Explaining the origins and evolution of India’s Korean policy

Introduction

This paper attempts to explain India’s Korean policy since its involvement in the Korean crisis in the immediate aftermath of World War II. I employ a binary approach to examine such a complex and intricate phenomenon, and argue that a combination of external and domestic factors have influenced the origins and evolution of India’s Korean policy. The initial phase of India’s Korean policy was influenced by the emergence of the Cold War in the immediate aftermath of World War II, and by India’s dominant political ideologies such as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. During this period India’s Korean policy mainly revolved around its commitment to non-alignment in which India adopted a neutral stance towards the issue. In the later Cold War period, India’s policy towards the Korean question can be explained against the background of its shifting external relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. During this period New Delhi drew closer to Moscow whereas its relations with Washington deteriorated, which in turn resulted in India’s inclination towards the North Korean regime.

At the end of the Cold War India embarked on an entirely new Korean policy in which it sought to increase its political, economic, and security engagement with South Korea. This move came at the end of the Cold War and followed on from its adoption of economic liberalisation to enhance its economic engagement with east Asian countries. By contrast, India’s interaction with North Korea remained minimal during this period mainly due to the latter’s proliferation of weapons and inability to carry on foreign trade with India. This paper also argues that, due to the changing regional architecture and India’s new quest for sustaining its economic growth, India’s Korean policy is entering a new phase. India is looking to deepen its security and economic ties with South Korea, and is keen to resolve the Korean issue again.

This study is based mainly on primary sources. Written primary sources include government documents, relevant legislations, and speeches, addresses and essays by policymakers. Statistical data from official publications and in-depth interviews with qualified informants are also a major primary source in this study. Our secondary data sources consist of published materials that are also based on extensive primary data. The data for this study is taken from both English and Korean sources.

The next section examines India’s policy during the origin of the Korean crisis and the Korean War period. The following section analyses the period in which India demonstrated its inclination towards North Korea. Then the third phase of India’s Korean policy will be examined during which India improved its engagement with South Korea whereas its interaction with North Korea remained minimal. The final section examines where India’s Korean policy is headed.

India’s neutralism during the Korean crisis

The Korean crisis was one of the earliest international issues in which India was involved following its independence. It is also worthy of note that it was the beginning of a contemporary international relationship between India and Korea after India became politically involved in Korean matters for the first time. A combination of external factors such as the emergence of Cold War, and domestic factors such as India’s political ideology, shaped India’s policy towards the Korean peninsula. The end of World War II marked the end of colonialism in Asia, and India was also among many nations that gained independence in this process. However, the end of World War II did not halt the struggle for power in Asia, as nations were locked in the Cold War mentality that divided the region into two groups. Both groups were led by superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers strived to strengthen their groups by including strategically important countries on their respective sides. India’s primary concern at that time was to maintain its independence, so it refrained from ‘leaning’ towards either bloc. India’s predominant political ideologies, such as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, also dominated its foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of its independence. India’s political ideology stemmed from its long struggle for independence from British rule, during which its political leaders consistently raised their voices against the empire and imperialism, and against the domination and exploitation of one nation by another (Nehru, 1938). As a result, when India launched its first foreign policy doctrine called the ‘non-alignment’ policy, it sought to keep itself separate from the Cold War politics that emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II. India also urged other Asian countries to adopt a middle course in keeping away from the Western and Soviet blocs, thus preventing power politics from harming Asian countries.

India’s policies of non-alignment, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were apparent in India’s actions in international affairs. As an example, India organised a non-political gathering called the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 in New Delhi. The conference brought together many leaders of the independence movements in Asia, including Korea, and represented a first attempt to assert Asian unity. The conference’s major objectives were to discuss the social, economic and cultural problems of the different countries of Asia, and to foster contact and understanding. ¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, who headed a provisional government that was preparing for India’s independence, stressed: ‘The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs’ (Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), 1947). Equally significant, addressing the United Nations (UN) Generally Assembly in Paris in November 1948, the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, introduced himself as a representative from Asia and said that:

Asia till recently was largely a prey to imperial domination and colonialism; a great part of it is free today, part of it still remains unfree; and it is an astonishing thing that any country should still venture to hold and to set forth this doctrine of colonialism, whether it is under direct rule or whether it is indirectly maintained in some form or other. (Nehru, 1948)

Nehru’s remarks underline that Indian policymakers felt Korea was still under colonial rule, although the form of such imperialism had changed from direct to indirect occupation.

Subsequently, the Indian government organised the second Asian Conference in January 1949 in which representatives of nearly 20 Asian governments gathered in Delhi to discuss the political situation prevailing in Asia. Reflecting India’s intention to organise the conference, Benegalu Rao said that it was the first time Asian governments had come together for a ‘political’ purpose. If the Asian Relations Conference of March 1947 had been a symbol of Asia’s awakening to new life, the Political Conference of January 1949 might be said to mark the coming of age of Asia and the beginning of a process of active cooperation between the countries in that region of the world (Rao, 1949). India’s progress continued when it signed a landmark agreement with China called ‘Panchsheel’, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, on 29 April 1954, which stated in its introduction that the two governments have resolved to enter into the present agreement based on five principles: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence (Ministry of External Affairs of India (MEA), 1954). The Panchsheel agreement became the principled core of India’s non-alignment foreign policy. For example, during the visit of Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, to India, the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, issued a joint statement in June 1954 that elaborated his vision of Panchsheel as the framework not only for relations between India and China but also for India’s relationships with all other countries (MEA, 2004: 2).

India’s initial policy towards the Korean crisis can be discussed against this background. It is significant to note that India’s Korean policy took shape based on its commitment to work under the UN, because it believed it to be the only institution which had no ideology and was thus neutral. Indian diplomat, Vijaya Lakhsmi Pandit’s, statement in the UN illustrates this point. She stated that:

Our Organisation, the United Nations, has no ‘ism’ of its own; it embraces all ‘isms’ and ideologies; it embraces all civilisations of the West and of the East; its principles cannot be said to derive exclusively from either of any of the contending doctrines. That is why, in this most critical time, and notwithstanding the discouraging factors, we continue to place our faith in it. (Pandit, 1947)

Against this background, India perceived that its role would not affect its neutral position if it was involved in the Korean issue through the UN. Therefore, when the Korean issue was brought to the UN in September 1947, India agreed to be part of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea in the capacity of Chairman. The real task of this commission was to conduct and to observe a free election, and to help the Koreans in establishing a national government of their own.

When the Korean War broke out, India took an explicit stand on the issue by openly condemning North Korea’s aggressive action towards South Korea. In this regard, Nehru made a statement in the Indian parliament:

Our policy is, first, of course, that aggression has taken place by North Korea over South Korea. That is a wrong act that has to be condemned, that has to be resisted. Secondly, that so far as possible the war should not be spread beyond Korea. And thirdly, that we should explore means of ending this war. The future of Korea must be decided entirely by the Koreans themselves. (Rao, 1950)

In addition, India stood with UN Security Council Resolution 82, which noted with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) by forces from North Korea; determined that this action constituted a breach of the peace; called for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel (UN Security Council, 1950a). Yet Nehru’s statement in the Indian parliament, and India’s support of the resolution against North Korea, did not mean that it supported either the South Korean or US stance on the issue. Rather it should be seen as supportive of its own commitment to a non-aggression policy, which demanded that countries in Asia must refrain from an aggressive foreign policy.

Two subsequent resolutions on the Korean crisis, when India had a right to vote, illustrate India’s stance on this issue more clearly. In UN Resolution 83, which noted that North Korea had not ceased hostilities and thus urgent ‘military measures’ were required to restore peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, India did not participate in the voting (UN Security Council, 1950b). Again, India abstained from voting in UN Resolution 84, which recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance to South Korea make these forces and assistance available to a unified command under the United States (UN Security Council, 1950c). Given the fact that India did not participate in the resolutions that favoured military action against North Korea and legitimised the US-led military operation in the Korean crisis, it can be inferred that India’s primary concern was to maintain its non-alignment policy towards the issue.

Furthermore, in order to solve the Korean problem impartially, India strongly advocated the involvement of China in the matter. India’s support for China was as a direct consequence of their joint struggle against colonialism and imperialism. India stated categorically that the only possible way to avoid a grave situation was to hold negotiations with the Chinese government, which had become very concerned about events happening on their doorstep. For instance, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, said India was of the opinion that the admission of the People’s Government of China into the UN Security Council is a prerequisite to maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula (New York Times, 8 July 1950). However, Washington ruled out New Delhi’s appeal to give Mao a role on the Security Council. The United States drafted a note to Jawaharlal Nehru assuring him that it wanted peace in Korea, but added that it was not prepared to bring communist China into the UN to discuss the question at Lake Success (New York Times, 18 July 1950). Washington’s reply disappointed Nehru whose reaction to the US State Department’s rejection of his proposal on the Korean crisis was described by his associates as one of ‘keen disappointment’ (New York Times, 20 July 1950). Yet, Nehru did not lose hope. He sent a new message to US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asking him ‘as an act of faith’ to use his influence to bring the Chinese communist regime of Mao Zedong into the UN. But Washington stood firm on its decision (New York Times, 22 July 1950). Meanwhile, Nehru called a special session of the Indian parliament on 31 July 1950 to discuss the Korean conflict and the international situation (New York Times, 12 July 1950). During this session, the Indian President, Rajendra Prasad, explicitly manifested India’s stance on the matter stating that the Indian Prime Minister had appealed to the President of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, and to the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to break the deadlock in the Security Council over the admission of the People’s Republic of China, so that international tension might be eased and a way opened to find a solution to the Korean problem through discussion in the US Security Council.

Another significant feature of India’s initial policy towards the Korean issue was its demand for ‘localisation’ of the Korean conflict. For example, Nehru appealed to both Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union and the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to exert their influence and authority to localise the arms struggle in the Korean peninsula. India also tried to prevent the further escalation of the Korean conflict when China simply declared that if the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel, China would be forced to intervene in Korea. It was reported that Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, informed the Indian ambassador to Peking, KM Pannikkar, that China would not tolerate any attacks on North Korea by US and South Korean troops (Panikkar, 1955: 108). Convinced that China’s actions could accelerate the tension on the Korean peninsula, India was quick to communicate China’s intentions to the United States so that a future crisis could be averted (Panikkar, 1955: 235–236). Nehru urged Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, to refrain from taking such action (Gopal, 1979: 104). Furthermore, India also opposed any move by the UN forces to enter North Korean territory, which could also give rise to the possibility of an ‘internationalisation’ of the issue. India asked the representatives of the United States to clarify their stance on the South Korean President’s statement that: ‘If 90 days after the political conference opens it has failed to achieve the objective of Korean unification, then naturally we shall resume the battle for our national independence and unity’ (Menon, 1953). This was again part of India’s policy of promoting mutual non-interference and non-aggression in the Korean crisis.

Above all, India played its role in the Korean crisis only when it perceived that its role would not affect its neutral position on the issue. For instance, as we saw earlier, India refrained from committing itself to providing military assistance in the Korean crisis. However, it decided to send a custodian force and a medical unit to Korea. India agreed to clarify its obligations when, under the Korean Armistice Agreement, it was invited to be Chairman, Umpire and Executive Agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission responsible for the disposition of those prisoners of war who were not directly repatriated (Parliament of India, 1953). Equally significant was India clarifying its neutral position with regard to the political conference on Korea, proposed as part of the Armistice Agreement, in that it was never a candidate to become a member of the conference, and similarly it had never refused to carry out any of its obligations under the UN (Menon, 1953). India’s neutral stance on the issue was also evident in Prime Minister Nehru’s reply to the question of whether India had requested the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to convene an early conference to find a permanent solution to the Korean problem. He clarified:

The Korean Armistice Agreement ended the violent conflict there. In accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, a political settlement was to have been discussed in a political conference. Such a political conference was never held owing to differences of interpretation among the members concerned. In 1954, India pleaded for such a conference to be held, as provided in the Armistice Agreement. Since then, no fresh approach has been made. It is for the powers concerned to agree to this and not for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which was there only to supervise the replacement of military equipment and military movements in Korea. (Parliament of India, 1956)

Thus, it can be said that India’s initial policy towards the Korean problem was heavily influenced by the adoption of a non-alignment policy, which was a result of the emergence of the Cold War in the immediate aftermath of World War II. This, combined with India’s predominant political ideologies such as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, stemmed from its long struggle for independence.

India’s inclination towards North Korea

India’s Korean policy in the later Cold War period was heavily influenced by its shifting external relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It is worth mentioning that India believed its non-alignment policy, which was based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, would help it avoid any kind of future war and that it did not need to be concerned with the power politics of the Cold War. However, these assumptions proved counterproductive. Two external factors had profoundly impacted India’s foreign policy. Firstly, India was for the first time since its independence forced to fight a border war with China, with whom it sought to maintain a cordial relationship. Secondly, the emergence of anti-India alliance politics led by Pakistan, a member of the American Alliance network, brought the Cold War mentality to south Asia wherein India found itself in a security dilemma. Nehru himself recognised the changing external reality while conceding that: ‘if the world is viewed as divided essentially between imperialists and communists … then there is indeed no place for the non-aligned’ (Nehru, 1963: 460) . He further endorsed that:

It (India) is learning that in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace, or to mind one’s own affairs, but that it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength, to adjust our relations with friendly countries in the light of the changing actualities of the international situation. (Nehru, 1963: 462–463)

Later Indira Gandhi, who was the second longest serving Prime Minister of India, also recognised the security dilemma which emerged from Washington and Beijing systematically supporting Islamabad against New Delhi (Gandhi, 1972: 72–75). As a result, India was left with no option but to incline towards alliance politics to increase its own security. It therefore strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union and took a strong anti-US stance on key issues at regional and global level.

India’s preference for a socialist system over a capitalist one, and the early adoption of an anti-Western stance on various issues, was also an important catalyst for the convergence of India’s interests with other socialist countries on the regional and global stage. Thus, New Delhi also drew closer to Moscow because of the latter’s adherence to socialism. India signed a landmark agreement called the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in New Delhi in August 1971, a move that gave a clear signal of New Delhi’s leaning towards Moscow (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 1971). It also moved to establish a strong economic relationship with the Soviet Union (Rao, 1973). Furthermore, India’s strong leanings towards the Soviet Union were evident from the fact that New Delhi maintained cordial relationships with members of the Soviet Alliance Networks in Asia including Afghanistan, Mongolia and Vietnam. Thus, India’s Korean policy in the later Cold War period was understandable against this backdrop. It can also be said that India’s anti-US stance and its leaning towards the Soviet Union, combined with North Korea’s own strong opposition of the United States and its close relationship with the Soviet Union, caused India to favour the North Korean regime.

India explicitly demonstrated its inclination towards North Korea in the later Cold War period. It is worthy of note that the United States undertook all efforts to isolate the North Korean regime in the aftermath of the Korean War. However, India did not come under the influence of the United States and accommodated North Korea both economically and politically. For example, with regard to strengthening economic relations between the two countries, a trade negotiation was held in New Delhi in September 1957 between the trade delegation from North Korea and the State Trading Corporation of India (Parliament of India, 1957). Furthermore, India signed another trade pact with North Korea in December 1968 envisioning a total trade turnover of $9.4 million in the following year (New York Times, 10 December 1968). India also signed a trade agreement with the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) in New Delhi in February 1974 through which New Delhi granted Pyongyang a most favoured nation treatment in respect of customs duties and charges relating to imports and exports (MEA, 1974a; Parliament of India, 1974a). The agreement was also important in light of the fact that no such agreement had been signed at the time between New Delhi and Seoul. ² Furthermore, both India and North Korea pledged to deepen economic ties as both aimed to increase a two-way trade to one billion Indian rupees by 1979 during the discussions between the Minister of Foreign Trade of the DPRK and the Commerce Minister of India in October 1978 (Parliament of India, 1978).

India also accommodated North Korea politically by establishing consular relations with DPRK on 1 March 1962. Thus, North Korea opened a Consulate General in New Delhi and the government of India opened a Consulate General in Pyongyang (Parliament of India, 1968). Furthermore, India decided to upgrade its relationship with North Korea and established diplomatic relations with the North Korean regime on 10 December 1973. At the same time India also gave equal status to South Korea. New Delhi had already established consular relations with Seoul in 1962 and upgraded these to diplomatic relations also on 10 December 1973. Nonetheless, New Delhi’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang was a significant development in bilateral relations, because India recognised North Korea’s regime and became part of only a few non-communist countries to do so.

It is also significant to note that India explicitly showed its solidarity with North Korea in condemning US foreign policy on various regional and international issues. For example, both India and North Korea strongly opposed NATO and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which were created by the United States in the name of an anti-communist alliance system in Europe and Asia respectively. India called this US alliance system not only the wrong approach but also a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian country (Brissenden, 1960). North Korea strongly opposed the US-led military alliance system, characterising it as aggressive and imperialist (Scalapino, 1963; Kim, 1978).

India also joined hands with North Korea to condemn US foreign policy in international affairs, particularly by using the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) platform. For example, India and North Korea specifically condemned US policy in a political resolution passed by the heads of state of governments of NAM countries in Colombo in 1976. The resolution stated that the political, military, economic and other collaboration by the United States and the Western Powers had encouraged and enabled the racist regime of South Africa to persist in its crimes, and that it specifically condemns the United States and the West for their collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field, and for the supply of enriched uranium by the United States to South Africa (NAM Summit, 1976). In a further denouncement of US South African policy, India and North Korea both supported the resolution which used words such as ‘imperialist’ power when describing the United States and when criticising them over their support for the racist regime in South Africa (NAM Summit, 1979).

India and North Korea were also on the same side in criticising US policy on the Arab–Israeli conflict. They supported a political resolution which noted that the US policy of aligning itself with Israel and supporting it in all areas, particularly in Israel’s continued occupation of the Arab territories and the United States denying the Palestinian people their inalienable rights, played a major role in preventing the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region (NAM Summit, 1979). The resolution also denounced the decision by the US government to use their veto on any draft resolution relating to the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes, or to recognise their national independence, self-determination and statehood (NAM Summit, 1979). It further denounced the position adopted by the United States, which continued to supply Israel with advanced weaponry and various forms of aid for the development of an arms industry in Israel.

India’s preference for maintaining a cordial relationship with socialist rather than capitalist countries was also an important catalyst that pushed New Delhi closer to Pyongyang. As socialist nations, both India and North Korea demonstrated their clear intention to develop a closer relationship with the south-east Asian socialist countries. For example, India and North Korea both stood with the North Vietnamese regime during the Vietnam War. India and North Korea’s support of North Vietnam was in contrast to the policies of the United States and South Korea who strongly supported South Vietnam and were engaged in military conflicts with North Vietnam. North Korea was one of the earliest countries to establish formal diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in January 1950. President Ho Chi Minh visited North Korea in 1957, and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung visited North Vietnam during November and December 1958 and again in November 1964. When South Korea, under the Park Chung-hee regime, took an active role in the Vietnam War by sending troops to support South Vietnam, North Korea intensified its support of North Vietnam by providing substantial economic and military aid to them (Hong, 1994; Park, 2003). India also supported North Vietnam’s regime. The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, visited North Vietnam in February 1954, which was a landmark in India–North Vietnam relations. The President of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, was warmly welcomed to India and described as a great revolutionary and almost a legend. The Indian government described this visit as historic, which opened a new chapter in the history of the close and time-tested relationship between these two countries (MEA, 2003). Equally significant is India’s strong criticism at various international platforms of the US bombing of North Vietnam. For example, the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, called for an immediate cessation of bombings and the resolution of the Vietnam conflict within the framework of the Geneva Accords in a communiqué released after her meeting with Soviet President, Aleksey Kosygin, in July 1966 (Thakur, 1979: 965). Ultimately, when North Vietnam was isolated internationally following US pressure, India established official diplomatic relations with North Vietnam’s regime in January 1972 by raising the level of their representatives from consular to ambassador. By contrast, relations between India and South Vietnam remained at consular level. Thus it can be said that the question of Vietnam during the Cold War was an important juncture during which both India and North Korea recognised their mutual regional interests.

India appeared to explicitly endorse North Korea’s position on developments on the Korean peninsula. North Korea repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed on the Korean peninsula (Kim, 1978). Also, Pyongyang wanted Korea’s admission to the UN to be achieved in the name of a single state. Kim II Sung, in his Five Point Policy of National Reunification on 25 June 1973, called for the creation of the ‘Confederal Republic of Goryeo’ and for both Koreas to enter the UN ‘as a sole state’ (North Korea International Document Project, 2012). North Korea’s policy was in opposition to South Korea’s because the latter sought to enshrine the division of Korea through the ‘simultaneous entry’ of the two Koreas into the UN (Wang, 1997). As a result, the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK issued a letter to the governments of many countries, including India, expressing its views on the reunification of Korea. The letter described various steps taken by the government of the DPRK to realise a peaceful reunification of Korea. The Indian government’s position was that they supported the efforts currently made by the two Koreas to achieve peaceful reunification through ‘bilateral talks and free from outside interference,’ an obvious reference to the US troops in South Korea (Parliament of India, 1973; Parliament of India, 1974b). In addition, India endorsed North Korea’s view on the NAM platform. For example, in September 1973 the fourth conference of the heads of state of the NAM countries, in which India participated, passed a political resolution on the problem of Korea, which called for: ‘the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea and an end to foreign interference in all its forms in the domestic affairs of Korea’. The resolution also declared that: ‘Korean membership of the United Nations can only be achieved in the name of a single state, after the complete reunification of the country or after the establishment of a confederation of North and South’ (NAM Summit, 1973). Thus it can be said that the resolution extended complete support for Kim II Sung’s position on the development of the Korean peninsula and reiterated India’s support for North Korea.

India’s leaning towards North Korea was apparent when the latter was admitted to the NAM organisation as a fully-fledged member. Furthermore, New Delhi endorsed Pyongyang’s criticism of the Washington–Seoul nexus through the NAM platform. The DPRK became a member of NAM at the NAM Foreign Ministers’ Conference held in Lima in August 1975. Thereafter, North Korea, led by Premier Pak Song Chol, participated in the fifth conference of the heads of state of NAM countries held in Colombo in August 1976. The conference gave considerable thought to the ‘question of Korea’ and not only endorsed the views of the DPRK on Korean developments but also criticised the South Korean and US governments’ position. For example, the conference noted that: ‘today the imperialists have turned South Korea into a military base for aggression and a base for nuclear attack … and have created a threat of aggression against the DPRK’. It further warned that: ‘if the imperialist manoeuvres for aggression against Korea are not foiled, war will break out in Korea, which will expand to Asia and the world’. It continued:

‘The non-aligned countries cannot allow the imperialists to play with the destiny of small countries at their will to sacrifice them, nor can they allow any state to install military bases and interfere in the internal affairs of other States’.

It also criticised the government of Park Chung-hee, noting that: ‘in South Korea which is under the foreign troops’ occupation, fascist oppression prevails and the elementary democratic rights and freedom of people are ruthlessly trampled underfoot’. It further demanded that: ‘all the foreign troops be withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean Military Armistice Agreement be replaced by a peace agreement’. Finally, the conference expressed its firm: ‘solidarity with the government of the DPRK and the entire Korean people in their struggle for the realisation of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country’ (NAM Summit, 1976).

In brief, India demonstrated a clear leaning towards the North Korean regime in the latter Cold War period.

Forging a new Indo–South Korean relationship

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, India embarked on an entirely new foreign policy through which it sought to increase its engagement with South Korea, while its interactions with North Korea suddenly became minimal. India’s new Korean policy was largely influenced by external factors such as the end of the Cold War, and by domestic factors such as India embarking on a programme of economic liberalisation. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, international politics moved away from its Cold War phase (Waltz, 1993). India’s foreign policymakers recognised this fact and began to recalculate its strategic options. In particular, India decided to improve its relationship with the world’s sole superpower, the United States, by largely abandoning its former opposition to US strategic and diplomatic policies. Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee, even took the bilateral relationship one stage further when he said that India and the United States are ‘natural allies’ in the quest for a better future for the world in the 21st century (Vajpayee, 1998). At the same time, after a long period of pursuing protectionism and import substitution policies, India initiated a liberal economic policy in an attempt to make India’s economy more market-orientated, and to expand the role of private and foreign investment. India’s economic liberalisation was part of its new foreign policy called the ‘Look East’ policy, in which India sought to enhance economic engagement with east Asian countries. India’s Korean policy after the end of the Cold War should be understood against this background.

As soon as the Cold War ended, India recognised South Korea as a close partner. After embarking on a new policy towards east Asian countries India created a special relationship with South Korea. The state visit by Indian Prime Minister, Narshimha Rao, to South Korea in 1993 was one of the earliest state visits in Asia after the end of the Cold War. The visit was also significant because the Indian Prime Minister did not undertake the state visit to North Korea, despite having already accepted the invitation from the President of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, to visit the DPRK (Parliament of India, 1993). Since then, there has been a rapid increase in the number of high-level political exchanges between India and South Korea. A number of heads of state from both countries have paid visits to each other’s countries. In addition to these bilateral political exchanges, India also joined the high-level regional political forum with South Korea, most notably the East Asian Summit (EAS), a leading forum which deals with political and security issues in the region. This was in stark contrast to its earlier stance when India had joined such a forum with North Korea, for example, the NAM organisation.

India’s initiation of a security engagement with South Korea is another crucial development in bilateral relationships. The India–Korea Strategic Partnership was signed when the South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, made a state visit to India in 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) of South Korea, 2010). This strategic partnership was a further development of the Indian and South Korean security relationship, which was based on the ‘Long-term Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ established in October 2004 when the South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, paid a state visit to India (MOFAT of South Korea, 2004). Both countries promoted their foreign policy and security dialogue to their vice-foreign ministers, MOFAT of South Korea, the Secretary (East), and the MEA. They agreed to strengthen dialogue and exchanges in the area of defence through regular high-level military exchanges, and to explore the possibilities of joint venture cooperation in research and development as well as in the manufacture of military equipment, including the transfer of technology and co-production. It was also the first time both countries recognised their concerns over maritime security, and agreed upon the need for greater cooperation between their navies and coastguards in maintaining the safety and security of international maritime traffic (Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, 2012). Establishing this strategic partnership was also the outcome of a long-standing regional demand (Singh, 2008).

India’s endorsement of liberal economic ideology also contributed to the convergence of Indian and South Korean economic interests. It is significant to note that, when India adopted a liberal economic policy, South Korea was given a significant place in this new policy as a result of the latter’s extraordinary capitalist economic growth that was regarded as nothing short of an economic miracle (World Bank, 1993). Accordingly, the facilitation of South Korean investment was given top priority by the Indian government. For instance, an agreement between the governments of India and South Korea on the promotion and protection of investment was signed in New Delhi in February 1996. On the other hand South Korea’s declining economic relations with its traditional partners, coupled with the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s, provided a critical juncture during which South Korea came to recognise India as a natural economic partner. Since then, India’s economic relations with South Korea have improved markedly and Seoul has emerged as one of the largest economic partners of New Delhi. India’s trade account with South Korea has rapidly increased since the end of the Cold War. It has increased by a multiple of several times – from $1.4 billion in the year 1997–1998 to about $16.7 billion by the year 2013–2014 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) of India, 2014). At the same time, South Korean investment in India has also increased rapidly. India received investments of $540 million in 2013, compared with just $2 million in 1991 (Korea Eximbank, 2014). In 2009 New Delhi chose South Korea as the first north-east Asian country with which to conclude a trade pact, called the India–Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

In contrast to India’s growing engagement with South Korea, its interaction with North Korea remained minimal during this period mainly due to the latter’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to parts of Asia, particularly Pakistan, and its inability to carry on foreign trade with India due to its domestic economic difficulties. Indeed North Korea’s nuclear proliferation in south Asia provided the occasion for India to speak openly against the former’s actions. India’s Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, stated in parliament that it was widely believed North Korea had assisted Pakistan by providing long-range missiles, missile technology and components. He also stated that the government believed the continued supply of sophisticated missiles and related technology posed: ‘a threat to India’s security’ and was not conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region (Parliament of India, 1999a). It is important to note that India’s stance represented a change in policy, because it had previously remained aloof from the growing military relationship between Islamabad and Pyongyang (Parliament of India, 1969; Parliament of India, 1982). In addition, the transportation of equipment required for nuclear weapons from Pakistan to North Korea was a matter of deep concern to India. Pakistan’s nuclear links with North Korea had come as no surprise to the Indian government, as it believed there was an emergence of an Islamabad–Pyongyang ‘nuke nexus’ through which Pakistan’s missile programme was developed with assistance from other countries, including North Korea, and for which, in return, Pakistan assisted with North Korea’s nuclear programme (Parliament of India, 2002).

India also openly expressed its concern over North Korea’s advances in its nuclear and missile capabilities. When North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006, the Indian government issued a statement stating:

We are deeply concerned at the reported nuclear test conducted by the DPRK. It is unfortunate that the DPRK has conducted such a test in violation of its international commitments, jeopardising peace, stability and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region. (Parliament of India, 2006)

When North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on 25 May 2009, India became gravely concerned saying:

For the DPRK to conduct such a test in violation of its international commitments would be unfortunate. Like others in the international community we are concerned at the adverse effect on peace and security in that region of such tests. (Parliament of India, 2009).

Another reason that prevented India’s interaction with North Korea was the latter’s inability to carry on foreign trade due to its domestic economic difficulties. In contrast with other east Asian countries that became active on the Indian market after India’s economic liberalisation, bilateral trade between India and North Korea has declined. It is significant to note that, since India’s economic liberalisation, China, Japan and South Korea have become the top exporters of their finished products to India’s domestic market. In the year 2013–2014 China was India’s biggest trading partner, with two-way trade standing at $65.8 billion and a record trade deficit of $36.2 billion in favour of China. Bilateral trading with South Korea accounted for $16.7 billion, with a trade deficit of $8.2 billion in favour of South Korea. Finally, India’s bilateral trade with Japan was $16.2 billion, with a trade deficit of $2.6 billion in favour of Japan. By contrast, India’s economic relationship with North Korea remained stagnant with two-way trade between the two countries in 2013–2014 amounting to just $186 million, with a trade deficit of $176 million in India’s favour (MCI of India, 2014).

A new phase in India’s Korean policy?

So far we have seen that India’s policy towards the Korean peninsula since its independence has been profoundly influenced by a combination of external and domestic factors. In this concluding section I will examine where India’s Korean policy is headed. It would appear that India’s Korean policy is entering a new phase in which it shows a new-found enthusiasm to resolve the North Korean issue, and to deepen its engagement with South Korea. External factors continue to influence India’s policy towards the Korean peninsula. With the rise of Asian giants India and China, and the decline of US’s influence, the east Asian regional architecture is changing. Such factors are compelling a ‘rising’ India to play its due role in east Asia in order to maintain peace and stability in the region, and in this regard take a clear cut stand on regional issues including the Korean Furthermore, domestic factors such as the quest to sustain domestic economic growth will press New Delhi into deepening its economic engagement with the fast growing east Asia region.

The evidence so far suggests that India has recognised both requirements. As we saw earlier, after the end of the Cold War India developed both a strategic and economic engagement with South Korea. Now India has decided to ‘deepen’ its strategic and economic partnership, and a number of initiatives have been taken in recent years. In September 2013 India’s senior military officials held their first strategic dialogue with their South Korean counterparts with whom they discussed ways to boost military ties and cooperation in the defence industry (Ministry of Defense of India, 2014). India has also set up a ‘defence wing’ in South Korea as part of the Indian Embassy in Seoul, and South Korea has done likewise in New Delhi. ³ India has signed an agreement with South Korea on the ‘protection of classified military information’ which, it is believed, will contribute to the enhancement of mutual confidence and cooperation in the military field (Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, 2012). New Delhi has intensified naval cooperation with Seoul by conducting frequent joint military exercises in both Indian and South Korean waters. India has also recognised South Korea as a crucial partner in enhancing cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as environmental security, energy security and information security (Cheong Wa Dae of ROK, 2014).

On the economic front, India has sought to deepen its economic relationship with South Korea, and has already joined with South Korea in revising the global economic system. The most notable example of such cooperation is G20, where both economies are participating as rulemakers. The announcement by the Indian government of a taskforce to research the possibility of currency swap cooperation between India and South Korea is a good sign pointing towards deepening cooperation. Owing to the fact that India and South Korea are both among the largest holders of foreign currency in east Asia, their joint cooperation could be crucial for financial stability in the region (Kumar, 2014: 108). In addition, the fact that India has offered special economic zones exclusively to South Korean companies in India, is another illustration of deepening economic relations between the two economies. ⁴ New Delhi has decided to secure a nuclear deal with Seoul after recent talks between the two countries. This follows the delay in the India–Japan nuclear deal (Ministry of Science ICT and Future Planning, 2014).

Recently, a resurgent India has shown its intention to resolve the North Korean issue, and has opened a direct diplomatic channel with North Korea. Following an agreement to hold Foreign Office consultation meetings on a regular basis, India’s top diplomats for east Asian affairs and North Korea’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs have held several bilateral negotiations in New Delhi and Pyongyang to discuss bilateral, regional and international situations. When tensions were running high on the Korean peninsula following North Korea’s nuclear test on 12 February 2013, New Delhi opened diplomatic negotiations with Pyongyang. An Indian delegation headed by Gautam Bambawale, the head of the Joint Secretary of India’s MEA, met his North Korean counterpart and it was reported that both parties discussed the situation on the Korean peninsula extensively. New Delhi urged Pyongyang to refrain from engaging in provocative acts to escalate tensions in the peninsula, while Pyongyang explained to New Delhi their perception of the ongoing situation. ⁵ Later, India’s External Affairs Minister, Salman Khushid, met his Pyongyang counterpart, Pal Ui-Chuan, on the sidelines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) meeting and told him that: ‘it was important not to get isolated. If you do not get isolated, you will have friends to help you. But if you get isolated, it becomes difficult for even your friends to help you’ ( Deccan Herald , 1 July 2013; Times of India, 2 July 2013).

In addition to talking directly with Pyongyang, New Delhi seems to be more actively engaged with other stakeholders in resolving the North Korean issue. New Delhi has decided to work together with Seoul towards North Korean denuclearisation. This came about when India’s National Security Adviser, SS Menon, visited South Korea for the first time as the Indian Prime Minister’s special envoy to Seoul. ⁶ Furthermore, India has for the first time started to include the North Korean issues in its international negotiations. In a joint communiqué released after the summit meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the US President Barack Obama in Washington, D.C., India and the United States both urged North Korea to take concrete actions towards denuclearisation and other goals, as well as to comply fully with all of its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and to fulfill its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks (White House, 2014). In addition, India has also started to cooperate with Japan in resolving the North Korean issue when, in a joint communiqué, both countries expressed their concern over North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, including its uranium enrichment activities. They strongly urged North Korea to take concrete actions towards denuclearisation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). India has also called upon China in this matter because, as the rising powers, they recognise that they have ‘common interests’ on several international issues and that there is a need for closer cooperation and coordination between the two sides. They also recognise that the Asia Pacific region plays an increasingly important role in global affairs and are of the view that the current priority in this region is to maintain peace and stability (MEA, 2014). This underscores the rationale that, despite a tension in bilateral relations, New Delhi wants to cooperate with Beijing on key security issues, including North Korea. In addition, India has also intensified its efforts at multilateral meetings, such as the EAS and ARF, to bring about the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner.

Going forward, India needs to play a more proactive role in regional issues in light of the fact that the perception about a rising India has greatly changed. The United States, a declining influence in the region, has recognised the importance of India’s leadership position in east Asia by stating that: ‘New Delhi should not just look east, but also engage east and act east as well’ (Clinton, 2011). On the North Korean question, Washington has for the first time recognised that New Delhi is a ‘stakeholder’ who should be involved in region-wide efforts to compel North Korea to abide by its denuclearisation commitments and obligations (Kampbell, 2011). Similar demands for India’s greater engagement in east Asia have been raised by other smaller powers in the region (Razak, 2010; Lee, 2012). A rising India must respond to these regional demands. Yet its growing engagement with east Asia in general, and the Korean peninsula in particular, should not be seen as ‘containing a rising China’. India has shown remarkable support for China’s dream in the Asia Pacific region, in particular India’s support for the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Economic Belt. Similarly, India’s involvement in east Asia, including the Korean peninsula, should be seen as the ‘natural’ act of a rising power. India and China can both jointly play a constructive role in bringing about Korean reunification, which in turn will foster regional stability. India should work for Korean reunification for economic reasons as well, because a unified Korea could create enormous economic opportunities for India as well as other Asian countries.