Two Aspects of Past Self-Continuity from Narrative and Essentialist Perspectives

Abstract

Self-continuity, the sense of connection between one's past and present self, is at the core of identity. However, differences between two perspectives on self-continuity, the narrative perspective and the essentialist perspective, remain unexplored. This study investigates whether these two perspectives represent distinct facets of past self-continuity. We examined the relationship between self-continuity and factors such as acceptance of the past, self-concept clarity, and temporal comparison orientation, and whether these associations vary depending on the perspective through which self-continuity is understood. A total of 57 Japanese university students (M_age = 19.68, SD_age = 1.74, range = 18–28, 33 women, 24 men) participated in an experiment in which either the narrative or essentialist perspective was activated through descriptive tasks. Results showed that self-continuity correlated positively with acceptance of the past and temporal comparison orientation specifically in the narrative condition. These findings suggest that the two perspectives reflect distinct components of self-continuity.

Keywords

essentialism identity narrative self-continuity

Identity encompasses one's awareness of sameness and continuity within the self and the recognition of others of this aspect (Erikson, 1980). Undergoing various physical changes and environmental transitions, adolescents face the crucial task of psychologically adapting to such changes and establishing a sense of continuity (Erikson, 1980; Sadeh & Karniol, 2012; Wintre et al., 2008). However, medium- to long-term intervention studies on the preservation and promotion of this continuity are scarce (Sedikides, 2022). One reason for this research gap is the abstract and multifaceted nature of the concept of continuity. Philosophical debates have emerged regarding when the present self and the self at different points in time can be considered the same person (e.g., Dennett, 1992; Parfit, 1984), which demonstrates the diversity of interpretations of the diachronic identity of the self or the sense of continuity.

Scholars have explored the psychological sense of diachronic self-identity, which is referred to as the sense of continuity, through self-continuity studies. Self-continuity involves the belief that one's past, present, and future selves are connected as the same individual (Sedikides, 2022). Recalling the past or envisioning the future influences the present self because of the perception that these selves are linked and identical (Bluck & Liao, 2013). People inherently possess a certain sense of self-continuity and are motivated to maintain it (Sedikides, 2022).

The current study investigates various interpretations of self-continuity and explores the potential presence of multiple facets based on distinct interpretative frameworks. Numerous studies aim to elucidate the determinants of self-continuity and the impact of alterations in self-continuity (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2020; Sharma et al., 2021; Sokol & Serper, 2019). However, a notable diversity exists in the interpretations of self-continuity, and its operational definition varies across studies (e.g., Allé et al., 2016; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Sokol & Serper, 2019; Tippett et al., 2018). Incorporating conclusions derived from diverse perspectives on self-continuity into the discourse of a cohesive psychological construct requires careful examination. In other words, the diversity of interpretations surrounding self-continuity implies the presence of multiple facets, which poses a challenge to the integration of research findings. Accordingly, the present study investigates the interpretations of self-continuity and explores the potential presence of multiple facets based on distinct interpretative frameworks. Elucidating the aspects that constitute self-continuity will contribute to the elaboration and integration of findings in self-continuity research.

Two Perspectives on Self-Continuity

Two perspectives based on the philosophical arguments on diachronic self-identity have emerged in self-continuity research. The first perspective considers integration into a self-narrative as the basis for diachronic identity (e.g., Dennett, 1992). From this narrative standpoint, self-continuity is defined as incorporating past and future events into a narrative that confers meaning and places the present self at the core of the narrative. Studies that follow this perspective evaluate self-continuity through the coherence of life narratives (e.g., Tippett et al., 2018) and the relevance of the present self to past and future events (e.g., Allé et al., 2016).

The second perspective posits that the stable elements of the self form the foundation of diachronic identity (e.g., Parfit, 1984). This stability-centric view proposes that certain self-components exist and that their temporal stability represents self-continuity. Studies that adopt this perspective employ measures that emphasize the temporal stability of the self. For example, Ersner-Hershfield et al. (2009) and Sokol and Serper (2019) used self-report questionnaires to measure the similarity or overlap of past or future selves with the present self as indicators of self-continuity. Similarly, Sadeh and Karniol (2012) and Sharma et al. (2021) evaluated self-continuity by assessing the level of agreement between characteristics rated for past and future selves compared with those for the present self. Consequently, interpretations of self-continuity vary across studies, which leads to various findings that stem from different interpretations of self-continuity.

Furthermore, these differences in the interpretation of self-continuity are evident among individuals (Chandler et al., 2003). Chandler et al. (2003) conducted interviews with Canadian adolescents to investigate their justification of the continuity of their past and present selves (i.e., self-continuity). The findings revealed that individuals provide rationales for self-continuity from two perspectives. The first perspective aligns with the narrative view, which emphasizes the recognition of the relevance of past events to the self and the integration of the past and present into a self-narrative and resembles the narrative position. In the process of constructing a narrative that assigns meaning to events that one experiences, the individual recognizes the narrative self at the center of such narrative (Dennett, 1992). They then justify self-continuity through the understanding that the self exists on a coherent narrative from the past to the present (Habermas & Köber, 2015). Typical examples of this strategy include the following: “I had the courage to tell my parents about the career I wanted to pursue, and they accepted and encouraged me to pursue it. That experience changed me so much that I am now able to strive with confidence. In this way, my past and present are connected.”

The other aligns with an essentialist viewpoint, which assumes the existence of stable self-components and is similar to the stability-focused position. From the essentialist view, the self is assumed to be composed of a surface and a core (Johnson et al., 2004). Individuals believe that the true self lies at the core of the self (Schlegel et al., 2009) and justify self-continuity through its constancy. An example of such justification is as follows: “My extroversion, which is an indispensable trait in describing me, has always been the same. Therefore, the past and the present are connected.”

Becker et al. (2018) also explored these variations in justifying self-continuity as differences in the foundations of self-continuity. They postulated that viewing one's life as a narrative story and perceiving the self as stable over time form the basis of self-continuity. Subsequently, the authors demonstrated that these factors independently explain variances in self-reports regarding “the sense that my past, present, and future are connected.” These findings suggest the existence of two distinct aspects of self-continuity.

Moreover, some studies yielded inconsistent results dependent on whether they investigated self-continuity from the narrative or the stability-focused perspective. For example, research using self-event connections as an indicator of self-continuity (narrative perspective) identified links between self-continuity with depression and subjective well-being (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2020). Conversely, studies that use the similarity between the past and present selves as an indicator of self-continuity (essentialist perspective) found no associations between self-continuity and mental health (e.g., Sokol & Eisenheim, 2016; Sokol & Serper, 2017). These results bolstered the hypothesis that the two self-continuities perceived from each perspective constitute distinct facets of self-continuity.

Chandler et al. (2003) demonstrated that self-continuity can be justified from the narrative or essentialist perspective, which highlights the possibility that these perspectives are not mutually exclusive. In other words, individuals can provide rationales for self-continuity from both viewpoints (Santo et al., 2013). This coexistence of diverse interpretations of self-continuity within individuals aligns with research on the working self-concept. According to the working self-concept model (Markus & Kunda, 1986), self-concept comprises various self-schemas in which the activated schema is dependent on the situation. These schemas encompass interpretations of the self, which are referred to as self-views. Scholars have demonstrated that the influence of self-views on cognition and behavior is context-dependent (Cross et al., 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In the narrative self-schema, the self is interpreted as being constructed through various experiences. In situations in which this schema is activated, the focus lies on which events shape the present self. In contrast, in the essentialist self-schema, the existence of a definitive element that constitutes the self is assumed. In scenarios in which this schema prevails, changes in the self are superficial, and the invariant elements are interpreted as constituting the true self (Schlegel et al., 2009). Based on the working self-concept model, these self-schemas coexist within the individual. In other words, individuals may simultaneously possess essentialist and narrative self-continuity perceptions, which constitutes distinct aspects of self-continuity. If the two self-continuities perceived from different perspectives represent distinct facets of self-continuity, there may be differences in the mechanisms underlying the formation and functions of self-continuity according to these perspectives. Investigating this hypothesis can refine the existing findings on self-continuity and contribute to the development of effective intervention strategies for enhancing self-continuity and fostering identity development.

The sense of continuity that constitutes identity encompasses a global continuity from the past to the future. However, the majority of studies that examine the temporal aspect of identity focus on continuity between the past and present or between the present and future (Syed & McLean, 2016). Notably, research that addresses continuity from the narrative perspective predominantly emphasizes past-to-present continuity with less attention to the integration of future events into the self-narrative (Syed & Mitchell, 2015). Consequently, the current study also specifically investigates past-to-present self-continuity.

Distinguishing between the two abovementioned perspectives of self-continuity highlights how each perspective assumes the nature of the self (Chandler et al., 2003; Dennett, 1992; Parfit, 1984). The narrative perspective assumes that the self exists at the center of generated narratives to attribute meaning to various experiences (Dennett, 1992). Within this framework, the past and present selves are integrated through the meaning-making of past events for explaining changes in the self that occurred from the past to the present (Chandler et al., 2003). However, attributing meaning to past experiences is not always straightforward and requires confronting and accepting past events (Weinstein et al., 2011). Consequently, a higher perceived level of self-continuity from the narrative perspective corresponds to increased acceptance of one's past.

Alternatively, the essentialist perspective posits the existence of stable self-components. From this view, individuals perceive that the self remains the same even as various aspects of the self-change over time, because these changes are regarded as peripheral, while the core component remains unaltered (Chandler et al., 2003). From the essentialist perspective, high perceived levels of self-continuity imply individuals are aware of the central component of the self and believe in its stability over time (McLean, 2008). This conviction in self-concept and its constancy is conceptualized as self-concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996). Although several studies have reported a positive association between self-concept clarity and self-continuity (Jiang et al., 2020; Sharma et al., 2021), the association should be salient from an essentialist perspective, given these assumptions.

Moreover, the distinction between self-continuity perceived from the narrative and essentialist perspectives is evident in how individuals assimilate and contrast their past and present selves. The relationship between temporal comparison orientation (Hanko et al., 2010; Namikawa, 2011), which reflects the tendency to contrast the past and present selves, and self-continuity is likely to vary between the narrative and essentialist perspectives. Self-continuity from the narrative perspective emerges from the construction of self-narratives that integrate the past by objectifying and making meaning of it (Chandler et al., 2003). Consequently, high perceived levels of self-continuity from the narrative perspective contrasts the past self with the present one before integrating them, resulting in high levels of temporal comparison orientation. In contrast, self-continuity, as perceived from the essentialist perspective, is rooted in the stable component of the self, which emphasizes the similarity between the past and present selves. Consequently, high perceived levels of self-continuity from the essentialist perspective leads to greater assimilation between the past and present selves, which results in low levels of temporal comparison orientation.

The Present Study

This study aims to investigate the hypothesis that continuity perceived from the narrative and essentialist perspectives represent distinct facets of self-continuity. In this study, we compare past self-continuity perceived from the narrative and essentialist perspectives by exploring whether or not the relationship among self-continuity and acceptance of the past, self-concept clarity, and temporal comparison orientation differs based on the perspective from which self-continuity is perceived. Specifically, we conduct an experiment to manipulate the perspective from which the participants perceive self-continuity scale items using priming. We then examine whether or not the activated perspective influences the association between self-continuity and each variable. Research on the working self-concept indicates that individuals possess concurrent self-schemas rooted in different self-views in which the relatively dominant self-schema influences psychological processes (Grossmann & Jowhari, 2018; Trafimow et al., 1991). Building on this idea, the current study assumes responses to questions, such as “Do you feel that your past and present selves are connected?” will align with self-continuity perceived from the situationally dominant perspective within the individual. In other words, self-continuity perceived from the narrative (or essentialist) perspective is likely to be reflected in the responses if the accessibility of the narrative (or essentialist) self-schema is relatively high when a person is responding to inquiries about self-continuity.

Methods

Participants and Experimental Design

We recruited participants from a national university in Japan with the objective of obtaining a sample size of approximately 55 to test for a medium interaction effect (ΔR² = .13, α = .05, 1−β = .80). Finally, we randomly assigned 62 participants (M_age = 19.71, SD_age = 1.70, range = 18–28, 37 women, 25 men) under the narrative or essentialist condition.

Procedures

The participants engaged in a descriptive task tailored to their experimental condition and completed a questionnaire. Under the narrative condition, the participants were given a descriptive task that activated their narrative perspective by responding to the following question:
The way we think about the past and the present differs from person to person. In particular, the degree to which a person feels that “the present self exists because of past experiences, and that the past and present selves are connected” varies across persons. Now, please think about yourself. What experiences in the past do you feel “influence who you are now”? Please answer in the space below. Please also describe how you feel the experience has affected your present self. You can write about more than one event.

The participants in the essentialist condition were asked to respond to the following question:
The way we think about the past and the present differs from person to person. In particular, the degree to which a person feels that “there are parts of the self that have remained unchanged from the past to the present, and that the past and the present are connected” varies across persons. Now, please think about yourself. What parts of yourself do you feel “unchanged between past and present selves”? Please answer in the space below. You can write specifically about one thing in a sentence or list several things.

Both descriptive tasks lasted for 5 min. Afterward, the participants completed a questionnaire that assesses self-continuity, manipulation check, acceptance of the past, self-concept clarity, and temporal comparison orientation.¹ It was followed by a debriefing, and the participants received a pen acknowledging their participation.

Questionnaire

Past Self-Continuity Scale

We developed the Past Self-Continuity Scale, which comprises six items (“I feel that my past and present are connected”, “There is continuity between my past and present.”, “I feel that I am now an extension of my past self,” “I don’t believe that my past and present are continuous,” “I feel my past and present are discontinuous,” and “I feel no connection between present and past selves.”) with reference to previous work (Habermas & Köber, 2015; Sedikides et al., 2015). Items were rated using a six-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree (ω = .95, α = .90).²

Manipulation Check

The participants responded to the manipulation check items following the Past Self-Continuity Scale. These items evaluated their interpretation of the scale regarding the narrative and essentialist perspectives. They were asked to indicate their interpretation of specific expressions about past self-continuity related to the narrative (“I interpreted it as meaning I am who I am now because of my past experiences”) or essentialist (“I interpreted it as meaning that there are parts of myself that are the same in the past as in the present”) perspectives. Items were rated using a four-point scale ranging from 1 = not applicable to 4 = applicable.

Accepting the Past Scale

We used the Accepting the Past Scale (Ishikawa, 2013), which is composed of seven items (e.g., “I try to face my past”) to assess attitudes toward the past.

Self-Concept Clarity Scale

We used the Self-Concept Clarity Scale that consists of 12 items (e.g., “I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality”) to assess self-concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996; Japanese version developed by Tokunaga & Horiuchi, 2012).

Measure of Temporal Comparison Orientation

We also used the Measure of Temporal Comparison Orientation (Namikawa, 2011), which consists of 11 items (e.g., “I often compare myself now with who I used to be”) to assess temporal comparison orientation.

Statistical Software

Statistical analysis was conducted using R 4.5.1.

Results

Manipulation Check

We conducted a comparative analysis of the mean ratings on the manipulation check items across conditions to evaluate the efficacy of the descriptive task in manipulating the perspective from which participants viewed the items of the Past Self-Continuity Scale. Specifically, the participants under the narrative condition exhibited a more robust narrative perspective (M = 3.89, SD = 0.31) than their counterparts under the essentialist condition (M = 2.96, SD = 0.98; t(55) = 4.79, p < .001, d = 1.27). Conversely, the participants under the essentialist condition demonstrated a more essentialist perspective in their responses to the scale (M = 3.29, SD = 0.80) compared with those under the narrative condition (M = 1.75, SD = 0.69; t(54) = 7.59, p < .001, d = 2.03). After confirming that the manipulation was established, we excluded data of five participants. One participant identified the objective of the experiment. Meanwhile, four participants self-reported that they did not give an essentialist interpretation to the self-continuity measure despite being assigned to the essentialist condition. We thus performed subsequent analyses with 57 participants (M_age = 19.68, SD_age = 1.74, range = 18–28, 33 women, 24 men; narrative: 29, essentialist: 28). The mean difference in self-continuity between conditions was not statistically significant (t(55) = 0.64, p = .524, d = 0.17; M_narrative = 5.21, SD_narrative = 0.73; M_essentialist = 5.07, SD_essentialist = 0.83).

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis

We conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses with self-continuity as the independent variable, perspective as the moderating variable, and acceptance of the past, self-concept clarity, and temporal comparison orientation as the dependent variables (Table 1). We transformed the perspective into a dummy variable in which the essentialist condition takes a value of 0, and the narrative condition takes a value of 1.

Table 1.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis.

Acceptance of the past Self-concept clarity Temporal comparison orientation

Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2

Self-continuity 0.26 0.03 0.27* 0.21 0.22 −0.01

Perspective (narrative vs. essentialist) −0.13 −0.13 0.45 0.45 0.53* 0.53*

Self-continuity × perspective 0.52* 0.14 0.51*

ΔR² .07 .07* .13* .00 .13* .06*

Note. Coefficients are standardized. p < .05.

Perspective and self-continuity were centered prior to analysis. We entered self-continuity and perspective in Step 1 of the regression and included the interaction term in Step 2. The results exhibited a significant increase in the coefficient of determination for acceptance of the past (ΔR² = .07, ΔF(1, 53) = 4.11, p = .048), and the interaction term proved significant (β = 0.52, SE = 0.26, p = .048). The results also pointed to a significant increase in the coefficient of determination for temporal comparison orientation (ΔR² = .06, ΔF(1, 53) = 4.23, p = .045) in which the interaction term was also significant (β = 0.51, SE = 0.25, p = .045). However, in the model with self-concept clarity as the dependent variable, although the coefficient for self-concept clarity in Step 1 was positive and statistically significant (β = 0.27, SE = 0.13, p = .039), introducing the interaction term did not result in a significant increase in the coefficient of determination (ΔR² = .00, ΔF(1, 53) = 0.30, p = .588).

Simple Slope Analysis

We estimated the simple slopes of the regression of self-continuity on acceptance of the past under each condition. Figure 1 illustrates that the simple slope for self-continuity was positively significant under the narrative condition (β = 0.55, 95% CI [0.16, 0.93], SE = 0.19, p = .006). Conversely, the simple slope for self-continuity did not reach significance under the essentialist condition (β = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.32, 0.37], SE = .17, p = .881). Subsequently, a similar analysis was conducted with temporal comparison orientation as the dependent variable. Here, the simple slope of self-continuity under the narrative condition was again positively significant (β = 0.50, 95% CI [0.13, 0.87], SE = 0.19, p = .009) but not under the essentialist condition (β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.34, 0.32], SE = .17, p = .954).

Figure 1.
Interaction Effect of Self-Continuity and Perspective on Acceptance of the Past and Temporal Comparison Orientation. Note*. Error Bars Represent Residual Standardized Errors.

Discussion

This study aimed to investigate whether or not past self-continuity, as perceived from the narrative and essentialist perspectives, constitute distinct aspects of self-continuity. The results of this study highlight that the perspective through which self-continuity is viewed influences the association among self-continuity, temporal comparison orientation, and acceptance of the past. Acceptance of the past and temporal comparison orientation demonstrated a positive correlation with self-continuity when interpreted from the narrative standpoint. However, this association was not evident when self-continuity was perceived from the essentialist perspective. These outcomes imply that continuity perceived from the narrative and essentialist perspectives represent distinct facets of self-continuity.

From the narrative perspective, self-continuity was positively associated with acceptance of the past. Integrating the past and present selves requires openness to past experiences (Weinstein et al., 2011), and those who accept the positive and negative aspects of their past are likely to obtain a clear sense of identity (Bauer et al., 2005; McAdams, 1995). This association, which was observed only from the narrative perspective, underscores the unique aspect of self-continuity formed by confronting and meaningfully integrating past experiences.

Moreover, a high level of perception of self-continuity from the narrative perspective correlated with increased temporal comparison orientation. Previous studies have proposed that reduced self-continuity leads to temporal contrast (Peetz & Wilson, 2013). Alternatively, in forming self-narratives that integrate change, the past and present selves are contraposed as objects to be narrated (Habermas & Köber, 2015; McLean, 2008). However, the current findings imply that the contrast between the past and present selves, which is inherent in narrative-driven self-continuity, is not necessarily a result of diminished self-continuity. This notion highlights that the relationship between self-continuity and temporal comparison varies according to the perspective of self-continuity; from the narrative perspective, it positively relates to contrasting the past and present selves.

The study was unable to elucidate the characteristics of self-continuity perceived from the essentialist perspective. In particular, contrary to our hypothesis, the study observed a positive main effect between self-continuity and self-concept clarity but without any differences between conditions. However, these results do not imply that no association exists between self-concept clarity and self-continuity perceived from the essentialist perspective. Instead, it indicates that a positive association also exists between self-continuity perceived from the narrative perspective. The formation of a self-narrative, which involves the creation of a coherent story about oneself, may lead to a clearer self-understanding (Schwartz et al., 2017). In addition, self-concept clarity enhances meaning in life, which facilitates the construction of an integrated self-narrative, because self-concept serves as a filter through which individuals interpret the events they experience (Chu & Lowery, 2023). As such, further investigation is required to shed light on the relationship between self-concept clarity and self-continuity from each perspective.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study has four main limitations. First, it should be replicated with a larger sample size. Although the sample size was determined through prior power analysis, the effect sizes of the statistically significant interactions were smaller than anticipated. Based on the considerable effect sizes observed in this study (ΔR²s > .06), data from at least 117 participants would be required to obtain robust results (α = .05, 1−β = .80). Accordingly, this study should be regarded as preliminary, and the robustness of its findings warrants further examination.

Second, this study did not reveal the characteristics of self-continuity as perceived from an essentialist perspective. The interaction between experimental conditions and self-continuity was statistically significant; however, the hypothesis regarding self-continuity under the essentialism condition was not supported. Differences were observed between conditions in the manipulation check items, and no evidence was found that the manipulation altered the level of self-continuity scores. Thus, the interpretation that the interaction revealed in this study reflects differences between the two aspects of self-continuity is considered valid. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the manipulation may not have been sufficiently robust to test the hypotheses adequately. Future research should refine the manipulation method to enable a more rigorous test. It is also necessary to theoretically explore other variables that more strongly capture the characteristics of self-continuity from an essentialist perspective. To further develop this research, utilizing the Past Self-Continuity Scale (Asayama & Toyama, 2025) would be effective. This scale measures self-continuity justified from both narrative and essentialist perspectives. For example, it would be meaningful to verify whether the characteristics of the essentialist perspective revealed by surveys using this scale are also demonstrated in the experimental paradigm. Such findings would indirectly support the validity of this scale.

Alternatively, the lack of clarity regarding the characteristics of self-continuity from an essentialist perspective may be attributed to the cultural background of the Japanese participants in this study, which constitutes the third limitation. Essentialist self-views are considered not universal but a product of Western culture (Baumeister, 1987). Therefore, it is conceivable that, in Japan, with its distinct cultural background, self-continuity may not be readily reasoned from this perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Cultural differences in warranting strategies for self-continuity have been documented in several studies. For example, Chandler et al. (2003) and Dunlop and Walker (2015) reported that non-immigrant European Canadians tend to use essentialist strategies more frequently. Conversely, non-Western groups such as Native North Americans and Asian immigrants rely relatively more on narrative strategies. However, in a supplementary interview survey similar to that of Chandler et al. (2003), conducted with a small sample of Japanese university students, both strategies were observed (see Supplementary B). Becker et al. (2018) examined cultural differences in the bases of self-continuity, such as self-narrativity and stability, focusing on two dimensions: contextualism beliefs and flexibility-monumentalism. Their findings indicated that these cultural factors moderate the relationship between these bases and global self-continuity. However, the effect was not strong enough to suggest that the strategies were mutually exclusive across cultural groups. Altogether, these findings indicate that while cultural background regarding self-views may have influenced the results of this experiment, it was unlikely to be the dominant factor. This study thus advances research on self-continuity from two perspectives, providing insights into the functional differences between them. Future research should also examine cultural variations in the roles and formation processes of these two aspects of self-continuity.

Fourth, this study focused only on past self-continuity. However, the temporal integration of identity is not limited to the past self. Future studies should investigate whether the assumption of dual aspects of self-continuity can be extended to encompass future and global self-continuity. Furthermore, because this study was conducted exclusively with university students, it is necessary to examine whether the findings can be generalized to individuals with different demographic attributes. High levels of global self-continuity are associated with older age, higher income, and longer years of education (Lu et al., 2023; Rutt & Löckenhoff, 2016). Regarding age specifically, examinations of warranting strategies from narrative and essentialist perspectives have mainly focused on adolescence (Chandler et al., 2003; Dunlop & Walker, 2015). Studies of adults have demonstrated that self-narrativity and stability explain global self-continuity (Becker et al., 2018; Hong et al., 2022). Furthermore, Asayama and Toyama (2025) examined adults and found that, similar to university students, they also exhibit a structure in which self-continuity stemming from the two perspectives constitutes different aspects. However, the relationships with acceptance of the past and self-concept clarity differed from those observed in adolescence. Evidence suggests that the roles of meaning-making and integration of experiences related to self-change (narrative perspective) and finding stability from past to present (essentialist perspective) vary across developmental stages (McLean, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the influence of demographic attributes on the differing roles of self-continuity from the two perspectives.

The findings on the dual aspects of self-continuity are crucial for understanding self-consciousness and identity development during adolescence. An accurate measurement of each aspect can lead to a more precise understanding of the perceptions of the self by adolescents. The insights of the current study could open potential avenues for the development of effective intervention methods tailored to specific individuals and objectives. For instance, employing autobiographical reasoning as an intervention strategy may prove beneficial. Specifically, autobiographical reasoning involves reflective thinking and narration about one's past (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) and has been demonstrated to mitigate decline in self-continuity (Habermas & Köber, 2015; Jiang et al., 2020). It encompasses reasoning related to past events and experiences in terms of stable and changed aspects of the self (Pasupathi et al., 2007). Future research could more intricately examine the impact of autobiographical reasoning by distinguishing between the two aspects of self-continuity.

Conclusion

The study proposes that past self-continuity, as perceived from the narrative and essentialist perspectives, denotes different aspects of the same concept. The narrative perspective emphasizes the narrativity of the self, whereas the essentialist perspective focuses on the stability of the self. This contribution is significant for the research on self-continuity and identity, because it clarifies a concept that has been abstract and inconsistently defined. Further research on the role of each aspect in identity development can enhance interventions that promote identity development. Continued exploration based on the current findings is necessary for understanding the continuity of identity.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-dev-10.1177_2192001X251389193 - Supplemental material for Two Aspects of Past Self-Continuity from Narrative and Essentialist Perspectives

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-dev-10.1177_2192001X251389193 for Two Aspects of Past Self-Continuity from Narrative and Essentialist Perspectives by Akira Asayama and Miki Toyama in International Journal of Developmental Science

	Acceptance of the past	Self-concept clarity	Temporal comparison orientation
Self-continuity	0.26	0.03	0.27*	0.21	0.22	−0.01
Perspective (narrative vs. essentialist)	−0.13	−0.13	0.45	0.45	0.53*	0.53*
Self-continuity × perspective		0.52*		0.14		0.51*
ΔR²	.07	.07*	.13*	.00	.13*	.06*

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Enago (www.enago.jp) and Editage () for the English language review.

ORCID iDs

Akira Asayama

Miki Toyama

Ethical Considerations

The research ethics committee of the University of Tsukuba's Institute of Human Sciences approved this study (approval number: 2021-54A).

Consent to Participate

All the participants gave their informed consent to participate in this study.

Author Contributions

All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by Akira Asayama. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Akira Asayama and Miki Toyama commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interest

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability

The data are available on the Open Science Framework for open access ().

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author Biographies

Dr. Miki Toyama is a Professor at the Institute of Human Sciences, University of Tsukuba. Her research centers on educational and social psychology, with a focus on motivation, creativity, and self-perception.

Akira Asayama is a doctoral student in the Graduate School of Comprehensive Human Sciences at the University of Tsukuba. He is also a Lecturer at the Sapporo Campus of Hokkaido University of Education. His research centers on adolescent and educational psychology, with a focus on self-continuity, identity, and motivation.

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	Acceptance of the past		Self-concept clarity		Temporal comparison orientation
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
Self-continuity	0.26	0.03	0.27*	0.21	0.22	−0.01
Perspective (narrative vs. essentialist)	−0.13	−0.13	0.45	0.45	0.53*	0.53*
Self-continuity × perspective		0.52*		0.14		0.51*
ΔR²	.07	.07*	.13*	.00	.13*	.06*