Does the Sensitivity of Firm Performance Impact the Determinants of CEO Compensations? An Empirical Evidence with Saudi Insurance Companies

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of insurance companies’ performance determinants that affect the CEO’s compensations in the emerging market for insurers. The researchers have pooled data for 10 Saudi insurance companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange (TADAWUL) and applied different regression models to assess the relationship between the various CEO compensations packages and insurance companies’ performance. A linear regression model was the better model fitting to explain the data well. The dependent variable is the CEO’s compensations measured by using salaries, allowances and bonuses. Five variables had used as independent variables besides two variables as insurer-specific control variables. We found a significant positive impact between the total earned premiums, the net incomes and CEO compensations. But relationship between investments, assets and revenues and CEO compensations was negative. At the same time there is no relationship between profit per stock, and the insurer’s age and CEO compensations.

Keywords

CEO executive compensations hypothesis testing performance sensitivity regression models Saudi insurance companies

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