In the Name of Cow: Legal–Constitutional Discourse and the Contours of Contemporary Indian Politics

‘Cow’ and the Making of Indian Constitution

A careful exploration of the post-1947 legislative debates—CA and the first Lok Sabha—introduces us to a display of a clear ideological divide on cow protection. A democratic–liberal position led by Nehru and Ambedkar emphasized on the reconstitution of agricultural economy and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines for the improvement of cattle wealth in the country (Zachariah, 2001). Ambedkar who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Fundamental Rights insisted that the Indian state is based on the principles of democracy, which has political, social and economic dimensions; hence, the protection of cow should not be seen merely with regard to political or religious beliefs of a particular community (GOI, 1948, Vol. VI, pp. 470–472). Arguably, this position proposed regulated slaughter of the useless cow as an important requirement for the planned growth of agrarian economy.

On the other hand, during the colonial period, the Hindu nationalist argument was put forward by a few prominent Congress leaders like Purushottam Das Tandon, Govind Das, Thakur Das Bhargava and Raghu Vira, who had been associated with the Arya Samaj and the cow protection movement. They described the cow as a sacred animal, a symbol of national sentiments and a cultural factor that united various strands of Indian society (De, 2018, pp. 123–163). Asserting the sacred status of the cow, Raghu Vira, a member from Central Provinces and Berar region, argued that ‘the entire universe was treated as one and the cow is the symbol of that oneness of life … Brahma hatya and go-hatya … are on a par… The cow is the mother of the … nation…’ (GOI, 1948, Vol. VI, pp. 470–472). Responding to Ambedkar’s modernist assertion that preservation of useless cows would be an economic burden, Thakur Das Bhargava said, ‘…ours is an agricultural country and the cow is ‘Kam-Dhenu’ to us—fulfiller of all our wants … the value of the refuse and urine of a cow is greater than the cost of her maintenance’ (GOI, 1948). In order to make their arguments persuasive, the protectionist lobby evoked the principles of vegetarianism and non-violence. For instance, Raghu Vira said, ‘in this country’s civilization, we gave prominent place to what we call Ahimsa or non-killing and non-injury … of human beings but also of the animal kingdom’ (GOI, 1948). He asserted that production of milk must be prioritized over the consumption of meat for the better health of the nation.

These discussions were reduced merely to the sacred status and economic viability of cow protection. However, the slaughter of other bovine animals was one of the most conflicting issues that was addressed in the name of cow protection. Broadly speaking, there were three important aspects of this debate: the nature and economic viability of a ban exclusively on the slaughter of cow and its progeny; ban on the slaughter of other animals (buffalo, goat, sheep and camel); and the constitutional provision for animal preservation in general.

This tussle became more evident after the recommendations of the Advisory Body, Cattle Preservation and Development Committee. The committee, headed by Rajendra Prasad, unanimously voted for a legislative provision to ban cow slaughter completely even from the economic perspective. But, the proponents of animal protection demanded widening the category of bovine animals arguing that slaughtering of buffaloes and goats that contribute in the milk supply is as sinful as that of cows (GOI, 1948). This actually became the main point of contention.

The protectionist lobby within Congress initially proposed to adopt cow protection as a Fundamental Right of Hindus for an effective judicial enforcement. This demand was equally supported by the Muslim members of the CA. In order to clear all confusion and conflict in this regard and to delink Muslims from cow slaughter, Z. H. Lari, a Muslim representative from United Provinces, stated that if cow protection was the desire of the majority, then the community should ‘express itself clearly, definitely and unambiguously’, and ‘let there not linger an idea in the mind of the Muslim public that they can do one thing, though in fact they are not expected to do that’. Arguing that the phrases like ‘modern and scientific agriculture’ are contradictory to the suggested provision itself, he insisted on adopting ‘a very clear and definite rule instead of the vague phraseology of the clauses which have been put forward’. He insisted to ‘incorporate a clause in Fundamental Rights that cow slaughter is henceforth prohibited (even on the day of Bakrid), rather than it being left vague in the Directive Principles, leaving it open to Provincial Governments to adopt it one way or the other, and…to resort to emergency powers under the Criminal Procedure’ (GOI, 1948, p. 473). Syed Mohammad Saadulla, the Muslim representative from Assam, also urged to leave no ‘misunderstanding between the majority and the Muslims on this point’ (GOI, 1948). However, clear and definite expression on cow slaughter was one thing that CA deliberations failed to achieve.

Thakur Das Bhargava, interestingly, refused this proposal after the formation of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights arguing that it would contradict with the rights of religious minorities and would result in the imposition of majority community’s wish. He persuaded for a uniform law. Finally, the subject was included in the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) for complete preservation of cows. However, Bhargava reframed the provision to include the category of other bovines in the prohibition provision (GOI, 1948, Vol. V, pp. 406–407, Vol. VII, p. 473; Vol. XI, pp. 278–279). The amended provision reads, ‘The state shall endeavour to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and drought cattle’ (Article 48, Constitution of India).

The amendment was accepted by the Advisory Committee. Accordingly, the Ministry for Food and Agriculture issued a circular in December 1950 to take reasonable steps in this regard (GOI, 1953, pp. 172–173). Quite interestingly, the category of other animal was unanimously left undefined and unclear with ‘modern and scientific’ phraseology. This arrangement not only complicated the task of cow protection but left the whole issue of animal preservation open for multiple interpretations. Instead of making provisions for a uniform law on cow slaughter and sparing the matter of the protection of other animals for regional considerations, the CA put the matter under the Entry 15 of the State List. This meant, the state legislatures were given exclusive power to make law with respect to the preservation, protection and improvement of cow and other bovine animals. Any legislation on this matter was expected to be guided by the needs of modern and scientific approach towards agriculture and animal husbandry, as well as the dietary and occupational requirements of the local population.

As far as the demand for a national preservation law is concerned, it emerged as a contested political issue since a national law could have not been passed without a constitutional amendment supported by the two-third majority of both houses of the Parliament.

The Legal–Constitutional Politics of Cow Protection

The first phase of cow politics began immediately after the enactment of the Constitution. The RSS passed a resolution entitled ‘Ban on Cow Slaughter’ in 1952. It was argued that ‘the issue of cow protection is not merely an economic question for our country; it is a point of cultural sanctity and a symbol of our national oneness’. The RSS called for a nationwide public protest in order to ‘remind (the Government) of their sacred duty to protect the bovine species’ (RSS, 1952). On 26 October 1952, the RSS launched an anti-cow slaughter campaign in several provincial capitals, held massive cow processions, launched signature campaigns to send petitions to the President and organized public meetings pressurizing the central government for a central law. Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in its first election manifesto accused Nehru of sacrificing national interests and encouraging Muslims to continue to earn profits by killing Gau Mata, the mother cow (Puri, 1980, p. 163).

The Nehru-led section of the Congress managed the issue within the framework of its stated liberal–secular modernism. While the Congress adopted an election symbol of two oxen representing its notion of nation, Nehru quite openly opposed the Hindu political organization’s agenda on the grounds that they were trying to communalize the issue of cow protection. For instance, addressing a public meeting in Bhisla, Madhya Pradesh, on 29 November 1952, he said, ‘I will never allow a Central legislation to ban cow slaughter in the country…The States are at liberty to ban the slaughter of cows in their respective areas…’ (Hindustan Times, 1 November 1952; Kumar & Sharada Prasad, 1952).

However, Nehru took a very different stand in the Parliament. His response to Indian Cattle Prevention Bill, 1955, is very relevant in this regard. Govind Das, a Congress cow-protectionist leader, presented this Bill in the Lok Sabha, which in effect sought to bring a central legislation for cow protection. As expected, the Bill received criticism from the liberal–secular lobby of the Congress insisting on adopting an economically viable and constructive approach. Nehru, who had emphasized the powers of states to enact laws in this regard, especially during the time of elections, quite paradoxically advised the state governments ‘not to bring forward any Bill for cow protection’. He claimed ‘…I am even prepared to resign the office of Prime Minister rather than yield in this matter’ (GOI, 1955, p. 4153). Interestingly, the cow protectionist lobby of the Congress voted in support of the Bill by openly expressing their will against the so-called party line. The Bill was rejected by the house simply because its subject matter was in the exclusive sphere of state legislatures (Sathe, 1967, pp. 81–82). Nevertheless, Nehru’s statement eventually became a powerful reference point in cow politics.

In order to pacify growing controversies, the Cabinet constituted an expert committee to look into the matter in a comprehensive manner. The committee, however, did not deviate from Nehru’s position. It recommended: (a) total ban on cow slaughter would be injurious to the economy, and (b) it would be prejudicial to the health of the limited stock of healthy cattle because their maintenance would be sacrificed for preserving the unproductive and unprofitable cows. Committee’s report established an administrative consensus. Later on, the Animal Husbandry wing of the Agriculture, the Animal Husbandry Department and the Planning Commission reiterated that even the state governments should take a realistic view of the fodder resources before making any law in this regard (Sathe, 1967, pp. 77–78). In fact, the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) categorically rejected universal ban (GOI, 1951, p. 279).

These overwhelming planning-centric administrative claims of the Nehru-led Congress, however, were not to become any kind of ‘guiding principle’ for regional manifestations of cow politics. The state-level Congress during the Nehru period was merely an organizational articulation of Congress’ factions that had amalgamated with the specific context of regional politics. Thus, it was much easier for the Congress to articulate different positions on controversial issues tactically at national, regional and even at the district level (Kothari, 1970, p. 18). In fact, these local arenas became the focus of real political contestation where the deliberate ambiguities on animal preservation found multiple expressions.

Quite contrary to Nehru regime’s national position, the municipalities and legislatures in a number of Congress-ruled states, especially in north India, the centre of aggressive cow politics, adopted stricter preservation measures almost immediately after the enforcement of the Constitution and came up with discriminatory legislations within the span of 6 years (Parveen, 2017b). For instance, municipalities, which were dominated by Congress’ protectionist lobbyists, in states like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other north Indian states, issued by-laws banning the slaughter of cows and of buffaloes arguing either to increase the supply of milk and cattle wealth or to close down a trade ‘objectionable’ to other local communities. The municipalities cancelled license of meat traders, shut down municipal slaughterhouses and stopped issuing further permits for slaughter and sale of beef. It also revived contestation over the religious festivities of Bakrid because these by-laws either completely ignored the sacrificial slaughter or made it an exception subject to complex administrative procedures. Similarly, these states imposed stricter legislations on meat trade in the name of cow preservation laws. For instance, the Central Provinces and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1951, placed a total ban on the slaughter of cows and restricted the slaughter of buffaloes, allowing it as a subject of certification by authorities. The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955, completely restricted the slaughter of all categories of bovine cattle under any circumstance. The UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, prohibited the slaughter of cows and remained silent on slaughter of other bovines. These Acts made no exception for slaughter even for bona fide religious purposes. Most importantly, these laws criminalized cow slaughter, making it cognizable (arrest without warrant) and non-bailable offence (De, 2018, pp. 137–147).

Such an extensive ban on slaughtering of big animals (cow and buffaloes) affected the livelihood of a number of communities traditionally associated with meat trade and auxiliary industries (FICCI, 2013, pp. 56–75; Parveen, 2017a, 2017c)). Bihar, UP and Central Provinces had a relatively larger population of Muslim and non-Muslim communities—Kasab (Muslim butchers), Khatik (Hindu butcher), Balmiki, Charmakar and Badhir (Hindu butcher caste of Bihar)—who constituted a thick socio-economic and cultural network (Kumar, 1997; Maren, 1998). The legislations led to sharp reactions and a long legal battle, especially from Muslim butchers, since they were the first to be affected in the meat value chain by such moves. Around 12 writ petitions were filed before the Supreme Court (SC) by 3,000 petitioners. These petitions were eventually decided by the SC in the famous Hanif Qureshi Case in 1958 (Hanif Qureshi & Others vs. The State of Bihar, 1958).

The petitioners made three broad arguments: Infringement of Fundamental Right under Article 19 of the Constitution to carry out their traditional occupation; violation of the right to equal protection of law as it discriminates between class of butchers involved in the slaughtering of big animals and small animals; and violation of the right to religious freedom under Article 25 of the Constitution (Ibid). The most striking feature of Hanif Qureshi case was that the petitioners identified themselves as members of an occupational Qureshi community and Indian citizens invoking their commercial engagements in the meat value chain as the most significant aspect to be considered. However, the SC defined the petitioners as Muslim first and Qureshi incidentally (De, 2018, pp. 148–163). It is quite evident how this clear case of constitutional validity acquired an overtly communal tone since it was eventually reduced to a claimed Muslim religious right to sacrifice the cow and a supposed Hindu right to worship the animal by the SC. In an unprecedented move, the SC accepted the petitions of the Bharat Gow-Sevak Samaj, All India Anti-Cow Slaughter Movement Committee, Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and Madhya Pradesh Gow-Rakshan Sangh, recognizing them as third party in the case (Sathe, 1967, pp. 75–78). The third party argued that DPSPs are superior to the Fundamental Rights; hence, these legislations do not violate the Fundamental Rights of minority community on any ground.

The SC judgement deviated slightly from the ‘economic argument’, which by that time had dominated the administrative discourse. The SC concluded that (a) a total ban on useful cattle was reasonable and valid; (b) a total ban on the slaughter of useless she-buffaloes, bulls and bullocks could not be supported as reasonable in the interest of the general public. However, in the case of cows, the SC referred to the sacred and heavenly status it possesses in the Vedas. The court held that a total and unconditional ban on cow slaughter was valid because ‘Hindus in general hold the cow in great reverence and the idea of the slaughter of cows for food is repugnant to their notions and this sentiment’. It further said, ‘the constitutional questions cannot be decided on the grounds of mere sentiments, however passion ate (sick) it may be but… [question of cow slaughter]…has to be taken into consideration…in arriving at a judicial verdict as to the reasonableness of the restrictions’ (Hanif Qureshi & Others vs. The State of Bihar, 1958).

This judgement offered a new direction to cow politics. Although a number of petitions and counter-petitions were filed, questioning the judicial validity of the ‘holy’ status of cow in later years, it became a landmark. The Hindu organizations, which represented selective north Indian upper-caste values, projected the judgement as a legal assertion of ‘Hindu sentiment’. A new movement for a countrywide ban on slaughtering of all animals began in the name of motivational symbol—cow. It was argued that ahimsa is a unifying philosophy of Hindu culture, and it should be respected as well as asserted, even politically (RSS, 1958, 1960).

Hindu Cow and Muslim ‘Appeasement’

The Nehru government, however, remained committed to bringing the issue of animal preservation and meat trade within the framework of planning. A number of Committees were formed during the period 1957–1958 such as the Expert Ad hoc Committee (for examining the conditions of slaughterhouses); Committee for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals; the Meat Inspection Practices and Pharmaceutical Enquiry Committees (to modernize meat industry and associated businesses). These administrative moves were concerned with the sanitary conditions in existing abattoirs in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras; opening of new slaughterhouses on modern lines for increasing meat export to foreign countries, especially to West Asia and the Arab world; and to develop Indian tanneries to meet the increasing demand for Indian leather (Rajya Sabha Debates (RSD), 19 February 1958, p. 905, 4 March 1958, pp. 2047–2050, 7 May 1959, pp. 2183–2184, 2195–2196). ¹

BJS and the protectionist lobby of the Congress opposed these proposals describing such efforts as ‘Muslim appeasement’. BJS launched an aggressive anti-Nehru, anti-meat/anti-Muslim propaganda for electoral mobilizations in the 1960s in north India. These states had already banned cow slaughter and regulated the slaughter of other animals (GOI, 19 February 1958, p. 905, 15 December 1959, pp. 2499–2500, 29 November 1966, p. 2011). Yet, the cow belt of north India remained the centre for most vigorous and aggressive cow protection movements and communal violence! (Al Jamiat, 7 November 1966; Delhi Municipal Committee [DMC], 20 October 1967; National Archives of India [NAI], 1964, 1967a, 1967b). As a result, the meat industry emerged as an important marker of nationwide Hindu subjugation. Any effort for its improvement was used in the election campaigns to mobilize popular Hindu sentiments in the name of cow (RSD, 1960s and 1970s). ² BJS’ politics in Delhi is a good example to elaborate this point.

Cow slaughter was banned in Delhi. In fact, no such slaughter had ever taken place in Delhi’s slaughterhouses since 1947 even before the enactment of the By-Laws of Delhi Municipal Committee (DMC) of 1951, which officially banned cow slaughter in the state (Delhi Municipal Committee [DMC], 1951). Yet, Delhi was exposed to the aggressive campaign and anti-Muslim rhetoric for electoral mobilization. During the 1961 Municipal Corporation by-election campaigns, the BJS used slogans such as A vote for BJS is a vote for the protection of cow. It also circulated a number of provocative pamphlets depicting Nehru as a killer of the gau mata and responsible for the plight of Hindus in Delhi, UP, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Bihar just before and during the assembly elections (NAI, 1961). ³ The leaflets, published by the Go Hatya Nirodh Samiti—a Delhi based organization—are worth examining to analyse the nature of cow politics in Delhi in the 1960s.

One such pamphlet portrayed Nehru as cow-killer (see Figure 1). It depicted Nehru holding a sword soaked in cow’s blood in one hand and the beheaded cow’s head in the other while the dead cow lay on the floor. The pamphlet called upon ‘Arya Veer’ and ‘Hindu Veer’ (the courageous Hindu fighters) to ‘arise to protect mother cow! To stop the fellow Hindus and the Congress from indulging into a sinful act of the killing of mother cow!’ (NAI, 1961). It evoked group solidarity by arousing a feeling of common experience of the hurt and the humiliation.

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Figure 1.

Source: NAI (1961).

This interesting illustration places the symbol of cow in the larger philosophical premise of Hindu nationalist ideology to assert the supremacy over Congress in defining the nation and national identity. The use of the word ‘Arya’ represents ‘Aryavrat’—a pious Hindu land. It provokes Hindu sentiments associated with the sacred land of cows and reiterates that ‘cow Protection involved a struggle not only over a “sacred symbol” but also, locally, over “sacred spaces”’ (Penny, 2004, p. 107). Nehru-Congress in this metaphorical representation is depicted as an enemy of mother cow and of the pious Hindu nation-space (NAI, 1961). The pamphlet reproduced Nehru’s statement that he made in the Parliament opposing the Indian Cattle Prevention Bill, 1955 as an evidence to confirm Congress’s hostility towards Hindu sentiments NAI, 1961. Interestingly, this picture was reproduced in another thick pamphlet Bharat Man Ki Durdasha Kyon (Why the Mother India is in bad shape?) written by Lala Hardev Sahai of the Cow Slaughter Prevention Committee and a close ally of Congress protectionist lobby.

This leaflet reiterated Congress–Muslim connection claiming that ‘opening of new Kasai-khane (slaughterhouses) in different states and planning to increase the export of meat, leather and associated products to foreign countries is only a way to appease Muslims’. It reiterated that ‘both the Muslims and government has played fraud on Hindus’ (NAI, 1961):

Muslims earn profits worth of billions of rupees annually by slaughtering cows, selling cow-meat, cow skin, and cow blood…Congress would never take a step which could go against the Muslims no matter how harmful it would be for the nation and its Hindu population. (NAI, 1961)

The next illustration in the same leaflet sums up the BJS’ criticism of the Congress. Nehru is shown attracting voters with his party’s electoral symbol of ‘two bullocks with a yoke’ (see Figure 2). It criticized Congress for exploiting rural sentiments by appropriating the symbol of yokes when it is not even sincere for the protection of cow—the backbone of agrarian economy. The caption on this illustration says: ‘Pandit Nehru, the leader of Congress government, which has continued the killings of oxen, is pursuing voters by showing regards to his electoral symbol—the pair of oxen (NAI, 1961)!

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Figure 2.

Source: NAI (1961).

These pamphlets introduce us to an interesting reformulation of the Hindu nationalist argument. Ignoring the existing apparatus of legislation with regard to cow slaughter, the cow-protectionists and BJS characterized the absence of a uniform law in the country as an anti-Hindu act of the Nehru-Congress. In other words, a straightforward explanation is worked out: there is no law to stop cow slaughter; Congress does not want it because it wishes to appease Muslims; the feelings of innocent Hindus are betrayed by Nehru-Congress.

Congress and Cow in the 1960s: ‘Vote for Calf and Cow Forget All Others Now’

Following this success, BJS intensified cow-protection campaigns and initiated a more organized form of agitational politics in Delhi. The party facilitated a conference organized by Bharat Gow-Sevak Samaj in 1964 to have a uniform law. The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) was also formed in the same conference to pursue the larger agenda of the ‘cultural revival’ of Hindu society (The Organiser, 31 August 1964). This kind of politics became more aggressive after Nehru’s death (Katju, 1998). BJS as well as the Congress’ cow-protectionist lobby started pressurizing for a uniform law. A delegation of MPs led by Govind Das met the home minister and submitted a memorandum in September 1966. Gulzarilal Nanda, the then Home Minister, a staunch supporter and an active member of Bharat Sadhu Samaj, made two important announcements on 28 October and 4 November 1966, respectively, for bringing union territories and other states within the purview of preservation legislations (GOI, 5 December 1966, p. 4021).

Meanwhile, a network of various cow protection organizations was established in Delhi that included prominent leaders such as M.S. Golwalkar of RSS, M.C. Sharma of BJS and Vishwambhar Prasad of Cow Servicing Society. In the same spirit, on 25 September 1966, the leading cow protection organizations formed a Committee, called Sarvadaliya Gow-raksha Mahaabhiyan Samiti (SGMS, All Party Campaign for Protection of the Cow), in Delhi. The Samiti included leaders representing VHP, RSS, Bharat Sadhu Samaj (a body representing different Hindu sects), the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad (a party of Hindu ex-princes), three Shaivite Shankaracharyas, including the Jagatguru (world-teacher) Shankaracharya of Puri and different heads of monasteries called Mahants. The SGMS drafted a thorough plan of action and warned the government for a massive Satyagraha (protest) and hunger strike if an immediate nationwide ban on cow slaughter was not imposed. Keeping an eye on the upcoming elections in 1967, the working committee of the Jana Sangh also extended its support to the SGMS (Hindustan Times, 4 November 1966; The Organiser, 7, 20 and 25 September 1966).

The working committee of BJS facilitated a large agitation led by Sadhus in front of the Parliament House on 7 November 1966. It was a gathering of around 10,000–1, 20, 000 protesters, which Delhi had never seen before. ⁴ Most significant aspect of this protest rally, which emerged as an important political symbol and marked the turning point of Indian politics, was the presence of around 15,000 sadhus including the trishul-dhari (trident-wearing) and naked Naga Sadhus, with others parading cows and bulls painted with slogans. Incited by the BJS MP Swami Rameshwaranand, who had been expelled from the Parliament for his aggressive behaviour, the crowd marched towards the Parliament House complex and eventually turned violent (GOI, 17 November 1966, Vol. 53). The Hindu reported, ‘Police were forced to open fire as lathi charges and firing of tear-gas shells did not have any effect on the swelling mob’ (The Hindu, 8 November, 1966; Economic and Political Weekly, 1966, 12 November, Vol. 1, no. 13, pp. 519–520). ⁵ Seven protestors, including some Sadhus and one policeman, were killed and over 100 injured, followed by grave destruction to private and public property. Around 1,400 people were arrested and a 48-h curfew was imposed. This show of strength by the radical Hindu groups transformed the cow issue into a national concern for the first time in independent India. This event, in fact, provided a perfect opportunity to different political players to redesign their cow politics. The Shankaracharya of Puri, who had now acquired a media image of a revered Hindu religious leader, started a fast unto death to register his protest against the death of sadhus (GOI, 7 November 1966, pp. 133–146).

The Muslim political reaction to this incident is very interesting. In an editorial entitled Hindustan Main Gaye Kashi Par Pabandi Ka Masla (debates on cow slaughter) Al Jamiat, the pro-Congress Jamiat-ulema-e-Hind (JUH) newspaper, showed complete sympathy with Shankaracharya and appealed to him to break his fast. It demanded for a complete ban on cow slaughter in India (Al-Jamiat, 7, 30 November 1966). Al Jamiat published a number of editorials thereafter and suggested for community initiatives like adoption of stray cows (Al-Jamiat, 10 January, 2 February 1967). It is worth noting that JUH had always called for a proper legislation in this regard. It had welcomed the DMC by-laws that officially banned cow slaughter in Delhi in 1951. ⁶ The JUH took a very critical view of the Sadhu incident and argued that this sensitive issue had been left for the BJS to demonize Muslims for cow killings and pursue the Hindu Mahasabha’s agenda of a Hindu huqumat (Al Jamiat, 27 April 1965).

The Indira government, however, did not initially change its attitude towards this kind of agitational politics. Gulzarilal Nanda was sacked for being a patron of Bharat Sadhu Samaj. He was also held responsible for administrative lapses that led to the violent events. The government also refused to negotiate with Hindu leaders. In fact, it went ahead and arrested the Shankaracharya of Puri along with other fasting sadhus who courted arrest themselves.

This was the turning point in the chain of events. Shankarcharya’s arrest aroused public anger throughout the country, and the government was forced to release him almost immediately. The Shankaracharya, however, continued his fast. The BJS activists showed solidarity with Shankaracharya and orchestrated fasts to express its support to the protests, which spread throughout north India. For RSS and BJS, it was a political opportunity to strengthen their political–electoral constituency. The image of ‘sadhu’ was a new symbol of Hindu subjugation, and ‘satyagraha’ was a new form of political mobilization to achieve larger objective of ‘Hindu unity’. The RSS resolution, asked ‘people to continue to co-operate wholeheartedly with the peaceful and non-violent movement of the Samiti for securing this legitimate and noble demand’ (RSS, 1966). The figure of assaulted and, according to RSS Resolution, ‘fasting holy men who have entered the fire of stern penance for this most sacred national cause’ strengthened their mass base. Calling November 7 ‘the day of the mammoth anti-cow slaughter demonstration’, RSS resolution called upon the government ‘to gracefully respond to this unanimous demand of the people’ (RSS, 1966). It was successfully channelized by the BJS on the streets as well as in the Parliamentary Debates (GOI, 15 December 1966).

On the other hand, the aroused popular anger due to atrocities against agitating sadhus and the sacking of Gulzarilal Nanda forced Congress to rethink its strategy. It was important for the party to carry out a balancing exercise by pacifying the dissent within the organization and, at the same time, by appropriating the popular political sentiment. Although Indira Gandhi was appreciated by the liberal lobby for being tough and not kneeling down to the ‘unreason and illegitimate demands’ pushed by sadhus, it was important to deal with the potential threat that the death of fasting Shankaracharya of Puri could have posed (Chaudhuri, 1967, p. 126). Keeping an eye on the elections due in February 1967, Indira Gandhi did not want to appear as opposed to the Hindu sensibilities associated with cow and sadhus that the movement had aroused by bringing a large number of voters on the forefront of national politics. The image of ‘sadhus’, in this sense, emerged as an important political symbol for Congress too. The party discovered Shankaracharya as a potential collaborator to create a favourable political discourse around ‘Hindu’ sentiments. Thus, for Indira Gandhi, Shankaracharya turned out to be an important figure to show sympathies for ‘Hindu’ voters. But it needed a carefully thought about strategy (Copland, 2014, pp. 420–422). In an address in the Parliament on 5 January 1967, the Indira government expressed its deep concerns on the matter and promised to pursue state governments for adopting adequate preservation legislations. The government issued an official statement on the same day and announced for the setting up of a high-level expert committee to evaluate the feasibility of ‘a total ban on the slaughter of cow…’ (GOI, 5 January 1967). On 31 January 1967, Shankaracharya was officially informed about the decision and was appealed to break his 73 days long fast (GOI, 31 January 1967).

It was a turning point in Congress’ politics (Kothari, 1971). Soon after the 1967 elections, the Congress government at the centre set up the Sarkar Committee on Cow Protection by a resolution on 29 June 1967, under the Chairmanship of a retired Chief Justice of the SC of India, Justice Amal Kumar Sarkar. It included two representatives from the central government, two Congress state government ministers (mainly the trusted politicians and bureaucrats of Indira Gandhi), three nominees of the members of SGMS, including M. S. Golwalkar, R. P. Mookerji (BJS) and the Shankaracharya of Puri (GOI, 28 and 29 June, 1967). The government, after consultation with the members of SGMS, issued Terms of Reference explaining the purpose of the committee to ‘suggest ways and means for the effective implementation of the provision of Article 48 of the constitution’. It was also empowered to give full consideration to any suggestion that the constitution should be amendment to bring about a total ban on the slaughter of cow and its progeny. It would also have to consider ‘appropriate practical steps for the protection of cows, calves, bulls and bullocks’ (DMC, 2 April 1970, p. 21; GOI, 2 April 1970, pp. 19–49). The Committee discussed the issue comprehensively with consultations from the state governments and union territories and invited memorandums. It held 12 meetings, but could not reach to any conclusive decision due to a lack of consensus between different groups on the Terms and Reference (GOI, 2 April 1970, pp. 19–49).

Consequently, three representatives of SGMS walked out on 5 August 1968. They proposed for a constitutional amendment to formulate a uniform law on cow slaughter, and, most importantly, to bring other bovine cattle within the jurisdiction of preservation laws to completely ban every kind of slaughter in India in all situations (GOI, 2 April 1970, pp. 48–49, 4 December, pp. 34–35, 28 August 1970, pp. 50–51). The SC’s interpretation of Article 48 in the Hanif Qureshi case became the main reason of conflict. As discussed earlier, the SC had observed that total ban on the slaughter of other useless bovine animals was not in the interest of general public and, thus, was invalid. The SGMS remained persistent on total ban, evoking the principle of non-violence and Hindu-sentiments argument. On the other hand, the Congress was firm on not accepting any demand whatsoever.

Interestingly, while these negotiations were on, the Indira faction of the Congress, called Congress (R) that soon became Congress (I), adopted cow and calf as election symbol after a split in the party in 1969. This move of Indira Congress should be seen as a new explicitly communal mantra of the Congress-style politics of cow protection. It suited the national political environment polarized on the issue of cow protection quite well. During the election campaign of 1971, this symbol was supplemented by an interesting slogan: ‘Vote for calf and cow, forget all others now!’ (Sanghvi, 2006, p. 77). Two years later, when Indira Gandhi was asked to comment on the Mishra Committee’s finding that no central cow-protection law could be made, she replied: ‘Indian cows, whether they are sacred or not, are absolutely necessary to the existence of the nation… Can you [ever] imagine me giving orders to destroy one?’ (Copland, 2014, p. 437).

This pro-cow gesture went well with the powerful rhetoric of Gareebi Hatao (eradicate poverty) in the 1971 elections. It was a balancing act. Indira Gandhi took a conscious turn towards socialism, addressing the needs of the underprivileged sections and religious minorities, which was a need of the time in the absence of efficient leadership (Kaviraj, 2010, pp. 39–40). This socialistic overtone helped her to get the ideological support from the Left parties in the Parliament. At the same time, the symbol of a cow and calf empowered the Congress to appropriate the BJS’ cow-protectionist Hindu constituency.

After achieving unprecedented success in the 1971 elections, the central government continued its negotiations with the members of SGMS and appealed to participate in the proceedings. The Committee, however, could not make any progress (GOI, 2 April 1970, p. 35). The government extended the tenure and even reorganized the committee twice in 1972 and 1973, by inviting other representatives, due to the non-cooperation of the members of SGMS. Finally, the Indira government concluded, without a full formal report, that a complete ban on cow slaughter was neither practical nor feasible (GOI, 14 March 1973, pp. 96–97)!

Conclusion

This article has tried to unpack a few complex, yet interesting, aspects of constitutional, legal and electoral politics over cow protection in post-independence India. This political symbolism was used by different political forces to establish favourable ideological as well as electoral equilibriums. It makes three broad arguments. First, the legal–constitutional framework that evolved out of a compromise between competing ideological forces provided immense possibilities for political actors to appropriate the cow as a powerful symbol for articulating their imagination of nation, national identity and belongingness. In fact, these debates provided the necessary ideological comparisons required for the survival of both the dominant—secular–communal—forms of politics across party lines. While the cow protectionist alliance represented Hindu majoritarian view, the Nehru-led fraction of the Congress successfully consolidated the secular-modern version of politics nationally.

Second, the politics of cow relies on a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities: the arguments presented by different political actors were cow-driven but not entirely cow-centric. These obscurities have played an important role in keeping the issue of cow preservation contested. The number of municipal by-laws and state legislations that evolved in the first decade (1949–1955) in north Indian states demonstrate how these ambiguities were translated to enforce comprehensive and discriminatory prohibition on a commercial activity. Eventually, these laws communalized the meat industry and transformed cow preservation into an unresolvable Hindu–Muslim question.

Third, the cow politics cannot be reduced to the politics of Hindu nationalists, especially the BJS. The Congress has always been a bigger player as well as a beneficiary of such religious symbolism. On the one hand, Congress successfully managed the issue at the ideological level—projecting itself as a modernist party, while, at the same time, appeasing the cow protectionist lobby through ‘representative opposition’ within its organizational folds. As a result, the Congress was able to address and, to some extent, appease both the progressive as well as the Hindu majoritarian sensibilities. It even gained ideological support from the left parties and other non-BJS forces at the national level for the so-called liberal position. Thus, the party maintained a secular-modern image at the national level by asserting against a universal law, while leaving the states at liberty to act accordingly.

The Congress governments in the cow belt played a politics of convenience. The party leadership appropriated the ‘Hindu nationalist’ argument that presented cow beef and carabeef (or buff meat) as a symbol of Hindu–Muslim antagonism in north India, by enacting stricter laws scrutinizing the slaughter of all bovines. Interestingly, such strict legislations were not implemented in the north-east region or the southern Indian states, where the consumption of cow meat was comparatively much higher. Thus, the northeast states never became a battleground for any kind of preservation legislations until recently. This politics of convenience not only helped Congress to evolve as a ‘self-sufficient one-party system’ in electoral politics but also provided a larger ideological framework to establish favourable communal–secular equilibriums. Consequently, different cow politics evolved in different Congress-ruled regions. This has been the reason why aggressive cow politics is played out in the states, where cow killing was officially illegal. The article demonstrates that the purpose of dominant political groups, especially Congress, was not to resolve the issue but to keep it contested in order to consolidate their ideological positions at different times and spaces.