Educational Accountability Relationships and Students’ Learning Outcomes in Tanzania’s Public Schools

Voice relationship

A voice relationship is defined as a complex accountability relationship that connects families and government officials in education, for example, policy makers and politicians (The World Bank, 2004). This relationship is further defined as the “long route” of accountability through which citizens provide mandates and/or their preferences to policy makers (the state) and politicians to design services that respond to their needs (Gropello, 2004). In Tanzania, both councillors and Members of Parliament (MPs) are expected to hear their constituents’ opinions on public education. Thus, politicians are expected to serve as a vehicle for conveying citizens’ views to the government. These views are presented to politicians through citizens’ voices: Citizens either speak directly to politicians in meetings or by visiting their offices or, as in most cases, the councillors and MPs, as representatives of their respective constituencies, are expected to be well-informed about educational problems. Hence, they should be better placed to communicate education-related issues to the government without waiting for those issues to be reported by their constituents.

In many cases, however, the opinions that are largely reported by citizens involve issues related to a lack of teaching and learning facilities, including shortages of teachers, classrooms, desks, toilet facilities, and teacher accommodations (Galabawa & Agu, 2001). This implies that citizens and politicians are very concerned about observable school facilities, but less concerned about what is going on in the classroom.

Further findings show that in practice, opinions about students’ learning outcomes are primarily expressed by nongovernmental organizations, such as Uwezo/Twaweza and HakiElimu. For example, Uwezo/Twaweza expressed concern about whether schoolchildren were learning. Uwezo/Twaweza’s reports reveal that although many children were enrolled in school, some of them graduated without acquiring basic literacy and numeracy skills. Indeed, empirical evidence collected by Uwezo/Twaweza consistently demonstrates that children’s competence in literacy and numeracy is well below expectations (Uwezo, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014). In 2013, for example, only 45% of children could read a Standard II-level story in Kiswahili, only one in five (19%) children could read a Standard II-level story in English, and only three out of 10 (31%) children could do a Standard II-level multiplication problem (Uwezo, 2014). Uwezo/Twaweza catalyzed the adoption of several government initiatives in a bid to improve the early development of literacy and numeracy skills. Those initiatives include designing a new curriculum for early grades and in-service teacher training to equip teachers with the skills to teach literacy and numeracy. With respect to the voice accountability relationship, it can thus be argued that the relationship between end-users of the services, such as parents and families, on one hand, and policy makers and politicians, on the other hand, remains rather weak. It is the availability of strong nongovernmental organizations such as Uwezo/Twaweza and HakiElimu, both of which help curb this weakness and raise important issues, that requires the utmost attention and improvement to help enhance students’ learning outcomes.

Compact relationship

A compact relationship is broadly defined as a long-term relationship of accountability that connects politicians and policy makers to organizational providers (The World Bank, 2004). When applied to the Tanzania context, the policy maker is the MOEST, or the parent ministry, which is charged with the following functions: formulating, monitoring, and evaluating educational policies; overseeing teacher training; registering schools; providing quality assurance; ensuring quality education service delivery in the country by conducting research to assist in making informed decisions; formulating and implementing mechanisms to strengthen quality assurance mechanisms to ensure that education is provided in accordance with set standards; and monitoring and evaluating Tanzania’s education policies, legislation, guidelines, and curricula (URT, 2010).

At the top level, there is a Ministry of PO-RALG, which is responsible for supervising the day-to-day provision of educational services. With regard to education, the functions of this ministry include the following: monitoring the employment of teachers and nonteaching staff in regions and local governments, initiating and monitoring the transfers of teachers and nonteaching staff from one region to another, monitoring the appointment of secondary school heads, monitoring the appointment of school board members and their training in school management, monitoring in-service training for teachers and capacity building for nonteaching staff, coordinating the provision of government scholarships for children from poor families, participating in the coordination of Form 1 and 5 selection in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, and implementing policies, coordinating, and monitoring (URT, 2010).

The implication of this relationship is that the providers of education services (the heads of school and teachers) in public schools are also accountable to both the MOEST and the Ministry of PO-RALG. In the latter ministry, teachers are accountable through ward educational officers, district educational officers, and regional educational officers. This relationship is confusing and has resulted in the heads of schools and teachers having several immediate supervisors, including both politicians at the village ward, district, and regional levels and educational officials at the ward, district, and regional levels. It should be noted that as these educational officers are also regulated by the Ministry of Education, Science, Technology, and Vocational Training, they are answerable to that parent ministry. This tendency violates a management principle known as unity of command, which requires that each subordinate have only one superior; for example, an employee must not have many bosses or superiors (Hoy & Miskel, 2013). Notably, if an employee or subordinate works under the influence of many bosses or superiors, he or she is subjected to a state of confusion, dilemma, anarchy, and disorder (Hoy & Miskel, 2013). This situation also affects the organization’s overall efficiency, productivity, and profit. In this regard, the literature highlights several benefits of ensuring the unity of command in organizations, including fostering a better relationship among superiors and subordinates; providing clear and well-organized authority, responsibility, and accountability; reducing and/or avoiding duplication of work; providing prompt or quick decision-making; and enhancing coordination and teamwork, boosting workers’ morale and positive attitude, and ultimately leading to higher productivity (Hoy & Miskel, 2013). The existing accountability relationship in Tanzania between the government, policy makers, and service providers is complicated and confusing, which may explain pupils’ poor learning outcomes. The study findings in this regard reveal a lack of appropriate reporting mechanisms to monitor and adequately evaluate school performance processes.

Benchmarking the current arrangements of education provision in Tanzania with the World Bank (2004) accountability framework suggests that Ministry of PO-RALG constitutes a group of politicians that includes school committees, councillors, ward education development committees, and Members of Parliament. This represents an intricate accountability model known as governance, which requires politicians’ participation in school governance.

Client power relationship

The third type of accountability is the “client power” relationship, which is defined as a relationship that connects families to school organizations (The World Bank, 2004). It is regarded as the “short route” of accountability, which denotes forms of direct client feedback, comanagement, and/or client choice related to services provided (Gropello, 2004; The World Bank, 2004). Under this type of accountability, the end-users of education, for example, families and their children, are expected to hold service providers (schools) accountable for student performance. In Tanzania, families are primarily connected to the schools through school committee boards. The evidence indicates that almost every school in the country has a school board committee. These school committees are responsible for the management and overall development of the school. Inter alia, their roles are to involve all pupils, parents, and school staff in maximizing the benefits of primary school; to oversee the school’s day-to-day affairs; to plan the budget and ensure the proper use of school funds; and to effectively communicate educational information to all parents, pupils, and other stakeholders (URT, 2001). In practice, the school committees are mainly concerned with issues related to school construction activities, school facilities, and the management of funds (Galabawa & Agu, 2001). Several school committee bodies are less concerned about what is going on in the classrooms. Accordingly, it can be argued that school committee boards are relatively weak in holding schools accountable for the students’ learning output.

Families are also free to visit the school and enquire about their children’s learning outcomes. However, the empirical evidence suggests that there is a gap between Tanzanian schools and families and that families’ participation is limited to matters related to the construction of school buildings; it seldom extends to education quality (Komba, 2013). The reasons for the schools’ limited efforts in involving parents in academic-related matters is the unwarranted belief among educational authorities that parents and members of the community are ignorant, for example, that they have never attended school themselves (Komba, 2013). Essentially, the findings indicate that the client power accountability relationship is weak and cannot be expected to yield much in terms of holding the school accountable for poor school outcomes. Under this scenario, the only remaining option is to apply voice accountability to politicians and policy makers. Moreover, politician/policy makers must use compact accountability to hold the schools accountable. As already noted, however, the compact accountability relationship is confusing and unclear; therefore, it is less helpful in holding the schools as accountable as they should be.

Management relationship

A management relationship is defined as the relationship that connects organizational providers and frontline professionals (Gropello, 2004, p. 1). An organizational provider is the government or private entity that provides the service, for example, the schools (The World Bank, 2004). A frontline professional is an employee who is engaged in the actual provision of services, for example, teachers (The World Bank, 2004). Evidence from studies in Tanzania consistently affirm declining teachers motivation, low commitment to teaching, and a poor working environment, causing the majority of teachers to dislike the teaching profession (see, for example, HakiElimu, 2011; Mkumbo, 2012; UNESCO & Ministry of Education and Vocational Training [MoEVT], 2014). The situation is further compounded by poor salaries in the teaching profession, which erode the interest of highly performing graduates to join the teaching profession (UNESCO & MoEVT, 2014). Further evidence suggests that some graduates join the teaching profession simply because it is a profession that guarantees graduates immediate postgraduation employment from the government (UNESCO & MoEVT, 2014). Based on the factors that encourage graduates to join the teaching profession and the poor working environment in public schools, it can be argued that the majority of Tanzania’s teachers are intrinsically demotivated and less committed to teaching, which in turn affects both their level of accountability and students’ learning outcomes.

The findings further suggest that a lack of teaching and learning facilities limits the extent to which schools can demand and actuate teachers’ accountability. Arguably, demanding accountability from employees requires that employers fulfill their responsibilities by providing employees with the tools necessary to deliver adequate teaching. The literature also highlights the issue of teacher absenteeism in Tanzania’s public primary and secondary schools (UNESCO & MoEVT, 2014). Teacher absenteeism contributes to poor student learning outcomes. The factors that the literature cites as contributing to absenteeism include poor teacher management and accountability (UNESCO & MoEVT, 2014). Indeed, the available empirical evidence suggests that the management accountability relationship is rather weak, thus contributing to students’ poor learning outcomes.

Using the framework that guided this study, the educational accountability relationship in Tanzania can be summarized as indicated in Figure 1, which was adapted from the World Bank (2004) accountability framework:

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

Educational accountability relationships in Tanzania’s public primary and secondary schools.

As noted earlier, both routes are weak in holding the service providers accountable.

Financial accountability

As noted above, the government of Tanzania is currently providing fee-free education whereby pupils are provided with capitation grants (MOEST, 2016). To enhance financial accountability, the government is obliged to provide clear guidelines for distributing those resources. MOEST (2016) Circular Number 3 provides guidance for the provision of fee-free education, highlighting the roles of the government and various stakeholders in implementing the fee-free education policy. For example, the circular states that the government is responsible for ensuring that funds are effectively utilized in achieving the desired learning outcomes. In the same manner, school organizations are responsible for ensuring that funds are effectively used in accordance with government directives and that they help bring about the expected improvement in learning outcomes. In contrast, parents as consumers of education services are expected to closely monitor the use of resources and the resulting learning outcomes (MOEST, 2016). However, for schools to ensure the effective use of funds, school heads are required to be knowledgeable and equipped with financial management skills. Evidence from the literature indicates that Tanzanian schools have a critical shortage of nonteaching staff (Komba, 2012). Accordingly, the school Heads typically assume all financial responsibilities. In practice, head teachers have generally been found to have insufficient financial skills in the areas of planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluating (UNESCO, 2011). Is it logical to hold the head teachers accountable when they lack sufficient knowledge, skills, and information to properly manage school funds? Furthermore, it should be noted that the curriculum for training primary and secondary school teachers does not provide teachers with financial management courses. Hence, although the need for in-service training for teachers is unavoidable, because of financial constraints, in-service training is rarely provided.

Another inefficiency surrounding financial accountability is associated with various forms of corruption, including the payment of salaries to ghost teachers and capitation grants for ghost students. The other weakness in financial accountability concerns the provision of flat grants to all students regardless of variations in their physical conditions, learning needs, and school locations. Therefore, the money provided may exaggerate existing inequalities across schools and individual learners. Arguably, the recently introduced fee-free education policy treats children from rich and poor families equally (HakiElimu, 2017). Providing financial assistance to children from rich families could be regarded as wastage of government resources. The question here is as follows: Should national resources be directed to subsidize the education of children from poor families who cannot afford to contribute? In other words, there might be a need to provide funding through a need-based formula. These identified inefficiencies in financial accountability might have contributed to students’ poor learning outcomes.

Regulatory accountability

Regulatory accountability focuses on inputs and processes, emphasizing compliance with available laws and regulations (UNESCO, 2016). Schools’ teaching and learning processes are largely regulated by the school inspection system, which is expected to hold schools and teachers accountable for achieving not only teaching and learning goals but also organizational management and leadership goals (UNESCO, 2016). Tanzania has a School Inspectorate Department that is responsible for ensuring adherence to educational policies, laws, regulations, and standards in the delivery of basic and teacher education. The department has four sections: the Primary Education Inspectorate Section, the Secondary Education Inspectorate Section, the Teacher Education Inspectorate Section, and the School Inspectorate Management Support Section. The Inspectorate Department has several responsibilities for inspecting and recommending strategies to enhance the quality of basic education and evaluate the relevance and effective use of the instructional materials used in preprimary, primary, and special education schools, and adult and nonformal education centers (MoEVT, 2010). Evidence from the field on the effectiveness of school inspections suggest that inspections are irregularly conducted, are superficial, and do little to boost the quality of services in schools (Mmbando & Hongoke, 2010), as illustrated by the following statement:

Inspectors do not spend sufficient time for adequate and meaningful inspection of schools and, consequently, school inspectors do not seem to obtain a true picture of the state of schools and to reflect on the outcomes of inspection. The time spent by inspectors on offering professional support to teachers in schools was usually negligible as inspectors spent most of their time solving administrative problems with head teachers and that teachers were never helped as adequately as they should. (Mmbando & Hongoke, 2010, p. 15)

The reason for irregular school inspection is a lack of financial resources to cover the cost of school inspections. Other shortcomings that have been identified in the Inspectorate Department include the following: (a) incompetence among some school inspectors, some of whom are weak and do not possess the requisite professional qualities to inspect others; (b) poor support and training for inspectors; (c) inspections that focus on school buildings and administrative systems rather than on teaching and learning, with minimal attention paid to the identification and improvement of educational standards; (d) reports that are rarely used to improve educational quality; and (e) the fact that only a few days are allocated for school inspection (Mmbando & Hongoke, 2010). With respect to the time allocated for inspection, the following has been reported:

Due to paucity of time at the disposal of school inspectors, the school inspections, wherever held, have become superficial and a mere formality. Additionally, because of inadequate time, the inspectors experience the following two major constraints: a) They hardly devote their attention to the follow-up action of the inspection reports with the result that the very purpose of the inspection gets defeated and (b) They find it difficult to keep themselves abreast of the latest development in their subject areas. (Mmbando & Hongoke, 2010, p. 15)

Accordingly, one can argue that inspection in Tanzania largely focuses on visiting schools, pointing out mistakes, writing reports, and submitting the reports to government bodies. This implies that the process is a mere formality. Indeed, these challenges raise doubt about the Inspectorate Department’s ability to foster and strengthen accountability, and ultimately to improve students’ learning outcomes.

Professional accountability

Professional accountability concerns issues such as the extent to which education enables learners to meet their day-to-day needs and the extent to which educators adhere to professional standards (UNESCO, 2016). The question here resolves around whether consumers of the public education system accept that education is relevant to their day-to-day needs and whether teachers work ethically. There is abundant evidence from the field (see, for example, Komba, 2013, 2017) to indicate that some families from poor economic backgrounds are unwilling to finance or encourage their children’s schooling because they are skeptical about whether education contributes to poverty reduction. This concern has contributed to low enrollment, dropout, and poor learning outcomes in rural schools (Komba, 2013, 2017). With respect to teachers’ adherence to professional standards, there is evidence of cases in which teachers have behaved unethically, including engaging in illicit sex liaisons with students, stealing school resources, and engaging in examination malpractice (Anangisye & Barrett, 2006; Anangisye, 2015; Mabagala, 2016). Professional accountability is therefore regarded as weak, contributing to poor school outcomes.

Participatory accountability

Participatory accountability is considered an effective strategy for building equitable education systems and providing quality education (UNESCO, 2016, p. 8). This approach to accountability requires families to have a voice and opportunities for dialog with school governing bodies (UNESCO, 2016). This type of accountability is similar to the client power accountability relationship discussed earlier. Hence, as noted above, all of Tanzania’s schools are legally required to have school committees. Families are expected to be fully engaged in school management. Parents’ participation in school can be at the individual level or through the school committee. However, as noted previously, accountability is not an issue that school committees are expected to raise. Instead, the focus is on the management of funds and teaching and learning resources. However, individual parental involvement has been found to be poorly defined in Tanzania’s educational policies (Komba, 2013). It has been noted that there is no clear policy on this matter, and hence very little parental involvement in education. Furthermore, as noted earlier, in many cases, individual parental participation is limited to matters concerning the construction of school buildings and seldom extends to education quality.

The findings suggest that home–school partnership in Tanzania, which could enhance participatory accountability, is characterized by so-called over-professionalism (in which parents’ contribution to academic matters is underestimated and largely unrecognized) and a compensatory model in which the school operates pursuant to a deficit model that assumes that parents are illiterate, and hence ineffective in supporting their children’s education (Komba, 2013; Ravn, 2005; Whalley, 2001). In the latter model, the school compensates for inadequate parenting skills. In Tanzania, this partnership has been operating without a thorough assessment of parents and the community’s needs and experience, suggesting a lack of accountability in regard to investigating changing needs and experiences, both of which are crucial in establishing a responsive and flexible parent involvement model. In sum, there is very little partnership and so-called “bounded or conditioned” involvement based on the argument that the parents are poor, ignorant, and illiterate (Komba, 2013; Ravn, 2005; Whalley, 2001).

The findings suggest weak participatory accountability whereby the school largely assumes responsibility for education. This scenario contributes to an increase in the number of children graduating from Class 7 who are unable to read and write.