State’s Response to Intra-state Conflicts: The Case of North-East India

Abstract

Contemporary state politics is marked by intra-state conflicts, many of which have ignited civil wars. In the midst of diversity, and despite her success in sustaining democracy, India still faces intra-state conflicts, which often threaten its territorial integrity. Presently, Jammu and Kashmir and the North-Eastern States are the most talked about cases in this regard. This article studies the nature of conflicts in North-Eastern India and the way the state has responded to such conflicts. The study finds the existence of five major types of conflicts and almost an equal number of responses from the state. Though, over the years, India has successfully resolved many forms of disputes, in the case of the North-Eastern States, on the contrary, state’s responses have resulted into new cases of conflicts. Thus, in the absence of adequate principles and institutions, bringing a lasting solution to these issues does not look like achievable in the immediate future.

Keywords

Conflict decolonisation secessionism counter-insurgency homeland federalism

Introduction

Intra-state conflicts have been a dominant feature of many nation-states for decades. As such, the focus of most of the states shifted especially after the Cold War era to issues concerning conflicts within the state. During the Cold War years, the world succinctly focused on rivalry between ideologically constructed groups of states, and even prior to that was the conflicts between states that hoodwinked the nerves of most of the states in nearly all of the continents, particularly visible in Europe. Contemporary state politics, however, is marked by intra-state conflicts many of which ignited civil wars.¹

Some call it ‘state formation conflict’ as it involves an identity-based territorially focused group against the state with a demand for separate state, thus linking to some form of nationalism. Refer Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007).

Sometimes labelled as ethnic conflict, such intra-state conflict is prevailed in most of the countries in the world. Africa is known as continent of ethnic conflict and produces number of civil wars. In the Arab world, religious rivalries have often challenged the state system. This has also been the case in the former Yugoslavia, a region renowned for its rich multi-ethnic heritage.²

There are many cases which can be taken as examples. The Balkans has long been the crossroads in Europe. Migrations and the rule of successive empires have produced a diverse, intermixed population composed predominantly of Slavs (such as the Eastern Orthodox Serbs), Croats (Catholic), Muslims and Jews. ‘Since 1991, alongside major political and social transformations following the fall of communism, deadly conflicts have broken out between ethnic groups in several areas of former Yugoslavia’. Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 4th edition (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), 257.

Other examples are including conflict between the White and the people of colour in USA, between the Hutus and Tutsis, between the Burundi and Rwanda, the Turks and Greeks on Cyprus. Thus, many multi-ethnic states are often succumbed to effervescent and dynamic intra-state conflicts. Differing linguistic, religious and cultural backgrounds can become fault lines that result in open antagonism between communities. In south-east Asia, the Hmong and the Among the states in the South-East Asia, mention may be made of the conflicts in Cambodia between the Hmong and the Laos and that of the conflict between the Akhai and Thai in Thailand. Other parts of Asia particularly the South Asia subcontinent could never escape from such issues. The conflict between Sinhalese- and Tamil-speaking populations in Sri Lanka or the war that separated Bangladesh from Pakistan can be the cases in point. There are many more such cases.

In the midst of diversity, India could never shield herself from such musses of intra-state conflicts. ³

The term intra-state conflict here simply means conflict between different groups within the territory of a state involving state either as a party to the conflict or as an adjudicator. There cannot be a single cause that explains these conflicts as a number of issues have conducted this situation in the region. The current article does not attempt to deal with the causes of these conflicts, it instead tries to explain the kinds of conflicts happening here and state’s approach to resolving it and the consequences of the responses. For causes refer Nameirakpam Bijen Meetei, ‘Ethnicity, Colonial Legacies, and Post-independence Issues of Identity Politics in North-East India’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 20, no. 1 (2014): 99–115 and also Naorem Sanajaoba, Manipur Past and Present (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1988), Vol. 1.

Despite its success in sustaining democracy, India still faces myriad of challenges in the form of intra-state conflicts which often threaten its territorial integrity. Right from the moment India declared herself as a Republic, issues of secessionism and autonomy movements began to grow. Tamil Regional Identity Movement, Sikhs’ Movement for special political status, movements against illegal migrants in Assam, anti-migrant movement in Maharashtra, religious hostility, etc., all have tested the pillars of her national integration. Many of these movements for regional autonomy and identity have been accommodated successfully in the political system, but many others still continue to subsist despite of state’s effort to end all such hostilities. Jammu and Kashmir and the North-Eastern States are the most talk-about cases in this regard. The present article is an attempt to analyse the nature of the intra-state conflicts in North-Eastern India and the way the state has responded to address these conflicts during the post-independence period.

Intra-state Conflict in the North-Eastern States

Plethora of conflicts and incompatibilities between groups make North-Eastern India known to the world as naturally carved beautiful landscape but ill-sorted region. As expressed by the existing state of incompatibilities and hostile meetings between opposing armed forces, if there is truly any region that can be considered a zone of ethnic conflicts in the country it will very rightly be the North-Eastern States. Conflicts and disputes between ethnically charged groups across the region creating insecurity and uncertainty about peace and prosperity have been regular feature of the socio-political dynamics of many states. Till date there is a popular perception about the North-Eastern India as a security nightmare plagued with insurgency. During the colonial period, particularly near theend of it, the conflicts were easier to read as they were open, direct and limited as well. They were open and direct as all fought against colonial occupation of the native space. These were also limited as the disputes were mainly between colonial administration representing the state and native communities, where the latter demanded national rights to self-determination from the former.⁴

For instance, Nagas' political struggle against the colonialism (refer V.K. Anand, Conflict in Nagaland (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1980) or Manipur's movement against colonialism. During this period, different tribes came together to fight against the colonial occupation. For instance, Meeteis joined hands with the Kukis in their rebellion against the foreigners. This is a glaring example of the Hill and valley people fighting together against the foreign forces in the past. Refer Phanjoubam Tarapot, Bleeding Manipur (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2005), 14748.

There washardly any conspicuous issue, which can be considered as inter-ethnic conflicts involving demands of special consideration and recognition either from each other or from the Indian authority.

The nature and dimension of conflicts have changed and become quite complex during the post-independence period.⁵

Inter-ethnic conflict within the territory of independent India particularly in the region is a post-colonial affair though the root of which was already laid down during the colonial rule itself.

The way different groups and the state are entangled in state of opposition makes the whole conflict situation more complex in recent years. There are claims and counter claims against and from different groups, which are more or less armed with sophisticated weapons. Involvement of the state in the conflict both as a party and an adjudicator makes the intra-state conflict more multi-faceted and complicated. We have seen the conflict over the whole region, namely, between the Naga and Kuki and Meetei in Manipur, and the Mizo and Riang in Mizoram, between the Arunachali and Chakma in Arunachal Pradesh, to name a few. Insurgency, which can be taken as extreme form of political upsurge, has rocked almost all the states in the North-Eastern Region at one time or other. Armed insurrections took roots in Nagaland and Manipur between the 1950s and 1960s. The armed movements intensified in Mizoram in the 1960s, in Tripura in the 1970s, while in the case of Assam, it was in the 1980s. Militancy also affected Arunachal Pradesh if not as menacingly as the other neighbouring states.⁶

Nameirakpam Bijen Meetei, ‘Ethnicity, Colonial Legacies, and Post-independence Issues of Identity Politics in North-East India’, 100.

Types of Conflicts

A meticulous survey of the intra-state conflicts in the North-Eastern Region will clearly confirm the existence of five major types of conflicts. First, the conflict involving the state on the one hand and an ethnic group on the other where the latter claims illegitimacy of the former and demands outright secession. Indian state has faced it earlier in other regions too. For instance, Tamil regional identity movement, which was more of a linguistic nationalism originally, aimed at breaking away from the independent India. So was Sikhs’ movement for special political status which finally turned into Khalistan Movement. It had secessionist aspiration too. All demanded separate sovereign states. In the North-Eastern Region, currently the best example would be the case of the Meeteis’ struggle against the state. Though pretty much similar to the aforementioned movements as far as the idea of formation of separate sovereign state is concerned, the case of the Meeteis in Manipur has some distinctive features. They claim that Manipur was an independent state prior to its inclusion in Indian Union, which was done with force.⁷

Sanajaoba, Manipur Past and Present, xviii and also refer Gunjan Veda, Tailoring Peace: The Citizens Roundtable on Manipur and Beyond (Guwahati: North East Network, 2005), 15.

As even the British did not establish direct rule over the tiny state, it was never a part of Indian administration. When they left, the subcontinent Manipur was also left as a sovereign state and thus, formed its own constitution and accordingly held the distinction of having the first general election conducted in the sub-continent on the basis of universal adult franchise. Only after India gained her independence, she was forced to sign merger agreement with India making her a part of India. Thus, from the perspective of Meetei-armed groups, their struggle against the Indian state is decolonisation movement for restoring their past sovereignty.⁸

The Nagas had claimed the same but finally instead of a sovereign state presently they press for an alternative administrative arrangement within the Indian Union.

The second kind of conflict happens between the state and an ethnic group where the latter claimed discrimination in the policy of the former and therefore, demand specific rights. The claims of All Party Hill League Conference (APHLC) and Hill State People’s Democratic Party (HSPDP) against state policy in Assam can be a good example here. Out of fear of exploitation in the hands of people from the plains, under the umbrella of these political parties three matrilineal communities, namely, the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo, came together to demand a separate state within the union to uphold their distinct identities. Though the movement for a separate state gained considerable strength after 1952 elections, it was the Declaration of Assamese as official language in the State of Assam in 1960 that gave a severe shock to the hill people and demanded the formation of Meghalaya.⁹

J.K. Sarkar, ‘The A.P.H.L.C. in Retrospect’, in Tribal Movements in India, ed. K.S. Singh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), Vol. l, 215–29 and L.S. Gassah, ‘Regionalism and the HSPDP in Meghalaya: Some Basic Issues’, in Regionalism in India (with Special Reference to North-East India), ed. B. Pakem (New Delhi: Har-Anand publications, 1993), 280–88.

The case of Mizos (who were given Mizoram later) and also, in a more recent form, the case of Bodos are all issues related with claims of discrimination and insecurity about identity and resources and demand special considerations within the state boundary.

Third, the category of intra-state conflict in the North-Eastern Region takes place between one ethnic group on one side and one or more ethnic group/s on the other side where more or less every group complains about trespassing against each other and demand exclusive right to safeguard itself. The direct confrontations between communities in Manipur as a result of complaints of trespassing specially on rights, land and other ethnic possessions have been familiar features of conflict in the region. Kuki-Tamil clash of 1995 at Moreh was the result of Kukis’ alleged attempt to incarcerate the trade and commerce in and around the area under their control, which was read by Tamils as snatching of their ‘rights to run a free market’. Interestingly, this clash could also be linked to the large-scale migration of Kuki to Moreh due to Naga-Kuki clash in 1992 in other parts of the state on the same issue of trespassing on ethnic possessions. The issue of Moreh also resulted to the Kuki-Paite clash in 1997. Moreh, located at international border adjoining Myanmar at about 120 miles to the southeast of Imphal, has been a seat of many ethnic violence.¹⁰

North East Sun, New Delhi, 1–15 July (2007).

It inhabits diverse communities including Tamils, Malayalees along with Manipur’s ethnic indigenes, notably Nagas, Kukis and Meeteis. Interestingly, Moreh is a major economic and political centre of Tengnoupal, which is claimed by the Nagas as their ancestral province. On the other hand, the very Moreh has been the hub of what is known as Kukis’ political goal Zale’n-gam. However, the most apparent example in this regard would be the conflict that emerged when group/s demand exclusive political and territorial boundaries: Nagas’ demand for integration of all Naga inhabited territories, or the formation of the Nagalim, Kukis’ demand for Zale’n-gam,¹¹

Zale’n-gam is a name of the proposed Kuki homeland demanded by KNO and KNF.

Meeteis’ aspiration for territorial integrity and independent Manipur. Visibly, therefore, each move from a group seems to hunch the other as any such move was reciprocally taken as trespassing. The case of the existing conflictual relationship among Khasi-Garo and Jaintia in Meghalaya also comes in this category.

Fourth class of conflicts occur between one minor group and another bigger group where the former complains about forced assimilation and demands exclusive right to safeguard itself. This sort of conflict happened mainly within ethnic conglomerates, which are composed of clearly distinguishable identities. The Nagas, Kukis and Lushais are all examples of conglomerate groups within which such conflicts exist.¹²

The names of the tribes considered to be a part of the larger ‘Naga’ conglomeration as articulated by ‘The United Naga Council Working Group’ are Anal, Chothe, Koireng, Maram, Monsang, Poumai, Tangkhul, Thangal, Chiru, Kharam, Lamkang, Mao, Maring, Moyon, Puimei, Tarao and Zeliangrong. Refer United Naga Council Working Group, Issues Relating to the Territorial Integrity of Manipur: A Naga Perspective (10 December 2002). Similarly, many tribes constituting ‘Kuki’ have close cultural affinity—linguistically as well as by custom. However, all agree that it would be an over exaggeration to project these tribes under one cultural head. Refer Gangumei Kamei, ‘Glimpses of Land and People of Ancient Manipur’, in Past and Present, ed. Naorem Sanajaoba (Delhi: Mittal Publication, 1988), Vol. 1, 3–22 and Col. Shakespeare, The Lushai Kuki Clans, Part I (London: Macmillan, 1912). Similarly, the use of the term ‘Kuki’ is not without controversy and contradiction. Col. Shakespeare (1912) even wrote that the term Kuki is not recognised by the people to whom it is applied. The term was arbitrarily applied to them by the British administrators who had a hazy knowledge about them. Also refer Rajat Kanti Das, ‘The Problem of Ethnicity: Some Observation’, Journal of Anthropological Survey of India 50, no. 1–2 (2001): 37–47.

Even the state recognises these conglomerates sidelining the internal differences by following the British legacy of polarising the ethnic diversity of the hills when, in 1951, the Schedule Tribes List of Manipur was notified as ‘Any Kuki tribe’ or ‘Any Naga tribe’, and ‘Any Lushai tribe’, without making any mention of the ethnic names of the different tribes.¹³

Even in the latest list Any Lushai (Mizo) tribe or any Kuki tribe are used. Refer ‘State/Union Territory-wise List of Scheduled Tribes in India’, http://www.tribal.gov.in/WriteReadData/CMS/Documents/201306030201065184795StatewiseListofScheduledTribe.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015).

As composed of different identities, the inter-group rivalry within a conglomerate has been a regular phenomenon. Even the attempts to the unification of all the tribes under these umbrella groups have not been successful so far. Among the Kuki-Chin-Mizo, three major divisions already took place by the middle of the 1940s, namely, Mizo Union (predominantly constituted by Hmars), Kuki National assembly (initiated by Thadous and Haokips) and Khul Union (initiated by Paite, Vaipei, Simte, Gangte, Kom, etc.). This was followed by the creation of political parties based on community lines since 1950.¹⁴

It is perhaps necessary to mention about the Kukis here that apart from the differences over a commonly acceptable nomenclature, a number of tribes of this group have dissociated themselves from the group, and joined the Naga constellation or decided to assert themselves by individual tribe’s names. Some of them are also in a state of oscillation between the two largest groups, the Nagas and the Kukis. This has contributed a lot of confusion to the question, who were the Kukis at a given specific period of time.

The Chin Kuki Mizo (CHIKM) Congress while condemning the demand for the Kuki homeland by the KNF issued a press release in the later part of May 1993, that such demand has created turmoil in the hills of Manipur.¹⁵

This was reported in many dailies in Manipur. Refer, for example, The Freedom, 17 May 1993.

Thus, another generic group Khulmi was born. The Khulmi was constituted by Paites, Vaipeis, Gangtes, Simtes, Zou and other non-Thadou tribes from the Kuki-Chin groups who claimed to have originated from Khul meaning cave. Though pan-tribal concept of Khulmi disappeared after it was not granted recognition by the Government of India, none of its member tribes returned to the Kuki fold. The non-Thadou Kukis in Churachandpur looked upon the KNF and its demand for Kuki homeland with suspicion, as they already have experienced inconvenience regarding the imposition of Kuki homeland tax. Majority of them feel that if the Kukis have to demand homeland, they can do it so at Sadar Hills but not in Churachandpur. They do not want to be a part of Kuki homeland under Thadou hegemony. Thus, in the recent times, we witness many tribes, such as Hmars, Paites, Gangtes, Vaipeis, etc., who have disowned the name ‘Kuki’ and have asserted their own ethnic identity. Such an act led to the formation of splendid groups, such as the Hmar National Union, the Paite National Council, the Gangte Tribal Union, the Simte National Council, the Vaipei National Council and Mate Tribal Union. This is primarily because of the lack of common ideology and partly because of the dominant attitude of the larger group within the conglomerates. Among Nagas also the story has been the same. To mention the least, one of the tribes of the Naga conglomerate, the Zeliangrong claimed that they are not only different from the other tribes in the Naga fold culturally but also their history is different. Zeliangrong (combination of three groups: the Zeme, Liangmai and Rongmei) formed Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) on 25 February 2011 to struggle for Zeliangrong State/homeland, which was again reaffirmed recently.¹⁶

See E-pao, ‘ZUF Reaffirms Demand for Zeliangrong State’, http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=33..130315.mar15 (accessed 11 May 2015). Many factions of Nagas are engaged in the battle of supremacy to increase their respective areas of operation and influence in the region. A major hindrance to carry on the process for peace in Nagaland is the existence of more than one organisation, each claiming to be representative of Naga people. The announcement by the Centre to involve the NSCN (K) faction in the peace process met with a veritable wave of protests launched by the powerful Naga Hoho and the Nagaland People’s Council (NPC). The Kohima-based Naga-Hoho is the apex tribal council of Nagas living in different parts of the Northeast. Refer Dinesh Kotwal, ‘The Naga Insurgency: The Past and the Future’, Strategic Analysis 24, no. 4 (2000): 751–72.

Finally, one of the serious issues in North-Eastern States has been the issue of immigration, which allegedly induces outsiders and insiders into conflicts in many parts of the region. Assamese’s fight against the outsiders is a well-known issue. Even local groups in Meghalaya claim one of the biggest cause of tension in the state which is the fear of the indigenous tribes, that is, the Khasis, the Jaintias and the Garos, of being swamped demographically, culturally and economically by the non-tribes who can be broadly categorised into external influx of nationals belong to other countries, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, internal influx of Indian nationals from other-states within the country. These tribal communities do not welcome a sizable number of immigrants in their state as it disturbs their demography and create tussles in terms of sharing of resources.¹⁷

Author’s field note (conducted field work in Meghalaya during June 2015).

This issue of insiders–outsiders conflict has been a common feature in almost all the states in the region, which have experienced migration of people not only from other parts of the country but also from neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Nepal. The history of the plight of the Tripuries in Tripura is also an often cited case in this connection. In their own state, the indigenous tribal population has turned out to be a population without land and reduced to minority and the migrant Bengalis have emerged as majority, controlling every aspect of the polity. Not surprisingly, the recent ethnic clashes between Bodo-Muslim violence in Assam in which over 400,000 persons were displaced and many hundreds died, have been directly attributed to the issue of illegal migration in the state. These five classes of intra-state conflicts in the region share two common characteristics. First, in all these forms of conflict, the claims of identity misrecognition and economic injustice turn out to be the driving force to the conflict. Second, in terms of demands, all the groups (barring the state) involved in the conflict demand exclusive rights, particularly of territories

The State’s Response to Conflicts

How is the state responding to these conflicts? Analysing the whole spectrum of state’s response to the intra-state conflicts, it comes to light that there are two sets of responses put up in this regard: constitutional and extra-constitutional. The constitutional responses can be further divided into territorial and non-territorial responses. The most eloquent territorial response has been the demarcation of group-specific territories within the union. It may be on the basis of common cultural affinity so that a particular group having distinct culture can preserve their values by means of self-governance, or it may be on the ground of regional development. In the former case, India’s purveyance of federalism is the best example. This form of federalism seeks to recognise unique character of each region in the union. In the linguistic reorganisation of the states in pan-Indian case and in the case of the North-Eastern Region, the formation of ethnicity based units is the direct result of the very nature of our federalism.¹⁸

Federal units such as Telangana are also shaped on the basis of regional development.

Further, the creation of sub-federal units on the basis of VI Schedule within some states in the North-Eastern Region or demarcation of boundaries with an aim to restrict the access of ‘others’ through Inner Line Permit System in the hope of safeguarding minorities settled within the territory from economic, social and political exploitation in the hands of the outsiders are all in line with the intended territorial response to intra-state conflicts. These sorts of territorial arrangements are hoped to provide regional or ethnic (including linguistic) autonomy so that intra-state conflicts may be settled.

On the other hand, the non-territorial responses include either recognition of cultural need of ethnic conglomerates or specific provisions, not amounting to territorial demarcation for a particular area/s. In many cases of ethnic diversity and conflict, one of the major demands has been the protection of cultural and economic interest of different ethnic communities. With such provision to recognise and safeguard the interests, communities’ complain of exploitation and subordination in the hands of majority and more affluent groups may be reduced. Therefore, provisions are added to the constitution to enable group/s to safeguard and even promote their interests. Some of the good examples in this regard may be the provisions provided under Article 371A of the constitution which grant special provisions for Nagaland. Not even the acts of the Parliament shall apply to the state of Nagaland in regard to religious and social practices, customary laws and procedures, etc., unless Legislative Assembly of Nagaland so decides. Articles 371, 371B, 371 C, etc., are other examples.¹⁹

Even Article 370 concerning the state of Jammu and Kashmir is also special status granted to particular area not the community specific. Refer P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India; with Selective Comments (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2002).

The initiatives like establishment of North-Eastern Council and The Ministry of Development of North-Eastern Region can also be considered here. Though not directly related with response to end intra-state conflicts, such efforts may in the long run help improving socio-economic conditions of the people of the region which may further help in minifying particularly those conflicts resulting from claims of economic exploitations.²⁰

For instance, the Ministry of Development of North-Eastern Region is responsible for the matters relating to the planning, execution and monitoring of development schemes and projects in the North-Eastern Region. Its vision is to accelerate the pace of socio-economic development of the region so that it may enjoy growth parity with the rest of the country. For details refer http://mdoner.gov.in/node (accessed 21 February 2018). For North-Eastern Council, refer http://necouncil.gov.in/about-us/nec-act-1971-0 (accessed 21 February 2018).

There are other articulated responses of the state that could be called extra constitutional as these are conjured up beyond the provisions of the constitution. This extra-constitutional response clearly includes two inter-related schemes, one following the other. The principal approach is one authority/military rule. With the assumption that there should be only one authority with a single-armed force in a state, the state stations paramilitary forces with special powers in conflict areas as a strategy to subvert the dissident-armed groups of different conflicting factions. Thus, the state makes its presence and dominance felt in these areas through military expeditions and operations so that conflict may be controlled. This is in fact in line with the principles created at the time of independence when the ‘nation’ was broken into two that any kind of secessionist movement will not be tolerated, while they were weak it may be neglected but if it becomes strong, it will be rooted out by any means including force.²¹

This is the first principle. Other principle is the prohibition ‘against the concession of demands for any form of political recognition of a religious community’. Refer Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, The New Cambridge History of India (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7.

Armed forces have been deployed ‘to protect every State against internal disturbance’ by even enabling to exercise special powers. For instance, to deal with intra-state conflict situation, the Government of Assam imposed the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act in the Naga Hills in 1953 and step up police action against the dissident groups. The state further deployed the Assam Rifles in the region along with enacting the Assam Disturbed Areas Act of 1955 that provided a legal frame for the paramilitary forces and the armed state police in the hope to controlling insurgency in the region. But the situation aggravated and even Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) formed a parallel government ‘The Federal Government of Nagaland’ on 23 March 1956, which finally necessitated the centre to promulgate the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance 1958, which was ultimately converted into Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958.

The other approach that follows the first is what can be termed as ‘aftershock response’. As counter insurgency strategies, especially that of deploying armed forces, fail to produce the desired result, the option of cease fire agreements with what was once labelled as the ‘rebel forces’ was brought into play by the state. Reports and instances of human rights violation by security forces against civilians come from public and different organisations including Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) led the state to suddenly think of having talks with dissident groups. Presently the state is undertaking talks with various militant groups in the region.²²

Refer Swarna Rajagopalan, Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones, Policy Studies 46 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2008).

Consequences of the State’s Response

In the light of these issues of intra-state conflict and response of the state to it, one may look at the current state of affairs in the region in terms of the existing dynamics of conflict. Though this can be taken as the products of the duel between ensuing conflicts and the state’s intervention, it is in fact not an altogether new and different from the earlier but more of continuing the same stream with more or less curls. The most expressive product or the curl of it is the escalation of violent conflicts involving more number of varied dissenters.

Let me start with the territorial demarcation. Many of the intra-state conflicts with autonomy and secessionism as the target were successfully resolved by this strategy the best example of which is the accommodation of linguistic identities through linguistic reorganisation of India.²³

The Tamil regional identity movement, which carried the streak of secessionism was well accommodated by creating federal unit for the Tamils within the union. Refer for details Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence.

However, in the case of the North-Eastern Regions creation of such federal and sub-federal units on the basis of ethnicity hardly solve the problem of intra-state conflicts. Instead, it escalates competition for autonomy and exclusive land within the federal units. Such option of granting exclusive territorial rights generate more problems than solution as multiple minorities each of which sees itself as distinct identity which demands exclusive territories. While ethnic clans and conglomerates come together to forge a common identity for achieving the exclusive territory, disagreements come into sight immediately and the group/s which are allegedly discriminated within the weave narrative of their distinct identity and challenged the dominance of the other group, often leading to inter-community conflicts.²⁴

Nameirakpam Bijen Meetei, ‘Rethinking Cultural Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Northeast India’, Eastern Quarterly 4, no. 2 (2007): 113–23.

In a region like the Northeast where a large number of communities settle within the same territory dividing the given land in a manner that satisfies the concerns of each community is hardly possible.

Even the non-territorial responses of the state have many limitations, the recognition is granted to ethnic conglomerates by rendering special provisions to these conglomerates and thus unacknowledged differences within. Area-wise special provisions are also made and this is done on one misassumption about the diverse groups existing in an area as ethnical one. That is, it either grants cognition to ethnic conglomerates allowing them to go ahead with the existing system of governance or special status is given to one area where different groups exist allowing them to run their majoritarian authoritative administration. Consequently, recognition of ethnic conglomerates means neglect of diversity within. In both the cases, opportunity provided is misappropriated by the larger and stronger leading to movements from the smaller and neglected ones.²⁵

Even in the case of the Jammu and Kashmir, Article 370 clearly suggests that the special status is granted to the area named Jammu and Kashmir where different communities are settled. Interestingly, it was the Hindu king who negotiated the special status with the Indian authority but the majority of the region happened to be the Muslims. The pundits have been complaining about state’s negligence and even discrimination. This noticeably highlights the failure of area-specific status in terms of intra-state conflict management. Similarly, special protection or right granted to ethnic conglomerates to protect group identity is unsuccessful as well. The finest example in this regard will be special group rights granted to ethnic conglomerates under Article 371 A, which grants the Nagas right to preserve and continue with their cultural and economic interests. But whose cultural and economic interest it actually protects and promotes? It is visibly the majority community within the conglomerate.

The best example in this case could be that many sub-groups claim the subjugation and discrimination in the hands of larger groups within Naga and Kuki conglomerates. Many even assert separate identity. Therefore, both the policies encourage conflict between groups.

In regard to the use of force as a means to control the conflict, the existing insurgencies in the region and counter-insurgency from the state, and voices against deployment of forces illustrate its failure too.²⁶

On the use of force, many fear that this importance of the region in the national politics is demonstrated from the point of ‘national security’ rather than human and cultural security of the individuals and groups inhabiting this region. The region has been taken as a space where ‘physical power’, rather than anything else, plays dominant role in constructing a political discourse of citizenship and peoplehood. As a result, it is even said that this region does not find itself within ‘the narrative and memory of the nation, yet continues to occupy a central position regarding the territorial integrity of India. In this context, the Naga struggle for self-determination has been considered a threat to the territorial integrity of India’. Refer Dolly Kikon, ‘Engaging Naga Nationalism: Can Democracy Function in Militarised Societies?’ Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 26 (2005): 2833–37.

Even the state changes its stand on one authority and one military principle when it brought in the idea of ceasefire agreements and talks with the rebel groups. Still the ‘talks’ (which were in fact necessitated after public claim against armed forces, and state’s realisation of its failure) not only fail to fabricate any substantive result,²⁷

It is a widely acknowledged fact that the suspension of operation (cease fire agreements) with various militant groups in the region is a failure. Even the governments acknowledge it. Assam Tribune in its 21 May 2017 issue reported that the Chief Minister of Manipur talking about the reasons of failure of suspension of operation during his speech at a function on the occasion of Anti-terrorism Day. He said that the failure is due to ‘the ignorance of those in authority, and security forces were not serious in their undertakings, particularly as far as dialogues are concerned’, refer Assam Tribune, 21 May 2017, p. 10.

but also is a contradiction to the principles of the state itself. If one buys the Weberian state theory then state should be the sole body to use force legitimately.²⁸

Max Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’, in From Max Weber, eds. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1972), 77–128.

Indian state has been following the same principle when it did not recognise any dissident-armed groups. Suddenly, this was changed and decided to have agreement with the latter meaning that they are given recognition by the state which further means legitimising their activities. This is in crude sense of recognition of the existence of multiple armies within the same territory. The more alarming consequence is that it may temporarily mute the conflicts between the state and the revolting ethnic armies who enter into the agreements. But this has created an environment of heightened inter-ethnic conflicts between newly legitimised groups. This legitimating, from the state suddenly, propelled confidence of the armed groups not of keeping the principles of democratic process but of competing with other groups. Therefore, while the numbers of groups accepting cease fire agreements with the state increases, at the same time the number of incidences of conflict also increases. The best example here is again the case of the tripartite relationship between the Naga, Kuki and the Meetei. The moment a group learns about a possibility of the state having an agreement with another group tension gets heightened between them. The moment agreement is announced the violent oppositions already erupted against the ‘terms and condition’ of the agreement. The best example can be that of the Nagas’ ceasefire agreement with the state and violent agitation against the agreement initiated by the Meeteis and the Kukis. This heightening of tensions between groups simultaneously heightens conflict between some groups on the one hand and the state on the other hand.

Conclusion

Considering all the persisting problems, bringing a lasting solution to these issues of intra-state conflicts does not look like achievable in immediate future. Nonetheless, resolving such conflicts is not only necessary for sustaining our democracy but also urgency as the security of thousands of innocent life is at stake. As suggested earlier, Indian state has already shown the possibility of resolving such issues in the past by democratically accommodating the dissident groups. In the case of the Northeast, the difficulty may be immense for many groups are entangled in a very complexes liaison. However, it can be addressed suitably. The only concern is that adequate institutional principles and modalities of addressing these issues have not been found yet. Considering the complexity of the conflict and consequences of whatever responses of the state discussed so far, any approach towards resolving intra-state conflicts in the regions without proper institutional framework would backfire. It is at this juncture that wheel needs to be invented. Though inventing the wheel is not an easy task, it is need of the hour.