Ethnicity and Political Action in North-East India: Agency,Mobilisation and Community Relationship

Introduction

In democracy, citizens engage in political actions not only through electoral process, but also other forms of activities that include mobilisation outside the formal institutions of power including electoral activities. Such political actions are performed by various agencies through mobilising different sections by adopting multiple ways and means. Although modern democracies set certain institutional structures and processes for engaging in political actions, people are often motivated by identities and communitarian values driving them towards political actions. Hence, class, caste, gender, religion, region and ethnicity emerged as motivating factors for agencies to engage in political action, and thereby contributing to democracy. The political actions of such kind often played out within the limits of the constitutional authority of the state, cannot be antithetical to constitutional morality and dignity and wellbeing of citizens. When the ethnicised political actions of the ethnic communities disturb the intercommunity relations and the prevailing social trust, the democratic state initiate dialogue with the actors and ensuring their mainstreaming in the political process.

North-East India (NEI) is often described as the hotspot of ethnic activities such as ethnic assertions, self-determination and ethnic conflicts. In the past, ethnic assertions of smaller communities led to the formations of various states in the region like Meghalaya and Mizoram from the undivided Assam. The current assertions of Bodos and Karbis in the region are based on the ethnic demand for autonomy and separate statehood, thereby adding a new dimension to their political action. Such assertions can be seen in the context of the dominant ethnic community’s advantageous position in the political set up, and monopoly over resources and public offices thereby leaving little for other numerically marginalised communities within the states. The later remained as second-class citizens as they were denied not only territorial accommodation, but also adequate share in the distribution of resources. This has precisely led to their identity assertion and political action. Although it is commonly assumed that the tribal communities are having solid social capital and amenity, the ethnic conditions prevailing in NEI drag these communities in opposite directions.

NEI is known for its subterranean ethnicity and protracted political actions by youth, students and women associations belonging to a particular ethnic community, and often with well-articulated ethno-regional sentiments. Such ethnic political actions are often resorted to preserve their identity, culture and language. They are driven by subjective consciousness emerging out of memories and memorials. The ethnic political actions of many organisations often lead to the ethnic othering of ‘us’ and ‘them’, wherein ethnic minorities come under risk. Although ethnicised political actions in many cases may not contradict the constitutional morality, they rekindle the politics of otherings. Sometimes such actions lead to violence. In some cases, the perpetrators adopt violent methods while resorting to bandhs, and at times they do adopt peaceable methods of observing black day, nude protest, and so on. Anyway, ethnic organisations are making and maintaining ethnic boundaries, and thereby engage in identity construction through their political actions.

Youths’ Political Action

NEI is known for its youth activism and sustained political action. Youth as an agency play vital role in protecting their distinct ethnic values. Their ethnic mobilisation is part of larger identity mobilisation, and ethnicity is used as a mode of political action against inclusion and exclusion. Youth as an agency for political action is often amorphous because youth and students are overlapping categories. Moreover, they also include students and women—the most dynamic social group in every society. In the past, the traditional ‘dormitory’ was considered as the centre of played an important role in youth activities of the ethnic communities in Northeast. Although various youth organisations are building social capital, creating a community network and encouraging civic engagement, the construction and maintenance of ethnic boundaries are leading to the identity of ‘outsider’, which is generalised in all these communities. Further, the ethnic mobilisation of youth often leads to the violation of human rights in the form of physical attack on members of minor community. Freddy argues that the contemporary youth activism and consequent violent activities in many occasions are result of emerging issues of unemployment and other factors related to urbanisation. ¹

In the broader sense the term, ‘youth’ include students and women who constitute the most dynamic social sections in every society. In Meghalaya, the Federation of Khasi, Jaintia and Garo People (FKJGP) is a youth organisation, though non-youth can be a member, trying to influence the politics of the state. It constructs solidarity between three major ethnic communities in the state and take up common issues. The FKJGP was formed on the basis of the unity of three main ethnic groups of the state and members are drawn from different age groups and occupations and are usually above the age of 18 years. Its objective is to unify the indigenous tribes of the state for the common purpose of socio-economic growth, political rights and issues on influx of foreigners, boundary and work permit for non-tribal traders in the state. In Assam, the Asom Jatiyabadi Yuba Chatra Parishad (AJYCP) engages in ethnic political actions intended to protect the socio-political and cultural identity of the Assamese. In the recent past, it was active in opposing the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016 (CAB) and demanding Inner Line Permit (ILP) for non-indigenous people of the state. The AJYCP asserted that since the state is witnessing the exodus of Bangladeshi Hindu immigrants since 1971, CAB would vitiate the insecurity and displacement of the communities indigenous. ² In their views and suggestions on CAB submitted to the Chairman of Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), AJYCP alleged that the illegal Bangladeshi nationals, who keep entering into the state from across the border, have been disturbing the delicate demography of the state. Its apprehension is that if the Citizenship Act is amended, the ‘suspected nationals’ might be able to regain the voting rights along with other rights of the citizenship. ³

Young Mizo Association

The Young Mizo Association (YMA) is the oldest and the largest youth organisation in Mizoram. It was formed as Young Lushai Association (YLA) on 15 June 1935, but later got renamed as YMA in 1947. YMA was formed with an objective of the preservation of traditional values and useful customs. Its constitution of 1935, called Dan Bu, elaborated the organisation’s objectives as:

Y.M.A. will create an atmosphere so that youth may fully utilize their leisure in a profitable way and so that they live a life proper and healthy. Imitating Christian ways of living in every respect, it should be Christianlie Association. It should mainly aim at showing a manner that of Christ. This Association would organize debates, discussions and drama. It would encourage games like hockey, football, badminton, etc. It would also inspire the members to have indoor games and books to read at home. ⁴

Any Mizo over the age of 14 is eligible to be part of the YMA, as there is no upper age limit. The YMA is administered by its central committee at Aizawl and five sub-headquarters, 47 groups and 805 branches—some in Manipur, Assam, Nagaland and Tripura—having a membership of more than 0.4 million. It undertake the activities of cleanness in the locality, generating health awareness, and extending helping hand to their fellow men. YMA also popularised the Mizo tobacco with a slogan that smoking Mizo tobacco was much cheaper than cigarettes. It has been cherishing on the distinct ethnic values and culture of Mizo ethnic community. Although time and again it declared itself as a non-political organisation, YMA influences state power and even pressurise the political establishment on various issues.

The YMA considers Mizoram as Christian-majority state and it is their duty to uphold and honour the Christian values. It establishes a strong link with Presbyterian Church, the largest domination of the Catholic Church and creates interpersonal trust within the community, among the Mizos. In the early phase of its formation, the YMA tried to ‘broaden the outlook of the Mizos in general and to evolve more progressive ideas among its members in particular’. ⁵ Based on the principles of tlawmngaihna (spirit of selfless service), YMA has been focusing on several social services and humanitarian work. The social service activities of YMA have received recognition from both the Central and state governments. For instance, the Government of India acknowledged YMA’s contributions by giving the Indira Priyadarshni Vrikshamitra Award 1986 and the Indira Gandhi Paryavaran Puraskar 1993 and Award for Prevention of Alcoholism and Substance (Drug) Abuse 2013. The Government of Mizoram has honoured YMA with the Excellence Service Award for three consecutive years from 1988 to 1990. YMA championed the Baby Boom Policy in order to procreate more children for its community. It is often critical of the Government of India’s population policy and claimed that the population density is 52% per square kilo metre as against the 382 square kilometre of national average. It often claimed that the annual population growth in Mizoram is 1.6%, which is below the national mark of 2.37% in 2011.

Construction of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’

Though the YMA engaged in social services and played an important role in education by setting up of schools for the educational advancement of Mizos and involved in productive role in the welfare of the Mizos and the overall development of Mizoram, its political action based on ethnic mobilisation generated ethnic consciousness, which often led to ethnic animosity and inter-community tensions. Its construction of ‘ethnic self’ resulted in seeing other communities as a threat to identity and material survival. YMA made frequent demands for conducting census on illegal refugees from Myanmar. These animosities and conflicts can be understood taking into account of deteriorating trust deficit between communities. In other words, the occurrence of frequent conflicts has been as the result of erosion of efforts to bridge social capital between various ethnic communities. Fukuyama contends that tribal communities in developing countries constitutes a form of social capital, binging more social cooperation than ‘comparably sized number of disorganised individuals…however, this tribe may be war with its neighbours…prevents equal distribution of collective benefits’. ⁶ In order to take stock of these kinds of situations, Fukuyama suggested

what is needed in these cases is to increase the radius of trust among individuals in the various small, inward-looking groups that comprise these societies, and to facilitate the building of cooperative relationships, in both economic and political spheres, between groups that typically have had little to do with one another. ⁷

In many occasions, the YMA has been taking law in its own hands by harassing non-tribals and checking their documents for their stay in the state. The atrocities against non-Mizo communities by YMA turned this association as the ‘Youth Murder Agency’. The YMA has been engaging in repeated incidents of snatching away the trade licenses and ILP of the non-Mizos in the state. In many occasions, its anti-liquor campaign led to violence and loss of human life. In the name of drive against drugs and alcohol, YMA engaged in harassment, humiliation and intimidation of the non-Mizos including other tribal communities, which often led to the increasing instances of human rights violations. On one occasion, the YMA’s ire turned against the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission in Mizoram demanding her ouster from the state for rising concerns about human rights violations taking place in the state. However, in solidarity with the Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission, David M. Thangliana, the editor of Newslink, the most popular English daily in the state, resigned from the YMA’s central literature subcommittee. The YMA is often accused of interfering in the personal matters of many families. A national daily reported that R. Ralkhuma of Thuampui, who was suspected to be selling illicit liquor was reported to have an internal fight with his wife in the night. On hearing this, the YMA leaders visited his house where his wife complained that she was frequently suffering from domestic violence. YMA leaders enquired Ralkhuma about the accusations made by his wife, which ensued in scuffle amongst them and Ralkhuma. The leaders hit his head with iron road and later he succumbed to injury. ⁸ YMA’s inclination to protect and preserve its distinct culture and identity often led to moral policing. It once expressed strong dislike for girls who attend funeral services wearing tight dress. It appealed to them to wear traditional Mizo puan on a particular day in a week. ⁹

The ethnic mobilisation of YMA often acted against the interest of the smaller ethnic communities such as Maras, Chakmas, Chins and Brus. The Maras, a smaller tribal community inhabited in Saiha District of Mizoram, often complained that the failure on the part of the government led to unwanted harassment by the YMA. The YMA often conducts rallies in Mizoram for demanding the abolition of the Chakma Autonomous District Council (CADC), which was established in 1972 alleging that it was created by the Central government without consulting the people of Mizoram and it became the safe haven for Bangladeshi infiltrations. The Chakmas, mostly settled in the southern western part of the state, are the second-largest ethnic minority constituting 10% of the population in Mizoram. Although the CADC was formed in 1972 to protect their interest, they often face the ire of YMA, especially with its arbitrary head counting of the Chakma population. The Chins are the other smaller ethnic community inhabited in Champhai District bordering Myanmar. It is believed that most of the Chins came to Mizoram between 1988 and the mid-1990s. In fact, the Mizos originally belonged to the Chin Hills of Burma and the Chins and Mizos share common history, tradition and culture, though speak different languages and dialect. They have the same genetic, cultural, historical and linguistic heritage and the same descend from the Zo people settled in the Lushai Hills. At the time of the British regime, the present Mizoram was named Lushai Hill, while the Chin state was called the Chin Hill. Although the Chins and Mizos have common ancestry and blood relationships, Mizos often spread the propaganda that Chins are responsible for many of the social ills faced by the community such as alcoholism, drug abuse, prostitution and HIV/AIDS. The YMA engaged in forcible repatriation of Myanmar’s Chin refugees from Aizawl. On 17 July 2003, a local Mizo girl was raped by a Chin immigrant from Myanmar in a hotel run by his father in Aizawl, which triggered violence in the city. The YMA served a quit notice to ‘foreigners’ and pressurised them to leave Mizoram immediately. Moreover, it also contributed to the forcible repatriation of the Chin refugees from the state.

YMA and the Brus

Perhaps, among all the minority ethnic communities in Mizoram, the Brus are the worst victims of virulent ethnicised political action of the YMA in the state. The Brus are the local name for the small Reang tribal community in Mizoram, who opposed the Christian values propagated by the YMA. They once demanded adequate political representation by way of reserving seats in the Mizoram Legislative Assembly for their community. In 1994, the Bru National Union (BNU), a political organisation of the Brus, was formed which later demanded separate Autonomous District Council (ADC) for the Brus in Mizoram. It needs mention that Mizoram set up three ADCs for three smaller ethnic communities such as Chakmas, Lai and Maras. The Chakma ADC was set up in the south-western Mizoram bordering Bangladesh, the Lai ADC in southern part of the state and the Mara ADC in the south-eastern corner of Mizoram.

In 1996, the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), the armed outfit of the Brus, was formed following the violent clashes between ethnic Mizos and Brus in the Mamith sub-division of Mizoram. In October 1997, following the ethnic tensions after the killing of a Mizo forest official in Mizoram by the Bru militants, around 41,000 Reang tribal refugees migrated to north Tripura’s Kanchanpur Subdivision where they were placed in six shelter camps. On 13 November 2009, a 17-year-old Mizo was killed by Brus near Bungthuan village, which triggered violence against the Brus. These two tragic incidents forced the Brus to leave their place in Mizoram and settle in refugee camps in the neighbouring state of Tripura.

The central government, though, many times announced the repatriation of 36,000 tribal refugees to Mizoram, most of the did not cooperate with repatriation process without a written assurance from the Mizoram government. Over the years, the Brus have been demanding that they should be placed in certain place in group, and not send them dispersed in different villages. The contention of YMA is that the Brus are not refugees and they left Mizoram on their own will and nobody forced them to leave the state. According to them, the Brus are originally from Tripura who came to Mizoram seeking shelter and peaceful lives and stayed there, but again they returned to their homeland Tripura on their own. The YMA’s apprehension is that if the repatriated refugees are placed in one or two villages, they demand a separate ADC within the state, which is not acceptable in the present condition. Moreover, it alleges that when the Brus migrated to Tripura, they displaced the local communities in the villages of Sakhan Hill Range in Tripura like Sakhan Tualsen and Upper Dosda, which also contributed to the tension between these two communities. The Indian Human Rights Report 2006 indicted the physical attack unleashed by the YMA on Bru minorities in the state. ¹⁰

Although YMA is contributing to building social capital within the Mizo community, bridging social capital with other communities is a missing link in Mizoram. One can see this missing link in the context of the prevailing ethnic identity and consciousness and growing ethnic animosities against other communities as perpetuated by YMA. While the ethnic identity and ethnic consciousness generated by YMA are bringing solidarity among the Mizo community, its extreme posturing would lead to ethnic rivalry and conflicts. Even building a bonding capital is a problem in Mizoram in the context of the conflicts that take place between communities having common lineages such as the Mizos and the Chins. It often creates vicious circles that lack trust, leading further to the eruption of violence and erosion of social capital. The YMA, instead of building social capital across the communities, sharpens social conflict and strengthens social division. As a result, associational life is ethnicised which is not based on peace and prosperity. The YMA’s reluctance to create bridging social capital can be in the backdrop of its unwillingness to share resources and public office, and also extend institutional accommodation to various communities. Youth, the ignited minds of society, turn to be the prisoners of particularistic identity due to the ethnic mobilisation of YMA.

Students’ Political Action

Students are the radical fulcrum of society. They are expected to transform it towards the path of modernity. However, student activism in NEI has certain peculiar features in comparison to other parts of the world and India. According to Baruah, ‘student movements of the North-East India seem to have acquired longer student duration compared to the intense short-lived agitations of the West.’ ¹¹ Unlike the party affiliated students’ organisations in India, the students’ organisations in NEI stand for protecting ethnic cultural distinctiveness. These organisations are known for their informal networks and formal associations, and their activities do not confine only to college and university campuses, but in the society at large. The students often take off campus issues related to ethnic communities such as influx of foreigners, ILP, work permit, interstate boundaries on the above issues. Students, along with youth, are also involved in variety of vigilantism such as border vigilantism, moral vigilantism, political vigilantism (clean politics). Baruah argues that when student organisations claim monopoly over the moral and intellectual values affecting the life of the other ethnic communities. ¹² They engage in political action by organising protest and ethnic mobilisation within the democratic framework. Many ethnic students organisations like All Assam Students Union (AASU) transformed into political parties accepting electoral democracy and upholding constitutional morality.

Perhaps, the virulent forms of students’ political activism visible in the NEI were during the Assam Movement (1979–1985) against the illegal migrants from Bangladesh. The AASU was in the forefront of the Movement for driving out illegal immigrants from the state, as they impoverish the socio-political and cultural life of the ethnicised Assamese. In different states of the region, most of the ethnic communities have students’ organisations taking up the issues related to their communities. In addition to community specific students’ organisations, the political action is often conducted through a common platform. The North East Students Organisation (NESO), an umbrella organisation of many student organisations in the regions—AASU, Naga Students’ Federation, Garo Students’ Union, All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union, All Manipur Students’ Union, Khasi Students’ Union, Mizo Zirlai Pawl, Twipara Students’ Federation—often take up the common issues affecting the ethnic communities in the region. The issues include reservation of people from the region in higher educational institutions, action against illegal migrants, work permits for outsiders, implementation of Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC), extension of ILP for the entire NEI, and so on. Perhaps, the pertinent issue raised by students is related to illegal migration, as they feel that it would violate their economic, social and political rights.

The students’ activism often transgresses over the boundaries of the state and they carry it out in the other parts of India. The community specific students’ organisations and NESO are proactive in various educational institutions like colleges, universities and professional institutions for safeguarding the interest of the students. Their actions relate to fight against racism and discrimination encountered by them in their everyday life in metropolitan cities like Delhi and Bengaluru. The students’ political action outside the region attracted wider public attention in 2014 with the killing of Nido Taniam, a 20-year-old boy from Arunachal Pradesh in Delhi residential area following racist slur against his hairstyle. In February 2014, after the Nido’s death, the Government of India, constituted an eleven-member committee under M. P. Bezbaruah, member of the North East Council, to study the racial attack on the northeast people who study and work staying in India’s major cities. The recommendations of the committee, among other things, included completion of investigation of the cases related to discrimination of northeast people within 60 days by an official not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) or Superintendent of Police (SP). The Bezbaruah Committee recommended special cell in Delhi Police with recruiters from the region to deal with such crimes. The committee stressed to influence the minds of the general populace about the ‘ethos of Northeast in the psyche of the people outside northeast. This can be achieved by amending the school curriculum and university syllabus making study of the region mandatory.’ ¹³ It also recommended the insertion of new sections of 153C and 509 A in the IPC to strengthen the legal framework against racial discrimination of people from the region.

Backing NRC and Resisting CAB

The National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship Amendment Bills (CAB) were the recent issues in which the students in the region ventured into ethnicised political action. While favouring the NRC, they took strong exception to the CAB 2016 and its subsequent passage in 2020. While welcoming the NRC for Assam to identity illegal immigrants staying in the state, the NESO demanded NRC for all Northeast States. ¹⁴ The NESO claimed that around 90,000 illegal migrants enter the region every year from Bangladesh. The central government is acting against the interest of the region, while different organisations are working on for detection and deportation of infiltrators. ¹⁵ Although the genesis of NRC goes back to the Assam Accord of 1985, the NRC exercise began in September 2015 under the Congress government in Assam following the Supreme Court’s instructions, which fixed 24 March 1971 as the cut-off date for establishing citizenship in Assam. The first draft of the updated NRC released on 31 December 2017, excluded 4,007,707 people from citizenship. The second and the final version published on 30 July 2018, which reduced the excluded people into 1,906,657. As Sanjoy Hazarika asserts that the NRC was the outcome of the sustaining demand of the people for protecting their rights and preventing the non-nationals from acquiring those rights. ¹⁶

The Khasi Students Union (KSU), one of the constituents of NESO, has been demanding that 1971 be made the cut-off year for carrying out NRC update in Meghalaya to separate genuine and non-genuine citizens. After the release of the draft NRC in Assam, there has been an apprehension that it may encourage illegal migration in Meghalaya, Manipur and Mizoram, and there were calls to protect ‘indigenous cultures’ in the region. The NESO observed black day in NEI on the issues of possible migration in the light of NRC. In Meghalaya, the KSU formed student vigilante and erected its own ‘KSU Infiltration Gate’ fearing the influx of the 4 million people who were left out of the final draft of the NRC in Assam on 31 July 2019. Checkpoints in different border districts of Meghalaya led to harassment of others, especially migrant labours from Bihar. The organisations allege that Meghalaya became the dumping space for illegal Bangladeshi and Nepalese migrants. In Mizoram, the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) guarding the Kolasib District bordering Assam to check infiltration to state.

While welcoming the NRC across the states in NEI, the NESO took exception to the introduction of CAB and the subsequent Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). It needs mention that according to the provisions of the CAB, 2016, citizenship rights should be granted to Hindus and other non-Muslims who want to migrate to India from neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan due to religious persecution. The CAB was passed by the Lok Sabha on 8 January 2019, but it failed to pass in the upper house due to lack of majority for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. Later a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) under Rajendra Agarwal was constituted to ascertain the view of stakeholders in Assam. In many places, which it visited faced protests from the various ethnic organisations such as students, youth and women. The government, through CAB, wants to enlarge the provisions of Citizenship Act of 1955 to provide asylum to ‘persecuted minorities’ in India’s neighbouring states adding a religious identity in the discourse of citizenship. The Citizenship Act, 1955 provides ways to acquire citizenship, namely, by birth, descent, registration, naturalisation and by incorporation of territory into India. According to the provisions of the Bill, citizenship rights should be granted to Hindus and other non-Muslims who migrated to India. The CAB provoked the ethnic communities of the NEI as they believe that it would facilitate migration from neighbouring countries. In wake of this the NESO demanded ILP for all states of the North East Region asserting that ‘like everyone else, refugees will also have to come with ILP. Our states cannot be made dumping grounds for all those refugees’. ¹⁷ NESO opposed the CAB as it affects the cultural values of the region. It further feared that the indigenous people in the region would decline 30% due to the illegal migration from neighbouring countries. Further, it alleged that legalising migration of non-Muslims would also affect the resource crunchy states in the region, as resources would be plundered by the migrants.

The NESO believes that the CAB is a threat to the identity of the local people. ¹⁸ Instead of passing the CAB, constitutional safeguard should be granted to the people of NE states, along with adequate delegation in the vast federal authority, including the rights over land and its natural resources. NESO, which submitted a memorandum to the chairman of JPC, alleged that illegal migrants have infiltrated into and polluted every aspect of the social culture of the northeast people. It also asserted that northeast should not be converted into dumping ground for illegal migrants. The Democratic Students Alliance of Manipur (DESAM) even threatened to launch a movement for demanding separate ‘political autonomy’ for the north-eastern states, if the Rajya Sabha passes the CAB. ¹⁹ Perhaps the most effective demand came from the NESO, in the context of CAB and subsequent CAA, was the introduction of ILP system for the entire region. The ILP, made by British under the Bengal Frontier Provision Act, 1873, exists in Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, which constituted the parts of the ‘excluded’ areas of erstwhile Assam. It is often argued that ‘the Inner Line Registration was a product of the colonial frontierising of the hills’. ²⁰ The profounder of ILP often cite Tripura’s sewed demography in favour of the migrants against the indigenous population. It needs mention that the indigenous population of Tripura have reduced to minority due to the large-scale influx from Bangladesh. It is also cited that Dimapur in Nagaland, the only district in the state the ILP is exempted, witnessed enormous influx of migrants and indigenous people lost the land and other resources.

Khasi Students Union

Formed in 1955 with the aim of raising the educational standards of the Khasis, the KSU claims to address the issues concerning the overall welfare of the Khasi community in general and students in particular. Moving away from their conventional space for political actions like universities, students mobilised for issues related to their community. KSU has branches outside the states and metropolitan cities in India to protect its members’ interest. As the custodian of ethnic life of the community, the KSU often insists that girls should wear traditional dress and bar them marrying outside their tribe. It often views the community interest in tandem with students’ interest. They often take ‘off-campus’ issues to protect the rights of the indigenous people. As Srikanth argues,

although it was not affiliated to any political party, KSU played a decisive role in the state politics influencing the government and the political parties. Initially it represented the collective voice of the traditional elites, the rising middle class and the educated intelligentsia of the Khasi community. ²¹

Although technically it disassociates with mainstream political parties in the state, it exercises its strong felt influence on them on various occasions to protect ethnic life. It is argued that ‘the KSU has built a reputation for itself that hinges on the credible possibility of violence combined with genuine popularity and legitimacy in the public imagination.’ ²² Over the years, the KSU raised variety of issues spanning from migration to education and environment that had devastating consequences on ethnic life of the Khasi community. At various points of time, it also demanded separate time zone for the northeast people and settling of interstate boundary issues. The KSU time and again demanded reservation of seats and job reservation for local Khasis in central institutions such as North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institute of Health & Medical Sciences, North-Eastern Hill University, and Rajiv Gandhi Indian Institute of Management.

Like other students’ organisations in the region, the KSU’s most rallying point for political action is issues of illegal migration and its potential impact on the ethnic life of the Khasis. It often alleges that Meghalaya, over the years, became the dumping grounds for the illegal Bangladeshi and Nepalese and people from other states of India without any legal documents. It objected to the Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950, as it led to migration of Nepalese to Meghalaya. The KSU took strong exception to giving trades to the non-tribals in the state. It opposed the Railway project in the Khasi Jaintia Hills regions stating that it leads to the influx of outsiders into the state. In 1989, KSU opposed the construction of railhead in Byrnihat in the Khasi Hills, alleging that it would accelerate migration of outsiders into the state. Under Mission 2020, connecting capital cities of the Northeast, the central government decided to construct the rail link in Byrnihat. KSU often cites that though Nagaland comes under ILP protection, the commercial district of Dimapur is exempted from ILP. Such an exemption contributed to the influx of outsiders to the district causing damage to its demography. In fact, the railway line connecting to Guwahati to Dimapur facilitated the flow of migrants to Dimapur. The EPW editorial claimed that,

the persistent opposition of the Khasi Students Union to the proposal to establish a railhead at Byrnihat, situated in the Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya, reflects the Khasi people’s attitudes towards ‘outsiders’ who are perceived as ‘swamping’ the state and towards other tribes in the state who are seen as monopolising political power. ²³

In addition to fighting for protecting their distinct identity and preserving its culture from the incursion of the outsiders, the students’ organisation take up environmental issues affecting the people of the state. In 2009, the KSU spearheaded an agitation when the state government decided to lease land to Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) for uranium mining in Meghalaya. The West Khasi Hills District in Meghalaya, which comes under the Sixth Schedule area, is known for rich reserve of uranium, estimated to be 9.22 million tonnes of uranium ore deposits. The Government of India in connivance with the state government and the UCIL had made many attempts to mine the radioactive mineral from the regions of the West and South West Khasis Hill Districts since 1993. In September 2009, the KSU was in the forefront of the agitation, called for blockades and bandhs and started hurling stones on vehicles, as it claimed that the mining would affect the health and livelihood of the tribal communities. Moreover, it was claimed that the mining would lead to the displacement of tribal communities from their land. This political action of the KSU was often described as an attempt to emerge as the champions of ‘subaltern environmentalism’ from protégé of ethno-regionalism.

Strained Community Relations

Although KSU united certain causes, however, clear division based on ethnic differences has been visible. It is argued that,

indeed, though there is in existence an organisation called All Meghalaya Students Union (AMSU), for all practical purposes ‘student’ politics in the state is still highly sectionalised and sectarian with the Students’ belonging to three major tribal ethnic communities, the Khasis, the Jaintias and the Garos organising themselves separately and articulating essentially sub regional grievances and demands. ²⁴

Often animosity and tension between three major tribal communities in the state manifested in the tensions between three other students’ organisations. For instance, Garo Students Union (GSU) and KSU conflicts. The KSU waged a vehement protest against the restricting of the Meghalaya Board of School Education (MBOSE), as it viewed that it is pathetic towards Khasis and Jaintia students. Interestingly the ethnic divide between three dominant ethnic communities in the state was visible when the Jaintia Students Union (JSU) overtly supported the stand taken by the KSU, the GSU viewed that any move to create a new office in Shillong as bifurcation of the Board to placate the Khasis. As Srikanth argues that when the Khasi community perceives the KSU as their representative to articulate their identity and demands, it would create greater insecurity, fear and suspicion among other tribes and non-tribal communities living in the state. ²⁵

The KSU adopts different strategies like bandhs, picketing, road blockades, rallies, and so on, and often acting as the push factor for the government in public policy making. While engaging in its political action, it gets much support from other organisations such the Federation of Khasi, Jaintia and Garo People (FKJGP). However, such political actions of the KSU such as bandhs, office picketing, road blockades, night blockage, hunger strike and rallies led to fixing the state. The major political parties in the state covertly support the political actions of the KSU and they have no capacity to challenge the KSU due to the invocation of ethnic sentiments. KSU has been in favour of preparing NRC for the state as it feels that the illegal migration would affected scarce resource capacity of the state and impoverishment of the indigenous ethnic communities. Acting as watchdog in border check post to the stop the possible migration of people from neighbouring Assam, it sets up infiltration gates and prevented people coming without proper documents. Such a political action often led to acting as a parallel authority to state and taking law in its own hand. It is often seen that public criticisms have never been heard from the civil society about the political action of the KSU. Although it is a non-party organisation, it has strong influence on major political parties in the state. As a result, no party dares to take any policy and action against the KSU.

The KSU always have developed a complicit between the state and government. According to Sirnate, KSU is ‘officially divorced from any political ideology and political parties, the KSU retain its uniquely disruptive voice in the politics of Meghalaya.’ ²⁶ The KSU was instrumental in floating the ethno-regional political party called Khun Hynniewtrep National Awakening Movement (KHNAM). It is argued that ‘the KSU today remains a non-ideological organisation sporadically engaging in activism and functioning as a springboard for politically ambitious young men’. ²⁷ In many ethnic conflicts in the state, the role of KSU was widely recognised. In the 1980s, KSU agitated against the non-tribals. It was involved in the 1987 conflict between the Khasis and non-tribals. During this time, many Nepali coal mine workers came under the ire of the KSU as the lost jobs and leading to group clashes between Khasis and Nepalese. In 1991–1992, again the anti-outsider agitation erupted and violence was unleashed on the non-tribals and their properties. In 2013, KSU with other ethnic organisations agitated over the demand for the extension of ILP to Meghalaya, which also ignited the non-tribal sentiments. All these occasions, the state government and its agencies often bowed to the dictates of the KSU.

The KSU’s approach towards the minority community in the state is often provocative, while asserting its identity and struggle. For example, its protracted ethnic political action turning into violent path was the Shillong violence in June 2018, when clashes broke out between Dalit Sikhs and Khasis in the Punjabi Lance in Sweepers Colony of Motphran area of Shillong. The tension started with a scuffle between a Khasis bus conductor and a Punjabi woman over a parking lot in the area. The Dalit Sikh settlement area is near to the Bara Bazar, the trade and commercial centre in Shillong. The Dalit Sikhs, who were brought by the British to carry out manual scavenging, have been living in the area for many decades, quiet often became the victims of KSU’s ethnic bigotry politics. ²⁸ When the area was clamped with curfew, the KSU demanded the release of Khasi protesters arrested by the police during the clashes. After the incident, KSU reiterated its demands for the ‘eviction’ of the ‘illegal settlers’ from the locality and in the state as a whole. When the Sikh organisations in Punjab interfered in this matter, the KSU claimed that it is an internal matter of the state. It is argued that though it is not a political entity, it could occupy a vital political space in the state due to its ability to articulate the anxieties and fears of the tribal communities in the state against the so called incursion of the outsiders in to its territory. ²⁹

Women’s Political Action

Women are often described as passive agent, rarely speak for themselves and engage in political action. However, in contrast to their counterpart in mainland India, women in NEI have high literacy and education, and in some states they outnumber men. Moreover, their political agency and activism is known for in the region. Women waged protested against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958. It is argued that ‘as stakeholders in conflict, women have also played a significant role as supporters of armed groups, and, in some cases, armed fighters. Women cadres in the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) are a case in point.’ ³⁰ The exemplarity of women’s political action in NEI is the involvement of women’s body in political action, stripping of cloths and using naked bodies as a mode of protest to impress upon the state against atrocities. Perhaps, it includes the ‘nude protest’ and the use of female body as the instrument of protest against the state, especially in its opposition to AFSPA. Bodies are central to power struggles and the body itself is the locus of resistance. ³¹

Women in northeast have acted as peacemakers in the conflict-ridden society. They have engaged in conflict resolution and peace-making, and are often seen as ‘promoters of peace and security’ in NEI. The women’s organisations such as Meira Paibi Movement in Manipur, Naga Mother’s Association and Bodo Women’s Justice Forum act as peace activists. The Meira Paibi Movement started in the 1970s as an anti-liquor movement. In fact, its actions are beyond enhancing the relations between men and women, and addresses certain broader issues such as human rights and ethnic violence. In Assam, the All Bodo Women’s Welfare Federation (ABWWF) was formed in 1993 to look after the interests of the Bodo women. In fact, Manipur has a history of Nupi Lan (Women’s War) in 1904 against a British order that forced men into hard labour.

Although some tribal communities such as Khasis, Garos and Jaintias are known for matrilineal relations, the women in NEI, like their counterpart in mainland India, also faces patriarchy, inequality, domestic violence, sexual abuse, human rights violation and depression. Women are the custodians of customary laws and traditions. Most of the tribal communities in NEI are often described as more gender-friendly, deep-rooted patriarchy exists in them. Although no visible form of oppression exists in contrast to women in the rest of India, women suffer heavily. Women had to wage political actions against gendered roles and gendered responsibilities. Their conspicuous absence in many ethno-regional movements in the region and leadership role in these movements accounts for the oppression they face in society. First, the customary laws often prevent them from engaging in political activism in public sphere. Yuval-Davis argued that ‘women’s role as carriers of ethnicity as ‘symbolic boundary maintenance’ is enacted in a very concrete way as women simultaneously ‘embody’ ethnic culture and gender; women in the ‘proper’ behaviour, in their ‘proper’ clothing embody the line which signifies the collective’s boundaries’. ³²

Second, women political activism could not translate into their representation in traditional institutions, legislature and parliament. Women are not allowed to participate in the traditional village councils and village development boards. Women in the region struggled for political representation and empowerment. Naga women are fighting for their representation in traditional institutions. Often such protests can be seen as assertion of equality challenging the prevailing chains of tradition. In spite of the matrilineal system that exists in many tribal communities, politics is often seen as a male bastion. The presence of women is not only rarely felt in the representative institutions, but also even in ethnic organisations of students and youth. It needs mention that a Khasis girl, Marbiang Khongwir, was elected to the President of the New Delhi unit of the KSU only on 30 October 2019.

Tribal communities are generally recognised as homogenous groups with some kind of gender equality that prevails in contrast to the mainstream Indian society. Outwardly, the position of women in tribal communities is comparatively high in contrast to their counterpart in the mainland India. Moreover, the existence of matrilineal system in some of the tribal communities reinforces this argument to certain extent. However, in reality, they face a lot of discrimination and oppression in the society. Women from ethnic community face multiple discrimination and oppression due to the intersection of ethnicity and gender, and it influences power relations, state policies and distributive policies. The customary laws, for instance, are biased cementing gender inequality. Thus women are not playing a major role in traditional institutions either in representation of in their participation in the decision-making process.

During the insurgency and the counter insurgency operation by the state, atrocities against women in the form of molestation, rape and abduction took place. The atrocities against women led to the women’s impoverishment adversely affecting their capabilities. It is argued that ‘counter-insurgency measures organised by the security forces often accompanied extremely gender insensitive measures aimed at the decapitation, maiming and heaping of indignities over the body of Manipuri women’. ³³ On 15 July 2004, dozens of naked tribal women in Manipur protested in front of the headquarters of the Assam Rifles carrying the banners that read, ‘Indian Army Rape Us’, ‘Indian Army take our Flesh’. The protest cropped up against the Indian security forces that allegedly abducted, raped and killed a tribal woman named Thangjam Manorama Devi. The extensive hunger strike of Irom Sharmila, a tribal woman in Manipur, since November 2000, for repealing the AFSPA is another example of intersectional discrimination and oppression based on gender and ethnicity. Sharmila launched her hunger strike after the fast unto death immediately ‘Malom Massacre’ where 10 civilians lost their life due to the firing by the security forces in November 2000. The decade-old hunger strike by Sharmila, though got wider national and international attention, no effective intervention was made by the state to resolve it.

Naga Mothers’ Association

Among numerous women associations in the region, the Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) deserves special attention, though the agency is not named as a ‘women’ association, but as ‘mother’ association, taking motherhood as the most empathetic instinct in the life of a women. The NMA, the largest grassroot women organisation, was formed on 14 February 1984, under the leadership of Neidonuo Angami, a social worker, with the aim of upholding womanhood, human rights and engaging in other philanthropic activities. Unlike other agencies like youth and students in the region, NMA is opened to all tribal communities in the state, and not confined to a specific tribal community, thereby taking ethnicity to all Naga tribes and protecting the identity of the Naga community as a whole. The membership of NMA is open to all adult Naga women irrespective of their marital status. The Constitution of the NMA, 1992 proclaims that ‘Naga mother of Nagaland shall express the need of conscientising citizens towards more responsible living and human development through the voluntary organisation of the Naga Mothers’ Association.’ ³⁴ The NMA engages its activities often developing solidarity with other organisations in the state such as the Naga Hoho, an umbrella organisation of various tribes, Naga Students Federation, and Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights. It is also transcending boundaries, as it has collaboration with Naga Women’s Union of Manipur (NWUM) for coordinating its activities outside the state. Unlike major women’s organisations in mainstream India, NMA has no political affiliation with any national or regional parties, but put pressure on them to take decision and formulate policies for the welfare of women.

The journey of NMA started with addressing ‘the social’, and it moved to focusing on ‘the political’, demanding representation in public institutions. The NMA emerged as a forum to fight against social problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction and HIV/AIDS. It is also taking up the issues like sexual offences and murders. In its relatable fight against alcoholism in the state, the NMA demanded review of the Nagaland Liquor Total Prohibition (NLTP) Act, 1989. It needs mentioning that in the mid-1980s, NMA pressurised the government against alcoholism realising that it leads to violence and domestic abuse, forcing the Congress government to pass legislation in the Legislative Assembly which legalised prohibition in the state. Again in 2000s, the NMA demanded to review the NLTP Act, 1989 as it failed to stop spurious liquor.

Perhaps, the most important role played by the NMA is as a peacemaker. It negotiated between state and non-state actors for bringing peace in the state and redefining its traditional gender roles in many occasions. Women are often the victims of violence, rape and other atrocities in conflict situations. It is argued that ‘the prevalence of ethnic conflicts in the region is natural response to its backwardness and the ‘natural’ propensity for violence of its indigenous populations.’ ³⁵ In the 1990s, the NMA was instrumental in many peace initiatives, especially in the wake of recurring Indo-Naga conflict, with a motto of ‘Shed No More Blood’. It is argued that ‘one reason women’s peace groups in Nagaland remain effective for longer periods is that they are able to blend the political with the social’. ³⁶

In the mid-2000s, the NMA focused on representation and accessing political power challenging its traditional gender roles and responsibilities defined by the tribal customary laws. It forced the state government to pass the Nagaland Municipal (First Amendment) Act. Accordingly, 33% seats were reserved for women in the civic bodies like municipal and town councils, triggering violent protests by some sections against the reservation in February 2017. For instance, in 2017 strong protests erupted against giving 33% reservation to women in urban local bodies in Nagaland. They had backing from Naga Hoho, the apex Naga tribal body. ³⁷ While NMA considered it as a right step to ensure political representation for women in the political institutions, the protesters argued that it would violate special rights guaranteed to Nagaland under the Article 371 (A) of the Constitution, which provides special provisions for customary traditions and laws of Nagaland. As per the special provision with respect to the State of Nagaland—notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, no Act of Parliament in respect of— (a) religious or social practices of the Nagas; (b) Naga customary law and procedure; (c) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law; (d) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides. While the protagonists of gender equality were swearing on its commitment to the 74th constitutional amendment under Article 243 (T) of the Constitution, the promoters of tradition and customary laws were pleading for Article 371 (A). The virulent protests against women’s reservation not only exposes the deep-rooted gender inequality in the Naga society, but also denigrates the inherent tribal tradition based on gender equality.

Although women as agency is proactive in fighting against social evils and acting as peacemakers, their invisibility is evident in the realm of power politics and representative institutions in the state. Since the formation of the state in 1963, only one-woman member was elected to the state legislature and only an MP, Rano Mese Shaiza, was nominated to Parliament in 1977. U. A. Shimray argues that by tradition, Nagas follow patriarchal social norms, which, however, are not reflected by notions such as the ‘birth of a male child being auspicious, man as the bread earner and protector of the society.’ ³⁸ To sum up, unlike other agencies for political action, women adopt a distinct way of mobilisation strategy, while cementing their ethnic values. Women’s political action does not lead to straining the relationship between communities.

Conclusion

Although modern democracies set certain institutional structures and processes for engaging in political actions, people are often motivated by identities and communitarian values, which drive them towards political actions. In the context of NEI, it is well evident that among of all agencies that involved in ethnicised political action such as youth, women and students, women adopt quite different approach in its mobilisation and community relations. In contrast, youth and students adopt belligerent ethnic action leading to ethnic animosities between communities. Their ethnicised political action results in the construction and maintenance of ethnic boundaries often adding to the problem of integration of various communities. Although ethnic identity constitutes their benchmark, women as agency try to reach out intra and inter communities addressing common issues such as alcoholism and conflicts that are affecting the entire society. Further, all these three agencies have overlapping categories, as for example, youth include both students and certain sections of women, and their approach to government differs. Although outwardly disassociate from active party politics and direct government affairs, they pressurise parties and government to formulate and often unformulate certain policies and legislations. Many students and youth organisations have either transformed into political parties or their members have entered into active party politics. However, women as an agency, whose political actions are motivated by the subjugated consciousness premised on the subjective social reality of the ethnic community, are still pushed back from party and power politics. In other words, the ethnic political actions of students and youth in many occasions resulted in the passage to party politics and sharing state power, while the political actions of women as an agency are yet to be ensured in their representation in local self-institutions, state legislatures and national parliament.