How small states acquire status: A social network analysis

Abstract

A number of recent studies have recognized the importance of status in international politics. While this developing scholarship has largely focused on great and middle powers, the pursuit of status by small states remains underexplored. For example, many studies claim that small states such as Qatar ‘punch above their weight’ in international politics in pursuit of status. How do small states without significant military power acquire status? How can we assess change in status over time? This paper argues that small states can acquire status by increasing their involvement in international politics and one way states can do this is through mediation efforts. Acting as a mediator for international conflict can enhance a small state’s status relative to its peers by demonstrating its relevance and importance in the regional and international system. This public act of mediation produces commonly held beliefs that the mediator state is an influential player in the international system, thus conferring it more status. Social network analysis reveals that as a state increases its international engagement through mediation activities, it can occupy a more central position in important networks, and a higher ranking within its peer group, indicating an increase in status. This increase in status can be translated to greater influence in international politics.

Keywords

Status Qatar social network analysis mediation small states soft power

Introduction

How do small states acquire status? How can we assess change in status over time? International relations theory has largely focused on the role of great powers, but we know that small states can and do play important roles in alliance formation, international institutions, conflict, and diplomacy. In fact, in recent years, some analysts have claimed that small states such as Qatar, exercise soft power and “punch above their weight,” partly owing to the fact that both states have been involved in high-stakes diplomacy and conflict mediation in many sensitive conflicts. Their perceived influence in the international system is striking given each state’s relative material capabilities. Qatar has a population of 250,000, occupies a small sliver of the Arabian Peninsula, and its military capabilities are severely limited.

These observations about the role of small states in the international system coincide with the burgeoning literature on the role of status in international politics (Bezerra et al., 2015; Neumann and de Carvalho, 2014; Renshon, 2016; Renshon et al., 2014; Volgy et al., 2013, 2014; Wohlforth, 2014). This new wave of scholarship focuses on how and why states engage in status seeking behavior in addition to and sometimes as opposed to other objectives. This paper situates itself within this literature on status attribution in order to demonstrate one way in which small states can acquire status. In doing so it uses social network analysis to measure status through a state’s position within networks of alliance and diplomatic relationships.¹

This paper argues that small states can acquire status by increasing their involvement in international politics and one way that states can do this is through mediation efforts. Acting as a mediator for international conflict can enhance a small state’s status relative to its peers by demonstrating its relevance and importance in the regional and international system. Status is a function of a state’s peer ranking. Social network analysis reveals that as a state increases its international engagement through mediation activities, it can occupy a more central position in important networks, and a higher ranking within its peer group, indicating an increase in status. This increase in status can be translated to greater influence in international politics. Examining Qatar’s international activities since 2000, we show that these small states came to occupy a more central position within important global networks and a higher ranking within their peer groups as they increased their mediation activities.

The paper uses a novel measure of status by looking at a state’s centrality ranking within networks of diplomatic and alliance relationships. We employ a research design aimed to illustrate our argument from different perspectives. Rather than focusing on a critical variable to establish causality, this paper explores the relationship between a state’s mediation activities and its centrality ranking within the structure of two specific networks: alliances, and diplomatic representation. Presenting a state’s rank ordering along different measures of centrality within its peer group offers a novel way to evaluate status. We examine changes in a state’s status through shifts in centrality ranking over time and show that through engaging in activities such as mediation and peacekeeping activities, small states can occupy a more central position within social networks and gain status.

We examine Qatar to explore the relationship between mediation and status. Qatar is a small state with limited military capability, and it is often recognized for its ability to punch above its weight and influence international politics. Qatar is seen as possessing a soft power yet lacking of military power projection capabilities even on a regional scale (Rubin, 2010). Qatar’s soft power activities include economic and cultural activities and the state sees itself in competition with its peers. Qatar is known to compete with other wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council states by building taller buildings, hosting prestigious events, and even arms purchases. Finally, Qatar, as well as other small states, such as Norway are unique in their role as small powers that mediate international conflicts.² As Kamrava points out:

Rarely do small states involve themselves in international mediations as a principal mediator, with Norway’s role in sponsoring the secret talks that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords being a major exception. In specific relation to the Middle East, the role of mediator has traditionally been played by the regional heavyweights, in particular Egypt and Saudi Arabia, each of whom views itself as the protector of the regional status quo. For their part, none of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have ever engaged in substantive mediation efforts. Qatar’s prolific mediation efforts are unique both regionally and, given its size, globally. (Kamrava, 2011: 541)

This paper uses social network analysis to show that mediation can play a part in a small state’s acquisition of status. More specifically, the Qatar case illustrates shifts in foreign policy and status acquisition. The Qatar case indicates that its increase in status over time, as measured by an increase in centrality and peer ranking within networks of diplomatic representation, corresponds with its rise as an international mediator since 2005. We do not claim that there is a causal relationship between mediation activities and status. Rather, the Qatar case offers a plausibility probe of the argument that small states can enhance their status as measured by their ranking relative to others through involvement in activities such as mediation in international conflict. The paper proceeds as follows. First, we examine existing theories regarding the foreign policy of small states. Second, we examine the relationship between status attribution and mediation activities. Third, we look at how social network analysis can provide an analytical tool through which to explore this relationship and follow this with an analysis of the case of Qatar. We conclude with a discussion of the results.

Approaches to understanding the foreign policy of small states

There are a number of different ways to understand the foreign policy behavior of both great powers and small states.³ Realist theories of international politics have argued that state behavior can be explained through its military power or economic capabilities. Soft power offers another framework for understanding how states attain their foreign policy objectives. However, both of these perspectives focus on instruments of material power, rather than developing an understanding of the relational and positional dimensions of power. As a result, explanations for state behavior based on hard or soft power are inappropriate measures of status and limited in their applicability to understanding status seeking behavior. Neither explanation provides a framework for understanding the relational dynamics inherent to the status seeking behavior of small states. This section will first examine realist explanations for state behavior and will then look at how soft power has been used to explain the behavior of small states. We will discuss some of these shortcomings and offer an alternative heuristic using social network analysis in order to assess the status seeking behavior of small states.

Realists tell us that great powers, bombs, and bullets drive international politics and that the rest is commentary. This approach has traditionally defined power as the ability to “do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not do” and posits that hard power gives a state the ability to influence international outcomes through coercion or fear of coercion (Nye, 1990a: 154).⁴ This capacity to exercise leverage over other parties is seen as a function of material capabilities, such as economic and military resources. Mearsheimer (2001: 55) for example, argues that “power is based on particular material capabilities that a state possesses,” specifically military power.⁵ Military power is based primarily on the size and strength of a state’s army and its supporting air and naval forces. He writes, “Even in a military world, armies are the core ingredient of military power” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 56). However, Mearsheimer makes an important distinction that we highlight and expand upon in the following section on soft power. Power can be defined in two ways. First, it can be defined as the actual assets or resources that a state possesses, such as military power, economic power, or population. Second, power can be seen as an outcome, as the ability to control or influence other states, or to force them to do something, and as a result it can only be measured after an outcome is determined (Mearsheimer, 2001: 57). Integrating the two perspectives, material power is thus what allows a state to exercise leverage or influence in the international system. According to Mearsheimer (2001: 56), the most powerful states will prevail in a dispute. Therefore, hard power is synonymous with coercion; states with abundant material resources should be better able to wield influence in the international system. Accordingly, small states, such as Qatar, are unlikely to wield influence in the international system.

Economic inducement is a variant of this material-based explanation.⁶ States that give considerable amounts of foreign aid can influence the behavior of other states and the likelihood of conflict. Accordingly, this explanation would argue that Qatar is able to influence international politics in large part because they have given considerable amounts of foreign aid. This aid could take the form of promises of investments, donations in post-war conflict zones, or the expectation that aid would be forthcoming should an agreement be reached between two warring parties.

Soft power has become a widely used concept among foreign policy analysts and officials since the end of the Cold War (Rubin, 2010). Coined by Joseph Nye (1990b, 2004), this term is generally understood as the ability to accomplish a foreign policy objective “through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” In contrast to hard power, which relies on carrots or sticks, soft power “gets others to want the outcomes that you want” (Nye, 2004). According to Nye, soft power “comes from attraction,” and rests on three resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to then at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2008: 96). Through these resources, soft power not only has the ability to influence, but also the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye, 2008: 95). The United States’ culture, values, and policies have been attractive to much of the world, and according to Nye, this attractiveness allows the US to obtain its goals without the use of coercion or threats. For Nye, soft power is “the ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004: 5). Within the context of our discussion, this approach would posit that soft power provides Qatar with the ability to exercise influence in the international system.

Identifying the shortcoming of these two idealized pillars of international relations, a material approach and an ideational one, reveals interesting empirical insights. If the realist approach were to be accepted, Qatar’s lack of military resources should preclude them from having influence over international outcomes. Qatar is a small power, and while it has armed forces, its military capacity and military expenditures are limited. Qatar possesses a small military force of 11,800 men, with an army, navy, and air force. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which measures military expenditures during the period 1988–2016, in 2010 Qatar’s defense expenditures were 1.5% of the national gross domestic product (GDP), equivalent to 2.11 billion US dollars (USD).⁷ As a point of comparison, in 2010 the United States, which has the world’s largest defense budget, spent 4.7% of its GDP or nearly 759 USD, Saudi Arabia spent 8.6% of its GDP on defense or approximately 51.4 billion USD, and in 2010 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) spent 6.1% or 19.14 billion USD. Relative to other states in the world and even in the region, Qatar has small defense expenditures. Because power is inherently a comparative metric, the relative measures of defense spending are important to consider.

Soft power also has its share of definitional and operational challenges (Kroenig et al. 2010). The understanding of soft power as attraction is difficult to evaluate in practice—identifying when states have it, how they use it, how it is measured. Many studies on soft power also conflate attributes and outcomes and this confusion comes from the fact that soft power can be a state resource, such as culture, political values, or foreign policy. Soft power can also be seen as an outcome. For example, Qatar’s ability to exercise influence in the international system is often seen as a function of its soft power (Barakat, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2010; Kamrava, 2011; Roberts, 2011). Finally, soft power may be something that states want more of: Doha has tried to enhance its soft power, and thus prestige within this international system through mediation (Kamrava, 2011).

These debates come down to a distinction between attributes and outcomes. Nye argues that defining power as the possession of resources or capabilities that influences outcomes “makes power appear more concrete, measurable and predictable.” He continues, “This definition also has problems. When people define power as synonymous with resources that produce it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want” (Nye, 2004: 3).

The idea of attraction is also limited in its applicability. Nye argues that soft power appeals to a sense of attraction, sense of duty, or appeal of shared values and about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes (Nye, 2004). However, a state’s ability to appeal to justness or shared values does not apply to Qatar. It ranks very low on many different indexes of political freedom, and its labor practices,⁸ and its citizenship laws are very strict. But the problems with the definition are criticisms of Qatar’s policy. Even the US, which is seen as a state with a considerable amount of soft power, has experienced variation in the appeal of its values. Many countries within the international community have criticized the justness of US policy and values. Defining soft power in terms of appeal and attraction would thus exclude many countries whose governments or policies are not seen as just and where hard power resources may be absent, but yet are still able to influence other actors.

The final critique is that the literature on both soft and hard power overlooks relational dynamics. For example, while realist explanations focus on absolute measures of national power, this variable must be viewed relative to other states and how other states perceive this measure of power. Goddard and Nexon offer a critique of contemporary realism and argue in favor of a research program that they call “the dynamics of power politics” (Goddard and Nexon, 2016: 4). This program is based upon the assumption that political activity is a struggle for influence in global politics. We draw upon this framework to highlight the distinction between status as a concept of social dominance whereby status is a function of hierarchy rather than instruments of military power. Goddard and Nixon argue that the study of power politics overlooks nonmilitary instruments. We draw upon this critique and argue that in order to understand how states acquire status, it is necessary to look at how states can increase their relative position in important networks (Goddard and Nexon, 2016; Lieber and Alexander, 2005).⁹ Traditional approaches to understanding the foreign policy behavior of states, specifically small states, define structure in attributional terms and overlook the importance of how variation in patterns of interaction and relationships impact status, influence, and, ultimately, power. We argue that a traditional explanation focused on hard or soft power cannot account for Qatar’s ability to influence regional politics and exercise leverage in the international system. Instead, we look at Qatar’s position within networks of international alliances and diplomatic ties as a way to evaluate changes in its status as it became more involved in international politics through mediation efforts. For this reason, this paper utilizes network analysis to capture the relational dynamics of status in the international system.

Acquiring status through mediation

This paper argues that small states can acquire status by increasing their involvement in international politics and one way they can do this is through mediation efforts. Through analysis of a state’s position and ranking within particular networks, social network analysis reveals that as a state increases its international engagement through mediation activities, it occupies a more central position in important peer networks, thus indicating an increase in status. Therefore, status is measured hierarchically through a state’s rank ordering within particular networks and is what allows states greater influence in international affairs.

The growing literature on the importance of status for international relations offers insights for how and why a small state is able to “punch above its weight” and influence international politics. Status is a concept about a state’s ranking, its position relative to other states within particular networks. Status is a fundamentally relational concept – it matters vis-a-vis the ranking of other states. If status is about rank ordering, a state’s status only matters with respect to its position relative to other states within its peer group or within the international system. Volgy et al. (2014: 58) find that a state’s status, as conferred by others, has an impact on its behavior in the international system.¹⁰ Acceptance by others as a major power confers legitimacy upon a state, enabling different types of international behavior. In other words, the acquisition of status depends upon its recognition by other states. According to the literature in identity and recognition, identity has an intersubjective nature, meaning it is dependent upon recognition by others. One aspect of identity is the recognition of status and prestige. From this perspective, status and one’s position within a hierarchal ordering is dependent upon recognition by other states. Diplomatic relationships depend upon social recognition, and our study thus underscores the importance of the intersubjective nature of status.¹¹

Hierarchy and ranking is another important aspect of status. Larson et al. (2014: 7) define status as, “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organizations, and diplomatic clout).” Bezerra et al. (2015) highlight the importance of hierarchical group membership in understanding status. They define status attribution in international politics as:

overtly recognized membership of an entity in a group along with an overtly recognized hierarchical ranking within the group that conveys standing different from those not in the group or from those ranked differently (higher or lower) in the group. The definition contains two primary components: group membership ad relative ranking in the group. (Bezerra et al., 2015: 258)

In international politics, status can manifest itself as membership in a club or as relative standing within that club. Renshon (2016: 9) also examines the positional nature of status and argues that status is perceptual, positional and social. He finds that status is “positional in the sense that absolute values don’t matter as much as comparisons to salient “reference groups…the only way to obtain status is through actions that can be seen by others or actions that have consequences are visible” (Renshon, 2016: 9). As Renshon (2016: 9) notes, this perceptual and social nature of status can help in evaluating status empirically as “these qualities imply what is termed the ‘visibility’ or ‘publicity’ hypothesis: the only way to obtain status is through action that can be seen by others or actions that have consequences that are visible.” Thus, observability of status is an important point and has influenced recent work on the status attribution of both major powers and small states.

States frequently engage in observable activities that enhance a state’s standing, or status, such as “space programs, acquisitions of high-technology weapons, major diplomatic initiatives, promotion of a state’s soft power or culture, and efforts to surpass others’ economic growth rates” (Renshon, 2016: 12). States can also host global sports events (Rhamey and Early, 2013), provide humanitarian aid, become involved in peacekeeping missions (Neumann and de Carvalho, 2014), innovate technologically (such as the development of nuclear power production or the acquisition of a nuclear weapon), make aid commitments (Renshon, 2016), engage in diplomatic missions or develop important diplomatic ties (Kinne, 2016). There are a wide variety of policy options available to states as a way to increase or maintain their status.

Status-seeking behavior can be competitive, especially when there is a gap between leaders’ perception of their state’s standing and what they perceive to be others’ opinions of their standing. When viewed in relational terms among peers, status seeking activities are inherently competitive. In fact, insecurity creates what Wohlforth (2014) calls a “status dilemma” in which policies to acquire more status may even lead to armed conflict. Social identity theory also highlights the competitive nature of status and policy options. Larson and Shevchenko (2014) argue that individuals compare their group’s qualities to those of a reference group that is similar or has slightly higher status. The authors apply this theory to states and find that lower status groups can pursue three different identify management strategies: social mobility; social competition; and social creativity. According to Larson and Shevchenko (2014: 38), social mobility occurs when the lower status groups try to imitate the higher status groups, social competition entails efforts to defeat the higher status group, and social creativity occurs when the lower status groups tries to find “new value dimensions in which it is superior.”

Of these three strategies, mediation in international conflict is arguably more a strategy of social creativity. A group may exercise social creativity by reevaluating a negative trait as positive or identifying a new criterion for evaluation on which the group ranks highly. For example, a lower-status group may exemplify a better skill or be more creative in certain domains. Alternatively, a state may attain a higher level of prestige through advancing positive social norms or cultures. Mediation is an example of social creativity, whereby a lower-status state can advance positive social norms in an attempt to attain prestige and enhance its standing within different groups of states within the international systems. Social network analysis provides a way to evaluate shifts in its position within different groups or networks of states. There are certainly other policy options that would fit within the strategy of social creativity, such as provision of foreign aid, or participation in peacekeeping missions.

Just as there are a number of different strategies by which states can acquire status, there are many possible measures of status acquisition and attribution that can reflect the positional and relationship nature of status. There is an important distinction between achieved and ascribed status in current studies of status attribution (Renshon, 2016). Achieved status refers to the material attributes discussed above, while ascribed status is used to capture the relational measures of status attribution, such as ranking based on diplomatic recognition. Older studies, such as that carried out by Singer and Small, focus on the ascribed measured of status and use the Correlates of War (COW) database to develop quantitative measures of status ordering by looking at membership in the international system and diplomacy data from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of World War II (Singer and Small, 1966). These earlier studies have focused on the status attribution of great powers and those states seeking to be great powers.¹²

More recent studies on status attribution have focused on the “achieved” and more relational nature of status attribution and can be applied to both great powers and small states. For example, Rhamey and Early (2013) look at status attribution as a result of states’ performance in, and hosting of, the Olympic Games. Volgy et al. are interested in how and why smaller states can also be impacted by the dynamics of status attribution and examine “the permeability of the status hierarchy” (Volgy et al., 2013: 3). These authors assess both club membership and ranking within a particular club in order to account for inequalities within the international system. Specifically, they develop a quantitative model of status attribution and identify key conditions under which status attribution is more or less likely. While this study is centered in ascribed status through the use of material variables to measure ranking, the authors emphasized the importance of recognition, which reflects the relational aspect of achieved status. Bezeera et al. (2015) examine resource transfers through bilateral aid provision and Olympic competition as two options out of many available to policy- makers in their pursuit of status. They find a statistically significant effect from both strategies.

Network analysis provides a tool by which to evaluate the relational nature of status. Renshon (2016), for example, uses network centrality in analyzing diplomatic exchanges between countries in measuring status focusing on a simple international hierarchy. Kinne (2016) shows how diplomatic recognition can provide a state with international prestige. He argues that diplomatic ties are determined in part by network influences as states decide which relationships to develop based on the ties of other states. Finally, Duque (2018) examines how diplomatic recognition becomes a foundation of the international status order. Using social network analysis, her study quantitatively examines both the relational and attribute-based arguments for status recognition.

We build upon this burgeoning field of quantitative analyses of status attribution and draw upon the use of network effects and diplomatic recognition (Duque, 2018; Kinne, 2016; Renshon, 2016) in combination with understanding of structural position and collective mobilization (Goddard and Nexon, 2016) in order to develop a method to evaluate how and why small states acquire status. While there are many different pathways through which states can acquire status, we focus on mediation activities and measure status by looking at a state’s placement and activity within different networks. In this paper, we treat status attribution as a function of ranking within networks of diplomatic and alliance relationships. A central position within these networks and a high ranking within its peer group would indicate that a state has been conferred status by being sought out by other states or by having more central (more powerful) states engaging with it.

Existing studies on status offer compelling insights for understanding state behavior, yet they tend to focus on developing a hierarchy of middle or great powers and say little about minor powers (Grant et al., 2010). Second, while the status seeking argument acknowledges the importance of position, many studies focus on a state’s attributes rather than a state’s structural position and overlook how the states’ interactions can impact a state’s position in a network. Our study focuses on the behavior of small states and their relationship to others within their peer group. It draws upon the notion that status is relative and is determined by a state’s positionality within particular networks. We assume that small states want and often try to increase their status relative to other states. However, it seems less likely that small states will be able to occupy a more prominent position within the international system at large. As a result, small states can increase their status within regional and peer networks, and status competition is more of a regional phenomenon. As a result, we look at a state’s position relative to others within both global and peer networks.¹³

Small states can increase their status in a number of ways. One way that small states pursue status is by becoming involved in international affairs through mediation efforts.¹⁴ Acting as a mediator for an international conflict enhances the small state’s status relative to its peers by demonstrating its relevance and importance in the regional and international system. This public act of mediation produces commonly held beliefs among the peer group that the mediator state is an influential player in the international system, thus conferring it more status.

We examine Qatar’s placement relative to other states within both global and their (competitive) peer networks to underscore the idea that status is ultimately a relational concept. In order to evaluate whether involvement in mediation efforts increased their status, we look at their changes in their structural position within two distinct networks: diplomatic representation; and alliances. More specifically, we determine whether these states occupied a more central position within global and regional networks, relative to their respective peer groups, after becoming more involved in the international system as conflict mediators.

We use this method to highlight the process through which Qatar has developed the ability to punch above its weight. Network analysis can provide a way to capture the relational aspect of status by looking at a state’s position within the structure of two different international networks: alliances; and diplomatic relationships. We look at changes in their status relative to other states within their peer groups and find that Qatar’s movement to more central positions within different networks signals an increase in their status relative to other states within their peer network. By looking at the changes in its centrality, we conclude that mediation efforts had an impact upon its status.

Social network analysis

Over the past decade, research in international relations has incorporated social network analysis as an analytical tool by which to understand state behavior. Network principles and methods have been used to understand the efficacy of international organizations, human rights, the strength of clandestine organizations, patterns of conflict and cooperation, proliferation, trade agreement, and many other issues.

Social network analysis refers to the study of the relationships among actors or nodes that give rise to a corresponding network. A central objective of network analysis is to measure and accurately represent structural relations, explain why they occur, and examine their consequences (Knoke, 1994; Knoke and Yang, 2007; Scott, 2012; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Wellman, 1998). The ties or relationships between actors within a network create a structure, a pattern of relationships that constrains or facilitates action (Kahler, 2009). Understanding these structural relationships is the central objective of network analysis. Within a neorealist framework of international relations, power is based on attributes and material capabilities, and structure is a function of the distribution of power or capabilities among states within the international system (Knoke, 1990; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). By focusing exclusively on attributes and material capabilities, structural realism overlooks important information regarding social power, vulnerability, and leverage. Social network analysis by contrast offers an alternative understanding of power and structure. A network approach, defines structures “as emergent properties of persistent patterns of relations among agents that can define, enable, and constrain those agents” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 561). Ties or relationships between actors can facilitate the transmision of both material and non-material products, such as information, beliefs, or norms (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 562).

Power within a social netork analysis is a function of a node’s relational ties and the location of an actor within a network (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006: 7). Power is not determined by actors’ relative capabilities based on material attributes, rather network analysis evaluates the relative position of nodes within structures of relationships.¹⁵ From a network perspective, power is the ability to influence the actions, beliefs, or relationships of other states. Social power, for example, is a function of a node’s prominence within a network (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 570). Prominence describes the properties of an actor’s location within a network and is a function of centrality, a measure of an actor’s position within a network. If an actor occupies a prominent position within a network, it possesses power because it has the ability to transfer and assess information and resources (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 570; Knoke, 1990). Centrality is also used as a measure of prestige within a social system (Maoz, 2011: 53). A prestigious actor is the recipient of many ties within a network. Identifying the structure of a network in terms of relationships, rather than material capabilities, can offer an alternative way of looking at power and the ability to exercise influence within the international system. For example, an actor with the most material capabilities may not be the strongest actor within the network.¹⁶ Centrality can be seen as “a direct source of power for states, individuals, and movements” (Montgomery, 2016: 19) and is thus relevant for understanding the status seeking behavior of small states who lack conventional military power.

States seek power for a variety of reasons. Maoz et al. (2007) argue that one reason is to attain status in world politics in order to gain respect, influence politics, and accomplish other goals. An actor’s position within a network can affect their status and thus their ability to influence international politics. As Montgomery explains, “network ties, in this approach, amount to an additional resource that—like military power and hard currency stocks—actors may accumulate to enhance their influence” (Montgomery, 2016: 21). Status allows states the ability to exercise influence in the international system. However, because small states do not possess the same material capabilities as great powers, they acquire status in a different manner – through improving their prominence within important networks.

Centrality can provide a different perspective on the concept of power and can generate different expectations regarding the capacity through which actors can exercise leverage or influence over the overall network. While there are multiple measures of centrality, there is disagreement over “what particular network positions provide actors with the greatest advantages or influence” (Montgomery, 2016: 22). The current study will examine status through two measures of centrality: degree; and eigenvector. Total degree centrality is the most straightforward measure. It is a measure of the total number of direct ties that a given node has to other nodes within the network. Central actors have strong connections to other network members while peripheral individuals do not. Central actors are “where the action is.” Total degree centrality focuses on the most visible actors within a network, who are in direct contact with many other actors. In the context of status-seeking smaller states, one can imagine total degree centrality as a measure of a state’s activity in seeking out and being sought out for engagement. A network node with high degree centrality may have “social power, easily accessing resources and information from other nodes because of its central position” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 570). Hafner-Burton and Montgomery argue that actors with high degree centrality can “withhold social benefits such as membership and recognition or enact social sanctions such as marginalization as a method of coercion” and would “expect additional support in a conflict” (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006: 11). In other words, centrally located actors within a network have the ability to exercise influence within the international system. The most central actors can control the flow of information or influence other actors within the network (Maoz, 2011: 54). Centrality and independence are interrelated; the most central nodes are less dependent on others. An actor with a high number of ties, for example, would be a critical node within the network.

Eigenvector centrality is a measure of a node’s connections to other central nodes. Each actor’s centrality is proportional to the sum of centralities of the nodes to which it is adjacent. This measure is often used to analyze prominence or popularity. Being connected with a central node can increase an actor’s prominence. As Bonacich and Lloyd note, “Having popular friends adds more to one’s popularity” (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2004: 331). Eigenvector centrality is often used as a way to gauge an actor’s status (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, 2004). In relationship to degree centrality, a node with a small degree score could have a higher eigenvector score than a node with a high degree score if the former’s friends are popular, while the latter’s friends are not.

Measures of centrality are a useful way to identify key actors, yet, it is important to recognize the limitations of these scores. Degree centrality, for example, reflects a node’s number of ties, but it overlooks overall network structure. Degenne and Forsé (1999: 133) note that “A local centre with links to peripheral nodes is less central than a local centre with links to other centrally located nodes.” Moreover, the overall number of ties is difficult to assess in relationship to other nodes. As an example, a person with links to four others in a group of 100 occupies a very different position than he would in a group of 12 (Degenne and Forse, 1999: 133). While eigenvector centrality can highlight an actor or a state’s prominence within infrastructure networks, it can overlook a node’s importance.

Looking at networks of alliances and diplomatic relationships, we hypothesize that Qatar should occupy a more central position after becoming involved in international mediation efforts. A state’s centrality and ranking vis-a-vis other states in its peer groups within alliance and diplomatic networks act as a proxy for status. Position within the network is dependent upon recognition by other states within the network of another state’s standing within the international system.

Similar to previous work on social network analysis in international relations, we use position within networks of alliances (Grant et al., 2010; Volgy et al., 2013) and diplomatic relationships (Duque, 2018) to evaluate status. These building blocks of international politics, networks of alliances and diplomatic relationships, are consistent with our relational view of status and they tell us something about what the system of states thinks about one particular state. Thus, they provide opportunities to assess status empirically.

Data and methodology

We examine two distinct networks, diplomatic ties and alliances, to evaluate whether increased mediation efforts corresponded to changes in a state’s position and ranking within the international system and within its peer group coincides. These networks can capture what are often referred to as soft power dynamics, yet this study departs from extant work on soft power by focusing on the structure of the relationship between actors, rather than unit characteristics and an actor’s ability to attract others. An actor’s centrality ranking with respect to states within its peer group will act as a proxy for that state’s status. Centrality within networks of diplomatic relationships and alliances signals a recognition of value by others. If another state develops alliance relationships or fosters diplomatic ties, then that state is seen as occupying a higher position within a network. It is this ranking that reflects status and allows states to influence the international system. As argued earlier, status and ranking within the international community is what confers membership into a club of states, nations who are seen as powerful and important. We evaluate several different measures to identify changes in an actor’s structural position. The remainder of this section discusses the process, rationale, and data used to analyze these networks:

Step 1: We configured diplomatic representation of any kind into a matrix to identify dyadic relationships. These data come from the Rhamey et al. (2013) data on diplomatic contacts. While this data set does not distinguish between different levels of representation, such as consular offices, high commissioner, etc., as is the case with other data sets (COW), the data set does code for the presence of a diplomatic representative in all nations by all nations. This data set was selected because it was the most updated version we could access. Because annual data were not available, and the data set only contained information for 2000, 2005, and 2010, we filled in the intervening years by recording the changes between each year and identifying the year of change. If the value from year to year. We aggregated did not change, the value stayed consistent for all intervening years.

Step 2: We explored the formalized relations that exist between states using alliance structure data from the COW Formal Alliance data set. We identified formal alliances between a dyadic pair of states and classified each pairing by type of alliance: defense pact; neutrality or non-aggression treaty; or entente agreement (Gibler, 2009). These data were complete through the years of examination. However, upon inspection of the data for the peer group specified, there appeared to be no change over the period under consideration, thus providing little insight into the evolving power structure of the selected region.

Step 3 We aggregated each network into two periods, 2000–2005 and 2006–2010 in order to observe shifts over time. This division corresponds to the observed shift in Qatari foreign policy that featured a greater involvement in mediation efforts. Network analysis software (*ORA) was then utilized to construct visualizations and extract network statistics. This analysis was conducted at the global network scale and the peer group level. The Qatari peer group, a key component of social identity theory, which undergirds the status argument, consisted of all Arab League nations, in addition to Israel, Turkey, and Iran. Palestine/West Bank and Gaza were not included due to data inconsistencies.¹⁷

Qatar

In recent years, Qatar has undergone a substantial transformation from a low-profile emirate, rich in natural gas, to an influential actor within the Arab world and the international community more broadly. It is one of the smallest Arab states, with an area under 12,000 square kilometers and fewer than 250,000 citizens. Despite its size and small population, it is ranked as one of the world’s richest nations with a per capita GDP of over 100,000 USD and the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas with the world’s third largest gas reserves (Khatib, 2013: 417). However, Qatar does not possess significant military capabilities, a critical resource for a state’s recognition as a key player within the international system. Despite its relative military weakness, Qatar has emerged as “one of the world’s most proactive mediators” (Kamrava, 2011) in recent years and has consequently become a key factor in the Arab world and the broader international community (Barakat, 2012; Khatib, 2013: 417).

Qatar has pursued programs designed to increase its visibility and international branding. It has hosted international summits, such as the 2001 World Trade Organization negotiations and the 2006 summit on “Sustained Peace in the Middle East.” In addition, Qatar has been actively involved in global sporting events, such as hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, purchasing the Paris St. Germain French league club in 2008, valued at 130 million USD,¹⁸ and giving F.C. Barcelona nearly 30 million Euros per season from the Qatar Foundation, joining the United Nations Children’s Fund as the team’s shirt sponsor.¹⁹ Sheikha Moza, the second wife of the former Qatari Emir and the head of the Qatar Foundation, the primary distribution arm for Qatari wealth, is a symbol of this type of public diplomacy, primarily through her global education efforts (Ulrichsen, 2011: 169).²⁰

Qatar has launched several initiatives to “portray itself as a cultural and intellectual hub through hosting world renowned academic and cultural centres” (Barakat, 2012: 7). Many prominent universities, research centers, and think tanks have set up campuses in Doha. Qatar has increased its visibility and impact on Arab domestic politics though Prince Hamad bin Khalifa’s founding of Al Jazeera in 1996 that launched a media revolution in the Arab world. Since its founding, Al Jazeera’s audience has increased tenfold and it has become one of the most important news sources in the Arab world. Despite claims that Qatar’s funding of the station does not influence its agenda, many believe that Doha is able to shape debates about regional and domestic politics in the Arab public sphere.²¹

Qatar has a diverse set of foreign relations. Doha has had good relations with a range of actors including Israel, Iran, and Hamas. Moreover, these diverse foreign relations are symbolized by the presence of two of the most powerful entities in the Middle East, Al Jazeera and US Central Operations Command (CENTCOM) (Rubin, 2010: 15). Doha’s most notable international activities have been in the field of diplomacy, primarily through its efforts as a third-party mediator. These activities have increased since 2005 and have become a mainstay of its diplomacy. To support these efforts, Doha has hosted conferences and, in some cases, negotiated agreements in Sudan, Palestine, and Lebanon. One of the most noteworthy achievements during the 2000s was Qatar’s role in negotiating a political agreement in Lebanon in 2008. These activities won the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, widespread praise.²² Qatar has also been involved in mediating conflicts between factions in Yemen, Palestine (Hamas and Fatah), Taliban and the US, as well as Djibouti and Eritrea. Khatib notes, “Qatar has been involved in so many conflicts in the region – mainly as a mediator and provider of humanitarian aid – that it has almost become expected that, whatever the conflict facing the region, the tiny emirate will find a role for itself within it” (Khatib 2013: 417).

The following examples show how Qatar has tried to influence international politics through its involvement in mediation. Qatar attempted to broker peace settlements between warring parties in Yemen. In May 2007, Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani visited Yemen and sent the Qatari Foreign Minister to meet with Houthi leaders in northern Yemen in an effort to broker the end of the conflict. A ceasefire between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels was announced in June, and a peace agreement was signed in February 2008 which included Qatar’s pledge of aid for reconstructing the Saada province. Fighting resumed the next year, and the mediation was declared a failure by Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh.²³

In Lebanon, Qatar led a group of regional states to bring warring Lebanese parties to crisis talks in Doha. The Doha Agreement signed on May 18, 2008, ended the eighteen-month long conflict and may have prevented a civil war in Lebanon.²⁴ While there was criticism of the Qatari position and a lack of cultural and contextual understanding, many analysts argue that it was a successful mediation. Similar to its efforts in Yemen, Qatar’s promise of monetary compensation provided Doha with some leverage over the parties to reach an agreement (Barakat, 2012). Qatar was also influential in mediating in the Darfur crisis, which erupted in March 2003 and led to the deaths of over 200,000 people. Mediation in Sudan was different from other negotiations in that the African Union and United Nations were also involved in the process (Barakat, 2012). Furthermore, the Qataris saw Sudan as an important investment opportunity (Gulbrandsen, 2010). Qatar had invested in a hotel and residences, and even opened its first bank outside the country. While monetary incentives may have played a part in the Qatari decision to become involved in negotiating peace talks, hosting talks alongside influential global actors has been an important means by which Qatar has bolstered its “brand” or legitimacy. In fact, Barakat (2012) argues that Doha was seen as a neutral venue for the negotiations. While Qatar has been successful in its efforts at mediation, many of the conflicts have not been resolved. Notwithstanding the success of these peace talks, Qatar continues to mediate in an attempt to increase its status within the international system.

Qatar’s involvement in international activities increased in the mid-2000s. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the intricacies of royal politics, there is a striking change in the conduct in Qatari foreign policy that requires explanation. The passage of Qatar’s new constitution of 2003 reflects these changes in foreign policy and highlights Doha’s commitment to international conflict negotiation. As explained by Ulrichsen (2012):

Qatar simultaneously has carved out a niche in diplomatic mediation initiatives. The new constitution unveiled in 2003 included reference to the “peaceful resolution of international disputes” as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Since then, Qatar has mediated in conflicts in Yemen, Darfur and, most successfully, in Lebanon. There, the 2008 Doha Accord ended eighteen months of political paralysis that came close to re-igniting civil conflict on several occasions. Qatar’s role as ‘a non-stop mediator’ has earned it widespread international recognition and a reputation as a (relatively) honest broker, although its critics allege there is little follow-through to ensure sustainable implementation of initial agreements.²⁵

This paper is an attempt to explain, on a structural level, why Qatar made this change and to show the impact this change had upon its status within the international system.

We argue that Qatar’s ability to influence regional politics and exercise leverage in the international system is not a function of material resources or soft power. Instead, it is due to Qatar’s status-seeking behavior and position within particular networks. Qatar’s position within networks of international alliances and diplomatic ties provides a way to gauge changes in its status as it became more involved in international politics through mediation efforts.

A social network analysis of Qatar’s centrality

This section explores changes in the position of key nodes within alliance and diplomatic networks from 2000–2005 and from 2006–2010. We examined changes in Qatar’s scores of total degree and eigenvector centrality scores in global and peer networks. In order to capture the relationship element of status, we focused on changes in Qatar’s ranking with respect to other states in its peer group rather than raw scores. Moreover, it is difficult to interpret raw measures of centrality without putting them in context and ranking within global peer networks is one way to understand the relationship aspect of status. We hypothesized that Qatar’s measure of centrality should increase over time, coinciding with its rise as an influential international mediator. This rise in in-degree centrality would reflect a greater effort by the state to be increasingly active. We would also anticipate an increase in eigenvector centrality as a state seeks greater access to prominent states in the network.²⁶ A higher centrality score indicates a rise in a state’s ranking within its peer group. Finally, a higher centrality score would indicate a state’s ability to serve as a broker or gatekeeper between states within the networking. An increase in ranking relative to others within a state’s peer group would thus indicate a rise in status. Overall, the data show a rise in Qatar’s centrality after it began mediation efforts, but in different capacities within each network. This rise in centrality can be seen as an indicator of its rise in status.

Centrality scores and status

First, we examined total degree centrality to include in-degree and out-degree where directionality of relationships is important, in addition to eigenvector centrality, because each measure of centrality provides a different lens through which to understand Qatar’s status within the network of diplomatic relationships. Each measure of centrality relates to status in a different way. Degree centrality measures the total number of ties for each node within a network. This is an important measure of status because it indicates how active a node is within the network. Maoz (2011) has argued that when states foster alliances with a focal state it can enhance their reputation as willing to honor treaty obligations. An actor with a higher centrality score is more visible. Having more diplomatic ties can increase a state’s reputation as being a legitimate and active participant in international affairs. Overall, a more central actor in a network of diplomatic relationships should create the opportunity to increase its status through visibility and sheer quantity of connections.

Second, a state with a high measure of eigenvector centrality through its relationships with powerful or other central actors within the network can acquire status through its ability to exercise leverage within the network. A militarily weak state could try to increase its status through establishing diplomatic relationships with powerful states. For example, a state such as Germany, which has neither a strong military nor nuclear weapons, can engage in diplomacy with many different countries. This ability to work with many strong states increases its status within the international community.

In the remainder of this section, we will assess Qatar’s centrality scores within networks of alliances and diplomatic representation. In Tables 1 through 6 we look at Qatar’s ranking relative to all other states within its group in both global and peer networks. We also compare Qatar’s centrality scores to two other actors within its peer network—Oman and Egypt. Similar to Qatar, Oman is a smaller power in the region, while Egypt is a larger, more powerful actor, both regionally and globally. Oman is thought to fill an important diplomatic role as the go-between for many opposing camps in the Middle East. Egypt, meanwhile, has historically been a central player in Middle East politics even if its role has declined in the Middle East in the last decade and a half. With this in mind, the network statistics of each state were compared in order to distill how centrality has shifted over time and to highlight the importance of ranking within a network to evaluate status.

Table 1.

Qatar: alliances—peer network.

Alliances: degree centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.570	0.551	1	1
Egypt	0.343	0.029	17	20
Oman	0.343	0.333	17	17
Peer average	0.413	0.388	−	−
Alliances: eigenvector centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.359	0.364	1	1
Egypt	0.219	0.019	18	20
Oman	0.229	0.223	17	17
Peer average	0.260	0.255	−	−

Table 2.

Qatar: alliances—global network.

Alliances: degree centrality—global network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.051	0.039	9	12
Egypt	0.031	0.002	69	126
Oman	0.031	0.024	69	69
Peer average	0.039	0.029	−	−

Table 3.

Qatar: diplomatic representation—peer network.

Diplomatic representation: in-degree centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.710	0.843	8	3
Egypt	0.841	0.870	2	2
Oman	0.710	0.730	8	9
Peer average	0.566	0.610	–	–
Diplomatic representation: out-degree centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.638	0.748	10	8
Egypt	0.855	0.887	1	1
Oman	0.638	0.609	10	16
Peer average	0.566	0.610	–	–
Diplomatic representation: eigenvector centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.335	0.334	7	6
Egypt	0.348	0.335	3	5
Oman	0.327	0.313	11	12
Peer average	0.275	0.276	–	–

Table 4.

Qatar: diplomatic representation—global network.

Diplomatic representation: in-degree centrality—global network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.182	0.286	74	54
Egypt	0.578	0.626	10	12
Oman	0.182	0.192	74	78
Peer average	0.244	0.273	–	–
Diplomatic representation: out-degree centrality—global network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.161	0.243	80	63
Egypt	0.615	0.615	7	8
Oman	0.153	0.170	84	92
Peer average	0.234	0.271	–	–
Diplomatic representation: eigenvector centrality—global network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 00–05	Peer rank, 06–10
Qatar	0.082	0.105	85	65
Egypt	0.199	0.194	10	10
Oman	0.077	0.080	87	92
Peer average	0.109	0.111	–	–

Table 5.

Qatar: composite—peer network.

Composite: degree centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 0–5	Peer rank, 6–10
Qatar	0.597	0.612	6	2
Egypt	0.514	0.241	15	20
Oman	0.429	0.417	18	17
Peer average	0.455	0.443	–	–
Composite: eigenvector centrality—peer network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 0–5	Peer rank, 6–10
Qatar	0.354	0.361	4	3
Egypt	0.292	0.136	16	20
Oman	0.256	0.259	18	17
Peer average	0.269	0.267	–	–

Table 6.

Qatar: composite—global networks.

Composite: total degree centrality—global network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 0–5	Peer rank, 6–10
Qatar	0.074	0.077	16	12
Egypt	0.147	0.105	1	1
Oman	0.058	0.050	21	21
Peer average	0.079	0.070	–	–
Composite: eigenvector centrality—global network
Country	2000–2005	2006–2010	Peer rank, 0–5	Peer rank, 6–10
Qatar	0.130	0.143	17	12
Egypt	0.196	0.154	1	8
Oman	0.102	0.101	21	21
Peer average	0.134	0.132	–	–

Alliances

The data on alliances do not reveal significant changes in Qatar’s structural position within the network and are thus not a clear indicator of an increase in status (see Tables 1 and 2). While Qatar’s degree centrality within its peer alliance network declined minimally after 2005, Qatar has a higher degree centrality score than others within its peer group. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain had the same score and increased after 2005. While Qatar’s eigenvector score increased during this period, its ranking as the most central state within its peer group (which includes UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain) remained the same. Overall, the data on alliances does not reveal an increase in status as measured through centrality during this time period. There were no significant findings when examining Qatar’s position within the global network of alliances and scores were unavailable for eigenvector scores in the 2000–2005 time period for alliances.

Qatar’s centrality scores changed very little over the ten-year period, and its position within the network of alliances tells us little about its change in status and role as a major international and regional actor. However, this non-finding supports our critique of material-based explanations for state behavior. Alliances tend to be a function of military strength, an attribute that cannot explain Qatari behavior. Moreover, alliance networks do not capture important relationships between Qatar and the international community. For example, there is no alliance between the US and Qatar even though CENTCOM is based in Qatar, or between Iran and Qatar even though their relations have been warm in the past.

Diplomatic relationships

The data for these networks are based on a variable composed of dyads of diplomatic representation between every country (see Tables 3 and 4). We expected that the most significant and relevant results would emerge from Qatar’s position within diplomatic networks. The results indicate that Qatar’s position within the structure of the diplomatic network changed considerably between 2000–2005 and 2006–2010. Qatar’s degree centrality scores, both in-degree and out-degree, increased after 2005. Within its peer network, its in-degree centrality, which measures the amount of representation by other countries within Qatar or could be described as the status attribution in that other countries seek out engagement with Qatar, increased with a shift in its ranking from 8 to 3. Qatar’s out-degree centrality also increased but to a lesser degree and its ranking only improved slightly. Out-degree centrality is the extent to which Qatar is engaging other states with diplomatic missions. Thus, within the peer network, while both in-degree and out-degree centrality increased, the larger gains were seen in Qatari status seeking through its deployment of diplomatic missions.

Within the global network, Qatar’s in-degree and out-degree centrality scores also increased overall and relative to others within its peer group. Similar to the peer group, a larger gain in centrality was observed in the Qatari engagement abroad within the global network. These findings suggest an increasingly engaged Qatari state in the diplomatic sector. However, this level of status resulting from occupation in a central position within these networks is limited largely to the peer group. Its centrality core and position relative to others is larger within its peer group and within the network of peer relationships. After 2005, Qatar occupied a more central position within the network of diplomatic engagement, indicating an increase in status within its peer group.

In line with our expectations, Qatar’s eigenvector scores increased in the global context, indicating status seeking behavior with powerful states outside of its peer group. While there was a minor decline within the peer group, its ranking within the peer group actually increased. This would indicate that while others experienced a decline in engagement with other states, Qatar remained consistent within the peer group. Eigenvector centrality highlights a state’s prominence by evaluating the prominence of actors to whom it is connected. As a result, very prominent actors may actually have lower eigenvector scores while less prominent actors may have higher scores due to their connections with states at the top of hierarchy.

Combined alliance and diplomatic networks

Finally, we created a composite score that looks at the interaction between alliance and diplomatic networks (see Tables 5 and 6). Evaluating Qatar’s position at the intersection of different networks is not only a more inclusive measure of status, but also provides understanding on how a state can interact within networks of both alliances; diplomatic representation offers a richer understanding of involvement. Within its peer network, Qatar experienced an increase in most measures of centrality and ranked above most of its peer states after 2005. Qatar’s in-degree and out-degree centrality, degree centrality, and eigenvector centrality scores all rose, albeit slightly. However, its raw centrality scores were much higher than most others within its peer group. Within the peer network, Qatar’s ranking increased such that it was in the top three states in all measures. Within the global network, Qatar’s scores increased an all measures. While the rise in Qatar’s raw scores was quite small, it experienced positive and significant rank changes relative to others in its peer group. Centrality at the intersection of multiple networks indicates a level of status that could allow Qatar further involvement and influence within the international system.

Conclusion

In this paper, we addressed the following questions: How do small states acquire status? How can we assess change in status over time? We argued that small states can acquire status by increasing their involvement in international politics and one way they can do this is through mediation efforts. Social network analysis reveals that as a state increases its international engagement through mediation activities, it occupies a more central position in alliance and diplomatic networks, indicating an increase in status.

Examining Qatar’s international activities over the last two decades provides a way to examine the status seeking behavior of small states. Qatar’s mediation activities in sensitive political and military conflicts illustrates how a small state can play an important role in international politics. Looking at a state’s ranking in networks of alliances and diplomatic relationships offers a way to evaluate shifts in status. A higher rank ordering in their peer group would indicate that a state has experienced a rise in status. A more central position within alliance and diplomatic networks is dependent upon recognition by other states, underscoring the relational and hierarchical nature of status.

These analyses reveal that as a state increases its international engagement through mediation activities, its centrality and ranking within its peer group in important peer networks increases, indicating a rise in status. This increase in status translates to greater influence in international politics. Whereas great powers increase their status through hard power, small states can acquire status through international involvement in activities such as conflict mediation.

This paper offers an exploratory study into identifying a new measure of status and understanding the status seeking behavior of small states. However, there are a few limitations. First, while the data indicate a relationship between mediation efforts and an increase in status for small states, we do not establish a direct correlation between mediation efforts and changes in status. There are factors other than mediation that could result in an increase in network centrality, possibly including achieved indicators of status, such as material capabilities. This paper was intended to explore the possibility that mediation is one way that small states that do not possess the same material capabilities as great powers can increase their status and standing relative to other states, both globally and in their peer group. Second, the network analysis conducted for this study is static, and as a result we are able to only look at the structure of networks at particular points in time rather than capturing continuous change over time. Despite these shortcomings, the increase in specific measures of network centrality corresponds to the time period in which Qatar became involved in international mediation efforts. Furthermore, the paper develops an alternative measure of status in using network analysis that could be tested more broadly in future studies.

This paper is an important step toward understanding how small states can “punch above their weight” and have an impact on international politics. Small states can engage in activities such as conflict mediation, increasing their status both globally and regionally. These activities and the acquisition of status allow states to have a greater impact on international politics than one would expect from small states. This paper is also a plausibility probe for advancing the use of centrality scores and rank ordering to enhance our understanding of how states acquire status. Examining changes in a state’s centrality scores and ranking order within peer groups provides a way to observe changes in status and whether those changes correspond with a rise in mediation activities.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

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