Humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan: Changing global dynamics and Pakistan's policy choices

Abstract

Afghanistan has gone through a series of turmoils propelled by internal conflicts and foreign interventions. As the neighbor that shares Afghanistan's longest and, arguably, most important neighbor, Pakistan cannot remain aloof from the developments in Afghanistan. During the past 40 years, Pakistan has supported Mujahiddin against Soviets in 1980s, recognized the Taliban regime in 1990s, and joined the US-led war on terror in the 2000s and 2010s. The article argues that the current Afghan imbroglio confronts Pakistan with a peculiar set of challenges due to the lack of legitimacy of the Taliban regime in the eyes of foreign powers and the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. We contend that Pakistan needs to engage with the Taliban and use its leverage to make the Afghan government under the Taliban more inclusive. The same will help to resolve the miseries of the Afghan population.

Keywords

Afghan Taliban humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan Pakistan–Afghanistan relations

Introduction

Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, has never been an easy feast in the struggle for power amongst its players, let alone foreign powers. The “Great Game,” or as the Russians used to call it, “the tournament of Shadows,” was one such power scuffle and strategic conflict between Great Britain and Russia on Afghan soil that took place in the 19th century (Rubin and Rashid, 2008). Whether it is a head-on collision, or the doctoring of a puppet regime such as that of Shuja Shah in Kabul, installed and supported by an outsider, the result has not been fruitful or worth the effort. The Afghan policy before WE Gladstone's Liberal government in Britain emphasized an offensive approach towards the frontier. However, under the Liberal government and a new administrative body in the Sub-continent, a new Afghan policy was formulated that aimed at setting up a defensive policy to protect the Indian Frontier region. Without going deeply into the events of the 18th and 19th centuries, the last part of the 20th century and the events seen by the early years of the 21st century will be discussed in the coming section.

The recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the inevitable stoppage of resources from external sources, in addition to the collapse of whatever little governance infrastructure there was, set off a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. This article analyzes how the international community, in particular Pakistan, responded to the humanitarian crisis. The issue at the core of the article is how the Taliban rule in Kabul impacted these policy choices.

Historical background of Afghanistan: An overview

Afghanistan has a long and tumultuous history of failed foreign invasions. The system of government in Afghanistan shifted from monarchy to republicanism during the Daud Era. The country saw a turbulent communist government backed by Russia during 1979–1989 (Qayum et al., 2017). Finally, the warlordism that followed the fall of the Soviet-backed communist government gave way to Taliban rule. Pakistan had already established itself as a major power broker in Afghanistan during the Mujahiddin resistance to Soviet occupation. The rise of the Taliban further strengthened Pakistan's position (Armajani, 2021).

The year 1996 not only marked the beginning of the new Islamic rule of Taliban in Afghanistan but also the fretting and disconcertment of the US over the fact that they did not want to leave the Taliban freely and absolutely on their own coupled with the alarming situation in the Central Asian region. It was right after the 9/11 attacks that the US asked the Taliban to hand over the mastermind behind the attacks, Osama bin Laden, who at that time was under the shelter of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Three days after 9/11, on September 12, 2001, Article 5, the mutual defense clause of the Washington treaty with NATO, was invoked which meant that the NATO countries were to help the US in its war on terrorism (NATO, 2001).

George W Bush demanded in a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, that the Taliban must hand over Al Qaeda leaders, ensure the complete closure of terrorist camps, and give access to the US and NATO forces to conduct operations. There was also a direct warning to the Taliban that if they did not comply, they would share the same fate as those mentioned. The Taliban refused to state that Bin Laden was their guest and that they could not hand him over to the US, with the statement that they did not see Bin Laden's involvement in 9/11. With a trembling state of affairs and barely managing to stand on its feet, the wrath of America marked the fall of the Taliban's government and the penurious fate of common civilians of Afghanistan in 2001.

War on terror

The US declared a war on terrorism and the first US military action was carried out on October 7, 2001 by airstrikes on Taliban targets and hideouts throughout the country. Having said that, the attacks carried out in Afghanistan by the US and allied NATO forces were not justified under the sphere of international law and their legality was questionable since the attacks of 9/11 were not executed by the State of Afghanistan (Ismail, 2017). The Taliban government could not withstand that intensity and ferocity of the US and vacated Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities and took shelter in remote areas. By November 13, 2001, the Taliban had evacuated Kabul, which US-backed Afghan forces soon recaptured, and Hamid Karzai was doctored as the caretaker of government and state for six months (Abrams, 2007). That was the first fall of Kabul in the 21st century by the US forces.

The Taliban were completely scattered, but by 2005 their forces had begun to regroup in southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. By 2009, they had expanded their presence in the north, reaching areas far from the south and east. Since there was internal conflict and low-intensity civil war between the Afghan government and the Taliban with no outcome, the Obama Administration came to assess that the internal conflict had no military solution and thus low-level negotiations with the Taliban, after the re-election of President Karzai, began in the start of 2010. However, the Taliban did not want to collaborate with the Afghan government as they considered them puppets and stooges inculcated by the US (Masadykov et al., 2010). Along with this, the Afghan government also opposed these negotiations as they were not a part of them and thus the negotiations were dissolved in 2014 with no outcome.

With the United States pulling its troops and other personnel out of Afghanistan on August 30, 2021, marking the end of a two-decade-long war in Afghanistan, the eruption of crisis and conflict was inevitable. The vacuum left for running the state pushed Afghanistan into the quagmire of power conflict which ultimately led to the eruption of numerous crises, massive internal displacements of people along monetary inflation, and humanitarian crisis (Essar et al., 2021).

In “The Logic of Political Survival,” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2005) has explained the theory of political survival under the lens of International Relations and global politics which enumerates the interrelation and correspondence between the available political survival strategies and the economic realities of a state. The forlorn fate of Afghanistan after the “endgame” finally came to an end and the absence of an authority to run the ransacked state create a desperate environment for the quest for power. And consistent with the logic of political survival, the Taliban seem to have chalked a strategy that wishes to retain the support of Pakistan without being overly dependent on Pakistan. The clearest indication of this trend is in the Taliban's attempts at diplomacy with India and other regional actors including Russia and China. The warmth with which aid from India was welcomed is a case in point.

The second fall of Kabul: An analysis of the re-emergence of Taliban rule

The second fall of Kabul happened on August 15, 2021, when the Taliban captured the city after the US forces left their bases overnight. The offensive actions of the Taliban created panic in the government of President Ashraf Ghani. Ghani fled Afghanistan and his government was overthrown and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, under the Taliban, was reinstated. Presently, Haibatullah Akhundzada holds the supreme power and the position of “Amir” followed by essential figures like Mohammad Hassan Akhund, acting as the Prime Minister, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led the negotiations with the US in Doha, Qatar, and was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Omar's son Mullah Yaqoob as the Defense Minister, Siraj Uddin Haqqani as the Interior Minister, and many more (International Crisis Group, 2021a, 2021b).

Undoubtedly, the coming of the Taliban into power will have severe impacts on its neighboring countries; Pakistan in particular both in terms of security and revival of religious extremism like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), sleeper cells, and the like. But that is not the epicenter of our discussion. With the Taliban taking hold of the bridles of the state, the imposition of sanctions and freezing of Afghan foreign assets, and the general unacceptability by the masses, there is a severe and unprecedented crisis in Afghanistan.

The aftermath of the Taliban takeover

The new Taliban government is desperately trying to convince the world and their own people that they do not advocate the same views they did in the 1990s but rather that their approach this time is moderate. They are trying to rebrand the image of their first government of 1996 to gather the sympathy and acceptance of the world. The Taliban are still accountable for what they did even though they have maintained a somewhat moderate attitude on issues like human rights, the rigorous application of Shariah, and other issues. This approach may be in the wake of the freezing of Afghan assets and the non-recognition of the Taliban government.

Not only their own people but the entire world are skeptical of the Taliban's links with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; Afghanistan may again prove to be a haven for terrorists. Furthermore, Pakistan has invested a lot, both in terms of capital and time. Regional countries like Russia, Pakistan, India, China, and Iran are likely to compete in the race to gain influence over Kabul to achieve their objectives by collaborating with the Taliban and other sub-national actors.

The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal is well documented. The country's economy was massively dependent on foreign aid. The stoppage of aid and the drain of resources due to a collapse of the governing machinery left the Afghan people at the mercy of a terrible winter and hunger. Most of the population, by most estimates, is susceptible to hunger.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: Under the pretext of the second fall in Afghanistan

Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for almost 40 years after the Cold War (1979), with currently more than 1.4 million registered refugees according to the UNHCR (Ghufran, 2011). Pakistan's current position is like a catch-22 situation where it is stuck between two contradictory options. Pakistan, in no capacity, can afford to host any more refugees given the economic stature of the country (Zehra & Usmani, 2021).

The second fall of Kabul poses a direct threat of an increase in internal as well as external instability, along with the obvious and certain displacement of people and mass migration towards neighboring countries, especially Pakistan. The eruption and increase in the humanitarian crisis is also inevitable and is likely to take a worse turn if not addressed as soon as possible (Zehra & Usmani, 2021).

In their first press conference after capturing Kabul, the Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid made an announcement in which he mentioned forming an inclusive government which represented Afghan ethnic minorities. Moreover, he also said that the rights of people would be guaranteed and respected and women would be allowed to pursue education and jobs. He also made the statement in an assurance to the international community that Afghan soil will not be used against any other state. However, time will prove whether these are just sugar-coated statements with the same erstwhile agenda or otherwise (Hamourtziadou, 2022).

According to a UN Women report, Afghan women constitute around 20% of the entire workforce in the country by contributing US$1 billion to the economy—roughly 5% of the total GDP. In the wake of the current crisis and conflict situation, Afghan women and girls have become more vulnerable to gender inequality risks. Families are also confining and restricting women to their homes for their protection and safety.

Though Pakistan has helped the Taliban in the past in numerous ways, that certainly does not indicate that Pakistan should not worry about the implications of the Taliban takeover on its social, religious, and political landscape. The worry remains like that of a nocturnal kangaroo looking out to protect themselves and their babies. The flight between Islamabad and Kabul has always been a turbulent one. Pakistan, right now, is deeply concerned about the instability in Afghanistan and the possible surge of refugees that it would give rise to and the majority of whose ultimate shelter will be Pakistan (Akıncı, 2022).

Re-Taliban takeover: An analysis of the crisis in Afghanistan

The Taliban are desperately trying to reach out to the world through diplomatic means to convince them to recognize their government. While they are making such efforts on one hand, concomitantly they are bluntly denying the fact that humanitarian crisis has created havoc in the country and that it is on the verge of collapse; the Taliban are doing nothing but deceiving themselves and their people.

“To abandon the Afghan people now would be a historic mistake—a mistake that has been made before with tragic consequences,” said Deborah Lyons, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (Leake, 2022).

These immense sufferings and disasters could not have been solved either by the Afghan puppet government with the suspension of foreign aid and assistance and neither does the Taliban have the potential to do so. Irrespective of the political conditions in Afghanistan right now, the international community must assist in lessening, if not ending, the social and financial sufferings of the people. Otherwise, history will repeat itself and the world will see a massive refugee crisis coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic and the environmental challenges that the world faces, and so we may be looking at a big disaster.

There is an extremely tense economic and social situation in Afghanistan. As per the reports of the World Bank, more than 75% of the total public funding was by foreign grants and aids; following the takeover of the Taliban, the said grants were suspended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which includes about US$440 million in new monetary reserves. International donors (states and NGOs, MNCs) after the Taliban's victory and control of the country have revoked and debarred non-humanitarian funding and frozen billions of dollars worth of assets, which contribute to as much as 40% of its GDP and 80% of budget spending. The concerns about the Taliban's links with terrorism, its human rights violations, and its failure to build an inclusive government have led the US and its Western allies to freeze more than US$9 billion in Afghanistan reserves overseas.

Along with civil disorder and power crisis in the state, there are other numerous crises, including a hunger crisis, a speedy rise in poverty, a collapsing of the healthcare infrastructure, unemployment, and the displacement of people. The world needs to address this or the consequences will be catastrophic.

With a population of around 39 million people whose dependence was utterly on foreign aid and assistance, the Taliban's coming into power resulted in sanctions, as mentioned earlier, and the suspension of the aid on which a major portion of the population was directly dependent. In the current situation, Afghanistan faces a severe hunger crisis with an anticipated drought that could take the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. It is an absolute shame and disgust that despite the US being involved in the long two-decade war it could not create the means for Afghanistan's economy to survive on its own.

Had Afghanistan's economic flaws been addressed earlier, the outcome of US withdrawal would not have been as we are witnessing now. Afghanistan is on the verge of collapse, and an unstable Afghanistan could prove dangerous not only for the region but for the world.

The country right now is hanging by a thread, and with no immediate response the world will witness one of the scariest times of the 21st century. There is no sense in leaving Afghanistan as it is right now; the only possible and sane solution is for the world to their help, of course with their concerns of security and peace addressed.

Hannah Neumann, a German member of the European Parliament, in an interview with DW, said that the West needs a balanced approach in dealing with the Taliban: “It shouldn’t be about we are either not going to talk to them or if we talk to them, we should recognize them. Whatever we choose to do, we must help common Afghans, especially women and children” (Shams, 2022). Moeed Yusuf, National Security Advisor to Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan, in clear words expressed that the Taliban are a reality that we cannot ignore and turn our eyes away from.

It is unquestionable that in these two decades the United States has strengthened numerous state systems vis-a-vis agriculture, education, sanitation, health, and the like in Afghanistan but has not provided any sustainable mode of survival. The US invested more than US$144 billion in Afghanistan for reconstruction and building their basic infrastructure, security forces, governance, social development, and fighting the menace of drugs. With the ongoing crisis, that structure is going to collapse.

Impacts on Pakistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan are direct neighbors, sharing a mutual border, the Durand line, of 2640 km. The countries share similarities in culture, religion, ethnicity, and geography but the relationship between the two has been not an easy one from the beginning (Sattar, 2020). After the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan was the only country that objected to Pakistan's entry into the United Nations.

Pakistan has always wished for stability in Afghanistan to achieve and maintain stability at home; the interests of the two countries are intermingled. Change in Afghanistan means a change in the region and an immediate impact on Pakistan.

Pakistan's decision to join the US-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan was a shortsighted one that significantly affected Pakistan in numerous ways by siding with the US. As Kissinger stated, “to be an enemy of America is dangerous, but to befriend is fatal” (Montano, 1999: 82).

Without stability in Afghanistan, striving towards the achievement of stability in Pakistan is merely an illusion and a hoax; trying to deceive ourselves. If Pakistan needs to stabilize itself, the stability of Afghanistan is a prerequisite for it. The international community, regional countries, and Pakistan right now should help out Afghanistan to come out of this crisis or the consequences will be grave for Pakistan. Pakistan suffered in the past, and cannot afford any more suffering right now. It lost more than 75,000 people across the country ,with material loss estimated at about US$123 billion (Sattar, 2020).

In this region, Pakistan has been severely affected by the previous and ongoing conflict and crisis in Afghanistan. For the past half-century, the conflict in Afghanistan has directly contributed to the devastation of its economical, social, and state structure while indirectly impacting the same in Pakistan. Afghanistan is an ethnically and regionally diverse country, all having different interests, with no means of sustaining its economy; the main figures often seek financial help from foreign sources. These involvements of the foreign sources and great powers have led both the leaders and the common people of Afghanistan into an enigmatic corner where they are unable to decide on the common interests of their country and Pakistan.

The Taliban's victory in taking control of the country is a strategic victory for Pakistan but the cost paid for this victory is huge, with anticipated looming dark clouds ahead. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan will have impacts on the security, economic, social, political, religious, and environmental landscape of Pakistan since two provinces of Pakistan, namely Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, are bordered with Afghanistan (Khan and Syed, 2021).

Spillover

Pakistan is still suffering from the massive spillover of refugees that occurred during the Afghan war pre and post 9/11. The mass migration not only resulted in the sensitivity of internal and external security of Pakistan but also led to other various issues that would be discussed in Pakistani society. Though UNHCR and other international donors were involved in addressing the spillover in Pakistan, the implications faced by Pakistan society were detrimental and fatal.

Following the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, according to a report published by the UNHCR, as of now 3.5 million Afghans are internally displaced. The UN has called on its member states to help Afghan people in “their darkest hour of need,” but while some countries have offered refugees a haven, others have indicated they will not be giving sanctuary to those fleeing the crisis. Both Pakistan and Iran have said that they cannot cope with a further influx of Afghan refugees. Officials in both countries have said that any refugees that do arrive will have to stay in camps near the border until they can return to Afghanistan.

Pakistan worries about the arrival of militants in this spillover which will revive the dark chapters of the devastations meted out by the TTP, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other militant groups in the first decade of the 21st century. In the wake of this, Pakistan closed its border earlier right after the Taliban takeover but, after a brief closure, the border was reopened for trade and assisting medical emergencies. Islamabad is doing all it can to help Afghanistan in this dire time, partly for its stability and unreservedly for its interests.

Security: Terrorism and extremism

Pakistan has long suffered from terrorism, with over 80,000 lives lost and an estimated economic cost of over US$100 billion during 2001–2021 (Ali, 2010). The sacrifices made during these two decades in the war against terrorism, to which it was not even a direct party, resulted in a decrease in terrorist activities in Pakistan. But the risk of those terrorist activities coming back has made Pakistan skeptical as the Taliban have links with terrorist organizations that were previously active in Pakistan (Sheng, 2021).

Pakistan witnessed a 42% increase in terrorist attacks in 2021 compared to the previous year, according to the Islamabad-based Pak Institute of Peace Studies, with a significant surge after Kabul fell. The report noted that the fall of Kabul had started adversely influencing the country's militant landscape and security, and the change in Afghanistan is “not helping in any way Pakistan's efforts to deal with the militant groups threatening its security” (Sial, 2007: 17).

As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan is ethnically and sect-wise diverse, and the possible escalation of sectarian violence in and beyond Afghanistan, in Pakistan, will be a nightmare for both. The Hazara Shias have been targeted in sectarian violence in the past, which greatly shook Pakistan and gave rise to hatred amongst the Sunnis and Shias. The infiltration of militants and other non-state actors that intend to destabilize Pakistan, after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, poses a real threat to the security and internal stability of Pakistan (Malik, 2022).

Some accounts also indicate that the TTP helped the Afghan Taliban in the takeover and also that TTP members poisoned in jails across Afghanistan were released. TTP is an anti-Pakistan terrorist group that aims at weakening the economic and geopolitical interests of Pakistan. With China's massive project the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is at a greater risk of insecurity and terrorism than ever before (Faheem et al., 2022).

Economic implications

With the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and its economic isolation by the international community, the new government is proving to be a burden rather than an asset for Pakistan. The increasing economic instability in Afghanistan will compel the devastated and war-stricken people to take shelter in Pakistan (Kosar, 2021).

As of now, the main concern of Pakistan is Chinese investment through CPEC. In July 2021, a deadly July bomb was set off by the Pakistani Taliban on Chinese nationals working on a hydropower project under CPEC, in which 13 people died. In recent months, the Pakistani Taliban has ramped up violence against both political opponents and Pakistani security forces, while also targeting Chinese interests in Pakistan (Baqai & Wasi, 2021).

In past, after the arrival of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, a gap was created between local citizens and refugees over resources. This created a burden on the domestic economic landscape of the two provinces where most of the refugees took shelter; KP and Balochistan. Though refugees may prove beneficial in some cases, the poor class whose dependence is mainly on monthly income or daily wages consider the arrival of refugees as a violation of their rights. Refugees work as cheap labor from which the market makes a profit but the wages of the local workers are seriously affected (Jadoon, 2021).

There are also economic concerns that most Afghan traders have their business in different cities of Pakistan but do not pay taxes. For instance, in Peshawar alone, these traders became billionaires but still acquitted themselves from paying taxes. Such things created a burden for local taxpayers and businesspeople and the growth of revenue collection is also badly affected.

As harsh as it may sound, the fact is that after the fall of Kabul when the Taliban took over, the country saw a grave crisis and because of the lack of economic activities in Afghanistan and to meet the country's requirement for consumer items, especially food and fuel, Pakistan had to ensure it contributed to and supported the continuous supply of the said consumable products to avoid a humanitarian crisis. This has, in turn, afflicted tremendous pressure on the foreign exchange of Pakistan and has led to the devaluation of the Pakistan currency, the rupee. It has also cast a shadow on Pakistan's current account. This is because Pakistan cannot afford the collapse of the Afghan government and a surge in the crisis and eruption of civil war which will have a devastating impact on the region and specifically on Pakistan (Drossart, 2021).

Social impacts

The social and cultural landscape of Pakistan, particularly that of KP, was not so narrow-minded as it became after the influx of refugees post 9/11. The seeds of cultural violence were inculcated and the ethnic-nationalist agenda was promoted and glorified in Pakistan. Furthermore, another bifurcation was created which was a split between the Sunnis and Shias; resultantly it became a national issue for the security and integrity of Pakistan. Proxy wars and attacks were carried out by the TTP and other such organizations against the Shias. Not only did sectarianism flourish but also the strict adherence of Pashtoons to their code of conduct, “Pashtoonwali,” was presented in a negative lens that it carries hatred for other ethnicities of Pakistan; it created a further rift between the Pashtoons and the Punjabis.

The Taliban also declared female education in liberal values as an un-Islamic act. They favored Madrassa's schools against the western type of education (Malik et al., 2019).

At times, the interests of refugees and those of the local population clash; in such cases, the locals change their stance, for the sake of their interests, against refugees, as happened in KP. Local citizens in KP initially welcomed Afghan refugees with open arms due to their belonging to the same ethnicity i.e. Pashtun (Marsden, 1992). But when the interests of local citizens clashed with Afghan refugees and they felt that refugees were one of the major causes of instability in the province, the people were compelled to change their narrative and thus the KP government decided to send refugees back to their native state due to their involvement in anti-state activities (Roehrs, 2015).

The credit of introducing the Kalashnikov culture to Pakistani society goes to the Afghan refugees. This resulted in the surge in crime rates and ethno-nationalist clashes between the people of Pakistan. Furthermore, the menace of smuggling, drug, and human trafficking, coupled with terrorist organizations in the region taking advantage of children working as labor in the streets by using them as facilitators and brainwashing them for suicide bombing, has worsened the social and cultural fabric of Pakistan (Margesson, 2007).

According to a research report on the use and smuggling of drugs conducted by the Interior Ministry, Government of Pakistan in collaboration with the Ministry of Narcotics, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the highest rates of opiate users and smugglers in Pakistan are in the province of Balochistan and KP. Both the provinces are a hub of Afghan refugees and these refugees are mostly involved in the drugs trade and create many social problems for the host state (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013).

Impact on the political landscape

According to Gil Loescher, a professor at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, “Too often refugees are perceived as a matter of international Charity organizations and not as political and security problem yet refugees are in fact intensely political. The presence of refugees accelerates existing internal conflicts in the host countries” (Kirui and Mwaruie, 2012: 162).

If the crises in Afghanistan are not addressed at the earliest possible time, the spillover of refugees will pose a threat to the political landscape of Pakistan like that in past. As of now, with Taliban's coming into power, Pakistan's biggest gain and strategic advantage is that India will lose its influence in Afghanistan, which was seen as a threat to Pakistan's security (Gul et al., 2021). The Taliban takeover also allows Pakistan to boost its bilateral trade with Afghanistan and provides an unrestricted trade route to the countries of Central Asia. But if it happens otherwise, another wave of mass migration will be triggered in Afghanistan and Pakistan will fall under that wave, which will result in domestic terrorism, political and economic instability, and the collapse of the social structure (Verma, 2021).

Pakistan support for the Taliban has almost ruined its relations with the US. President Joe Biden did not even call Prime Minister Imran Khan after gaining his presidential office. In a policy exchange seminar, Lt Gen McMaster, a former US National Security advisor, suggested that the US should stop treating Pakistan as a pariah state if it refuses to support the Taliban, that Pakistan is not a partner anymore and is behaving like an enemy by training and organizing extremist groups and using them as an arm for its foreign policy (Afzal, 2021).

Religious implications

In the first term of the Taliban in 1996, Pakistan witnessed an unexpected rise in religious extremism. Pakistan's military establishment and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were backing the Islamist regime in Afghanistan at that time, and religious extremism was a direct and certain outcome of Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan. Both countries and their populations share religious, tribal, and cultural bonds.

Maulana Sami ul Haq, considered the father of Taliban in Pakistan, claimed to have produced the most Taliban cadres from his madrasah at Akora Khattak, Nowshera, Dar-Ul-Uloom Haqqania. This organized group was the ideologue of Jihadis and demanded Afghan Taliban-type rule in Pakistan (Husain, 2018). Dar-Ul-Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak is often regarded as the “University of the Taliban/Jihad.”

The refugee surge, in the beginning, relocated the menace of extremism from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Along with that, the emergence of religious right-wing parties further escalated political instability and gave rise to radicalism in Pakistan. Different hardcore parties like Harkat-Ul-Mujahedeen, Harkat-Ul-Jihad-e-Islam, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Hizbe-Mujahedeen, and Harkat-ul-Insar were keenly active in Pakistan. They also had a large role in mounting terrorism in Pakistan (Aslam et al., 2020).

In the past, Madrassa students across Pakistan and from Akora Madrassa who took part in the Taliban fight against the Soviets and with the US before and after 9/11 in Afghanistan on their return to Pakistan wanted a similar movement like the Taliban to bring an Islamic/Taliban form of government to Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2003).

Moreover, the spread of the Madrassa network also had socio-economic impacts as the Pakistan government had not provided its due heed to modern education and on the improvement of the socio-economic sector; therefore, poverty and population growth also contributed to the Madrassa education and Talibanization.

Recommendations/conclusion

The Durand Line, Pakistan's longest border with Afghanistan, runs from the Wakhan Corridor in the northeast to the junction of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan near the Iranian city of Zahedan in the southwest. Pakistan needs a stable government in Afghanistan to achieve its strategic objectives for the operationalization of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) through the Wakhan strip of Afghanistan which will connect Pakistan with Central Asian countries like Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and others. This will be a win-win situation for all the stakeholders involved and particularly for the geo-economic interests of Pakistan, so keeping Afghanistan stable is a must. Unfortunately, if this does not happen soon this victory of Pakistan’s will merely be a pyrrhic one.

Keeping in view the billion-dollar projects like CPEC and BRI, Pakistan's stakes are high. It is in no position to afford a security blow to its projects. The arrival of the Taliban into power in Afghanistan will, according to some Pakistani analysts, help in achieving some of the strategic interests of Pakistan, like controlling and curbing the involvement of Indian non-state actors in destabilizing the Balochistan province of Pakistan by funding and providing arms to the liberation movements. From a Pakistani perspective, the previous governments in Afghanistan were more inclined towards India which contributed to weakening Pakistan by supporting Baloch insurgents, the TTP, and other terrorist organizations.

Beijing and Islamabad have been discussing this bilaterally and have communicated their concerns to the Taliban. As various terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan threaten CPEC and peace and security in Pakistan, the stakes for Pakistan are higher than ever before and it will continue to push the Taliban to show results by acting against various terrorist groups.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Muhammad Fahim Khan

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