Abstract
The armed struggle launched by United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) since the late 1970s for Swadhin Asom (independent Assam) and its reaction, appreciation, endorsement and critique in the civil society is an interesting case for investigation on how civil society works in India’s Northeast. Historically, civil society in Assam has been a domain of manifestations of grievances against the state, particularly, against the Government of India (GoI). As a result, the civil society in Assam has almost been overtaken by the passion of the ULFA, which steered armed struggle for Assam’s independence. Although the civil society did not endorse the path of violence pursued by ULFA for its proclaimed goal of Assam’s independence, a comprehensive critical voice against the militancy and violence pursued by it, has been almost absent. Only a few individuals consistently maintained a critique on ULFA from its inception.
In more than three decades of ULFA–GoI conflict, the civil society has undergone through different experiences—from being overtaken by collective passion for the cause raised by ULFA to complete subjugation and marginalization under coercion both by the Indian state and the ULFA, and to that of gradual revival as a critical domain to question both the state and ULFA. The present article is an attempt to examine this trajectory of the civil society in Assam vis-à-vis ULFA.
Keywords
Civil Society as Contested Domain
The idea of civil society has made a dramatic return recently attaining diverse popularity. Pointing this out, Kaviraj and Khilnani (2002) argue that such popularity, however, creates a problem of indeterminacy for the idea of civil society (p. 1). They have also argued that the idea itself may carry different meanings and may also stand for different ideals. They have further argued that ‘Invoked at the same time as the diagnosis and as the cure for current ills, deployed by conservatives, liberals, and radical utopians alike, by oppositional movements and by international aid donors, civil society has become an ideological rendezvous for erstwhile antagonists’ (Kaviraj & Khilnani, 2002, p. 11). The debate on civil society has become more problematic with the contemporary debate on civil society being dominated by Western liberal interpretations. Mark Robinson (2002) has argued that the Western liberal conceptions of civil society accept the development of bourgeoisie society as its principal reference point ‘either as a sphere of citizen action independent from and counter posed to the state, or as the terrain of struggle over capitalist class domination’ (p. 360). He has further pointed that one might ‘plausibly argue in countries where the capitalist mode of production is not fully ascendant, or where bourgeois values have not permeated extensively throughout society, other forms of contestation are likely to predominate’ (Robinson, 2002, p. 360).
Neera Chandhoke (2007), who is critical about the dominant notion of civil society, has argued that the problem with ‘civil society’ lies in the very concept assuming a consensual status. She argues, ‘There was a time when civil society was interesting, even riveting, for political theorists, simply because rival and often acrimonious interpretations, formulations, and theorisations jostled with each other to impart meaning to the concept’ (p. 608). Today, she argues that civil society has become a ‘consensual concept’, a ‘hurrah word’, whose construct is driven by the interest of donor agencies and critical social and political forces like social movements has been driven out of the civil society sphere (Chandhoke, 2007, p. 608).
There are others who assert that rather than accepting the dominant notion of civil society, it is important and possible to construct an alternative notion of civil society taking ideological contestation as a reference point. Mark Robinson (2002) has pointed out that the civil society rooted in the evolution of Western capitalist societies is both inappropriate and has little relevance to the contemporary Indian context. However, that should not result in complete rejection of the concept of civil society itself. For Robinson, it can be used ‘as an analytical tool that can be employed to useful effect in deepening understanding of non-western associational forms and social practices’ (Robinson, 2002, pp. 356–357).
Civil Society in Assam
Constructing a ‘single’ and ‘harmonious’ civil society itself is a challenging, and at times, an impossible task in case of Assam. Assam, a multi-ethnic society, has number of ‘civil societies’ across ethnic lines. However, when one refers to civil society in Assam it means the trans-ethnic domain, which represents the broader and composite society in Assam. However, it is now mostly confined to the Brahmaputra valley and its presence in the ethnically concentrated areas within the valley, too, is marginal. For example, in the present day Bodo Territorial Area Districts (BTADs) within the state of Assam, it is the Bodo civil society that has dominance. However, the unique aspect of the trans-ethnic civil society in Assam is that it has the potential to give representation to a number of ethnic communities too, which is not the case with the ethnically defined civil societies. Defining marker of the civil society in Assam is the Assamese language, which is also the lingua franca in the state.
ULFA represents a trans-ethnic struggle in the state of Assam against the Indian state. However, apart from ULFA, almost all other ethnic communities have their own militant outfits engaged in fighting against the Indian state. The claim of ULFA to liberate Assam from the occupation of the Indian state, therefore, is contested by those ethnic outfits who have also been struggling for liberation of their territories along ethnic lines.
Historically, civil society in Assam acted as a domain of manifestation of grievances against the state, particularly against the union government. That is how the civil society in Assam was almost overtaken both by the wave of the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) steered anti-foreigners movement and ULFA steered armed struggle for Assam’s independence. Although the civil society did not endorse the path of violence pursued by ULFA for its proclaimed goal of Assam’s independence, a comprehensive critical voice against the militancy and violence pursued by them has been almost absent except for a select individuals or group of individuals. While discussing the role of civil society in Assam as a broker of peace in ULFA–GoI conflict, these inherent limitations and contradictions need to be focused on (see Baruah, 2005; Mahanta, 2013).
There are three other crucial points that invite due attention as far as the civil society discourse in Assam is concerned. The first one is the role played by certain individuals in defining the discourses in the civil society. The second is the issue-based platforms that are brought into being to deal with a particular issue at a particular point of time whose existence is usually temporary. Third and final one is the ‘obsession’ and ‘irrationality’ manifested in the domain of civil society that disrespects and attempts to suppress rational arguments. The following sections will deal with these three important dimensions of civil society in Assam in documenting its role in the context of ULFA–GoI conflict.
Civil Society’s Engagement with ULFA vis-à-vis Indian State
Nani Gopal Mahanta (2013) describes transformation of Assamese identity as a journey from nationalism to secessionism. He argues that ULFA, which launched a war against the Government of India in 1979 demanding Swadhin Asom (independent Assam), ‘represents a mindset, a suppressed voice which is deeply engrained in Assam’s psyche’ (p. xvi). True to Mahanta’s assertion, the issues raised by ULFA are deeply rooted in the Assamese civil society. There are differences regarding their path of violence and the objective of an independent Assam—a Swadhin Asom, but the issues of negligence, exploitation and appropriation of resources by the Indian state in a ‘colonial’ manner is shared by the greater society. Accordingly, ULFA enjoyed a collective passion for quite a long time, particularly in the second half of 1980s and the early 1990s.
Although it acted as a domain of legitimacy for ULFA, the civil society, however, remained passive rather than being active in the formulation of its own ideas. Only a few voices, particularly Hiren Gohain, offered a consistent critique of ULFA. It is only in the recent past that the civil society in Assam has received a boost with its visible role in facilitating a process of dialogue between the rebel leaders of ULFA and the GoI. This has, however, happened in the backdrop of growing disintegration and revolt within ULFA.
Debating ULFA in the Civil Society: The Ideologue and the Critic
The phenomenon of ULFA occupied the centre stage in civil society discourse, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, there was a comprehensive debate, particularly between Parag Das, the ideologue of ULFA and Hiren Gohain, the critic. This debate is crucial to understand the inherent limitations of the civil society to act as a broker of peace in ULFA–GOI conflict.
Parag Das (1961–1996) was one of the leading ideologues of Swadhin Asom. He ‘provided the ideological foundation for independent Assam’ (Mahanta, 2013, p. 111). Mahanta further argues that through ULFA Parag Das ‘wanted to actualise his dream of an independent Assam’ (ibid.). A master’s degree holder in economics from Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, Das was the editor of Budhbar (a weekly published on Wednesdays) since its inception in 1989; edited and published a magazine called Aagan since 1994; joined as an executive editor of a popular nationalist daily Asomiya Pratidin in 1995 and was assassinated in May 1996. During the very short span of his active public life, particularly as a columnist and a journalist, Parag Das emerged as the most influential ideologue of ULFA’s armed struggle for independence. Detained under National Security Act in 1991 and again under TADA in 1993, Parag Das wrote and published Swadhinatar Prastab (Proposal of Independence) in 1993, which provoked the government to seize the manuscript and withdraw copies from the market, although many copies had already been sold out. This book is now referred to extensively for critical discourse on ULFA (see Mahanta, 2013). His other books, for example, Nishiddha Kalam Aru Ananya (Banned Pen and Others), Rashtradruhir Dinlipi (The Traitor’s Diary), Mok Swadhinata Lage (I Ask for Independence), Swadhin Asomor Arthaniti (Economy of Independent Assam), etc., also forcefully justified the cause for independence.
Mahanta brings together the political and ideological arguments of Parag Das scattered in his different writings. (2013, pp. 110–139). Parag Das builds his arguments for Assam’s independence citing various resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and also a few international covenants. Important among them are: Montevideo convention of 1933; UN Charter, 1945; UN General Assembly resolution no. 1541 (XV), 1960; resolution no. 2160 (XXI), 1966 and resolution no. 2625 (XXV), 1970, which invoke the right to self-determination of the smaller nationalities. To bring legitimacy to his arguments he also insists on cultural and ethnic uniqueness of the people of Northeast India justified by anthropological exploration; illegality both in Yandaboo Treaty, 1826 and Transfer of Power, 1947 through which Assam was made a part of British India and independent India, respectively and finally, the persistence of colonial interest in independent India.
Das pointed out that the Indian state, which also formally agreed to abide by the provisions of right to self-determination as per international laws, however, provides distorted interpretation of it. According to the Indian state, the UN provisions on right to self-determination are applicable only in case of independent states, that is, a state can be accused of violating the UN provisions on right to self-determination if it violates the right to self-determination of another independent state. Das argues that as per the position of the Indian state, the subjugated nationalities of an independent state cannot demand the UN approved right to self-determination. Therefore, the right to self-determination demanded by Kashmir, Nagaland, Assam or Punjab has always illegal in the eyes of the Indian state (Mahanta, 2013, p. 122).
With these strong views, Parag Das emerged as the most influential ideologue of Swadhin Asom, and thereby, a guide and philosopher of ULFA’s struggle for Assam’s independence. Das, however, became critical of ULFA when it started indulging in indiscriminate killings and extortion, and emerged as one of the strongest critics of the subversive elements from within ULFA who had surrendered and took a new entity called SULFA, that is, surrendered ULFA. Finally, Das was gunned down by those subversive elements in daylight in Guwahati in 1996.
Hiren Gohain, a leading Marxist intellectual and a reputed columnist, has engaged with almost all critical social and political issues encountered by Northeast India in general and Assam in particular since the 1970s. Gohain remained a critic both of the Indian state as well as the ultra and chauvinist nationality upsurges in the region. Gohain has been a consistent critic of ULFA and its demand for sovereignty since ULFA’s emergence as a visible force in the state since late the 1980s. Gohain has been so critical of ULFA that he called the ULFA episode in Assam as Andhajugar Agamon, that is, ‘Coming of a Dark Age’ (Gohain, 2011a, pp. 183–209).
Gohain’s critique on ULFA, however, did not rule out the context in which a force like ULFA emerges. He consistently argued that the negligence on part of the central government and the ruling class of India towards the demands of the people of Assam, which manifested through the Assam Movement, provided the much needed ground for the emergence of an outfit like ULFA. Gohain reiterated this position in 2011 while submitting the Sanmilita Jatiya Abhibarttan (SJA)’s Charter of Demands to pro-talk ULFA faction led by ULFA’s chairman. Gohain (2011b) asserted:
ULFA found public support in Assam in the first phase of their armed struggle because under the Indian state the legitimate hopes and aspirations of indigenous people were not only not fulfilled since independence, but they were aggravated by certain deliberate policies of the Centre. Instead of making adequate and well-conceived investments to rescue Assam from colonial stagnation and backwardness, her natural resources were ruthlessly exploited with little benefit for the indigenous peoples of the state.
He also pointed out that a callous attitude of indifference towards massive unchecked immigration threatened the independent existence of the identity of the indigenous people. The movements and struggles on these issues, Hiren Gohain has pointed out, ‘were eventually brought to an end with deceptive and practically insignificant awards and concession by the Centre’ (Gohain, 2011b). It is this approach of the centre that has forced the ‘desperate sections of the youth harassed by unemployment, economic stagnation in which unscrupulous businessmen alone thrived, and massive political corruption and misrule, took arms to wage a war against the Indian state’ (Gohain, 2011b).
Gohain, however, categorically disapproved ULFA’s goal of Swadhin Asom, which he considered both to be immature and illogical from the perspective of both revolutionary theory and practice. Gohain also pointed out that ULFA had misappropriated Mao Tse-Tung’s famous line: ‘Power comes out of the barrel of gun.’ Gohain reminded that Mao’s line needed to be understood along with the famous line of Karl Marx, who said, ‘The greatest revolutionary force is the revolutionary masses’ (Gohain, 2010, pp. 16–17). Such misappropriation makes ULFA a reactionary, not a revolutionary force.
Hiren Gohain’s critique of ULFA is centred on a wide range of issues—political ideological, strategy, leadership and mass base of ULFA. Gohain was one of the leading figures behind, the platform called Asom Ganatantrik Nagarik Sangstha (Assam Democratic Citizens’ Association) in the early 1990s and Sanmilita Jatiya Abhibarttan (State Level National Convention) in 2010, which was started to critically engage with ULFA. On the first occasion, it was indiscriminate killing, atrocities, kidnapping and extortion of ULFA that brought number of concerned citizens together to take a collective stand against ULFA’s unjust methods. On the second occasion, it aimed at facilitating a dialogue between the pro-talk ULFA leadership led by its president (but, opposed by the Commander-in-Chief) and that of GoI in the backdrop of ULFA’s growing fragmentation, erosion of support base and arrest of the top ULFA leadership.
The assassination drive by ULFA as an instrument of armed publicity (sashastra prashar) resorted to by the outfit in its heydays exhibited political and ideological bankruptcy of ULFA as well as its anarchist trend. At the initial stage, when such assassinations were confined to non-Assamese businessmen and people like Harlalka, Jhirmiwal, Surinder Paul, etc., it did not evoke much reaction in the greater Assamese society. ‘The conscience of Assamese people ended with demanding ‘immediate arrest of the culprits’ Gohain asserts (Gohain, 2011a, p. 186). However, a series of assassinations afterwards, particularly assassination of prominent individuals of Assam like Kamal Saikia and Manabendra Sarmah, touched the conscience of the Assamese people. The assassination of Kamala, a Russian engineer Sargei Greetsangko, who was first kidnapped and then killed by ULFA, invited the wrath of the Assamese people and also condemnation.
The intellectuals and the media, however, did not dare to criticize these barbaric acts on the part of ULFA, which committed all these in the name of the struggle for Swadhin Asom. Most of the newspapers remained either silent or indifferent on such acts and did not dare to offer space for critical comments. Hiren Gohain has pointed out that it was only Ajir Asom an Assamese daily edited by Radhika Mohan Bhagawati and The Sentinel edited by Dhiren Bezbaruah, where the pages were offered for the critics of ULFA. Hiren Gohain was offered the editorial page of Ajir Asom for his weekly column Prasangakrame, which Gohain used for a comprehensive and consistent critique on ULFA.
Such a division in the civil society in Assam both around the objectives and the strategies of ULFA and the dominant passion towards ULFA in the greater society imposed limitations on the civil society to negotiate peace between ULFA and GOI.
Organized Engagement of the Civil Society with ULFA: The Trajectory
Organized response of the Assamese civil society to ULFA–GoI conflict has passed through different phases over the last two decades. These may be divided into three phases:
The initiative of Asom Ganatantrik Nagarik Sangstha—early 1990s Initiative by People’s Consultative Group (PCG)—2005–2006 Initiative by Sanmilita Jatiya Abhibarttan—2010 onward
Asom Ganatantrik Nagarik Sangstha—Early 1990s
The first organized challenge to ULFA came from United Reservation Movement’s Council, Assam (URMCA). URMCA stood against the de-tribalization theory of ULFA, which URMCA perceived as a threat to the rights of self-determination of the tribal and indigenous people of Assam and also a reflection of Assamese chauvinism. URMCA organized series of meetings and also took out processions. ULFA retaliated by killing Dimbeswar Gogoi of All Tai Ahom Students’ Union. It did not really make URMCA weak, but more steadfast against ULFA (Gohain, 2011a, pp. 189–190).
It was at this juncture that the platform called Asom Ganatantrik Nagarik Sangstha (Assam Democratic Citizens’ Association) came into being. Hiren Gohain was instrumental behind this platform. The aim was to bring all democratic people who opposed both the anarchic activities and the political objective of ULFA. The initiative resulted in convening a state-level convention against the indiscriminate atrocities of ULFA. It was amidst these developments that president’s rule was imposed in Assam on 28 November 1990 and the AGP government in the state led by Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was dissolved. The Army also launched an operation called Operation Bajrang to flush out ULFA ultras. Operation Bajrang led to the arrest of around 500 suspected ULFA activists and it continued until April 1991 when fresh elections were announced for the State Assembly. Gohain has pointed out that the people being killed were not members of ULFA, although some were connected with ULFA through past acquaintances.
The atrocities and coercion by the Army brought new challenges to the organizers of the Convention. It almost turned people’s attention from ULFA’s indiscriminate killing and atrocities to that of the Indian state’s coercion. Coercion by the Army had also appeared to have brought some legitimacy to ULFA’s cause. However, a human grave of 15 persons found in the Lakshipathar camp of ULFA on 5 December 1990 and a few others in other places of Assam during the operation by the Army equally exposed the inhumanity of ULFA. Therefore, the Convention, originally aimed to address the anarchism and indiscriminate atrocities of ULFA, also had to address the coercion by the Army.
The Convention took place on 16 December 1990 at the District Library, Guwahati. A number of prominent political leaders including former chief ministers of the state Sarat Chandra Sinha and Golap Borbora, and veteran freedom fighter Bijay Chandra Bhagawati participated in the Convention. Hiren Gohain pointed out that all participants condemned the violation of rights of the citizens by the powerful armed forces in conflicts (particularly the Army and the insurgents); however, there were differences on who needed to be blamed for the whole situation in Assam. The important resolutions adopted in the Convention were:
The problem confronted by Assam be solved by the Government of India through dialogue rather than only by military means; An appeal be issued to identify and defeat the communal forces engaged in creating division among the people in the state; An appeal be issued to the newspapers not to be biased on reporting and to abide by the ethics of journalism; A committee be constituted by the Convention to enquire into the controversial issues in a comprehensive manner (Gohain, 2011a, p. 196).
It is clear from the resolutions that the Convention did not single-handedly condemn the atrocities by ULFA; although, it was the growing atrocities of ULFA that brought the Convention into being.
The political scenario in the state was also changing fast. On 1 July 1991, the new Congress government led by Hiteshwar Saikia was sworn in. On the same day, ULFA kidnapped 15 people including officials of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), an Additional Secretary in the Assam government’s General Administration Department A. S. Srivastava and a Russian national Sargei Greetsangko who was working for the state-owned Coal India. ULFA offered to release the hostages only if 24 hardcore ULFA members were set free. Hiteshwar Saikia invited the representatives of the civil society to explore the possible way outs to end the crisis. It is through the consultation with the civil society representatives that the state government declared ‘general amnesty’ and initially released 11 hardcore militants along with a total of nearly 400 ULFA suspects who did not have serious cases pending against them. Amidst the crisis, ULFA killed two of the hostages, the Russian national and an ONGC engineer, T. S. Raju. The state government released 21 of the 24 militants whose release was sought by ULFA. But, ULFA refused to reciprocate it by releasing all the hostages. It was at this juncture that Operation Rhino was launched in the state on 15 September 1991. The Operation continued till January 1992 when it was temporarily suspended following the prospect of talks between ULFA and the union government. On 11 January, five top ULFA leaders met Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in New Delhi with written direction from ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa. These leaders assured the government that they would abide by the Constitution and shun violence once the dialogue process moves in a positive direction. Accordingly, the union government declared its decision of ceasefire from 14 January to 1 February 1992. However, ULFA failed to move ahead with the dialogue due to the opposition of the chief of the outfit’s military wing, Paresh Baruah. As a result, the move for dialogue collapsed immaturely and the Army operations were resumed in April 1992.
It is at this juncture that ULFA became a divided house with some sections favouring dialogue and some sections opposing it. The government played with this division within ULFA and offered rehabilitation packages to those who opted to come out of ULFA’s fold. On 31 March 1992, 15 leaders of ULFA, including the publicity secretary Siddhartha Phukan, issued a press release declaring the formal division in ULFA. This resulted in the birth of SULFA—a phenomenon that created a new phase of terror in the history of troubled politics in the state. The state government used SULFA in its game plan to wipe out ULFA. A dark phase descended in the history of Assam known as the age of secret killings. Through 1996 assembly election, AGP came to power in the state under the leadership of Prafulla Kumar Mahanta. Change of government did not have any positive impact, the situation further deteriorated. Secret killings continued till 2001. During this period, the relatives of ULFA as well as human rights activists were targeted. The worst of the secret killings occurred on the night of 11 August 1998, in which the mother, brother, sister-in-law and the sister of ULFA’s central publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary were killed by the secret killers in their residence at Barama, Nalbari district. On the same day, brother of ULFA’s chairman was also gunned down in Dibrugarh. The government also used TADA in an indiscriminate way to send the critical voices to the jail (Talukdar & Kalita, 2011, p. 143).
Both Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino forced ULFA to shift its bases to the neighbouring country of Bhutan. Apart from ULFA, some other insurgent groups of Assam like Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) also set up camps inside Bhutan. Under the pressure of GoI, the Bhutan authority repeatedly appealed to the militant outfits to close their camps. The militant outfits refused to shift their camps that resulted in the launching of Operation All Clear by Bhutanese Army under direct supervision of Indian Army against ULFA, KLO and NDFB in December 2003. Although the top brass of ULFA had escaped themselves and fled from Bhutan, however, two of its leaders—the ideologue and adviser of ULFA Bhimkanta Buragohain and its publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary were arrested during the course of the operation. Even though the Operation All Clear was a severe setback to ULFA, however, it could not write ULFA’s epitaph. It was at this juncture that ULFA committed another barbaric act by carrying out a deadly bomb blast in Dhemaji town in Assam on 15 August 2004, in which at least 16 school children were killed and 40 others were injured. This incident, which was covered both by national and regional press and electronic media, invited condemnation from across all sections of the society. ULFA was also alleged to have committed another act of violence on 25 and 26 August 2004 by setting off a chain of bomb blasts at different places all over Assam killing seven persons and wounding 90.
It was amidst these developments that on 20–21 September 2004, a two-day Jatiya Mahasabha was organized in Guwahati under the auspices of the Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chatra Parishad (AJYCP). The Mahasabha adopted two major resolutions. The first resolution called for the initiation of talks between the ULFA and the central and state governments, while the second resolution called upon the ULFA to rein in its armed activities, and enter into a dialogue for the greater cause of the people.
People’s Consultative Group (PCG) and Peace Initiative
It is against the above background that ULFA came forward for a civil society-driven approach to resolve the political conflict between ULFA and GoI. It declared the formation of a nine member group called People’s Consultative Group (PCG) on 7 September 2005 along with two coordinators. There were, of course, questions in the greater society, particularly in media, in regard to credibility of PCG as a civil society entity for the simple fact that it was nominated by ULFA without any consultation with or endorsement from the greater society. The team, however, claimed itself to be a true representative of the civil society on the ground that it belongs to the non-combatant domain and its members represent vocations and occupations (Borbora, 2010).
PCG was a nine member group. In addition, ULFA also officially pronounced the names of Dr Indira Goswami (popularly known as Mamoni Raisom Goswami), Gyanpeeth awardee novelist/litterateur, as the Chief Coordinator and Mr Rebati Phukan as the Co-Coordinator for the PCG. The members of PCG are: Mukul Mahanta (engineer and human rights activist); Arup Borbora (senior advocate at Gauhati High Court); Dr Brojen Gogoi (senior corporate officer); Ajit Kumar Bhuyan (senior journalist); Haidar Hussain (editor-in-chief of Asomiya Pratidin); Hiranya Saikia (sportsperson and human rights defender); Dilip Patgiri (advisor to Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chatra Parishad); Lachit Bordoloi (human rights defender and advisor to MASS) and Diganta Konwer (social activist) (Borbora, 2010).
The Government of India took its own time to respond to the good gesture shown by ULFA. It was only a month later of formation of PCG that Government of India responded to ULFA’s initiative for peace and PCG was invited to Delhi for a formal dialogue scheduled on 26 October 2005.
PCG had three rounds of discussion with GoI during 2005–2006. The first round was held on 26 October 2005; second round on 7 February 2006 and the third round on 22 June 2006. Whereas the first round was attended by the Prime Minister of India, the third round was attended by the Home Minister of India. National Security Adviser (NSA) M. K. Narayanan was a key player in all the three rounds of discussion. PCG attempted to present a strong case for a direct dialogue between ULFA and GoI putting ULFA’s armed struggle in perspective.
Apart from insisting upon the fact that all core issues raised by ULFA including sovereignty must be discussed at the negotiation table for a meaningful dialogue, PCG suggested two positive steps to be adopted by the government to facilitate a direct dialogue with ULFA: first, to release the top ULFA leaders who were languishing in jails, and second, to bring out a white paper on whereabouts and status of the missing ULFA leaders and its cadres during the army operation in Bhutan in 2003. The response of the government appeared to be positive and was reflected in the joint statement issued after the third round of discussion where it was mentioned that:
Responding to the points made by the People’s Consultative Group (PCG), the Union Home Minister stated that their request for the release of the five ULFA detunes would be considered favourably in consultation with the Government of Assam ... The PCG expressed satisfactions over the Home Minister’s approach to negotiation that will help usher lasting peace in Assam. (Borbora, 2010, p. 77)
Three rounds of discussions finally proved to be futile with the unilateral resumption of army operation by GoI on 24 September 2006. Such deceptive attitude of the government forced PCG to withdraw from the process of dialogue on 28 September 2006.
After PCG had withdrawn from the dialogue process, there was another attempt steered by People’s Committee for Peace Initiatives in Assam (PCPIA), an umbrella organization representing various civil society groups in Assam and sympathetic to the cause of ULFA. PCPIA convened a two-day long Jatiya Mahasabha on 22–23 March 2007 to put pressure on GoI for a dialogue with ULFA towards a political resolution of Indo–Assam conflict. The Convention demanded that sovereignty should be the core issue in future talks between the banned group and the government. The Convention reminded the GoI that failure on the part of the government to address the issue of sovereignty would necessitate ‘a plebiscite’ that had to be held to ascertain public opinion on the demand for sovereign Assam (Bureau Report, Zee News, 24 March 2007).
There were setbacks to ULFA in June 2008 with two companies (A & C) of the 28th Battalion of ULFA declaring cessation of war. In the meantime, the infamous 26/11 Mumbai attack took place and Shivraj Patil was dropped from the Union Cabinet and he was replaced by the then Finance Minister Mr P. Chidambaram. Mr Chidambaram appeared to have shown no respect to the progress made through the three rounds of discussions that had already been held between PCG and GoI. The progress made towards ULFA–GoI talk was almost turned upside down by Mr Chidambaram who insisted that for such a talk ULFA had to abjure violence, deposit their arms with the government as well as agree to talk within the framework of Indian Constitution. At the international front, the replacement of Khaleda Zia government by a more India friendly Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh in early 2009 also brought changes on the ground. It is to be mentioned that after the Bhutan Operation in 2003, top leadership of ULFA shifted to and settled in Bangladesh. Among them were ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and his wife Kaberi Kachari; Finance Secretary Chitraban Hazarika and Foreign Secretary Shasha Choudhury. These leaders were also alleged to have received patronage from the Khaleda Zia government and developed a nexus with fundamentalist forces. The Sheikh Hasina government was determined not to allow the soil of Bangladesh to be used by insurgent forces, particularly from India, for their operations. In fast moving developments in November and December 2009, all top leaders of ULFA including the chairman, finance and foreign secretaries as well as deputy Commander-in-Chief Raju Barua were arrested by the Bangladesh authorities and handed over to the Indian authority. With these arrests and the developments that followed, ULFA got vertically divided into two houses—one led by its Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and other by the Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah. The Arabinda Rajkhowa faction is now engaged in dialogue with the GoI facilitated by SJA, to which the C-in-C is completely opposed to who continues to assert for Swadhin Asom. All the arrested leaders were finally shifted to central jail Guwahati. In February 2010, two jailed leaders of ULFA—Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi and Publicity Secretary Mithinga Daimary were granted bail by appropriate court of law, which resulted in a new initiative for peace steered by SJA.
New Initiative for Peace: Sanmilita Jatiya Abhibarttan
After the PCG initiative had failed and top ULFA leadership was arrested in November–December 2009, the leaders in jail explored the possibility of reviving the dialogue with GoI for a political resolution of the conflict. The two ULFA leaders released on bail in February 2010—Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi and Publicity Secretary Mithinga Daimary, who were arrested in 2003 during Operation All Clear—took a lead in this exploration. It is against this background that Hiren Gohain was approached to which he responded positively and the Sanmilita Jatiya Abhibarttan came into being. Led by Hiren Gohain, the steering committee has total 11 members, none of which subscribe to ULFA’s demand for sovereignty. Hiren Gohain is the chairperson of the committee. The other members included Mamoni Raisom Goswami (who was instrumental in the formation of the PCG); Nirmal Choudhury (former Vice Chancellor, Gauhati University); Rohini Kumar Baruah (retired IAS officer); Harekrishna Deka (noted poet, novelist, columnist and former DGP, Assam); Hiranya Kumar Bhattacharyya (former IGP, Assam, an ideologue of the Assam Movement) and Indibar Deuri (retired Postmaster General, Assam, and columnist) apart from the others.
It was under the banner of the SJA that a state level convention was convened on 24 April 2010 to find out solutions to all fundamental issues raised by ULFA. The convention was marked by a lot of debates and controversies. The whole initiative was criticized and condemned by ULFA Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah and those who explicitly or implicitly expressed their allegiance and sympathy to Baruah.
The 24 April 2010 SJA convention organized in Pragjyoti Cultural Complex, Guwahati was attended by around 2,000 people including representatives of more than 100 organizations. Political parties, except for the ruling Congress, also attended the convention and presented their views.
After day-long deliberations, the convention adopted a few resolutions and the important among them were (a) appealing to both ULFA and GoI for a negotiated settlement of the problems without any pre-condition; (b) holding talks at the highest level of ULFA leadership and GoI and (c) calling upon the government to give free passage to the ULFA leaders and releasing the jailed leaders of the militant outfit to facilitate meeting of the central committee of the ULFA to take decision regarding talks with the government.
The SJA immediately constituted a few expert committees to prepare reports on various burning issues of the state of Assam. The basic approach of SJA towards a negotiated settlement of the issues raised by ULFA is reflected in the press release issued by Hiren Gohain while submitting the reports and charter of demands prepared by SJA to the ULFA leadership on 7 May 2011. The release states:
The Charter demands constitutional amendments to give the state of Assam (and thereby its peoples) greater control over its own future through strengthening the State’s power to control the revenues generated here, the natural resources, and the planning process, and a secure demographic situation as well as accelerated balanced development. If the government of India and the ULFA honour the Charter in letter and spirit and do not undersell it, we may look forward to untroubled peace, true development and vigorous growth of democracy in the region. The SJA is formally handing over this Charter to the ULFA today. (Gohain, 2011b)
The SJA initiative yielded some positive outcomes. The top jailed leaders were released from the jail by January 2011 facilitating the process of dialogue and ULFA is in dialogue with the GoI at present. The dialogue, however, is opposed by the ULFA faction led by Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah. Till now, there has been no substantive outcome of the dialogue, and Hiren Gohain, who steered the move through SJA, has expressed his reservations over the sincerity of GoI towards sustainable and peaceful resolution of the conflict.
Conclusion
The chronological presentation of the civil society’s engagement in the peace process in Assam in the context of the three-decade long ULFA–GoI conflict reveals the nature, capacity and weaknesses of civil society in Assam. First of all, the civil society itself has been divided over its approach to ULFA, although civil society as a whole has always been critical of the Indian state. Second, the civil society has been a marginal force due the coercion permeated both by ULFA and the Indian State. Third, the successive civil society initiatives towards peace through negotiation was not a continuous process, rather one was disassociated from the other. For example, the PCG initiative was seen very critically by Prof. Hiren Gohain, who later on undertook the SJA initiative. The SJA initiative, in turn was seen very critically by majority of the members of PCG. The trust deficit among these initiatives helped the Indian state to undermine the civil society in Assam as a credible and sustainable force as a broker of peace.
As a result, these initiatives have failed to achieve any substantive outcome through the negotiations. It is due to these inherent weaknesses of the civil society in Assam that the whole phenomena of ULFA, which is gradually getting divided from within may prove to be a historical tragedy in the sense that a movement launched for Assam’s independence may disappear from history without even succeeding to bring any qualitative change in the federal character of the Indian state.