Transferable Utility in the Case of Many Private and Many Public Goods

Abstract

It is possible to have income effects on more than one good in utility profiles that lead to Transferable Utility (TU) and in the presence of many private and many public goods. Assuming that the utility functions are of the Generalized Quasi-linear (GQL) form is not necessary for TU to hold. I present a much broader class of utility profiles generating TU in which GQL emerges as a special case.

Keywords

Transferable utility allocative efficiency independent of distribution generalized quasi linear utility functions linear income expansion paths

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