Essentially, a cobweb of reciprocal relationships between these sub-state actors, whose status quo is symbiotic to each other, has cast its long shadow over Thai foreign policy formulation. In the Thai context, national interest has a class nature. Specifically, the interest of a dynastic web of khaki capitalist members and their elitist associates is more or less synonymous with the interest of the Thai state. This derives from the fact that the exclusive ruling-elite club (including those in khaki capitalist institutions)—who have customarily and consistently ruled “behind the throne,” regardless of the regime type in Bangkok—shape directions or even take actions on certain activities (e.g. border control) in both de facto and de jure forms.

Thai military and elite cronies have close ties with the Tatmadaw at multiple levels, through individuals, institutions, and the state (Chambers, 2021a). However, these alliances do not ensure overall stability at the borders. Therefore, EAOs with shared reciprocal interests play an unofficial and confidential role. This could explain how the Tatmadaw toppled the democratically elected regime in February 2021. The regime change triggered a country-wide civil war. Small wars have spread between the Tatmadaw, including the ethnic minority militias backed by it, and the anti-junta armed forces (e.g. the Kachin Independence Army), joined by a substantive number of anti-military civilians. These wars have occurred principally in areas under the control of EAOs. This has placed the Prayut government in an awkward position. Since the 1990s, Thai ruling elites, particularly some top members of khaki capitalist institutions, have cultivated good relationships at all levels with the Burmese top brass, including General Min Aung Hlaing, the current coup leader. Both Bangkok and Naypyidaw have propagated the story of Myanmar's new strongman as the “adopted son” of late statesman General Prem Tinsulanonda—Thailand's former Prime Minister, Army Chief, and President of the King's Privy Council—long before the coup d’état took place in 2021 (Ghosh, 2014).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it is an open secret that Thai elites have also invested in an “underground” cross-border economy. The illegal economy is controlled by ethnic armed rebel groups that reap lucrative benefits from “grey-area” business activities, such as arms trafficking (The Nation, 2017; VOA News, 2021). Therefore, Thai elites need to secure strong ties with the EAOs. They are trapped between choosing the Tatmadaw or the EAOs. In practice, however, taking one side has not appeared to be a feasible option for policy elites who handle Thailand–Myanmar relations or strife in border regions.

The Thai side tries instead to maintain “normal” ties with all parties. It acts through different channels to preserve the wider national security aims and self-interests of the khaki capitalist institutions. Omnidirectional overtures have been relatively successful, albeit not at all levels of affairs (Cheow, 1986). The omnidirectionality of actions has offset risks and friction in border areas, although in a roundabout way. However, conflicts among rebel militias and small wars between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs have seemingly become permanent. This means that the omnidirectional approach does not always provide an instant solution. For example, Myawaddy in Myanmar shares borders with Thailand's Tak province. The “geographic advantage” has led to a large underground economy. Small wars there concern Thai investors, especially because the Burmese junta in Naypyidaw and EAO leaders demand that the Thai state stops aiding the other side.

Cobra Column, Venom Column, White Elephant Battalion, and the trespassing MiG-29 fighter jet

We outlined Thailand's multifaceted stance in handling economic and political concerns along the Thai–Myanmar border. We also revealed that apprehensions and self-interests of the Thai khaki capitalist institutions are connected to legal and illegal border activities. Both Thailand and Myanmar seem to tolerate the latter. We explained that legal and illegal commercial activities are the reason why the Thai state has complex relations with the various actors involved. Thus, we now discuss why Thailand's reactions to the raid by the Myanmar MiG-29 fighter jet over Phop Phra in Tak province were extremely unusual. We can make sense of the response by acknowledging the Gordian “power” knots that bind Thailand (more precisely, a network of khaki capitalist elites who run the kingdom). An analysis follows of how such knots have prolonged the small war in Myawaddy. This forms the basis for our explanation of Thailand's unusual response to the airspace breach. We then present a postulated development to decipher what was behind the diplomatic response of the prime minister and the military response of the RTAF.

The anatomy of the small war in Myawaddy

The border conflict in Myawaddy has expanded considerably since mid-2022. A year earlier, only three EAOs were fighting the Tatmadaw and its Border Guard Force (BGF) units. The EAOs are the Karen National Union (KNU), Karen National Liberation Army–Peace Council (KNLA-PC), and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA-5). Now, at least three new armed groups are also involved. Cobra Column, Venom Column, and White Elephant (Sin Phyu) Battalion have entered the Myawaddy warfare setting (Kyaw Thu, 2022; Nora Aung, 2022). Although their details (e.g. chains of command) are unclear, local and other sources have reported that the three corps are under the leadership of Major General Saw Nerdah Mya. The major general is the son of General Saw Bo Mya, the late KNU chairman. He was the commander of the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) Special Commando before he was discharged from his duties in January 2022 (EMG, 2022).

According to anonymous sources in the Kayin State, KNU elites did not have full control over the newly formed militias led by General Saw Nerdah Mya (P Bunyavejchewin 2022, personal communication, September 15). Some sources say that KNU and DKBA-5 reached de facto deals with the Tatmadaw that would lessen the fog of war in Myawaddy and the wider Kayin State. Some factions, however, disagreed with the concessions (K Chotisut 2022, personal communication, August 21). Thus, they formed new militias to continue fighting Myanmar's armed forces. The initial raw recruits were Burmese youths. Soon, disgruntled mid-ranking Karen soldiers joined; the Cobra Column, Venom Column, and White Elephant Battalion do not impose express ethno-religious identity restrictions.

These armed groups have killed a substantial number of the Myanmar military's commissioned officers (Linn Htin and Maung Shwe Wah, 2022). They also occupied the Tatmadaw's military stations located near the Thai–Myanmar border and Phop Phra. The junta responded with airpower against the rebel battalions. However, the use of airpower is risky due to the geostrategic terrain near the border. A fighter jet must make a low pass and circle above Phop Phra before attacking rebels in Myanmar's territory. That is what occurred on June 30.

As a breach of national airspace by non-civilian flying objects is an extraordinarily serious violation of state sovereignty, it is difficult to believe that the military regime in Naypyidaw would do it alone without securing prior permission from Bangkok. In addition, the intruding MiG-29 jet incident occurred only one day after military officers from Thailand and Myanmar met on friendly terms. Thai Commander Lieutenant General Apichet Suesat of the Third Army Region is in charge of Thai–Myanmar cross-border affairs along the Tak province borders. He met General Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar's capital before attending the 34th Meeting of the Thailand–Myanmar Regional Border Committee held in Taunggyi. Pro-democracy activists claimed that the timing of these events coincided with the airspace intrusion over Thailand. Moreover, they accused the Prayut government of “conspiring” with the Tatmadaw (Bangwaek, 2022) or at least receiving prior approval to enter Thailand's airspace.

Postulated development

In light of the analysis above, the following development is postulated regarding Thailand's overall response. The Thai stance was twofold and unusual: (a) The RTAF made a heterodox and immediate move by issuing a press release with a strong-willed political message; and (b) the Prayut government, in contrast, downplayed the airspace intrusion. Thus, it could be presumed that the government, upheld by khaki capitalist institutions, turned a blind eye when the MiG-29 fighter flew without a formal invitation. The entry was an unfriendly or aggressive act. This was the first violation committed. The second violation was an attack on targets in Myanmar from Thai airspace. Why, then, did the government not react as firmly as usual? It can be inferred that the government dawdled for tactical reasons: ■

The intent was to appease the Tatmadaw.

■

Perhaps the appeasement aimed to enable the Myanmar fighter jet to carry out precision strikes.

■

The Thai government had no choice but to accommodate the request of its Burmese counterpart, given the spider web of mutual interests and relationships between elites in the two capitals.

This perspective contrasts the intent behind the RTAF press release, which, as stated above, was an iron-willed initial response. The press release was not aimed at a local audience or a panicked public. Instead, it was a communication sent to militant leaders of the EAOs and other ethnic minority armed groups. Thai khaki capitalist institutions in Thailand retain ties with these leaders to safeguard their revenue generators in the borderlands.

It remains unclear whether the political strategy employed by the Prayut government convinced the Tatmadaw's enemies. However, the negative backlash against the Prayut government in domestic politics is obvious. The airspace incident diminished the regime's legitimacy to a new low. The government's explanation failed to calm public anxiety. More precisely, pro-democracy critics pointed out that the handling of the fighter jet intrusion did not reassure the public of the country's actual defense capability, which was the result of skyrocketing military spending (Nanuam, 2022b). Logically, high expenditures justify a more impenetrable security environment. Thus, it is understandable why the public uproar did not seem to dissipate, even when the Foreign Ministry in Bangkok summoned the newly appointed Myanmar ambassador to Thailand (Sattaburuth, 2022).

Conclusion

This commentary provides an alternative explanation for the recent but rare incursion of a Myanmar MiG-29 fighter jet into Thai airspace. Many critics have accused the Prayut government of not intercepting the fighter jet promptly and railed at the understated response to the incident. In contrast, we contend that the Prayut government's reactions might not have been as unsound as they seemed. To make sense of the prima facie hesitant response, one needs to step back and examine the press release issued by the RTAF, which we argue was extremely unwonted as a starting point.

Our main argument is that there is a complicated interdependence between the Thai state, as represented by khaki capitalist institutions, and the Tatmadaw and ethnic minority armed groups. This spider web, or network of political and economic ties, is a key factor that has shaped Thailand's highly unusual responses to the breach of its airspace. More precisely, Thailand's complex positioning in border affairs could explain the Prayut government's awkward reactions. To remain involved and present, Thailand—the nation whose national interest is substantively defined by the interest of the ruling class behind the throne—had no choice but to maintain good relationships with all key conflict parties in Myawaddy, Myanmar's border region.

Pro-democracy activists have accused the government in Bangkok of conspiring with Myanmar's armed forces. The allegations that the government gave the green light to attack ethnic minority rebel troops from the sky above Thai territory might be true—Thailand has interests in the borderlands. However, the country's air defense capability is neither flawed nor incapacitated, as critics claim. The Thai military can detect non-civilian flying objects far beyond the TADIZ. The fact that Thailand responded in an atypical way to the illegal entry of foreign aircraft may be a precautionary measure to avoid further unrest in the borderlands. It is indisputable that the regime change in Naypyidaw has increased instability on the Thai–Myanmar border. In response, Thailand has exercised restraint to protect its national interests along the frontier. It did not shoot down the Myanmar MiG-29 fighter jet that entered Thai airspace and posed a risk to the country's national security.

Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to conclude that the Prayut government's alleged nonsensical response is not nonsensical at all.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by Thammasat University Research Unit in History and International Politics (Grant No. 7/2565); and Vejchewin Research Institute (Grant No. JA-2022-2).

ORCID iD

Poowin Bunyavejchewin

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