Creating Separation From the On-Field Product: Roger Goodell’s Image Repair Discourse During the Ray Rice Domestic Violence Case

Abstract

This analysis examines National Football League (NFL) Commissioner Roger Goodell’s image repair strategies during the Ray Rice domestic violence crisis. After receiving criticism for only suspending Rice for two games, the attacks against the NFL and Goodell substantially increased when TMZ released a previously unseen video of Rice knocking out his then-fiancée Janay Palmer in a Revel Casino elevator. Facing these new attacks, Goodell relied on a separation strategy that included acknowledging the NFL had a domestic violence problem, shifting the blame to Rice, and highlighting the NFL’s new domestic violence policy which was the most stringent in professional sports. Goodell also used mortification to enhance his separation strategy to suggest that he was responsible for the insufficient punishment of Rice, which shifted the blame to Goodell and away from the NFL product and NFL owners. Unlike other CEOs who only gain notoriety during an organizational crisis, Goodell was already disliked by players and the public prior to the Rice scandal, which may have enhanced his attempts to shield the league from the scandal. Implications are drawn concerning how the public’s perception of an executive can influence the effectiveness of image repair discourse and how a separation strategy can bolster an organization’s defense.

Keywords

Roger Goodell image repair separation strategy organizational crisis communication domestic violence

Since Roger Goodell became the National Football League’s (NFL) commissioner in 2006, the value of NFL franchises has risen 32%, and during that time, Goodell has become the most well-known commissioner in professional sports (Silver, 2014). Parallel to its meteoric rise over the past three decades as the nation’s most popular sport, the NFL has also become its most image conscious. During his first year as commissioner, Goodell created the personal conduct policy that punished players for their off-field behavior (Bell, 2007). ESPN reporter Pasquarelli (2007, para. 7) opined about the differences between Goodell and his predecessor Paul Tagliabue:

Tagliabue’s style was to allow such issues to dangle, to leave them unresolved by the NFL until they were first resolved by the court system. By comparison, Goodell, all too aware of a burgeoning problem and negative ramifications in the court of public opinion, is a veritable hanging judge. Good for him.

Goodell cultivated his persona as a law-and-order commissioner doling out punishment to players under the guise of “protecting the shield.” While his protection of the NFL’s brand supported the interests of NFL owners, Goodell’s tenure as the NFL’s law enforcement arbiter drew ire from players and fans. A 2013 NFL players’ poll revealed that 61% of players disapproved of the Goodell’s performance as commissioner, which was highlighted by complaints that he was an autocrat that punished players unfairly (Garafolo, 2013). Similarly, a 2012 USA Today/Gallup poll revealed that fans disliked Goodell more than any other commissioner in professional sports¹ (Brady, 2012).

Goodell faced his largest challenge as the NFL’s commissioner during the Ray Rice domestic violence case. On February 19, 2014, TMZ Sports posted a video of Ray Rice dragging his then-fiancée Janay Palmer out of Revel Casino elevator in Atlantic City (Gray, 2014). Interestingly, the crisis was not created by Rice’s arrest for domestic violence but rather Goodell’s initial punishment of Rice (a two-game suspension) that was widely perceived as being insufficient and tone deaf (Boren, 2014). New and more intense attacks against Goodell occurred when TMZ Sports released a second video on September 8, 2014, which showed Rice knocking out Palmer with a vicious haymaker inside the Revel Casino elevator (“Ray Rice elevator knockout,” 2014). In combination with criticism that the NFL does not take domestic assault seriously, the second video provided new questions for Goodell that focused on why could TMZ gain access to video footage inside the elevator but the NFL, with all of its resources, could not?

The attacks against the NFL and Goodell’s defense discourse deserve scholarly attention for several reasons. First, this crisis represents one of the first organizational crises brought upon by leaked evidence that was widely disseminated on social media. Certainly, organizations have faced attacks due to information leaks (Basinger & Rottinghaus, 2012; Brinson & Benoit, 1999), but the Internet and social media have increased the access to information that enhanced the attacks against Goodell during the Ray Rice crisis.

Second, this article further examines the applicability and success of a separation strategy used by an organization. Previous research has primarily examined organizations using a separation strategy during the initial phase of crisis discourse (Benoit, 2015; Benoit & Lindsey, 1987; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009), but this analysis examines Goodell’s use of a separation approach after the second TMZ video raised new attacks against the NFL. Importantly, Goodell only attempted to separate Rice from the NFL after the crisis intensified, which illustrated Goodell’s initial punishment of Rice was inadequate and exposed the NFL to further attacks.

Third, a unique aspect of Goodell’s apologetic discourse is that he was well known by audiences prior to the Ray Rice scandal, whereas other figureheads of organizations using a separation strategy only gained notoriety during their respective scandals. Robert Boland, professor of sports business at New York University, noted that professional sports commissioners represented the most public chief executive officers, which would make Goodell the most visible CEO in the nation (Brady, 2012). He further noted,

No chief executive of any Fortune 500 company answers to as many vocal shareholders, an unruly coalition of owners who can have them removed. And none of them have to answer to a public or a press that second-guesses them nearly as much. (as quoted in Brady, 2012, p. C3)

The article argues that Goodell’s notoriety prior to the Ray Rice allowed him to successfully separate the NFL from the Ray Rice scandal, which included Goodell also separating himself from the NFL and taking the blame for mishandling the crisis.

Sports Image Repair

Recently, scholars have identified sports crisis communication as a legitimate area of inquiry, which has primarily focused on attacks against individual athletes. Scholarship has examined attacks based on sexual orientation (Nelson, 1984), character issues (Brazeal, 2008; Brown, Dickhaus, & Long, 2012; Frederick, Burch, Sanderson, & Hambrick, 2014), physical assault (Benoit & Hanczor, 1994; Jerome, 2008), illegal drug use (Troester & Johns, 2013; Walsh & McAllister-Spooner, 2011), performance-enhancing drugs (Glantz, 2010; Kramer, 2013; Smith, 2013), and sexual infidelity (Benoit, 2013; Huxford, 2013). While scholars have examined an individual athlete’s defense discourse, sports organizational crisis communication remains understudied. Existing research on sports organizations’ defense discourse has examined Indy Car’s image repair after a series of driver deaths (Pfahl & Bates, 2008), labor relations between Major League Baseball and the players’ association (Meyer & Cutbirth, 2013), internal conflict between Dale Earnhardt and Teresa Earnhardt (Jerome, 2008), the NHL’s image repair strategies during the 2004–2005 lockout (DiSanza, Legge, Allen, & Wilde, 2013), and Duke University’s response to the men’s lacrosse team scandal (Barnett, 2008; Fortunato, 2008; Len-Rios, 2010). Implications from these case studies reveal successful image repair efforts from sports organizations occurred when the organization relied on corrective action. In addition, sports organizations relied on shifting the blame and separation strategies that seek to distance the organization from the accused actor or group, which has an expansive history in organizational crisis communication.

Separation Strategy

In the midst of crisis and scandal, organizations have a history of trying to distance the actions of a single person or group from the organization. A separation image repair approach uses a combination of bolstering, shift the blame, and corrective action to demonstrate that the acts of particular employee do not represent the attitudes, thoughts, or actions of the organization (Brinson & Benoit, 1999). Brinson and Benoit (1999, p. 507) identified three conditions needed for a successful use of a separation strategy: “The organization should show that the offensive action violated company policy, the scapegoats must be physically and symbolically separated from the organization, and corrective action must be instituted to prevent future violations of company policy.” In the sports context, Len-Rios (2010) detailed the Duke University’s successful use of a separation strategy that attacked both the media and the district attorney, bolstered the university’s commitment to learning and diversity, and suspended the lacrosse team for the entire season. Other prominent organizations using a separation strategy were Tylenol’s crisis communication discourse after cyanide was found in bottles in 1982 (Benoit & Lindsey, 1987; Benson, 1988; Snyder & Foster, 1983), Exxon’s response to the Exxon Valdez spill (Tyler, 1997), Texaco’s discourse after executives’ racist comments became public (Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000), and the Air Force academy’s response to sexual assault allegations by female students (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009). These case studies reveal that organizations that successfully employed a separation strategy identify and disassociate deviant members from the organization. Texaco, Tylenol, and Duke University not only successfully separated the company from the actions of employees but also responded immediately to the crisis. Responding to a crisis in a timely manner illustrates the organization understands the crisis represents a story of great magnitude to the general public and stakeholders that the organization needs to attend to immediately (Fortunato, 2008).

Given Commissioner Goodell’s unique circumstances stemming from his public notoriety, this article aims to expand on current separation scholarship to include an executive accepting responsibility for the crisis in an attempt to shield the organization from harm. Generally, an organization’s figurehead is not a known public entity before a crisis emerges (Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009; Len-Rios, 2010), which would limit an executive’s ability to separate himself or herself from their organization. In contrast, Goodell used his public persona to separate his actions from the NFL to protect the on-field product from the Ray Rice scandal. Given this distinct difference, this article explores the effectiveness of Goodell’s attempt to separate the Ray Rice scandal and his initial mishandling of punishment from the NFL product.

Method

This article examines Roger Goodell’s discourse in two ways. First, this study utilizes Benoit’s (2015) image repair theory to determine what image repair strategies Goodell used after TMZ released the second Ray Rice Revel Casino elevator video. The strategies are denial (simple denial, shifting the blame), evasion of responsibility (provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions), reducing offensiveness of the event (bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attack accuser, and compensation), corrective action, and mortification (Table 1). Second, after determining what strategies Goodell used, this analysis will evaluate whether his efforts satisfied Brinson and Benoit’s (1999) conditions needed for a successful use of a separation strategy. To mitigate the damage from the Ray Rice controversy, Goodell would first need to demonstrate that Rice’s actions, as well as his own inadequate punishment of Rice, violated the values of the NFL. Then, Goodell would need to physically separate Rice from the NFL and symbolically separate his ill-fitting punishment of Rice from the NFL. Lastly, Goodell would have to employ corrective action to prevent future domestic violence crises in the NFL.

Table 1.

Image Restoration Strategies.

Strategy	Characteristic	Example
Denial
Simple denial	Did not perform the act or act is not harmful	Weiner: I did not send that illicit photo
Shift the blame	Another performed the offensive act	A madman poised Tylenol capsules
Evasion of responsibility
Provocation	Offense was a response to the bad act of another	Gave tax breaks to prevent another state from luring business away
Defeasibility	Lack of information or ability to prevent offense	W. Bush: Bad intelligence to blame for justification for War in Iraq
Accident	Mishap	Could not see your car when I hit it
Good intensions	Meant well	Reagan (I-C): My heart and best intentions tell me I did not trade arms for hostages
Reducing the offensiveness
Bolstering	Stress good traits and deeds	Clinton (drug record): We’ve asked for more money and treatment to stop drug abuse
Minimization	Portray offense as less serious than it appears	Clinton (WW): Happened years ago
Differentiation	Portray offense as less offensive than similar acts	I borrowed your car, I didn’t steal it
Transcendence	More important values	Clinton (Lewinsky): I need to go back to work for the American people
Attack accuser	Reduce credibility of accuser	Limbaugh (Sandra Fluke): This woman is a useful idiot
Compensation	Reimburse victim	BP reimburses victims of Deep Water Horizon spill
Corrective action	Plan to solve/prevent offense from reoccurring	Reagan (I-C): New CIA director, new national security advisor, new procedure
Mortification	Apologize and express remorse	Hugh Grant apologizes to Elizabeth Hurley

Note: WW = whitewater scandal, BP = british petroleum.

Source. Derived from Benoit (2015).

Analysis

Before exploring Goodell’s image repair efforts after the second TMZ Ray Rice video, this section will provide a brief timeline of Goodell’s response to the first TMZ video. Although TMZ posted the video of Ray Rice dragging his then-fiancée Janay Palmer out of an elevator on February 19, 2014, the NFL waited until after criminal investigations were completed before levying punishment. The NFL formally punished Rice on July 24, 2014, suspending him for two games costing him USD $58,000 (Gaines, 2014). The punishment was roundly criticized by media pundits and former NFL players that often referenced his persona as an aspect of their criticism. ESPN’s Ed Werder provided the most poignant response to the Rice suspension: “Interested to see how @nflcommish justifies the Ray Rice suspension. Often accused of being overly harsh, he now faces opposite criticism” (as quoted in Hensley, 2014, para. 5). Goodell initially responded to criticism during his first public appearance with reporters on August 1, 2014, during the Hall of Fame game (Spada, 2014). In this appearance, he relied on bolstering to assert that the NFL cared about domestic violence and the suspension was consistent with their personal conduct policy (Spata, 2014). He also minimized the crisis stating:

I think it’s important to understand this is a young man who made a terrible mistake. It’s inconsistent with what we’re all about, and we’ve dealt with it in a serious manner, and we’re very confident that this young man understands where he is and what he needs to do going forward. (as quoted in Spata, 2014)

Media members roundly condemned Goodell’s comments at the Hall of Fame game, which included some media members questioning whether Goodell should even be allowed to punish players anymore. ESPN’s Dan Graziano (2014, para. 1–2) stated:

Roger Goodell screwed up the Ray Rice decision royally and still doesn’t understand why. For those reasons, it is time for the NFL commissioner to give up his absolute power over the league’s personal conduct policy. The judge-jury-executioner act is played out, and Goodell, who spoke Friday for the first time since levying a two-game suspension against the Baltimore Ravens running back for domestic violence, seems to know it. While he once wielded the policy with new-sheriff bravado, he now seems almost reluctant to wield it. And the result is that he’s wielding it very poorly.

Given the inconsistency with his persona and the abundance of criticism Goodell faced after the Hall of Fame game, his use of bolstering and minimization made his image repair efforts largely ineffective.

Amid continuing criticism from the initial two-game suspension of the Ray Rice, Goodell sent a memo to all 32 teams detailing the NFL’s new domestic violence policy on August 28, 2014 (Sharp, 2014). The public release of the domestic violence policy sought to quell criticisms of Goodell’s handling of the Ray Rice case. The memo recommended six specific enhancements of their personal conduct policy with regard to domestic violence.² Goodell’s abundant use of corrective action illustrated that he understood his initial suspension of Rice and subsequent discourse were ill-conceived and the NFL’s new domestic violence policy represented the strongest such policy in professional sports. In addition to the memo detailing changes to the personal conduct policy, Goodell admitted he erred in Ray Rice’s punishment and apologized for his handling of the case. He stated,

We allowed our standards to fall below where they should be and lost an important opportunity to emphasize our strong stance on a critical issue and the effective programs we have in place. My disciplinary decision led the public to question our sincerity, our commitment, and whether we understood the toll that domestic violence inflicts on so many families. I take responsibility both for the decision and for ensuring that our actions in the future properly reflect our values. I didn’t get it right. Simply put, we have to do better. And we will. (as quoted in Sharp, 2014, para. 12)

The August 28, 2014, memo represented a strong response to criticisms that the NFL did not take domestic violence seriously. Goodell appropriately took responsibility for the insufficient suspension of Rice, reaffirmed the NFL’s position against domestic violence, and created the most stringent domestic violence policy in professional sports.

While some were satisfied by the NFL’s new domestic violence policy, some media members lamented that Goodell needed sustained criticism to provide an appropriate response to the Rice case. New York Times columnist William C. Rhoden (2014, p. B13) argued, “But just once it would be great to see this multibillion-dollar empire admit the truth without being backed into a corner.” USA Today columnist Nancy Armour (2014a, p. C) added, “It’s about time. As clueless and hostile to women as its absurdly lenient punishment of Ray Rice was, the NFL has taken a strong stand with its harsh new penalties for domestic violence.” Although critics lambasted Goodell for the NFL’s intractable response to domestic violence, the same critics overwhelmingly thought Goodell’s admission of fault and the new domestic violence policies were positive steps taken by the NFL.

TMZ Elevator Video Emerges

The NFL hoped Goodell’s defense discourse on August 28 would effectively end the Ray Rice scandal. The NFL’s desire for the Rice scandal to dissipate before the 2014 regular season started ended on September 8, 2014, when TMZ Sports released footage from inside the Revel Casino elevator that showed Rice viciously knocking out his then-fiancée Janay Palmer (“Ray Rice elevator knockout,” 2014). The video renewed and intensified attacks against Goodell and the NFL. Baltimore Sun columnist Dan Rodricks’ (2014) summarized the new attacks on Goodell:

How is it that TMZ, the celebrity gossip website, got its hands on the Ray Rice assault video before the National Football League did? Does TMZ pay more? Maybe so. But maybe the answer is even simpler than that, lying within the nature of each entity: The NFL wanted this disturbing story of domestic violence by one of its most popular players to go away, and TMZ did not. (p. A11)

The release of the TMZ elevator video provided two immediate questions: First, did Goodell or any other NFL employee see the video prior to TMZ releasing it? Second, did the NFL have access to the videotape and willfully chose not to view it? Given the serious nature of these new attacks, Goodell granted his first formal interview during the Rice scandal to defend the NFL. This analysis focuses on Goodell’s September 10, 2014, CBS News interview with Norah O’Donnell after the release of the second TMZ video undermined the success of the August 28 memo (“Roger Goodell: We didn’t see full Ray Rice video,” 2014). During this interview, Goodell relied on denial, a separation strategy (shift the blame, bolstering, and corrective action) and mortification.

Goodell stringently denied that he or anyone else in the NFL either had access to or viewed the second videotape. Norah O’Donnell began the interview asking Goodell if any NFL employee saw the video prior to TMZ releasing it, which led to this exchange:

O’Donnell:

“So did anyone in the NFL see this second videotape before Monday?”

Goodell:

“No.”

O’Donnell:

“No one in the NFL?”

Goodell:

“No one in the NFL, to my knowledge, and I had been asked that same question and the answer to that is no.”

The tone of O’Donnell’s second question, a reiteration of the first, illustrated that many believed the NFL did have access to the second videotape before it was leaked to TMZ. The “to my knowledge” aspect of Goodell’s answer would provide him a form of protection if a later investigation revealed an NFL employee had seen the second video. In addition to denying that anyone in NFL saw the second videotape, Goodell denied that the NFL could have had obtained a copy of the tape. He stated, “But we [the NFL] can’t force them [law enforcement] to provide any information.”

Goodell sought to shift the blame in two instances to further deny that any NFL employee had seen the video from inside the Revel Casino elevator. First, he subtly shifted the blame to law enforcement agencies for not providing the NFL with access to the information. While he never suggested law enforcement was at fault, he did argue the NFL was not at fault. He stated:

We were told that was not something [the video inside the elevator] we would have access to. On multiple occasions, we asked for it. And on multiple occasions we were told no. I understand that there may be legal restrictions on them sharing that with us.

Goodell’s argument about legal restrictions sought to enhance his assertion that the NFL did not have access to the video. Second, Goodell shifted the blame to Ray Rice, suggesting that he and his attorneys did not fully disclose what happened in the Revel Casino elevator. He stated, “…when we met with Ray Rice and his representatives, it was ambiguous about what actually happened…. But what we saw yesterday was extremely clear, it was extremely graphic, and it was sickening.” Here, Goodell clearly contends that Rice misled the NFL out of self-interest and if he had been truthful, the suspension would have been more severe.³

Goodell furthered his separation strategy by bolstering the NFL in three ways. Goodell bolstered his image by expressing the NFL’s interest in acquiring the elevator video, acknowledging the NFL has a domestic violence problem, and that the NFL accepts and understands its position as an instrument for social change. This exchange with O’Donnell illustrates Goodell’s bolstering strategy:

O’Donnell:

Do you wish you had seen this videotape before it was released by TMZ?

Goodell:

Absolutely.

O’Donnell:

Why?

Goodell:

That’s why we asked for it on several occasions. Because when we make a decision we want to have all the information that’s available.

O’Donnell:

But is domestic violence more widespread [in the NFL] than in the general public? Do you look at the NFL and say, “I’m the commissioner. We’ve got a problem.”

Goodell:

Absolutely. We’re saying we have a problem. We have one incident, that’s a problem.

O’Donnell:

Do you feel like your job is on the line?

Goodell:

No, I’m used to criticism. I’m used to that. Every day, I have to earn my stripes. Every day, I have to, to do a better job. And that’s my responsibility to the game, to the NFL, and to what I see as society. People expect a lot from the NFL. We accept that. We embrace that. That’s our opportunity to make a difference not just in the NFL, but in society in general. We have that ability. We have that influence. And we have to do that. And every day, that’s what we’re going to strive to do.

Goodell’s use of bolstering, if accepted by audiences, might mitigate the damage done to NFL that as the protector of the league he’d want to have access to the video while acknowledging the league has a domestic violence problem.

Another important aspect of Goodell’s separation strategy was to physically remove Rice from the NFL. Rice was suspended indefinitely from the NFL shortly after the second TMZ video was released on September 8, 2014 (Hirschhorn, 2014). When asked if Rice could someday return to the NFL he stated, “I don’t rule that out. But he would have to make sure that we are fully confident that he is addressing this issue.” In addition to Rice’s indefinite suspension, the NFL would continue to promote and potentially revise the new domestic violence policy created on August 28, 2014. He stated that the NFL is going

…to continue to try to implement our policies and…our revised education and training so that we can get to people and help people and their families make the wiser decision—and know they have resources available.

In addition to the use of a traditional separation strategy, Goodell continued his use of mortification from the August 28 memo, arguing he “didn’t get it right” when he initially punished Rice. Goodell’s use of mortification furthered his separation strategy as he sought to take blame for the Ray Rice situation and separate the NFL from the crisis. He argued that contents of the first video were unacceptable and “that’s why we took action, albeit insufficient action. And we acknowledge that, we took responsibility for that—I did personally—and I take responsibility for that now.” During the interview, O’Donnell continued to press Goodell why the NFL did not punish Rice further after the first video was released. He stated, “I acknowledged that we didn’t get this [Ray Rice scandal] right. That’s my responsibility. And I’m accountable for that.”

Goodell’s continued to refrain that the Rice scandal was his “responsibility” and was an attempt to shift the blame away from the NFL and toward himself. Rather than have owners discuss the issue, in particular Baltimore Ravens owner Steve Bisciotti, Goodell sought to be the face of the Rice scandal and accept any criticism about his handling of the case. As a result, Goodell figuratively separated himself from the NFL creating the perception that the NFL did not bungle the Rice case, the commissioner did. By separating Rice through the indefinite suspension and himself by becoming the face of the Rice scandal, Goodell enhanced his image repair efforts to protect the on-field product and NFL owners. While he may have botched the initial punishment of Rice, Goodell’s use of bolstering, corrective action and his ability and willingness to take the full responsibility of the crisis demonstrated his commitment to protecting the organization.

Evaluation

This section evaluates Roger Goodell’s defense discourse with regard to the plausibility and of the strategies used and external data. This section uses media opinions and polling data to assist in evaluating Goodell’s image repair strategies during his interview with Nora O’Donnell.

The goodwill built by the NFL’s new domestic violence policy was rendered ineffective with regard to media audiences when TMZ published the second video showing Ray Rice knocking out Janay Palmer. Yet Goodell’s use of a separation strategy (shift the blame, bolstering, and corrective action) was effective with NFL owners and shifted the focus of the scandal away from the NFL product and toward Rice and Goodell’s handling of the crisis. Additionally, Goodell’s use of denials that any member of the NFL had seen the video inside the Revel Casino elevator was appropriate but was not accepted by most audiences, given the resources available to the NFL relative to TMZ’s resources. Nonetheless, Goodell’s use of a separation strategy shifted the blame to Rice, bolstered the NFL’s new policy against domestic violence, and Rice’s indefinite suspension represented the harshest punishment for a professional U.S. athlete accused of domestic violence. Additionally, Goodell’s desire to take full responsibility for the crisis insulated NFL owners and the NFL product from further damage or scrutiny due to Goodell’s mishandling of Rice’s case.

As expected, media pundits lambasted Goodell’s position after the O’Donnell interview. USA Today columnist Jarrett Bell (2014a, p. C1) opined, “As this case drags on—casting an ever-growing dark cloud over the league and leading national newscasts—Goodell and the NFL find themselves in an uncomfortable position: telling a story that no one believes.” Washington Post columnist Mike Wise (2014, para. 1–2) argued that NFL owners should fire Goodell, stating: “It comes down to this: If Goodell’s league cannot better protect battered women, what good is this moral armor Goodell has the audacity to call ‘The Shield’?” Media members have later identified that taking criticism for the league is part of Goodell’s job description. Pardon the Interruption’s cohost Michael Wilbon stated, “He [Goodell] is the whipping boy for the owners. They flog him and the general public every time Goodell steps out of his house, he is booed without mercy.” Cohost Tony Kornheiser agreed: “That the owners sit back and they say, ‘You know what? We’re not being booed. That guy’s [Goodell] being booed’” (Rydholm, 2017). Goodell’s public persona ensured that he, not the NFL as an institution, would draw the majority of the criticism from the Ray Rice scandal.

While media opinions were aghast at Goodell’s mishandling of the Rice case, NFL owners appeared satisfied with Goodell’s actions. New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft stated, “The way he has handled this situation himself, coming out with the mea culpa in his statement 10 days ago, and setting a very clear policy of how we conduct ourselves in the NFL, I thought was excellent” (as quoted in Armour, 2014b, p. C1). Atlanta Falcons owner Arthur Blank displayed outward support stating, “I think that Roger will do whatever is right for the league” (as quoted in Bell, 2014b, para. 5). Houston Texans owner Bob McNair acknowledged Goodell erred in his initial punishment of Rice but argued Goodell,

recognized that he made the wrong decision, and he corrected it. That’s what you want an executive to do. I think he’s being honest with us, he’s working hard and providing good leadership. That’s why he has the support. (para. 8).

Given the clear support from NFL owners, Goodell’s discourse convinced owners that he was still an effective disciplinarian and a positive influence for the NFL. Polling data illustrated a mixed response from fans about Goodell’s job performance and their overall interest in the NFL. With regard to the central question in the second phase of Goodell’s discourse, fans did not believe he was being truthful that no one in the NFL had seen the second Ray Rice video. A September 12, 2014, ESPN poll found that 55% of respondents believed that Goodell was being untruthful, with only 24% stating he was truthful, and 21% stated they had no opinion (“Poll mixed on Goodell keeping job,” 2014). The September 19, 2014, Sports Illustrated Marketing and Research Resources poll found that only 28.5% of fans believed Goodell should keep his job, 33.6% were unsure, and 37.8% of fans thought he should be fired (“NFL fan poll,” 2014). Yet the same poll revealed that while fans thought Goodell was performing poorly and that would not influence their desire to continue to watch the NFL. A majority (59%) of respondents stated their level of interest in the NFL remained the same from the year before, 32% stated their level of interest increased, and only 9% stated their interest decreased. An NBC News/Marist poll supported the results of the Sports Illustrated poll, which found that 86% of NFL fans would not change their NFL viewing habits because of the recent domestic violence scandal (Murray, 2014). These polling data demonstrated that while Goodell might draw the ire of NFL fans, it had little effect on their desire to watch the NFL. Overall, given the support from NFL owners and fans’ continued interest in watching the NFL, Goodell’s discourse appears to have been effective in saving his job and protecting the overall image of the league.

Implications

After examining Goodell’s defense discourse, this study offers several implications with regard to sports organization crisis communication. This analysis further supports that a separation strategy can be a successful approach for organizations amidst crisis, even if the strategy was only successful for certain audiences. Consistent with Furgerson and Benoit (2013), Goodell’s discourse was effective for primary stakeholders (NFL owners) even if his responses were panned by critics and the general public. Brinson and Benoit (1999) noted that successful uses of a separation strategy depend on three conditions. First, the organization should establish that the employee violated corporate policy, the offenders should be symbolically and physically separated from the organization, and company should take corrective action to avoid similar violations in the future. After the TMZ elevator video was released, Goodell shifted the blame to Rice and his attorneys claiming they withheld key details of the assault, suspended Rice indefinitely, and referred to the new stringent domestic violence policy the NFL created on August 28, 2014. While Goodell’s discourse was largely ineffective for the media, his separation strategy was effective with NFL owners. Additionally, while fans may have been outraged by Rice’s actions and Goodell’s response, they separated those events from actually watching the NFL with only nine percent of fans when polled said they would watch less than before during the 2014 season.

Second, this study further explores how the 21st-century digital landscape can change the exigences of a crisis situation. Consistent with previous research (Young & Flowers, 2012), this analysis found that the second TMZ video heightened the attacks against the NFL in ways that a general discussion of Ray Rice’s actions would not have produced. Additionally, the TMZ video went viral, which meant audiences were more likely to have viewed Rice’s attacks on his fiancée than viewing Goodell’s image repair discourse on CBS News. Future research should continue to examine how YouTube and social media can create or intensify an attack on an organization.

Third, this article contends that the public’s prior perception of Goodell assisted in his ability to separate his mishandling of the Ray Rice crisis from the NFL product. Unlike the figureheads at Texaco (Brinson & Benoit, 1999), Exxon (Tyler, 1997), or Duke University (Len-Rios, 2010), Roger Goodell was already a commissioner well-known to public audiences. Fans already disliked the commissioner (Brady, 2012), which made separating the responsibility of the Rice scandal from the NFL and toward Goodell a plausible strategy. Even though there was near consensus criticism from the media about Goodell’s handling of the Rice scandal, fans continued to watch the NFL. Baron (2015) noted that the 2014 season represented the second most watched NFL season behind the 2010 season, increased the number of telecasts with 29 million viewers or more from one in 2013 to five in 2014, and an NFL game was the most watched TV show for all 17 weeks of the season. These data reveal that fans may hate Goodell and the way he handled the Rice scandal, but those feelings did not dissuade them from consuming the NFL product in any way. Given Goodell’s successful redirection of fans displeasure toward him and away from the NFL product, future studies should explore how prior public perception of an executive may influence the types of image repair strategies an executive uses and their relative success.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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