Abstract
Over the last few years, desistance research has gained importance as an alternative to the risk-based âwhat worksâ approach. When significant proponents speak of a new desistance-paradigm arising, it has to be borne in mind that their analyses focus mainly on the practice of probation in the UK where dramatic restructuring and cost-cutting were implemented under the âwhat worksâ label. This paper presents the results of a research project investigating the implementation of a cognitive behavioural programme in probation in Austria. This programme, developed on the basis of âwhat worksâ and Risk-Need-Responsivity ("RNR")-principles, is assessed from a desistance perspective. Probationers themselves reflect on what helped them to âgo straightâ and what role the programme played in the desistance process. It is shown that the âwhat worksâ- and the desistance-perspective may complement each other under specific circumstances, even if certain conceptual differences remain.
Keywords
Introduction
The Austrian probation service is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation. In the post-war period and the golden age of the conservative-corporatist model of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), probation in Austria was based on psychoanalytic concepts and focused primarily on the relationship between the probationer and their probation officer, allowing freedom in the choice of methods and approaches. At the same time, the social needs of the probationers were a fundamental concern, and social reintegration was deemed one of the main goals of probation work. As the causes of crime were seen primarily in social circumstances, one expected that, if these circumstances changed, the offender would change as well. Although the legally defined aim of probation, âto prevent the offender from committing further crimesâ (§ 50 Austrian Criminal Code) has not changed since then, the focus in these early days was less on the crimes committed or on recidivism but on generally improving the social situation of the offender that was usually quite precarious. The controlling and disciplining aspects of probation were not denied but they were framed as an obligation imposed from outside and were perceived as conflicting with the self-concept of solidary help and advocacy for the excluded (Scherr, 2014: 266).
Unlike Great Britain, where probation services had already implemented âwhat worksâ programmes in the 1990s, such developments are relatively new in Austria. Only since 2014 have all probationers had to undergo a cognitive behavioural programme with a focus on their criminal offence and their risk of reoffending. Moreover, a structured risk assessment was implemented just recently. Unlike the previously practiced probation work that was quite unstructured, individualised and orientated on the needs of the offender, the newly introduced programme focuses on criminogenic attitudes and behaviours and thus fundamentally changes the perspective: All probation interventions shall now be guided by the aim of reducing the risk of recidivism (Mayer, 2015; Mayer et al., 2007: 38). The use of these new standardised and structured instruments is intended to foster the professionalisation of probation and to reduce reoffending.
The new programme and the research project
This article is based on a research project conducted by the author exploring the innovations in Austrian probation with a special focus on the introduction of the cognitive-behavioural programme. The study focused on the perspective of the probationers and intended to depict âhow and why people stop offendingâ (McNeill et al., 2012). In accordance with desistance research, which is usually qualitative, the project was based on extensive, problem-centred interviews with 32 probationers. 1 The interviews were complemented by conversations with the probation officers and by information from the files of the probation service. Based on these data, a typology of probationers was created, focusing on their differing perceptions of the effects of the programme on their desistance process (see below). The article not only summarises the different perspectives of the interviewed offenders on the cognitive behavioural programme but also addresses a more fundamental question: Do the results of this study support the assumption of a paradigmatic difference between âwhat worksâ and desistance as postulated, for example, by Fergus McNeill (2006)? The analysis shows that both perspectives may â under certain circumstances â harmonise quite well, although some conceptual differences remain.
The newly introduced cognitive-behavioural programme has its roots in the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) principles. 2 The programme focuses on a re-evaluation of the crime(s) committed. Compared with the âoldâ model of probation described above, it is structured, standardised and targeted. The actual practice of probation, however, is not only determined by the implemented programme and its delivery, but also shaped by the professional backgrounds of those who deliver it, by the organisational conditions of the probation service as such, and by the diversity of the clients who are to be âtreatedâ. As the research project followed a desistance approach, the cognitive programme was not evaluated with regard to its statistical risk-reducing effect. Rather, the intention was to understand the programmeâs outcome and impact from the perspective of the offenders. Different from quantitative evaluation research, in which context factors are statistically controlled for, the study explicitly looks at the personal experiences and the specific context: For whom, under which conditions, and how may this cognitive-behavioural programme support desistance from crime?
How does the programme work? A typology
In the empirical data, four ways that the probationers perceived and judged the cognitive-behavioural programme and its effects on their desistance process were found.
The enthusiasts
The first group consists of nine offenders who were enthusiastic and profound âfansâ of the programme. Interestingly, this group of probationers did not have much in common in the first place. They had different social backgrounds and committed very different crimes, from assault to robbery to the abuse of minors. It is important to stress that the positive change processes they underwent were not predictable at the beginning of the probation period as they were not considered âeasyâ, compliant probationers. In contrary, some of them were in deep trouble at the beginning, struggling with drug addiction and/or reintegration after release from prison. Still, all of them reported to have experienced a profound change process that was triggered or profoundly supported by the cognitive-behavioural programme. None of them reoffended while on probation.
Despite their socio-demographic and other differences, the programme seemed to perfectly resonate with their attempts to âgo straightâ. What these enthusiasts have in common is not only a certain openness to reflect on their past but also the way the programme was delivered to them. Their probation officers did not focus exclusively on past offences and the risk of recidivism. Rather, they all built strong relationships with their probationers and were able to help them to develop a future-orientated perspective. The cognitive-behavioural programme allowed these clients to âprocessâ their past offence(s), to reflect its causes and consequences. As became clear in the analysis of the interviews the probationers did not feel âreduced to the riskâ they might pose. On the contrary, they appreciated how they were guided through an individualised, sometimes painful, and in-depth process that affected their inner self, their cognitions and their behaviour.
In contrast to the specialist practice and the fragmentation of supervision of the British probation service (see e.g. Robinson, 2005), Austrian probation still allows for long-lasting working relations that even continue after relapses and periods of incarceration. Hence, the analysis of the cases and their context shows that a cognitive-behavioural programme can be very successful in supporting the desistance process when it is delivered by experienced, professional probation officers who have the organisational resources to treat each case individually and to follow a holistic approach.
In some cases, the change process was triggered by events and circumstances that were not related to probation; for example, becoming a father. Still, the new situation (such as fatherhood or a new loving partner) alone was not enough to change the probationersâ behaviour. Rather, it was only after the completion of the programme that the interviewees were able to see these circumstances as âhooks for changeâ (Giordano et al., 2002).
I have kids, but in the beginning I did not care. But after [the completion of the programme] I realised that I had kids, that I missed them and that it was time to take over responsibility, time to change. That everything must change now.
As McNeill (2006: 47) pointed out: âIt is not just the events and changes that matter; it is what these events and changes mean to the people involved.â And these meanings can be influenced successfully by professional probation practice using intelligently designed tools and programmes within the right context. At the same time, focusing on human capital only will not be enough â probation also needs to work on developing social capital, opportunities to apply these skills, or to practice newly forming identities (Farrall, 2002; McNeill et al., 2012: 9).
The compliant probationers
This group of eight probationers completed the cognitive-behavioural programme successfully and approved it. Still, the programme did not initiate or support a change process the way it did in the first group. Again, the background of these probationers was very different and the crimes that they had been incarcerated and/or set on probation for varied from murder to fraud to the possession of child pornography. Not all of these probationers felt as close to their probation officers as they did in the group described above.
The programme was seen to be an interesting tool, structuring the probation sessions, helping to sort out the disordered past, and leaving problematic events behind. Still, those who described a change process did not locate its starting point in the programme or any other probation intervention. Rather, developments independent of any criminal justice intervention led to a change in behaviour, such as severe health problems, changing routine activities (a new workplace), or significant social bonds, e.g. a new partner (âthe first time in my life that I liked to be at homeâ). The programme supported these positive developments. âIn the beginning I felt like I am obliged to complete the programme. [âŠ] After some time, I realised it did me good. [âŠ] I realised that this piece of the puzzle had still been missing.â
The sceptics
A group of the same size was sceptical about the cognitive behavioural programme as such. These eight probationers criticised the programme, its content and its structure. They opposed the confrontation with their criminal past and judged the tool âunnecessaryâ and âbackward-lookingâ. All these probationers had been in prison and were mainly motivated by the goal not to be imprisoned again, assessing their own recidivism risk as being very low. Some assured that they needed no help and supervision at all. For them, âgoing straightâ was just a matter of strong will. Interestingly, the probation officers judged the use of the programme in these cases much more positively because it helped to structure the probation sessions. Furthermore, it allowed them to continuously and straightforwardly address and challenge the neutralisation techniques of their clients.
The deceivers
A small group of four young probationers agreed to take part in the study obediently. They also seemed to be compliant probationers but what they said and what they did was inconsistent. Although they all assured to be law-abiding citizens at the time, they all reoffended during probation. Their sole motivation to âstay straightâ was to avoid aggravated sentencing. The programme was not able to change their patterns of thinking and behaviour, and their participation in the programme was superficial and shallow. These young men will need more than a cognitive behavioural programme to âgo straightâ, from maturation (Glueck and Glueck, 1937) to changing routine activities and social bonds (Laub and Sampson, 2001). Besides, all the probation officers in this group were quite young and just recently employed, and therefore not yet as experienced as their older colleagues.
Mission impossible? A desistance-oriented âwhat worksâ-practice
The popularity of desistance research not least stems from its innovative and legitimate critique of the âwhat worksâ-practice in the UK and other Anglo-Saxon countries. While key researchers in the field used to see a paradigmatic difference between the two approaches (McNeill, 2006), recent accounts emphasise their commonalities and speak of a complementary relationship between the desistance and âwhat worksâ approach (Maruna, 2015: 314). 3 In the following section, the recommendations for a desistance-orientated practice (see McNeill et al., 2012: 8 et seq.) will be contrasted with the Austrian situation, where the âwhat worksâ-principles are currently being implemented. Can the practice of probation in Austria be an example of such a complementary, enriching relationship?
Desistance as a challenging process
For someone who has been involved in persistent offending, desistance is a difficult and complex process that has to be given time and support. Probation should have realistic expectations and deal constructively with setbacks and relapses (McNeill et al., 2012: 8). This requires a holistic approach and enough resources to give the change process the time it needs.
Researchers have stated with regard to the British offender management that the preconditions for a holistic and long-term support by probation are barely met, describing âthe emergence of a trend toward a fragmented style of offender management, whereby staff increasingly occupy specialist roles, and offenders encounter a variety of staff in the course of supervisionâ (Robinson, 2005: 307).
In contrast to the UK, an Austrian probation officer is responsible for his or her client during the whole probation period, which usually lasts several years. They are responsible for all tasks and also deliver the cognitive-behavioural programme. Ups and downs as well as relapses are part of these long-term relations. Within this framework, the newly implemented cognitive-behavioural programme is just one piece of a much broader approach. The cognitive-behavioural programme does not have to be started immediately but the probation officer is given six months within which to start it. The programme can be suspended until basic needs of the probationer are addressed and their livelihood is secured. There is no prescribed period within which to finish the programme.
In the interviews conducted, probationers as well as their probation officers described setbacks and relapses as possible starting points for change if dealt with constructively. Even if some of the interviewed probation officers criticised that time pressure and workload had increased recently and that the high expectations of the management regarding the new methods put them under pressure, the overall conditions seem to give the probationers the time they need and allow for a desistance process to evolve according to its inner logic.
Still, the crucial questions of how to deal with clients who cannot be reached with the new, âactivatingâ methods and what happens to those who do not take on responsibility and refuse âresponsibilizationâ (Kemshall, 2002; Rose, 1996) remain. The probation service will not only be judged by its successful cases, but also by how it deals with those who are not able or not willing to be reflective and responsible managers of their own reoffending risk.
Standardisation versus individualisation
McNeill et al. (2012: 8) have pointed out that desistance is an inherently individualised and subjective process that also involves issues of identity and diversity. One-size-fits-all interventions will not work. The cognitive-behavioural programme used in Austria is a structured but not uniform programme for the prevention of reoffending. The creator of the programme explicitly calls for individual adaption to each specific client (Mayer, 2015: 155). Following the RNR approach, however, does not imply full freedom of methods but only allows for the adaption of the prescribed programme to the learning style, motivation, abilities and strengths of the offenders in order to raise their responsivity (Bonta and Andrews, 2007).
Austrian probation seeks to professionalise by introducing evidence-based methods, that is, âwhat worksâ principles in probation. Many probationer officers, especially the young ones, welcome the new guideline âfrom aboveâ stating how to address the offence, its causes and its consequences, and how to work on the reduction of the reoffending risk. At the same time, the introduction of this new cognitive-behavioural programme, together with other standardised instruments (such as a risk-assessment tool), restrict the previously existing freedom in the choice of methods. Now, all probation officers have to work within a cognitive-behavioural concept, whether they like it or not. Research on the profession of social work has shown that the introduction of evidence-based manuals and guidelines bears the danger of having de-professionalising effects. Especially when the restrictions are too rigorous and the manuals are too simplistic, it may not leave enough freedom to the professional judgement of the individual case and may therefore unduly restrict situational discretion. The relation between standardisation and (de-)professionalisation may at least be ambivalent and may sometimes have paradoxical effects (Mayrhofer and Pilgram, 2014: 259; Robinson, 2001: 245). It leads to an extension of the repertoire of methods and restriction in the freedom of methods; it leads to increased requirements due to the mandatory application of a new instrument. But the instrument also has a supportive function, especially for young professionals.
Motivation and hope, strengths and resources
Research has shown that emotional aspects such as motivation and hope play an important role in the desistance process (Burnett and Maruna, 2004; Farrall and Calverley, 2006 cited by McNeill et al., 2012: 9; Maruna, 2001). So, does the introduction of the cognitive-behavioural programme impede such positive emotions by focusing too rigorously on past offences and future risks?
The analysis of the cases shows that, despite the introduction of a risk-orientated programme, there is still room for the strengths and resources of the probationers to be discovered and empowered. Only very few interviewees criticised the programme for focusing too much on the past. Yet, in most of the cases it was possible to establish a connection between the critical assessment of past mistakes and future-orientated, positive life goals. The majority of the probationers felt well-supported. For them the probation officer was a person who believed in them in a situation when others had turned away from them: The probation officer always said to me: âYou are not that kind of person that you pretend to be. There is another guy behind this.â He tried to motivate me again and again. [âŠ] and this was very important for me, this motivation, this support that I can make it, that he believed in me. This meant very, very much to me.
This probationer also said that he had never been supported this way by his family or friends. Maruna and LeBel (2010: 75) point out the fact that successfully changing oneâs messed-up life requires a tremendous amount of self-belief, and this is made highly difficult, if not impossible, when those around you believe you will fail. Therefore, a person who supports and believes in you is of utmost importance during this process. This case also shows that motivation is not a static factor but is subject to change over time and in relation to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, as stated by Rowe and Soppitt (2014: 409) who stress the dynamic nature of motivation. This probationer was not ready to complete the programme at the beginning of the probation period. It was only after a very severe drug relapse that he was motivated to start the programme again and to finish it successfully.
De-labeling rituals
It is well known that the stigmatising rituals of the criminal justice system have negative effects on the offenderâs identity and foster secondary deviance (Lemert, 1951). Therefore, Maruna et al. (2004) call for de-labelling rituals to strengthen and support the positive effects of reintegration measures. They propose âofficialâ recognition of positive developments and a kind of certification for the progresses made to foster secondary desistance: [A]n additional, under-researched aspect of maintaining successful desistance from crime might involve the negotiation of a reformed identity through a process of prosocial labeling. Without some concrete recognition of their reform (i.e. some âcertificationâ), many ex-offenders might not be able to maintain the difficult process of ârecoveryâ and desistance. (Maruna et al., 2004: 279)
The cognitive-behavioural programme employed in Austrian probation can be completed in a kind of workbook. For some of the probationers, the completion of this workbook was an important ritual, enabling them to close a chapter and turn a new page â setting them free from past mistakes and allowing them to focus on the future. Another certification of the progress may be the premature termination of the probation period because of good conduct that is often granted after the completion of the programme. Interviewees described that they were âhappy like a childâ when they were told that their progress was recognised by the court and led to an early end to their probation period.
Significance of the working relationship
McNeill et al. (2012: 9) postulate that desistance can only be understood within the context of human relationships, pointing out that it is not just about the relationship between worker and offender but also between offenders and those who matter to them (Burnett and McNeill, 2005; McNeill, 2006). From the proponents of the cognitive behavioural programme that has been implemented in Austria, the importance of the relationship between therapist and client is seen as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of probation (Mayer, 2010: 161).
The analysis of the interviews shows that the programme was most successful when there was a deep and stable relationship between the probation officer and the probationer. The crucial meaning of this relationship becomes obvious when the desistance process is understood as a process that requires a narrative reconstruction of identity: Who would risk engaging in such a precarious and threatening venture without the reassurance of sustained and compassionate support from a trusted source, McNeill and Maruna (2008: 229) ask rightly. One interviewee recalls: âWe went very deep inside, so that it actually was really painful. But we continued to go deeper and he (the probation officer) knew exactly how to deal with it.â The desistance approach encourages the preservation of the importance of the working relationship as one of the main strengths of the âoldâ Austrian probation system.
Focus on risk or on rehabilitation?
One of the main points of criticism concerning cognitive behavioural programmes in probation is their focus on the offenderâs risk instead of social integration and rehabilitation (see e.g. Lindenau and Meier Kressig, 2015: 87). Moreover, Farrall (2002) criticises the focus of cognitive behavioural programmes on building human capital while neglecting the role of social capital. And indeed, the proponents of the RNR Model initially postulated that only so called âcriminogenic needsâ â that is, needs related to reoffending â should be targeted in treatment, while addressing needs that were not directly linked to the risk of reoffending may even be counterproductive (Bonta and Andrews, 2007: 11), thereby downgrading social integration as an objective in itself. After criticism, inter alia, from proponents of the GLM approach (Ward et al., 2007), their position is not as strict anymore (Andrews et al., 2011: 746). Still, the focus of these programmes is, without doubt, on reoffending, targeting primarily the improvement of human capital and not of social relations â and even less of social structure in which an individual must compete and survive, find a job and make a living.
Until recently, the social needs of the probationers were of fundamental concern and social reintegration was deemed one of the main goals of Austrian probation work. So how does the implementation of a cognitive behavioural programme change the practice of Austrian probation and its focus on rehabilitation and social integration? The interviews suggest that support for social integration and for building social capital is still one of the priorities in Austrian probation. When a client has serious financial problems or is homeless, the programme is suspended until the living conditions have improved. Despite the new tool the probation officers still address social relations and understand social integration as one of their main tasks. One priority does not preclude the other, most of the interviewees said, although of course both tasks compete for the scarce time and attention available.
Austrian probation must certainly be vigilant not to lose its important focus on social issues. There is a danger that probation targets only those needs that can be addressed by the programmes available, that is, focusing on behaviours and thinking patterns and not on problems arising from social circumstances (Kemshall, 2003: 71).
What is considered a legitimate risk must not be defined by the programmes available, reducing all causes of crime and criminalisation to a cognitive issue of the individual.
Manageable criminogenic problems are those that can be resolved through behavioural or lifestyle changes that are seen as achievable with a positive attitude and being amenable to normalizing interventions, programs, or therapists who provide tools for change and teach offenders to think rationally and logically. Structural barriers conveniently disappear. Systemic problems become individual problems or, more aptly, individualsâ inadequacies. (Hannah-Moffat, 2005: 43)
Client-centred to target-orientated probation?
The reflections set out above show that Austrian probation practice takes into account many recommendations set out by the desistance approach and that the implementation of âwhat worksâ elements seems to be compatible with its old values and principles in many ways. Still, there seems to be a conceptional basic difference between the two approaches: Who is steering the process? Proponents of the desistance approach postulate that probation should be guided by the probationers and primarily support naturally occurring processes.
The desistance paradigm suggests that we might be better off if we allowed offenders to guide us instead, listened to what they think might best fit their individual struggles out of crime, rather than continue to insist that our solutions are their salvation. (Porporino, 2010: 80, cited in Maruna, 2015: 326)
This statement is in clear contrast to the principles of risk-orientated probation as proposed by, for example, Mayer (2014), who is advocating âsteering by expertsâ. While the âoldâ probation practice was âoffender-orientatedâ â that is, guided by the needs of the offender â Mayer (2014: 43) suggests probation officers to be guided by expert knowledge and work âtarget-orientatedâ instead.
The interviews with the probation officers show that this envisaged change from offender-orientated to target-orientated practice is quite complex and difficult. The new role as an expert with a clear picture of the case, actively steering the process, is fundamentally different from the old, client-centred model of â simply put â emphatically and reactively resonating with whatever the client brings to the probation session.
When McNeill et al. (2012: 9) suggest that probation should be working with offenders not on them, they recall the importance of agency in the desistance process. The interviews from the study suggest that the use of a standardised instrument may, under the right circumstances, leave enough room for the integration of the offenderâs perspective and their agency. What is needed though are professional probation officers who are able to use the tool as a supplement to traditional casework skills. If such programmes and techniques are implemented under conditions of increasing resource and manpower constraints in probation leading to a deskilling of practitioners, then they will be badly implemented (Fitzgibbon, 2007: 95). Whether Austrian probation offers more than a one-size-fits-all programme, neglecting the needs and strengths as well as the agency of the probationers instead of building on them, does not only depend on the programme itself but also on the context in which such a programme is being delivered.
Conclusion
This article examines the relation between the desistance and the âwhat worksâ approach and questions the assumption that they constitute two different paradigms. Based on a research project on the implementation of a cognitive behavioural programme in Austrian probation, it is suggested that the asserted paradigmatic difference mainly stems from the analyses of the practice of probation in the UK, where dramatic restructuring and cost-cutting have been implemented under the âwhat worksâ label. In Austria, however, the probation services still follow a holistic approach and allow its social workers a reasonable degree of professional discretion even if new âwhat worksâ tools are being implemented.
Until now, Austrian probation was not facing the same challenges as probation services in the UK, even if recent governmental cost cutting plans threaten its high standards. Therefore, desistance research can be read as a warning. We can learn from desistance research what might get lost if we rely too heavily on standardised instruments. Programmes should never substitute professionalism and situational discretion, both of which are needed to treat each case individually and adequately. Moreover, services should not be split up in a multitude of service professionals with very specialised roles and low general expertise because the long-term relationship between probationer and social worker can be seen as a main precondition for supporting desistance. Under the circumstances outlined above â such as professional discretion, holistic approach, priority of securing livelihood, and so forth â cognitive behavioural programmes may be a reasonable complementary tool triggering or supporting desistance from crime in probation.
Desistance research suggests, though, that it will not be sufficient to change cognitive âcriminogenicâ thinking patterns and behaviour. Probation should therefore always address social relations and social integration as one of its main priorities. Desistance research importantly reminds us that, in spite of the standardised elements of such a programme, it is necessary to leave enough room for the inner logic of the desistance process to evolve. Furthermore, not all clients can be expected to become âexperts on their recidivism risk and its managementâ (Mayer et al., 2007: 43, my translation). It remains a crucial question how probation deals with those clients who refuse "responsibilisation" and who cannot be reached with the new âactivatingâ methods.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research received funding from the Austrian probation service. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Notes
Author biography
[Email:
