Discontents and Resistance of ‘Unverified’ Ex-combatants and Challenges to their Rehabilitation in Nepal

Dimension 1: Programmatic Context and Approach

In the literature, the political context is identified as an important element which affects the programmatic context of rehabilitation. Poulingy (2004) argues that transitional politics matter because every DDR programme, of which rehabilitation and reintegration are essential elements, involves politics and a politicized sequence of activities, and, in turn, it can affect national and local politics in one way or other. Understanding the complex relationship between the political economy of peace and DDR can provide better insights into how post-conflict politics may facilitate, but also impede, outcomes of a DDR programme (Bleie and Shrestha 2012; de Zeeuw 2008; Muggah 2009). Knight (2008), therefore, suggests the need to understand a DDR programme as a continuation of political dialogue, not just a programmatic undertaking. Similarly, Berdal (1996) argues that ‘political will’ becomes a chief criterion for the success of a DDR programme.

Apart from political context, the literature shows that the approach a rehabilitation programme may take largely determines how and what changes it brings to the lives of ex-combatants. Two different types of models are discussed in this regard. The first is the ‘ex-combatant-focused model’ which puts individual ex-combatants at the centre and advocates preferential treatment for individual ex-combatants. With recommendations to take a context-specific approach to reintegration, UNDP (2005: 52) mentions that the ex-combatant-focused approach suggests the need to provide ex-combatants with tailored, ‘individually-focused’, support for long-term reintegration.

By contrast, the second model, the community-focused model, expands the target beneficiary of the rehabilitation programme by incorporating ex-combatants’ families as well as the communities that receive returnee ex-combatants (UN 2006). Some argue that benefitting ex-combatants, many of whom may have had committed atrocities, and disregarding the suffering and grievances of other vulnerable and conflict-affected categories, such as unemployed youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), war-widows and the households which have lost family members as well as physical property in the conflict, can lead to new social tensions (Annan and Patel 2009; Kingma and Muggah 2009: 13). Last (1999), on the other hand, maintains that preferential treatment is essential for averting banditry among particular ex-combatants. The preferential system can have political objectives and meaning, as the system can help in motivating the target ex-combatants to accept and participate in the rehabilitation programme.

There is not a straight forward solution to this dilemma. A number of contextual factors, including the overall political objectives of the rehabilitation programme, need to be taken into account in selecting beneficiaries. For instance, if a rehabilitation programme is designed for a very limited timeframe, the community-focused model might not be viable. Similarly, if the ex-combatants are scattered across regions of the country, focusing on a particular community could be enormously challenging (Bleie and Shrestha 2012).

Dimension 2: Personal and Social Circumstances and Networks of Ex-combatants

The personal and social circumstances and background of ex-combatants, such as connections with their families and relatives and their relationships, interaction and trust with their personal and social networks—collectively known as ‘social capital’—are important enabling factors for successful rehabilitation (Leff 2008). Family is an important dimension in relation to an ex-combatant’s personal and social circumstances. How and to what extent ex-combatants maintain their relationships with family can have enormous effects on the success of the reintegration programme (Knight 2008). Evidence from Nepal suggests that such a protective role by families becomes useful, as these factors can facilitate smooth rehabilitation of ex-combatants (KC 2011).

In a case study in Lebanon, Kari Karame (2009) shows that the way in which the combatants managed to keep close contact with their families was one of the enabling factors for their successful economic reintegration. Although, family links play a vital role in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants, Dolan and Schafer (1997) state that, in some cases, it is extremely difficult to trace the families of ex-combatants, and that those who were detached from their families at an early age can be reluctant to return to them.

Individual ex-combatants’ personal circumstances, such as family commitments and responsibilities, as well as relationships and networks in the communities in which they are to be rehabilitated, can directly and indirectly shape their perceptions about the reintegration programme and livelihood choices that they make out of rehabilitation support (Lamb 2011: 17). Lamb further argues that such personal circumstances can also significantly influence their decisions about participating or non-participating in the rehabilitation programme.

Dimension 3: Post-conflict Economic Condition

Successful rehabilitation can be significantly shaped by both micro and macroeconomic factors in the environments in which ex-combatants are to be rehabilitated (Lamb 2011). Macroeconomic factors such as structural adjustment programmes, economic reforms, a narrow industrial base, labour market saturation, high inflation and high military expenditure affect economic rehabilitation support, such as vocational training and microenterprise development (Özerdem 2009: 24). At the micro level, economic reintegration is meant to restore sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants, which according to Porto et al. (2007: 141) requires ‘the stabilisation of the macro-economic situation in the country for which the revitalization of the national economy (strengthening the business sector both public and private) is extremely important, as is financial stabilisation’. Porto et al. imply that both micro and macroeconomic conditions are closely interlinked and thus, have a role to play in creating favourable conditions for a successful rehabilitation programme.

However, micro and macro economics in post-conflict situations are generally plagued by several shortcomings, such as poor employment opportunities, lack of physical infrastructure and inadequate economic development policies, as well as informal and shadow economic activities which undermine the growth of the formal economic sector (Lamb 2011; Upreti 2010). Therefore, emphasis should be given to linking the rehabilitation programme with post-conflict economic recovery and development initiatives (Bragg 2006; ILO 2009; Knight and Özerdem 2004; SIDDR 2006; UN 2000).

Job creation is an important element of economic rehabilitation (ILO 2009). In this regard, economic rehabilitation aims either to improve employability of ex-combatants through skill development training and job creation (ILO 2009; Specht 2010), or to promote self-employment or self-entrepreneurship after receiving relevant technical education or vocational training (Body 2006; ILO 1997). In both circumstances, negative economic indicators such as slow economic growth and sluggish development can have adverse effects. For instance, the creation of alternative livelihoods and/or jobs is exceptionally difficult in conflict or post-conflict economies, in which a number of unemployed young people compete for a limited number of opportunities (UN 2010). Similarly, skill and vocational training have the risk of being ‘supply-driven’, as the skill does not often match the demand in the market. Consequently, the chances of involvement of ex-combatants in the informal and ‘shadow’ economy may increase (Lamb 2011). Body (2006: 4), therefore, recommends selecting vocational training and technical skills for ex-combatants by taking into account their individual skills, needs, age, education and interests, as well as undertaking an assessment of the local economic context. A mismatch between demand and supply in terms of training and employment can exacerbate grievances of the ex-combatants and push them into alternative ‘violent’ or ‘criminal’ means of livelihood.

Dimension 4: National and Local Ownership and Collaboration

Promoting ownership by national government and fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships between government, international agencies, civil society and the private sector determines the outcome of a rehabilitation programme (UN 2006). SIDDR (2006) recommends promoting national and local ownership of rehabilitation programmes. Such ownership has both governance and political elements, because it requires an effective and transparent governance system and special institutional arrangements, which may be contingent upon the political process and the character of the DDR programme (Muggah et al. 2009).

Attached to ownership is the issue of partnership and collaboration. While the role of civil society is recommended (SIDDR 2006), local ownership and collaboration also depends on the initiative of the ex-combatants together with their families, and the support they receive from their communities, the government, non-government organizations (NGOs) and other forms of external assistance (Kingma and Muggah 2009).

Because of its capacity to offer jobs to ex-combatants, the private sector (PS) can be an important actor (Colletta et al. 1996; International Alert 2006; SIDDR 2006). However, the PS itself is one of the victims of a fragile post-conflict economy. Creating an enabling environment to harness the capacity of the PS to navigate post-conflict economic growth, and thereby create more jobs is, therefore, recommendable. Reduction of barriers to doing business, access to credit, technology and technical support are some of the recommendations made by SIDDR (2006: 29) in order to motivate the PS to contribute to the rehabilitation of ex-combatants. Despite this optimism, the PS is often hesitant to provide jobs for ex-combatants because of their militarized past. Lack of trust between the PS as employer and the ex-combatants as employees could, therefore, be a barrier for successful rehabilitation of ex-combatants in the local economies.

Politicization of UNIRP

From the outset, the unfavourable political environment and the politicization of the issue of including VMLRs in the rehabilitation programme remained a key challenge to the UNIRP. In fact, there was vital conflict of interest between major political parties. In this regard, this study found two pertinent issues that have had considerable negative effects on the rehabilitation programme.

First, the major political parties, including the CPNM, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) had sharply differing views on developing the modality of the rehabilitation package. It was this deep political division which delayed the discharge of VMLRs from cantonments for three years. The position of the NC was that the VMLRs should leave the cantonments immediately after their verification and that the Maoists initiate the process without any delay. Arguing that it is the CPNM which should be more responsible for the VMLRs, the NC-led government maintained a somewhat biased and rigid position in terms of providing a comprehensive rehabilitation package to VMLRs. In sharp contrast, the CPNM maintained that the VMLRs should be treated the same as other qualified ex-combatants. The Maoist wanted the government (led by the NC) to design a rehabilitation package which should be dignified and acceptable to VMLRs, although, the notion of ‘dignified rehabilitation’ was ambiguous. The CPN-UML, which held a middle-path approach to this debate, proposed that the government offer a rehabilitation package, with a value equivalent of less than ₹ 100,000 per VMLRs (interview with an officer from the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in Kathmandu, October 2011). It is notable that the entire process of management of the Maoists ex-combatants in Nepal was highly politicized, in which the lack of common understanding and shared outcomes of the DDR process seriously altered the modality, function and results of the management of the Maoist ex-combatants (Bleie and Shrestha 2012; Subedi 2013a).

While agreement on the rehabilitation package continued to be marred by deeply divided politics, the CPNM was under mounting pressure from the international community, including UNMIN and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Children and Armed Conflict, to release the VMLRs from cantonments immediately. In the meantime, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 Action Plan was signed by the CPNM, the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the UN. Following the signing of the action plan, amidst the political debate about a rehabilitation package, the CPNM made a unilateral decision to discharge the VMLRs from cantonments. Started in January 2010, the discharge process was entirely led by the CPNM with an almost non-existent involvement of the government. The CPNM’s unilateral decision to discharge the VMLRs and lack of the government’s involvement in the process was an outcome of their conflicting views towards VMLRs which marred the rehabilitation process.

Second, and as a consequence of politicization of rehabilitation, the UNIPR had to operate in an extremely sensitive and fragile political environment which caused institutional and operational difficulties for the UNIRP. For instance, the rehabilitation programme was envisioned as a six-stage linear process, involving the following sequence: (a) information and consultation; (b) profiling survey of combatants; (c) discharge from cantonments; (d) orientation and counselling in the transit centre; (e) rehabilitation with technical education and vocational training support; and (f) post-training support and monitoring. However, the second stage could not be conducted because the CPNM did not allow the government and the UN staff to collect personal information from VMLRs inside cantonments. This rejection demonstrates the degree of fear, mistrust and growing political animosity between the CPNM and the government, particularly when it involved collecting sensitive information about the ex-combatants. Due to the lack of the profiling survey, which was intended to document an individual ex-combatant’s existing skills, educational capacity and their further interests, the UNIRP could not obtain any baseline data. Lack of this data meant that the UNIRP had limitations in addressing the needs, interests and aspirations of the VMLRs, as well as to monitor and evaluate the progress of the programme.

Inadequate Planning and Preparations

The sudden unilateral discharge of VMLRs necessitated a prompt response to provide rehabilitation to the frustrated, angry and disillusioned VMLRs. A delay in their rehabilitation would inevitably have led to their involvement in criminal activities. The rehabilitation programme was, therefore, designed without adequate preparation. A well-prepared commencement of the programme would have made a difference in various ways. For instance, it would have provided adequate time to conduct a market survey, taking into account the realities of the local and national economy. However, a rigorous market survey prior to the rehabilitation package did not occur due to time constraints. Appropriate preparation time would also have enabled the UNIRP to adequately disseminate the information about the programme to the VMLRs.

Individual Combatant-focused ‘Minimalist’ Rehabilitation

Interviews suggest that the VMLRs’ rehabilitation programme was largely individual, ex-combatant-focused. Even some VMLRs’ families which were in dire need of economic help did not receive any support from the programme. This study found two factors which have shaped the ex-combatant-focused nature of the rehabilitation programme.

First, the UNIPR was designed to tackle the socio-economic issues and concerns of the VMLRs in an expedited manner. The programme was, therefore, specifically designed to keep the ex-combatants engaged in training and entrepreneurship skill development, so that it would avert their remobilization and engagement in ‘violent’ means of livelihood. From this point of view, the UNIRP, in one way or another appeared akin to a short-term stabilization programme in which comprehensive attention to the VMLRs’ families and community remained out focused. During the fieldwork, many ex-combatants asserted that although, the family did not complain, many felt that some form of material support targeting the ex-combatants families would have not only helped their families to recover from the economic burden but also made smoother the acceptance of ex-combatants into the family.

Second, the VMLRs were not only dispersed across the regions and districts, many of them also moved gradually from their origin to urban areas, either in search of employment or because they found it easier to live in new communities among which their past was unknown. Thus, from an operational point of view, the UNIRP had a limitation to emphasize a community-centred approach mainly due to the highly dispersed concentration and mobile nature of VMLRs.

Focusing more on the harnessing of the ex-combatants’ vocational, technical and entrepreneurship development skills, and less on social reintegration, the rehabilitation programme has indeed taken an approach which has emphasized bringing the VMLRs ‘back to work’, rather than ‘back to community’. According to a female respondent who worked in a UN agency in Kathmandu, the ‘back to work’ approach, which dominated the UNIRP with the intention to transform the VMLRs’ identity through jobs and entrepreneurship, actually missed an opportunity to reconnect some VMLRs with their family and communities of their origin, who had various difficulties in doing so.

Notion of Disqualified Combatants and (non)-Participation in the UNIRP

Definition of the term ‘ex-combatant’ is vague and contested in the literature. When used in the context of DDR programmes, the United Nations officially recognizes fighters as ex-combatants after they have been registered as disarmed (UN 1999). The international community defines ex-combatants based on an individual’s direct participation in hostilities, violence and atrocities and the degree to which he/she commits harm to enemy personnel as well as material (Lindsey 2001). Nilsson (2005) states that an individual who is directly involved in intra-state armed conflict and hostility, has caused violence and damages to physical material, and has been registered as ‘disarmed’, can be considered an ex-combatant. While this broad definition is certainly useful, it should, however, be recognized that some individuals who directly participated in armed conflict and insurgencies might not be officially disarmed, or may not be officially registered as a combatant. This is exactly the case in Nepal, where some of the Maoist PLA combatants were registered for verification, but were not considered eligible ex-combatants. The UNMIN initially classified the VMLRs as ‘disqualified’ combatants (IRIN 2012; Martin 2012; Pokharel 2012; Subedi 2013a). ⁴

The literal translation of ‘disqualified’ into Nepali language is ayogya, which has several negative connotations in the Nepali society (Bleie and Shrestha 2012). For instance, to be ayogya means, among other things, to be virtually useless, redundant, unfit, or incapable of anything good. The term was coined locally, to refer to the group of combatants who were not eligible based on their age and timing of recruitment. However, the term was received as a derogatory label. ‘Unverified’, instead of ‘disqualified’, would have been more appropriate and less derogative for those who were unsuccessful in the UN-verification process. The term came into usage without considering its potential sensitivity and negative connotations, and to a certain extent, it also reflected the UNMIN’s naivety and lack of sensitivity. When the use of the term was vehemently rejected by the ex-combatants, resulting in intermittent backlashes, the UNMIN and UN agencies eventually replaced the term by the less inflammatory VMLRs.This experience ultimately created an unfavourable operational environment for UNIRP and led to damaging social and psychological effects on the rehabilitation programme.

The use of the term, and the stigma, humiliation and feeling of rejection that it carried, was one of a few reasons why many VMLRs could not return to their villages and families. An ex-combatant in Dhangadi said, ‘being called “disqualified” is humiliating and carries a lot of social stigma. I cannot go to my villages because people call me “disqualified”; it hurts me badly’ (interview with a VMLR in Dhangadi, December 2011). The notion of ‘disqualified’ combatants therefore, generated the VMLRs’ negative perception and narratives towards UNIRP. As a consequence, while many rejected the UNIRP package, others became dubious about the UNIRP’s credibility to support them. In both circumstances, the UNIRP experienced the VMLRs’ rejection and non-participation in the programme.

Dependency Syndrome and Politics of (Dis)Engagement in Rehabilitation

This study found that a sizeable number of VMLRs developed a dependency on their commanders and CPNM leaders. This dependency syndrome was partly driven by VMLRs’ prolonged stay in the cantonments. Having lived in cantonments along with verified ex-combatants for more than three years, the VMLRs not only deeply associated themselves with the ex-combatants’ ‘war family’, but also substantially increased their expectations, particularly in terms of receiving similar support and benefits as other qualified ex-combatants. In the meantime, their expectations were raised by the PLA commanders and CPNM leaders who made unreasonable promises. For instance, a male VMLR interviewed in Dhangadi (December 2011) said:

We [VMLRs] were always told that we will be treated as equally as other fellows, so called ‘qualified’ combatants. The party leaders including Comrade Prachanda and PLA commanders always assured us that it was the UNMIN which classified us as ‘disqualified’, but they [Maoist leaders and PLA commanders] have not done and will never do so.

Making such high promises was indeed a tool used to retain VMLR’s loyalty towards the PLA commanders and CPNM leaders. As its consequence, it restrengthened some of the VMLRs’ dependency on their leadership.

Such dependency had particular effects on some of the VMLRs’ choice and decision to participate in the rehabilitation programme, because, in many places, commanders and the CPNM leaders discouraged and, in some cases, even restricted VMLRs participation in the rehabilitation programme. VMLRs from the far-west region (particularly in Bardiya, Kailali and Mahendra Nagar districts) and eastern region (Jhapa, Morang, Ilam, Dhankuta and Taplejung districts) were more discouraged than the central region. It was partly for this reason that the caseload was only about 1,585 by the middle of 2010 (UNIRP 2012), although, this figure increased towards the end of the same year (interview with UNIRP staffer in Kathmandu, November 2011).

Following the discharge of VMLRs from cantonments, the CPNM not only discouraged them from taking up any rehabilitation package, it also provided them with group accommodation, regular monthly allowances and rations. In Dhangadi district alone, the VMLRs who did not take up any rehabilitation package were accommodated in two rented shared houses. In several districts in the eastern region (Morang, Jhapa and Taplejung), as well as in Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Lalitpur, the VMLRs lived in shared accommodation arranged by the respective district office of the CPNM.

During the field visit, it was observed that these groups had a strong connection with nearby cantonments. The shared accommodation, in a way, looked like a ‘proxy-cantonment’. The PLA assigned a commander who was responsible for managing the VMLRs in a given shared accommodation. The assigned commander facilitated and coordinated with the PLA in cantonments, as well as the respective district committee of the party, to manage rations and other necessary expenses. Initially, discouragement of the VMLRs from participating in the rehabilitation programme was, to a certain extent, inspired by the prospect of their remobilization in the Maoist’s contentious politics through its various sister organizations, most notably the Young Communist League (YCL). Nonetheless, a number of interviews also suggested that many VMLRs could not return to their villages owing to the stigma attached to their ‘disqualified’ status; therefore, they demanded that the party arrange for them to live in groups. Almost all VMLRs interviewed preferred to live in the group, because doing so would increase their collective bargaining capacity, not only with the party but also with the government. Furthermore, group living assured them their physical safety and security. A male VMLR in an FGD in Dhangadi (December 2011) said:

Living together with fellow combatants and being in constant contact with commanders has provided us a sense of security and belongingness to the PLA family of which we are and will be integral part.

These dynamics, however, changed over time. The ex-combatants who did not participate in the rehabilitation programme began to feel ‘left out’. They formed a national struggle committee and began to organize struggle programmes against their own party for not taking any initiatives to provide them with an attractive and dignified rehabilitation package. ⁵ The struggle committee even presented a memorandum to the government, requesting it to be ready to revise and offer an attractive rehabilitation package. Those living in rented houses gradually became a burden, particularly an economic burden, to the PLA. In the meantime, the CPNM decided to dissolve the YCL which made the VMLRs, who were then branded as YCL workers, redundant. The district leaders and PLA commanders, therefore, gradually began to encourage the VMLRs to join the rehabilitation programme. In the meantime, the VMLRs who had participated in the rehabilitation programme began to show some achievements by earning modest livings on their own. As a consequence of these various factors and changing circumstances, the case load in the UNIRP programme increased dramatically at a time when the programme was going to end (interview with UNIRP staff, Kathmandu, August 2011). Consequently, by July 2012, net enrolment in the training and education programme of the UNIRP increased to 54 per cent (UNIRP 2012).

The Rehabilitation Package: Ex-combatants’ Mixed Perceptions

All the VMLRs interviewed in the field explicitly and consistently expressed that the rehabilitation package was ‘undignified, irrelevant and inadequate’. Their dissatisfaction towards the package had two dimensions. First, there has been a typical stereotyping of certain agricultural and labour intensive works and jobs in Nepalese society. Such labour intensive work attaches perceived low social status and indignity in the social hierarchy. Partly because of this social perception and also partly because the ex-combatants feel that their association with the war has empowered and elevated them socially, the VMLRs considered some traditional training schemes, such as poultry farming and motorcycle repairing, to be undignified and unsuitable for ex-combatants. Training packages which involved modern technology, such as mobile-phone repairing, were popular among most male ex-combatants.

Second, the intensity and timeframe of the training programme for the VMLRs was not enough. The VMLRs came from a distinct background; they did not possess the basic requirements and competencies to join any vocational and entrepreneurship development. Additionally, the training programme was fast tracked, which made it difficult for most ex-combatants to keep pace. A female ex-combatant who was doing tailoring training in Itahari said:

I was in the war for several years and then I spent an idle life in cantonments for three years. Now I am in tailoring training which is very intensive and I am having difficulty in learning so many things in such a short timeframe.

Another VMLR who was employed as a cook in a restaurant in Belbari, Morang, said that the content of the training was not only inadequate but it was also outdated. Although, the UNIRP offered support to upgrade skills, it was found that many VMLRs were not aware of this provision introduced later in the UNIRP.

Owing to the lack of a proper survey of the ex-combatants’ aspirations and needs, there was a mismatch between VMLRs’ expectations and what the UNIRP delivered. Many ex-combatants either preferred cash instead of training or a suitable foreign employment. Hasty planning by the UNIRP and the lack of an adequate market survey resulted in selecting and offering traditional training schemes which were not so appealing to the ex-combatants.

Participation in UNIRP: The Three Categories of VMLRs

In terms of their participation in the training, this study found three distinct categories of VMLRs: engaged, semi-engaged and disengaged. This categorization is based on the assessment of how individual ex-combatants’ personal and social circumstances influenced and framed their responses in terms of participating in the UNIRP.

In the ‘engaged’ category, there were VMLRs who either found the CPNM grip over them frustrating or felt that their dependency on the PLA would not bring anything to transform their lives in the long run. The ex-combatants in this category were already in good contact with their families and wanted to detach themselves from the CPNM. Therefore, driven by an aspiration and commitment to start a new career, they sincerely participated in the package from the beginning.

In the ‘disengaged’ category, the VMLRs did not participate in the rehabilitation programme for a range of factors, such as restriction from the CPNM and dissatisfaction about the package. Many VMLRs were actually being paid more in monthly cash allowances provided by the CPNM for not participating in the UNIRP than what they would have received from the UNIRP; therefore, the short-term incentives of non-participation weighed against participation.

In between was the ‘semi-engaged’ category. Many VMLRs wanted to settle in urban areas or find some better opportunities there. For those seeking such opportunities, taking up a rehabilitation package provided a paid ‘window period’ to find a new way of resettlement. Bleie and Shrestha (2012: 34) calls this phenomenon a ‘springboard’ for finding opportunities in urban areas. Similarly, for many VMLRs whose spouses were still in the cantonment, the UNIRP programme provided a good opportunity for them to buy time to wait for their spouses to be released from the cantonment. A female ex-combatant in Jhapa district interviewed in October 2011 said:

My husband is in a cantonment in Morang district, so I have started poultry farming in Kherkha bazar according to his advice. I will do this business until he is out of the cantonment. Once he leaves the cantonment, we will then again plan something new.

Some VMLRs accessed UNIRP for short-term benefits rather than for utilizing training and skills for a new career. The VMLRs from this category were mobile; therefore, the researcher could not locate many of them at their addresses provided by the UNIRP regional offices. It was also found that the UNIRP lacked a thorough and rigorous monitoring system to follow the progress of the VMLRs who frequently changed their location.

Informal Advice more Important in Selecting the Package

Although, formal career counselling was available in every regional office of the UNIRP and indeed it was mandatory before selecting any package, many VMLRs mentioned that they made their decision based on the advice received from one or many informal sources, including peers (fellow VMLRs), spouses, family members, relatives, CPNM leaders and commanders. Ex-combatants’ reliance on informal sources of counselling and advice was, therefore, more pertinent in selecting the rehabilitation package. When asked why they preferred to follow informal advice when career counselling was available in the UNIRP, an overwhelming number of VMLRs responded that the counselling session was too brief (often lasted for less than an hour), very formal, and, more importantly, they did not have enough time to build rapport with the counsellors.

Many followed advice from fellow VMLRs because this would enable them to live together with fellow ex-combatants during training. This also could open up the possibility of conducting a joint business, in which case the business start-up grant provided by the UNIPR could increase substantially. VMLRs also experienced a lack of adequate information about the package, its basic requirements and future prospects—another reason for relying on informal advice.

According to a counsellor working in the UNICEF, VMLRs had very limited trust and confidence in the UNIRP itself. The distrust increased partly because of the way the CPNM defamed the UNIRP and discouraged VMLRs from taking up any rehabilitation package. On the other hand, ex-combatants had trust either in the member of their biological family, the war network such as fellow combatants, their spouse (in most cases, who also served as combatants or CPNM party workers), the CPNM leaders, or commanders who had more influence than the UNIRP staff over the VMLRs’ decisions and choices of a rehabilitation package.

Family and Relatives, an Enabling Factor

A significant number of ex-combatants interviewed stated that although, there was not any restriction from the PLA on contacting their families, they were not able to visit them regularly, because either they were too busy in the war or there were security risks involved. Nonetheless, many mentioned that they were able to maintain communication with their families and relatives during the war period. A female VMLR ex-combatant in Itahari in October 2011 stated:

I could not visit my family because a lot of people were spying and I could be immediately killed by the police or army but I kept on communicating with them by phone or sending letters in the hands of people from my area.

This and several other similar testimonies show that connection between ex-combatants and their families survived in one way or other. Many ex-combatants strengthened their contacts with their families and relatives during their stay in cantonments. Ex-combatants were granted leave from cantonment for an approved period of time. Many ex-combatants utilized the time for catching up with family and relatives. Several ex-combatants mentioned that they even discussed their future plans with the family members during this period. A sizeable number of ex-combatants did not return to cantonments as many of them allegedly went for foreign employment, with the support of their families and relatives. ⁶ It is found in the fieldwork that there was a sizable number of VMLRs who had either no immediate family or they did not want to contact them. This category was found to be heavily dependent on the war network for their decision making.

Over time, the contacts established with family appeared to be beneficial in many VMLRs’ economic rehabilitation. For many VMLRs who chose micro enterprises, the support they received from their family and social network was an enabling factor in setting up their business. ‘I started grocery retail shop in my village because of the support I received from my family; without their financial and moral support I could not even think of doing this business successfully’, said a male VMLR from Jhapa district. Interviews with VMLRs highlight three different types of support: moral and psychological support, physical support and financial support.

In the past, the ex-combatants joined the Maoist insurgency with or without family consent, while many were also forcefully recruited (Mehta and Lawoti 2010; Subedi 2013b). However, regardless of their motivations to join the war, the families of ex-combatants, in general, were ready to extend moral and psychological support. The families which were unhappy with the Maoists facilitated in sending VMLRs to foreign employment, mainly in the Gulf countries, as well as India. Although, there are no actual figures on how many VMLRs left for foreign employment, it is found in the fieldwork that most of the VMLRs who were absent at the time of their discharge ceremony in 2010 might have gone abroad for foreign labour employment with the support of their families and relatives. According to a UN staffer interviewed in Kathmandu in August 2012, many VMLRs who returned from overseas employment later were found to be interested in participating in the UNIRP package towards the middle of 2012.

Many VMLRs, particularly those who started microenterprises, received significant physical and financial support from their families and relatives. Physical support, in general, involved helping in finding a location for the business and setting up the business itself. Access to credit was a major challenge for the VMLRs, mainly because the start-up support provided by the UNIRP was nominal and because the VMLRs had extreme difficulty in accessing the formal credit system, as they did not possess any property to declare as collateral guarantee. Many had received support from their families, to access credit via the local informal credit system and saving-credit cooperatives. A female VMLR from Morang said, ‘the business start-up provided in the form of in-kind support by UNIRP was inadequate. My father helped me to get a loan without which I could not have sustained this business’.

Contrary to a generally held perception that ex-combatants often have difficulties in receiving family support in their reintegration, the Nepali context shows otherwise. The support from family was not only easy to access but it also played a determining role in the VMLRs’ economic rehabilitation. This was possible owing to the typical social reasoning of the Nepalese. In Nepalese society, parents and family elders always maintain their social obligation and moral responsibility towards their children and younger family members, sometimes for extended periods. A male respondent in Kathmandu (interviewed in August 2012) said:

In general, there is not any prescribed age in which young people are to be independent and as long as an individual is not economically independent, family obligations and responsibilities to look after its family members continue to apply. It is precisely due to this typical sense of moral obligation towards one’s family member, young people are often found dependent on their parents even after their marriage.

Thus, why and how the VMLRs were able to receive various kinds of support from the members of their family can be explained by this practice in the Nepali culture.

Unfavourable Economic Conditions

Nepal’s post-conflict economy is characterized by sluggish economic growth. The GDP grew by 3.5 per cent in the 2011 fiscal year, ⁷ which is only slightly higher than the 3.1 per cent average growth rate during the Maoist conflict in 1996–2006 (World Bank 2011: 1). While the industrial sector grew by just 1.4 per cent in the 2010–11 fiscal year and remittance growth slowed to 20 per cent, the inflation rate has been in the double digits for 2010–11 (ibid.: 4). Low private sector investment, limited government spending on infrastructure, disruption of development projects due to instability, disruption of production, trade and transport and public insecurity in both rural and urban areas have resulted in dwindling economic growth and job cuts in the private sector as well the informal economy sector (UN 2011: 3).

According to the 2011 Census, nearly 60 per cent of the total population is under the age of 40 years. In terms of overall employment rate, the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010–11 shows that only 2 per cent of working age population in Nepal is unemployed (CBS 2011). However, more than 81 per cent of workers continue to engage in ‘under-employment’ and ‘vulnerable employment’, defined as unpaid family workers and ‘self-employed’ workers. The low levels of unemployment reflect the compulsion of most workers to take up any kind of work available to them since there are no social protection schemes. In this regard, it is estimated that approximately 30 per cent of Nepal’s labour force is underutilized, and this percentage is much higher in urban areas (49.9 per cent) than in rural areas (32.3 per cent) (ILO 2013).

While the overall macroeconomic indicators have been unfavourable for the rehabilitation programme, marginalization of the post-conflict economic recovery and development agenda by contentious political agendas in the current political transition have further created unfavourable economic conditions for the UNIRP (Subedi 2012).

The Private Sector: Important Actor but Ignored

Apart from a few private service providers involved in delivering vocational and microenterprise training, the PS was not systematically involved in the UNIRP. Although, the PS is an engine of economic growth and the largest job creator (Alexander et al. 2009), it was either unaware or had limited knowledge of the rehabilitation programme. When asked what role the PS could play in creating economic opportunities for the rehabilitated ex-combatants and how the sector could benefit from the UNIPR, private sector interviewees expressed mixed responses. While some believed that the rehabilitation programme could solve the labour shortage in industrial sectors where highly specialized technical skills are needed, others expressed hesitation to offer jobs to the ex-combatants. Because of the ex-combatants’ politicized and militarized backgrounds, business people believed that this could be problematic in the workplace. The decision to offer a job to an ex-combatant depended on how the rehabilitation programme could defuse their politicized and militarized mind-set and how the ex-combatants could become detached from the Maoist party (interview with a business man in Biratnagar, October 2011). Politicized trade unions present a major challenge to the industrial sector in Nepal (Kyloh 2008). In recent times, the CPNM-affiliated trade union has become a major concern for industrial relations (interview with a business man in Biratnagar, October 2011). In this context, business people also expressed concern that ex-combatants would retain links with the CPNM and its sister wings, which could lead to the politicization of the workplace.

As an attempt to involve the PS in the rehabilitation programme, the UNIRP interacted and coordinated with some influential business people and their umbrella organizations, such as the Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI). However, it failed to reach out to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) which occupy the major proportion of the private sector and make a huge contribution to the local and national economy, as well as creating jobs. Building a thorough coordination mechanism involving SMEs would provide the means to foster mutual trust and understanding between business people and former combatants. It could also provide prospective employers with an opportunity to observe the skill level and attitude of potential employees.

Reputation and credibility of training organizations also mattered for the ex-combatants in securing a job. There was more willingness to employ those combatants who graduated from institutes which had a strong reputation and linkage with the private sector, such as the Butwal Technical Institute (BTI; interview with an INGO worker, Kathmandu, October 2011). The training providers also could have played a facilitating role in the linking of graduates with potential employers. However, it was observed that many training institutions were either under-resourced or simply did not have the willingness and capacity to play a facilitating role. In the meantime, some training providers in the districts were sub-contracted. Saferworld (2010: 75) terms them ‘middlemen’ who did not understand the spirit of the programme and, therefore, had very limited ownership of it. Selection of credible training institutions and contracting them to offer post-training support, such as job linkage, counselling, monitoring and follow up, could have made the outcome of rehabilitation more effective.

Urban Centric Economic Rehabilitation

Since an overwhelming majority of ex-combatants including VMLRs who graduated from training programmes have been living in urban and semi-urban areas, particularly in the southern belt of the country, known as Terai, along the east and west highway, as well as in the Kathmandu valley (Subedi 2014), the economic rehabilitation of VMLRs ultimately appeared to be ‘urban centric’.

This study finds two dimensions of the urban centric rehabilitation: economic and social. Economically, the Terai region and Kathmandu are two major economic hubs in the country. Major industrial corridors such as the Morang–Sunsari industrial corridor and the Bara–Parsa industrial corridor are located in this region. Since economic opportunities are more available in the Terai region than the hills and mountains, big cities like Biratnagar, Birgunj, Butwal, Bhairahawa, Nepalgunj and Dhangadi are lucrative destinations from the employment and business point of view. Kathmandu, on the other hand, is seen as the land of opportunity. Thus, following the pathways to economic opportunities, many VMLRs that graduated from UNIRP landed in urban and semi-urban areas.

Socially, it was found that most of the VMLRs did not wish to return to the village for a host of social reasons, but perhaps most importantly because of the social stigma attached to their having been labelled as ‘disqualified’ combatants. The city spaces, in such circumstances, could help them to conceal their past identity and create a new civilian identity.

Rural–urban migration as well as foreign labour migration is growing at an unprecedented scale in Nepal. On the one hand, this new trajectory of internal and international migration has been gradually creating regional imbalances in terms of availability of human capital and business activities. On the other hand, the agriculture sector which is the backbone of Nepal’s economy has been suffering deeply from shortages of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The rehabilitation programme could have helped to address such imbalances by producing skilled and semi-skilled human capital in agro and agro-related sectors. This contribution would have to be more valuable and meaningful for agrarian transformation, which is essential for the economic development of post-conflict Nepal (interview with a civil society leader in Dhangadi, December 2011). Since the Maoist rejected agriculture-related training components, UNIRP lost the opportunity to contribute to human capital development in the agricultural sector. The rehabilitation programme ended up contributing to an already rapidly increasing rural–urban migration.