Learning From the United States?: Policy Transfer and the Development of Chinese Higher Education Since 1978

Reform of undergraduate education: General education, the credit system, and undergraduate scientific research

In the late 1970s, China began sending university lecturers to the United States and other Western countries. At the time, such groups were known as visiting scholars. Most visiting scholars returned to China and attempted to employ the teaching methods that they had learned in Western countries to reform Chinese university teaching (Shoresman, 1998). In addition to visiting scholars, numerous students were sent overseas to study, many obtaining their PhDs in the United States and returning to China. Although these scholars hoped to import foreign university teaching methods to China, they were not overly successful (Interview with a sociology professor, April 2018).

A feature of U.S. higher education is the importance it attaches to general education at the undergraduate level (Baker, 1947; Calhoun, 2000). After 1949, Chinese universities implemented a Soviet-style professional education system. In 1953, the Deputy Minister of Higher Education criticized the idea of general education in the United States (Zeng, 1953). However, following the initiation of its reform and opening-up policy, China gradually referenced the reforms and practices of the U.S. model of general education through various channels, including Chinese-U.S. scholars and study abroad programs. In 1978, Chen Ning Yang, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics, gave a lecture on university education at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) during which he mentioned the relationship between breadth and specialty. According to Yang, a disadvantage of U.S. education was its overemphasis on breadth, whereas the problem of Chinese university education was its excessive focus on specialty. As Yang (1978) noted:

China also has a bias on the issue of “Breadth” and “Specialty.” It is that Chinese universities pay too little attention to the direction of “Breadth,” and only develop in the direction of “Specialty.” In almost all universities, students select a major as soon as they enter the university, this major is quite limited. It is very difficult for a student to transfer to another major. I think this will greatly affect the university's first responsibility, which is to train talents with independent thinking ability.

Yang (1978) also mentioned the development trend in science of paying additional attention to the links between subjects so as to blur the boundaries between them, noting how interdisciplinary collaboration had contributed to many advances in science. Accordingly, he argued that Chinese universities “go in the direction of fewer majors” and “increase elective courses.” In 1983, Yang gave another speech in China in which he reiterated that excessive professional education is not conducive to the cultivation of innovative talents:

Under the situation of high-level technological development and high-level technological differentiation, an important condition for important breakthroughs is the need to educate many young people to be able to deal with scientific problems with several disciplines at the same time. This need runs counter to the professional system. (Zhang, 1994, pp. 74–76)

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the support of international organizations and the Chinese government, university presidents led numerous educational delegations visiting the United States to learn more about the U.S. higher education system. Such visits were typically more than 2 weeks in duration, with some lasting up to two months. During these visits, Chinese university leaders noted that engineering education in the United States involved both engineering knowledge and knowledge of the humanities and social sciences. Reflecting on a study tour of the United States in 1979, Jinming Lin (1980) noted how impressed he was with the general education model in the United States:

Students in engineering colleges are not just studying science and engineering theory courses. Each university requires students to take humanities, which account for about 10 percent of all credits, so that students have the social and humanities knowledge they deem necessary.

Israel (1983) argued that Chinese higher education in the early 1980s was “eighty thousand miles away from general education.” However, during this period, Chinese university leaders turned their focus to the problem of the over-professionalization of courses and began reforming the university curriculum through educational inspections and the reflections of Chinese-U.S. scholars. One of the major reforms in this respect was the requirement that students in the humanities and social sciences take courses in science and engineering and vice versa (Shen, 2018). From the mid-1990s, a number of comprehensive universities, including Peking University and Fudan University, took the lead in a new round of general education reforms. Among them, Peking University adopted both the U.S. style of general education and the core curriculum model. In this case, many of the faculty members who had returned from the United States participated in the general education curriculum reform and made explicit use of the American model as a reference. According to Professor Ke’an Li, the Director of academic affairs at Peking University, the university's general education system was “developed by studying the core curriculum system of Harvard University and the actual situation of Peking University” (Li, 2006).

Certainly, China has been relatively successful in adapting the U.S. general education model. For instance, there is consensus among both the government and universities that undergraduate education should integrate professional and general education (Shen, 2018). This has been facilitated by the fact that Chinese have encountered little resistance in the process of implementing general education. The actors promoting general education include academic elites from both the humanities and social sciences and science and engineering. The process has been facilitated by the strong affinity between the ideal of whole-person education contained in the concept of general education and the educational ideal of traditional China.

According to Levine (1984), in history, only two civilizations have valued liberal and general education, namely, ancient Greece and ancient China. However, China did not fully embrace the U.S. idea of general education. For example, while the U.S. associates general education with citizenship education and democratic politics, China generally does not associate general education with these two issues. Moreover, despite the popularity of the concept of general education in China, another closely related concept, liberal education, is neither fully understood nor accepted by Chinese academics. In a 2007 address, American scholar John Churchill tried to explain the concept of U.S. liberal education to Chinese audiences—an attempt immediately hindered by the concept's connection with civic education and critical thinking in the United States (Redden, 2009).

In addition to general education and credit systems, Chinese universities borrowed the undergraduate research system of U.S. universities in the 1980s. For instance, in the 1980s, the USTC based its reform model on the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). In 1981, Vice President Haibo Yang led a 12-member delegation from USTC on a visit to the United States. Of particular concern was the experience of undergraduate education at Caltech, specifically undergraduate research practices. In the outline of the study tour drawn up before the visit, one aspect that the delegation hoped to understand was the issue of undergraduate research in the United States—particularly in respect to the slogan of “Teaching in Science.” Upon returning home, the delegation summarized their thoughts on Caltech as follows:

California Institute of Technology also uses undergraduate methods to train undergraduates, and this experience is of reference value. In the future, we should increase the number of elective courses for undergraduates, increase the time for self-study, allow some students with good academic performance to take higher-level courses, and plan to recruit students to participate in scientific research from the third year of college to train them for scientific research ability. Allow some students who are outstanding in their studies to advance to the graduate school. (Delegation of University of Science and Technology of China, 1981)

In its subsequent reform of university curricula, USTC borrowed some practices from Caltech.

Transforming engineering universities into comprehensive universities

In the 1950s, China began vigorously developing specialized universities under the influence of the Soviet model. In 1952, university reform based on the Soviet model categorized colleges and universities into three types: comprehensive, industrial, and specialized universities. By 1955–1956, China had 194 universities: 14 comprehensive universities, 42 industrial universities, and 138 specialized (agricultural, normal, and medical) universities. The comprehensive universities, such as Tsinghua University and Zhejiang University, were distilled into industrial universities, with the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences departments of these universities relocated to other colleges and universities.

On July 3, 1978, Chen Ning Yang visited Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), where he proposed to the leader of the institution that SJTU, as a key university in the country, should do well in natural sciences. He suggested that a university with only an engineering school was insufficient (Jiang & Liu, 2019). From September to November 1978, an SJTU delegation visited the United States, where they investigated the development of higher engineering education in the country. Over the course of their 47-day visit, the delegation gained a deeper understanding of the U.S. higher education system. They were particularly impressed by the combination of science and technology in U.S. universities. Indeed, of the 27 universities they visited, none were purely technical; instead, all of the inspected universities offered a wide range of disciplines in sciences, engineering, medicine, and humanities. From 1979, SJTU began to adopt the U.S. university model and established the development principle of “supporting the natural sciences with engineering, promoting engineering with natural sciences, and combining natural science and engineering.” The university subsequently began developing its social sciences facilities and established the School of Management in 1984 (Jiang & Liu, 2019).

The Huazhong Institute of Technology (now the Huazhong University of Science and Technology) provides another example of the successful transformation of an engineering university into a comprehensive one. The transformation of this university was implemented under the leadership of Jiusi Zhu. In 1979, with the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) sent two delegations to study foreign higher education systems: Led by Zhu, one delegation visited the United States, Japan, and Canada, while the other investigated Western European countries. Over the course of a 10-week investigation of the U.S. system, Zhu's (2003) delegation found that engineering universities, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), were comprehensive institutions with a focus on the development of science and technology. This finding made Zhu deeply skeptical of a university model that only developed engineering science.

Although the Republic of China (1912–1949) had a tradition of comprehensive universities, the United States had a marked influence on the transformation of engineering universities into comprehensive ones. For example, the U.S. experience played an important role in Zhu's reform of the Huazhong Institute of Technology. Indeed, as Zhu (2003) noted, his university was the first in China to break through the Soviet model and implement reforms after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Other engineering universities followed suit and introduced reforms. For instance, Tsinghua University gradually reestablished other fields, such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, economics, management engineering, management information systems, foreign trade, and finance. Of course, not all universities used MIT as a reference in following the path of a comprehensive university. For example, the Chinese University of Science and Technology used the small-scale Caltech as a reference in their reform (The Chinese University of Science and Technology Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1979).

Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s, there was consensus in the education community regarding the transformation of engineering universities into comprehensive ones, while the adjustment and reorganization of higher education institutions (Yuanxi Tiaozheng) in 1952 became the subject of fierce criticism. Indeed, the adjustment and reorganization of higher education institutions was detrimental to the interests of some colleges and universities, seldom gaining anything positive from the Yuanxi Tiaozheng policy. For example, Zhejiang University lost its Colleges of Medicine, Agriculture, Law, Literature, Science, and Education in 1952, only retaining the College of Engineering. At the first China–U.S. University Presidents Conference in 1985, Weixue Lu, the Vice President of Zhejiang University, bluntly stated, “From our university's perspective, we believe that the adjustment and reorganization of higher education institutions in 1952 is useless” (Qian et al., 1986).

Another aspect of China's transition to the Soviet model was the establishment of universities under different government departments, such as the ministries of finance, health, agriculture, and metallurgy. In 1985, the Chinese government issued a landmark education reform document titled, “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Reform of the Education System.” One of the consultants, Changlin Tian, a Chinese-U.S. scientist and then the Vice-Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, suggested that all higher education institutions under the control of different government departments should break away from the affiliation with the departments. Although the opinions of Tian and the other consultants were valued in the fifth draft of the document, which included a “revocation of ministries and commissioned universities,” this suggestion was deleted from the sixth draft (Tian, 1986). Nonetheless, although Tian's (1986) proposal was not accepted in that year, the structural reform of higher education in China followed the suggested path. In 1998, the State Council of China transferred the control of the majority of affiliated institutions from different ministries to local governments.

The tenure-track system

In recent years, one of the most influential policies in China's higher education reform has been the introduction of the tenure-track system, undeniably a product of learning from the United States. However, unlike the introduction of the general education model and the reform of engineering universities, Chinese universities have encountered considerable resistance in trying to transition to the tenure-track system. Although China's higher education community has been aware of the tenure-track system since the early 1980s, attempts to implement such a system in Chinese universities in 2003 were unsuccessful. Even recent attempts to enforce this system in research universities have not been completely successful.

The tenure-track system originated in the United States. In the 1880s, in the face of competition from Johns Hopkins University, Harvard University President Charles William Eliot began increasing the requirements for faculty members, with those that did not meet the requirements asked to leave. Although this move marked one of the earliest examples of the modern “up or out” system (Geiger, 2014), the first codification of “up or out” tenure occurred under Harvard President James B. Conant in the spring of 1936 (Teichgraeber, 2017). It was not until the 1960s that the tenure-track system was widely implemented in the United States.

After 1949, the management of Chinese university faculty was characterized by a unit (Dan Wei) system. Becoming a university faculty member offers lifelong employment. Indeed, a faculty position was among those referred to as having an “iron rice bowl.” In the early days of reform and opening-up, Chinese university leaders and scholars began exploring the U.S. tenure-track system through educational investigations among other channels. Peiyuan Zhou, the former President of Peking University, published an essay entitled, “A Visit to the United States: Several Issues on Higher Education Reform” in the People's Daily on April 2, 1981. In this essay, Zhou (1981) introduced the U.S. tenure-track system as follows:

An assistant professor can be promoted to associate professor only after he has worked for at least three years, and has been assessed in three areas: teaching, scientific research, and social services. There is a saying in US universities, “publish or perish.” If you do not publish papers, you have to be fired. Only after being an associate professor is it possible to obtain a tenure in a university (in some universities only professors are tenured).

At the time, Chinese universities were facing various problems, including overcrowded faculty, faculty members with insufficient research capacity, and high academic inbreeding ratios. Indeed, many of the young and middle-aged university faculty were Worker–Peasant–Soldier students who enrolled during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and did not receive rigorous academic training during their college education. In this respect, implementing the tenure-track system and promoting the mobility of university teachers appeared to offer a solution to this dilemma. In 1981, Chinese universities had a total enrollment of 1,279,472 students, with some 666,339 university faculty and staff, 249,876 of whom were full-time faculty members. In 1981, the ratio of students to full-time faculty members was 5.11:1; by 1983, the ratio of students to faculty members was 3.98:1 (Department of Planning and Finance of the People's Republic of China [DPFPRC], 1984, p. 50).

To address the problem of the excessive number of faculty members, the practice of faculty mobility became a template for learning. For example, the leaders of SJTU visited various units outside the university to investigate the needs of employers, whereafter they successfully transferred more than 500 SJTU faculty to other institutions (Science and Technology Cadre Bureau of the State Science and Technology Commission, 1984). At the time, Nanjing University and Fudan University were similarly successful in transferring some faculty members to administrative positions or other non-university institutions (Pepper, 1982). However, Chinese universities did not have the conditions necessary to implement the tenure-track system.

In late October 1985, the State Education Commission held an international conference on teacher management in colleges and universities at Fudan University. Nine experts attended the meeting and reached a consensus that Chinese universities should implement an appointment system (Pinyong Zhi) rather than an assignment one (Renming Zhi). With the implementation of the former, those who were not hired could change their position or satisfy job requirements through further training (Chen & Sun, 1986).

The central government subsequently began reforming the management of university teachers. An important reform in this regard was the introduction of the Faculty Appointment System and the implementation of a structured wage system. Consequently, in addition to their basic salary, university teachers received further income based on their performance. The Faculty Appointment System was initially piloted in eight universities before being adopted nationwide (Cao, 1998).

In 1986, Zhejiang University issued “Regulations for the Appointment of Teachers in Zhejiang University” (discussion draft) and began trialing the appointment system for teacher positions in order to promote talent mobility (Office of the President of Zhejiang University, 1986, p. 14). In 1988, with the consent of the MOE, Zhejiang University decided to open the professorships to applicants at home and abroad (Office of the President of Zhejiang University, 1988, p. 25).

However, until the 1990s, universities did not have the financial foundation necessary to implement a tenure-track system. Given that the income of university faculty was low across all disciplines, the academic profession was not particularly attractive and retaining outstanding young talent was difficult. Indeed, approximately 27% of young faculty members were recruited after 1981—many of whom were considered “promising” or “core” members of their department—had left by 1991 (Cao, 1998). With the endorsement of a market economy as the ultimate goal of China's economic reform in 1992, China's economy gradually began recovering (Coase & Wang, 2016). Correspondingly, Chinese universities slowly emerged from their economic difficulties to accumulate the economic conditions necessary for further reform. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese universities have tried to break the so-called “iron rice bowl” and introduce a personnel contract system.

In 2000, the Central Organization Department, the Ministry of Personnel, and the MOE jointly issued “Opinions on the Implementation of Deepening the Reform of the Personnel System in Higher Education Institutions,” which proposed that colleges and universities sign personal contracts with university teachers and evaluate their teaching and research work. If the teacher proved unqualified for their job after the assessment or if the circumstances of the university had changed significantly, then the university could terminate the employment contract and relationship through dismissal or resignation. Accordingly, this policy document laid the legal foundation for the implementation of the tenure-track system. In 2003, Peking University borrowed from the U.S. tenure-track system and initiated personnel reform, which was considered an essential step in building a world-class university. However, implementation of such reform ultimately failed due to the resistance of younger faculty members. Reflecting the difficulty of such reform, Peking University's personnel reform prompted considerable discussion in the media and evolved into a nationwide public debate. Learning from the lessons of Peking University, some universities have since adopted a quiet approach in introducing a tenure-track system.

Yinxing Hong, Secretary of the Party committee of Nanjing University, participated in the first China–Yale University Leadership Seminar in 2004. Greatly inspired by the discussion of the tenure-track system, he subsequently initiated similar reform at Nanjing University, although the system was properly adjusted to Chinese university culture (Hong, 2004). In 2006, the MOE sent 19 Chinese research university leaders to the University of Michigan to participate in a 2-week Michigan–China University Leadership Forum covering the strategic management of universities, university–government relations, technology transfer, and economics. In addition to development, university faculty, and undergraduate and postgraduate education, the tenure-track system was part of the curriculum (Cook, 2008).

In 2005, Peking University began implementing tenure-track in the Center of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies. From 2014, all newly recruited faculty were managed under the tenure-track system, creating two faculty groups in the tenure (i.e., the new system) and non-tenure (i.e., the old system) tracks. In June 2016, the tenure track comprised some 360 faculty members, accounting for 13.9% of the university's total faculty (2,585 members). Broadly speaking, while those in the new system enjoy higher incomes, they also face more demanding evaluation standards. For example, to ensure a tenure position, they need to publish in top international journals and receive positive feedback from international experts in tenure review. Personnel reform has been in operation since 2016, with universities required to assimilate all non-tenure-track faculty into the tenure-track system in the next few years. The integration of the two systems should be completed within 5 to 10 years. Additionally, as of 2017, associate professors have to be on the tenure-track system in order to apply for full professorship. The new personnel system means that the majority of faculty members no longer enjoy an “iron rice bowl.” The primary motivation behind such reform is Peking University's desire to enhance its global standing in a short timeframe (Shen & Ma, 2018).

By 2015, most of China's 985 national colleges and universities had already implemented the tenure-track (“up or out”) system, as had some local colleges and universities (Yue, 2015). Although Peking University and Tsinghua University have implemented the tenure-track system for several years, the system conflicts with the renqing and guanxi cultures of Chinese universities and thus still encounters some resistance. Its ultimate acceptance and impact remain to be seen.