Book Review: Tariq Thachil,Elite Parties,Poor Voters: How Social Services Win Votes in India

Why do poor people support political parties that represent the economic interest of the elites? Tariq Thachil attempts to explain how the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which caters to the interest of the elites, massively gained votes from the Dalit and Adivasi groups without losing votes from the upper castes. By making use of both quantitative and qualitative data, he convincingly argues that BJP managed to make inroads in these communities by providing social services such as education and health. These services were provided through party-affiliated, yet private, independent welfare organizations. This allowed the party to continue to represent elite interests and at the same time, also act as representatives of the interest of the disadvantaged groups. By using the National Election data from the 2004 post-poll survey done by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, the author strongly argues that the upper caste and lower caste voters voted for the BJP for different reasons. The third chapter ‘Why Rich and Poor Voters Support an Elite party in India’ outlines this difference. Membership of a non-party organization is a significant predictor of the lower caste voters of the BJP. For the upper caste, the support for Hindu nationalist ideology is a significant predictor of BJP support.

In Chapter 4, titled ‘Why an Elite Party Turned to Services’, Thachil shows when and why Hindu nationalists turn to welfare as a mobilizing strategy; what was the nature of these services; and whether there is empirical evidence to suggest that there is a broad association between service provisions and the BJP’s performance at the state level. Bharatiya Janata Party has had a long history of social services, but initially most of their efforts were episodic, providing relief effort for natural calamities like earthquake and cyclones. It also provided relief during events like partition and it was only after 1990 that these services expanded substantially.

Thachil has thoroughly analyzed the work of these organizations, drawing on extensive conversations with Hindu nationalist service workers. Thachil shows how by providing these services, the workers slowly become the opinion-shapers in the villages they work in. He also makes an important point that the relationship between these service-delivery organizations and the subaltern is not defined by clientelistic politics: ‘Unlike the vote buying….such services are not distributed under Quid Quo protocols’ (p. 15). Instead, they are based on ties of goodwill, friendship, advice and information sharing (both accurate and rumours). Having first provided services, the BJP activists gain entry into these communities, which in turn helps them in building bonds. Sometimes, it was as simple as earning the trust of the local people by providing services in health and education, where the state had failed to do so, and other times, it was more overt and involved recruiting a small, but influential cadre of local leaders. Once the workers settle in their task and demonstrate regularity, which appeals to the villagers, they engage in soft mobilization where the teachers and health workers use subtle ways in shaping the opinion of the villagers. Thachil’s qualitative fieldwork reveals how the workers do not openly endorse any candidate, but suggest to the people which candidate is their own personal favourite. The main idea is to avoid being aggressive in trying to influence the voters, but still influence them towards the BJP candidates.

Drawing from the comparative analysis of three states (Chhattisgarh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh), the author shows how these social services produce positive results in some states and are failures in the others. Chhattisgarh was the state where these services helped the BJP. Here, the rival party (Congress) had not successfully provided public services and the poor voters were not effectively integrated as a political constituency. Here, the Congress had vertically mobilized poor voters through privileged intermediaries and in such a scenario, the poor voters were neither the recipient of policy benefits nor self-mobilized in opposition to local elites, which helped the BJP achieve the desired results. The two principal organizations that are active in the state are Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram and Sewa Bharati. These organizations provide social services primarily health and education to the subaltern. It provides services like one-teacher schools, child centres, residential hostels (which provide free room, meals and clothing), mobile dispensaries and health camps. The statistical analysis of the local survey conducted by the author established that the Dalits and Adivasis who came in contact with the services provided by these organizations were more likely to vote for BJP than those who did not.

On the other hand, in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, these services failed to translate into political support. In Kerala, services were organized, but people did not turn up. The state has had relatively effective public services and also an active lower caste involvement in political life, which reduced the demand for services offered by the BJP. On the other hand, Uttar Pradesh saw the acceptance of services, where people took advantage of them as they did in Chhattisgarh, but without any returns in terms of vote. Here, the lower castes have been sharply politicized along caste lines by the Bahujan Samaj Party’s (BSP) ethnocentric approach. The BSP, the most successful Dalit party here, took to horizontally mobilizing the lower castes (where the lower castes developed their own leaders and mobilized themselves). Consequently, the BJP found it very difficult to bridge the gap which resulted in less gains in terms of votes.

Thachil also devotes one chapter to comparative cases where he explains how a similar pattern was observed in other countries. The strategy adopted by the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, Yemen and Indonesia was very similar to that of the BJP.

The author also examines the BJP’s pattern of performance in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, which were held after his argument was conceived and tested. Since the raw data from 2009 National Elections Study was not available for scholarly use when the book went to press, Thachil referred to a set of articles published by the team that was involved in conducting the above survey to make an attempt to see whether the argument given by him anticipates emerging trends with Indian politics. The BJP had expanded its service organizations in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, but the voting results differed. In Karnataka, the BJP’s vote share increased, because a weak social policy ensured a strong demand for what the BJP was offering, and also the Congress’ vertical mobilization strategy was similar to what it used in Chhattisgarh. On the other hand, Tamil Nadu’s strong social policies and self-mobilized subaltern communities made it tough for the BJP to expand its service network in the state. Hence, the vote share of the party declined here. Thachil’s analysis anticipates that Hindu nationalists will have limited success in exporting a service strategy to many parts of India.

The 2014 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh saw the BJP performing well and winning 71 out of 80 seats. The party was successful among the upper castes and though it continued to trail the BSP among the Dalits, the gap between the two parties narrowed to such an extent that it ensured victory. The author specifies that the national results tallied with his argument, but that ‘the most significant discontinuity came in Uttar Pradesh’ (p. 283). In the Afterword, Thachil attributes this to the weakening appeal of the BSP’s ethnic patronage strategy of delivering benefits to its core cadre only, especially the Jatavs (a Dalit caste), plus Modi’s popularity and the sharp polarization of voters on caste and communal lines. He writes that the 2014 victory of BJP is best understood as ‘one produced by new factors (such as an especially popular leader) building on the foundation laid by the past efforts’ (p. 284).

Though this book analyzes how the BJP used social services as an electoral strategy to win votes of the Dalits and the Adivasis, it would be wrong to say that these services alone decide elections. This book is a major contribution that addresses the critical question of elite parties and their strategy to win votes of the poor. A major strength of this book lies in the fact that the author illustrates how several research tools can be used together. The mix of methodologies has enabled the author to go beyond just showing mere correlation between ‘services’ and ‘winning votes’.