Study of Iran–Saudi Arabia Sports Relations

Abstract

Political tensions and conflicts have been accompanying modern sports for a long time. The objective of this study was to determine the political reasons for not hosting football matches between Iranian and Saudi football teams. To address the research objective, a mixed-method approach was used. First, in the qualitative part, the political reasons for not hosting the matches identified through the content analysis and interviews were reviewed and evaluated by Delphi Group (25 people) in the second and third stages. Secondly, in the qualitative section of the study, the questionnaire was also used to rank the reasons. The research findings showed that tensions between Tehran and Riyadh increased after the Saudi Embassy attack in Tehran and Mashhad (January 2016) and the execution of Sheikh Nimr, a Shia sheikh opposed to the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia has requested that the Asian Champions League matches against Iranian opponents be held on neutral grounds in order to ensure the safety of its players. It is therefore recommended that sports managers and politicians in Iran reduce the political tensions between the two countries. In addition, they need to strive toward creating peace, friendship, and security between the two countries.

Keywords

Sports diplomacy Asian Football Confederation Champions League football Iran Saudi Arabia

Introduction

Political tensions and conflicts have been accompanying modern sports for a long time. Over the past century, ideological tensions and conflicts have overshadowed many international events since several countries have tried to use sports to validate political systems and ideas (Merkel, 2008). Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been engaged in intense competition and conflict in the Middle East (Mirtorabi, 2019). As regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia have had unstable relations after the revolution (Haji yousefi et al., 2018). On the one hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran has gained much power as a regional power and a claimant leader of the Islamic and Shiite world over the last few decades. There is also Iran’s influence and power in the Middle East and countries such as Syria, Iraq, and now Yemen. In addition, there are other areas, such as Bahrain, whose Shiite majority is oppressed by the rulers of those countries.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia considers itself the leader of the Islamic and Sunni world. It also considers itself the older brother of the Arab and Sunni countries of the Middle East. Consequently, this country seeks power and influence among the region’s countries in line with its ideological and national interests. In fact, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are two of the major powers in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. This is why examining their relations and their role in developments and events in the region is of paramount importance (Amiri et al., 2011).

Governments have benefited and been assisted by the function and role of sports in politics. Sports as a tool has been used in the social arena by individuals to pursue their desires and demands. The role played by sports in international relations is extensive, including power, national interest, security, peace, government-nation-building, prestige, foreign policy, diplomacy, and soft power (Shahrezaei & Shirzadi, 2019). Although sports and diplomacy have received much attention in recent years as a subdivision of public diplomacy, their history dates back to the 9th century BC. This was when the kings signed an Olympic ceasefire during the first games of the ancient Olympic Games. They agreed at the time to suspend all violent and hostile behavior during the games to please spectators and athletes. Centuries later, the link between sports and diplomacy was strengthened over time, and the Olympic Truce was reminiscent of this relationship and the increasing importance of sports diplomacy in the 20th and early 21st centuries as theories, policies, and cultures have been taken into account in international relations (Deos, 2014). Esteghlal Tehran Football Club has won the Asian Clubs’ Cup twice in the 1970 and 1990–1991 seasons, and Pas Tehran Football Club won the championship in the 1992–1993 season. No Iranian team has won the Asian Champions League since the tournament's name changed to Asian Champions League. Only three teams, Persepolis Football Club, Sepahan Football Club, and Zob Ahan Esfahan Football Club, have made it to the finals. It should be noted that Esteghlal Football Club competed in the finals four times and lost twice in the finals to its opponents.

The football match between Iran and Saudi Arabia has always been one of Asia's most sensitive games. The result of 15 competitions between these two prominent Asian teams has been five victories for Iran, four victories for Saudi Arabia, and six draws. In these games, a total of 35 goals have been scored, including 22 goals for the Iran team and 13 goals for the Saudi Arabia team. It is noteworthy that in the clashes between the two teams in the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup, the match has twice been decided by penalties. Iran has been defeated by a penalty shootout both times. The AFC Competition Committee had announced in late January 2016 that if the situation and relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia do not turn normal by 15 March 2016, the matches of the representatives of these countries will be held in the territory of a third country, which became definite and was decided. AFC's website posted in a letter to the Iranian and Saudi Arabian Football Federations: It is with regret that the Saudi Arabian government has yet to lift travel restrictions on its citizens to the Islamic Republic of Iran at the time of writing this letter. The ban does not include exemptions for football teams. Besides, no significant progress has been made in relations between the two countries, which was the main reason for adopting the AFC Competitions Committee's final decision. In January 2016, the AFC Competitions Committee decided to move the matches between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the AFC Champions League to the later stages of the competition to obtain an independent assessment of the political, security, and safety situation in both countries prior to the deadline of 15 March 2016. The letter added that the AFC took several steps in accordance with the AFC Competitions Committee requests in order to gain a full understanding of the safety and security situations in bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They were:

The International Center for Sport Safety was commissioned by the AFC to conduct an independent evaluation to address the security risks for the two countries’ representatives’ security.

On 23 and 24 February 2016, members of the AFC Competitions Committee were present for the home matches between Iran and the UAE representatives.

The AFC security officers and AFC Competition Managers were assigned to monitor Iranian representatives’ home games to evaluate all security issues to keep games running smoothly.

The supervisors of the AFC games who supervised the Iranian representatives’ games on the territory of this country were requested to provide additional and complementary reports regarding the security arrangements made by the host teams for those games.

On 9 March 2016, both the Football Federations of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran were asked to provide a comprehensive report on their respective government agencies’ activities regarding bilateral relations between the two countries (AFC, 2016).

In addition, the International Federation of Association Football (Fédération Internationale de Football Association, FIFA) president also stated in his first comment after visiting Iran in 2018: “I do not think we will have a problem with the hosting situation between Iran and Saudi Arabia teams that cannot be solved.” At a meeting with the Iranian Minister of Sports and Youth, Massoud Soltanifar, Infantino emphasized that neither politics nor football should be entangled. He reiterated their commitment to ensuring that everyone enjoys football, including the people of Iran, those of Saudi Arabia, as well as individuals around the globe. He also stated that “there is a problem that needs to be handled by someone else, and football is my area of expertise. Despite the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia have still not been able to resolve their issues after five years, they continue to play their football representatives on neutral grounds in the Asian Champions League.”

As Aldasam (2013: 14) points out, in the 1990s, the reformist Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, was recognized for his efforts to break the “Wall of Mistrust” between Iran and the United States through sports and other forms of citizenship diplomacy. In February 1998, the US national wrestling team entered Iran with the Iranian Wrestling Federation's official invitation to participate in the Takhti Cup International Tournaments. The popularity of wrestling in Iran is like the popularity of American football in the United States. Although the event received scant coverage in the American media, at least in the sports sector media, it was considered an influential event in Iran, which gathered a large number of people at the Azadi Sport Complex; people who were supporting the American wrestling team as much as their national team. The American flag was seen at Azadi Stadium as Zeke Jones, the US national wrestling team star, waved the Iranian flag. After the match, the Iranian and American wrestlers hugged each other to display the athletic spirit that their politicians were unable to imitate. They also provided a constructive model of how sports can overcome the artificial wall of distrust between countries’ leaders. The next major opportunity for sport diplomacy between Iran and the United States emerged in June 1998. This was when the US and Iranian football teams were placed in the same group at the World Cup in France. This game's importance was not in the 2-1 victory for Iran; rather, it was manifested in the friendship and spirit shown by the players on both sides of the field. The media in the United States covered the event well this time. This match became a symbol against all political stereotypes about Iran for years. Given these conditions, sports diplomacy can be utilized in Iran–Saudi Arabia relations to reconcile and establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Therefore, in this study, we sought to answer the following question. What are the political challenges of Iran–Saudi Arabia relations and their impact on the football matches of the representatives of the two countries in the Asian Champions League?

Literature review

There is a relationship between sport and diplomacy. The literature on sports diplomacy discusses how sport can serve diplomatic interests through international sporting events (Grix and Brannagan, 2016; Keys, 2017; Kobierecki and Strożek, 2017; Merkel, 2008; Murray, 2012; Murray and Pigman, 2014; Qingmin, 2013). In this line, Metzger and Özvatan (2020), in their analysis of football games, borders, and politics between Germany and Turkey, maintain that the diversity of national teams and their publicity facilitate the movement of boundaries in the politics of possession and that international football competitions also constitute possessed games.

States are justifying their investment in elite sport and hosting sport mega-events by trying to create a positive international image in order to achieve both economic and political objectives. Several developing countries have recently attempted to host sports mega-events. For example, e Castro (2013) explained that sport and mega-events are important foreign policy tools. His study suggests that South Africa's soft power, prestige, and visibility can be enhanced by mega-events. Besides, South Africa, the African continent, and the international relations system have greatly benefited from sport and mega-events as foreign policy tools.

Moreover, Grix and Lee (2013) have attempted to examine the three most active states that host mega-sporting events: Brazil, China, and South Africa. The researchers conclude that Brazil, China, and South Africa's success in bidding for a sports mega-event signals and boosts their shift from regionally based emerging powers to embedded global powers. Meanwhile, Zare and Géczi (2022) contend that for nations like Iran, where they are not able to host mega-events, Olympic success can act as a factor for Iranian international prestige. Grix (2013) in his study about the United Kingdom, remarked that the most important goals of the United Kingdom at the 2012 London Olympics are to increase tourism, domestic investment and exports, the self-esteem of the country's political elite, the sense of patriotism and national identity, and ultimately provide a distinctive display of the host. For instance, the 2006 World Cup also reported Germany as an appropriate opportunity to correct Germans’ image in the minds of the world after two dark periods of Nazism and socialist–communist East Germany.

In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature examining the nations’ sports relationship. In the context of Eastern Europe, Doupona Topič (2015) affirmed that after 1990, political, economic, and legal changes led to new European developments, influencing both sports and science. It has been found that political leaders and parties use sports to reaffirm their power by diverting attention away from social problems. In Eastern European countries, it has been a common practice at all levels of national institutions, and sport and politics have become increasingly intertwined.

A number of researchers have examined Asian countries. As an example, according to a study by Merkel (2008), sports diplomacy goes beyond holiday promotion between Korean countries. Given their symbolic power and versatility, sports diplomacy is an integral part of Korean foreign policy. Rich (2018) described an example of the sporting politics between North and South Korea since the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games in 2018. North and South Korea thawed their relations when they decided to form a unified women's hockey team. During the opening ceremony, the team marched into the stadium under one unified flag.

Moreover, Stevenson and Alaug (2008), in research entitled “Sports diplomacy and emergent nationalism: Football links between the two Yemens”, stated that in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Yemenis were trying to gain international support, their national division seemed to be permanent despite the commitments of the authorities. Sports diplomacy took place through the September Revolution Cup, and the Yemeni Cup was the first lasting and institutional relationship between the two sides. The cross-border soccer matches shed light on cultural similarities and reaffirmed politicians’ statements that unity is desirable and achievable even if it weakens political differences.

In the case of Qatar, as a small Middle Eastern country, it has incorporated sports into its soft power strategy. As the country strives to become a regional sports hub, its emir and close advisors realize the importance of sports diplomacy. In this respect, Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015) examined the critical role of global sport within Qatar's international strategy through the successful bid to stage the 2022 football World Cup. They concluded that while Qatar's use of soft power may not seem useful in the short term, it has positive effects in the long term.

Several small Gulf states have used sports as a method of highlighting themselves on the global stage, including Qatar (2022 World Cup), UAE (high-level sporting events), and Bahrain (2004 Formula 1). The study by Bromber et al. (2013) on the role of sports in these countries suggested that the sports cooperation between three countries located on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, namely Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, has resulted in progress in the region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia have a poor diplomatic relationship, despite a good relationship between the southern shore countries of the Persian Gulf. Mottaghi (2015) has examined the causes of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in his study. Essentially, the study found that the lack of three common concepts of normativity, images, and identities in Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as geopolitical competitions, are significant factors that cause tension between the two nations.

With respect to the political relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is evident that as a result of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and Iran supported opposing groups in the affected states, causing unrest in the Middle East and disrupting its power structure. While taking cues from history, Mirza et al. (2021) traced the structural roots of the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. They claimed that the fall of Saddam Hussein, the civil war in Iraq, and the Arab Spring that led to violent movements in Syria, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen enhanced Saudi–Iran competition.

Organizing the Asian Champions League matches between Iran and Saudi Arabia on neutral grounds would prove to be costly for the two countries’ clubs. Owing to the economic and financial problems in Iran, many football clubs are unable to pay their domestic and foreign players and coaches. There are many ongoing financial cases against Iranian clubs in FIFA, which implies that these clubs have not yet paid the salaries of their foreign players and coaches. Therefore, by resolving disputes between the two countries, such as organizing a friendly sporting event between Saudi Arabia and Iran, sports diplomacy can serve as a strategy to break the political stalemate with Saudi Arabia, similar to an event that occurred between China and the United States in the 1970s, which is called “Ping-Pong Diplomacy.” Accordingly, limited internal and external research was conducted on the lack of hosting Asian Champions League matches between Iranian and Saudi football teams. In addition, given the strategic position of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, the researchers considered the political implications associated with not hosting AFC Champions League matches between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Following the identification of these factors, they were addressed individually.

Methodology

Sample

The sampling was conducted in accordance with a convenience sampling approach. The statistical population included all sports science experts, political science professors and experts, sociology scholars, coaches, referees, and athletes across the country.

Procedure

A mixed-method approach was used. In mixed methods research, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected and analyzed within the same study. Over the past few years, mixed methods research has evolved rapidly, becoming a recognized research methodology with its own identity (Denscombe, 2008). The data were collected and analyzed in three stages. In the first research stage, the researchers reviewed the studies conducted in this area and used content analysis. Next, in the second stage of the research, interviews were conducted with 25 participants of the statistical population to identify the political reasons for not hosting the AFC Champions League football matches between Iranian and Saudi football teams. The political reasons for not hosting the matches identified through the content analysis and interviews were reviewed and evaluated by Delphi Group (25 people) in the second and third stages. The responses were analyzed qualitatively using the Delphi method. Two rounds of Delphi analyses were carried out (Figure 1). The identified factors with at least 70% positive answers in these two rounds remained for the next stage. In the final stage, a Likert questionnaire was used, and at the end, the factors identified in the previous three stages were ranked in Table 1.

Figure 1.

Data collection and data analysis procedure.

Table 1.

Shows the 4–0 range.

Effect less	Very little effect	Low impact	high impact	Too much impact	Oral judgment
0	1	2	3	4	number

Researchers consulted six sports management scholars to determine the validity of the questionnaire. A questionnaire was used after reviewing all corrections and necessary changes. The reliability of the questionnaire was also assessed by Cronbach's alpha (α = 0.86). The data was analyzed using SPSS, EXCEL, and the Dimatel model. Moreover, by referring to the website of the AFC, the games played between the representatives of the two countries on neutral grounds were classified.

Results

Findings from Dimatel technique

After preparing the conceptual research model, using a questionnaire and a comparison matrix, the model was implemented using the Dimatel technique. To calculate the weight in the process of analyzing the elements of each level relative to its corresponding elements at a higher level, they were compared as a pair, and their weight was calculated. These weights are called relative weights, and then by combining relative weights, each option's final weight is determined. We call it absolute weight. All comparisons are made in pairs. In these comparisons, decision-makers use judgment. Suppose element i is compared to element j. In that case, the decision-maker will say that the importance of element i over element j is one of the cases in Table 2, which shows the range 4–0 through this questionnaire. For this purpose, the preparation has been obtained.

Table 2.

R and J shows the political reasons for not hosting the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Champions League football matches between the Iranian and Saudi football teams.

Political reasons for not hosting the AFC Champions League football matches between Iranian and Saudi football teams	R	J	R + J	R−J	Ranking
Saudi Arabia fears the Islamic Revolution in other Muslim countries	9/891216	9/512369	19/423585	0/358847	1
Iran's support for the Arab Spring or the Islamic Awakening in the Arab world	9/876514	9/413654	19/290168	0/46286	2
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in defence of the rights of all Muslims and the freedom movement and aggression against Israel and the West	9/846342	8/447120	18/293462	1/399222	3
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in establishing an Islamic society based on Shiite principles	8/654782	8/210452	16/865234	0/44433	4
Attacks on Yemen by Saudi Arabia and its allies (including Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan) sparked the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia	8/579213	8/321458	16/900671	0/257755	5
The existence of the Sunni religion in Saudi Arabia, which basically considers the Shiite religion to be infidel and racist	8/512367	8/251685	16/764052	0/260682	6
Saudi Arabia expands destructive activities among Iranian tribes, especially Sunnis, and creates ethnic–religious conflicts in Iran	8/438751	7/201458	15/640209	1/237293	7
Saudi support for ISIS and Al-Nusra	8/265014	7/325148	15/590162	0/939866	8
Iran's conflict with the United States and Israel and Saudi Arabia's support for the two countries	7/716435	6/431025	14/14746	1/28541	9
Saudi Arabia did not consider any nuclear deal between Iran and the West to be in its interests and saw it as part of a development that could help Iran expand and expand in the region	7/662475	6/306214	13/968689	1/356261	10
Execution of Sheikh Nimr, a cleric opposed to the Saudi-backed government of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia)	7/653214	6/684125	14/337339	0/969089	11
Iran's support for Houthi Shiite forces in Yemen	6/762014	5/434101	12/196115	1/327913	12
Saudi cooperation with Israel to strike at the axis of resistance	6/692147	5/352157	12/044304	1/33999	13
Formation of a coalition of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on behalf of Saudi Arabia and 41 other countries without Iran	5/716360	4/215815	9/932175	1/500545	14
Suppression and execution of Saudi Shiites by this country	5/682530	4/302145	9/984675	1/380385	15
Saudi Arabia welcomes the US government action to include Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the 2019 list of the US terrorist groups	5/430215	4/213587	9/643802	1/216628	16
The holding of illegitimate meetings of Arab–Islamic organizations with the aim of threatening Iran and criticizing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the tripartite meetings of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League meeting, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in May 2019 in Saudi Arabia	4/845630	2/719301	7/564931	2/126329	17
Destroying the historic centers of Qatif, where Shiites lived, and building mosques in these places for Sunnis	4/652149	2/645251	7/2974	2/006898	18
Tehran protesters attack the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 1987, killing a Saudi diplomat	4/365890	2/581325	6/947215	1/784565	19
Establishment of an Arab-Western NATO to counter the Iranian coalition	4/230148	2/152210	6/382358	2/077938	20
Saudi Arabia's efforts to reduce the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz	3/975031	1/893521	5/868552	2/08151	21
Preventing the pilgrimage of Iranian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia in 2016	3/752014	1/254151	5/006165	2/497863	22
Saudi support for the launch of Persian radio and television networks, Iran's opposition language, including Iran International channel	3/578931	1/325415	4/904346	2/253516	23
Migration of a number of sports reporters and elites to Persian radio and television networks, including Iran International channel	3/466582	1/358742	4/825324	1/10784	24
Saudi Arabia's withdrawal from the Muslim Brotherhood coalition to form an anti-Iranian coalition	3/341268	1/358125	4/699393	1/983143	25
Occupation of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016	2/995874	1/154125	4/149999	1/841749	26
Lowering oil prices by increasing production by Saudi Arabia to hit Iran's economy	2/987124	1/652145	4/639269	1/334979	27
Saudi Arabia's attempt to thwart Iran's nuclear talks and the P5 + 1	2/854260	1/124158	3/978418	1/730102	28
Termination of Saudi diplomatic relations with Iran	2/762351	1/112534	3/874885	1/649817	29
Saudi Arabia was at the forefront of supporting Iraq in its 8-year war with Iran	2/682034	1/132746	3/81478	1/549288	30
Emphasizing that the cradle of Arabism, Islamism, and the land of revelation is trying to connect the two concepts of Islam and Arabism, Saudi Arabia	2/589201	1/254612	3/843813	1/334589	31
The formation of the Arab League in 1945 and the absence of Iran in it	1/210407	1/102541	2/312948	0/107866	32
Despite the two holy shrines in Saudi Arabia and its spiritual center in the Islamic world, the country has always considered itself worthy of the leadership of the Islamic world	1/352145	2/215866	3/568011	−0/863721	33
Geopolitical position and the special position of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East	1/354126	0/423696	1/777822	0/93043	34
Iran's oil embargo on Western countries and Saudi Arabia's support	1/357541	0/541256	1/898797	0/816285	35
Rape of two young Iranians at Jeddah airport	0/351697	0/235565	0/587262	0/116132	36
Mena accident	0/368491	0/907451	1/275942	−0/53896	37
Saudi Arabia's interaction with Iran in extraditing bodies in the Mena incident	0/342368	0/595493	0/937861	−0/253125	38
The killing of the pilgrims of the Sacred House of God in 1988	0/335742	0/754057	1/089799	−0/418315	39
The renaming of the Persian Gulf into Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, into the Arabian Gulf	0/241785	0/825411	1/067196	−0/583626	40

Model evaluation based on the Dimatel model

Calculate the normalized matrix:

First, based on the above steps, the M and M (I−M) −1 communication matrices were calculated by the EXCEL software, which is described below:

\begin{aligned} The resulting matrix of expert opinions = - \bar{M} \\ M = α - \bar{M} \end{aligned}

α is the largest set of matrix lines M, given that in the matrix

\bar{M}

the largest total of the resulting line belongs to (B = 16.1).

Therefore, the elements of the matrix $\bar{M}$ and α – 1/16, 1 multiply the result by the matrix M. Now, having a direct relationship matrix, calculate the intensity of the relationship.

M(I−M)⁻¹ the intensity of direct relationships and M²(I−M)⁻¹ the intensity of indirect relationships is intense.

Since the sum of the unlimited sequences of direct and indirect effects of the elements on each other is calculated as a geometric progression, the indirect effects along the continuous chain will be reduced and removed from the diagram.

The sum of the linear drives of each matrix component M(I−M)−1 indicates the intensity of the effect of the component on other elements. The intensity of the influence of each element on the other elements is called the vector R. The sum of the columnar valves of each matrix component M(I−M)−1. The intensity of the effect of the component indicates the other elements, the intensity of the effect of each element of the other element is called the vector J. The R + J vector shows the weight and significance of the criteria. The actual location of each element in the final hierarchy is determined by the (R−J) and (R + J) columns, (R−J) indicates the position of an element (along the axis of the arrays), and this position, if positive (R−J), is definitely a penetrator. If it is negative, it will definitely be under the influence (receiver). (R + J) indicates the total intensity of an element (along the longitudinal axis) both in terms of penetration and in terms of being affected.

Table 2 lists 40 reasons for not hosting football matches between Iranian and Saudi teams in the AFC Champions League. After ranking the 40 identified reasons, these data indicate that Saudi Arabia's main fear is the Islamic Revolution in other Muslim countries. The second reason is Iran's support for the Arab Spring or the Islamic awakening in the Arab world. In third place is the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in defense of the rights of all Muslims, as well as its aggression toward Israel and the West. In addition, the following reasons were ranked among the last three factors: Saudi Arabia's interaction with Iran in extraditing bodies in the Mena incident, the killing of pilgrims at the Sacred House of God in 1988, and the renaming of the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Gulf.

Table 3 shows the Asian Champions League 2016 football teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia played on neutral grounds. Data indicates that six of Iran’s and Saudi Arabia's football matches in the 2016 AFC Champions League were played on neutral grounds. Three of the matches were played in Oman, while three were played in Qatar.

Table 3.

The Asian Champions League 2016 shows the football teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia played in neutral ground.

Club name	Date held	Stadium venue
Al Hilal Saudi Arabia—tractor Iran	19 April 2016	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Tractor Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	1 May 2016	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al-Atihad Saudi Arabia—Sepahan Iran	20 April 2016	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Sepahan Iran—Al-Atihad Saudi Arabia	4 May 2016	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia—Zobahan Iran	4 May 2016	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Zobahan Iran—Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia	20 April 2016	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman

Table 4 shows the 2017 AFC Champions League matches between the Iranian and Saudi Arabian representative teams. In 2017, each country's representative played 14 matches on neutral grounds. There have been six matches played in Oman, five matches in Qatar, and three matches in the UAE, Dubai.

Table 4.

The Asian Champions League 2017 shows the football teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia played in neutral ground.

Club name	Date held	Stadium venue
Esteghlal Iran—Al Taawoun Saudi Arabia	27 February 2017	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al Taawoun Saudi Arabia—Esteghlal Iran	9 May 2017	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Esteghlal Khuzestan Iran—Al Fateh Saudi Arabia	20 February 2017	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al Fateh Saudi Arabia—Esteghlal Khuzestan Iran	25 April 2017	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Zobahan Iran—Al Ahly Saudi Arabia	28 February 2017	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al Ahly Saudi Arabia—Zobahan Iran	8 May 2017	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Persepolis Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	21 February 2017	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al Hilal Saudi Arabia—Persepolis Iran	24 April 2017	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Esteghlal Khuzestan Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	23 May 2017	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al Hilal Saudi Arabia—Esteghlal Khuzestan Iran	31 May 2017	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Persepolis Iran—Al Ahly Saudi Arabia	22 August 2017	Zubail Dubai Stadium
Al Ahly Saudi Arabia—Persepolis Iran	12 September 2017	Abu Dhabi's Mohammed bin Zayed Stadium
Al Hilal Saudi Arabia—Persepolis Iran	26 September 2017	Abu Dhabi's Mohammed bin Zayed Stadium
Persepolis Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	17 October 2017	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman

Table 5 provides an overview of the 2018 AFC Champions League matches. The representatives of Iran and Saudi Arabia have played four football matches on neutral grounds in 2018. On the basis of the table, two of the four matches were played in Oman, one in the UAE and one in Kuwait.

Table 5.

The Asian Champions League 2018 shows the football teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia played in neutral ground.

Club name	Date held	Stadium venue
tractor Iran—Al Ahly Saudi Arabia	12 February 2018	Sultan Qaboos Muscat Stadium in Oman
Al Ahly Saudi Arabia—tractor Iran	3 April 2018	Emirates Stadium Al Ain
Esteghlal Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	20 February 2018	Oseib Stadium Oman
Al Hilal Saudi Arabia—Esteghlal Iran	16 April 2018	Kuwait Stadium

Table 6 illustrates the Asian Champions League matches in 2019. Iran and Saudi Arabia played all eight of their football matches on neutral grounds. There were three matches held in Qatar and five matches played in the UAE.

Table 6.

The Asian Champions League 2019 shows the football teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia played in neutral ground.

Club name	Date held	Stadium venue
Zobahan Iran—Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia	29 May 2019	Qatar‘s Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia—Zobahan Iran	11 March 2019	Al Maktoum Stadium in Dubai
Esteghlal Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	8 April 2019	Qatar’s Hamad Bin Khalifa Stadium
Al Hilal Saudi Arabia—Esteghlal Iran	23 April 2019	Emirates Stadium Mohammed bin Zayed
Persepolis Iran—Al Ahly Saudi Arabia	9 April 2019	Zubail Dubai Stadium
Al Ahly Saudi Arabia—Persepolis Iran	22 April 2019	Al Maktoum Stadium in Dubai
Al-Atihad Saudi Arabia—Zobahan Iran	26 July 2019	Zubail Dubai Stadium
Zobahan Iran—Al-Atihad Saudi Arabia	12 August 2019	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium

In table 7, there are eight matches between the representative teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the group stage of the Asian Champions League in 2020. Five matches were played in the UAE, one in Kuwait, one in Qatar, and one in Bahrain.

Table 7.

The Asian Champions League 2020 shows the football teams of Iran and Saudi Arabia played in neutral ground.

Club name	Date held	Stadium venue
Esteghlal Iran—Al Ahly Saudi Arabia	5 May 2020	Al Maktoum Stadium in Dubai
Al Ahly Saudi Arabia—Esteghlal Iran	17 February 2020	Jabr al-Ahmad Stadium Kuwait
Shahr Khodrou Iran—Al Hilal Saudi Arabia	21 April 2020	Al Rashid Stadium Dubai
Persepolis Iran—Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia	30 September 2020	Qatar's Jassim bin Hamad Stadium
Persepolis Iran—Al Taawoun Saudi Arabia	2 March 2020	Al Maktoum Stadium in Dubai
Al Taawoun Saudi Arabia—Persepolis Iran	7 April 2020	Zubail Dubai Stadium
Sepahan Iran—Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia	2 March 2020	Zubail Dubai Stadium
Al-Nasr Saudi Arabia—Sepahan Iran	6 April 2020	Bahrain Isa Stadium

The results of the tables indicate that 40 Iranian and Saudi football players have competed in neutral matches in the AFC Champions League until the end of the 2020 Group Stage.

Discussion

Sports are no longer merely physical activities; the politics, cultures, economics, and other dimensions of their formation space affect their nature. Sports also promote public mobilization, emotion, economic development, media propaganda, and create nationalization and national convergence, which urge governments to pay attention to sports. The creation of new concepts such as sports policy and sports diplomacy among the powers involved in international politics signifies creating a new field for political interactions in a different form from the battlefield or naked political negotiations (Fazeli, 2012). Today, football has become a part of communities’ lives, and it is one of the necessities of the modern world. It plays an essential role in the economics and development of societies and can even be a reflection of community culture. Therefore, the World Cup offers the countries an opportunity to increase public diplomacy and expand their culture and values in the broader context. In other words, football is a global affair and has created a common global language (Noori et al., 2018).

This study's primary purpose was to investigate the political reasons for not hosting the AFC Champions League between Iran and Saudi Arabia teams after 2016. The results showed that the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are two strong traditional rivals in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Since the Islamic Revolution, the two countries have been competing on various regional issues and have become more acute following developments in the so-called Arab uprisings (the Arab Spring). It has been clearly demonstrated in some Arab countries (Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen) and has led the two countries to take positions and activities against each other. Thus, these two countries’ competitions in the four studied areas can be seen as strategic and geopolitical in nature. While ideological differences exist (Shia vs Sunni), it is clear that the element of strategy between these two countries toward each other is in jeopardy, which guides their actions at the regional level in the four cited countries (Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen).

The results showed that the main political reason for the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia for not hosting the AFC Champions League football matches is Saudi Arabia's fear of the Islamic Revolution in other Muslim countries. This finding is consistent with Mirza et al. (2021), they identified that the sources of their rivalry are structural and can be explained by their aspirations for leadership of the Muslim world, religious-sectarianism, antithetical governance structures, and the Iranian nuclear program.

In order to find solutions for Iran and Saudi Arabia's relationship, Alaei (2019), in a study examining Iran–Saudi Arabian political and competitive approaches and anti-hostility mechanisms, explains that the two countries are moving toward regional convergence, adaptation, understanding, interaction, and cooperation. To this end, the parties must respect each other by accepting all differences, recognizing each other's interests, and relying on commonalities. Explicit, clear, and consistent negotiations can lead to cultural, security, and economic ties between the two countries. Moreover, he added designing a joint or multilateral security system in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play a decisive role is an appropriate structural solution and suitable mechanism to reduce conflicts and the level of hostility between the two countries. Besides, it is argued by Ahmadzadeh et al. (2019) that Iran can gain a level of legitimacy in public opinion and among the Arab world by providing a peaceful and rational political brand of its political leaders internationally, as well as introducing a leading Iranian model in adapting religion to new and emerging developments. In this way, the Islamic Republic of Iran can come up with a rational and prudent strategy to neutralize the Arab–Islamic nationwide coalition of Saudi rulers.

The main political reason is the Iranian foreign policy toward Islamic rights, freedom movements, and aggression against Israel and the West. Additionally, the Iranian support for the Arab Spring, ethnic-religious conflicts, Iran's conflict with the United States and Israel, and Saudi Arabia's backing for these countries are also significant factors that led to Iran and Saudi Arabia's governments declaring that they would not compete in each other's country in the Asian Championship League. Moreover, these findings are consistent with those of Mirza et al. (2021) and Motaghi (2015). According to them, there are several factors that have contributed to the increasing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, such as the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, and Iran supporting opposing groups in affected states, causing unrest in the Middle East, and disrupting its power structure. Additionally, there is lack of common societal norms, images, and identities between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as geopolitical competition.

The results also showed that due to some political problems between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Asian Champions League football matches in which Iranian and Saudi teams play together had been held on a third ground since January 2016. Shariati Feizabadi (2019), in a comparative study of sports diplomacy in the development of foreign relations between Iran and selected countries, states that post-revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran sports has undergone high and positive developments. Despite its growth in popularity, especially on the international stage, it has not yet found a suitable model from the point of view of sports diplomacy. Iran's diplomatic relations politicians still lack an understanding of the diplomatic power of Iranian athletes, referees, coaches, and Iran's athletic position compared to countries like Brazil, Russia, China, and even neighboring Turkey. While other countries use sports indirectly to deliver their message to the global community, this issue is neglected in Iran's diplomacy system. As a result of the lack of links between the sectors of international relations and sports, and as a result of the view of sports as “backyard life,” diplomatic decision-makers of the country have been denied low-cost opportunities that could have been beneficial diplomatically for the country.

Elahi Manesh and Sayad (2018) examined the standard cultural components in politics and football (a case study of contemporary Iran). They state that despite the differences between politics and sport due to being influenced by culture, there are commonalities among them. With a sociological approach to politics and sport, proper discipline, and long-term cultural planning by the elite of politics and government in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is possible to reinforce the positive components and reduce the negative ones. Malakoutian (2009) and Mohammadi Azizabadi (2017) believes that sports can play the following important and strategic roles in the relations of nations and governments at different levels: improving and correcting the image of a nation; fostering friendship, enhancing peace, and developing inter-nation comity; promoting trade and tourism; encouraging international development; unifying minorities; and, most importantly, improving international relations for friendship between nations. In other words, sports can be used by geopoliticians, diplomats and policymakers, and political representatives of governments and nations, organizations, various international relations actors, and regional actors to strengthen relations, aid peacebuilding, and improve international relations.

Conclusion

Generally, based on the findings in this study, it is concluded that resolving soccer diplomacy issues requires lengthy and challenging decision-making processes, which are in the hands of heterogeneous groups of stakeholders. In addition, the specific political complexities of governance and sociological and management issues have made football and diplomacy unable to keep pace with international trends such as countries with football diplomacy. Meanwhile, football's over-dependence on the government and structural problems necessitate cooperation between the authorities and administrators in different areas of the country to solve the issue of football diplomacy.

In order to solve the Saudi–Iranian problem, public diplomacy could also solve the crisis created by their relationship and be the first step to getting the elites and politicians of the two countries to talk to each other. In the public diplomacy debate, sports diplomacy is referred to, for example, a friendly sports event between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Sports diplomacy is a strategy to get out of the political blockade with Saudi Arabia and an example of what happened between China and the United States in the 1980s called “ping-pong diplomacy.” There were no diplomatic relations between the two countries during those days. A table tennis tournament in China and an invitation to the US national team helped establish relations between the two countries. Based on the factors identified in the present study, it is recommended that the authorities address these challenges by studying the present study. They are advised to rely on the results of the research to ensure the peace and security of the two states, as well as achieve common ground between them.

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Fateme Zare

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