Abstract
Sheldon Krasowski’s No Surrender provides convincing evidence against the traditional argument that the treaty negotiations between Indigenous people in Western Canada and the government of Canada suffers from cultural misunderstanding. For years, scholars in history have used “cultural misunderstanding” to explain why Indigenous people have been portrayed as dupes in treaty negotiations. Krasowski’s work, mainly if not completely, challenges this racist thesis by documenting and analyzing original manuscripts, eyewitness accounts, and original treaty documents. Krasowski’s careful research points out that the treaty commissioners of the Canadian government intentionally avoided discussing a surrender clause during the negotiations, and the Indigenous people never did surrender their lands.
Krasowski’s methodology of supporting his analyses on the treaty-making process is grounded in oral history, which requires years of building rapport with people who have knowledge and talking to them. His analyses of the numbered treaties differentiate his work from other historians. Unlike interpreting individual treaties separately, Krasowski views Treaty 1 through 7 as a whole, which he refers to as the “treaty bundle.” The treaty bundle allows Krasowski to discover new points that are hardly detected in the analysis of individual treaties.
The methodology utilized by Krasowski could be debatable; however, he well justified his approach. Krasowski analyzes official reports (e.g., treaty commissioners’ reports and government reports), eyewitness accounts (e.g., journalists’ and settlers’ reports), and the Indigenous oral histories. Krasowski does not argue that we shall fully adopt the stories told by the Indigenous oral histories. In contrast, he organically assembles the materials and honestly discloses them. The contradictions shown by these documents reveal that a surrender was never discussed during the negotiations. Krasowski lets the evidence speak for itself, which makes his arguments relatively objective.
All the arguments start with highlighting the importance of the Douglas Treaties and the Selkirk Treaty, which are precedents of Treaty 1. The two treaties are also preceded by treaties among Indigenous peoples and treaties between the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) and First Nations. The government of Canada heavily relied on HBC workers regarding the treaty negotiations. The Selkirk Treaty was written after consulting with Indigenous leaders and it contains a detailed map of the land. The translation of the treaty also had both English and French versions so they could be checked against each other. Krasowski views this treaty as a more respectful treaty than the numbered treaties because the numbered treaties were written completely by the treaty commissioner and only read at the end of the negotiations.
The detailed analysis of the Selkirk Treaty is important, not only because it was the precedent of the numbered treaties but also because the differences between the Selkirk Treaty negotiations and the numbered treaties negotiations suggest that the treaty commissioners had strategies to deceive the Indigenous people. This argument is enhanced by the main discussion on Treaties 1 through 7, performed in Chapters 1 through 5. In these chapters, Krasowski uses substantial evidence to prove that the content of the eyewitness accounts is different from that in the official government documents. For instance, in the process of negotiating Treaty 3, Alexander Morris, the lieutenant governor of Manitoba, reported that Anishinaabe chiefs refused to begin the process since there were jealousies among them. However, Anishinaabe oral history reported that the chiefs needed multiple days to perform ceremonies.
The contradictions are more often to be seen in Treaty 6 negotiation because numbers of eyewitness accounts and oral history records were recorded and published and they did not match the content of the official account of the treaty. Krasowski criticizes the fact that historians often ignore other versions of Treaty 6 negotiations and only focus on the version made by Morris. Morris’s version describes treaty commissioners as “wise and high-minded” and chiefs as “orators with unreasonable demands.” Krasowski also argues that the treaty commissioners have a negotiating strategy to confuse the chiefs. For example, Morris brought two interpreters but at first refused to have the third interpreter, who was hired by the chiefs. Additionally, the interpreters at the negotiations may have softened their tones to avoid any controversy that may have occurred while negotiating the surrender clause. However, one thing that cannot be more evident is that the discussions on the surrender clause are absent. Krasowski argues that this absence, at the least, casts some doubts on whether the Indigenous people did surrender their lands.
There are several strengths in the book. First, Krasowski not only describes treaties but also details treaty negotiations. The description of treaty negotiations includes what happened before, during, and after negotiations, which gives readers a live picture of each negotiation. Second, Krasowski uses a large number of different resources (e.g., original manuscripts, eyewitness accounts, official documents, and original treaty documents) to support his arguments and assumptions. As Krasowski points out in his book, often the official documents are different from eyewitness accounts and oral history records. Such contradictions do not weaken the credibility of the book, on the contrary, presenting them and letting readers decide which side they believe makes the book look more objective. Third, through his careful analyses, Krasowski challenges the mainstream view of “cultural misunderstanding” in the treaty negotiations. The numbered treaties will continue having a significant impact on modern Canadian society. Krasowski’s No Surrender apparently will make readers reconsider the treaties.
The book, of course, has its weaknesses. For example, the topic may limit the scope of the audience. It discusses treaty negotiations in Canada that occurred almost 150 years ago. Indigenous people in Western Canada will most likely find this book valuable. Nevertheless, the book may shed light on other places where treaty negotiations also happened and enlighten scholars to investigate. No Surrender is a typical history book. Krasowski mentions the names of many of the people engaged in the treaty negotiations. Although a few of them are the key persons, such as Alexander Morris, it is still hard for a reader, who just starts reading books related to this topic, to manage.
The topic of the book may limit its audience. However, with certain background knowledge, the book is easy to read and follow. The appropriate audience for the book can be academic researchers, policy makers, and whoever is interested in such a history. Also, as qualitative research that uses and analyzes accounts, transcripts, and documents, the current book can be used in the upper undergraduate and graduate levels. The topic of the book may only make it suitable for students in history courses. However, its social meaning makes it applicable for proper students in the criminal justice or sociology major as well.
