Identifying the conceivable diplomatic outcomes of Sport Diplomacy initiatives

Abstract

Although studies around Sport Diplomacy (SD) are expanding rapidly, there is no specific agreement on the outcomes of SD initiatives. The purpose of this study is to identify the conceivable diplomatic outcomes of SD from the perspective of international public diplomacy and sport experts. Researchers used a fuzzy Delphi method, which is an advanced version of the qualitative Delphi method that employs statistics to determine the distance between the levels of consensus within the expert panel. Thirty online surveys were completed by the experts, who were selected through targeted sampling. The statistical population included public diplomacy and sports scholars, and the researchers identified about 200 individuals who qualified for the sampling population because of their academic studies in the fields of public, cultural, and sport diplomacy. After running two rounds of fuzzy Delphi, the SD outcomes were classified into two categories of explicit/specific outcomes and implicit/general outcomes. The results showed that the outcomes of “cross-cultural communication,” “mutual understanding,” “trust building,” “nation branding,” “country reputation,” “attraction,” and “co-option” were the most possible explicit/specific outcomes of SD initiatives undertaken by countries’ ministries of foreign affairs and related agencies. “Sport industry development,” “sport tourism development,” and “socio-economic development” were the most possible outcomes of the implicit/general efforts of SD initiatives undertaken by the sport federations, private sector, NGOs, and other institutions outside the formal diplomacy system. Co-option-A term derived from Nye's theory of soft power as the ultimate goal/outcome of SD endeavors is manifested in “Peace Building (Conflict Conciliation)” between hostile states/nations and “Peace Development” between friendly states/nations.

Keywords

Soft power public diplomacy Sport Diplomacy model Sport Diplomacy outcomes international relations

Introduction

Sport is an increasingly important aspect of the cultural, economic, environmental, and political milieu of modern life. Sport is being used by a number of countries to raise their profiles and create influence. While sport has long been a resource available to governments as a tool of public diplomacy, it is now being used more often as an element of a broader and more comprehensive political strategy, known specifically as Sport Diplomacy (SD) (Garamvölgyi et al., 2020). In order to respond to novel social, political, cultural, and economic pressures, countries are increasingly turning to SD as a foreign policy instrument, and, therefore, cannot ignore the importance that global sport has on their core interests (Jackson and Haigh, 2008).

The ever-growing body of literature on SD reveals that there are many distinct examples and various political goals and reasons for individual countries to implement SD initiatives ((Marcin, 2017; Zintz and Parrish, 2019). However, empirical studies in the field are lacking, particularly those that explore the possible outcomes and implications of SD. Therefore, the purpose of the current study is to identify the conceivable outcomes that governments seek to achieve through the implementation of their various SD initiatives.

Literature review

Sport Diplomacy

Public Diplomacy scholars and practitioners see activities such as sport, cultural events, and exchange programs as an integral part of international cultural understanding and important avenues for otherwise diverse citizens around the world to understand and interact with each other. These efforts involve not only communicating the message(s) that a country wishes to present abroad but also analyzing and understanding how the nation is perceived and the ways that the messages are interpreted by global audiences (Snow and Taylor, 2009). Fullerton and Kendrick (2017) call this idea “country concept” which they define as the outcome of public diplomacy and other nation branding activities.

Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the International Olympic Committee, believed that SD has a substantial impact on international relations and includes such positive outcomes as, enhancing friendship and solidarity among athletes, promoting world peace, bolstering “mutual understanding” among peoples and advancing friendly relations among nations. Through sport, a country can show to the world its hospitality and strengths (Jankovic, 2017).

Outcomes of Sport Diplomacy

Various systems of government, such as liberal democracy, communism, socialism, Nazism, apartheid, and fascism, have sought to use sport as a means of demonstrating their power and domination. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested heavily in projecting its cultural image. SD was one of the core cultural diplomatic endeavors used to paint a picture of the Soviet state as a place that valued expression, cultivated excellence and tolerated diversity (Cull, 2009). Likewise, according to Larmer (2009), the new generation of Chinese leaders see sport not so much as business, recreation or entertainment, but as a projection of national ambition (Snow and Taylor, 2009). In the West, many scholars have pointed to American films, television programs, music, as well as sport, as important resources of U.S. soft power, as they often serve to create an attractive image of the United States among foreign audiences (Seib, 2009). The use of SD is not limited to the so-called “superpowers.” The emerging national powers, such as the BRICS countries have also implemented SD. Cornelissen (2010) pointed out the many sport mega-events that were scheduled in BRICS¹ countries. These countries have used sporting mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup as a conduit for economic growth, to demonstrate their effective political systems and, ultimately, as a globalization tool to compensate for the absence of other types of international influence (Fullerton and Holtzhausen, 2012).

There are many countries that have written official SD documents with the aim of acquiring some “unique outcomes.” Kobierecki (2017) introduced the SD of Norway with the main goal of a subsidiary role in Norwegian “nation branding.” The Australian government released its Australian SD Strategy 2015–18 with the mission of “growing the value and influence of Australia's sport credentials and assets in the Indo–Pacific region and beyond”(Government, 2017). The European Union released an SD report recently with the aim of promoting the European values through sport diplomacy and the use of sport as a tool to support EU external relations (Directorate-General for Education, 2018).

Therefore, it is clear that government systems of all types of political ideologies are using SD for their specific purposes and expect certain outcomes from the implementation of various SD initiatives. The expected outcomes of government systems are sometimes clear and easily identifiable. In other cases, they are implicitly and intricately designed and implemented. For example, the goal of “Duel SD” in cases, such as US-China Ping-Pong diplomacy and India-Pakistan cricket diplomacy, has clearly been implemented to reduce the tensions between the states through the popular sport of the two nations. By contrast, the multiple goals and expectations of the Chinese government in holding the 2008 Beijing Olympic games (Choi et al., 2015), as well as the huge investment of Qatari government (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018) in sport across multiple SD projects is evidence that much more expertise and scrutiny is required.

Whether the expected outcomes are simple or sophisticated, all governments of any ideology are pursuing their own outcomes from the implementation of SD initiatives. To better understand the success or failure of achieving the expected outcomes, we need to develop theoretical frameworks and consider the specific goals and priorities of different government systems relative to the phenomenon of SD.

A review of the literature indicated that the study of the outcomes of sports diplomacy, in particular, is very rare. In one of the few studies about the outcomes of SD, Nygård and Gates (2013) outline four mechanisms of SD: image-building; creating a platform for dialogue; trust-building; and, reconciliation, integration and anti-racism. According to the study authors, these mechanisms are not deterministically controllable and can have unintended consequences. The first mechanism, image-building is best exemplified by hosting the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup. A platform for dialogue would include the Goodwill Games between the USA and USSR. As to the third mechanism, sport can be used to build trust between nations, communities and individuals, such as football matches between Israeli and Palestinian youth that are meant to foster trust. Finally, sport can be taken as a catalyst for achieving reconciliation, integration, and the promotion of anti-racism. Moving ever more micro, sport can be used to build trust, and through trust-building, build peace.

There are other key concepts associated with SD outcomes. Rofe (2018) mentioned some key terms for SD outcomes, such as “reinforcing mutual confidence, trust and reliability,” “eliminating hostility between civilian,” “military crisis management,” and “mutual trust.” “Nation branding” is another keyword of SD outcomes that has been mentioned in many sources. Nation branding is a practice used by states to build and manage their reputations (Anholt, 2004). Countries create an image for themselves, and they try to feature certain (often symbolic) characteristics that make them distinct and appealing (Anholt, 2005). Anholt's “nation brand hexagon” illustrates the various avenues through which people perceive the cultural, political, commercial, and human assets of a country, as well as its investment potential and tourism appeal. A country's “brand”, therefore, is the sum of how nations and individual citizens perceive all six of these aforementioned characteristics. Building on Anholt's nation branding hexagon, other scholars have drawn a connection between nation branding and soft power (Freeman, 2012). Zaharna (2008) notes that public diplomacy and tourism are two key components of “nation-branding,” and hosting sporting events allows the two elements to come together and help national governments and other diplomatic players achieve their political goals. Therefore, a conscious shift has occurred by many governments to incorporate sport exchanges, visits, and competitions to cultivate their power via global public opinion (Rofe, 2018).

“Attraction”—a keyword often used by Nye (2011) when talking about soft power—can be found in abundance in the sporting arena. Nye himself has used sport in explaining the power of “attraction” in diplomacy by pointing to the allure of iconic basketball player Michael Jordan, and the opportunity taken by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to showcase China through the 2008 Olympic Games. Moreover, it is precisely the global reach of mega sport events, such as the Olympic Games and World Cup, that attracts a range of actors and utilizes them to achieve diplomatic goals (Frawley, 2016).

Purpose of this study

Identifying the outcomes of SD initiatives makes it possible to study the motivations and reasons that different governments are investing in SD. There are classic examples of SD, such as US-China Ping-Pong diplomacy, which facilitated a more open dialogue between the two countries. In modern SD practices, such as hosting major sporting events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, achievements include sports industry development, national brand improvement, the country's reputation promotion is recognizable (Abdi, 2019; Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018; Zaripova and Dilmurodov, 2022). It also acts as a roadmap for countries that have not taken the path of SD seriously, reminding them of the expected goals and outcomes of SD initiatives. Given that there are few, empirical studies recognizing the possible outcomes of SD, this study allows for a broader and more comprehensive investigation of this area. Therefore, according to the existing theoretical gap, the present study seeks to identify the conceivable outcomes governments may achieve from the implementation of their SD initiatives. If the outcomes of sports diplomacy are properly identified, governments and private institutions to evaluate outputs related to sports diplomacy initiatives. From a theoretical standpoint, this study also serves to complete the model of Sport Diplomacy (Abdi et al., 2018; Abdi et al., 2019).

The model of Sport Diplomacy

According to Nye (2011), there are a wide variety of basic resources that can be utilized for soft power through skillful conversion strategies. Nye specifically notes that popular sport can play an important role in communicating cultural values. Therefore, sport can be one of the basic tools that is specially forged to wield soft power. Sport and other soft power resources provide a wide variety of choices for practitioners of public diplomacy to achieve their goals, but whether these resources produce preferred outcomes depends upon the context, the target, and the qualities of the power-conversion strategies. To convert soft power resources into positive outcomes requires the critical ability to create perceptions of such qualities as benignity, competence, and charisma among the targeted foreign publics. Based on Nye's argument about soft power and accepting the premise that SD is “an arrow in the quiver” of soft power of nations (Grix et al., 2015; Grix and Houlihan, 2014; Grix and Lee, 2013; Murray and Pigman, 2014).

Abdi (2019) attempted to construct a model that identifies the resources, skillful strategies of conversion, and outcomes of SD. According to Figure 1, the main SD resources were classified into three categories, including “Sport Events,” “Sport Human Capital,” and “Sport Products.” Further, “sport players,” “women's sport,” “hosting/ participating in regional, international, continental or global events,” “coaches,” and “authentic sport leagues” were identified as the most applicable SD resources (Abdi et al., 2019). The model of SD situates the skillful strategies of conversion, including “Official and SD Solidarity,” “Competent Cultural Ambassadors” and two sub strategies—“Universal values ambassadors” and “National values ambassadors.” The strategy of “High Performance” includes three sub strategies of “Best records,” “Best management,” and “Best communication strategies,” and the final conversion strategy, which is “Vast Media Coverage” (Abdi et al., 2018).

Figure 1.

SD resources and conversion tools from the viewpoint of international PD and sport experts (Abdi, 2018).

The SD resources and skills/strategies of conversion are presented in Figure 1.

According to Abdi et al. (2018), the skillful conversion strategies are the vital part and heart of the process of SD. It means that in addition to the two sides of the context and the target emphasized by Nye, the success and failure of SD initiatives are closely related to how planning and implementation of conversion strategies are explained in the SD model. In other words, all conceivable outcomes of SD may be achievable when the SD conversion strategies along with the context factors and characteristics of the targeted country/nation have the necessary coordination and solidarity. Hence, when we are arguing about the conceivable outcomes of SD; our premise is that all three sides of the context, target, and especially conversion strategies are ultimately met with precision and ingenuity.

Therefore, the success and failure of SD initiatives depend more on the selected resources and, more importantly, on how to design and implement skillful conversion strategies, rather than on the expected outcomes of SD. Of course, the goals of SD must also have the general characteristics of goal setting (i.e., they should be SMART²).

Research questions

According to the aforementioned model of SD, there are some raw SD resources that governments can select alone or in a combination. These basic SD resources require “shaping,” according to Nye, by skillful strategies to obtain desired diplomatic outcomes. What remains to be identified in completing the model, and therefore the purpose of this study, are the conceivable diplomatic outcomes of SD endeavors. Therefore, the current study attempts to answer the primary question:

What are the conceivable outcomes governments may achieve from the implementation of their SD initiatives?

Another key question concerning the SD model is, who will be the major entity responsible for designing and implementing SD initiatives—the government, NGOs, or the private sector? Rofe (2018) asked if the nation brand embraces tourism, foreign direct investment, brand exports, sport, the arts, cultural activities and so on, who runs it? Private sector or public sector—or both? Therefore, a second research question is posed:

Who are the major entities responsible for the design and implementation of the SD initiatives?

In an attempt to answer these questions and as a starting point for investigation, the model proposes two kinds of SD outcomes: the Specific Outcomes and the General Outcomes, for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and related agencies are directly responsible. The outcomes are reflected in the proposed pattern in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

The proposed outcomes of SD initiatives.

Furthermore, by identifying the probable sport diplomatic outcomes and thereby finalizing the SD model, this study will attempt to define the concept of “SD” itself.

To answer the questions posed above about the outcomes of SD, the views of international public diplomacy and sport experts were collected and analyzed using the fuzzy Delphi method.

Methodology

The present study is a work of fundamental research aimed at developing scientific understanding in the field of SD. In terms of strategy and data collection, the present study is qualitative research conducted via an online survey. A measurement tool consisting of a researcher-made questionnaire for collecting expert opinions featuring a combination of closed and open-ended questions was employed. Each item on the questionnaire included a five-point Likert scale along with a comment box to capture the expert's view and to better refine the data for the subsequent Delphi rounds. The statistical population included all public diplomacy and sport experts; however, due to language, time, and financial constraints, only those who knew English language could participate in this research. Although the precise size of this community is not known, background research allowed the researcher to identify about 200 individuals who had published academic studies (book, article or dissertation) in the field of SD. Using targeted sampling, the researchers narrowed the population pool to 60 experts, who were invited to participate in the study. Thirty ultimately agreed to participate and entered the executive phase.

This study aims at identifying the conceivable outcomes of SD initiatives. By utilizing the fuzzy Delphi method (FDM), the outcomes are identifiable. The FDM was selected because of the exploratory nature of the study and because the Delphi method, in general, is an inexpensive research approach involving experts without physically bringing them together (Masser and Foley, 1987). The fuzzy Delphi method is an advanced version of the qualitative Delphi method that uses statistics to determine the distance between the levels of consensus within the expert panel. This technique is based on respondents’ opinions. In this way, verbal expressions are used to measure views, which can be somewhat subjective. Verbal expressions have limitations to reflect fully respondent's mental latencies. In other words, although the experts’ competence and mental abilities are used for decision-making, the quantification of experts’ opinions cannot completely reflect the human thinking style. Using statistical fuzzy sets is more consistent with human linguistic and sometimes vague descriptions and is better to make decisions in the real world by applying fuzzy numbers. Therefore, applying FDM is appropriate for this study due to the uncertainty about what outcomes of sports diplomacy. In addition, the anonymity of Delphi participants allows them to interact, rethink, and compare their thoughts in a “non-threatening forum” without being influenced by each other's opinion (Miller, 1993, p. 198).

The fuzzy Delphi method, deployed here, was developed by Kaufman and Gupta in the 1980s (Cheng and Lin, 2002). The application of this method, for making decisions and consensus on issues where objectives and parameters are not explicitly stated, leads to very valuable results (Jafari and Montazer, 2009). To remove, modify, or stabilize the components and sub-components of the outcomes of SD, the fuzzy Delphi technique was used.

The research questionnaire was designed with the aim of consulting the experts on their level of agreement with the proposed outcomes of SD. Therefore, experts are supposed to express their agreement through verbal variables, such as very low, low, moderate, high and very high. These variables are defined in the form of triangular fuzzy numbers, according to Table 1 and Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Triangular fuzzy numbers for the five-point Likert scale.

Table 1.

Triangular fuzzy numbers of the five-point Likert scale.

Verbal variables	Triangular fuzzy numbers (m, α, β)	Defuzzified score (x)
Completely agree	(0.75, 1, 1)	0.958
Agree	(0.5, 0.75, 1)	0.75
No idea/average	(0.25, 0.5, 0.75)	0.5
Disagree	(0, 0.25, 0.5)	0.25
Completely disagree	(0, 0, 0.25)	0.0416

In the above table, defuzzified scores are calculated using the following formula:

x = \frac{m + 4 (α) + β}{6}

Different criteria for achieving consensus are expressed in the fuzzy Delphi method (Habibi et al., 2015). The threshold in this study is usually 0.7; however, this threshold can vary among studies. If the value of the de-dipped value accumulated from the expert opinion is larger than the threshold, then the criterion is consistent. If the benchmark is less than the threshold, it will be eliminated. Microsoft Excel 2013 software was used to run fuzzy analysis and draw graphs.

It should be noted that we benefited from the Stimulus strategy (Abdi et al., 2018) in order to stimulate the experts to participate actively, provide maximum feedback and encourage further participation.

Findings

The majority of the survey respondents (43.6%) were 51–60 years old; 6.7% (smallest percentage) were 31 years old or younger. The mean age of experts was slightly above 49 years old. 63.33% were male and 36.77% female. According to Table 2, the highest number of the experts were from the United States (26.67%), followed by the United Kingdom (20%), Iran (13.3%), New Zealand (10%), China (6.7%); Australia, Russia, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and Canada were each represented with 3.3%. 93.3% of the experts had a doctoral degree, and 6.7% had a master's degree. Finally, 53.3% of the experts were in the public diplomacy panel, and 46.7% of them were in the sport panel based on their self-reports.

Table 2.

Nationality of experts.

Country	Frequency	Percent
USA	8	26.7
UK	6	20.0
Iran	4	13.3
Australia	1	3.3
China	2	6.7
Russia	1	3.3
Taiwan	1	3.3
New Zealand	3	10.0
UAE	1	3.3
Hong Kong	1	3.3
South Africa	1	3.3
Canada	1	3.3
Total	30	100.0

The international sport and public diplomacy experts were requested to comment on any proposed hierarchical specific/general outcome according to Figure 2. Table 3 displays the results of the quantitative count of the answers of experts to each proposition in the first phase of the fuzzy Delphi.

Table 3.

Results of counting the responses of the first stage of the survey (First Phase of Fuzzy Delphi Rounds).

Question	Amount of agreement with any proposition						Experts’ opinions mean (m, α, β)			Defuzzified mean (x) (Crisp value)
Question	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral/average	Agree	Strongly agree	Total	m	α	β	Defuzzified mean (x) (Crisp value)
Q1	0	1	4	18	5	28	0.49	0.74	0.91	0.73
Q2	1	3	8	13	4	29	0.39	0.641	0.82	0.63
Q3…Q24
Q25	2	5	12	8	0	27	0.26	0.49	0.74	0.49
Q26	2	3	15	7	0	27	0.27	0.50	0.75	0.50

According to the results presented in Table 3, only the proposition of “Q₁: There are some real outcomes which we can expect after performing the previously mentioned SD endeavours well” could exceed the threshold of 0.7. Also, with the explanation of the stimulus strategy, the goal was to get the most out of the comments and feedback from the experts, and the results of this round of fuzzy Delphi would not be the yardstick for eliminating or stabilizing propositions. So, after applying some changes based on experts’ opinions, a modified second-order questionnaire was given to the experts with the following changes: At first, and because of the consensus of experts in opposition for applying the word "all" at the beginning of the propositions, it was replaced with the phrase "we can expect." The propositions of “The specific and general outcomes of SD are separate,” “Prestige” is an explicit/implicit outcome of SD endeavours,” and “the general outcomes are hierarchical” were deleted given the huge opposition of the experts. The specific outcomes changed to explicit/specific outcomes for which the countries’ ministry of foreign affairs and related agencies are primarily responsible for the implementation of related initiatives. The general outcomes were changed to implicit/general outcomes, for which all other public and private institutions outside the country's ministry of foreign affairs and related agencies are mainly responsible. The order of priority of the propositions for the specific/explicit, as well as the general/implicit outcomes, changed. The proposition of “The “implicit/ general outcomes” joined the “explicit/ specific outcomes” and the point of “nation branding” was added. Then the proposition of co-option was divided into two propositions of “peace building (conflict conciliation)” and “peace development.” The number of experts decreased to 25 persons because some experts dropped out of the study for personal reasons.

Table 4 displays the results of the quantitative count of the answers of experts to each proposition in the second phase of the fuzzy Delphi.

Table 4.

Results of counting the responses of the second stage of the poll (Second Phase of Fuzzy Delphi).

Question	Amount of agreement with any proposition						Experts’ opinions mean (m, α, β)			Defuzzified mean (x) (Crisp value)
Question	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral/average	Agree	Strongly agree	Total	m	α	β	Defuzzified mean (x) (Crisp value)
Q1	0	1	3	15	6	25	0.51	0.76	0.71	0.71
Q2	0	0	7	10	8	25	0.51	0.76	0.69	0.71
Q3	0	0	8	10	7	25	0.49	0.74	0.76	0.70
Q4	0	0	4	14	7	25	0.53	0.78	0.72	0.73
Q5	0	0	7	12	6	25	0.49	0.74	0.73	0.69
Q6	0	1	4	12	8	25	0.52	0.77	0.66	0.71
Q7	0	1	3	15	6	25	0.51	0.76	0.79	0.72
Q8	0	0	2	20	3	25	0.51	0.76	0.9	0.74
Q9	0	0	5	15	5	25	0.5	0.75	0.75	0.71
Q10	0	0	5	14	6	25	0.51	0.76	0.71	0.71
Q11	0	0	4	15	5	24	0.51	0.76	0.75	0.72
Q12	0	0	6	14	5	25	0.49	0.74	0.78	0.70
Q13	0	0	5	7	13	25	0.45	0.76	0.79	0.71
Q14	0	0	5	15	5	25	0.5	0.75	0.79	0.71
Q15	0	0	3	16	6	25	0.53	0.78	0.77	0.74
Q16	0	0	5	15	5	25	0.5	0.75	0.79	0.71
Q17	0	0	7	7	11	25	0.54	0.79	0.53	0.70
Q18	0	0	2	14	9	25	0.57	0.82	0.66	0.75
Q19	0	0	3	13	9	25	0.56	0.81	0.61	0.73

The results of Table 4 indicate that, except Q5 (in bold), all identified propositions of SD outcomes could acquire a score equal to or greater than the threshold of 0.7, and thus be consolidated as SD outcomes. Thus, Q5 (approximate hierarchy of specific/explicit outcomes is expected after the implementation of SD) was not recognized as an effective proposition and was removed from the list. These manipulations allowed the researchers to complete the SD Model (see Figure 4) to include Resources, Conversion Tools (skillful strategies), and the explicit/implicit outcomes as based on Nye's model of soft power (Nye, 2011).

Figure 4.

The final model of SD (SD resources, conversion tools, and the explicit/implicit outcomes).

Discussion and conclusion

Because the scholarship of SD is new and relatively limited, measuring the outcomes of SD is quite difficult. SD is only one part of the diverse and broad range of public diplomacy efforts, and it is less developed and understood. If measuring the outputs of public diplomacy, which is better researched, is difficult, doing the same for SD is much harder. Therefore, the current study makes a much-needed contribution to this important and growing field.

Based on the views of experts, the ideas of the researchers, and the review of extant literature, the current study identifies the conceivable outcomes derived from the skillful and systematic application of SD resources via two arenas. The first, which is the main focus of formal SD efforts, are efforts directly executed by countries’ ministries of foreign affairs and related agencies. This avenue of expected outcomes is called “specific and explicit outcomes.” The outcomes are explicit because they are looking for clear goals and are specific in the sense that they are designed and implemented by a special trustee: the official diplomacy system.

In this way, according to fuzzy Delphi results, explicit outcomes include “Cross-Cultural Communication,” “Mutual Understanding,” “Trust Building,” “Nation Branding,” “Country Reputation,” “Attraction,” and “Co-Option” (“Conflict Conciliation/Peace Building”). It is noteworthy that the experts did not agree on the proposition of “an approximate hierarchy for the explicit outcomes.” This means that, according to experts, the diplomacy system of countries cannot wait, first, for cross-cultural communication, to be neatly followed by mutual understanding, in the implementation of SD plans. Therefore, in the opinion of the experts, there is no timetable sequence and hierarchy between the outcomes. Outcomes can overlap, and their priority varies. Also, within societies that have a deep understanding of each other (such as India and Pakistan), an SD plan may be the most important goal, which pursues the ultimate goal of co-option, which manifests in peace building (through Conflict Conciliation). However, the same plan might open doors of cross-cultural communication among people who are less sympathetic or caring. Finally, the consensus of experts on each outcome is very close to the threshold of 0.7, expressing the vulnerability of their consensus on possible and expected outcomes of SD.

The second arena covers all the other efforts that occur outside of a country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and related agencies, but instead are the results of sport industry and sport tourism, executed independently of countries’ official diplomatic channels. This arena is “general/implicit outcomes, such as when governments perceive sport as an economic stimulus and invest heavily through the youth sport leagues, sport federations, private sector, NGOs, and other institutions outside the formal diplomacy system. These entities are pursuing goals such as creating a sport hub and developing professional sport leagues with no explicit diplomatic goal. The development of the sport and sport industry has attracted outstanding foreign players to sport leagues and sport tourists from other countries, and the presence of foreigners in the country may provide a beginning to the diplomatic process. A prominent example is Yao Ming, a famed Chinese basketball player who was recruited to play in the NBA, the most attractive and developed basketball league in the world, and caused widespread cultural exchanges between the US and China (Haozhou, 2012). Haozhou (2012) showed that, given the flexible and transnational image of Ming and his symbolic stance in the Chinese and US societies, he emerged as part of the framework of US-China relations—culturally, economically, and politically. Ming was also able to play the role of a bridge between the West and the East to facilitate “Cross-Cultural Communication,” “Mutual Understanding,” and maybe “Trust Building.”

The term “general” is opposite to the term “specific” because several organizations are struggling for the development of a certain sport, and the main purpose of the plans and programs of these institutions is not necessarily diplomatic, but rather the development of the sport. Additionally, the term “implicit” is the opposite of “explicit,” because the diplomatic outcomes of sport derived from the development of the sport industry are an implicit goal, and essentially the primary goal is the development of the sport industry as an economic stimulus.

Thus, according to the fuzzy Delphi results, the implicit/general outcomes include the “Development of the Sport Industry,” the “Development of Sport Tourism,” “Socio-Economic Development,” and “National Brand Development.” Experts also associate the implicit/general implications of the “national brand” component as a common point in the efforts of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other ministries with specific/explicit outcomes. This means that the implicit diplomatic achievements of sport, which are the result of the efforts of the apparatus outside of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, will, through the strengthening of the national brand and the reputation of the country of origin, set the path to higher goals, including the attraction and alignment of societies. The overall view of the experts in this study indicated that the main concern was how to prioritize the outcomes of SD. Therefore, dividing outcomes into explicit and implicit arenas is quite critical and requires further research.

In summary, explicit/specific outcomes are the main goals of SD and, in fact, due to the long-term planning and implementation of various targeted sport initiatives and programs by ministries of foreign affairs and other diplomatic apparatus, we can expect such outcomes to be achieved. As the experts pointed out in this study, the hierarchy or precise priority cannot be considered among these outcomes, but as a result of the implementation of diverse and long-term diplomatic projects, along with other instruments of cultural public diplomacy, such positive goals can be achieved.

On the other hand, general/explicit outcomes are specific to countries or states that are essentially investing in sport as an industry, and part of their national development is through the advancement of sport industry and tourism. For example, Qatar, China, and South Korea have invested heavily in all areas of sport and have hosted global tournaments (Anholt, 2004; Choi et al., 2015; Winberg, 2017). Therefore, the same development of the sport industry also sends an implicit diplomatic message to the world, including the strengthening of national image and brand, the country's reputation, the attraction of sport tourists, the attraction and political participation of contact groups through the development of sport and social development.

By finalizing and explaining the SD Model; we can now present our specific definition for the concept of SD. Therefore, SD, in our view, refers to all the initiatives that governments, explicitly, and other non-governmental institutions, implicitly, are implementing with the aim to achieve some targeted and pre-determined diplomatic outcomes through employing potential sport resources and applying conversion strategies consciously and intelligently. The presented definition is very close to the Murray's definition of SD as “the conscious, strategic and ongoing use of sport, sportspeople and sporting events by state and non-state actors to advance policy, trade, development, education, image, reputation, brand, and people-to-people links” (Murray, 2018). The two definitions of SD have the same structure of resources, conversion strategies and some desirable outcomes; however, they are somewhat different in the components and phrasing of the concepts.

As Nye states, the ultimate goal of soft power is co-option (Nye, 2011, p. 101). According to the SD model, co-option as the ultimate goal/outcome of SD endeavors is manifested in “Peace Building (Conflict Conciliation)” between hostile nations/states and “Peace Development” between friendly nations/states. To achieve the ultimate outcome of co-option through the implementation of the SD initiatives, there are some other outcomes required to be achieved in advance, including cross-cultural communication, mutual understanding, trust building, nation branding, country reputation, and attraction. These outcomes cannot be acquired with any specific priorities and hierarchies among them. For instance, an SD initiative may include a flawless holding of a mega sporting event such as the FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Games, with the aim of nation branding, country reputation or attracting billions of audiences, globally. However, another instance of SD initiative may include a friendly cricket game between India and Pakistan aimed at mutual understanding, trust building, or ultimate outcome of Peace Building (Conflict Conciliation) between the two states with no significant intention to promote nation branding or improve country reputation. These examples show that the targeted outcomes are fundamentally diverse and contextual.

Indeed, as the SD Model (Figure 4) shows, pursuing diplomatic outcomes requires the appropriate and accurate selection of one or a combination of several resources of SD along with skillfully implemented conversion strategies. As Nye reminds us, whether the shaped resources produce positive or negative responses in the targets (and thus preferred outcomes) depends upon the triad prerequisites of the context, the target, and the qualities of the power-conversion strategies. This suggests that just one-third of the prerequisites is in hands of the SD policy makers. In fact, the emphasis of Nygård and Gates (2013) on uncontrollability of the four mechanisms in making intended consequences highlights the importance of conversion strategies. Therefore, conversion tools (skillful strategies), which Nye calls “critical abilities,” are very important and sensitive in the process of implementation of SD initiatives. Hence, as noted earlier, the success and failure of SD initiatives depends more on the selected resources and, more critically, on how to design and implement conversion strategies, rather than on the expected outcomes of SD.

It is also worth noting that when Nye is talking about the “Basic Resources” of soft power, he is referring to various resources including culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military. Therefore, SD is just one of soft power resources. According to the final SD Model, a core conversion strategy is “Official and SD Solidarity”. It means to implement an SD initiative successfully; a state needs to have master plan for coordinating all the public and cultural diplomacy initiatives, including those related to sport, in line with the macro policies of the country. In this case, achieving positive outcomes from SD are more likely when the targeted audiences are ready and the context conditions are in place. A concrete example is Brazil. The role of Brazilian government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordinating activities to present the bid for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and was even more evident for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Almeida, Marchi Júnior and Pike, 2014). According to the organizational structure of this Ministry in Brazil, it is likely that this decision-making took place in cabinet diplomacy that includes authorities in high hierarchical positions such as the President of Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretary and others sub-secretaries.

The most important limitations and obstacles in conducting this study include language limitations (experts must know English), difficult access to people who have practical experience in implementing SD initiatives due to time and budget constraints and convincing experts to participate and persevere in Delphi rounds.

In conclusion, the proposed SD Model should be considered in relation to its capabilities and limitations. Sport and sport resources are not “magic bullets” in terms of acquiring soft power and positive diplomatic outcomes. Deep understanding of the triangle prerequisites of the context, the target, and the qualities of the power-conversion strategies is necessary to adjust the expectation level of the proposed Model of SD.

Footnotes

Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Science Research and Technology (grant number 5732).

ORCID iD

Kambiz Abdi

Notes

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