A political–institutional explanation of environmental performance in Latin America

Abstract

This research utilizes the 2010 Environmental Performance Index to examine how electoral rules affect environmental performance in 20 Latin American democracies. Using supporting time-series analysis with dependent variables for habitat protection, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide emissions from 2000 to 2008, our study finds that proportionality and party systems influence environmental performance in the region. Results show that representation impacts ecosystem vitality more so than public health. We account for this gap by arguing that levels of political representation influence the allocation of public and private goods which, in turn, help determine environmental outcomes. Our findings do not always paint a consistent picture, which may be attributed to the difficulties of operationalizing complex concepts such as environmental performance within and across countries and examining how these relationships change over time. Additional research is warranted to tease out these relationships.

Keywords

Latin America environmental health electoral rules public policy political institutions

Introduction

Little is known about the impact of political institutions on environmental policy in Latin American democracies. It has been decades since Latin America transitioned towards democracy, and due to those developments, political institutions in Latin America have become more adept at representing a superfluity of interests, including some that have traditionally been outside the purview of government. Environmental policy, which has been supported by mass publics in industrialized countries, has indisputably entered the sphere of governmental decision-making in Latin America. Generally, not much is known about environmental policy-making in the developing world. This research utilizes a unique set of environmental measures to examine how political institutions shape policy.

Prior research has established strong relationships between political institutions and environmental policy. It was in the 1990s that political scientists began studying how democracy impacts environmental performance. Congleton (1992) was among the first to find that democratic rule enhances environmental performance. One rationale as to why democracies achieve higher environmental performance is that demands for higher environmental standards are better expressed in systems that allow for the free flow of information (Barrett and Gaddy, 2000; Midlarsky, 1998). A second rationale argues that they are better able to provide public goods (Congleton, 1992; Deacon, 1999). Poloni-Staudinger (2008) suggests that consensus democracies appear to promote better environmental performance when it comes to recycling, clean water, use of unleaded fuel, and maintenance of recreational areas. On the other hand, majoritarian democracies do better when it comes to conservation efforts such as setting land aside for preservation.¹ Poloni-Staudinger rightfully concludes that even though the results indicate that electoral rules matter, they are dependent on how environmental performance is measured. Ozymy and Rey (2013), by separating the analysis of environmental performance into dimensions of ecosystem diversity and environmental public health, were able to ascertain that the relationship between electoral rules and environmental performance is more complex than previously thought; specifically, the effect of institutions on performance diminishes as issues become more politically contentious, moving from biodiversity to air pollution, and then climate change.

Environmental protection in Latin America conflates political, economic, and social concerns. Unlike the industrialized countries of the global north, countries within the region are focused more on economic development than habitat protection and public health. The Environmental Kuznets Curve literature suggests pollution levels rise with industrialization and then begin to taper off when income levels reach a certain point, thus taking on an inverted U-shaped curve. Latin America has yet to achieve the levels of prosperity required for environmental protection to become a primary concern, yet gains have been made. The region, unlike other areas of the global south, has achieved impressive levels of political development that go unaccompanied by economic prosperity. Every country in Latin America struggles with millions living in extreme poverty. In 2005, 150 million Latin Americans earned less than purchasing power parity (PPP) US$2.50 a day, and just under half of these citizens earned less than PPP US$1.25 (Kingstone, 2011). When it comes to inequality, the region goes unsurpassed. The Gini coefficient for the region in 2004 averaged 53.2. By comparison, the same measure for OECD countries that year averaged 32.2 (Kingstone, 2011). The poor in Latin America constitute a very large portion of the population as wealth remains concentrated in the hands of the few. Pervasive corruption has been addressed in previous studies, but, arguably, little remains known about how corruption impacts environmental performance. Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2010) find that the influence that party discipline has on environmental policy is tempered by the level of corruption found within a country. Their research suggests that persistent corruption mitigates the effects that party discipline has on environmental performance. Facetti (2009: 316) argues that the environmental policy arena provides “an excellent case study of the nature and impact of corruption and the ways in which it both undermines democratic practices and the rule of law and contributes to a public loss of confidence in the political system.”

This study seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of environmental performance in Latin America by examining whether political institutions impact environmental policy through electoral rules that favor proportionality and party-centeredness. Prior research links greater proportionality with multi-party systems, coalition building, stronger presidents that rely less on unitary powers and more on cooperation, and the overall promotion of public goods. It has also been shown that the personal vote appears to undermine these influences. We argue that political development within the region better explains environmental protection by agreeing with Hicken and Simmons (2008: 110), who theorize that institutional design, rather than the level of spending, may affect how a given pool of resources is allocated. We find that most of the gains made through environmental protection in Latin America are in the area of habitat protection, which has less of an economic impact than public health. In the area of public health, where the political costs may be greater, fewer gains have been made.

Political institutions

Juan Linz (1994) best describes the difficult nature of executive–legislative relations in Latin America. He argues that the political systems in Latin American countries—modeled after the US system—create a problem of dual legitimacy between legislators and the president. In Latin America, presidentialism is coupled with multi-party systems, and what results more often than not is popularly elected presidents who, unlike prime ministers in a fused parliamentary system, lack a majority in parliament. Linz (1994) surmises that the political context of Latin American democracies is one where the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches makes it inherently difficult for deadlocked governments to circumvent an impasse. Unlike parliamentary systems where the vote of no confidence and a call for new elections allows new governments to form, in Latin America minority presidents are kept in power by the rigidity of electoral rules (Linz, 1994). Mainwaring (1993) also argues that political polarization is greater in multi-party presidential systems than in two-party presidential systems. He asserts that presidents are less likely to have majorities in parliaments, but are also less likely to form coalitions (Mainwaring, 1993).

Shugart and Carey (1992) put forth that the problems regarding governability identified by Linz and others may be more pronounced in some presidential systems than others. They argue that electoral rules matter. For instance, presidential systems that provide a lesser amount of legislative powers to the executive can become very stable when they ensure fair representation of all parties and generate inducements towards the establishment of pre-electoral coalitions (Shugart and Carey, 1992). In addition, Shugart and Carey maintain that a well-conceived presidential system provides a strong arbitrator capable of facilitating consensus and compromise.

Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) advance this line of reasoning by suggesting that differences within presidentialism could be more significant than differences between presidential and parliamentary systems. They assert that important considerations—including the nature of the party system and party discipline—can impact the success of presidential systems (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). Mainwaring and Shugart find that presidents with weaker power over legislation potentially function better because they are encouraged to negotiate and compromise with legislators. Moreover, even though desirable, majority support of the president’s own party in the legislature is not necessary (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). What is important, they suggest, is the extent to which presidents can rely on their parties to form consensus and build coalitions, two undertakings that demand strong party discipline. Jones (1995) argues that electoral rules have a strong impact on the nature of legislative majorities. He suggests that presidential systems with plurality elections and concurrent legislative elections discourage fragmentation of parties in the legislature (Jones, 1995).

Legislative and presidential power within Latin American democracies tends to shift back and forth. Cox and Morgenstern (2002) argue that presidents and legislators tend to adjust to one another’s strategies. Instead of a zero-sum game, what results is a constant re-adjustment of policies and a substantial amount of legislative influence. They maintain that weaker presidents tend to rely more on unitary powers than stronger presidents. For instance, weaker presidents may turn to decrees, vetoes, and regulatory changes to advance their agendas, while stronger presidents will engage the legislature. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) agree that presidents with large legislative support have a greater propensity towards negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. In a study not directly focused on Latin America, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) find that legislators pursue policies when the benefits outweigh the costs. Otherwise, legislators will opt to defer power to the president. Samuels (2003), in a study of the Brazilian legislature, finds that legislators are sometimes better able to promote their interests through the reduction of formal legislative powers.

Unlike parliamentary systems where forming governments provides a strong incentive for multiple parties to join alliances, few inducements exist in presidential systems for the formation of coalitions. Understandably, some scholars argue that presidential systems are naturally structured towards the discouragement of cooperation (Mainwaring, 1993). Because multi-party cabinets are common in Latin America (Cheibub et al., 2004), however, presidents have been able to form coalitions and build support for their legislative agendas. Amorim Neto (2006) finds that presidents, through cabinet appointments, can instill loyalty and build support, thus making them better able to rely on the legislative process than unitary powers. Morgenstern (1994) argues that multi-party cabinet membership also fosters legislative harmony that creates an atmosphere conducive to the passage of legislation. Of course, this entails the cabinet members being given some access to resources in exchange for their loyalty.

Proportional representation

Almost all studies that focus on political institutions and environmental policies target OECD countries. We look at Latin America because, unlike in most developed countries, where green parties and environmental advocates help set the environmental agenda, these structures have been practically ineffectual, yet environmental interests have made relative gains. We believe that one key reason for the gains in environmental protection is that the region has gravitated, over time, towards proportional representation (PR). Wills-Otero (2009: 33) has argued that the shift is due to an “influx of voters to the electorate, the advent of new political parties that capture a substantial number of votes from the dominant party, and a shift in the preferences of the electorate away from the major party.” This has created some very interesting dynamics. As Rogowski and Kayser (2002) suggest, PR systems are influenced less by interest groups. Therefore, even though the proliferation of political parties in Latin America has failed to produce viable green parties, this failure is mitigated by the regional shift towards PR.

Past research helps explain why PR systems serve as a counterweight to special interests. It has been found that PR systems tend to produce parties that exhibit greater degrees of coherence, ideological foundations, and discipline, and that are better able to deal with changes in voter sentiments than plurality or majority-based systems (Duverger, 1959; Katz, 1980; Rae, 1971). PR systems are also conducive to multi-party systems and higher voter turnout (Rae, 1971). Proportionality, which is closely related to representativeness, is believed to increase when electoral rules prescribe PR elections (Shugart & Carey, 1992). Lijphart (1984, 1994, 1999) puts forth that single-member district plurality or majority systems are typical of majoritarian democracies while PR systems are typically used by consensus democracies. The plurality and majority single-member district methods are winner-takes-all methods—the candidate supported by the largest number of voters wins, and all other voters remain unrepresented—and hence a perfect reflection of majoritarian philosophy. Moreover, the party gaining a nationwide majority or plurality of the votes will tend to be overrepresented in terms of parliamentary seats. In sharp contrast, the basic aim of PR is to represent both majorities and minorities and, instead of overrepresenting or underrepresenting any parties, to translate votes into seats proportionally.

Thus far, the arguments delineated for the effects of proportionality on special interests have posited that special interests indirectly impact government policy through the electoral process, sometimes referred to as “congruence” (Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000). However, recent research has also focused on “covariational congruence,” or how special interests influence policy directly in between elections (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Dalton et al., 2012; Golder and Stramski, 2010). This argument stipulates that majoritarian systems are more likely to respond to special interest influence during the electoral cycle (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, 2015; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012). Muller and Strom (2010) argue that a single party can respond more easily to special interests than a multi-party coalition because of the transaction costs being more costly and difficult, thus further diminishing the role of interest groups and lobbies within systems of PR. Essentially, coalitions generate friction within policy-making (Jones et al., 2009). Moreover, majoritarian systems are more incentivized to react to special interests because of the consequences they pose in the voting booth, thus making them more captured by such interests. In short, the literature substantiates that there are strong electoral and organizational reasons for governments in proportional systems to be less responsive than majoritarian governments to special interests both during and in between elections.

Party systems

Party-centered systems exist when: “(a) electoral rules give party leaders authority over who has access to the ballot, (b) votes are cast for a party list, and (c) votes are pooled at the party level” (Nielson, 2003: 472). When party leaders exercise power over rank-and-file legislators, such as allocating seats, they create the ability to pass reforms that benefit the entire party (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Myerson, 1993), and provisions of public goods are allocated nationally and uniformly. Candidate-centered systems, on the other hand, tend to “encourage politicians to develop their own clienteles and constituencies—their core support bases—that will finance their campaign and muster the votes required to win office” (Nielson, 2003: 473). Research suggests that the personal vote relates closely with pork-barrel politics, particularism, greater corruption by public officials, and a lesser amount of concern with the allocation of national public goods (Ames, 1995; Cox and Thies, 1998; Golden, 2003; Golden and Chang, 2001; Samuels, 1999).

It has been well established that elected officials who are accountable to broader constituencies are more motivated to allocate broader public goods. Conversely, those that have narrower constituencies tend to dole out private goods targeted to smaller groups (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Franzese et al., 2004; Lake and Baum, 2001; Olson, 2000; Stasavage, 2005). We argue that the personal vote and particularism results in governmental provisions of good environmental outcomes for subsets of a country’s population by adhering to business interests in localized areas. Stated differently, a patchwork of environmental outcomes is more likely to materialize when countries are composed of districts where candidates seek personal votes because the electorate’s preferences are disaggregated; in some districts brown interests may prevail while green interests prevail in others. Hicken and Simmons (2008) argue that party-centered systems allocate more public goods than candidate-centered systems because the latter are more prone to corruption, a position that is well-supported by the literature (Chang, 2005; Chang and Golden, 2007; Cox & Thies, 1998; Hicken, 2006). They suggest, and we agree, that the personal vote culminates with the “systematic undersupply” of public goods (Hicken and Simmons, 2008: 113).

A public goods analysis

Environmental outcomes are analogous to public goods in that they share jointness of supply and non-excludability. Previous research finds that democracies utilizing single-member districts tend to favor the distribution of private goods over public goods. Focusing on fiscal policy, several studies have found that majoritarian democracies spend more on government consumption and less on transfers, thus providing opportunities for elected officials to make decisions regarding private sector purchases of goods and services (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000). First-past-the-post electoral systems allow politicians greater opportunities to dole out private goods. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1992) argue that majoritarian democracies are more likely to impose economic sanctions to satisfy the narrow interests of those groups who benefit from such legislation. The shortcoming of this arrangement is that politicians with greater autonomy from the party tend to repay supporters with private goods (Ames, 2001; Cain et al., 1987; Weingast et al., 1981). But when the success of individual politicians is directly tied to the success of the party, more collective goods are provided (Cox and McCubbins, 1993).

Therefore, electoral rules that determine whether a system is party-centered or candidate-centered will impact the amount of public or private goods that are doled out by political leaders. Grossman and Helpman (2005) argue that this occurs, in part, because party discipline is associated with the sternness that party leaders at the national level use to compel individual legislators to promote legislative preferences. This in essence demands that legislators not pursue narrower, localized, private interests over broader public goods. Scruggs (1999) rightly argues that political institutions may matter more than economic institutions when it comes to environmental policy. He argues that “the institutions of day-to-day government may also explain why some countries produce more consensual decisions and provide higher levels of public goods” (Scruggs, 1999: 9).

Data

The dependent variables in the analysis are drawn from the 2010 Environmental Performance Index (EPI).² The largest hurdle to analyzing connections between political systems and environmental outcomes has been gathering both reliable data across countries on environmental policies and defining the proper comparative boundaries for outcomes. The 2010 EPI represents an important leap in this direction. The EPI measures environmental performance across 163 countries using a proximity-to-target methodology, ranking countries against a series of international targets for environmental public health and ecosystem vitality. The EPI consists of 25 indicators of environmental performance within 10 policy categories, weighted between two general dimensions of environmental public health and ecosystem vitality. We use the full EPI and both of the two general dimensions of public health and ecosystem diversity in the analysis. The measures are listed in Table 1 and values for all variables by country are found in the appendix as Table 4. This approach recognizes that countries face a range of environmental pressures. The targets for each of these performance variables are derived from four sources: international treaties or goals (i.e. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the Panel on Climate Change), standards set by international organizations, leading national regulatory requirements, and when unavailable, expert judgment based on prevailing scientific consensus.³

Table 1.

Measuring environmental performance.

Environmental health indicators	Measurement
Environmental burden of disease	Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)
Air pollution—effects on humans	(Outdoor) urban particulate concentrations (PM-2.5 to PM-10)
	(Indoor) % of inhabitants burning solid fuels indoors
Water quality—effect on humans	% of country with access to improved source of sanitation and drinking water
Ecosystem vitality indicators	Measurement
Climate change	Greenhouse gas emissions per capita (in metric tons)
	Emissions intensity per unit of energy; industrial greenhouse emissions intensity
Agriculture	Agricultural water intensity; agricultural subsidies; pesticide regulation
Fisheries	Marine trophic index; trawling intensity
Forestry	Forest cover; growing stock change (2005 to 2000)
Biodiversity and habitat	Biome protection; critical habitat protection; % marine area protected
Air quality (ecosystem)	NOX emissions; CO₂ emissions; non-methane VOCs; ecosystem ozone
Water quality (ecosystem)	Water quality index; water stress index; water scarcity index

CO₂: carbon dioxide; PM: particulate matter; NOX: nitrogen oxides; VOCs: volatile organic compounds

Source: EPI (2010).

Independent variables

The three primary independent variables of interest are the levels of PR, party discipline, district magnitude, and corruption. The measures for PR and district magnitude are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). The PR variable measures proportionality on a scale from whether a country is pure PR (with no majoritarianism) = 2, elements of PR and majoritarianism = 1, and no PR (only majoritarian characteristics) = 0. Two primary reasons motivated us to index proportionality. First, we sought to create a scale that measured the PR characteristics of each country. This simple index has meaning moving from pure PR (no majoritarian tendencies) to no PR (only majoritarianism) and thus functions to capture these characteristics in a range. We believe that this makes for a more powerful indicator than simply including two dummy variables. The second reason is that we wish to avoid collinearity in the models. By including dummies for PR and majoritarianism, particularly when some countries have characteristics of both, we run the risk of washing out results and obscuring the relationships in question.

The party discipline measure that we use was compiled by Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2010). The variable considers three aspects of party discipline we code as dummies: does the electoral system contain a closed list option where voters can express preferences within a party list 1 = yes 0 = no, does the electoral system contain an open list option where voters can express preferences within a party list 1 = no 0 = yes, and does a party have control over candidates’ access on all ballots 1 = yes 0 = no. The dichotomous indicators are combined into a 3-point additive index where 3 = most discipline to 0 = least discipline. District magnitude is measured as the mean district magnitude for the lower-chamber or house (missing data prevent the use of the upper-chamber).

We incorporate the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score for each country compiled by Transparency International, which measures the perceived level of public corruption in 178 countries.⁴ This measure rates countries on a scale from 0 = highly corrupt to 10 = highly clean, so that lower values indicate higher levels of corruption. Figure 1 shows that as the amount of public corruption decreases (they have cleaner government), environmental performance generally increases. Second, we account for the land area of the countries included in the analysis. Third, we account for population density. Fourth, we account for poverty and inequality by including human development index (HDI) scores from 2010. Fifth, a trade openness measure compiled by Heston et al. (2011) is incorporated into the model. The measure examines openness of the economy in 2009 in current prices measured as total trade (sum of imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP.

Figure 1.

Comparing national environmental performance and corruption.

Results

Table 2 reports the relationship between environmental performance, electoral rules, corruption, poverty/inequality,⁵ and the appropriate control variables across all 19 countries in the analysis.⁶ The dependent variable in column 1 is the full EPI index, followed by the index of ecosystem diversity and index of environmental public health. Cells display regression coefficients.⁷

Table 2.

Predicting environmental performance in Latin American democracies.

	EPI, full	Ecosystem vitality	Environmental health
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Independent variables
PR	14.64***	23.74***	5.54
	(3.61)	(5.95)	(3.88)
Party discipline	–18.56***	–25.83**	–11.29*
	(5.09)	(8.41)	(5.48)
District magnitude	.29**	.38*	.21
	(.12)	(.20)	(.13)
Corruption	5.80**	8.44**	3.16
	(1.85)	(3.07)	(2.00)
Land area	–.000002*	–.000003	–.000001
	(.000001)	(.000002)	(.000001)
Population density	.01	.00	.01
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)
HDI	–83.27	–178.03*	11.50
	(50.13)	(82.80)	(53.95)
Trade openness	–.11	–.12	–.11
	(.09)	(.15)	(.10)
Constant	122.21***	175.19**	69.24
	(37.42)	(61.81)	(40.27)
N	19	19	19
F	3.48	2.38	2.79
Prob >F	.035	.100	.066
Adj. R²	.52	.38	.44

Adj. R2: adjusted R-squared; B: Beta; EPI: Environmental Performance Index; F: F-statistic; HDI: human development index; N: Number; PR: proportional representation; SE: standard error.

Source: EPI (2010); Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2010); Heston et al. (2011); Keefer (2010).

***

p<.01, **p<.05, *P<.10.

As evidenced by the results, the impact that electoral rules, corruption, and poverty/inequality have on environmental performance is more nuanced than previously thought. The results from the full model indicate that Latin American democracies with electoral rules that prescribe higher levels of representativeness achieve higher levels of environmental performance, as illustrated by the PR and district magnitude variables. The result for the PR measure indicates that a one-unit increase increases a country’s environmental performance score almost 15 points. For district magnitude the same one-unit increase increases environmental performance about one-third of a point. The full model results also indicate that party discipline affects environmental performance. The inverse relationship between the two variables indicates that less party control results in better environmental performance. A one-unit decrease in this indicator is shown to lessen a country’s environmental performance score by approximately 19 points. When looking at the impact of corruption on environmental performance, the full model indicates that cleaner political systems with less corruption have higher levels of national environmental performance. A one-unit increase in the variable enhances environmental performance by almost six points. Interestingly, poverty/inequality did not prove to be significant in the full model.

When comparing the results of the full model (described above) with those of the ecosystem diversity and environmental public health models, one becomes appreciative of the EPI measure. As stated earlier, this dependent variable really allows us to closely examine how environmental performance is impacted by political institutions and social factors such as corruption, poverty, and inequality. This ability for greater insight reveals some very interesting complexities. To begin, we learn that in Latin America proportionality significantly affects environmental performance in the area of ecosystem diversity, but not when it comes to environmental public health. As illustrated in the ecosystem diversity model, PR and district magnitude were again significant. In this model, for every one-unit increase in PR, the ecosystem diversity score increased nearly 24 points. With regards to district magnitude, the same one-unit increase produced an increase to the score of the dependent variable of around one-third of a point. Looking at the party discipline measure, which was again significant, a one-unit increase resulted in a decrease in the ecosystem diversity score of almost 26 points. Here, again, an increase signifies greater party control. When looking at corruption, we again see that, similarly to the full model, it appears significant. In the ecosystem diversity model, a one-unit increase (signifying less corruption) produces an increase in the score of the dependent variable of a little over eight points. The poverty/inequality measure appeared significant in the ecosystem diversity model—something that was not true in the full model. In this model, a one-unit decrease in HDI produced a decrease in the score of the dependent variable of approximately 178 points.

An examination of the environmental public health model appears very informative. In this model, the only independent variable that appears significant is party discipline. A one-unit increase (less party control) produces an increase in the score of environmental public health of a little over 11 points. What is more telling, however, are the variables that appeared significant in the prior two models, but not in this one. PR, district magnitude, corruption, and, to a lesser extent, HDI proved significant in the full and ecosystem diversity models, but, again, not in the environmental public health model.

It is worth noting that given the difficult nature of measuring performance outcomes and predictors across these countries, we make the previous assertions cautiously. When unpacking the EPI and parceling the three measures of performance, it becomes apparent that any measure that operationalizes a wide concept such as environmental performance cannot provide a definitive, full account of this relationship across or within countries. Because of this limitation, we note cautiously the important institutional relationships that are borne out in the models, but seek to bolster the findings by providing alternative dependent variables and additional analysis below. Moreover, given the fact that performance often shifts over time, it is important to accentuate the results with time-series models as well.

The EPI measures environmental performance across countries, but it provides no information over time (the previous two pilot studies use different methodologies, making them incomparable). We also feel the mixed results from the second and third models may be attributed to the broad nature of the indices, as well as the problems of operationalizing wide-ranging concepts, such as environmental performance. We address both of these problems by gathering alternative data to those found in Table 3 on habitat protection, particulate matter (PM-10), and carbon dioxide (CO₂₎ emissions to examine whether our predictor variables demonstrate a similar relationship with these measures of environmental performance across countries over time. We measure habitat protection as the percentage of total national lands protected from development. PM-10 emissions are measured as the amount of emissions at the country level in micrograms per cubic meter. CO₂ emissions are measured as metric tons per capita. Measures are taken from the World Bank. We collect data on the same key variables in Table 2 from 1999 to 2010. Data limitations restrict the trade variable to 2000–2008, the CPI has missing data from 1999 to 2001, while the habitat protection measure is only available for all countries from 2005 to 2008. We again drop Panama from the analysis as it has missing data from our district magnitude variable from 2007 to 2010. Altogether, this leaves us with 71 cases for the habitat protection model and 153 cases for the remaining models.

Table 3.

The impact of electoral rules on habitat protection, particulate matter emissions, and CO₂ emissions, 2000–2008.

Model specification	Habitat protection	PM-10emissions	CO₂ emissions
	Random effectsGLS	Fixed effectsPCSE	Random effectsGLS
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Independent variables
PR	.18**	–11.53***	.15
	(.08)	(2.80)	(.94)
Party discipline	–6.26	4.40*	–4.02*
	(6.84)	(2.50)	(2.18)
District magnitude	.01***	–.27*	.006
	(.00)	(.15)	(.004)
Corruption	–.14	–1.10	–.95
	(.12)	(1.03)	(.89)
Land area	–.001	–.01***	–.00
	(.001)	(.00)	(.00)
Population density	.003	–.09***	.03
	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)
HDI	4.95***	101.50***	–.63
	(1.36)	(28.95)	(1.27)
Trade openness	–.001	–.49***	.04
	(.003)	(.06)	(.03)
Constant	28.85**	49.74**	10.14*
N	71	153	153
R² within	.29	–	.16
R² between	.08	–	.32
R² overall	.10	.19	.30
Prob > chi²	.000	.000	.05

B: Beta; CO₂: carbon dioxide; GLS: Generalized Least Squares; HDI: human development index; N: Number; PCSE: panel-corrected standard errors; PM-10: particulate matter; R2: R-squared; PR: proportional representation; SE: standard error.

Source: EPI (2010); Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2010); Heston et al. (2011); Keefer (2010).

***

p<.01, **p<.05, *P<.10.

We want to examine these relationships both between and across countries. Random-effects estimation will produce superior results over fixed-effects estimation, as we have key electoral variables that lack variation within countries, and it allows us to take into account cross-sectional and time-series variance. Diagnostic tests allow us to proceed with a random-effects model in two cases and fixed-effects in the habitat protection model. While random-effects estimations may be prone to endogeneity problems, we made this choice based on accepted diagnostic tests. We began by choosing between fixed- and random-effects estimation using the Hausman test, which suggests a random-effects model to be more appropriate for the habitat protection and CO₂ models; the test suggests fixed-effects estimation is more appropriate for the PM-10 model. A modified Wald test detects group-wise heteroskedasticity in this model. We implement the robust panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to address this problem.

Having recognized the limitations of measuring such encompassing concepts as environmental performance/outcomes and gathering quality data for both dependent and independent variables across a range of countries, we seek to provide a fuller understanding to overcome these limitations by creating static models in Table 2 with three indicators of performance for the dependent variables, as well as three time-series models in Table 3. It is important to note that we do not view any one model as indicative of a definitive link between such wide concepts as environmental performance and political institutions, but focus instead on the larger picture coming through the analysis.

Table 3 reports the results of the analysis using random-effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression for the habitat protection and C0₂ models, and a fixed-effects linear regression with robust PCSE for the PM-10 model. The findings of the time-series analysis comport well with and help to clarify the EPI models. Column 1 displays the habitat protection model, which finds that higher levels of PR across countries increases the percentage of protected lands in these Latin American countries. A one-unit change across countries and time increases protected lands by 0.18%. We see that a higher level of mean district magnitude again positively impacts environmental performance in terms of land conservation. Unlike the EPI models in Table 2, across countries and over time we do not see a strong impact of corruption on environmental performance.

Examining the fixed-effects model for PM-10 in column 2 again shows that PR has a positive impact on environmental performance within these countries. The direction of the coefficient is reversed, but this indicates a similar pattern to the first model—as PR increases, levels of particulate matter decrease. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the variable causes an approximate reduction of 11 units within these countries. An increase in mean district magnitude results in a decrease in PM-10 as well. Both models show a strong relationship between higher levels of human development and both habitat protection and particulate matter emissions. Unlike the first two models the CO₂ model in column 3 is relatively weak. Besides party discipline, none of the indicators are significant.

These models help to build part of the larger picture on institutions and environmental performance in Latin America. We have made a valid attempt to measure performance with various indicators, both over time and with models using the full EPI and two sub-indices. Our strongest relationships are found with our measures for proportionality and district magnitude, and party discipline, but these relationships were not always consistent when subjected to a series of statistical models. While this finding may suggest a shortcoming in our approach, it also highlights the necessity for examining these relationships across a range of indicators to build a picture of the complex relationships between institutions and environmental performance in Latin America and for properly measuring those relationships.

Conclusion

This research provides an analysis of the impact of political institutions on environmental performance in Latin America. As countries within the region strive to develop, they will increasingly confront questions regarding the negative externalities of their efforts. At the forefront of those concerns will be environmental degradation. Arguably, environmental public health will be negatively impacted as Latin American countries continue efforts to attract foreign direct investment and move down the path of industrialization. Will democratic institutions be able to safeguard the environment? Greater levels of representation play a limited role when it comes to regulating industry and securing environmental public health. Corruption and poverty/inequality only serve to exacerbate the situation. Ultimately, we need more research on these complex relationships with different indicators to help further understand if these conditional assertions can be further validated.

How do these findings inform our understanding of political institutions in Latin America? Much has been written about the new left in Latin America. Can socially conscious parties achieve gains safeguarding environmental public health? This research indicates that the likelihood will not be great, unless electoral rules are made to encourage less particularism. As Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) suggest, our research supports the view that an important factor in circumventing the executive–legislator impasse is the strength of party leaders. If Cox and Morgenstern (2002) are correct that weaker presidents tend to rely more on unitary powers than stronger presidents, then stronger party discipline should indeed encourage presidents, weak or strong, to engage the legislature. The important question, however, is whether strong party leaders can effectively compel executives to address important issues. Our study indicates that when it comes to environmental performance, party discipline is imperative for sound policy-making.

More research is needed to attain a better understanding of how institutional design interrelates with the path towards development, one that benefits Latin Americans by providing greater prosperity and equality, but doing so by simultaneously meeting sound environmental performance standards in all areas. Learning whether political institutions can enhance understanding of the environmental cleanup of other toxic and hazardous material is important. Similarly, knowing the significance of other political, economic, and social factors in helping explain environmental performance is also desirable. Addressing these questions will help us to comprehend the factors that lead certain countries to do more than set vague sustainability standards or create myriad regulations; it will further our knowledge of how developing countries can actually improve their overall environmental performance and better protect public health and the environment from harm.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table 4.

Descriptive statistics by country.

	EPI	Env Health	Eco-system	Partydisc	HDI	PR	Distmag	CPI	Trade	Popdensity	Landarea
Argentina	61.0	74.49	47.60	2	.78	2	10.70	2.90	37.35	14.44	2,736,296.00
Bolivia	44.3	45.40	43.27	2	.64	1	1.69	2.80	68.63	8.90	1,069,133.70
Brazil	63.4	71.63	55.19	1	.70	1	19.00	3.70	19.88	22.34	8,511,043.60
Chile	73.3	81.28	65.40	1	.78	0	2.00	7.20	68.50	23.01	721,229.34
Colombia	76.8	74.60	78.94	2	.69	2	5.00	3.50	36.43	38.55	1,141,177.03
Costa Rica	86.4	82.18	90.61	2	.73	2	8.10	5.30	84.66	87.47	51,014.99
Dominican Republic	68.4	72.51	64.38	2	.66	1	6.10	3.00	52.50	202.23	48,092.01
Ecuador	69.3	75.77	62.92	1	.70	1	2.74	2.50	56.48	52.05	256,270.64
El Salvador	69.1	68.89	69.26	2	.66	2	8.24	3.60	59.72	301.14	20,278.94
Guatemala	54.0	56.38	51.56	3	.56	1	10.72	3.20	55.98	123.00	108,523.47
Honduras	49.9	58.04	41.70	2	.60	1	7.10	2.40	104.32	63.38	112,078.10
Jamaica	58.0	70.25	45.83	1	.69	0	1.00	3.30	87.02	241.93	11,060.19
Mexico	67.3	76.63	58.06	2	.75	1	80.60	3.10	57.80	54.18	1,943,058.29
Nicaragua	57.1	58.73	55.38	3	.57	2	7.60	2.50	98.66	47.18	118,789.48
Panama	71.4	71.75	70.99	1	.76	1	–	3.60	138.15	44.83	74,515.22
Paraguay	63.5	58.07	68.96	2	.64	2	4.40	2.20	95.14	15.46	395,907.51
Peru	69.3	61.34	77.21	2	.72	2	4.80	3.50	43.68	22.13	1,288,259.27
Trinidad	54.2	70.17	38.33	1	.74	0	1.00	3.60	99.81	256.25	5,202.12
Uruguay	59.1	72.00	46.21	3	.77	2	5.20	6.90	52.02	19.10	174,047.96
Venezuela	62.9	79.13	46.67	1	.70	1	6.80	2.00	38.72	30.14	911,835.87

CPI: Corruption Perceptions Index; Dist mag: District Magnitude; Env Health: Environmental Health; EPI: Environmental Performance Index; HDI: human development index; Party disc: Party Discipline; Pop density: Population Density;

PR: proportional representation.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

References

Ames

(1995) Electoral rules, constituency pressures, and pork barrel: Bases of voting in the Brazilian Congress. Journal of Politics 57(2): 324–343.

Ames

(2001) The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Austen-Smith

(2000) Redistributing income under proportional representation. Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1235–1269.

Barrett

Gaddy

(2000) Freedom, growth and the environment. Environment and Development Economics 5(4): 433–456.

Bawn

Rosenbluth

(2006) Coalition parties versus coalition of parties: How electoral agency shapes the political logic of costs and benefits. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 251–265.

Bhattarai

Hamming

(2001) Institutions and the environmental Kuznets curve for deforestation: A cross-country analysis for Latin America, Africa, and Asia. World Development 29(6): 995–1010.

Blais

Bodet

(2006) Does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policymakers? Comparative Political Studies 39: 1243–1262.

Bueno de Mesquita

Smith

Siverson

, et al. (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

Buitenzorgy

Mol

APJ

(2011) Does democracy lead to a better environment? Deforestation and the democratic transition peak. Environmental and Resource Economics 48(1): 59–70.

10.

Cain

Ferejohn

Fiorina

(1987) The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

11.

Carey

Shugart

(1995) Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formula. Electoral Studies 14(4): 417–439.

12.

Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania (2011) Penn World Table Version 7.0.

13.

Chang

(2005) Electoral incentives for political corruption under open-list proportional representation. Journal of Politics 67(3): 716–730.

14.

Chang

Golden

(2007) Electoral systems, district magnitude, and corruption. British Journal of Political Science 37(1): 115–137.

15.

Cheibub

Przeworski

Saiegh

(2004) Government coalitions under parliamentarism and presidentialism. British Journal of Political Science 34(4): 565–587.

16.

Congleton

(1992) Political institutions and political control. The Review of Economics and Statistics 74(3): 412–421.

17.

Cox

McCubbins

(1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.

18.

Cox

McCubbins

(2001) The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes. In: Haggard

McCubbins

(ed.) Structure and Policy in Presidential Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.21–63.

19.

Cox

Morgenstern

(2002) Epilogue: Latin American reactive assemblies and pro-active presidents. In: Morgenstern

Nacif

(eds) Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.1–22.

20.

Cox

Thies

(1998) The cost of intraparty competition: SNTV and money politics in Japan. Comparative Political Studies 31(3): 267–291.

21.

Crepaz

(1998) Inclusion versus exclusion: Political institutions and welfare expenditures. Comparative Politics 31(1): 61–80.

22.

Dahl

(1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

23.

Dalton

Farrell

McAllister

(2011) Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24.

Dalton

Farrell

McAllister

(2012) Political Parties and Democratic Linkage. In: How Parties Organize Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

25.

Deacon

(1999) Dictatorship, democracy, and the provision of public goods. UC Santa Barbara Economics Working Papers, 11–99.

26.

Duverger

(1959) Political Parties. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

27.

Epstein

O’Halloran

(1999) Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

28.

Facetti

(2009) Is Latin America condemned by corruption? In Millett

Holmes

Perez

(eds) Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species. New York: Routledge, pp.301–324.

29.

Fiorino

(2006) The New Environmental Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

30.

Franzese

Nooruddin

Long-Jusko

(2004) Geographic versus partisan bases of representation: Party unity and the effective constituency in US distributive politics. Presentation, Midwest Political Science Association, 15–18 April 2004, Chicago, IL.

31.

Fredriksson

Wollscheid

(2010) Party discipline and environmental policy: The role of “smoke-filled back rooms”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 112(3): 489–513.

32.

Golden

(2003) Electoral connections: The effects of the personal vote on political patronage, bureaucracy, and legislation in postwar Italy. British Journal of Political Science 33(2): 189–212.

33.

Golden

Chang

(2001) Competitive corruption: Factional conflict and political malfeasance in postwar Italian Christian democracy. World Politics 53(4): 588–622.

34.

Golden

Stramski

(2010) Ideological congruence and electoral institutions. American Journal of Political Science 54: 90–106.

35.

Gourevitch

(2003) The politics of corporate governance regulation. Yale Law Journal 112(7): 1829–1880.

36.

Gourevitch

Shinn

(2005) Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

37.

Grossman

Krueger

(1995) Economic growth and the environment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(2): 353–377.

38.

Grossman

Helpman

(2005) A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4): 1239–1282.

39.

Heston

Summers

Aten

(2011) Penn World Table Version 7.0. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

40.

Hicken

(2006) How do rules and institutions encourage vote buying? In Shaffer

F. C.

(ed.), Democracy for Sale: The Causes, Consequences, and Reform of Vote Buying (47–60) Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

41.

Hicken

Simmons

(2008) The personal vote and the efficacy of education spending. American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 109–124.

42.

Hukkinen

(1995) Corporatism as an impediment to ecological sustenance: The case of Finnish waste management. Ecological Economics 15(1): 59–75.

43.

Iversen

Soskice

(2006) Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. American Political Science Review 100(2): 165–181.

44.

Jones

(1995) Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracy. South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.

45.

Jones

Baumgartner

Breunig

, et al. (2009) A general empirical law of public budgets: A comparative analysis. American Journal of Political Science 53: 855–873.

46.

Kaempfer

Lowenberg

(1992) International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. Boulder: Westview.

47.

Katz

(1980) A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

48.

Keefer

(2010) Database on political institutions (DPI2010). Development Research Group. Washington: The World Bank.

49.

Kingstone

(2011) The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development. New York: Routledge.

50.

Lake

Baum

(2001) The invisible hand of democracy: Political control and the provision of public services. Comparative Political Studies 34(6): 587–621.

51.

Lijphart

(1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

52.

Lijphart

(1994) Democracies: Form, performance, and constitutional engineering. European Journal of Political Research 41: 107–113.

53.

Lijphart

(1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

54.

Linz

(1994) Presidential and parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In: Linz

Valenzuela

(eds) The Failure of Presidential Democracy (2nd ed.). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp.3–87.

55.

Lizzeri

Persico

(2001) The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. American Economic Review 91(1): 225–245.

56.

Mainwaring

(1993) Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: The difficult combination. Comparative Political Studies 26(2): 198–228.

57.

Mainwaring

Shugart

(1997) Conclusion: Presidentialism and the party system. In: Mainwaring

Shugart

(eds) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.394–439.

58.

Midlarsky

(1998) Democracy and the environment: An empirical assessment. Journal of Peace Research 35(3): 341–361.

59.

Morgenstern

(1994) Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-call Voting in Latin America and the United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

60.

Morgenstern

(2002) Towards a model of Latin American legislatures. In: Morgenstern

Nacif

(eds) Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.1–22.

61.

Muller

Strom

(2010) Coalition agreements and cabinet governance. In: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. In: Strom K, Muller W and Bergman T (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–199.

62.

Myerson

(1993) Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative elective systems. American Political Science Review 87(4): 856–869.

63.

Needler

(2002) Conclusion: The legislature in a democratic Latin America. In: Close

(ed.) Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

64.

Neto

(2006) The presidential calculus: Executive policy making and cabinet formations in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies 39(4): 415–440.

65.

Neumayer

(2003) Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from panel analysis on air pollution in OECD countries. Ecological Economics 45(2): 203–220.

66.

Nielson

(2003) Supplying trade reform: Political institutions and liberalization in middle-income presidential democracies. American Journal of Political Science 47(3): 470–491.

67.

Olson

(2000) Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.

68.

Ozymy

Rey

(2013) Wild spaces or polluted places: Contentious policies, consensus institutions, and environmental performance in industrialized democracies. Global Environmental Politics 13(4): 81–100.

69.

Persson

Tabellini

(1999) The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43(4–6): 699–735.

70.

Persson

Tabellini

(2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

71.

Poloni-Staudinger

(2008) Are consensus democracies more environmentally effective? Environmental Politics 17(3): 410–430.

72.

Powell

(2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Views. New Haven: Yale University Press.

73.

Rae

(1971) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.

74.

Rogowski

Kayser

(2002) Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power price-level evidence from the OECD countries. American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 526–539.

75.

Rogowski

MacRae

(2004) Inequality and institutions? What theory, history, and (some) data tell us. Presentation. Department of Political Science, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 18.

76.

Samuels

(1999) Incentives to cultivate a party vote in candidate-centric electoral systems: Evidence from Brazil. Comparative Political Studies 32(4): 487–518.

77.

Samuels

(2003) Ambition, Federalism and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

78.

Scruggs

(1999) Institutions and environmental performance in seventeen Western democracies. British Journal of Political Science 29(1): 1–31.

79.

Shugart

Carey

(1992) Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

80.

Siavelis

(2009) Executive-legislative relations and democracy in Latin America. In: Millett

Holmes

Perez

(eds) Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species. New York: Routledge, pp.101–118.

81.

Soroka

Wlezien

(2010) Degrees of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

82.

Soroka

Wlezien

(2015) The majoritarian and proportional visions and democratic responsiveness. Electoral Studies 40: 539–547.

83.

Stasavage

(2005) Democracy and education spending in Africa. American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 343–358.

84.

Weingast

Shepsle

Johnsen

(1981) The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy 89(41): 642–664.

85.

Wills-Otero

(2009) Electoral rules in Latin America: Explaining the adoption of proportional representation systems during the twentieth century. Latin American Politics and Society 51(3): 33–58.

86.

Wlezien

Soroka

(2012) Political institutions and the opinion-policy link. Western European Politics 55: 1407–1432.