Exploring the Dynamics of Social Composition and Recruitment Procedures of Madras Army,1807

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of research on the history of the colonial armies in South Asia in general and the Madras Presidency in particular. This has been further accentuated with the emergence of the new military history that explicates the social composition and the diverse recruitment procedures of the Madras Army, hitherto unexplored under the East India Company around the first half of the nineteenth century in India. In fact, the very concept of raising an army battalion in the subcontinent underwent change to meet the potential challenges of the other European authorities, which existed during that time. The very composition of the Madras Army and its diverse recruiting policies made the presidency army capable of handling the emerging threat and maintaining the trading interests in the subcontinent of the East India Company. The Madras Army looked upon the epitome of disciplined military tradition since its inception. This article argues how the social composition and recruiting procedures came to be conglomerated to form a distinct military establishment in south India under the company rule.

Keywords

East India Company Madras Army social composition south India recruitment training

Introduction

This article attempts to explore the origins, social composition and recruitment process in the Madras Army during the colonial period (1807–61). After the Vellore Mutiny, the Madras Army's social composition underwent tremendous change and the British officials’ approach towards the issues and problems related to recruitment and discipline in the army also changed.2

E.G. Phythian Adams, The Madras Soldiers: 1746–1946 (Madras: Government Press, 1949), 13.

After the 1857 Revolt, the colonial administration examined the recruitment process of the three provincial regiments to avoid the possibilities of revolt in future. It is often presumed that following the Vellore Mutiny, there was hardly any instance of serious rebellions within the Madras regiments.3

Jane Hathaway, ed., Rebellion, Repression, Re-invention: Mutiny in Comparative Cross-cultural Perspective (USA: Westport, 2001), 1–9.

After the Vellore Mutiny, there was no rebellion in Madras regiments, but there were rebellions among the European officers. Scholars have pointed out the various reasons behind the disturbances in Vellore Mutiny and failed to analyse the hidden dynamics of rebelliousness, which were at play within the army throughout the first six decades of the nineteenth century. Given the background, it is important to understand the complexities surrounding the reorganisation of the Madras Army during the early nineteenth century. Here, an attempt has been made to relate the social composition of the Madras Army with the recruitment patterns, which remained in a state of flux throughout the study period. The notions of discipline and recruitment often conditioned the colonial government’s attitude towards selecting the sepoys from a particular social background. Initially, there was some confusion regarding the social categories, which could be offered employment in the army, but ultimately the colonial administration favoured particular social backgrounds. These ideas were largely a fallout as the social and political parameters influenced the patterns of governance in south India. It also needs to be argued that military history of India, particularly south India, is largely written from the point of view of administrative perspectives of the military establishment. However, there could be a strong assertion that the military history of south India possibly cannot be narrated without understanding the changing social complexities within the military establishment during the early nineteenth century.

Since the beginning of European settlements in the Coromondel Coast, a quasi-military force of Indians was maintained in all the principal settlements. The Portuguese, Dutch, English, Danish and French kept bodies of peons to protect their settlements. These temporary peons were frequently called ‘Poligars peons’ and they largely belonged to the military lineage castes. However, these peons were largely unskilled. Later, these peons were trained in European methods of shooting and other tactics.4

H. Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment in the Old Madras Army (Calcutta: Superintendent of the Government Press, 1922), 11.

In the early stage, the peons represented the Madras Army in a limited way.5

For more details, see Raj Sekhar Basu, Socio-culture Transformation of Two Depressed Castes: The Case Studies of the Pulayas and Paraiyans of Southern India, 1850–1956, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calcutta, 2004, 210.

In the later stage, they were trained by the European officers and their efficiency improved remarkably. In January 1748, Major Stringer Lawrence, Commander-in-Chief, testified their efficiency.

The formation of modern sepoy force started in 1765, though it had not attained its full measures of efficiency.6

C.D. Maclean, Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency (Madras: E. Keys, 1885), Vol. 1, Part 2, Para XXXV, 244.

The peons employed on the Coromondel Coast were never considered a serious military force until the middle of the eighteenth century. It was believed that Duplex was the first person to perceive their military potentialities.7

Lt. Col. H.F. Murland, Baillie-Ki-Paltan: A History of the 2^nd Battalions, Madras Pioneers, 1759–1930 (Madras: Higginbotham, 1932), 4.

In fact, Robert Clive played an important role in establishing the Madras Army. At that time, sepoys were formed as a company consisting of 100 persons each, with a due proportion of native officers, Havildars and Naiks. The company’s administration suggested the companies, known by the names of their native commandants, to form four battalions with a European subaltern to each and a captain to command the all the companies. Lieutenant Charles Todd was appointed to command the whole of the company’s army.

Social Composition and Recruitment Patterns in Madras Army

In the beginning, the French had a better military establishment and presence when compared with their continental adversaries in south India. In fact, the conflict with the French in the Carnatic war influenced the company’s officials to form their own army. Unlike the Indian princedoms, the company found it difficult to recruit soldiers from the upper caste martial groups. The recruitment of the Tamil soldiers in the company’s army began sometime in the middle of the eighteenth century. The Madras battalions were mainly from south India and only about 5 per cent from outside of the Madras Presidency. Indeed, the idea of forming Madras battalions emerged since the upcountry men lacked foundation and veracity. The initial battalions were formed from independent companies which were locally enlisted and they maintained their existence for some years. The recruitment of Tamil soldiers in the company’s army began sometime in the middle of the eighteenth century. The records of the company’s military establishment in the 1770s and the 1780s indicate that the sepoy battalions were essentially composed of Tamils, Telugus and Muslims. H. Dodwell observed8

Madras Military Consultation, dated 26 July 1762, F.244, Tamil Nadu State Archives, Chennai (hereafter TNSA) and Lt. Col. E.G. Phythian Adams, The Madras Regiment, 1758–1958 (Coonoor: Ava Mariya Commercial Printers, 1981), 258–61.

In 1765, the Military Regulations were printed; but no copy so far as I know has survived. However it is likely that they contained to our little purpose, beyond a general restriction of recruitment within the ‘proper caste’. The earliest definition of what the proper castes were seemed to be in the form of an army order was one that emphasized on the policy of confining recruitments as far as possible within the Rajpuths, Mussalmans and three Telugu castes—the Kammavaru, the Razu and the VelamaVaru.

Dodwell referred to one of the resolutions of the Madras Council where it had been observed,9

For more details, see Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 14–15, 45–47; Innes Munro, A Narrative of the Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast against the Combined Forces of the French, Dutch and Hyder Ali Cawn, From the Year 1780 to the Peace in 1784 (London: T. Bensley, 1789), 21–41.

At the present the sepoy battalion, are composed of men of different sects or religion on which account they cannot be supposed to be so attached to each other as if each battalion were composed of men of the same sect or religion. It is proposed that each of the sepoy battalions be formed of men of the same caste, either Mussalman, Malabars, or Gentoos, which it is presumed may not only be productive of greater attachment and harmony among the sepoys of the same battalion, but also may create a spirit of emulation among the several battalions.

At much later dates, weavers and cultivators were excluded.

In any case, martial qualities were not the monopoly of the citizens of north India. Constant warfare had been going on for centuries all over the south and this region had produced a class of soldiers who were not only courageous but also enterprising. However, during the first 100 years of Madras Army, the English officials mainly preferred to rely on a small mixed force of Europeans, half-caste Portuguese and Africans. The ostensible reason being that as strangers on a foreign land the company’s officials felt that more reliance could be placed on the fidelity of soldiers who were also aliens.

As indicated earlier, the French were the first to realise the value of raising local troops and formed sepoy battalions in south India. The French raised a force of around 5,000 in 1739 and the English company took the same strategy after a few years. C.D. Maclean observed about the class and caste composition of Madras battalions:10

Maclean, Manual of the Administration, 245.

From the proceedings of Government, dated 7^th May 1770, it appears that the Sepoy battalions then consisted of Mohamedans, Tamils, and Telingas, but no details of caste are given. It may be inferred that the number of Brahmans, Rajputs and Mahrattas in the Madras Army was very small. It is clear that the authorities were desirous of restricting enlistments to men of good caste, but it is equally clear that this was not practicable during the last eighteenth century.

Captain Innes Munro (1789) observed that: ‘These boys are amazingly attached to their masters and will keep close to their heels in the midst of the greatest dangers. When they grow up they make the best sepoys, for all of them speak English well.’11

Munro, A Narrative of the Military Operations, 76.

In 1791, Captain R. Gold pointed out that the sepoys had high state of perfection to their offices with strict discipline and the efforts to make their lives comfortable, they appeared really attached to the service.12

Ibid., 81.

It indicates that the Britishers had great faith in the capabilities of the native boys and their physical abilities which later proved to be the asset on which the company essentially fell back upon in laying the foundations of the Madras Presidency Army.

In 1795, owing to the small pay of the sepoys and high price of rice, considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining good soldiers, and the battalions were kept up to their proper strength by accepting undersized men and those of lower caste background. An attempt was made to recruit the sepoys from Bengal Presidency, but desertions were so numerous that the Supreme Government issued orders to abandon the experiment.13

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 79.

In 1798, General Harris pointed out that the difficulties in procuring eligible recruits in the Carnatic had then begun to shrink. He stated that:14

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 45.

Although the men obtained in the more southern countries are much inferior to the northern recruits in caste, size and thrifty, and being less subject to local attachments and little encumbered with religious habits or prejudices to inferior with the regular performance of their duty, are found to stand the pressure of military hardships with much fortitude and to manifest at all times a firm adherence to the service.

During the early nineteenth century, attempts were made to recruit the sepoys for Madras Army from Hindustan but they were not successful. In 1818, the Adjutant General in Bengal Presidency stated that the men who could enter the ranks of the Madras Army from Hindustan were generally those who had no ties behind, had committed some act for which they were in disgrace within their kindred or amenable to British laws or wished to escape from the debts they contracted—in short, all those of desperate fortunes and who for fear of detection were unwilling to enter Madras Army battalions.15

Ibid., 61.

However, Sir John Phillippart opined that though the infantry sepoys of Madras Army were rather short in stature, they were active and capable of undergoing great fatigue upon a very slender diet. It was stated that on very few occasions a man could be found who could arrive at a greater precision in all his military exercise like these short-statured hardworking south Indian sepoys. It would be like: the factors like moderation, sobriety and patience were instilled in them. On the other hand, these elements and the sense of commitment were almost unknown to their European counterparts. But although there existed in that body of men a fitness to attain mechanical perfection as soldiers, the company’s military commanders were of the opinion that there was hardly any man among them who was capable of providing leadership of their own.

Roy and Dasgupta pointed out that the Britishers preferred to recruit the higher caste people in the Madras Army, but they did not succeed. Until the third decade of the nineteenth century, the Madras Army consisted of mainly Muslims, middle caste Hindus, some lower caste Hindus and only very few from higher castes. Further, they stated that in 1824, the First Infantry Regiment of the Madras Infantry was composed of 45 per cent Muslims, 25.6 per cent Telugus, 14.5 per cent Tamils, 5 per cent lower castes Hindus and 9.2 per cent high castes. Interestingly, most of the higher caste Hindus came from western Bihar, eastern and southern Awadh, especially the Bhojpur region, while the other communities came from Karnataka, Mysore and Andhra regions.16

Kaushik Roy and Sabyasachi Dasgupta, ‘Discipline and Disobedience in the Bengal and Madras Armies, 1807–56’, in War and Society in Colonial India, ed. Kaushik Roy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 57; see also, Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 73; W.J. Wilson, History of the Madras Army (Madras: Superintendent Govt. Press, 1884), Vol. 3, 344.

In 1830, Colonel Welsh observed that Muslims and four Hindu major castes dominated in the Madras Army. According to him, about one-third comprised of Muslims and the rest of them belonged to Hindu castes, namely, Rajputs, Gentoos (Telugus), Tamils and Paraiahs (outcastes of Tamils). He further stated that the Paraiahs were brave, active and attached to their officers and services. Initially, the recruitment of the Paraiahs in the Madras Army had strong resistance from the Hindu upper caste people. Consequently, since the early nineteenth century, the Paraiahs and other untouchable communities were gradually being excluded from the combative units and relegated to the ranks of the pioneers and gun-lascars to conciliate the Hindu higher caste people. Despite resistance from Hindu higher caste people, there were no discriminations against the Paraiahs in the Madras Army and they continued to be enlisted, though mainly as the sappers and pioneers.17

Roy and Dasgupta, ‘Discipline and Disobedience in the Bengal’, 57.

The composition of various Madras sepoy battalions depended entirely upon the accidental presence of the recruits, who presented themselves for enlistment to various regiments, and equally upon the inadvertent methods related to the extensive drafting that took place on the occasion of the formation of new battalions.18

It may be noted that Clive seems to have favoured the ‘mixed’ battalion system. See Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 34.

In 1839, the Commander-in-Chief Order declared that ‘all natives are eligible for enlistment without reference to caste, provided they are in all other respects perfectly fit for the service’.19

General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 21 September 1839, TNSA.

The Madras sepoys were mostly well featured, but dark in complexion, and they were always ready to work with spade and pickaxe, an excellent trait and also good marchers. Despite their frugal eating habits, they possessed many good qualities of active service. Of course, they had few caste prejudices and when properly led, were fully as reliable as their more ‘showy brethren’ of the other presidencies.20

E.G. Phythian-Adams, The Madras Soldier, 1746–1946 (Madras: Superintendent Govt. Press, 1948), 23.

Since the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, equal proportion of recruit opportunities were given to the four main groups, namely, Tamils, Telugus, Muslims and lower caste Hindus. Even then, it was not intended to group any of these in any particular regiment, though attempts were made indirectly to divide them equally within all the battalions.21

E.M.C. Military, No.139, dated 6 July 1858, TNSA.

But there are hardly any details on caste composition of Indian soldiers in the company’s battalions stationed in south India. The numbers of soldiers from upper castes, namely, Brahmins, Rajputs and Marathas, were comparatively small in the Madras Army.22

For more details, see Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 15 and 45–47.

Indeed, the British authorities favoured the enlistment of men from upper castes, but these attempts failed until late eighteenth century.

According to Henry Dodwell, the Muslims and Telugus supplied three-quarters of the whole Madras Army. Out of sixteen battalions, in three battalions the Telugu dominance was over a half of the men and majority of them were Muslims. In four battalions, about 40–50 per cent were Muslims as against two with that proportion of Telugus and seven battalions with 30–40 per cent Muslims as against four containing as many Telugus. Thus, the Muslim predominance was well marked with some occasional exceptions in the Madras Army. The Tamils on the whole provided not even one-third of the soldiers provided by the Telugus and their average percentage was only about 11.3 per cent, though in terms of overall population Tamils exceeded the Telugus. On the other hand, Brahmins, Rajputs and Marathas contributed only 7.6 per cent of the whole Madras Army. The others constituted mainly Christians and Paraiahs, about 4.7 per cent.23

Ibid., 45.

Regimental Records also show the recruitment of different castes from various districts into the Madras Presidency. In the Carnatic districts, half of the soldiers seemed to have been Muslims and nearly a quarter Telugus. In Trichirappalli and other southern districts of Madras Presidency, about 41 per cent were Tamils, 30 per cent Muslims and 20 per cent Telugus. In the Northern Circars, the recruits comprised of 57 per cent Telugus and 37 per cent Muslims, while in the Mysore and Ceded Districts, two-thirds of the recruits were Muslims. In fact, a large number of Muslims were recruited in every group of districts in south India and their percentages never fell below 30 per cent.24

Ibid., 47; E.M.C. Military, Nos. 167–169, dated 8 December 1894, TNSA.

On the contrary, the Government of Madras stated that Muslims were scattered throughout all the districts of the Madras Presidency and they could not be localised or centralised.25

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 48.

Interestingly, the majority of men who came from Hyderabad and northern India were not Muslims, rather they were Hindus, mainly Rajputs and Brahmins.

The British military officials gave some priorities to the Hindu upper caste sepoys. Lieutenant Colonel W.J. Wilson observed that these men were Brahmins or of some upper castes and had to be remunerated in the following manner: ‘A piece of land yielding 24 star pagodas or three per annum was to be made over to each corps. Each man while employed was to receive two pagodas a month as pay, besides batta at the rate of two single fanams a day.’26

Wilson, History of the Madras Army, 179.

Major General A. Macleod had stated that the native infantry of Madras was generally composed of Muslims and upper caste Hindus and initially none but men of high military tribes were enlisted in the company’s army in the later period. He further observed that with the progress of time, considerable changes took place and natives of all description were enrolled in the Madras Army service. According to him, some of the lower caste people and despised social groups obtained considerable reputation by virtue of their service in the Madras Army. However, the company’s officials were aware of the implications of the recruitment of the despised social groups, fearing a backlash from the upper caste people. So the recruiting process maintained a balance among all castes so that there were no acts of disturbances and disobedience within the company battalions.27

Major General Alexander Macleod, On India, Smith (London: Elder and Co., 1872), 30.

William James Hoover dealt with the caste question in the context of the new turban that was introduced for the Madras sepoys by the company’s military establishment in south India. He pointed out that men of the native infantry saw this new turban as a threat to their caste identities and felt that acceptance of this new headgear would embroil them in social disturbances and religious conflicts, leading to their marginalisation within the indigenous society. The attitude of the sepoys became increasingly negative after their protest at Vellore Mutiny. Not only the Hindu upper caste but also the Hindu lower caste soldiers thought that the British officials would convert them to Christianity and to fulfil this motive, they were trying to win over some of the regiments.28

For more details, see James W. Hoover, Men without Hats: Dialogue, Discipline and Discontent in the Madras Army, 1806–1807 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 56–60.

Basu observed that the Paraiahs who belonged to lower caste groups were largely employed in the Madras Army. 29

For more details, see Raj Sekhar Basu, Nandanar’s Children: The Paraiyans’ Tryst with Destiny, Tamil Nadu, 1850–1956 (New Delhi: Sage, 2011), 153; Basu, ‘Socio-culture Transformation of Two Depressed Castes’, 324.

Kamalanathan stated that since the 1760s, the Paraiahs continued to work in the Madras Army. Indeed, the lower caste people, particularly Paraiahs, had shown their interest to join the army to improve their social status with the upper caste people.30

T.P. Kamalanathan, K. Veeramani is Refuted and the Historical Facts about the Scheduled Caste Struggle for Emancipation in India (Tiruppathur: Self Respect Rational Publishing, 1985), 35.

However, Paraiahs and other caste people were not aware of the notions of hierarchy prevalent in the battalions, which were often conditioned by caste, territory and social standing. Nonetheless, the lower caste people believed that they would get the opportunity to enhance the civic equality by performing military rituals and drills along with the upper castes and that would eliminate all forms of social discrimination and would no longer be forced into servitude and exploitation.31

V. Geetha and S.V. Rajadurai, Towards a Non-Brahmin Millennium: From Iyothee to Periyar (Madras: Samya Publishers 1998), 71.

In south India, the company’s military officials had frequently praised the Paraiah soldiers for their submissive nature and honesty. However, there were shrinking employment opportunities for the Paraiahs in the aftermath of the Revolt of 1857.32

Kamalanathan, K. Veeramani Is Refuted, 35.

Virtual Shift in the Military Recruitment Policy during the Post-mutiny Period

After the 1857 Revolt, there was a virtual shift in the British government’s military recruitment policy. The British commanders influenced by the martial race theory favoured the recruitment of the upper caste people in the army, proposed by the Peel Commission in1858.33

The Peel Commission (Jonathan Peel who was Major General of Forces, Principal Secretaries of State, Department of War became the Chairman of the Commission) was appointed by Her Majesty for the purpose of inquiring into the organisation of the army which was funded and controlled by the East India Company. The commission had clearly communicated its orders to the officers of the three presidencies in matters related to the recruitment of the soldiers in the army. Finally, they proposed the martial race theory. For more details, see Peel Commission Report (London: Government Printing, 1858), x–xiv.

There seems to be a growing opinion that while recruiting soldiers from various native communities, military, social and environmental perspectives had to be taken into consideration and possibly explicate the induction of Jats, Gurkhas, Sikhs and Pathans in the military battalions.34

Stephen P. Cohen, ‘The Untouchable Soldier: Caste, Politics of the Indian Army’, The Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 3 (1969): 456.

Despite the predominance of Muslims in the Madras Army, the Paraiah community had displayed their active participation. 35

For more details, see James Welsh, Military Reminiscences Extracted from a Journal of Nearly Forty Years’ Active Service in the East Indies (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1830), 14–15.

The Paraiahs’ presence in the company’s army helped the British to establish their sway over India and on overseas settlements.36

Raj Sekhar Basu, ‘Ideas, Memories and Meanings: Adi-Dravida Interpretations of the Impact of the 1857 Rebellion’, in The Great Rebellion of 1857 in India: Exploring Transgressions, Contests and Diversities, ed. Biswamoy Pati (New York: Routledge, 2010), 165.

The question of loyalty has often been linked with social composition of soldiers. Phythian Adams had praised the black troops of Madras Army despite some grievances among the regiments regarding pay and other financial entitlements. Roy also has pointed out that there were cases of disturbances and disobedience within the regiments. 37

Roy and Dasgupta, ‘Discipline and Disobedience’, 57.

But on the whole, there was very little doubt that the Madras Army was loyal towards the company’s raj. Possibly, the recruitment policy adopted by military officials was responsible for keeping the Madras Army much loyal to the company’s administration. The chief characteristics of the Madras sepoys have always been their unflinching loyalty, remarkable power of endurance and devotion to their superior officers, but that devotion could be won only by those who deserved it. The Madras pompoms38

Madras soldiers were affectionately called pompoms by the British officials.

were the direct descendants of those who participated in the military expeditions led by Clive, Coote and Wellesley.39

Adams, The Madras Infantry, 111.

In 1840, Lt General Burton observed:40

Ibid., 114.

The army was fully officered and in a state of good discipline and efficiency. The men are not tall but were in no want of activity and strength in proportion to their size. They are mostly well featured, they are always ready to work with spade and pickaxe, an excellent trait which the Bengal sepoys do not so commonly possess; they possessed good qualities on active service. They have few caste prejudices and fully reliable when properly led in the service.

Major General Alexander Robert, who also served in the Madras Army, emphasised that the discipline of the Madras Army was efficient and soldier like.41

Major General Alexander Robert was adjutant general of Madras Army. He was questioned by the Peel Commission in 1858. For more details, see Peel Commission Report, xxiv.

The high standards of discipline of the Madras Army were also pointed out by Major General Pratt.42

Major General Pratt had been in India for 25 years. He was deputy adjutant general in Her Majesty’s forces at Madras. For more details, see ibid., xxxiii.

Douglas M. Peers, influenced by the ideas of General Harris, has propounded that the predominance of lower caste people in the Madras Army was one of the main reasons which explicated the lack of religious prejudices and local attachments on its part. The Madras sepoy battalions were recruited mainly from families already settled in south India. All these qualities enabled them to withstand the pressure of military hardships with great fortitude and firm adherence to display service, as they were believed to be less attached to religious prejudices and local sentiments. Roy argued that there were deeper ideological understandings to recruit the lower caste people which were part of a deliberate official strategy to isolate the Indian contingent of Madras Army from local issues and sentiments.43

Roy and Dasgupta, ‘Discipline and Disobedience’, 59.

Major General Burlaw also expressed the fact that the lower caste people were merely attached to religious sentiments.

The Peel Commission Report (1858) reveals that there were several officers in the three presidency armies, who supported the mixed caste theory in matters related to the reorganisation of the army. But, such views were not supported by the other officers, who were entrusted with the responsibilities of commanding the company’s battalions.44

At the time of investigation, the officers of different presidencies were divided on the opinion on the recruitment of the soldiers. For more details, see Peel Commission Report, xxii and 41.

Consequently, lower caste recruitment became a lot more restricted in the regiments. The commission had investigated the whole issue of the Revolt of 1857 from various aspects and decided to reorganise the whole army by modifying the recruitment policy. In other words, it was believed that there should be no prejudice in recruitment process based on the religious background of the sepoys. Even the Queen’s Proclamations (1858) suggested non-interference with the religious life of the Indian masses.

Interestingly, the company’s administration in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had displayed an inclination to recruit soldiers from social backgrounds, irrespective of the distinctions of jati and honour.45

Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1996), 112–14.

The company’s administration has been guided by a general assumption that they could instil a so-called corporate identity and a sense of shared belonging within the Madras Army by recruiting the lower caste people, as they were obedient to their superiors.46

Since the 1820s, the Madras Army had evolved a corporate identity of its own and was relatively isolated from the host society. The colonial officials tried to implement this in the Madras Army to make it expert in warfare. See Roy and Dasgupta, ‘Discipline and Disobedience’, 55.

From the very beginning, it was the native sepoys of Madras Army who displayed their potentials in the battlefields which caught the attention of British military officials supervising the field operations. From the beginning, the Madras Army was successful in projecting a distinct identity of its own. Everywhere, the Madras Army represented the political and military superiority of the British power and helped the English East India Company to acquire additional territories under its sway. It is necessary to mention here that Lord Robert Clive was the first person who utilised the Madras Army in the Battle of Plassey in 1757 at Bengal and to establish new overseas settlements. It is to be pointed out here that the thambis (Madras soldiers) served as loyal brigades of the company with dedication.

Recruitment Doctrine and Training Mechanism

The recruitment of the native sepoys was only the first step in forming a battalion. These recruits had to be moulded to suit the decorum and etiquettes of the European military battalions. In the beginning, the East India Company showed more interest in recruiting Europeans as they had no faith in the fidelity of the natives. But soon, the company officials realised the practical difficulties to get sufficient number of trained Europeans for service in the Madras Army. Consequently, the company was compelled to recruit the natives.

Recruitment and Training in the Company’s Army

The successful wars with the French and local ruling groups in south India had led to territorial expansion of the company in south India. The European military officers were recruited for the administration of the Madras Presidency. Since the number of civil servants was miniscule, the services of the military officers were utilised for the maintenance of the army and also for the administration of the newly conquered territories.47

H.H. Dodwell, ed. The Cambridge History of the British Empire, V (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 160.

But the recruitment of European officers always remained a major problem for the East India Company.48

Military Consultation to Europe, 1765–67, 4, General Letters from Fort St. George to England, dated 1 April 1766, Para 33, 92, TNSA.

In the early days, direct commissions were offered to young men from England. This was the most popular policy adopted by the company to recruit the officers.49

C.H. Philips, The East India Company (Manchester: The University Press, 1940), 54.

However, the recruitment to the commissioned posts in the East India Company differed from the Royal Army. In the case of the company’s army, retired officers of the European regiments, who were in half pay during the peace times, were given a preference in terms of recruitment to the commissioned posts.50

Dodwell, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, 158.

Such officers improved the organisational structure and boosted the morale of the company’s army in south India. In 1786, the Court of Directors succeeded in getting some officers trained at their own expense in the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. From that time, the quality of military officers greatly improved.51

H. Dodwell, The Nabobs of Madras (London: Herbert William & Norgate, 1926), 41.

Similarly, the Court of Directors also realised the importance of training to the officers who shouldered the serious responsibility of administration. Consequently, Lord Wellesley founded the Fort William College in Calcutta in November 1800 to train the civil servants. Subsequently, the College of Fort St. George was set up in Madras, taking a cue from the College of Fort William.52

C.S. Srinivasachari, History of the Madras (Madras: Varadachary & Company, 1939), 216.

The number of officers trained by the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich was not sufficient to meet the requirement of the army. Even in 1800, Major General Braithwaite, the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, expressed his dismay over the security of the European officers.53

Military Consultation, 1800, Vol. 271 (A), C-in-C’s letter to G-in-C, dated 19 June 1800, 49–67, National Archives of India, New Delhi).

Consequently, in 1812, the East India Company founded its own military college at Addiscombe54

Dodwell, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, 161.

for training the artillery officers and engineers.55

Wilson, History of Madras Army, 335.

Later, the officers of infantry were also admitted in that college. Though officers attached to the corps of artillery engineers and to some extent infantry were imparted training at Addiscombe, there was no training worth the name for the officers of cavalry. In fact, the Court of Directors had given all the posts of commissioned officers to their relatives and friends without any qualifications and training. Consequently, these officers became well versed with the intricacies of warfare neither on their own nor in the course of their experience in commanding their regiments after their appointments.56

Fredrick John Shore, Notes on Indian Affairs, 1 (London: John W. Parker, 1837), 130–31.

The Court of Directors was particularly eager to maintain a powerful European corps since they felt it was absolutely necessary for the security of their possessions.57

Military Despatch From England 1768, Vol. 4, From the Court’s Letter to Fort St. George dated 11 November 1768, Para 37, 87, TNSA.

They felt that since they were strangers in a foreign land, they should not have exclusive faith on the military service of the natives. Instead, they reposed their faith on the fidelity of soldiers brought from the European companies.58

Adams, The Madras Soldiers, 122.

Therefore, they organised the Madras–European regiment and allowed it to mingle with the native troops.

The Forms and Patterns of Recruitment in the Company’s Army

The natives were recruited in large numbers during the later part of the eighteenth century. The company required Indian military personnel for a number of reasons, namely, healthier and military duties.59

In the early days, there was hardly any standard method which was adopted by the company for the recruitment of the European soldiers. The company’s European troops included a detachment of soldiers sent out from England. The European troops were mostly composed of the European mercenaries, deserters, prisoners of war, debtors, criminals, convicts, derelicts and ‘bad characters’.

In 1796, the governor general directed the Madras government to recruit from amongst the Dutch in the neighbourhood of Madras. For more, see Military Dispatch From English, 1796–97, Vol. 25(A), Letters From the Court, dated 8 January 1796, 20–21, NAI, An officer of E.I.C., Historical Sketch of the Princes of India (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1833), 21 and Historical Records of Honourable Company’s 1^st Madras European Regiment (London: Smith, Elder & Co., n.d.), 377–78.

The company had its own criteria for selecting prospective sepoys. One was physical fitness, a Prussian passion for tall men, as described by Amiya Barat.60

Amiya Barat, Bengal Native Infantry: Its Organization and Discipline, 1796–1852 (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay), 49.

This was reflected in the prescriptions related to the recruitment of the sepoys. The instructions were issued to Lt Holland on this matter by the Bengal government in 1762 to entertain ‘no men but such as are of good stature, strong limbed and free from any bodily imperfections nor any under sixteen years of age or above thirty five’.61

Recruiting instructions issued to Lieutenant Holland, 29 October 1762, Carnac Paper, OIOC Mss. Eur. F. 128/4 cited in Channa Wickremesekera, Best Black Troops in the World, op. cit., 99.

In the Bengal Army, good stature meant a minimum height of 5′7″. In the Bombay and Madras armies, standards were considerably lowered. In the Bombay Army, the minimum height was 5′2″, while in Madras it was 5′4″.62

For Bombay, see Moor, A Compilation, Chapter XXXIX. For Madras, see Major Madan Paul Singh, Indian Army Under the East India Company (New Delhi: Sterling, 1976), 150.

These kinds of criteria compared favourably with those employed in selecting recruits for the company’s European units and the regular British Army. Troops recruited for the company’s European regiments stipulated a height requirement of 5′1″–5′5″.63

For example, an advertisement in ‘The Gazetteer and New Delhi Advertiser’ of 31 August 1781 calls for lads five foot one to enlist for service in India in the Company’s army cited in H.C. Willy, Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, K.B.(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 202.

The physical standards of recruits laid down for the European regiments in the company’s service were higher than those laid down for the natives. In England, no one, in any corps, below the height of 5′8″ was recruited, while that standard was maintained in the company’s artillery alone; the infantry standard was fixed at 5′6″. During emergencies, the fixed standards were not followed very rigidly. For instance, the standard age for the company’s European service was fixed between 20 and 25 years. But during the war time, the standard height was reduced and men were also eligible for enlistment in the military up to 30 years of age. The company’s European troops were physically more robust than the native troops. Yet, the latter had more endurance and greater stamina than the former. A European was considered fit for service in India for about 12 or 15 years and a native for 20–25 years.64

Minutes of Evidence, Q. 1422–23. Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 13, p. 1, Commons 735 V of 1832, Evidence of Sir Robert Scott. See Peel Commission Report, 46.

In some situations, the native troops were favoured in matters related to employment than European troops, but in other cases, Europeans proved better than the natives.65

Ibid., 11–16.

The European artillery was far superior to the Golundauze, owing to better energy and martial skills resulting from better physical standards.66

Minutes of Evidence, Q 1273, 1301–03, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 13, p. 1, Commons 735 V of 1832, Evidence of Colonel Munro. See Peel Commission Report, 56–78.

On the other hand, in the cavalry, the native troops were in an excellent state of efficiency and were as good as the Europeans.67

Ibid., Question Nos. 1998 &1999, 67–75.

All recruits in Madras Army on enlistment were required to take an oath, swear or affirm in the name of almighty god to serve the government with truth and loyalty. In fact, they also took promises to obey orders of all officers and never to abandon the colours but to defend them with their life.68

For Bombay Presidency sepoys, in addition to the terms of Madras, they swore that in case they failed in any part of their duty as such, they would submit to the penalties prescribed in the articles of war. In Bengal, a similar oath was taken. In Punjab and Hyderabad contingents, the oath contained an additional clause which did not occur in any other presidency; the soldiers swore to march to wheresoever ordered. For more details, see Major Madan Paul Singh, Indian Army, 150.

The Indian soldiers were four times cheaper than their white counterparts. The utilisation of native manpower for military purpose was viewed as a necessity for the company’s policy of enlarging its territorial possessions.69

Barat, Bengal Native Infantry, 23.

The East India Company’s army thus offered a large number of employments to the native people. The large amount of revenue of the company went to feed the military establishment in the Indian subcontinent.70

Ibid., 24.

The company’s administration used two strategies to induce and encourage the recruitment of younger sepoys. In fact, such strategies were very often guided by the realities, since the company’s army was mostly filled through the recruitment of the native sepoys. The company used the military rank as an inducement for native sepoys.71

Wickremesekera, Best Black Troops in the World, 97.

For example, the commander of the East India Company forces in Madras offered higher rank for those who brought fifty recruits, that is, the rank of Jemadar, for those who brought thirty recruits, their rank would be Havildar and those who brought twenty recruits, their rank would be Naik.72

Ibid., 98.

The Government of Madras also encouraged the children of sepoys who were wounded or killed in action to join the service. In fact, from 1785 onwards the East India Company favoured the recruitment of the persons from the same village, from which the sepoys came or were related to them as kinsmen. However, the natives were attracted by good and regular pay and by the influence of donning the company’s military attire. As a result, the natives came forward to enlist themselves in the company’s military services.73

The Imperial Gazetteer of India, 4, 329–30.

Apart from that, the company’s administration in Madras was also interested in enlisting them, so as to maintain a powerful army for the protection of the presidency against formidable fearsome adversaries, such as Tipu Sultan and the French.74

Military Consultation 1784, 98-A, Governor’s Minute dated 29 March 1784, 1122–26, NAI.

For the enlistment of natives, recruiting parties were despatched from the headquarters or from the recruitment depots, which were authorised to enlist by the order of the adjutant general.75

General Regulation of the Army, Madras, 1849, Recruiting Regulations, Para 1, 368, TNSA.

When the native officers or their sepoys went on furlough, they were instructed to bring with them recruits for the company’s native army.

A recruiting party normally considered Europeans non-commissioned officers and native officers.76

Army Regulation in India, 2, Part-B, Para 931, 138, TNSA.

After the arrival of a recruiting party in a particular district, officer-in-charge either broke his detachment into smaller parties or sent out his men individually to different villages. Recruits were brought before the recruiting party, and they were examined by a medical officer.77

General Regulations, Para 15, 370, TNSA.

If they passed in the medical test, they were considered for enlistment from the date of examination and their names were forwarded to the regiment by the recruiting officers.78

General Regulation, op. cit., 372, TNSA.

The selections of those recruits were to be approved by the commanding officers of the regiments.79

Military Consultation 1796, 201-A, Military Proceedings dated 8 August 1796, 3780–81, TNSA.

An important feature of early recruitment of troops was called as irregular troops. They were less expensive and were enlisted at the times of war. Moreover, they were disbanded immediately after the war was over.80

Auber, An Analysis, 438.

The Paraiahs and the Madras Army

The East India Company’s recruiting officers were enlisted in centres at Madurai, Coimbatore and Bangalore.81

In Madurai centre, Maravars, Agambadyars, Kallars, Naickars, Paraiahs and native Christians were enlisted; in Coimbatore centre, Paraiahs, native Christians, Mophalahs and Muslims; and in Bangalore centre, Muslims, Coorg, local Tamils, Paraiahs and native Christians were enlisted. For more, see Army Regulations, India, 1, Part B, Regulations and Orders for the Army in India, Para 942–43, 1801, 140–41, TNSA.

Rajputs, Muslims and three Telugu castes, namely, Kammavaru, Raju and Velammavaru, were considered to be ‘the proper castes’. In the early days, sepoys were recruited chiefly from the proper castes.82

The Madras Army was composed of diverse races. A few Rajput families which had settled long ago in the south of India, a few Hindustanis or men from Oudh and the North West Provinces, Gentoos, or those who used the Tamil language. The Hindus altogether formed about two-thirds of the army, the remaining one-third being Muslims. The recruits were taken to far-off districts. The Gunturs, or those who spoke Telugu, came from the Northern Circars. The Malabars came from the southern districts, Chingleput, North and South Arcot. Trichinopoly, Salem, Madura, Tanjore and Tinnevelly comprised those portions of the country which were at times called the southern Polingers. The Muslims were also drawn from all parts. No race, tribe or caste had been excluded from enlistment by regulation.

The object was to maintain a due proportion so that no single caste could predominate over another. An order was published sometime before the mutiny fixing a caste proportion, which included all castes in the existing constitution of the Madras Army. See H. Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 14.

Later, a new strategy was devised by the company to recruit the sepoys. It was decided to recruit in equal proportions from the four main ethnic and social categories, namely, Tamils, Telugus, Muslims and men of Hindu lower castes.83

Ibid., 15.

More interestingly, the company’s recruitment system clearly favoured the enlistment of Paraiahs in the Madras Army. The Paraiahs, who were a labouring caste, were generally regarded as members of a diligent and frugal caste, less given to pleasure in good times.84

Edgar Thurston and K. Rangachari, Caste and Tribes of Southern India, 4 (Madras: Government Press, 1909), 113.

But, their condition was deplorable and neither religion nor society took interest in their improvement. Consequently, as a sign of social protest, a sizeable number of Paraiahs converted to Christianity, while some of them migrated to Ceylon to work in the coffee and tea plantations and many of them joined the army. 85

William Mayer (trans.), Administrative Problems of British India (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1910), 112–13.

Indeed, their decision to seek employment in the army was influenced by a number of reasons: (i) ‘they wanted to stop the social suppression or social discrimination from the higher caste people in the society. The Paraiahs were endowed with a higher calibre and physical ability. He may have been inferior in morals to high caste men but as a soldier he was superior.’86

C.J. Napier, Defects Civil and Military of India Government (London: Charles Westerton, 1853), 29.

(ii) They wanted to raise their economic status through good pay and pensions. The regular and handsome pay and better treatment attracted the Paraiahs who flocked into the Madras Army as sepoys.87

Roy, ed. War and Society in Colonial India, 9.

In 1790, the Madras Army enrolled 18 per cent of Tamils and out of them 12 per cent were the Paraiahs. (iii) They had an idea to control or to protect them from the high-caste subjugation or suppression.88

S. Manikam, Slavery in the Tamil Country: A Historical Overview (Madras: The Christian Library Society, 1982), 65–70.

The recruiting officers at Madras informed that the Paraiahs with the king or emperor’s uniform were able to work through the Brahmin quarters and move about freely.89

Gilbert Slater, South India: Its Political and Economic Problems (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1936), 296.

Therefore, the authorities continued to enlist them in the Madras Army. It was not surprising that the Paraiahs were given preference at the time of recruitment even after the great mutiny in 1857.90

Saxena, The Military System in India, 115.

However, in order to satisfy the army officers belonging to higher castes, the Paraiahs who were brave, active and attached to their officers were excluded from the infantry. Despite such policies of exclusion and discrimination, they continued to maintain their numerical presence in the corps as sappers, miners and lascars.91

Welsh, Military Reminiscences, 15.

The Madras native army composed of the sepoys belonging to various parts of south India, possibly because of the company’s demand of sepoys and also partly because of the company’s own assessment of the expenditure to be incurred on the military expeditions in this region. In 1766, the Nawab of Carnatic handed over two battalions of his army, one from Trichirappalli and another from Ongole to the East India Company.92

Military Consultations 1766, 24, Military Proceedings, dated 8 January 1766, 13, TNSA.

Again in 1767, sepoys were selected from the Nawab’s troops stationed at Timarikottai and divided into three companies.93

Military Consultations 1767, 26 (A), Military Proceedings, dated 21 January 1767, 50–52, TNSA.

But in 1782, the company felt that the evil practice of enlisting sepoys from the Nawab’s troops should be stopped. However, it is clear that such recruitment was exceptionally conditioned to the exigencies of war and was by no means part of a settled policy.94

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 18.

Further, the commandants of the southern garrison were ordered to endeavour their best to procure sepoy recruits95

Military Consultations 1784, 99(B), Military Proceedings, dated 20 May 1784, Para 2025, TNSA.

of various castes including Kallars—a de-notified caste.96

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 21–22.

Similarly, in 1766, the Northern Circars were included in the Presidency of Fort St. George and within the next 18 years, it became one of the most important regions from which battalions were raised for the company’s service.97

Military Consultations 1784, 101(B), President’s Minute, dated 31 August 1784, 3143, TNSA.

The Madras Army was composed of mixed recruits. This mixed composition of the Madras Army indirectly destroyed caste solidarity and prejudice and the domination of the army by one single caste group over the others. Men of different races, languages and religions heterogeneously mixed together in the same company or troops.98

Stephen Peter Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1971), 33.

Similarly, the Madras Army was entirely different from the Bengal Army, which comprised of what was called ‘class-company regiments’. For example, the regiments drew recruits from three or more different races but the men of each caste or race were kept apart in separate companies.99

John Stracherry, India: Its Administration and Progress (London: Macmillan, 1911), 480.

The battalion formed in the Circars comprised mostly of Telugus and Muslims, whereas the battalions serving in the Carnatic and the southern provinces were composed of Tamils, Telugus, Muslims and Hindu lower castes. These sepoys were evenly distributed within all the regiments.100

100

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 15–16.

But, the battalions of Circars were altogether distinct from those of the other parts of the presidency and they were numbered separately till 1784.101

101

Military Consultations 1784, 102 (B), Military Proceedings, dated 11 October 1784, 3836–7, TNSA.

They, without much doubt, accounted for the most efficient part of the Madras Army.102

102

Military Consultations 1785, 108 (C), C-in-C’s Minute dated 16 August 1785, 2199–2200, TNSA.

In October 1784, the distinction between the Carnatic and Circar battalions was abolished and the whole battalion of native infantry was called the Madras battalion.103

103

Ibid., 2211.

When the number of sepoy battalions was reduced from thirty-five to twenty-one in 1785, all the eight Circar battalions along with six junior Carnatic battalions were broken up and distributed among the remaining Carnatic units.104

104

Military Consultation 1785, 108 (C), C-in-C’s Minute, dated 16 August 1785, 2197, TNA.

The sepoys mainly recruited in the Andhra regions were heterogeneously mixed together with those from the Carnatic and southern provinces. Thus, the mixed system was a matter of an accident.105

105

Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, 40.

Similarly, it may be noted that already in 1765 Robert Clive seems to have favoured the mixed battalion system. Further, he also recommended that the native battalion should be composed of equal number of Hindus and Muslims.106

106

Ibid., 15.

The Madras Army inadvertently was successful in forging unity among the sepoys belonging to various races or castes and religions and there was a sense of belonging to a family. With regard to the appointment of the officers, a policy of discrimination was followed deliberately, as it was a practice in the British Civil Service. The posts of commissioned officers were offered only to the Europeans, whereas the natives were conferred upon utmost the rank of junior commissioned officer only. The natives who received those ranks were called the native officers. Besides a limited number of commissioned officers, there were a large number of non-commissioned officers among the Europeans who carried out the same duties as the junior commissioned officers of the native corps. There was no direct recruitment for the rank of junior commissioned officers and also no prescribed qualification. On the other hand, the natives were promoted to those ranks only on the basis of seniority.107

107

George Tomkyns Chesney, India Polity, 263.

However, the knowledge of reading and writing in vernacular language was required for such promotions. In 1763, when the independent companies were first formed into battalions, the natives had been appointed to command the army under the designation of native commandants.108

108

The Asiatic Review, 12 (London: Smith Elder, 1917), Tyrell, Military Notes, 408.

But in 1785, this post was considered unnecessary and hence abolished.109

109

Military Consultations 1785, Vol. 108 (B), letter from C-in-C, dated 25 July 1785, 205–08, TNSA.

Subsequently, Subedar was the highest rank obtained by all the natives till 1823. When the new rank of Subedar-Major was created, the selections were made by the commanding officers for its appointment.110

110

General Regulations of the Army, Madras, 1849, promotions of native officers, Para 2–3, 357, TNSA.

Consequently, there was not a single native officer privileged enough to become a commissioned officer in the Madras Army under the East India Company.

It could be argued that the recruitment policies in the Madras Army varied considerably during the early nineteenth century. In fact, it worked mainly on the basis of the indigenous recruiting patterns and displayed a preference for high-caste recruits. But recruitment was only the first step in the making of a sepoy. The recruits also had to be moulded into European-style soldiers and in the course of this transition they were exposed to different war strategies.

The status of native sepoys in the indigenous society was very high. It was a great privilege and a matter of respect for a person to be a sepoy in Madras Army. But the treatment given to the natives in the army by the British officers was not very humane. Abusing and striking the native sepoys were common practices in the Madras Army. An uncontrolled freedom and authority enjoyed by the Europeans in the presidency led to acts of tyranny and suppression of the natives. However, the authorities were very much worried about the attitude of the British officers towards the native soldiers. It was considered safe for the English to rule a foreign land if the native inhabitants were respectful to them. One of the great means of gaining respect of the natives was to speak their own language. So every officer who got commission was advised to give special attention to learn the native language. Hindi was officially recognised as the sepoy language since it was the general language of Hindustan. Consequently, the company ordered that all commanding officers of the sepoy battalion should be able to communicate in Hindi. This should be deemed as an essential qualification. Besides, knowledge of Hindi was made compulsory for the post of adjutant and other staff appointments. Similarly, later the study of Hindi was declared to be a part of the duty of the European officers. It is also important to mention here that the system of awarding gifts to the successful candidates of the entrance examination was introduced during this time in the Madras Presidency.

In reality, the condition of the native officers was deplorable. The attitude of the European soldiers towards the native officers was equally bad. Even an English sergeant commanded the native officers of the highest rank. The native officers were compelled to live in the same tents along with the sepoys in the campground. Generally, the native officers acted as the link between the sepoys and the commanding officers. As discussed earlier, the English officers were better paid than the native officers. The European soldiers were accommodated in barracks, whereas the native sepoys were allowed to live in huts. The differential treatment in terms of pay and entitlements, housing conditions and privileges between the English officers and the native officers in the Madras Army generated debate among the military theorists.

Conclusion

The Madras Army sepoys composed of soldiers belonging to different religions, namely, Hinduism and Islam, and consisted both Hindu higher caste people and lower caste people, the latter were dominant. In fact, the Muslims were largely prevalent compared to other caste people. The colonial government was guided by the general assumptions that they could grow a corporate identity and so-called nationalism within the Madras Army by taking the lower caste people as they were obedient to their superiors. From the very beginning, the lower caste soldiers in the Madras Army showed their potential in the battlefields and caught the attention of the British military officials. Everywhere, the Madras Army represented the British power and helped the British government to continue their sway within the subcontinent and also in other countries. Throughout the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Madras Army experimented with the recruitment of diverse groups of people, differing in terms of both religion and caste affiliations. However, despite the contending notions of hierarchy, territoriality and social standing, the element of discipline was very rarely sacrificed. The general spirit of the army was congenial, making it a compact and strong fighting unit. It was only under a particular set of circumstances that mutinies took place. In fact, the mutinies were the inevitable outcomes of the conflicts between certain requirements of discipline and the religious sentiments of the sepoys. The Madras Army, for a fairly long period of time was blessed with encomiums on the part of the colonial bosses for being loyal servants of the company in south India; this is an undeniable fact.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my supervisor Dr Raj Sekhar Basu and two anonymous referees for their excellent comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article and remarks made by Professor Velayutham Saravanan. The research for this article was carried out from 2012 to 2014 with the help of fellowship received from the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR) and History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

Exploring the Dynamics of Social Composition and Recruitment Procedures of Madras Army,1807–61

Abstract

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Social Composition and Recruitment Patterns in Madras Army

Virtual Shift in the Military Recruitment Policy during the Post-mutiny Period

Recruitment Doctrine and Training Mechanism

Recruitment and Training in the Company’s Army

The Forms and Patterns of Recruitment in the Company’s Army

The Paraiahs and the Madras Army

Conclusion

Acknowledgements