Abstract
This article analyzes recent variations in governing strategies in different Indian states. Those variations mean that the ‘Indian state’, as citizens experience it, takes different forms in different states. Between 1989 and mid-2014, no single party could gain a parliamentary majority. That caused a major decentralization of power away from the once dominant Prime Minister’s Office—horizontally to other institutions at the national level, and vertically downward to governments at the state level. Ironically, that decentralization of power at the national level was accompanied by a marked centralization of power in the hands of chief ministers within many states. This is connected to a surge in state and central government revenues after 2003, and to India’s far from neoliberal economic order which leaves huge discretionary power in politicians’ hands. Various devices—legitimate and illicit—which chief ministers use to increase their influence and to survive in power are examined.
This article analyzes the difficulties and opportunities that senior politicians and political parties in India face as they seek to govern. It examines leaders’ and parties’ efforts to connect with, respond to, cultivate support from and perhaps control citizens and society. A focus on those two words draws our attention mainly to the states in this federal system. It is at the state level and below that most of the actual governing occurs in India. It is there that governments and society mainly interact.
There is another reason to focus on states. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar (2009, pp. 394, 401) have argued that ‘The 1990s could easily be called the decade of the states: as the theatre of politics shifted to the states…’, a decade which saw ‘the emergence of the state as the principal arena of political choice’. That remained true after 2000, although the emergence of Narendra Modi at an assertive prime minister with a parliamentary majority in 2014 may change things. Between 1980 and 2014, state-based parties participated in multi-party ruling alliances in New Delhi, but their cabinet ministers at the national level often focused less on governing than on milking their ministries for benefits and funds (legitimately and illicitly) to be used within the individual states which form their power bases. They were inordinately but understandably preoccupied with the state level. With the possible exception of 2014, all national elections since the early 1990s have been ‘state led’, an expression used privately by a leading Congress Party strategist (Interview, New Delhi, 5 August 2005). Or as Yadav and Palshikar (2009, p. 395) wrote before the 2014 election, ‘National election outcomes do not mainly reflect a “national mood” that prevails at that moment; rather they reflect an equilibrium of political forces that happens to obtain at the state level at the time when national elections are held’.
This is partly the result of fundamental changes in the Indian political system which prevailed between 1989 and 2014 when it was impossible for any single party to gain a majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament). That triggered a very substantial redistribution of power away from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) which had been dominant for most of the period between 1971 and 1989. Power flowed to other institutions at the national level, but also to parties, governments and forces at the state level. (That change and its partly ironic implications are considered in detail in the first section of this article).
Many important policy (and political) initiatives emerged at the state level between 1989 and 2014. State governments often adapted, manipulated and repackaged centrally sponsored schemes to a greater extent than Yadav and Palshikar imply. Even before 1989, most of the actual governing in India took place at and below the state level, but the redistribution of power after 1989 made that comment more valid than it was then—even though centrally sponsored schemes loom larger today.
Two other things draw our attention to India’s states. First, in recent years, state governments have been changing. As we shall see in the first section, power within many of them has been greatly—and in some cases radically—centralized. Second, in the wake of the post-1989 redistribution of power in favour of parties and governments at the state level, variations between state governments (and states’ political systems and cultures) have become more marked. This means that in different parts of the country, the ‘Indian state’ takes varied forms.
Much of the discussion in this article focuses on the thinking and actions of senior politicians—mainly the chief ministers of states. This is partly because many of them have become far more important in recent years since they have centralized power in their own hands. But senior leaders have also had less attention than they deserve from many social scientists who study India and other developing countries. They hold centre stage here because they usually make most of the key decisions about how their states are governed. There are certain exceptions to that statement. Some senior leaders operate within parties that have considerable institutional substance, and that curtails their personal influence. But there are few such parties in India. In most states, senior politicians are largely unconstrained by party institutions, and are reasonably (and in many cases, very) adroit. Despite this, many analyses pay them little heed. They give us Hamlet without the prince—and indeed, without The Prince, the book by Machiavelli which should never be far from our minds.
In other words, much of the literature underestimates the importance of political agency. Many studies—especially by economists (e.g., Bardhan, 1984)—concentrate on the social underpinnings of politics, on economic forces and trends, on formal political institutions, etc. These things are important and need to be examined, but they are not the whole or even the main story. Some analysts treat politics (and even the most potent politicians) as epiphenomenal. Many see path dependency as the central theme in the recent history of political and policy processes.
The credibility of these analyses has been undercut by recent changes in state politics, discussed below. This writer is currently participating in a study of significantly increased efforts during the last decade to tackle poverty and inequality by governments in four countries: Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Except in Brazil, those governments increased their efforts despite unhelpful legacies which they had inherited. They experimented and innovated. 2 Political agency overcame those legacies and broke free of path dependency. 3 At the state level in India, we also find numerous recent examples of chief ministers who introduced important innovations. 4 This makes it possible to see the India’s federal system as a laboratory for political and policy experimentation; hence the emphasis on senior leaders here.
This article is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the implications for state politics of the massive redistribution of power between 1989 and 2014, away from the once-dominant PMO—horizontally to other institutions at the national level, and vertically downward to the state level. It also analyzes the centralization of power that has, paradoxically, occurred in many states in recent years. The second section considers another crucial trend: the surge in the revenues of state and central governments since 2003, which has enabled state governments to spend (and thus to achieve) more. It explains how this has helped to produce in a key change in recent years: state (and central) governments have often been re-elected since December 2008, in contrast to the preceding 30 years in which most of them were rejected by voters. The third section examines numerous devices—legitimate and illicit—that senior politicians have used to centralize power in many (although not all) states. The fourth section discusses other devices that have been used—by centralizers and others—in the struggle to govern at the state level. The fifth section recapitulates.
The Redistribution of Power between 1989 and 2014—Its Ironic Implications
Between 1989 and 2014, it was impossible for any single party to win a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, so that India was governed by minority governments or by coalition governments that included large numbers of parties, many of them state based. That has triggered the crucial transition. Power flowed, very substantially, away from the PMO which was vastly powerful during most of the period from 1971 to 1989, to other institutions at the national level and to governments, parties and forces at the state level. This made it impossible for the PMO sustain its dominance at the national level and over the federal system. It is worth stressing here, partly because in 2014 a new prime minister took office who has long been a determined centralizer. He is changing the picture that is presented here, although the institutions that gained power after 1989 will impede efforts to re-centralize.
The redistribution of power after 1989 enabled many institutions at the national level—and the federal system which bridges national and state levels—to be regenerated after they had withered and suffered assaults during the era of PMO dominance before that year. They regained a great deal of substance, autonomy and power. Indira Gandhi, in particular, sought to weaken nearly all of these institutions—and a key informal institution, her own Congress Party’s organization—in the interests of person and dynastic rule. (The only institutions which she ignored were, curiously, the Election Commission and the armed forces.) Between 1989 and 2014, abuses of power by actors at the apex of the system, which were common when the PMO dominated, largely ceased to occur because other, regenerated institutions checked them.
However, this decentralization of power away from the PMO was attended by a startling irony. While power was dispersed and de-concentrated at the national level and within the federal system as a whole, in the same period it became more concentrated and centralized in the hands of chief ministers within many individual states in the federal system. At the state level, that triggered not a regeneration of institutions but degeneration—something akin to the de-institutionalization that occurred at the national level during the years of PMO dominance (1971–1989). And in an era in which abuses of power by prime ministers in New Delhi diminished markedly, the centralization of power in many states led to an increase in abuses of power by some chief ministers—although as we shall see in the third section, some other centralizing chief ministers have not been illiberal and abusive. A small number of Indian states—extreme cases—began to resemble ‘authoritarian enclaves’, although the Constitution imposes some checks on that trend. (A major opportunity awaits researchers who seek to explain both the trend towards ‘authoritarian enclaves’ and the restraints upon it).
Table 1 crudely sorts most of India’s larger states into three categories: (i) in which one leader dominates state politics, (ii) in which a leader exercises near-dominance and (iii) in which no single leader dominates. (States in the table followed by question marks may belong in different categories). The table was constructed in January 2016. Readers viewing it at a later date will surely see that changes in the table are required. That reminds us of an important point that is re-emphasized below: over time, states tend to move from one category in the table to another.
Concentrations of Power within State Governments in Large States
Note, however, that in January 2016, 45.8 per cent of Indians lived in Category A states, and 42.4 per cent lived in Category B states. So a huge majority of Indians (88.2 per cent) then lived in states where power was rather (or very) highly centralized. The percentages will change as times passes, but the reality of centralization in many states remains.
Three comments on this table are needed. First, as noted above, over time some state governments have moved from one to another of these categories—in different directions. For example, between 1995 5 and the untimely death of Chief Minister Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy in September 2009, (the undivided) Andhra Pradesh was located in Category A, but in the period after that, it belonged in Category C—until the return to power of the centralizing Chandrababu Naidu (after the creation of Telangana) thrust it back into Category A. By contrast, West Bengal was a Category C state until the state election of May 2011, but since then, it should be placed in Category A.
Second and more crucially, there are important differences between state governments that are grouped in each of the three categories listed above. These are the products of several sets of variations across states, including: traditions of state–society relations and modes of governing; the configurations of powerful interests within any given state; the condition of the bureaucracy (relatively undamaged and thus reasonably effective in some states, but crippled by abusive mistreatment from politicians in others); the state government’s revenue base; levels of development; natural and human resources, etc.
Third, in states where power has been centralized, the influence of party organizations and legislators has waned. We have already seen that most state-based parties have long had weak organizations, but when chief ministers achieve dominance or near-dominance, their party organizations lose influence and atrophy still further. (Even the two national parties have experienced this in some states). Members of ruling parties in state legislatures—and even ministers other than the chief minister—often find themselves unable to lobby bureaucrats on behalf of constituents or powerful allies, to influence policy implementation, to obtain transfers of officials within their bailiwicks, to enrich themselves by selling influence, etc.
We need to consider how power has been centralized in many states. But before we turn to that, it is necessary to examine another key development in recent years. It is mightily important in its own right and in some states, it has contributed to the process of centralization.
The Surge in State and Central Government Revenues Since 2003
If the redistribution of power after 1989 changed the rules of Indian politics, so has another more recent change. Since 2003, the revenues of state and central governments have increased markedly. This has enabled governments and ruling parties at both levels to spend far more than before on initiatives that are aimed at easing the problem of demand overload and at attracting popular support. Many of those initiatives have proved successful.
Before 2003, disappointing revenues meant that all state governments faced serious and often crippling resource constraints. Senior politicians were forced to devise ways of cultivating popularity which were not particularly expensive. Most of them found this next to impossible, so that failure to win re-election was the norm in that period. In interviews, leading politicians who held power in those years at the state level wistfully remark upon how much more they could have achieved—and how much more likely re-election would have been—if they had enjoyed the higher revenues available to their successors. Table 2 indicates how substantial the revenue surge has been since 2003.
These figures need to be adjusted for inflation, but even if that is taken into account, the steep increase in revenues is vividly apparent. When we consider that a significant portion of central government revenue is distributed among state governments, we can see that in recent years, ruling parties at the state level have had several times more money to spend than in the period before 2003 when the surge began.
This has made a major difference in their capacity to achieve popularity. Clear evidence of this emerges from a reliable CSDS/Lokniti poll taken in 2009. The data in Table 3 show that pervasive pro-incumbency sentiments existed towards both state and central governments. Respondents were asked whether they were ‘fully satisfied’, ‘somewhat satisfied’, ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’—first with the performance of the Congress-led UPA government in New Delhi, and then with that of their state government. 6 The table aggregates responses by ‘fully’ and ‘somewhat’ satisfied voters into one figure, for states which elected at least four Lok Sabha members.
Gross Revenues of Central and State Governments (in billions of rupees)
Satisfaction with Central and State Governments (percentages)
Every state government, except Jharkhand which had witnessed serious political disarray, enjoyed a better than 50 per cent satisfaction rating. Seventeen of 21 achieved over 60 per cent. The central government could also take comfort from this evidence. It had a better than 50 per cent satisfaction rating in every state except Jharkhand—and in 18 of 21, it scored more than 60 per cent. This evidence of pro-incumbency sentiments owed much to the surge in state and central government revenues.
A crucial result of this change in the rules of politics has been evident in the outcomes of state elections since December 2008. Before that, the norm over nearly three decades had been the rejection of ruling parties at the state level. Since then, more state governments have been re-elected.
How Power is Centralized: Two Sets of Devices, Legitimate and Illicit
To understand what has been happening (and changing) in state-level politics, we must examine the strategies that have been used by some chief ministers to centralize power in their own hands. In some cases, they do not dominate their parties when they assume office, so they must pursue centralization in order to achieve dominance over both their parties and their governments. In other cases, they already dominate their parties when they take power, so that they pursue centralization in order to sustain their pre-existing dominance. In all cases, two sets of devices are available to centralizers. The first entails actions that are legitimate; the second involves illicit machinations. Most chief ministers engage in both strategies at the same time, and vary only in the emphases which they give to one or the other, but for analytical clarity, let us consider each separately.
Legitimate Devices
The recent surge in state governments’ revenues is extremely important here. It provides those governments, ruling parties and the chief ministers who head them with opportunities to undertake new programmes, and to increase spending on existing programmes—in efforts to cultivate popularity. Three sets of ‘legitimate’ devices are available to them. Some readers may (understandably) question the legitimacy of the first two of these—populism and clientelism. They are included here because they are ‘legitimate’ inasmuch as they are not—for the most part, and strictly speaking—unlawful.
The term populism has been used in different ways, but it refers here to actions by senior politicians which are intended to have mass appeal, and to dramatize (often rather theatrically) the benevolence of a leader, a ruling party and a state government. Populist schemes include subsidies on services and other public goods (for everyone, or for specially selected sets of beneficiaries), and ‘giveaways’. Chief ministers who use populism in attempts to centralize power associate themselves personally with these schemes. An example of a subsidy is the Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan’s special fund to provide grain at greatly reduced prices in Madhya Pradesh. When giveaways are provided, chief ministers often personally bestow items upon beneficiaries, with cameras present—as when colour television sets were distributed by M. Karunanidhi in Tamil Nadu.
Second, funds may be used to support networks that distribute patronage—that is, resources from government programmes which patrons in the ruling party provide to clients who may then distribute them to their own clients still further down, and perhaps to key interests. Political scientists describe such practices as clientelism. This term is used here in a somewhat broader sense than in some analyses—which tend to concentrate on the delivery by patrons of material goods in exchange for electoral support. 7 In this analysis, it may entail the delivery of a wider array of things: funds and goods, but also services and favours. It is also important to note that patronage is not only delivered in order to attract electoral support, although that is important. It may also serve as a means of bringing some order to party organizations which are, for the most part, undisciplined and disorderly—by binding clients to patrons and thus to the parties to which they belong. 8
In recent years, however, many chief ministers and their close associates have become increasingly disenchanted with clientelism because it lacks political efficacy. They see that during the years between 1980 and 2008 in which leaders relied mainly on it, voters ousted ruling parties at a large majority of state elections. This happened partly because nearly all party organizations lack the strength to distribute patronage effectively. Chief ministers also recognize that because party organizations are ill disciplined, patronage networks have haemorrhaged resources—as subordinates have pocketed funds or demanded exorbitant payments in exchange for largesse. Patronage is also sometimes misallocated, so that the intended recipients do not receive enough to maintain their loyalty. To make matters worse, clientelism has been unable to keep pace with soaring demands from a great (and increasing) diversity of interests. The financial burdens imposed on profligate governments by clientelism have also persuaded senior leaders to de-emphasize it (see, e.g., Raghavan, 2010).
These realizations have led many chief ministers to adopt a third approach: programmatic efforts to deliver goods and services, improve livelihoods and promote development (including poverty reduction) —which are largely or entirely protected from those who wish to divert resources to patronage networks. These programmes are intended to conform to Weberian norms—so that they are implemented in an impersonal manner through supposedly disciplined and relatively impartial bureaucratic channels, according to policy criteria, rules and sometimes laws established by senior leaders. These programmes may be described as post-clientelist initiatives.
A remarkable diversity of such initiatives have emerged in various states in recent years: new insurance and pension schemes, scholarships, ambulances, health care provisions, training programmes to equip young people for the job market, new employment programmes, new schools, road improvements, water harvesting, irrigation schemes, agricultural extension schemes, etc. Centralizing chief ministers seek to identify themselves personally with these new offerings. Some of these initiatives are ‘centrally-sponsored schemes’ which have emerged from New Delhi. When the party in power at the state level is in opposition to the government at the national level, those schemes or elements of them may be re-labelled, in the hope that citizens will associate them with that party. Other new initiatives are entirely the creations of state governments.
When chief ministers seek to insulate such programmes from subordinates who manage patronage networks, they almost never curtail existing patterns of patronage distribution. Such actions would anger groups of clients who receive patronage, and undermine the ruling party’s popularity. They would also alienate powerful subordinates within ruling parties who preside over patronage networks, and who might then challenge the chief minister. Those subordinates are permitted to continue with their clientelism. Indeed, they may even be encouraged to do so, in order to distract them from the chief minister’s attempts to dominate the formulation of new policies—and not incidentally, to take most of the credit for them. But the amounts of government money spent on ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives have tended to increase significantly, while the amounts spent on patronage distribution remain constant or increase more slowly. That is possible thanks to the surge in state government revenues. So ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives tend to gain in importance in relative terms—relative to clientelism. Since chief ministers usually control ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives, this shift in the balance is facilitated by the centralization of power within many states, but it also strengthens the hands of chief ministers and reinforces their efforts to centralize (for a fuller analysis, see Manor, 2013).
It should be stressed that not all centralizing chief ministers who introduce ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives seek to achieve top-down control and to create aggressively illiberal political regimes. Some do so, and such initiatives can serve their purposes. But in some states, the centralization of power within ruling parties and state-level cabinets—and the ‘post-clientelist’ programmes which facilitate that—have instead made governments more inclusive, responsive and in another way, decentralized. That has occurred where chief ministers have devolved substantial powers and resources onto elected councils (panchayats) at lower levels, thus creating participatory processes, and encouraging the emergence of demands and popular preferences from below. 9 In other words, we need to be aware of an irony: the promotion of democratic decentralization requires strong support from leaders at the apex of power in whose hands substantial powers have been concentrated.
When chief ministers use the legitimate devices discussed above in efforts to centralize power—whether they do so in pursuit of illiberal control from above or to promote more open, participatory processes from below—there are no guarantees that they will succeed. To achieve that, they must also operate shrewdly, subtly and adroitly—to gain and then keep control of the political and policy processes. That is a tall order. Some who have briefly succeeded in achieving dominance have then been so extravagantly and guilelessly autocratic that they have alienated most interests (including many within their own parties) and destroyed themselves. Two examples are former chief ministers Ajit Jogi in Chhattisgarh and Vasundhara Raje in her first term in power in Rajasthan. Still others such as former Chief Minister B.S. Yeddyurappa in Karnataka have been so inept that they never achieved dominance in the first place (see Manor, 2012). More often, however, centralizers have flourished and won re-election.
Illicit Devices
Most chief ministers who seek to dominate their parties and governments have also resorted to additional, illicit devices. Several years of high economic growth have caused urban land prices to soar and have created opportunities for industrialists to make immense profits—not the least in mining. But since India’s economic liberalization has been cautious and limited—and, despite much comment to the contrary, far from neoliberal—senior politicians retain powers of approval that are crucial to entrepreneurs. Centralizing chief ministers have taken advantage of this to extract massive illicit ‘contributions’ from industrialists in exchange for licences, permissions and other support. One chief minister demanded and received bribes from industrialists in excess of US$1 million (5 crores) on more than 100 occasions, each time 10 —and he is by no means an exception. Chief ministers also acquiesce in illicit land deals worth vast sums, again in exchange for kickbacks, and some have been participants in such deals.
Illicit ‘contributions’ usually go directly to chief ministers. As a consequence, they possess ill-gotten resources that dwarf those of even their most corrupt predecessors in earlier periods. They also dwarf the funds that can be raised by their subordinates or by politicians in rival parties. How does this help chief ministers to centralize power? As we shall see in the fourth section, the main targets for the money are not voters (who cannot be bought) but other politicians. Some subordinates in the ruling party need to be supported, while others need to be reined in. Politicians in rival parties can sometimes be induced into restraining themselves. Money can also be used to undermine them and their networks of support.
Some (but certainly not all) centralizing chief ministers also develop links to organized crime. They do so partly to raise further money, but since the bribes noted above usually provide vast sums, those links are often used to provide the ruling party with what one politician described to this writer as ‘some muscle’—which can be used for intimidation. Some chief ministers even facilitate already energetic efforts by the criminal underworld to penetrate into booming urban centres. In South India in the early 1980s, only one city had a serious organized crime problem—not Chennai, Hyderabad or Bangalore, but Vijayawada in Andhra Pradesh (Manor, 1993, pp. 62–65). Today, all of those cities are afflicted.
Other Devices Used in the Struggle to Govern
The discussion in the third section above on centralizing chief ministers’ use of populist, clientelist and ‘post-clientelist’ approaches does not exhaust the repertoire of devices available to them. We must consider three others which are used by leaders who seek to centralize, and by those who do not.
Co-optation, Intimidation, Coercion
Chief ministers and other senior politicians at the state level may use favours and inducements to co-opt important actors and groups. They may deploy threats (‘intimidation’), and in some cases use coercion to intimidate adversaries. It is unnecessary to explain these things to most readers, but they are noted here because we must pay attention to them.
We must also ask a crucial question about leaders in any state government: how do they view and treat alternative power centres? How do they deal with the media, civil society organizations and formal institutions of state which are alternatives to the executive—including the State Assembly, its committees and Speaker; the courts; the police and the Intelligence Bureau; Lokayuktas (ombudsmen); the state Election Commission; regulatory agencies; various state-generated corporations; the governor; the bureaucracy; panchayati raj institutions, etc.?
In some Indian states where chief ministers have achieved dominance or near-dominance, alternative power centres have been treated with great hostility. That was true, for example, in Andhra Pradesh under Chandrababu Naidu and Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy, and in Gujarat under Narendra Modi. But in some other states, less hostility has been evident, and in states where no leader has achieved even near-dominance, the treatment of alternative power centres has usually been more liberal than in nearly all of Asia and Africa.
Dividing and Uniting
Senior leaders in state governments obviously make efforts to unite as many social groups behind them as possible, and to divide groups that tend to support their rivals. Identity politics, involving religious and caste groups, come into play here. These things help to decide election outcomes, but their importance should not be overstated. Consider the re-election of Nitish Kumar’s government in Bihar in 2010. Some commentators rashly announced that it showed that ‘development’ (which that government had pursued) had finally trumped caste. But they were as mistaken as those who argue that in state elections, identity (or less helpfully, ‘ethnic’ 11 ) politics are decisive. More subtle and authoritative analyses showed that in that Bihar election, both factors were important. Sanjay Kumar used CSDS/Lokniti polling data to demonstrate that while ‘development’ programmes—including some ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives—gave the government broad appeal, the chief minister’s shrewd targeting of most ‘lower caste Dalits referred to as “Mahadalits”’ and of ‘lower castes among Muslims referred to as “pasmanda Muslims”’ had also been essential. The business of dividing and uniting has become more complex, requiring politicians to disaggregate more than before. 12 (For a further dimension, see item 5 in the list below).
The Deployment of Money
In recent years, as noted above, massive funds have been illicitly raised by senior politicians at the state level. Little of the money is used in attempts to buy votes, since it is well known that Indian voters have the sophistication to accept funds and gifts and then vote as they please. Most funds are used by senior political leaders to pay political actors of various descriptions, for various purposes. The list below covers several such areas.
Enabling candidates from the leader’s party to run lavish election campaigns.
Buying off key personnel in rival parties’ organizations as elections approach. For example, before the 2008 state election in Karnataka, B.S. Yeddyurappa, the BJP leader, used funds from mining interests to make huge payments to key Congress Party leaders in numerous districts of the state. This crippled the Congress organization and was one important reason, among others (Manor, 2008) for the BJP’s victory.
Inducing legislators and activists from opposition parties to behave agreeably towards the ruling party inside and outside the State Assembly. There are perfectly legal ways to do this which do not entail the use of illicit funds, as Bhairon Singh Shekhawat demonstrated when he was BJP chief minister in Rajasthan. He interviewed each opposition legislator, asked for a list of 10 priorities in their constituencies, promised to tackle a few and said that his inclination to address the rest would depend on the restraint that they showed towards his government. But the inducements noted here are outright bribes.
Inducing legislators from opposition parties to defect, resign their seats and seek re-election on the ruling party’s ticket. Chief Minister Yeddyurappa engaged in such a manoeuvre, in what was called ‘Operation Lotus’, soon after the 2008 state election.
Inducing candidates from small parties and/or key social groups (usually castes) to conduct energetic election campaigns in constituencies where they will take votes from the main rival to the leader’s party. In some states, candidates from minor parties have been given substantial sums to persuade them to campaign aggressively (and to cover some of their campaign expenses). They are told that if they gain ‘x’ number of votes, they will receive a further payment greater than the initial sum. In one state, a party adopted what it called a ‘one plus two’ approach— meaning that it would pay the candidate twice the initial amount if ‘x’ number of votes were gained. In that state, a rival party which would lose votes to such candidates considered countering with a ‘one plus three’ offer to the same people, to do little or no campaigning. In the end, however, it decided not to do this—and lost the election.
The various devices listed just above can be used simultaneously—along with populism, clientelism and ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives. Indeed, that is the usual practice. 13 However, some of them do not sit comfortably alongside one another. Senior politicians’ strategies for governing Indian states, therefore, often amount to incongruous hybrids in which a certain dissonance—and in some cases, outright contradictions—exist between different components. In analysing ruling parties and state governments, we must ask how manageable these incongruities are, and how (if at all) they are managed.
Recapitulation
States in India’s federal system have always been important political arenas. It has always been there that most of the actual governing occurs. It is there that state and society mainly interact. But between 1989 and 2014, they became even more important, as substantial powers have flowed downward from New Delhi to governments, parties and forces at the state level.
This created both problems and opportunities for politicians at the state level, but (so far at least) the latter greatly outweigh the former. A surge in central and state government revenues since 2003 has made it possible for ruling parties and governments in the states to spend and achieve more. Many senior politicians have seized this opportunity by devising new initiatives that have enabled them to reverse a trend that had prevailed over the previous three decades, whereby ruling parties were thrown out by voters at most state elections. Those new initiatives have been popular enough to gain many state governments re-election since late 2008.
If economic stagnation were to reduce or reverse the increase in revenues, state governments and ruling parties would face serious dilemmas. Funding the new initiatives that have been created in recent years—some of which are expensive—would become extremely difficult. If belts were tightened, popular discontent might re-emerge. But that had not yet happened at the time of writing (early 2016). As Table 2 indicates, revenues during 2011–2012 (a year of slowing economic growth) continued to rise impressively.
The decentralization of power from New Delhi to the states has been attended, paradoxically, by a centralization of power within many state governments—a trend that has largely been overlooked by scholars. In early 2016, over eight in ten Indians lived in states where chief ministers had achieved dominance or near-dominance. Centralization has undermined the influence and substance of formal government institutions and of ruling parties (which are informal institutions) at the state level. This change makes it imperative that political analysts focus on chief ministers—and on the immense importance of political agency, a theme which (again) has been seriously under-researched.
Any study of them must examine two other recent changes. The first is the massive increase in the illicit profits which chief ministers can reap from two main sources: bribes from industrialists and land deals—both of which have contributed to the centralization of power in many states. The second is the increasing emphasis given at the state level to ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives—another trend that has been largely ignored by scholars. 14 Chief ministers have promoted such initiatives out of frustration with the inadequacy of populism and clientelism to ensure re-election. The increasing importance of ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives—which are mainly implemented through bureaucracies—has reduced the influence of parties and party organizations at the state level. But again paradoxically, it has also helped to make ruling parties re-electable. This article has suggested various research strategies that may help colleagues to explore these changes, so that parties, leaders and governments at the state level may be better understood.
