Reconciling sharia with “Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia”: The ideology and framing strategies of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI)

Introduction

The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 significantly altered the societal and political landscape of Indonesia, opening up political opportunity to express various sorts of political aspiration in ways that would have been previously inconceivable. Among others, the proliferation of ubiquitous manifestations of the seemingly inexorable march of political Islam serves as the hallmark of post-Suharto order. The ascension of Suharto to power in 1967 signified the commencement of a new order that was typified by its contrast to the previous regime of President Sukarno (1945–1967) with regard to economic development policy: while the latter demonstrated its staunch anti-capitalist and anti-foreign investment posture, the former embarked upon a model favoring market-driven economic growth reinforced by massive foreign investment. However, this development agenda came at a price, for in an attempt to ensure the success of its development agenda, under the pretext of maintaining stability, the Suharto regime took a range of draconian measures primarily oriented towards emasculating political parties and political Islam, engineering elections and utilizing the military’s coercive force to maintain the status quo (Effendy, 2003; Aspinall, 2005). Throughout this period, Islamic manifestations in Indonesia were mostly channeled through social and educational rather than political means.

Islamic movements in Indonesia, as much as social movement organizations everywhere in the world, do not operate in a vacuum. The ebb and flow of their activism and the dynamics of their methods of struggle are closely contingent upon the degree of political openness and circumstances unique to a regime in an environment to which they are attached. Nahdlatul Ulama ¹ and Muhammadiyah, ² among others, have served as the two largest and most influential moderate mass-based Islamic organizations in the country. They were founded in the pre-independence period in Indonesia in 1926 and 1912 respectively. There was, however, a brief period of time following the formal recognition of Indonesia’s independence when Nahdlatul Ulama gravitated toward practical politics. Against the backdrop of the parliamentary democracy system that Indonesia briefly adopted from 1950 to 1959, Nahdlatul Ulama contested the 1955 elections after severing ties with the biggest Islamic party at the time, Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Association). ³ In addition, while Muhammadiyah never transformed into a political party, it constituted one of the major components of Masyumi.

Under the Suharto regime’s strictly controlled political environment, the opportunity for Islamic organizations or movements such as Nadhlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to engage in practical politics was ruled out. As a result, it came as no surprise that the manifestations of the aspirations of all Islamic organizations at the time were channeled mainly through social activities. To date, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have established thousands of both modern and traditional schools, ⁴ universities, hospitals and orphanages that are scattered throughout the country. Particularly through education, these organizations have played a valuable role in sowing the seeds of civil society, promoting and nurturing the moderate Islamic values of religious tolerance, inclusiveness and pluralism. Hefner (2000) coined the term “civil Islam” to denote the characteristics of Islam attached to the societal landscape of Indonesia that has long nurtured rich precedents for tolerance and civility, which is attributable to the profound commitment of civil organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama along with their leaders to promoting moderate and tolerant Islam through civic and educational activities.

The abrupt end of Suharto’s rule on 21 May 1998 was followed by the breakdown of law and order and, at the same time, the rise of radical forms of political Islam, in stark contrast to the moderate and tolerant Islam upheld by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. After more than 30 years of being politically strangled by the authoritarian regime, political euphoria began to sweep across the country, and Indonesians channeled such euphoria in various political expressions. Salim and Azra (2003: 1–2) argued that the face of political Islam in the aftermath of the Suharto regime was characterized by the mounting expression of what is considered “more formalistic Islam,” as evidenced by, among others, the growing demand of certain regions of Indonesia for the formal implementation of sharia and the emergence of radical Islamic revivalist movements. ⁵

Some of these movements, including Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, or the Indonesian Party of Liberation), Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, or the Council of Indonesian Holy Warriors), and Forum Umat Islam (FUI, or the Forum of Islamic Society), remain active today. While much has been written about HTI (Salim, 2005; Arifin, 2005; Rahmat, 2005; Fealy, 2007; Muhtadi, 2009; Ward, 2009; Ahnaf, 2009; Osman, 2010a, 2010b; Munabari, 2010), FPI (Fealy, 2004: 114–115; Hefner, 2005: 284–286; Ng, 2005; Wilson, 2006, 2008; Jahroni, 2008; Rosadi, 2008; Woodward et al., 2014), and MMI (Van Bruinessen, 2002; Fealy, 2004), FUI has so far been insufficiently studied. This is unfortunate because, like the other movements mentioned above, FUI has been actively engaging in various forms of collective action such as mass protests, public gatherings, media statements, and so forth, since it came out in the open in 2005. It has raised a plethora of protest issues ranging from social and economics such as protests against the Indonesian government’s decision to raise fuel prices in 2012 to religion and morals such as persistent demands for the dissolution of Ahmadiyah Indonesia ⁶ and a series of mass demonstrations against the Miss World pageant in Bali, Indonesia in 2013 (Detik, 2012a; Viva, 2013). These Islamic revivalist movements share considerable features with other social movements elsewhere in the world. They all demonstrate the ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in various forms of collective action that typically employ extra-institutional means of influence (Gamson and Mayer, 1996: 283; Tarrow, 1998: 4; Tilly, 2004: 7).

These revivalist movements engage in constant efforts to mobilize a variety of resources that will facilitate the implementation of their pro-sharia goals. One may categorize Indonesian Islamic parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, or Prosperous Justice Party), ⁷ which originated as a campus-based Islamic education (tarbiyah) movement and gained popularity among Muslim students in the 1990s, as an Islamic revivalist movement. This is attributable to the fact that the actors and structures of political parties and social movements are mutually intertwined, such as the Green Parties. However, although political parties may consider themselves as part of a social movement under certain conditions, this mostly applies to parties originating in social movements. Furthermore, scholars agree that the main difference between social movements and political parties lies in the specific roles they play: while the political activism of the latter is mostly done within institutionalized politics such as parliament, the former are considered outsiders (Diani, 1992: 14–15; Goldstone, 2003: 3).

Equally important, social movements also develop their frames of protest by means of interpreting and assigning meaning to events and conditions, which are in turn transmitted to the public, resonate across multiple layers of audiences, and tap into the collective memory of the public. This sort of process is often referred to as “framing” and is extremely vital to every social movement in their attempt to appeal to the public and transform the bystander public into adherents. Nevertheless, in order to analyze the framing process of social movements, one cannot overlook the role of their ideologies. It is the ideologies of social movements that serve as the set of beliefs which, in turn, determine how these movements perceive and interpret the world and how they justify what is right and wrong through which discontent and issues are framed (Zald, 1996: 262; Oberschall, 1996: 94).

Virtually all Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia agree that Islam should not be regarded merely as a theological reference that attends to religious injunctions such as daily prayers, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like. They extol the virtues of Islam which function both as a corpus of rules and an overarching way of life that also regulates political and public affairs; hence the relentless demand on the part of these movements for the implementation of sharia. However, despite their common endeavour to make Islam the only solution (Islam huwa al hall) to a wide range of perceived problems in Indonesia, the extent to which sharia is interpreted, articulated, and implemented varies from one movement to another. This is attributable to differences in understanding of the concept of sharia between each of these movements, which is anchored in their respective ideologies and socio-religious platform. For instance, while HTI strongly believes that the implementation of sharia must be executed in conjunction with the reestablishment of the caliphate (Muhtadi, 2009; Ahnaf, 2009; Osman, 2010a; Munabari, 2010), FPI disagrees with such a concept and argues that there is no need to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Ng, 2005; Jahroni, 2008).

This study is important because it attempts to fill this literature gap. The ideology and framing strategies of Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia are far from being homogenous. As suggested above, some of them such as HTI have remained adamant that they will not compromise their quest for the transnational caliphate. Some others such as FPI have demonstrated their willingness to advocate the cause of sharia while respecting the nationalism of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI, or the Unitary Republic of Indonesia). This study offers insights into how the FUI plays a role in developing a revivalist ideology—the implementation of sharia—and, at the same time, frames of protest that appear compatible with and beneficial to the national efforts of the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, literature on social movement theory has predominantly focused upon various aspects of social movements in the West (McAdam et al., 1996). In contrast, the majority of the studies of Islamic movements tend to employ area studies approaches and lack in social movement theory. Wiktorowicz’s (2004) edited book on a social movement theory approach to Islamic activism in the Middle East helpfully bridges this gap. This study contributes to an emerging literature on how studies of Islamic movements in the Muslim world, particularly in Indonesia, are approached and tied to the widely employed theoretical frameworks of social movements in the West.

This study considers FUI as a social movement, for it demonstrates the implementation of the most widely-agreed elements that are embodied in social movements mentioned above, such as the ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in the form of collective action such as mass protests, public gathering, and media statements. The study primarily aims to examine FUI’s ideology and how it influences the way in which it develops its frames of protest. It opens with a discussion of the societal and political factors that contributed to the emergence of FUI. Through the lens of framing perspectives, it will then analyze FUI’s ideology and its framing strategies. Considering that FUI is a coalition movement that consists of a number of movements, it will also discuss the differences of ideology and preferred protest issues among FUI’s member movements. The study demonstrates that, in an attempt to muster support from the Indonesian public, FUI intentionally portrays itself as a pro-sharia Islamic movement that is committed to working toward the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia. To this end, FUI develops its rhetoric and discourses in such a way as to convince the public that its sharia aspirations are not against the national interests of Indonesia, and at the same time, to contest mainstream meaning that is against its causes, such as reinterpreting and redefining Pancasila ⁸ —the basic philosophy of the state of Indonesia—so as to facilitate the implementation of its sharia agenda.

The emergence of FUI

FUI was founded as a result of the fourth congress of Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (KUII, or the Congress of Indonesian Muslims) held by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, or the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) on 17–25 April 2005 in Jakarta (Sitompul, 2005). Hundreds of Indonesian Muslim people from a wide range of Islamic organizations, boarding schools, and universities participated in this congress. The congress had four primary objectives including: formulating strategies for advancing the culture of Muslims; seeking solutions to thwart moral degradation widely perceived as an unfortunate consequence of the spread and influence of pornography and illicit drugs; defining the concept of religious ethics and the unity of Muslims; and countering the negative stereotypes of Islam subsequent to the global campaign against terrorism launched by the United States (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 12 March 2008).

The congress concluded with the “Jakarta Declaration”, which crafted 14 recommendations for better solutions to a variety of challenges facing Indonesia. One of the foremost recommendations was an urgent call for the implementation of sharia (Panggabean, 2005; Detik, 2005). To this end, the congress authorized a number of ulama (Muslim scholars) to establish a special committee responsible for ensuring the effective execution of these recommendations. In a follow-up meeting held in May 2005, this committee agreed to form a forum with the primary goal of facilitating communication and exchanging information among a wide array of Islamic organizations. Additionally, the forum was directed at providing individuals belonging to its member movements with training courses and workshops on Islamic subjects, and at actively responding to contemporary local and global issues pertaining to Islam and the Muslim world. Mashadi from Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI, or the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World) was elected to serve as the forum’s leader, while Muhammad al-Khathath was chosen as the secretary-general. Al-Khathath is a former leader of HTI and one of its first-generation members.

Portraying itself as a broad-based Islamic umbrella movement, FUI claimed that its members were drawn from virtually all Islamic movements and organizations as well as Islamic political parties in Indonesia. Among the movement’s claimed members are FPI, Hizbud Dakwah Islam (HDI, or the Party of Islamic Preaching), MMI, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT, or the Congregation of the Oneness of God), KISDI, Gerakan Reformasi Islam (GARIS, or Islamic Reform Movement), Dewan Dakwah Islam (DDI, or Islamic Preaching Council), Al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, (Persatuan Islam (Persis, or Islamic Unity), Tim Pengacara Muslim (TPM, or Team of Muslim Lawyers), PKS, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, or Development and Unity Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, or Crescent and Star Party), and some other organizations. However, this sweeping claim is unfounded, because in reality only a very few of them are active members of the forum. FPI, HDI, GARIS, and MMI are among the forum’s active member movements. Among them, FPI is the largest member movement in terms of the number of followers. It has invariably participated in every FUI demonstration, as evidenced by the frequent appearance of its supreme leader, Rizieq Shihab, in the movement’s mass protests, and by the conspicuous symbols and clothes of its members.

The emergence of FUI in 2005 was mostly due to favorable political opportunities in Indonesia following the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 which facilitated the flourishing of a variety of mass organizations and political parties. However, Gamson and Mayer (1996: 276) and Tarrow (1998: 7) argued that it is not only the socio-political circumstances of a country that help create opportunities for the emergence of a social movement. Social movements themselves also create opportunities for other movements to emerge. Moreover, they can also create opportunities for other movements to devise collective action strategies such as protest rhetoric and what social movement scholars often refer to as repertoire of contention. It refers to an array of protest-related tools and actions available to a movement in a given time frame such as rallies, vigils, sit-ins, petition drives, public meetings, solemn processions, boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, pamphleteering, and so forth (Zald, 1996; Della Porta and Diani, 1999).

Here, the activism of Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI that emerged shortly after the fall of the Suharto regime played a role in the establishment of FUI. The emergence of a certain social movement is more often than not initiated by ‘a social movement entrepreneur’ ⁹ that performs tasks such as providing the rationale of the establishment of the movement and encouraging other activists to endorse it (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 149; McCarthy and Zald, 1993: 42). This is also the case for FUI whose emergence was initiated particularly by HTI. Owing to the perceived need for enhanced cooperation and coordination among Islamic movements and organizations in the country, HTI took the initiative to serve as the movement ‘entrepreneur’. Through some of HTI former leaders such as Muhammad Al-Khaththath, it approached the leaders of other Islamic movements with the aim of mustering support for the establishment of FUI (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 2 April 2013).

Turmudi and Sihbudi (2005: 278) rightly pointed out that HTI avoided being an exclusive movement, positioning itself as an inclusive movement that is eager to cooperate with other Islamic movements. Nevertheless, such eagerness is not simply driven by the normative behavior of any movements or organizations in the world that tend to band together for a common cause. Rather, it is intended more to exert influence on other movements in such a way as to support and adopt HTI’s ideologies, particularly those relating to the reestablishment of the caliphate (Munabari, 2010). One of the major pronounced examples of such influence in the aspect of resource mobilization was the holding of workshops organized by HTI for the other member movements of FUI in order to facilitate the dissemination of HTI’s ideologies such as the importance of implementing sharia and reestablishing the caliphate. For instance, HTI former leader, Hafidz Abdurrahman, became a speaker in FUI’s workshops, delivering religious talks on the topic of Islamic sharia (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2008).

Another example was the fact that the distribution of FUI’s fortnightly tabloid called Suara Islam (the Voice of Islam) relied exclusively on the marketing network of HTI’s print media. As a result, according to a senior member of FUI who used to be a member of HTI, the consumers of Islamic print media made the assumption that the FUI’s Suara Islam belonged to one of HTI’s print media. This is attributable to the fact that, in addition to the considerable similarities of content and editorial style between Suara Islam and HTI’s print media such as Al-Wa’ie, the Suara Islam was sold by the same sellers of HTI’s print media, the majority of which were HTI members and sympathizers (personal communication with Shodiq Ramadhan, Secretary of FUI, Jakarta, 2 April 2013). In sum, during the period between 2005 and 2008, particularly through Muhammad Al-Khaththath, HTI not only played a significant role in disseminating its ideologies to other member movements in FUI, but also provided the forum with considerable organizational resources. However, it was not until the “Monas Incident” in June 2008 that HTI later opted to sever ties with FUI.

The Monas Incident refers to a violent clash in the vicinity of Jakarta’s iconic symbol of the National Monument Tower (well-known as ‘Monas’) on 1 June 2008 between the supporters of Ahmadiyah Indonesia called Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan (AKKBB, or the Nationalist Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith) and an Islamic militia movement called Komando Laskar Islam (KLI, or Islamic Militia Command), whose participants were drawn from FUI member movements. ¹⁰ As a result of this incident, the leader of FPI, Rizieq Shihab, and some of its members were arrested and convicted of inducing their followers to attack AKKBB. This added to FPI’s long record of violence and at the same time imperilled FUI, whose non-violent image had been projected by Al-Khaththath. The HTI’s withdrawal from FUI was HTI’s exit strategy from any association with FPI. This was subsequently followed by the dismissal of Al-Khaththath from HTI and the cutting of all organizational resources HTI used to provide to FUI.

Redefining Pancasila

FUI has also made efforts to show the public that the primary cause it has been upholding since the beginning of its history, that is, the implementation of sharia in Indonesia, is not against Pancasila as both the basic ideology and the supreme source of law of the Republic of Indonesia. The forum argues that the first article in Pancasila, which is “Belief in One God”, serves as the raison d’être of the implementation of sharia in Indonesia. According to FUI, the term “Belief in One God” in this regard refers exclusively to the one and only God which Muslims all over the world worship. Consequently, in the eyes of FUI, it is only natural that, based upon this article, any product of laws and regulations in the country shall be in accordance with God’s commands and injunctions—sharia.

Of course, the correct and common interpretation of the first Pancasila article is different from that of FUI. The first Pancasila article, indeed, capitalizes on the obligation of all Indonesian citizens to respect each other’s religion and beliefs, without referring to any specific religion. It guarantees freedom of practice of religion and beliefs (Decree of the People Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. II/MPR/1978, 1978). However, such correct and common interpretation of this article is not taken for granted by FUI leaders. They redefine it and provide a set of arguments to justify their understanding and unilateral interpretation of the article. According to Rizieq Shihab, the leader of FPI, which is currently the largest member movement of FUI:

The first article of Pancasila has to be viewed as the most fundamental teaching of Islam, that is, the Tauhid (the oneness of Allah). … Therefore, this article serves as the basis for the implementation of the commands and laws of Allah as the one and only God (Shihab, 2012: 16).

Based upon the above argument, it is obvious that FUI deliberately attempts to formulate its own interpretation of the first article of Pancasila which deviates from the correct and common one. The deliberate interpretation of the words “Belief in One God” in Pancasila as “belief in the One and Only God (Allah)” in the eyes of FUI begets the inevitable consequences of the implementation of Allah’s commands and laws—sharia. Accordingly, it is only natural that FUI further holds that any ideologies that do not emanate from the principles and teachings of “the One and Only God (Allah)” thus oppose the first article of Pancasila.

All ideologies that are not in accordance with the noble principles of ‘the Oneness of God’ such as atheism, communism, Marxism, secularism, and liberalism must be prohibited in Indonesia. Likewise, any deeds and behaviors that oppose such the noble principles as vice, murder, theft, rape, corruption, sorcery, gambling, and so forth must also be prohibited (Shihab, 2012: 17).

The framing of FUI’s rhetoric on Pancasila

Rooted theoretically in symbolic interactionism and contextual constructivism, Snow and his colleagues developed three core framing concepts to account for how ideologies and symbols work in the service of social movements. First, movements seek to change socio-political conditions that are loaded with problems that need to be tackled. At this initial stage, movements construct and develop what Benford and Snow (2000) called diagnostic framing that attends to the function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility. McAdam (1996: 110) referred to such a stage as “naming” grievances. Movements further connect these grievances with other grievances. Prognostic framing, the second core framing concept, deals with the primary task of offering solutions to the problems, including planning a protest or attack along with tactics on how to execute the plan. The third concept, motivational framing, provides a rationale for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents. This task includes the formulation of an array of apt and powerful vocabularies that, when adopted and espoused by the adherents, will help sustain their participation in the movements’ collective action (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615–618).

Through the lens of framing formulated by Benford and Snow (2000), FUI has attempted to attend to the social movement’s function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility, which is referred to as diagnostic framing. This type of framing, as its name implies, also requires that the movement diagnose or identify any problems in society that need to be addressed, more often than not, by the authority of the country. First, FUI wished to convince both the public and authority that the established understanding and interpretation of the first article of Pancasila is not correct and thus needs to be revised according to its version. Second, FUI offered solutions to the aforementioned problem along with rationalizations of why its solutions are worth endorsing. One of the solutions that the forum offered was the perceived correct reinterpretation of the first article of Pancasila, which should be understood as belief in the one and only God (Allah).

Through such reinterpretation, FUI further argued that sharia is the law of God (Allah) and that its implementation in Indonesia is therefore the manifestation of this very article, which is referred to as prognostic framing. This framing deals with the task of offering solutions along with justifications to a wide range of problems the social movement addresses. Third, through motivational framing, FUI has endeavored to formulate vocabularies that are chiefly aimed at portraying itself as a pro-sharia movement that is, at the same time, committed to the betterment of Indonesia. In other words, the movement attempts to send a clear message that, unlike HTI whose sense of nationalism has been heavily questioned, its programs and activities are for the sake of Indonesia, not any other country. One of these vocabularies is the movement’s “NKRI Bersyariah”, which is also expected to serve as a powerful catchphrase in order to appeal to the bystander public and transform them into adherents.

Democracy and electoral participation

All former HTI leaders and members who become FUI ‘entrepreneurs’ believe that democracy is against Islamic teachings. This view is not different from that of HTI, which also views democracy as a system of kufr (disbelief). HTI considers the notion of democracy to be synonymous with that of secularism in that both of them negate the laws of God (sharia) as the overriding guidance for humankind in dealing with a plethora of problems in life. This is due to the fact that in democracy, sovereignty is vested in the hands of the people, which is often associated with the Latin phrase vox populi, vox Dei, or ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’ (Zalloom, 1995). However, while HTI denounces the secular aspect of democracy, it does not view the other elements of democracy, ¹¹ such as the procedure of electing leaders or representatives through elections, as against Islam. The key difference between HTI and FUI in this regard is not their understanding of democracy as a notion. They both agree that this particular notion is alien to Islam. Rather, they differ on their stance on electoral participation. While HTI deliberately avoids both becoming a political party that contests seats in the parliament and casting votes on election day, FUI does not refrain from supporting a certain political party or presidential candidate. In 2009, FUI officially supported the presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto. According to FUI, an important reason for this support was the candidates’ commitment to endorsing FUI’s agenda, including the dissolution of the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 27 April 2013).

Al-Khaththath held the view that, in HTI, there is no prohibition from participating in general elections. He mentioned that, indeed, when he was a leader (mu’tamad) of HTI in the beginning of the 2000s, he himself had even asked the former supreme leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), ¹² Abdul Qadeem Zallum, whether or not HT was allowed to participate in general elections. The answer he received was that the general election in Islam is considered to be mubah (allowed). HTI spokesperson, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, also held the same view as Al-Khaththath regarding the permissibility of electoral participation in HTI. Yusanto explained that, basically, the general election is only one method of electing a leader. In Islamic terms, this is known as wakaalah, which literally means representation. It consists of four elements: (1) waakil (representatives); (2) muwaakil (people represented by waakil); (3) ‘amal (deeds or activities that will be executed by waakil on behalf of muwaakil); and (4) ‘aqad (pledges made by both waakil and muwaakil). However, despite the fact that the Islamic legal status of general elections is mubah and that HTI is allowed to participate in them, the reality is that HTI has always shunned them. In other words, HTI never showed its non-electoral participation stance to the public, thanks to Indonesia’s electoral law no. 10 year 2008 article 28, stating that any attempt to discourage people from exercising their right to vote is considered illegal and thus subject to punishment (Munabari, 2010).

Fealy (2007: 19) mentioned that there were some aspirations in HTI to transform the movement into a formal political party to contest Indonesia’s 2009 general elections. Responding to this particular claim, Al-Khaththath stated that the possibility of HTI becoming a formal political party and contesting seats in the country’s general elections had, indeed, been on the agenda of the International Conference on the Caliphate held in Jakarta in August 2007. ¹³ He further said that the HTI had intended to officially launch itself as a political party at the conference. However, there were two main reasons why the launch did not happen. First, HTI fell short of requirements set forth by Indonesia’s Electoral Commission regarding the minimum number of party branches that must exist in the country. Second, the majority of members of the HTI provincial committee (al-Lajnah al-Wilayah) ¹⁴ disagreed with these aspirations (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 22 June 2013). This suggests that the main reason why HTI has thus far shunned electoral participation is due to a conscious choice of its leaders despite the fact that the Islamic legal status of electoral participation is mubah.

Being aware of the fact that participating in general elections is allowed, Al-Khaththath personally disagreed with the aforementioned choice of his former colleagues in HTI. It is against this backdrop that, through FUI, he supported the presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election. Moreover, Al-Khaththath also ran as a candidate, albeit unsuccessfully, for the House of Representatives in the 2014 legislative election. His candidacy was officially endorsed by the Islamic Star and Crescent Party, which failed to pass the parliamentary threshold set by Indonesia’s Electoral Commission.

FUI’s pro-electoral participation stance is undoubtedly influenced by Al-Khaththath’s view on the lawfulness of actively participating in general elections, which is reflected in voting for certain candidates who have pledged to support FUI’s pro-sharia agenda. This includes the possibility of running as candidates for political office, as epitomized by the above-mentioned Al-Khaththath’s candidacy for the House of Representatives. Moreover, FUI holds that this pro-electoral participation stance is fully in accordance with its slogan, “NKRI Bersyariah”, which is ultimately oriented towards the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia. However, while FPI supported FUI’s pro-electoral participation stance, MMI opposed it. FPI considers supporting certain candidates that run for presidential or gubernatorial elections to be an effective way to facilitate the implementation of its ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’ principles. This support is based upon the condition that these candidates must be willing to help implement and succeed FPI’s programs such as the eradication of social vices and the dissolution of the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia once they are elected (personal communications with: Muhsin Al-Attas, Leader of FPI, Depok, 8 January 2014; Novel Bamukmin, Secretary of FPI Jakarta Chapter, Jakarta, 1 June 2013). In contrast to FPI, MMI not only rejects the concept and practice of democracy, but also shuns electoral participation. MMI’s view on democracy and electoral participation is very similar to that of HTI. Although the practice of democracy manifested in the method of electing leaders—the general election—is mubah, MMI firmly holds that, in reality, those who adopt and practice the notion of democracy will never agree to support the implementation of sharia.

MMI complained about FUI’s decision to support the presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election, arguing that the decision had never undergone deliberation among all FUI member movements, particularly MMI. However, despite this complaint, MMI refrained from severing ties with FUI for the sake of maintaining unity among Islamic revivalist movements in the country (personal communication with Abu Jibril, Deputy Leader of MMI, Tangerang, 9 April 2013). MMI’s complaint against FUI’s support for Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto clearly implies that, although FUI was established to serve as an umbrella movement for a variety of Islamic movements in Indonesia, it is unable to accommodate every aspiration of its member movements. Ideological differences do exist among them, and FUI’s decision to participate in general elections by supporting certain candidates is undoubtedly influenced by Al-Khaththath’s view on the lawfulness of participating in general elections.

Implementing sharia in Indonesia: Which sharia?

Virtually all Islamic revivalist movements that emerged after the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 espoused the implementation of sharia in Indonesia. They all agree that sharia constitutes a panacea to a plethora of problems that have afflicted the country since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, the extent to which sharia is interpreted and implemented varies from one movement to another. Sharia is a set of comprehensive rules and regulations in Islam that have to be adhered to by every Muslim, and these rules and regulations apply to matters that not only fall under the sphere of the individual, but also the public. For example, the way HTI interprets the implementation of sharia, as mentioned earlier, goes as far as to call for the reestablishment of the caliphate. This is due to the fact that, in the eyes of HTI, the establishment of the caliphate is an integral part of sharia. In contrast, FPI does not consider the establishment of the caliphate or any form of Islamic state in Indonesia a necessity, because, according to FPI, Indonesia is already an Islamic state although there are many of its regulations that are still not in accordance with sharia. According to a senior executive of FPI:

Indeed, the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia is not necessary on grounds that the country is already an Islamic state. It has implemented a number of laws that are in accordance with sharia such as those of Islamic banking, Islamic marriage, and zakat (alms giving). It is true that the full implementation of sharia has yet to be realized, but this is something that we need to achieve gradually (personal communication with Jafar Shodiq, Deputy Secretary General of FPI, Jakarta, 5 June 2013).

Another different interpretation of sharia is demonstrated by MMI in that it calls for the formalization of sharia through the revision of all legal products, particularly a penal code, in such a way as to be in fully in accordance with sharia, without capitalizing on the call for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, 2001: xvii-xxviii). FUI, as discussed earlier, deliberately avoids calling for the establishment of any form of Islamic state in the country through use of its slogan “NKRI Bersyariah”. However, sharia is a broad concept that encompasses detailed commands and injunctions on all aspects of life. It does not only regulate the form of a state, but also a wide range of issues that are basically aimed at exposing and critiquing the government’s inability to cope with a plethora of political, social, economic, and religious injustices. The differences as to whether or not these movements participate in general elections discussed above are a result of their interpretation of sharia. While HTI and MMI shun electoral participation, FPI supports it. This suggests that although FUI was established to serve as an umbrella movement for various Islamic movements and aimed to enhance unity, coordination, and communication among them, in reality, it is confronted with the fact that not all of its member movements have a uniform stance of the concept of sharia when it comes to certain delicate issues such as the ideal form of a state in Islam, electoral participation, and some other issues that will be discussed in the next section.

Considering the differences between FUI member movements on issues such as those mentioned above, an analysis of some of the protest issues that FUI has raised in its collective action is necessary in order to account for how it interprets and applies its sharia concept. This is because the way in which an Islamic revivalist movement understands and interprets its concept of sharia is the reflection of its ideologies and socio-religious platform. However, FUI’s understanding and interpretation of sharia can only be appreciated by the public through the range of protest issues that this movement has raised, how it responds to these issues, and what solutions it offers to remedy them.

FUI’s protest issues

FUI was founded to accommodate the aspirations of a variety of Islamic movements and organizations in Indonesia. As a result, any protest issues that the FUI has thus far raised are always based upon prior deliberations among its member movements. In principle, FUI attempts to advocate the interests of Islam and its adherents in the country (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 27 April 2013). The forum’s protest issues range from rejecting the rise of fuel prices to displaying the sense of Islamic solidarity towards its fellow Muslim Rohingyas who suffer from discrimination by the Myanmar government. Social movements everywhere in the world employ what is often referred to as “master frames”, that is, relatively inclusive and flexible framing that covers such broad concepts as human rights, injustice, environmental justice, culturally pluralist and “return to democracy” frames, among others (Benford and Snow, 2000). FUI, too, employs such master frames. However, considering that it is an Islamic revivalist movement, it is only natural that its master frames are deliberately based upon Islamic teachings and principles. Accordingly, we are unlikely to see any Islamic revivalist movements that raise such concepts as human rights, democracy, and pluralism, which are often raised by secular or non-religious social movements. Rather, Islamic revivalist movements, including FUI, will normally raise jargons such as “sharia for the betterment of Indonesia”. This does not necessarily mean that the Islamic revivalist movements’ manifestation of the concept of “injustice” that often becomes the quintessential master frame is always different from that of secular or religiously-based social movements.

Sometimes, such manifestation of the concept of “injustice” between these two types of movements overlaps when it is translated into their protest issues. For instance, when FUI staged a mass protest against the government’s decision to raise fuel prices in 2012, it viewed such a policy as an injustice, in the same way as the majority of secular or non-religious social movements. As far as FUI is concerned, the criteria for injustice in this regard are determined by Islamic teachings and principles. At first glance, protesting against the rise of fuel prices has no direct relevance to the teachings of Islam. However, in the eyes of FUI, this policy is also considered an injustice and thus labelled as maksiat, which literally means wickedness. Thus, this policy is against Islamic teachings and principles because it is considered an unnecessary burden that has a considerable socio-economic impact on Indonesian households (Detik, 2012b). Here, FUI’s understanding and manifestation of “injustice” is not only limited to Islamic worship such as regular prayers, alms giving, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, and so forth. It is also manifested in matters other than worship, which often fall under the public sphere, such as public policies.

As for FUI’s protest issue of rejecting the rise of fuel prices, through diagnostic framing, which is the first step of framing, the forum attends to the social movement’s function of identifying problems in society that need to be addressed by, more often than not, the authorities. The government’s decision to raise fuel prices in this regard undoubtedly served as what FUI considered to be a problem and therein lies what is often referred to as injustice. However, diagnostic framing also requires that a social movement carries out an act of attributing responsibility or what is often referred to as “naming grievances” (McAdam, 1996: 110). After identifying a problem in need of remedy, which was the rise of fuel prices, FUI then picked a target of blame—the government. In the second framing, which is prognostic framing, FUI planned an action to respond to this policy by staging a mass protest in Jakarta and concomitantly urged the government to withdraw this policy. Prognostic framing is employed by social movements to offer solutions to a variety of problems they address and to plan a set of collective action plans. Staging a mass protest constitutes a favorite form of collective action that FUI employed in this regard, and urging the government to withdraw its unpopular fuel prices rise serves as one of the solutions that the forum offered.

Last, motivational framing is normally employed by social movements to provide a rationale for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents, and formulating an array of apt and powerful vocabularies that will help sustain their participation in various forms of collective action. Here, as reflected from the forum’s statement and protest signs during the mass protest against the fuel prices rise, FUI called upon the public to endorse the implementation of sharia in Indonesia as an effective solution not only to the issue of the rise of fuel prices, but also to other social and economic problems in the country. “NKRI Bersyariah” or “Indonesia with sharia for the betterment of Indonesia” is the forum’s very slogan that, in this regard, serves as the aforementioned powerful vocabularies that are aimed at appealing to the bystander public and at the same time transforming them into adherents (Okezone, 2012).

Another example of FUI’s protest issues is the demand to cancel the Miss World contest held in Bali in September 2013. This issue might not be seen as a problem in need of remedy from the perspective of secular or non-religious based social movements, but because it constitutes a problem in the eyes of FUI, it held a series of mass rallies against it in Jakarta. This is what differentiates Islamic revivalist movements such as FUI from other type of movement, particularly ones that are secular or non-religious. In the initial diagnostic framing stage, , the ideologies and socio-political platform of a social movement play a major role in the selection of protest issues. Islamic teachings and principles obviously serve as FUI’s primary source of guidance on which decisions regarding the selection of protest issues are based.

To many Islamic revivalist movements, the chief reason for this protest is unambiguous: according to Islam, exposing women’s bodies in public is haram (forbidden). However, the way FUI framed this protest issue went beyond merely saying that Miss World is haram. Rather, as reflected in the forum’s protest signs, FUI portrayed this beauty pageant contest as contradictory to Pancasila, which is the basic philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia (Tempo Interaktif, 2013). This is certainly a deliberate attempt to amplify the magnitude of the protest issue of Miss World before the Indonesian public, convincing them that this is indeed a big issue and therefore worth endorsing. As discussed earlier, FUI has made efforts to reinterpret and redefine Pancasila in such a way as to match its ideologies and goals, the primary of which is undoubtedly the complete implementation of sharia in Indonesia. The forum argued that Pancasila is compatible with sharia, and any attempt to prevent its complete implementation in the country would automatically be deemed as against Pancasila. Because the Miss World contest is considered against sharia, it comes as no surprise that FUI argued that this contest is also against Pancasila. However, linking the protest issue of the Miss World contest with Pancasila was framed not only to bolster the impact of the protest, but also to demonstrate FUI’s purported commitment to the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia, a pro-nationalism image that the forum has developed vigorously.

FUI has not only addressed national issues such as those mentioned above, but also international ones in so far as these issues are deemed against Islamic teachings and principles. In the eyes of FUI, the Myanmar government’s discrimination against Muslim Rohingyas is a gross violation of the rights of Muslims, because according to Islam, all Muslims in the world are considered one nation. This means that if there are Muslims in certain parts of the world, such as the Rohingyas or in Palestine, who suffer from any sort of discrimination, their fellow Muslims in the rest of the world have to show deep sympathy towards them and feel obliged to offer them any kind of help that is possible. Here, the forum’s target of blame was not only the government of Indonesia, but also that of Myanmar. FUI urged the government of Indonesia to provide protection to the Rohingya refugees and the right to live in Indonesia. Equally important, the forum condemned the Myanmar government and urged them to stop what it considered to be a Rohingya massacre. In fact, some FUI leaders managed to meet with the Myanmar Ambassador to Indonesia to express this protest (Voice of Islam, 2012).

When dealing with issues of discrimination against any Muslim population in the world, virtually all Islamic revivalist movements will agree that this particular issue should be part of their diagnostic framing. In other words, they feel that they should often raise such issues with the public. However, there is one primary difference between HTI and FUI in terms of the solution they offer in this regard. HTI urged the Indonesian government to dispatch the Indonesian military to countries where Muslims are discriminated against by their governments, such as in Myanmar and Palestine (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2012). In contrast, FUI did not offer this solution. As mentioned above, the forum only urged the Indonesian government to offer the Rohingya refugees protection and the right to live in Indonesia, without demanding any dispatch of the Indonesian military to Myanmar to rescue the Rohingya community. This is attributable to FUI’s deliberate strategy to offer a solution that is deemed realistic.

While FUI agrees that all Muslims in the world are considered one nation (ummah), dispatching the Indonesian military to unilaterally rescue the Rohingya community and at the same time wage a war against the Myanmar government is impractical. This is exactly the same raison d’être as FUI’s deliberate option of avoiding any mention of the reestablishment of the caliphate as a solution in any of its collective action as it is an irrelevant solution to a wide range of protest issues the forum has thus far raised. FUI holds that any unrealistic solution it offers to the Indonesian public would potentially backfire on the image and protest agenda of the forum (personal communication with Shodiq Ramadhan, Secretary of FUI, Jakarta, 2 April 2013).

The Indonesian public will find that many of FUI’s protest issues raised since HTI’s withdrawal from FUI in mid 2008 are the same as those of HTI. HTI also raised protest issues such as the Rohingyas and the Miss World contest. This suggests that the diagnostic framing employed by these movements is similar, which comes as no surprise given the fact that those who direct the FUI leadership were former HTI leaders and members. However, the protest issues of these movements are not always necessarily the same. There were occasions when HTI raised a protest issue that was not raised by FUI, and vice versa. As an example, HTI rejected a bill about mass organizations in Indonesia presented to the Indonesian House of Representatives in 2013 that called for stricter rules and regulations for every mass organization in the country. Some of the objectives of this bill were to prevent any social unrest in society resulting from the activities of organizations or movements that are considered radical, and to prevent them adopting an ideology other than Pancasila.

HTI criticized the bill and labelled it as the government’s deliberate attempt to curb freedom of expression on the part of civil society organizations in Indonesia. HTI labelled such an attempt as a serious setback for the progress of democracy in the country (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2013). In contrast to HTI, FUI did not stage any mass protest against this bill. Al-Khaththath argued that the bill was basically meant to target movements that receive donations from outside Indonesia such as HTI and those whose ideology is not compatible with Pancasila, and, accordingly, FUI found no reason to stage a mass protest against the bill (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 2 April 2013).

The other example was a series of FUI protests against the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahja Purnama, alias Ahok, calling for him to step down as a governor due to some of his statements and policies which are considered offensive to Muslims, such as his intent to disband FPI and his policy prohibiting the slaughtering of cows and sheep in schools during the Muslim holiday of the Feast of the Sacrifice (Idul Adha) (Kompas, 2014). In contrast to FUI, which considered this issue to be worth protesting, HTI did not view this issue as strategic enough to address because it was a local issue as opposed to a national one. Because the chief aim of HTI is to delegitimize the government and replace it with the caliphate (Osman, 2010a; Munabari, 2010), it is only natural that the national government of Indonesia, rather than local government, should always serve as the primary target of HTI’s collective action. This explains why, unlike FUI, HTI did not stage any mass protest against the governor of Jakarta.

While all Islamic revivalist movements would agree that Islamic teachings and principles serve as the guidance for determining protest issues to be raised in public, there are occasions when the manifestation of these teachings and principles differ from one movement to another. The fact that FUI and HTI sometimes raise different protest issues is attributable to their different interpretation of these teachings and principles. In other words, these differences are determined by particular ideologies and socio-religious platforms of the movements. However, as far as FUI is concerned, ideology and socio-religious platform alone are not sufficient to account for differences of opinions among its member movements regarding a range of issues raised in the public. The nature of FUI’s leadership, which heavily relies on Al-Khaththath as the de facto ultimate decision maker in the forum, also matters. Indeed, this is the most important factor in every one of FUI’s decision-making processes. An obvious example of this was MMI’s complaints about the FUI decision to officially support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election, which was considered by MMI to be a unilateral decision.

Another example is a difference of opinion concerning an allegedly deviant syiah (or shia) ¹⁵ community in Indonesia. Unlike the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah community that is viewed by all Islamic revivalist movements in the country as deviant, not all of them regard syiah as deviant. FPI holds that not all syiah Muslims are categorized as deviant. According to them, there are three categories of syiah. First, syiah ghulat: this category of syiah considers Ali bin Abi Thalib, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, a God and believes that the contents of the Holy Quran are no longer original. FPI considers this category to be extremely deviant. Second, syiah rafidhoh: this category of syiah does not go so far as to consider Ali a God, but publicly condemns the companions of Prophet Muhammad. FPI also views this category of syiah as deviant. Third, syiah mu’tadilah: this category of syiah neither considers Ali a God nor condemns the companions of Prophet Muhammad. It considers Ali to be more prominent than other companions of Prophet Muhammad and narrates the sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad (hadith) as exclusively derived from Ali and his direct descendants. Unlike the first and second categories, FPI does not consider this third category to be deviant. While FPI calls upon Muslims to rectify those who adhere to the first and second categories of syiah, by force if necessary, it opts to employ a method of dialogue in order to deal with the third category. In the eyes of FPI, despite differences in terms of the sources of Islamic jurisprudence between syiah and sunni, ¹⁶ the syiah community in Indonesia falls under the third category, hence the use of a dialogue method instead of force (personal communications with: Muhsin Al-Attas, Leader of FPI, Jakarta, 8 January 2014; Slamet Maarif, Deputy Secretary of FPI, Cibubur, 20 November 2013).

The aforementioned FPI stance stands in contrast to that of MMI, which rejects such categorization of syiah and views all syiah as deviant. In fact, it considers syiah the most dangerous and rebellious ideology and must therefore be confronted (Hidayatullah, 2015). Based upon the belief that syiah is extremely deviant, MMI contacted FUI and proposed a plan to stage a mass protest against the syiah community’s plan to celebrate their religious festival called Idul Ghadir ¹⁷ in Jakarta on 26 October 2013. Unfortunately, Al-Khaththath did not agree with MMI’s proposal on the grounds of the belief that, like FPI, a mass protest against the syiah community in Indonesia is not an appropriate method to employ because they are not considered deviant (personal communication with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of FUI, Jakarta, 20 November 2013). As a result, MMI staged a mass protest against the syiah community alone without any support from FUI (Suara Islam, 2013). This clearly suggests that despite FUI’s claim that it serves as a coalition with a view to accommodating the aspirations of a wide range of Islamic elements in Indonesia, and that there is a mechanism of consultation prior to the selection of any protest issue the forum has thus far raised to the public, the ultimate decision-making process in the forum is nevertheless determined by Al-Khaththath. Even though FUI is a coalition movement that consists of a number of Islamic revivalist movements and organizations, its leadership is solely directed by former HTI ‘entrepreneurs’ with Al-Khaththath being the de facto leader of these ‘entrepreneurs’ upon whom the overall direction and progress of FUI heavily depends.

Conclusion

This study analyzed the manner in which FUI frames its protest issues and rhetoric in an effort to appeal to the Indonesian public and transform them into the forum’s adherents. Social movements constantly struggle with meaning contestation with a view to countering discourses that are not in favor of their causes, and at the same time, interpreting as well as assigning meaning to these discourses. FUI is no exception. In an attempt to portray itself as an Islamic movement whose ideologies and goals are oriented towards the betterment of Indonesia, FUI formulated a slogan of “NKRI Bersyariah” or “The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that is in accordance with sharia”, which also functions as the representation of the forum’s ideology. This slogan was deliberately crafted to differentiate FUI from HTI’s popular catchphrase of “the caliphate”, which has met with severe criticism from many organizations in Indonesia for its transnational and anti-nationalist tendencies, as soon as HTI cut ties with FUI in 2008.

The study examined FUI’s deliberate self-portrayal as a pro-nationalist Islamic revivalist movement through a carefully planned rhetorical strategy aimed at convincing the Indonesian public that the forum’s pro-sharia aspirations are, indeed, congruous with the basic ideology of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila. Unlike the correct interpretation of the article that capitalizes on the obligation of all Indonesian citizens to respect each other’s religions and belief, without referring to a specific religion, FUI redefined it as “Belief in one and only God (Allah)” based upon Islamic perspectives. This unilateral redefinition consequently serves as FUI’s raison d’être for its call for the complete implementation of God’s (Allah’s) commands and laws—sharia.

As a coalition movement that consists of a number of Islamic movements, differences of opinion among major FUI member movements regarding its decisions and selection of protest issues exist. This is attributable to the different understanding of Islamic perspectives on certain issues such as those regarding the Islamic legal status of electoral participation and the allegedly deviant syiah (or shia) community. While differences of opinion concerning such issues in FUI are inevitable, the final decision-making process always lies at the discretion of the forum’s secretary-general, Muhammad Al-Khaththath, upon whom the overall activities, programs, and progress of FUI relies. In the end, when differences of opinions occur, it is Al-Khaththath who makes the final decisions in FUI.

The future of FUI rests on its ability to manage the ideological differences of its member movements. HTI’s withdrawal from FUI in 2008 was the first obvious example of how FUI was confronted with dire internal problems that could not be resolved, with ideological differences between HTI and other major FUI member movements playing a major part in this withdrawal. Similarly, MMI had expressed its complaints about some of FUI’s decisions mentioned above, but refrained from cutting ties with it for the sake of maintaining unity among pro-sharia movements in the country. However, there is no guarantee that MMI’s discontent will always be muted in the future. After all, FUI is a coalition movement, whose organizational resources are highly dependent upon its member movements. This implies that the forum’s ability to manage the ideological differences of its member movements is vital to its continued existence in Indonesia.

Studies such as this help us understand the current dynamics of pro-sharia movements in a contestation of meaning within the socio-political milieu of contemporary Indonesia. As home to the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia has diverse Islamic groups, ranging from moderate to radical. While it is true that under the regime of President Suharto (1967–1998), Indonesia had been recognized as a moderate Islamic country, the country has witnessed an escalation in the activism of Islamic revivalist movements whose goals have revolved around the implementation of sharia and the caliphate ever since the regime’s demise. Some of these movements, such as HTI, have been persistent in calling for the reestablishment of the transnational caliphate. Some others, such as FUI, have opted to mute their campaign for the establishment of an Islamic state, and to engage in a relentless meaning contestation against their opponents through the reinterpretation and redefinition of mainstream meaning in the country that is not in favor of their sharia aspirations. In other words, they attempt to convince the Indonesian public that their pro-sharia agenda is, indeed, for the sake of the national interests of Indonesia. Equally important, all these movements are not immune to intra-organizational conflict: some of them underwent organizational breakup such as MMI. ¹⁸ However, this does not necessarily mean that their struggles for sharia falter. As this study has demonstrated, despite challenges and organizational conflict among Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, there will be movement ‘entrepreneurs’ among them who are ready and willing to take what they perceive to be divinely inspired responsibility for continuation of the struggle for the implementation of sharia.