Space Debris: Legal Challenges Toward a Sustainable Space Environment

Abstract

The launch of Sputnik-1, the first artificial satellite, on October 4, 1957, was an important turning point in the history of human civilization. It triggered significant political, military, technological, and scientific advancements. It also laid the foundation of bitter contemptuous competition between the United States and former Soviet Union for supremacy in the exploration of space. But with the passing of time, the traditional space race paradigm evolved with new players, including private spaceflight entities, giving rise to a modern “New Space Race” characterized by diverse participants and broader objectives. These activities accelerate space exploration and the launching of more satellites, which generates the problem of space debris, causing significant threats to the sustainability of outer space. The risk of collision of debris in earth orbit has been escalating catastrophically, leading to a chain reaction of breaking it, known as Kessler Syndrome. The development of the Antisatellite technology and China’s test on the FY-1C weather satellite substantially adds fuel to the fire, increasing the risk of debris. This article addressed the following research question: How well does the current international legal regime respond to space debris, and what binding reforms are needed for sustainability? It evaluates relevant legal challenges through doctrinal analysis of treaties, state practice, and comparative lessons from environmental and ultimately arms control regimes, and proposes actionable, enforceable legal solutions.

Keywords

outer space space debris sustainability ASAT Technology New Space Race

BACKGROUND

Space debris, often referred to as space junk, space pollution, space waste, space trash, space garbage, or cosmic debris, denotes the aggregation of nonfunctional human-made objects in the Earth’s orbit.¹ The intensify accumulation of debris in outer space is causing issues of sustainability and exploration of it. Unfortunately, the current regime for the regulation of activities in outer space fails to address it effectively.² In 2024, over 11,500 operational satellites are currently orbiting Earth, with SpaceX’s Starlink system accounting for about 9,000 of these (ESA Space Debris Office, 2024). Around 10,000 are in low Earth orbit (LEO) between 400 and 1,200 km. Each launch generally places more nonfunctional objects in orbit as debris. NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office states that there are over 36,000 tracked pieces larger than 10 cm, 1 million estimated pieces in the 1–10 cm size category, and over 130 million estimated pieces in the less than 1 cm category (not counted purely because of their smaller size).³ It is important to note that each satellite launched into orbit is accompanied by one or more nonfunctional objects, referred to as space debris.⁴ According to the US Space Surveillance Network, more than 15,000 pieces of space debris are larger than 10 cm (4 inches) across. The minimal average quantity of debris per cubic km accumulates densely in Earth’s orbit. As a result, it constitutes a serious threat to the functional satellite, and falling debris into the earth also poses serious threats to life, property, and the environment, especially in densely populated regions. Furthermore, in late 1970, two renowned NASA scientists, Burt Cour-Palais and Donald Kessler, closely observed the debris issue and propounded a scientific theory on the multiplication of space debris, later known as the “Kessler Syndrome.”⁵ They have observed that the risk of satellite collisions escalates with the growing deployments of satellites into orbit. Each collision would significantly affect the orbital environment. The “Satellite collisions would produce orbiting fragments, each of which would increase the probability of further collisions, leading to the growth of a belt of debris around the Earth,” the duo wrote. “The debris flux in such an Earth-orbiting belt could exceed the natural meteoroid flux, affecting future spacecraft designs.”⁵ The idea they have posits that at a specific juncture, the proliferation of artificial debris will attain a critical threshold, escalating at a rate that surpasses the natural decay rate of removal from orbit into the Earth’s atmosphere. Their approach to debris also demonstrates that substantial pieces of space debris may collide with smaller junk, resulting in hundreds or thousands of new small debris pieces that could impact further massive pieces. The “collisional cascading” phenomenon could exponentially augment the quantity of space debris, substantially elevating the hazards and expenses associated with space activities. The precise tipping point for the onset of the collisional cascade is debatable. The research and simulations conducted by NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) indicate that the proliferation of space debris will intensify, primarily due to collisions among the debris.⁶ The Kessler Syndrome illustrates a cascade of orbital debris that could hinder humanity’s future space aspirations and activities. Moreover, the issue of debris further worsened on January 11, 2007, when China conducted a ground-based missile test, destroying the Fengyun-1C satellite. This weather satellite has been in orbit at an altitude of over 500 miles since 1999.⁷

The destruction of Fengyun-1C generated a substantial amount of debris, creating an estimated 3,000 pieces.⁸ China is not the first state to conduct the antisatellite (ASAT) test, United States was the first state to conduct the ASAT test back in the 1950s, and according to Data Center Dynamics, it has since conducted at least three ASAT debris-creating tests: two in the mid-1980s and one in 2008.⁸ Hence, a coherent legal regime is required to regulate activities in outer space, and the current regime is not effective to regulate activities in outer space.

These examples point to an important conclusion—there is a vital need for a coherent legal framework, as the current systems have failed us for two major reasons—(a) structural failures—such as vague definitions, and (b) failures of implementation—such as vague guidelines that are nonbinding. The issue of space debris is clearly illustrated via Figures 1 and 2, which provide a full (visual) overview of the problem, and specifically the increasing space debris in LEO and the impacts that it has on the sustainability of space.⁹ All of the figures recognize with increasing concern the risks of space debris, but more importantly recognize with increasing alarm the number of objects in space that are signaling increasing congestion in LEO with implications for functional satellites and space missions.

Fig. 1.

Data of monthly mass of object in Earth orbit by object type. A bar chart depicting the increase in mass of objects in Earth’s orbit over time, categorized by object type. Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20230003009/downloads/ODQN%2027-1_final.pdf.

Fig. 2.

Data of month number of objects in Earth orbit by object type. A line graph showing the growing accumulation of space debris in Earth’s orbit, highlighting trends in low Earth orbit (LEO). Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20230003009/downloads/ODQN%2027-1_final.pdf.

CONCEPT OF SPACE DEBRIS

The term debris is derived from the Old French word “debris,” meaning rubble or broken pieces.¹⁰ Debris has a wide connotation due to its origin, ranging from little paint particles that have been chipped to screwdrivers that astronauts misplaced while on field missions, and there are uncontrolled satellites whose functions have ceased to exist. It can be characterized as nonfunctional and artificial, situated in or around Earth’s orbit. Space trash refers to nonfunctional, human-made items in or around Earth’s orbit.¹¹ It also includes nonoperational satellites, expended rocket stages, debris from space collisions, and minute particles resulting from the disintegration or erosion of bigger entities. It poses substantial threats to all nonoperational satellites and space vehicles, including the International Space Station (ISS), due to its potential for collisions that could generate additional debris, thereby exacerbating space debris formation through the Kessler Syndrome.¹² Furthermore, Space agencies and enterprises generate these sorts of debris by abandoning launch vehicles or obsolete satellites in orbit and constructing spacecraft with components that may detach; debris can also result from astronauts inadvertently dropping objects during extravehicular activities. There is a possibility that more debris particles could cause collisions with existing objects as space grows more congested.¹³ The most prevalent kind of trackable debris is “fragmentation debris,” which comprises microscopic matter fragments resulting from collisions between space objects or accidental explosions. This type of debris accounts for 49% of all trackable debris.¹³

There are four categories of debris: (1) inactive payloads (20% of the trackable debris), (2) operational debris (26%), (3) fragmentation debris (49%), and (4) microparticulate matter. The aforementioned debris can originate from abandoned launch vehicles, detached spacecraft components, or accidental loss during extravehicular activities. Although inactive and operational debris are important to track and resolve, most of the debris is fragmentation debris created as a result of intentional collisions, accidental collisions, or explosions.

Table 1 provides an illustration of incidents that generated debris, and it is important to note both intentional impacts (ASAT) and accidental events while also acknowledging that there were no legal remedies for each event. These cases highlight enforcement gaps in the Liability Convention, as no formal claims were pursued despite clear damages, setting precedents for future disputes.

Table 1.

Satellite Incidents Table

Rank	International Designator	Common Name	Year of Breakup	Apogee Altitude (km)	Perigee Altitude (km)	Debris Catalogued	Debris in Orbit	Assessed Cause of Breakup
1	1999-025A	Fengyun-1C	2007	865	845	3,532	2,793	Anti-satellite (ASAT) test
2	1982-092A	Cosmos 1408	2021	490	465	17,853	364	ASAT test
3	1993-036A	Cosmos 2251	2009	800	775	1,715	1,021	Accidental collision (with Iridium 33)
4	1994-029B	STEP II upper stage	1996	820	585	754	76	Accidental explosion
5	1997-051C	Iridium 33	2009	780	775	657	300	Accidental collision (with Cosmos 2251)
6	2022-151B	CZ-6A upper stage	2022	847	813	533	529	Accidental explosion
7	2006-026A	Cosmos 2421	2008	420	400	509	0	Unknown
8	1986-019C	SPOT 1 upper stage	1986	835	805	498	30	Accidental explosion
9	1981-053A	Cosmos 1275	1981	1015	960	479	418	Accidental explosion
10	1965-082DM	Titan 3 C-4 transtage	1965	790	710	473	32	Accidental explosion

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20230003009/downloads/ODQN%2027-1_final.pdf.

Table 2.

List of Space Debris Fall Incidents

Year	Incident	Impact/Details
1969	Japanese ship struck by debris	Five sailors injured by debris from a suspected Soviet spacecraft.
1978	Kosmos 954 reentry	Radioactive debris scattered over Canada.
1979	Skylab reentry	Debris fell in Australia; NASA fined $400 for littering.
1987	Kosmos 1890 debris	Metal debris landed between homes in California; no damage.
1997	Woman hit by Delta II rocket debris	No injury reported; incident occurred in Oklahoma.
2003	Columbia disaster	Debris across Texas and Louisiana caused property damage and contamination risks.
2020	Long March-5B reentry	Rocket core crashed in Côte d’Ivoire, damaging property.
2022	Long March 3B debris in India	Debris killed livestock and injured others; metal fragments found in Maharashtra and Gujarat.
2024	Dragon spacecraft debris in U.S.	Struck homes in Florida and North Carolina, causing property damage.

Wikipedia contributors. List of space debris fall incidents. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 2025 Oct 20 [cited 2025 Oct 23]. Available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_debris_fall_incidents.

Definitions of Space Debris

There is no universally accepted definition of space debris, but different agencies have tried to define it. This lack of binding definition hinders liability attribution, as treaties like the Liability Convention refer to “space objects” without distinguishing functional/nonfunctional status (analyzed further in Legal Regime of Space Debris). In common parlance, debris generally comprises decommissioned space objects, including rocket stages, separation devices, shrouds, clamps, and various fragments, encompassing particles that persist following the breakup of a space object.¹³ Qarl Q. Christol proposes that debris comprises tangible, physical properties that may be observed, handled, weighed, and processed in factories or studied in laboratories. In 1982, the Report of the Second UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space embodied that space debris comprises various items, such as expended rocket motors, nuts and bolts, and satellites that have lost their ability to function.¹⁴ The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) also defines debris as the most acceptable, such as “all man-made objects, including their fragments and parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, in Earth orbit or re-entering the dense layers of the atmosphere.”¹⁵ The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the COPUOS provided that “Space Debris” is “all man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or reentering the atmosphere, that are nonfunctional.” The definition provided by the ESA also resembles the previous definition, which stated that “all nonfunctional, man-made objects, including fragments and components, in Earth orbit or reentering the Earth’s atmosphere.” Artificial space debris predominates over the natural meteoroid environment, except for particles approximately one millimetre in size.”¹⁶

The Problem Cause by Space Debris

Space debris comprises defunct satellites or rockets’ components employed to launch them into orbit. The objects are predominantly located in two distinct regions of space: LEO and geostationary orbit. It poses serious threats to functional satellites and astronauts in outer space and may cause life and property damage while entering the Earth. The debris in orbit approximately travels at a speed of up to 17,500 miles/h.¹ With this rate, there is the potential for even very small bits of debris to inflict significant damage, which poses a threat to a spacecraft and can result in costly damage.¹³ When debris with a diameter of 10 cm or more collides with a functional satellite, there is a high probability that the satellite will be completely destroyed. Large, nonfunctional objects that remain in orbit pose a risk of collision because they have the potential to generate enormous quantities of space debris and consume orbit space that could otherwise be put to better use. Furthermore, there are many instances in which satellites have been destroyed due to debris in space caused by human activity in space.¹⁷ Another factor contributing to the unfavorable influence of space debris on astronomical observations is the accumulation of debris through space. Concerns have been raised over the potential of astronomical satellites, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, to be impacted by light-reflected space trash. This debris can potentially cause damage or degradation to the detectors included within the telescope’s spectrograph. While mitigating excessive debris is a prevalent difficulty for all countries, debris removal may remain a contentious political issue. Active debris removal (ADR) provides a dual-use technology. The capacity to alter the course of debris suggests the capability to manipulate active satellites as well, rendering any debris remediation technique a possible space weapon.¹⁷

Table 1, titled “Satellite Incidents Table,” presents a detailed account of significant satellite breakup events that have contributed to the proliferation of space debris. The table documents incidents such as the Fengyun-1C ASAT test (2007), Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 collision (2009), and Cosmos 1408 ASAT test (2021), along with key details including the year of breakup, altitude, and the number of debris fragments catalogued. These data underscore the alarming frequency of debris-generating events, revealing how both intentional actions, such as ASAT tests, and accidental collisions have exacerbated the space debris crisis. The figures and table collectively demonstrate the urgent need for an effective legal framework and international cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by space debris and ensure the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

Table 2 provides the list of Space debris fall incidents and also it is important to note that the Space debris poses serious threats to life, property, and the environment, particularly when it re-enters and impacts Earth.

Space Debris: Threat to Lives On Earth

Space debris, often perceived as a remote hazard confined to outer space, is emerging as a safety concern on Earth. In 1961, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro claimed that a reentering fragment from a defunct American satellite had resulted in the death of a Cuban cow. A medium-sized metallic piece of an American spacecraft landed upon a traffic intersection in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, in 1962. In early 1970, a German ship in the Atlantic Ocean was struck by a part of the Saturn-V rocket used in the US Apollo 9 mission to facilitate a lunar landing.¹⁸ The initial instance of fatality or injury resulting from the collision with descending space debris was documented in China in early 1995.¹⁹ On January 26, as India celebrated its Republic Day, the Chinese Long March-1 vehicle, with Apstar-2 communications satellites, collapsed mid-flight, resulting in the descent of rocket stages that caused the demise of a couple and injuries to numerous others. Moreover, space activities are being held accountable for atmospheric contamination. Environmentalists have long asserted that the exhaust from the American space shuttle contributes to ozone depletion.²⁰ The risks related to space exploration captured public attention during the unplanned reentry of NASA’s Skylab in July 1979. Fortunately, the 77-ton Skylab met its demise in the ocean off the Australian coast. In the first quarter of the previous year, the United States successfully deorbited its partially impaired defense satellite, which had raised concerns about potential catastrophic impacts on Earth landing.²¹

Legal Regime of Space Debris

This article is based on a doctrinal method which examines the instruments of space law through interpretative avenues, as well as state practice via findings from UNCOPUOS and national laws, as well as comparative perspectives gleaned from environmental regimes (e.g., binding targets in the Paris Agreement) and arms control (e.g., verification in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)). The focus on the empirical dimension of actual incidents is seen through case studies.

The regime consists of five treaties created by the UN: Outer Space Treaty (OST, 1967), Rescue Agreement (1968), Liability Convention (1972), Registration Convention (1976), and Moon Agreement (1984), along with resolutions. The regime is ineffectual in addressing space debris because it has both a structural failure (e.g., no provisions for debris) and a failure to actually implement binding obligations (e.g., although there are nonbinding guidelines and periodic state practice and compliance, there is a lack of uniformity state-to-state). Due to the failure to adequately resolve the debris issues, these treaties are considered obsolete without imposing the responsibility on states to remove them.²² The OST is a cornerstone piece of legislation on outer space. It specifies that space exploration is accessible to all states and promotes the peaceful utilization of outer space. The convention does not explicitly mention space debris but it mandates that nations refrain from causing harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies. The “no harmful interference” phrase has been included in Art.7 states that the “State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”²³ Furthermore, these treaties also impose no duty on spacefaring nations to internalize the externalities of their space debris, resulting in excessive debris accumulation. As a result of it, other states are not obligated to intervene and may prefer to avert provoking an international controversy by displacing another nation’s debris.²⁴ The treaties instituted stringent property rights for “space objects” and their components but did not define “space debris,” which remained ambiguous until the formulation of the nonbinding Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2007, resulting in scholarly uncertainty regarding the ownership of space debris as a component of space objects.²³ Moreover, no clear and absolute prohibition exists against creating space debris by one’s actions, nor is there a requirement to remove it once it has been produced. It is appropriate to state that the international community has failed to effectively deal with the issue and intricacy caused by the debris. The OST, considered the foundation of space law, lays out fundamental principles such as free exploration, nonappropriation, and state responsibility. Article VI of the OST holds states accountable for all national space activities, including those conducted by private entities, while Article VII establishes liability for damages caused by space objects. However, the OST does not explicitly mention space debris, leaving ambiguity about who is responsible for mitigation and removal. Moreover, since the treaty was drafted in the early years of space exploration, it could not have anticipated the exponential growth in satellite launches and the escalating debris problem.

The Liability Convention of 1972 complements the OST by defining liability rules for space-related damage. It imposes strict liability for damage caused on Earth and a fault-based liability system for space-related incidents. However, in the case of space debris, assigning fault and establishing causation is extremely challenging, especially in high-speed collisions where debris particles can be as tiny as paint flakes but still cause significant damage.²⁵ The lack of explicit provisions addressing liability for abandoned or fragmented debris further complicates enforcement efforts. The Registration Convention of 1976 seeks to improve accountability by requiring states to register space objects launched under their jurisdiction. Although registration aids in tracking space objects, it does not impose any obligations on states or operators to prevent debris generation or remove defunct satellites. The rapid expansion of commercial space activities has also made compliance inconsistent, with many smaller satellite operators failing to properly register their assets. Recognizing the limitations of binding treaties, nonbinding guidelines have been introduced to promote responsible practices. The UNCOPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, adopted in 2007, recommend measures such as minimizing debris release, postmission disposal, and collision avoidance. Similarly, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), an international technical forum, provides best practices for debris mitigation. Although these guidelines are widely recognized, they lack enforcement mechanisms, as no penalties exist for noncompliance. Despite these legal frameworks, enforcing space debris regulations remains a significant challenge. Jurisdictional ambiguity and difficulties in attributing responsibility make legal accountability elusive. For instance, in the 2009 collision between an active Iridium commercial satellite and a defunct Russian Cosmos-2251 satellite, thousands of debris fragments were created. However, no legal action was taken against Russia, as no clear liability framework existed for debris-related collisions in space. This incident underscored the urgent need for better space traffic management (STM) and clearer liability mechanisms.

Another notable case is China’s 2007 ASAT test, in which a Chinese weather satellite (Fengyun-1C) was deliberately destroyed using a missile, generating over 3,000 pieces of long-lived debris. The test was widely condemned for violating the principles of space sustainability, yet no legal action was taken, exposing the weaknesses of international law in addressing intentional debris creation. A similar incident occurred in 2021 when Russia conducted an ASAT test, destroying one of its defunct satellites and producing hazardous debris that endangered the ISS and other operational satellites. These events highlight the urgent need for binding regulations to prevent reckless debris-generating activities. The growing presence of private space actors further complicates the legal landscape. Companies such as SpaceX, OneWeb, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper are launching mega-constellations consisting of thousands of satellites, significantly increasing the risk of orbital congestion. Unlike state actors, private companies operate under national jurisdiction, meaning their compliance with space debris regulations depends on the regulatory frameworks of their respective countries. However, national space laws vary widely, creating inconsistencies in global debris mitigation efforts. For example, the United States has established space debris mitigation regulations through agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NASA. The FCC now requires satellite operators to submit deorbiting plans before obtaining a license. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has introduced the STM Initiative to coordinate debris mitigation efforts across member states. Even China, despite being a major contributor to space debris, has implemented national policies requiring postmission disposal of satellites. However, the lack of harmonization between national regulations creates loopholes, allowing some operators to circumvent stricter mitigation measures by launching from countries with weaker laws.

Another layer of complexity arises from the technical challenges of ADR. Several ADR technologies, such as robotic arms, nets, and lasers, are being developed, but their legal status remains uncertain. The OST prohibits the unauthorized alteration or destruction of space objects, making removing debris without the owner’s consent difficult. Since most space debris lacks active control or clear ownership, ADR efforts could be perceived as acts of aggression, potentially violating international law. This also raises security concerns, as ADR technologies could be repurposed for military applications, further complicating diplomatic negotiations.

Lack of a Clear Legal Definition

The fundamental distinction between space debris and space objects also poses significant challenges within the framework of international law. These issues generally stem from uncertainties in legal terminology and deficiencies in treaties such as the OST (1967) and the Liability Convention (1972). Art.1 (d) of the Liability Convention, 1972 and Art.1 (b) Registration Convention, 1974, both defined “space objects include components of such objects as well as their launch vehicles and parts.” However, it fails to define the distinction between functional and nonfunctional objects categorically. International law lacks a formal, globally recognized concept of space debris. Space debris generally denotes nonoperational entities, yet there is no threshold defined in treaties. As a result, there is an ambiguity over the legal classification of debris as a “space object.” Furthermore, the Liability Convention establishes liability for damage inflicted by space objects. However, it does not specifically address space debris. This issue raises concerns about the liability of states for harm inflicted by debris that is no longer within their control. In general, space-faring nations must register space objects with the United Nations in accordance with the Registration Convention. Nonetheless, numerous antiquated objects and waste bits remain unrecorded, complicating the assignment of responsibility.²⁶ As a result, there is less discrepancy against the notion that large portions of a satellite after an explosion have destroyed it, would likewise form component pieces, and would, therefore, be considered to be space objects. In this way, any damage produced by such component parts would be included within the purview of the Liability Convention, which would, at the very least, lead to the possibility of compensation in theory. This is the most significant advantage of this arrangement.²⁷ Moreover, practical difficulties could remain due to the fact that the dispute settlement system under the Liability Convention does not inherently result in a binding conclusion if the liable state(s) refuse to pay following diplomatic consultation. A binding decision can only occur if both parties to the dispute consent in advance, which may not frequently happen.²⁸ Furthermore, a basic issue emerges involving another legal facet of space objects. Classifying a specific metal as a “space object” is essential but not sufficient for enforcing the Liability Convention and may also invoke Art’s provisions VIII of the OST and the Registration Convention.

Liability Convention

The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects is called the “Liability Convention.” It establishes regulations concerning personal harm and property damage, as well as the resolution of these matters at the international level. It mostly deals with damages inflicted by space objects and does not specifically address damage resulting from space debris unless it is classified as a “space object.” It also does not sufficiently address the rising issues of nonfunctional debris and fragmentation incidents. This convention is based on the fault-based liability system,²⁹ which primarily demands proof that the launching state acted negligently or intentionally. Arts I and II of the agreement clearly stipulate that a country that launches or facilitates the launch of a space object, or from whose territory a space object is launched, is accountable for damages caused by its space object on the Earth’s surface or to aircraft in flight. However, it is silent on damage outside the Earth’s surface, and the concept of culpability remains ambiguously defined.³⁰

Nonbinding Guidelines

The nonbinding guidelines on removing outer space debris are the most important soft laws in the regulations of activities in space affairs and mitigating the risk. The United Nations developed these guidelines from the IADC and the ESA. The UNCOPUOS 2007 has developed guidelines on space debris to promote the sustainable use of outer space. However, these nonbinding characters have many shortcomings that cause difficulties in regulating states’ activities in outer space. These guidelines include some rules and principles observed under soft normality and are not enforceable. Moreover, their acceptability is absolute; some advanced states may partly implement these guidelines. Developing or emerging nations cannot do so due to insufficient financial resources or technology. The absence of a global organization that monitors compliance and imposes penalties on individuals who disobey the regulations is noteworthy. Due to the fact that domestic regulations are frequently lacking or insufficient, private space enterprises are also not adequately held accountable in accordance with these principles.

State Practice and Compliance

State practice demonstrates varying enforcement of space law obligations. In UNCOPUOS negotiations (2020–2024), for example, the United States and EU actively sought binding debris rules and submitted proposals to require mandatory deorbit plans, while China and Russia took a strong opposition premise based on sovereign rights. Moreover, various liability disputes existed in instances like the post-2009 Iridium-Cosmos Collision, whereby the U.S. State Department indicated that the U.S. considered denying liability after needed discussions with Russia. However, while on-site causation proofs were inadequate in obtaining compensations and diplomatic tensions existed due to the Russian relations and the Russian and American situation, no formal claim was filed. More recently, in 2021, the U.S. condemned the Russian ASAT test, citing damage to U.S. operations and impacting all areas of interest in space operations (UNCOPUOS 2022 session), and while there were condemnations from many countries, including the EU and India, and Japan, there was no concerted action from the UNCOPUOS or applicable Liability Convention. There is consistency with compliance patterns of developed states, leading (with the EU more recently pushing the STM initiative that consists of postmission disposal roles and obligations), and for emerging nations, incomplete compliance roles, which create global inequalities reflective of verification deficiencies in the NPT.

Proposed Liability Framework

To respond to such obligation and enforcement gaps, this paper proposes a new liability approach we call the “Space Debris Liability Matrix.” To assign responsibility: (1) for inactive satellites (inactive payloads), the liability for launching states will remain absolute (on relevant behalf) and as per an amended Liability Convention; (2) for fragmentation debris, it would be culpable or fault-based, but with a presumption that the operator was negligent if no avoidance of fragmentation plan was filed with the state; (3) for private operators, its jurisdiction would be nominally enforced in national jurisdiction based on harmonized licensing, but presented with an international fund (similar to oil spill funds entitlement when abiding by UNCLOS) to cover liabilities on unclaimed damages. The Matrix, using approaches in the Paris Agreement with their nationally determined contributions, would report to a UN authority annually and could encourage compliance objectives and accountability to sustain against Kessler Syndrome.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The problem of space debris poses an alarming threat to the sustainability of outer space and life and property on Earth. The existing international framework is obsolete to effectively regulate activities in outer space. There is the inherent flow of the nonbinding guidelines, lack of enforcement measures, and the absence of accountability for both governmental and commercial entities. As space exploration has proliferated rapidly, especially with the emergence of commercial enterprises and mega-constellations, current regulatory frameworks have struggled to keep pace with technological improvements and new concerns, including uncontrolled reentry incidents and orbital congestion. Similarly, disparities in financial, technological, and political capacities among states have resulted in the uneven implementation of debris reduction methods, exacerbating inequalities in space governance.²⁸ Unestablished, enforceable global regulations have led to fragmentation, intensifying inconsistent behavior among operators and the proliferation of space debris. Access to space, a common global common, is at risk unless there are thorough and legally binding structures to ensure its sustainability. To address these challenges, it is essential to establish a comprehensive international legal framework for space debris regulation and reduction. This framework should include binding obligations, accountability mechanisms, and enforcement tools. To promote equitable access to space, a system must strike a balance between the interests of governments, businesses, and emerging spacefaring nations. For removal and a safer orbital environment, it is vital to improve international coordination, encourage innovation in ADR technologies, and incentivize sustainable activities. Legislative reforms are important, but everyone must do their part and commit to long-term space management if space travel is to be sustainable. The growing space debris is causing serious dangers to ongoing and future space activities, threatening the long-term sustainability of outer space. In the presence of international regulatory norms such as the OST, the Liability Convention, and guidelines by organizations like the UNCOPUOS, the absence remains of a binding, all-inclusive regulatory framework for space debris mitigation and remediation. Declaratory regulatory tools available now fail to bring space-faring actors and private actors under the purview of enforceable obligations. This regulatory vacuum, combined with the increased space activities for commerce, the launch of mega-constellations, and the greater militarization of space, has compounded the problem. As space becomes ever-crowded, the risk of collision, fragmentation, and the Kessler Syndrome—a phenomenon where repeated collision creates an uncontrolled buildup of debris—looms over the horizon.

A fundamental challenge for the mitigation of space debris is the inability to define ownership and responsibility for the debris objects, and thus the enforcement of legally binding commitments is complicated. Currently, the governing legal structure allocates the majority of the liabilities to the launching state, not the abandoned satellites, nonworking spacecraft, or the debris resulting from the fragmentation incidents. An internationally accepted process for the ADR is also not available, something required for the mitigation of the existing debris. National legislations, including those by the United States, the EU, and China, have taken some initiative toward the mandatory postmission disposal plans, but the legislations differ everywhere, leaving loopholes for collective activities.

Another major challenge is the rapid expansion of the commercial space market, including the launch by private actors such as OneWeb, SpaceX, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper of thousands of satellites. Private actors provide significant inputs toward space exploration, and their activities also account for the mounting crowding of the LEO. In the vacuum of international regulations under international law, the actors can pursue their economic agendas over the demands for long-term sustainability, resulting in increased opportunities for collision by the satellite and the spreading of debris.

To ensure that the space environment is sustainable, the international community has to make strong policymaking and legally binding moves. First, a legally binding international covenant entirely dedicated to space debris management is required. This covenant has to incorporate concrete responsibilities for satellite operators, mandatory debris mitigation measures, and enforcement provisions for the guarantee of conformity. Second, the international regulatory authority, possibly under the United Nations umbrella, has to be set up for space debris mitigation, ADR activities, and the establishment of best practice standardization. This authority has the mandate for the enforcement of penalties for noncompliance by the business and state actors. In addition, technological innovations for debris mitigation and ADR need to be legally supported and incentivized. Governments and private industries need to be encouraged toward the development and deployment of debris removal equipment, including robot arms, net-capture equipment, and laser deorbitation equipment. Legal structures need to provide international legality for ADR activities, not infringe upon state sovereignty, and not induce conflict or accusations of weaponization. Another essential building block is the international harmonization of space legislation for conformity with international best practice. International space-faring nations need to use common licensable provisions for mandatory postmission deorbit plans, satellite end-of-life processes, and collision mitigation. Besides, the international STM structures need to be collectively devised by the states for enhanced coordination for space debris tracking and collision prevention. An international STM infrastructure for real-time tracking and collision prevention will significantly reduce the hazards caused by space debris. Public–private partnerships also need to be encouraged for the mitigation of debris by resolving the legal and financial hurdles. Governments can also offer incentives such as tax relief, subsidies, or grants for debris removal solution-developing corporations. In addition, insurance structures need to be revised for the incorporation of space debris liabilities, and satellite operators need to ensure suitable caution is taken for the prevention of debris formation. Raising global awareness about space debris is also critical. Educational activities, workshops, and international conferences need to be funded for raising awareness among the policymaking circles, the space industries, and the general citizenry. An informed global citizen will be able to promote stricter regulations and responsible space activities. In conclusion, space debris is a daunting challenge, and through the combination of international cooperation, legal reforms, and technological innovations, the door can be opened for the achievement of a sustainable space environment. To counter the dangers caused by space debris, the need is for proactive measures through the establishment of binding legal structures, regulatory authority, and international cooperation by the states, private actors, and international organizations. If only the challenge is met now, the outer space can be made sustainably available for the next generations.

SUGGESTIONS

(1)

Binding UN Treaty on Space Debris, with mandatory mitigation (e.g., 25-year deorbit rule) and ADR protocols, modeled on Paris Agreement’s nationally determined contributions with verification. Ratification by major space-farers, with a UN Space Debris Authority for monitoring/penalties (fines, launch bans).

(2)

Harmonized National Laws via UNCOPUOS, drawing from NPT’s IAEA inspections.

(3)

Incentives for ADR tech (subsidies, PPPs).

(4)

Global STM System for real-time tracking, like maritime AIS. These address inequalities, enforce accountability, and prevent Kessler Syndrome.

AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTIONS

T.Q.: Conceptualization, structure of the article, research methodology, content, and legal analysis. S.A.S.: Literature review, drafting of sections related to legal frameworks, and critical revisions. A.A.S.: Research design, authored key sections of the article, and revisions and feedback on the entire article. S.S.: Review of relevant literature, methodology section, and final revisions to the article, ensuring its coherence and clarity.

Footnotes

AUTHOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No competing financial interests exist.

FUNDING INFORMATION

No funding was received for this article.

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