The Tweet Heard Round the World: Daryl Morey,the NBA,China,and Attribution of Responsibility

Abstract

Following Houston Rockets General Manager Daryl Morey’s social media post advocating for Hong Kong independence, a 2 (NBA, Houston Rockets) × 3 (attacking the accuser, justification, apology) experimental design was utilized to explore the effects of different crisis response strategies on sports fan relationships between/among a professional sport league, one of its teams, and crisis responsibility attribution. Results indicated that apology strategy functioned better in reducing the blame placed on the organization than attacking strategy. Also, people with a more positive relationship or a higher level of identification with the organization would attribute less responsibility. However, when controlling the organization-public relationship or sport identification, response strategies could no longer predict attribution of responsibility significantly, suggesting that the previous relationship matters more than which response strategy is utilized in a crisis.

Keywords

crisis response strategy organization-public relationship attribution of crisis responsibility identification NBA

On October 4, 2019, Daryl Morey, the general manager of the Houston Rockets, posted a tweet, concisely reading: “Fight for Freedom. Stand with Hong Kong.” As Hong Kong independence has long been a “third rail” issue for the Chinese government and Chinese citizens (France24.com, 2019), these seven simple words suddenly placed himself, the team, and the National Basketball Association (NBA) in the middle of a geopolitical controversy. Morey’s tweet seemingly rebuked China’s stance, evoking firm opposition, protest, and denouncement from mainland China. Such strife was major for NBA stakeholders as China is the league’s second-largest market (Blinebury, 2016), and NBA icon Yao Ming had made the Rockets “China’s team” (Wan, 2016).

Facing fierce criticism from Chinese fans, sponsors, and commercial partners, Morey stated in a subsequent tweet that he was “merely voicing one thought, based on one interpretation, of one complicated event” and “my tweets are my own and in no way represent the Rockets or the NBA,” with both evoked entities then distancing themselves from Morey’s tweet (ESPN.com, 2019). However, financial fallout nevertheless occurred; most Chinese sponsors suspended associations with the Houston Rockets and Chinese broadcasters stopped broadcasting Rockets games specifically, resulting in a loss up to $400 million for the league (Young, 2020) before the COVID-19 pandemic prematurely ended the season.

A sport crisis can arise for a variety of reasons, including competitive situations (e.g., fighting, cheating), off-field events (e.g., scandal, abuse), reflections about identity issues (e.g., gender bias, racial stereotypes) and beyond (Billings et al., 2017). Morey’s case obviously was of the off-field variety, disrupting the relationship between the NBA and China while evoking inquiry regarding whether a different announcement or response crisis strategy could have yielded a better result. Scholars have explored the effectiveness of different response strategies in sport crisis events (e.g., Benoit, 2013; Billings et al., 2018), yet the intermingling of sport organizations and overseas stakeholders—particularly within a geopolitical crisis—has not received empirical investigation. The huge financial potential, population size, level of popularity of basketball in China, and complicated political and historical context, make China an important territory to understand in today’s sport market. Thus, a study examining Chinese NBA fan reactions to Morey’s remark based on different potential crisis response strategies and messengers offers the opportunity for substantial insight.

Prior relationships with an organization can affect the amount of blame placed on the involved organization (Brown & White, 2011). Therefore, organization-public relationships (OPRs) are measured to test whether pre-crisis relationships Chinese fans had with the NBA and the Houston Rockets influence attributions of responsibility for the league and the team. While OPR offers relational perspectives for studying crisis situations, sport identification facilitates psychological approaches because the level of team/league identification could predict sport spectator affection and behavior (Fisher & Wakefield, 1998; Potter & Keene, 2012). As attribution of responsibility reflects stakeholder attitudes toward an organization after a crisis and may further affect consumption behaviors, this study also explores the effect of sport identification on post-crisis reactions, providing new insights into communicative crisis management.

Literature Review

Situational Crisis Communication Theory

A crisis is defined as “a sudden and unexpected event that threatens to disrupt an organization’s operations and poses both financial and a reputation threat” (Coombs, 2007, p. 164). Reputation functions as a valuable asset when determining an organization’s financial performance (Carmeli & Tishler, 2005); therefore, the effectiveness of different response strategies in dealing with the crisis-based reputational threat is crucial. Informed by attribution theory (Weiner, 1985), Coombs’s (2007) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) provides a mechanism for measuring which types of response strategy work best in minimizing an organization’s reputational damage. When facing an unexpected event, people usually make sense of the situation through placing responsibility on something or someone (Weiner, 1985), with SCCT postulating that the less responsibility stakeholders believe the organization assumes, the better the strategy.

SCCT categorizes response strategies into four postures: (a) denial, (b) diminishment, (c) rebuilding, and (d) bolstering. Denial strategies remove the connection between the organization and the crisis, including attacking the accuser or scapegoating. Diminishment strategies argue the crisis is not that bad or the organization lacks the control, and includes excuses and justification. Rebuilding strategies offset the negative influence by offering compensation or taking the responsibility actively. Finally, bolstering strategies refer to building positive connections between the organization and the public, such as reminding the stakeholders of an organization’s past good works.

SCCT recommends managers choose response strategies based on the evaluation of the current crisis situation. While rebuilding strategies (e.g., compensation, apology) focus on victims well and offer high perceived organizational sincerity, it is not always the best choice (Benoit & Drew, 1997; Coombs & Holladay, 2008). Coombs and Holladay (1996) suggest that increased compensating does not always manifest in reputation protection and, sometimes, may even make stakeholders think the crisis is worse than initially conceived (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). Based on evaluating the factors influencing reputational threats (e.g., crisis history, prior relational reputation), SCCT suggests that diminishing strategies are best used when there is a positive or neutral prior relationship, rebuilding strategies should be adopted when there is a negative previous relationship, and denial strategies can be utilized when there is no history of similar crises. As such, this study focuses on three postures (denial, diminishment, and rebuilding) to explore which works best in reducing the blame people place on the involved stakeholders. The three strategies selected were: (a) attacking the accuser (from denial), (b) justification (from diminishment), and (c) apology (from rebuilding), as they were the most-used strategies in previous studies (e.g., Brown & White, 2011; Ki & Brown, 2013) and proved more relevant/feasible in the specific case of Daryl Morey.

The effectiveness of response strategies on attribution of responsibility has also been tested (e.g.,Brown & White, 2011; Ki & Brown, 2013; Sisco, 2012), confirming that certain SCCT strategies worked better in reducing public blame (e.g., Kiambi & Shafer, 2016; Sisco, 2012), while other studies found no significant differences among those strategies (Brown & White, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Ki & Brown, 2013). The current study adopts an experimental design to explore how the level of attribution of crisis responsibility differs depending on the applied response strategies (attacking, justification, and apology) and the implementer of the strategy (NBA or the Houston Rockets). As such, two initial research questions are advanced:

RQ₁: Which crisis response strategy produces the highest attribution of crisis responsibility for the NBA?

RQ₂: Which crisis response strategy produces the highest attribution of crisis responsibility for the Houston Rockets?

Organizational-Public Relationship

As a prominent paradigm in public relations research, relationship management offers a framework for investigating whether the relationship history between the organization and its stakeholders influences crisis reactions. Organization-public relationship (OPR), defined as “the state which exists between an organization and its key publics in which the actions of either entity impact the economic, social, political, and/cultural well-being of the other entity” (Bruning & Ledingham, 1999, p. 160), is utilized to predict people’s perception of a crisis. Connecting crisis communication to OPR, positive relationships are likely to mitigate the negative influence of a crisis (Kim & Lee, 2005), leading to more support for an organization (Ulmer, 2001), and helping managers understand the nature of the crisis to form appropriate response strategies (Coombs & Holliday, 2001). However, negative relationship histories can damage the organization reputation and cause less support (Park & Reber, 2011). As such, two hypotheses about the predictability of the OPR on responsibility attribution are proposed:

H₁: A more positive OPR (with the NBA) will predict a lower level of attribution of responsibility for the NBA, regardless of crisis response strategy.

H₂: A more positive OPR (with the Houston Rockets) will predict a lower level of attribution of responsibility for the Houston Rockets, regardless of crisis response strategy.

Coombs and Holladay (2001) also call for scholars to explore the impact of pre-crisis relationships on the ability of crisis response strategies to lessen attribution of responsibility. Brown and White (2011) test the mediating effect of the OPR on both responsibility attribution and the utilization of response strategies, finding that maintaining a positive OPR before the crisis is more effective in reducing the blame than considering which crisis response strategy should be used. The current study extends previous studies by measuring two—rather than one—directly-involved organizational response strategies. Also, rather than categorizing the prior relationship as a binary (good/bad; e.g. Brown & White, 2011; Kiambi & Shafer, 2016), this study measures the OPR as a continuous variable, as all participants recruited in this study are already fans of a sport league (NBA). Therefore, two additional research questions are posed:

RQ₃: With NBA-based OPR controlled, which crisis response strategy produces the best attribution of crisis responsibility for the NBA?

RQ₄: With Houston Rockets-based OPR controlled, which crisis response strategy produces the best attribution of crisis responsibility for the Houston Rockets?

Team Identification and League Identification

The OPR provides a relational approach, while sport identification offers a psychological perspective for interpreting crisis events. Based in principles of social identity theory, team identification refers to an individual’s emotional bond with a sport team (Sutton et al., 1997), with such bonds leading to the “pressure to evaluate one’s own group positively” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 16). Organizational communication researchers have found highly-identified members use more linguistic defense mechanisms to make sense of or justify their organization’s wrongdoing, warranting exploration of whether sport fan crisis reactions can be affected by identification levels (Ploeger & Bisel, 2013).

Numerous studies have analyzed the affective, physiological, and behavioral consequences of team identification, finding high identification can predict intense reactions to the game outcome and team-related news (Potter & Keene, 2012), increased merchandise purchases and media consumption (Fisher, 1998; Fisher & Wakefield, 1998), and steadfast loyalty to the team even when it is an underdog (Wann & Branscombe, 1990). In this study, team identification and league identification are explored to analyze a crisis from a psychological perspective. Because people feel tendencies to prefer “in-groups” and a higher level of identification often leads to more protective behaviors, two additional hypotheses are proposed:

H₃: A higher level of league identification will predict a lower level of attribution of responsibility for the NBA, regardless of crisis response strategy.

H₄: A higher level of team identification will predict a lower level of attribution of responsibility for the Houston Rockets, regardless of crisis response strategy.

Finally, this study examines how team/league identification and crisis response strategies could collectively affect responsibility attribution, providing the foundation for two final research questions:

RQ₅: With league identification controlled, which crisis response strategy produces the best attribution of crisis responsibility for the NBA?

RQ₆: With team identification controlled, which crisis response strategy produces the best attribution of crisis responsibility for the Houston Rockets?

Method

As experimental designs provide a clearer understanding of the effects of certain crisis stimuli (Coombs & Holladay, 2008), this study applies a 2 (the NBA/the Houston Rockets) × 3 (attacking, justification, apology) between-subject design to access responsibility attribution for the two involved organizations based on crisis response strategies.

Participants

Participants included 321 Chinese self-identified NBA fans recruited from a Chinese website Wen Juan Xing, a for-profit organization facilitating researchers in data collection from targeted populations. To participate, all participants had to identify as at least a “4” on a one to seven (low-high) author-created semantic differential scale indicating their NBA fandom as well as acknowledging awareness of Morey’s tweet (a single question asking whether they were aware of this event). Of the 321 respondents, 194 (60.4%) reported their favorite NBA team is the Houston Rockets, and 127 (39.6%) favored other NBA teams. Heavy Rockets fandom is unsurprising given the influence of former Rocket Yao Ming, creating a de facto “home team” for many Chinese fans (Blinebury, 2016). Similar to the overall NBA fan demographics (Gaille, 2015), in this study, 70.4% (n = 226) of the participants identified as male and 29.6% (n = 95) identified as female. Respondents also reported their age (M = 28.12, SD = 6.58).

Measurement of Independent Variables

Team/league identification, OPRs, and crisis response strategies were each treated as independent variables, each unpacked as measures below.

Team identification

Team identification was measured using Wann and Branscombe’s (1993) Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS), with seven, 7-point Likert-type items (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). Sum scores of the seven items were utilized to represent individuals’ team identification, ranging from 7 to 49. Higher scores represented higher levels of team identification. Cronbach’s α was acceptable (α = 0.74); mean and standard deviation of this scale were calculated (M = 38.89, SD = 4.51).

League identification

League identification was measured via a modification of Reysen and Branscombe’s (2010) fanship scale, with seven, 7-point Likert-type items (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Sum scores of the seven items were used to indicate individuals’ level of league identification, ranging from 7 to 49. Higher scores represented higher levels of league identification. Cronbach’s α was acceptable (α = 0.80); mean and standard deviation were calculated (M = 34.72, SD = 5.67).

Organization-Public Relationship (OPR)

Prior relationships with the NBA and the Houston Rockets were both measured using a modification of Bruning and Galloway’s (2003) OPR scale consisting of 12 items. Three items were utilized within four overarching dimensions: anthropomorphism (whether people trust the organization), professional benefits/expectations (beliefs about whether the organization will engage in those responsible actions or not), personal commitment (the degree of closeness people feel toward the organization), and comparison of alternatives (whether stakeholders think other providers can offer similar or better service than the organization). Respondents answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), with scores in professional benefits/expectations and comparison of alternatives reverse coded. The four dimensions were combined to produce an overall score for the OPR, ranging from 12 to 84. A higher score represented a more positive OPR. Cronbach’s α for the NBA was acceptable (α = 0.80) and for the Rockets was good (α = 0.92). Means and standard deviations were calculated for the NBA (M = 60.61, SD = 8.30) and for the Houston Rockets (M = 56.83, SD = 13.54).

Crisis response strategies

After answering questions about their team/league identification and OPRs, each participant was randomly assigned to one of the six stimuli (shown in the Appendix), with each manipulation involving a fictitious newspaper article pertaining to the organization’s response to Morey’s remark but with different messengers (NBA, Houston Rockets) and response strategies (attacking the accuser, justification, apology). Fictitious articles were prepared to ensure consistency of variable manipulation and control of all other potentially confounding variables. After reading the fictitious news article, participants received a manipulation check item asking them to recall the spokesperson and the crisis response strategy used. For example, participants who read “attacking the accuser” article were asked whether “NBA attacks China and refuses to punish Daryl Morey for his remarks.” Only correct responses were considered valid data.

Of the 321 respondents, 54 (16.8%) were exposed to stimulus 1 (attacking/NBA), 51 (15.9%) were exposed to stimulus 2 (attacking/the Rockets), 54 (16.8%) were exposed to stimulus 3 (justification/NBA), 54 (16.8%) were exposed to stimulus 4 (justification/the Rockets), 52 (16.2%) were exposed to stimulus 5 (apology/NBA), and 56 (17.5%) were exposed to stimulus 6 (apology/the Rockets).

Measurement of the Dependent Variable

Attribution of responsibility functioned as the dependent variable, using a modification of McAuley’s et al. (1992) Causal Dimension Scale II (CDSII) with total of 10 items to measure how much responsibility and blame people place on the NBA/Houston Rockets. Four dimensions (locus of causality, stability, personal control, and external control) were tested and respondents answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Sum scores of the ten items were used to indicate one’s attribution score, ranging from 10 to 70. A higher score represented greater responsibility which people attribute to the organization for causing this crisis. Cronbach’s α for the NBA (α = 0.79) and for the Rockets were both acceptable (α = 0.82). Mean and standard deviations were calculated for the NBA (M = 49.98, SD = 8.32) and for the Houston Rockets (M = 48.01, SD = 9.52).

Results

RQ₁: Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Highest Attribution of Crisis Responsibility for the NBA?

A one-way ANOVA tested the effect of crisis response strategies. The mean scores of attribution of crisis responsibility for the NBA ranked from highest to lowest and the standard deviations were shown in Table 1.

Table 1.

Means and Standard Deviations of Attribution Scores for the NBA.

Crisis Response Strategies/Subject	Mean	SD
Attacking/NBA	52.80	6.27
Attacking/the Rockets	52.71	9.09
Justification/the Rockets	49.85	9.71
Justification/NBA	48.98	7.17
Apology/the Rockets	48.02	8.67
Apology/NBA	47.69	7.32

Results also indicate the differences among the six groups were significant (F(5,315) = 4.087, p = .001, R² = .06). Therefore, Bonferroni tests were utilized to explore whether the difference between every two groups was significant, and multiple comparisons results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Multiple Comparisons Between Crisis Response Strategies.

Response Strategies/Subject	1	2	3	4	5
1. Attacking/NBA
2. Attacking/the Rockets	1.000
3. Justification/the Rockets	.910	1.000
4. Justification/NBA	.229	.293	1.000
5. Apology/the Rockets	.003	.047	1.000	1.000
6. Apology/NBA	.020	.029	1.000	1.000	1.000

Findings indicate that the attacking strategy produced more attribution of responsibility for the NBA than the apology strategy, no matter who implements it. However, differences between attacking and justification strategies—as well as between justification and apology strategies—were not significant.

RQ₂: Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Highest Attribution of Crisis Responsibility for the Houston Rockets?

A one-way ANOVA tested the effectiveness of crisis response strategies. The mean scores of attribution of crisis responsibility for the Rockets ranked from highest to lowest along with the standard deviations were shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Means and Standard Deviations of Attribution Scores for the Rockets.

Crisis Response Strategies/Subject	Mean	SD
Attacking/the Rockets	51.65	9.69
Justification/the Rockets	49.74	10.92
Justification/NBA	48.67	8.85
Attacking/NBA	47.33	8.60
Apology/the Rockets	46.18	8.63
Apology/NBA	44.62	8.99

Differences among the six groups were significant (F(5,315) = 3.857, p = .002, R² = .06). Therefore, Bonferroni tests explored whether the difference between each pair was significant and the multiple comparisons results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

Multiple Comparisons Between Crisis Response Strategies.

Crisis Response Strategies/Subject	1	2	3	4	5
1. Attacking/the Rockets
2. Justification/the Rockets	1.000
3. Justification/NBA	1.000	1.000
4. Attacking/NBA	.274	1.000	1.000
5. Apology/the Rockets	.039	.685	1.000	1.000
6. Apology/NBA	.002	.073	.387	1.000	1.000

Fans attributed more responsibility to the Rockets when the Rockets applied the attacking strategy compared with when the NBA/Rockets used the apology strategy. There were no significant differences found between attacking and justification strategies, between justification and apology strategies, or between the attacking strategy and the apology strategy as applied by the NBA.

H₁/H₂: A More Positive OPR Will Predict a Lower Level of Attribution of Responsibility, Regardless of Crisis Response Strategy

Hypothesis 1 and 2 tested whether the OPR would negatively predict the attribution of responsibility. For Hypothesis 1, single linear regression indicated that the OPR (with the NBA) was a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility for the NBA (β = −.127, p = .024); Hypothesis 1 was supported.

For Hypothesis 2, single linear regression indicated that the OPR (with the Rockets) was a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility for the Rockets (β = −.217, p < .001); Hypothesis 2 was also supported.

H₃/H₄: A Higher Level of Identification will Predict a Lower Level of Attribution of Responsibility, Regardless of Crisis Response Strategy

Hypotheses 3 and 4 tested whether the league/team identification level would negatively predict the attribution of responsibility. For Hypothesis 3, single linear regression indicated that the league identification was a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility for the NBA (β = −.23, p = .005); Hypothesis 3 was supported.

For Hypothesis 4, single linear regression indicated that the team identification was not a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility for the Rockets (β = −.017, p = .909); Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

RQ₃/RQ₄: With the OPR Controlled, Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Best Attribution of Crisis Responsibility?

Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) explored the relationships among response strategies, attribution of crisis responsibility, and the OPR. For Research Question 3 (about the NBA), the interaction between response strategies and the OPR was not significant (F(5,309) = 1.184, p = .317, R² = .02). Therefore, the effect of response strategies and the OPR on attribution scores are discussed individually. When considering the influence of response strategies, OPR was a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(1,309) = 8.045, p = .005, R² = .03). However, when considering the influence of the OPR, crisis response strategy was not a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(5,309) = .866, p = .504, R² = .01).

For Research Question 4 (about the Rockets), the interaction between response strategies and the OPR was not significant (F(5,309) = .681, p = .638, R² = .01). Therefore, the effect of response strategies and the OPR on attribution scores are discussed individually. When considering the influence of response strategies, OPR was a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(1,309) = 30.346, p < .001, R² = .09). However, when considering the influence of the OPR, response strategy was not a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(5,309) = .404, p = .846, R² = .01). Therefore, Research Question 3 and 4 were answered, indicating that when controlling the OPR, crisis response strategy could not predict the attribution of responsibility in a significant way.

RQ₅/RQ₆: With Sport Identification Controlled, Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Best Attribution of Crisis Responsibility?

ANCOVAs also examined the relationships among response strategies, attribution of crisis responsibility, and sport identification. For Research Question 5 (about the NBA), the interaction between response strategies and league identification was not significant (F(5,309) = .741, p = .594, R² = .01). The effect of response strategies and league identification on attribution scores are discussed individually. When considering the influence of response strategies, league identification was a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(1,309) = 10.738, p = .001, R² = .03). However, when considering the influence of league identification, crisis response strategy was not a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(5,309) = .416, p = .838, R² = .01).

For Research Question 6 (about the Rockets), the interaction between response strategies and team identification was not significant (F(5,309) = .472, p = .797, R² = .01). The effect of response strategies and team identification on attribution scores are discussed individually. When considering the influence of response strategies, team identification was not a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(1,309) = 1.865, p = .173, R² = .01) and when considering the influence of team identification, crisis response strategy was also not a significant predictor of the attribution of responsibility (F(5,309) = .240, p = .945, R² = .01). Therefore, Research Question 5 and 6 were answered, showing that when controlling league/team identification, crisis response strategy could not predict the attribution of responsibility in a significant way.

Discussion

Previous reputation management scholarship delineates that consumer-brand identification plays a key role in determining effective response strategies (Ma, 2000) and that groups in which people identify shift such equations notably (Brown et al., 2015). This study offers noteworthy advancements in the variables that are part and parcel of the way attribution of responsibility unfolds. Theoretical and practical insights can be gleaned.

First, from a theoretical perspective, SCCT strategies initially unfold from an evaluation of the current crisis situation. The tweet from Daryl Morey was unique in that many NBA fans in its home nation (the United States) likely rated the post to be benign (while some public figures, such as LeBron James, commented about Morey not being educated on the situation), whereas fans within the league’s most prominent secondary market (China) received the comment as much more seminal, controversial, and urgent. General lack of understanding of the mainland China/Hong Kong relationship led to most Americans’ failure to understand why a tweet could cause this level of crisis. The messengers in this study (NBA, Houston Rockets) were both U.S.-based; the subjects in this study were all in China, creating a unique confluence of identities that could be activated, including nationality, sports/NBA fandom, and the organization/public relationship (OPR).

An additional core theoretical contribution pertains to the collective findings of all research questions and hypotheses, as the main message from the study appears to be that social identity can overshadow crisis communication strategies, at least within highly-identified sporting situations. Here, the key predictors of team and league identification resulted in more clear shifts in attribution of responsibility than the strategy employed. Sports fans with high degrees of commitment have been found to enact their own reputation management strategies within social media (Brown & Billings, 2013). As such, crisis communication scholars should include potential in-group affiliations within strategic experimental designs, whether involving sports or other areas in which affiliation appears central, such as in political or religious contexts.

The first two research questions revealed what SCCT long has established: strategies matter. More specifically, the attacking strategy attributed more responsibility than either of the other tested strategies (justification, apology). Intriguingly, though, people attributed more responsibility when the Rockets applied the attacking strategy, but not when the NBA did so. One possible reason is the previous close relationship between the Rockets and China (because of Yao’s influence), making it even harder for Chinese fans to accept such a long-beloved “home team’s” failure to understand the importance of geopolitical issues in China. As such, future research could explore whether sports fans are somewhat more tolerant of the global sports brand than of a specific sports team when specifically using the attacking strategy for reputation management.

While SCCT strategies resulted in differing attribution of responsibility as the apology strategy significantly diminished the blame placed on the organization more than the attacking strategy, it was the elements of identity that proved most essential to how Chinese fans responded to the stimulus. The perceived OPR appears key (as indicated in H₁ and H₂), as does league identification (yet, interestingly, not team identification, as suggested in H₃ and H₄). Indeed, once OPR and league identification were controlled for within the analysis, attribution of responsibility could not be predicted by the response strategy utilized (as indicated in RQ₃, RQ₄, and RQ₅). As such, relationships and identification with the entity seeking to navigate a crisis became more crucial than the manner in which the actual crisis was being handled. This finding does not imply that SCCT strategies did not matter but, rather, that such strategies become a second-order function of the primary part of the equation, which pertains to the attitudes people had about the entity (in this case, the NBA) at the onset of the potential crisis event.

This illustrates how important brand communication management strategies that create strong team and league affiliation are in facilitating a positive public relations outcome before any crisis occurs. This also implies that team and league marketing and communications strategies should be continually evaluated and refreshed to maintain brand affinity and image (see Vincent et al., 2020). Moreover, the significant results yielded by team identification and league identification on the measure of attribution of responsibility (in H₃ and H₄) further indicate that while both refer to identifying with a sport organization, one’s connection with a team and with the whole league may predict different attitudes toward a crisis event. Scholars should differentiate between these two terms in future crisis communication studies.

From a more practical perspective, several potential reasons provide additional insight and nuance for the findings. Arguably the most crucial of these factors is that sports fandom tends to produce higher levels of global identification than virtually any other context in which people interact (Hill & Vincent, 2006). It is well-established that sports media, in particular, features elements of fandom and avidity that is unparalleled to any other media product (Gantz et al., 2006) and the same likely applied to most other entities utilizing situational crisis communication strategies. Prior studies have applied SCCT to entities such as non-profit organizations (Sisco, 2012) and textile companies (Ulmer, 2001) yet these entities are unlikely to occupy the daily, repetitive psychological space that sports fandom entails.

Previous research also has shown that social media makes both the crisis and the responses to it unfold in different manners (Graham et al., 2015) and the same likely holds within the current study as well. The fact that social media is a much more regulated and limited space in China likely altered the manner in which Chinese NBA fans reacted to Morey’s post. For instance, Brown et al. (2015) uncovered how fans of Penn State University used social media in an attempt to mitigate a highly egregious act: the sexual molestation of children by a member of the football coaching staff. However, such fan-enacted attempts to diminish the ramifications of Morey’s tweet could not reasonably be accomplished in the Chinese landscape as support for the NBA and/or Houston Rockets were generally met with personal, individualized social media attacks about lack of loyalty to one’s country. As such, avenues for understanding, discussing, and determining attribution of responsibility clearly unfold within a uniquely muted Chinese context.

The current study, of course, is not without limitations. Primary among these are that the manipulations were shared with Chinese fans who already had knowledge of the controversy, even if they were not privy to attempts to manage the fallout. The fact that Houston Rockets games were specifically removed from the Chinese television landscape (even pre-COVID-19) could have influenced fan identity with the specific team as well. As is often the case in experimental research, the benefits of using actual reputational challenges as stimuli present the need for similar studies of hypothetical challenges in order to compare and contrast the relative strengths and weaknesses; that warrant is established here as well. Moreover, future research should attempt to determine how other international audiences could respond to similar sports crisis strategies. Furthermore, as the study of geo-political relations and sport can and will unfurl in areas beyond mere crisis communication, scholars also should be sensitive about geo-political issues regardless of whether a crisis has occurred in a global context such as the Morey case.

Conclusion

This study revealed the primary role that organization/public relationships and sports-based identity can embody within an attempt to manage situational crisis. The strategy utilized still can result in substantially different levels of responsibility attribution, yet must be considered within the wider lens of the degree of established relationship with the potentially offending body. Particularly within the case of sports—where fandom is often a core part of one’s activities, values, and lifestyle—those relationships appear to be remarkably central in understanding attempts for mediated reputational management.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Sitong Guo

Andrew C. Billings

Kenon A. Brown

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The Tweet Heard Round the World: Daryl Morey,the NBA,China,and Attribution of Responsibility

Abstract

Keywords

Literature Review

Situational Crisis Communication Theory

Organizational-Public Relationship

Team Identification and League Identification

Method

Participants

Measurement of Independent Variables

Team identification

League identification

Organization-Public Relationship (OPR)

Crisis response strategies

Measurement of the Dependent Variable

Results

RQ1: Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Highest Attribution of Crisis Responsibility for the NBA?

RQ2: Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Highest Attribution of Crisis Responsibility for the Houston Rockets?

H1/H2: A More Positive OPR Will Predict a Lower Level of Attribution of Responsibility, Regardless of Crisis Response Strategy

H3/H4: A Higher Level of Identification will Predict a Lower Level of Attribution of Responsibility, Regardless of Crisis Response Strategy

RQ3/RQ4: With the OPR Controlled, Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Best Attribution of Crisis Responsibility?

RQ5/RQ6: With Sport Identification Controlled, Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Best Attribution of Crisis Responsibility?

Discussion

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iDs

References

RQ₁: Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Highest Attribution of Crisis Responsibility for the NBA?

RQ₂: Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Highest Attribution of Crisis Responsibility for the Houston Rockets?

H₁/H₂: A More Positive OPR Will Predict a Lower Level of Attribution of Responsibility, Regardless of Crisis Response Strategy

H₃/H₄: A Higher Level of Identification will Predict a Lower Level of Attribution of Responsibility, Regardless of Crisis Response Strategy

RQ₃/RQ₄: With the OPR Controlled, Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Best Attribution of Crisis Responsibility?

RQ₅/RQ₆: With Sport Identification Controlled, Which Crisis Response Strategy Produces the Best Attribution of Crisis Responsibility?