Experience of Violence and Non-Electoral Political Participation Among Nigerians

Abstract

Most studies on political participation suggest that social capital is an important factor for individuals to express their political agency. This study provides another perspective—the violence perspective. There has been a debate about the direction of the association between violence and political participation, and most of these studies have focused on electoral participation and civic engagement. This study seeks to examine how the experience of non-domestic violence (NDV) are associated with non-electoral political participation (NEP) in Nigeria. Using the seventh round of the Nigerian Afrobarometer dataset, findings from the study show that individuals who experienced NDV were more likely to be active in non-electoral political activities. The findings of this study have broader implications for the importance of the norms and values that inform engagement in the political realm, especially in developing countries.

Keywords

non-electoral participation social capital violence Africa political participation

Introduction

Political participation reflects the important roles individual citizens play in shaping their political system and society in general (van Deth, 2018). The democratic process is anchored in the idea of the equality of citizens and participation in the political process, as individuals are expected to be invested in the political processes that inform their society (Dobratz, et al., 2016). In studies of political participation in Western democracies, the traditional focus has often been on elections and political parties. Participation outside of electoral institutions has always existed, but the political process in developed democracies, such as Nigeria, has revolved around electoral competition, and so has the study of participation. However, many forms of political participation are not sponsored or organized by parties (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Norris et al., 2005), and in non-Western settings these non-electoral forms of participation are sometimes dominant. From boycotts and petitions to blockades and violent demonstrations, citizens often express their preferences outside of the electoral process, sometimes intimidating those who work within it (Vráblíková, 2014).

Violence and social networks are some of the perspectives that inform how citizens perceive and interact with the state. Social capital is a collective attribute: It denotes a level of comity, connectivity, trust, and trustworthiness among members of a society (Putnam, 1995). Violence is often understood as evidence of a breakdown of social capital or its complete absence. But the relationship between violence and social capital is more complex than this easy equation implies. On the one hand, several studies have shown that social capital, especially organizational ties, and voluntary groups, shape political participation (Howard & Gilbert, 2008; Klesner, 2007; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Mora, 2013; Putnam, 1993, 1995). Social networks have been shown to affect political participation (E. D. Campbell, 2013; Gil de Zuniga et al., 2012; Valenzuela et al., 2012), suggesting that voluntary associations and groups enable individuals to generate the social capital to engage in meaningful interactions with the state.

On the other hand, there has been a burgeoning of studies on the impact of wartime violence and criminality on political participation (Bateson, 2012; Bauer et al. 2016; Bratton, 2008; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Ley, 2018; Trelles & Carreras, 2012). The majority of studies on wartime violence and conflict have addressed electoral participation (Bateson, 2012; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Bratton, 2008; Ley, 2018; Trelles & Carreras, 2012), social trust (McKeown & Taylor, 2017), and civic engagement (Bateson, 2012; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009). This study seeks to contribute to this body of research by examining the relationship between non-electoral participation (NEP) and violence. Qualitatively different from all other forms of political participation (Ley, 2014; Schussman & Soule, 2005), NEP is considered unconventional, is mainly non-institutionalized, and does not aim to disrupt or threaten the stability of a democracy (Barnes & Kasse, 1979). Some NEP activities include signing petitions, participating in (lawful) demonstrations and (un)official strikes, contacting a government official to make a complaint, refusing to pay taxes, boycotting products, occupying buildings, painting slogans, and refusing to pay taxes (Barnes & Kasse, 1979). Whereas electoral political participation mainly occurs within the election period (except for special elections), NEP is disconnected from the activities of electoral cycles and is therefore undertaken outside the electoral campaign cycle.

A study of the linkage between violence and NEP can reveal how individuals engage in relatively risky forms of political engagement (Schussman & Soule, 2005). Understanding the link between the experience of violence and NEP can illuminate the intersections between the realities of everyday domestic living and political behavior, especially in the global South. This linkage also points to the possibility of the interpenetration between the state and civil society (Schmitt, 1932). Thus, non-political institutions—like voluntary associations, religious institutions, and cultural groups—can have political ramifications. By examining if there is a link between experiencing Non-Domestic Violence (NDV) and NEP, this study seeks to contribute to the idea that the lines between the normative values of the state and civil society are blurred within the context of political participation.

Conceptual Framework

In his description of the development of the modern state, Poggi (1978) described two conceptual ideas regarding the nature of the political: (1) politics as the allocation of scarce resources and (2) politics as “us” against the “other.” Politics as a process of allocating scarce resources is based on Easton’s (1953) ideas about politics involving the authoritative allocation of values in society. The allocation process can be undertaken via customary prerogatives, free exchange among individuals in society, and authoritative commands from institutional authorities (Poggi, 1978). Thus, politics represents a crucial dimension of social life through which values and resources are allocated. The systems of the state created through this process are informed by a symbolic and discursive process among citizens in a polity (Poggi, 1978).

The second orientation of politics—politics as “us” against the “others”—is based on Carl Schmitt’s theory of the state (Poggi, 1978). For Schmitt (1932), “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (p. 26). This relationship implies that the protection of one’s collectivity or social group from external harms and threats serves as the role, and thus the sources of legitimacy, of states (Poggi, 1978). This view of politics focuses on the external as the state is involved in a continuous preparedness for a possible conflict with “others” that may intend to threaten or harm the state.

These two notions of the perceptions of the state may not be mutually exclusive in society. Both views of politics are often complementary, as each approach addresses the weaknesses of the other (Poggi, 1978). For Schmitt, given that the collective is employed as a reference point, the definition of the collective, that is, “us,” and the external force is a product of politics. Individuals in societies that need the symbolic process (i.e., the definition of the collective and the other), suggested by Easton, may also need to gather and deliberate about defining the collective and creating the boundaries for the collective (Poggi, 1978). For Easton, values must be generated, protected, and preserved before they are authoritatively allocated. The view of the symbolic public processes and the inward-looking conception of the allocation of values and resources show the importance of the collectivity (Poggi, 1978). The collectivity can only define its internal allocation process by denying others what they regard as theirs (Poggi, 1978).

The equation of the state with politics is erroneous as the state and society penetrate each other (Schmitt, 1932). Not only reserved for the state, the concept of the “political” is an integral force of human existence and diversity (Schmitt, 1932), suggesting that non-political or neutral domains like religious institutions, civil society, and cultural institutions have political dimensions, and blurring the lines between what we consider as the normative values of the state and civil society. In this sense, the dualistic notion of politics (as allocation and competition) may also influence people’s perception of the state and political engagement.

The State as a Shared Entity (Social Capital Perspective)

For the orientation of politics as allocation, individuals in society may perceive social interactions and consensual deliberations as integral to engaging with the state. This view of politics is anchored in the idea that individuals must engage in deliberative and discursive functions to sustain the polity (Poggi, 1978). The discursive function also plays a potential symbolic role in providing inclusive governance, as individuals seek to make their voices heard on state issues and the policymaking process. This symbolic role implies that a strong and active civil society, in which individuals can peacefully congregate for discursive functions, is indispensable for consolidating the democratization of a polity (Putnam, 1993, 1995). This idea aligns with the impact of civic organizations, personal and communal networks, and the subsequently generated social capital (Putnam, 1995), on individual attitudes and behaviors (Howard & Gilbert, 2008). Individuals can take advantage of civic groups and organizations to gain the resources and skills they need to be politically engaged (Mora, 2013).

Various studies have shown the importance of voluntary organizations, including religious and social groups and community-oriented activities, for engaging with the state (Howard & Gilbert, 2008; Klesner, 2007; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Mora, 2013; Teorell, 2003). Voluntary organizations provide a platform for attracting individuals into politics, political discussions and debates, and engagements with the state, which is necessary for strengthening a democracy (Putnam, 1995). Political discussions provide the requisite knowledge for individuals to be politically active (Putnam, 1993, 1995). Thus, the voluntary organizations, and the social capital they generate, play the interactional and deliberative function that mirrors the symbolic and discursive role of the legislature and judiciary in the modern state.

The State as a Competitive Sphere (Violence and Conflict Perspective)

The conceptual focus of this paper is the influence of violence on the civic and political lives of citizens, which aligns with Schmitt’s (1932) ideas about politics. This view of politics is informed by a sense of awareness of external “others” whom the state or society has to be ready to aggressively engage with. This aggressive engagement can lead to a conflict-based and violence-oriented view of the state. An orientation toward violence can necessitate political activity to reduce violent events or use conflict-oriented and violent means to engage with state institutions. Violence is also conceptualized as an acceptable means of interacting with state institutions.

Experiences of violence can have either a positive or negative influence on political participation. On the one hand, these experiences can physically and psychologically hinder individuals from fully engaging in the activities of their polity and communities. Various studies have shown the negative impact of violence on political participation (Bratton, 2008; Ley, 2018; Trelles & Carreras, 2012). An increase in criminal violence reduces the tendency for citizens to be politically participative, as these events make them take refuge in their private spaces (Trelles & Carreras, 2012). More specifically, the occurrence of violence reduces voter turnout (Ley, 2018; Trelles & Carreras, 2012). Events of criminal or political violence, especially during elections, can lead citizens to be disenchanted with the political process (Trelles & Carreras, 2012). It is also possible that non-electoral forms of political participation, such as protests, sit-ins, and marches, may engender a high risk of violence, which may discourage attendance, thereby reducing participation (Ley, 2014). Thus, we can extend this argument to NEP and hypothesize that:

H₁: The experience of NDV is linked to the tendency of increased NEP.

On the other hand, several studies have shown a positive link between experiences of traumatic and violent attacks on political participation and civic engagement (Bateson, 2012; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009; McKeown & Taylor, 2017). A study of four regional barometer surveys for Asia, Latin America (including the United States and Canada), Europe, and Africa, found that “no matter what the continent or the type of participation, having recently been the victim of a crime is always associated with greater political activity and engagement” (Bateson, 2012, p. 575). Experiences of violence and victimization can spur individuals into political action, most likely to register their dissatisfaction with their victimization experience (Wood, 2003). According to Blattman (2009), surviving a traumatic experience can reveal one’s hidden potential and change one’s self-image. From this change and discovery, individuals may seek to make sense of the victimization experiences, taking on agency and becoming politically active in their communities (McKeown & Taylor, 2017). Thus, experiences of violence can inform personal growth and political agency, which psychological studies suggest have positive effects on traumatic events (Laufer & Solomon, 2006; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Similarly, crime victims tend to be more politically and civically active, and the effect of victimization expands to peacetime, including the experience of nonviolent and violent crime (Bateson, 2012; Blattman, 2009). We can expand the foregoing argument to NEP and suggest that:

H₂: The experience of NDV is linked to the tendency of decreased NEP.

The Political Context of Violence in Nigeria

Nigeria is an emerging democracy with its share of internal conflicts and political setbacks. The country has held only six consecutive democratic elections, with military administrations ruling for 33 years out of its 59 years of political independence. According to The Economic Intelligence Unit (2020), Nigeria is a hybrid democracy, and it is only one position above the category of an authoritarian country. According to The Economic Intelligence Unit (2020), hybrid states are characterized by regular electoral frauds, state pressure on political opposition, non-independent judiciaries, widespread corruption, constant media harassment, low levels of civic participation, and poor functioning of governance.

While attempting to grapple with the tensions of being a democracy in an ethno-religiously diverse nation, Nigeria has witnessed several challenges to the tenets of democracy (Aniekwe & Agbiboa, 2014). Violence informs the nature and understanding of politics in Nigeria (Angerbrandt, 2018). Conflict, aggressive competition, and the contestation of power are built into the narratives of the Nigerian polity as politicians struggle over economic and political resources and the control of the state (Bratton, 2008; Omotola, 2010). The Nigerian governing elite has been implicated in acts of electoral violence, corruption, and fraud to the point that the government is more like a criminal gang than a democratic government (Egobueze & Ojirika, 2017). Conflicts and violence have characterized most of the elections since 1964 (Omotola, 2010), including rampant incidents of electoral malpractice and violence. For instance, during the recently held Kogi State special governorship elections, the female leader of the opposition party in the state was burnt to death (Odogun, 2019). Journalists have also been threatened and attacked while covering elections. For Ikpe (2015), “Electoral violence has become ingrained in the Nigerian political system such that every election is greeted with anxiety” (p. 96).

Given the lack of confidence in the Nigerian electoral institutions and structures, supporters of unsuccessful candidates in elections, believing that their contender has been robbed of victory, are more inclined to engage in violent protests (J. Campbell, 2010). Violent protests incited by losing candidates occurred during the 2007 gubernatorial elections across the country, the 2008 Jos local elections, and the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections (J. Campbell, 2010; Egobueze & Ojirika, 2017). These violent events left several citizens dead. Other physical manifestations of electoral violence in the country include political assassinations, voter intimidation, riots, looting, bombing, hijacking of electoral materials and ballot boxes, and political thuggery (Bratton, 2008; Ikpe, 2015; Omotola, 2010). Some of the notable victims of political assassination include Funsho Williams (gubernatorial candidate in Lagos State), Dr. Ayo Daramola (gubernatorial candidate in Ekiti State), Theodora Giwa–Amu and Nduli Elumelu (both legislators from Delta State), Bola Ige (a Minister from Oyo State), and Odunayo Olagbaju and Temitope Olatoye (both legislators from Oyo State).

With so much violence in evidence, the average Nigerian citizen has been politically socialized into conceiving of the Nigerian polity as an arena in which conflict and violence are part of the acceptable means for claims-making. Thus, the conflict-ridden Nigerian polity informs many Nigerians’ understandings of the state, suggesting that norms and values of political conflict can communicate the idea that politics in Nigeria is a “do or die” affair (Ikpe, 2015)—only suited for individuals willing and ready to be violent. In 2007, about one in 10 Nigerians experienced threats of electoral violence (Bratton, 2008). Also, an online analysis of the Afrobarometer website shows that in 2017, about 18% of Nigerians reported having experienced violence at a political event. This vision of politics aligns with Schmitt’s conception of politics in terms of conflict and aggressive opposition.

Several studies have examined the role and context of political participation and civic engagement in Nigeria. Most studies on the subject have addressed political participation in Nigeria within the context of internal grievances, unemployment, political conflicts, social media, and negative reaction toward state policies (Adegbola & Gearhart, 2019; Mustapha et al., 2016; Nelson et al., 2018). Given the nature of competition and aggression that informs the country’s politics, this study examines how the conflict and violence-orientation shapes political engagement in Nigeria. Studying Nigeria, a developing country (Huther & Shah, 2000) with an emerging democracy and a relatively high level of political violence, provides a unique socio-political context to investigate the dynamics between violence and political participation.

Methods

This study examines how the experience of NDV informs NEP among Nigerians. The seventh round of the Afrobarometer survey was employed for this study. This dataset is based on nationally representative samples, which represent a cross-section of adult Nigerian (aged 18 years and above). The sampling frame used for this survey was based on the 2006 Population and Housing Census for Nigeria (Isbell, 2015). Similar surveys have been conducted in other African countries, and this survey is the latest round of data collection. About 1,600 respondents were interviewed with a response rate of 85% and a margin of error of +/–2 at a 95% confidence level. The study was conducted by Practical Sampling International on behalf of the Afrobarometer. Data were collected on socio-political issues through which the analysis of this study was possible. The weighting of the data was based on the region of residence, gender, urban-rural residence, household size, and area of enumeration (Isbell, 2015).

Measures

The outcome variable for this study is non-electoral participation (NEP). Five items were used to capture this variable. Respondents were asked if they had participated in the following activities in the past year: requesting government action; contacting the media (to mention their dissatisfaction with the government); contacting a government official to make a complaint; refusing to pay taxes to the government and participating in a protest. The responses to these questions were recoded as Yes (1) and No (0). For Verba et al. (1978), citizens’ involvement with public affairs is a latent variable that can be discerned from several individual activities. To examine the latent construct from the five indicators, a principal component analysis (PCA) using tetrachoric inter-item correlation was conducted. The analysis revealed that the five questions tapped into a single underlying variable (see Table 1). The five items were used to generate an additive index, ranging from 0 (lowest NEP) to 5 (highest NEP; Cronbach’s alpha = .74).

Table 1.

Factor Analysis of NEP.

Indicators of NEP	Factor loading
Requesting government action	0.81
Contacting the media to register dissatisfaction of the state	0.74
Contacting a government official for a complaint	0.81
Refusal to pay tax or a fee to the government	0.65
Participating in a protest or demonstrations	0.79
Eigenvalue	2.91
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy	0.83

Social Capital and Violence Variables

Social capital was captured with four indicators: being a member of voluntary organizations and religious groups, discussing politics, and attending a community meeting, and these factors have been applied in previous studies (Klesner, 2007; Teorell, 2003). Respondents were asked if they belonged to voluntary and religious groups (Not a member = 0, Inactive = 1, and Active = 2). They were asked how often they discussed political matters when getting together with their friends and families (Never = 0, Fairly Often = 1, and Regularly = 2). Respondents were also asked how often they attended community meetings (Never = 0, Once = 1, A Few times = 2, and Often = 3).

For the violence variable, several questions were asked to capture the respondent’s fear and experiences of violence. The respondents were asked if they had ever feared or experienced the following types of NDV in the past two years: violence among people in their neighborhood, violence at a political event, violence during a protest or March, or an armed attack by political or religious extremists. The responses to these questions were recoded as No fear or experience or only feared violence = 0, and Experienced violence = 1. The initial options for the question on fear and experience of violence were no fear, fear, and experience. The author coded the variable to only capture respondents that had experienced violence. The recoded variable was created to distinguish between those who fear violent assaults and those who experienced them. Like NEP, a PCA using tetrachoric inter-item correlation was conducted to examine the latent construct from the four indicators of fear and experience of violence. The analysis revealed that the five questions tapped into a single underlying variable (see Table 2). The four items were used to generate an additive index, ranging from 0 (no experience of violence) to 4 (highest incidents of experience of violence) (Cronbach’s alpha = .79). This scale was used as the independent variable in all the multivariate analyses.

Table 2.

Factor Analysis of Experience of NDV.

Indicators of NEP	Factor loading
Experience of neighborhood violence	0.74
Experience of violence in a political event	0.84
Experience of violence during a protest	0.85
Experience of attacks from religious/political extremists	0.73
Eigenvalue	2.53
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy	0.81

Control Variables

The control variables used in this study are gender, educational attainment, employment status, political partisanship, religion, place of residence, time spent seeking news information, and the level of deprivation of basic needs. Most of these control variables have been applied in previous studies (see E. D. Campbell, 2013; Gil de Zuniga et al., 2012; Valenzuela et al., 2012), and they have been found to predict political participation.

Method of Data Analysis

For the multivariate analysis, negative binomial regression (NBRM) analysis was applied to generate three multivariate models. Negative binomial regression is appropriate for the nature of the outcome variable, which is a count variable. Figure 1 shows that the NEP was over-dispersed (see Figure 1). The conditional variance (2.11) is greater than the conditional mean (1.12), necessitating the condition for a negative binomial to be used rather than an ordinary linear regression. The NBRM provides extra parameters to capture the over-dispersed nature of the outcome variable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). Using NBRM, incident rates were generated. Four multivariate models were generated for the analysis. Model 1 examines the associations between the control variables and NEP. Model 2 introduces variables for social capital into the first model, model 3 adds the effects of the experience of violence, and Model 4 shows the effects of both social capital and violence variables in the same model. The sequence of the modeling strategy enables us to ascertain that the relationship between social capital and the experience of violence and NEP is not spurious. Model 1 provides a baseline, while the sequences of social capital variables in Model 2 and violence variables in Model 3 illustrate how these distinct dimensions of state engagement inform NEP while accounting for control variables. The fourth model reveals if social capital variables explain the relationship between the experience of violence and NEP or if these two orientations predict NEP independently of one another.

Figure 1.

Frequency distribution of NEP among Nigerians.

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 shows the socio-demographic and political descriptions of the respondents. The table shows that a similar number of males and females were interviewed for this study. As depicted in the table, 14% of the respondents had no formal education, 13.5% had primary education, 57% had secondary education, and 15% had a university degree. About 57% of the respondents were rural dwellers, while 44% resided in urban areas. Forty-nine percent of the respondents were employed. As for religion, 42% were Muslims, and 57% were Christians. About 48% of the respondents are affiliated with one political party. For social capital variables, about 11% and 50% of the respondents were either inactive or active members of religious organizations, respectively. About 10% and 36% were inactive and active members of voluntary organizations, respectively. About 52% and 26% discussed political matters with their friends and family members fairly often and regularly, respectively. Close to 16.3% of the respondents attended a community meeting once, 21.7% of the respondents attended a community meeting a few times, 15.4 % attended a community meeting often, and 46.6% have never attended a community meeting. For the experience of political violence, the mean score is 0.6. This implies that at least two respondents have experienced one form of NDV.

Table 3.

Descriptive Statistics.

Variables	Frequency	Percent	Variables	Frequency	Percent
Educational level			Gender
None	230	14.4	Male	801	50.1
Primary	215	13.5	Female	798	49.9
Secondary	910	57.0
University	241	15.1
Partisanship			Place of residence
No	836	52.3	Urban	646	43.5
Yes	763	47.7	Rural	904	56.5
Religion			Employment status
Muslim	669	41.8	Unemployed	811	50.7
Christian	907	56.7	Employed	789	49.3
Traditional/others	24	1.5
Level of deprivation	6.1 (M)	4.8 (SD)
Access to news information	5.6 (M)	5.1 (SD)
Social capital
Religious organization membership			Voluntary organization membership
Not a member	628	39.4	Not a member	861	54.0
Inactive	170	10.7	Inactive	158	9.9
Active	795	49.9	Active	575	36.1
Discussing politics			Attending a community meeting
Never	346	21.6	Never	745	46.6
Fairly	838	52.4	Once	260	16.3
Regular	415	26.0	Few	346	21.7
	Often	247	15.4
Violence variables
Experience of NDV		0.6 (M)	1.04 (SD)
NEP		1.1 (M)	1.5 (SD)

Note. N = 1,599.

Multivariate Analyses

Table 4 shows that variables capturing social capital influences NEP. The baseline model, Model 1, shows that gender, educational status, partisanship, and the level of basic deprivation, were significantly associated with NEP. This model is statistically significant at p < .001, and it explains about 2.1% of the variance in NEP. In this model, being a male, having a university degree, being close to a political party, and being relatively deprived of basic needs is associated with a higher tendency to engage in non-electoral activities. Model 2 is statistically significant at p < .001, and it explains the 7.7% variance in NEP. Model 2 shows that respondents who discussed politics fairly often or regularly were more likely to be participative in non-electoral activities than respondents who did not discuss politics. Also, respondents who were inactive or active members of voluntary organizations were more engaged in non-electoral political activities than respondents who did not belong to any voluntary organization. Respondents who were inactive or active members of religious organizations were more engaged in non-electoral political activities than respondents who did not belong to any religious organization. Respondents who attend community meetings were more active in non-electoral political activities than those who did not.

Table 4.

Multivariate Negative Binomial Regression for Social Capital, Domestic Violence, and NEP in Nigeria (Afrobarometer, 2017).

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender
Male (RC)
Female	−0.23 (0.07)**	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.22 (0.07)***	−0.05 (0.07)
Employment status
Unemployed (RC)
Employed	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.06)
Education
None (RC)
Primary	0.22 (0.15)	0.18 (0.14)	0.20 (0.15)	0.17 (0.14)
Secondary	0.16 (0.14)	0.22 (0.12)	0.17 (0.13)	0.22 (0.12)
University	0.34 (0.16)*	0.32 (0.14)*	0.37 (0.16)*	0.34 (0.14)*
Partisanship
No (RC)
Yes	0.41 (0.07)***	0.24 (0.07)***	0.37 (0.07)***	0.22 (0.07)**
Deprivation index	0.03 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)**
Religion
Muslim (RC)
Christian	0.12 (0.08)	−0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	−0.08 (0.07)
Traditional	0.49 (0.29)	0.28 (0.24)	0.45 (0.29)	0.27 (0.23)
Residence
Urban (RC)
Rural	0.14 (0.07)	−0.02 (0.07)	0.15 (0.07)*	−0.01 (0.07)
Access to news information	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Social capital variables
Discussion of politics
Never (RC)
Fairly	—	0.22 (0.11)*	—	0.21 (0.11)*
Regularly	—	0.30 (0.11)**	—	0.28 (0.11)*
Membership in voluntary organizations
Not a member (RC)
Inactive member	—	0.24 (0.11)*	—	0.24 (0.11)*
Active member	—	0.44 (0.08)***	—	0.42 (0.08)***
Membership in religious organizations
Not a member (RC)
Inactive member	—	0.06 (0.12)	—	0.06 (0.12)
Active member/leader	—	0.30 (0.08)***	—	0.28 (0.08)***
Attending a community meeting
Never (RC)
Once	—	0.60 (0.10)***	—	0.57 (0.10)***
Few	—	0.61 (0.10)***	—	0.61 (0.10)***
Often	—	0.79 (0.10)***	—	0.78 (0.10)***
Violence variable
Experience of violence	—	—	0.17 (0.03)***	0.11 (0.03)***
Constant	−0.61 (0.16)***	−1.34 (0.18)***	−0.69 (0.15)***	−1.36 (0.17)***
Prob > χ²	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
R ²	.021	.0765	.028	.0798
Obs	1,590	1,581	1,589	1,580

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

In Model 3, variables capturing the experience of violence were shown to predict NEP. This model is statistically significant at p < .001, and it explains the 2.8% variance in NEP. Model 3 shows that the higher the incidents of NDV, the more likely respondents were to be active in non-electoral political activities. Model 4 is the complete model, which examines the effects of social capital and violence variables on NEP. This Model is statistically significant at p < .001, explaining the 8% variance in NEP. In this model, there is a reduction in the effect of non-domestic violence on NEP when social capital variables are controlled. The coefficient of experience of violence on NEP decreased from .17 to .11. Nevertheless, the inclusion of social capital variables does not completely explain the effect of experiencing violence on NEP, nor does it change the directions or significant levels of the link between experiencing violence and NEP. This implies that social capital and experiencing violence are significantly associated with NEP in the same multivariate models without canceling out the effects of one another.

Additional analyses revealed significant interactions between some social capital variables and the experience of violence on NEP. The impact of experiencing NDV on NEP varies with membership in voluntary and religious organizations (i.e., models 5 and 6 in Table 5). This variability implies that the positive effects of NDV on NEP decreases if the individual is an active or inactive member of a voluntary group or an active member of a religious group. Figures 2 and 3 show that individuals who are non-members of religious or voluntary groups are more politically participative than individuals who are active or inactive members of such groups.

Table 5.

Regression Analysis of Social Capital, Non-Domestic Violence, and NEP in Nigeria (Afrobarometer, 2017).

Variables	Model 5	Model 6
Social capital variables
Discussion of politics
Never (RC)
Fairly	0.21 (0.11)*	0.22 (0.11)*
Regularly	0.28 (0.11)*	0.29 (0.11)*
Membership in voluntary organizations
Not a member (RC)
Inactive member	0.36 (0.13)**	0.23 (0.11)*
Active member	0.50 (0.10)***	0.42 (0.08)***
Membership in religious organizations
Not a member (RC)
Inactive member	0.05 (0.12)	0.18 (0.14)
Active member/leader	0.27 (0.08)***	0.39 (0.09)***
Attending a community meeting
Never (RC)
Once	0.57 (0.10)***	0.57 (0.10)***
Few	0.60 (0.10)***	0.61 (0.10)***
Often	0.78 (0.10)***	0.79 (0.10)***
Violence variable
Experience of political violence	0.18 (0.05)***	0.23 (0.05)***
Interactions
Membership in voluntary organizations × NDV
* ^aNot a member × NDV (RC)	0.18 (0.05)***	—
Inactive member × NDV	−0.18 (0.09)^#	—
Active member × NDV	−0.10 (0.06)^#	—
Membership in religious organizations × NDV
* ^aNot a member × NDV (RC)	—	0.23 (0.05)***
Inactive member × NDV	—	−0.20 (0.11)^#
Active member/leader × NDV	—	−0.17 (0.06)**
Constant	−1.41 (0.18)***	−1.44 (0.18)***
Prob > χ²	.0000	.0000
R ²	.081	.082
Obs	1,580	1,580

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This model controls for gender, employment status, educational attainment, partisanship, deprivation index, religious affiliation, place of residence, and access to news information.

This refers to the base effect when the experience of NDV predicts NEP in the interaction models, which represents the reference group. For the variables employed in the interaction analyses, the reference group is “Not a member.”

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ^#p < .10.

Figure 2.

The effect of NDV on NEP in the context of membership in voluntary organizations.

Figure 3.

The effect of NDV on NEP the context of membership in religious organizations.

Discussion

This study sought to examine the impact of experiencing violence on political participation in Nigeria. First, the study found that social capital indicators had a significant effect on NEP. This finding aligns with previous studies (Howard & Gilbert, 2008; Klesner, 2007; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Mora, 2013; Putnam, 1993, 1995). Studies have shown that voluntary and religious groups represent one of the various platforms through which individuals are mobilized to engage in political action (Mora, 2013; Teorell, 2003). The linkage between social capital and NEP also aligns with the ideas of Easton, which suggest that individuals are inclined to employ their discursive energies in political action. It is possible that individuals are motivated to be politically active by the resources and skills they gain from their voluntary and religious groups and political conversations with friends and family members. In addition, these findings imply that Nigerians recognize the importance of the deliberative process before making claims from the state. The deliberations and discussions within voluntary and religious groups, family, friends, and community circles can generate sufficient social capital to mobilize individuals to engage with the state. The social capital variables explain the gender gaps in NEP, suggesting that these associational platforms provide the requisite skills and knowledge for political participation. Furthermore, additional analysis of the interactions between association membership, gender, and NEP shows that women’s NEP exceeds their male counterparts if they are active members of voluntary or religious associations. This analysis is not shown in this manuscript, but it could be provided upon request

This study also found that individuals who experience more forms of NDV are more likely to participate in non-electoral political activities. This finding is in line with the third hypothesis of this study and also aligns with previous studies (Bateson, 2012; Bauer et al., 2016; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009; McKeown & Taylor, 2017). Violence and traumatic experiences can motivate individuals to seek different political avenues to voice their dissatisfaction with the state and its institutions (Blattman, 2009). The unstable (i.e., do-or-die) nature of the Nigerian political environment often causes citizens to reflect on their personal experiences of violence in the public domain. In this way, violence becomes not only a tool for engaging in Nigerian politics but also a means of making sense of the general nature of the country’s political values. This propensity for violence has epitomized Nigerian politics since 1964 (Omotola, 2010), and one can argue that individuals in an emerging third- world democracy like Nigeria often have to grapple with the contradictions of the democratic institutions and violence-oriented political norms (Ikpe, 2015).

As Schmitt (1932) argues, conflict is a persistent feature of human relations and being political, and the findings from this study suggest that the competitive nature of the polity can motivate individuals into political action. One could argue that the violence-oriented perspective can show individuals how to politically engage with the state, especially in conflict-ridden societies (Bøas & Hatløy, 2006; Christensen & Utas, 2008; Utas, 2003). For individuals in conflict-oriented societies like Nigeria, violence may be one of the acceptable means and values of social interaction, political expression, and engagement with the state. This suggests that as citizens develop and imbibe a conflict-oriented approach toward politics, they see themselves embracing and capable of handling the aggressive “do or die” nature of Nigerian politics.

More research is needed to examine the nuance of the beliefs and experiences of non-domestic violence on political behavior. These studies could be extended to the experiences of intimate partner violence and perceptions and opinions on gender relations and gender values on political behavior. Given the political-oriented nature of the survey, the Afrobarometer does not collect data on the experience of intimate partner violence, and this is the main reason why this research could not analyze or draw any conclusions on the impact of experiencing intimate partner violence. Additionally, future studies could examine the impact of other dimensions of violence on political behavior, such as intimate partner violence, state repression, police brutality, accidents, and history of child abuse.

Additional analyses (models 5 and 6 in Table 5) reveal that the effects of experiencing violence predict NEP based on the attainment of social capital, especially being a member of a religious organization. This finding suggests that voluntary or religious groups can provide some moral, social, or spiritual support for victims of NDV, enabling these victims to redirect their political energies to other non–political avenues. Also, individuals may need religious associations to engage in the symbolic and consensus-based process to define their aggressive approach to engaging the state. Dense networks of interaction probably broaden citizens’ sense of self, which enables the “I” too develop into the “we” (Putnam, 1995). Further empirical studies could explore the dynamic relationship among social capital, the experiences of violence, and political participation.

Limitations of the Study

The cross-sectional nature of the data limits the extent to which one can make causal explanations about NEP. Also, some of the reported descriptive data suggest that the survey respondents may not be representative of the Nigerian population on critical dimensions that have implications for NEP. For instance, the 2013 Nigerian Demographic Health Survey reveals that 46% of Nigerians are Christians, while 54% are Muslims (National Population Commission and ICF International, 2014). However, in the Afrobarometer survey, there are more Christians (57%) than Muslims (42%), and this survey’s respondents are considerably older and better educated than the Nigerian population. A major reason for this difference is that the Afrobarometer survey focuses on adults over the age of 18 years and this population could distort the socio-demographic composition of Nigeria.

Importantly, because this study was conducted in Nigeria, the findings may not be generalizable to other countries, especially in the global South. Nevertheless, the additional analyses with a multilevel regression analysis revealed a significant variation in the effect of the experience of NDV on political participation across 36 African countries. This finding shows the need for more studies to understand the political, socio-cultural, and institutional context of violence and political participation. Another limitation is that the options for NEP provided to the respondents were somewhat limited. The respondents were not asked the number of times they participated in the activities. One could also assume that the rates of experience of violence are underestimated, given the sensitive nature of the subject in the country. Nevertheless, the data on political participation were collected in the past year of the survey, so respondents likely could easily recall their engagement in political activities.

Conclusion

This study shows that the link between violence and political participation depends on the kind of political participation. It also shows the importance of distinguishing between experiencing violence and the context of the association between violence and political behavior, especially with regard to social capital. This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it suggests a conceptual framework that shows how the values that inform the development of Nigeria can be reflected in the political behavior of its citizens, pointing to the blurring of the values that define the political realm and civil society, as suggested by Schmitt (1932). Further studies should be undertaken to examine the process through which individuals develop these values and how these values shape an individual’s political worldview. Second, this study sheds light on the need to distinguish between the various forms of political participation when examining the role of violence. As Ley (2014) suggests, the experience of violence may suppress electoral turnout, leading individuals to direct their political energies to non-electoral forms of participation. Finally, this study shows the need to distinguish between people’s values and experiences of violence. Even though the experience of NDV increases the tendency for NEP, being a member of a voluntary and religious association reduces the effect of only NDV on participation. This finding points to a possible impact of group associations as a vital outlet for individuals to access alternative means of making claims.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge and appreciate Afrobarometer for providing the dataset used for this study. I would like to thank the peer reviewers whose invaluable insights and comments helped to improve this article. I also want to appreciate Professor Phil Goodman’s invaluable support and encouragement during the development of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Eugene Emeka Dim

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