Abstract
Using communal violence data between 2006 and 2017, this study challenges the idea that communal violence is primarily an issue in the Hindi Heartland. The data demonstrates how Karnataka and West Bengal are also witnessing rising levels of communal violence. The study goes on to take a closer look at the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Karnataka and West Bengal. It demonstrates how a combination of factors ranging from localized narratives of Hindu nationalism, caste coalitions, alliances with regional parties and the decline of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI[M]) in West Bengal and the Janata Party (JP)/Dal in Karnataka have been crucial factors for BJP’s rise in these two states.
Keywords
Introduction
The sheer scale of the Godhra riots of 2002 captured national and international attention. These riots came nearly a decade after the Babri Masjid was demolished on 6 December 1992. Looking at Hindu–Muslim violence historically, rioting has generally taken place in waves (Brass, 2003, p. 8). The first wave of riots goes back to 1947, when the country was partitioned. The second wave was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Ram Janmabhoomi movement was accompanied by riots across the country. The Godhra riots can be looked at as the third wave. However, unlike the previous two waves, the Godhra riots were different. While the intensity of the violence was unlike what India had previously seen, it was geographically confined to Ahmedabad, Vadodara and some neighbouring areas. During the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, rioting was geographically spread with riots in Aligarh, Bhagalpur, Meerut, Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Mumbai and Hyderabad among other places.
It has now been 18 years since the Godhra riots. Communal riots in India have generally been closely linked to electoral politics. This article takes a closer look at twenty-first-century communal violence 1 in India. The analysis consists of two parts. The first part is a broad quantitative assessment of how communal violence is spread across Indian states. Here, the spatial spread of communal violence between 2006 and 2017 will be looked at in greater detail. The states witnessing the most frequent violence will be identified. The second part contextualizes the trends identified by the quantitative data between 2006 and 2017 2 . It takes a closer look at two case studies, Karnataka and West Bengal. It highlights the path taken by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to establish an electoral presence. It identifies the challenges and successes of BJP in expanding in regions beyond the Hindi Heartland.
Riots and Politics
Given the endemic nature of large-scale Hindu–Muslim rioting in India, it has attracted reasonable scholarly interest. Brass (1997, 2003), Tambiah (1997), Varshney (2001), Wilkinson (2006), Engineer (1997, 2006) and, more recently, Pai and Kumar (2018) have done extensive research on Hindu-Muslim riots in India. The general consensus among Brass, Wilkinson, Tambiah and Engineer is that riots are closely linked to political and electoral calculations. Wilkinson (2006) suggested that rioting is linked to the state-level political dynamics. Violence levels tend to peak just before elections. If the party in power relies on minority support or has a coalition partner that relies on minority support, the state government has every incentive to stop riots (Wilkinson, 2006). On the other hand, if the party in power does not rely on minority support, it has no incentive to stop riots (Wilkinson, 2006). Rioting is closely linked to electoral competition at the state level.
Brass suggests that rioting is often linked to the interests of local political and economic elite. In every riot-prone town/city, there is an ‘institutionalized system of riot production’, which can keep the communal tensions simmering and spark a riot when it suits the interests of the local political and economic elite (Brass, 2003). The temporal distribution of rioting in Aligarh is linked to the institutionalized riot system, which sets off a riot when it suits local political interests.
Tambiah (1997) suggests that rioting is closely linked to the political culture of the region. The process of ‘mass mobilization’ during elections is an inherently violent exercise, of which riots are an important part (Tambiah, 1997). He adds, riots are like pre-rehearsed theatrical performances, where the audience is not just the targeted community but also the larger ethnic/religious community of the perpetrators. The demonstrative impact of riots serves as a tool to enable ‘mass mobilization’.
A more recent work by Pai and Kumar (2018) suggests that ‘everyday communalism’ has been the new model used by BJP in Uttar Pradesh (Pai & Kumar, 2018, p. 276). They suggest that after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the Ram Janmabhoomi discourse started having diminishing political returns. To counter this, the party used a new system of communal discourses that are regional and penetrate the everyday lives of individuals (Pai & Kumar, 2018). As a result, not only has the religious discourse continued to yield political dividends, but it has also brought in new caste groups into BJP’s support base.
Historical examples of communal riots in India support the link between riots and politics. The anti-Sikh riots that took place in Delhi in 1984 offer a good example. The riots saw the active support of Delhi-based Congress leaders like Jagdeesh Tytler and Sajjan Kumar (BBC, 2018). Similarly, the rise of BJP coincided with the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. BJP was able to use the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation as a platform to further their political fortunes. In the 1984 elections, when BJP contested for the first time, they managed to win only 2 Lok Sabha seats. The tally increased to 85 in 1989, 120 in 1991, 161 in 1996 and 182 in 1998 and 1999. The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation and the riots that accompanied it in the late 1980s and early 1990s were an important factor in BJP carving out a national political space for itself. Engineer suggests that Advani’s Rath Yatra ultimately propelled BJP into power in the late 1990s (Engineer, 1997). For parties like BJP, religious nationalism and Hindu–Muslim tensions form an important part of the ideological narrative. In order to win elections, BJP needs a section of the Hindu community to vote as a block. Given the layers of caste, linguistic and regional differences, a homogenous Hindu religious identity needs to be constructed. It is here that religious nationalism, riots and Hindu–Muslim tensions become an important factor in creating a sense of a homogenous Hindu identity. Hansen suggests that a ‘fearful and aggressive’ image of Muslims was an important aspect of Hindu nationalism (Hansen, 1999, p. 178). The inherent suspicion of minority groups (Christians and Muslims) goes back to the origins of Hindu nationalism. Savarkar suggested a territorial definition of Indian identity, where an ‘Indian’ is anyone how considers the territorial regions of India as his/her mother land and holy land (Jaffrelot, 2009, p. 86). Given that the holy land for Muslims and Christians is outside India, Hindu nationalism questions their loyalty to the Indian nation. Partition and the creation of Pakistan meant that the loyalties of the Muslim community are more closely scrutinized (Contractor, 2012; Fazal, 2014; Metclaf, 2014). Since the religious narrative and Hindu–Muslim tensions form an important part of Hindu nationalism, the second wave of Hindu–Muslim rioting in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. It is not a mere coincidence but rather the rioting was a direct product of the Ram Janmabhoomi campaign.
Setting up the foundation for further analysis, this study sticks to the understanding that Hindu–Muslim tensions and communal riots are a product of larger political and electoral calculations. When discussing the implications of the trends emerging from the post-2002 communal violence data, the link between politics and communal violence will be the cornerstone of the analysis. The next section briefly discusses the methodology and justifies why the state has been chosen as the unit of analysis.
A Note on Method: Choosing the Level of Analysis
The reality of communal riots in India is that they have been spatially and temporally distributed. This article is primarily concerned with the spatial distribution. There are three primary spatial contours on which Hindu–Muslim rioting has been spread between 1945 and 1995 (Varshney & Wilkinson, 2006). Firstly, rioting is concentrated in urban areas. The dataset developed by Varshney and Wilkinson suggests that Hindu–Muslim rioting is primarily an urban problem (Varshney, 2001; Varshney & Wilkinson, 2006). Varshney highlights that less than 4 per cent of deaths between 1950 and 1995 have been from rural areas (Varshney, 2001, p. 95). Secondly, rioting is most common in states in central and western India. Five of the most riot prone states in India between 1945 and 1995 were Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Brass, 2003, p. 61). States in the south and north-east of India do not witness Hindu–Muslim rioting very often. The Varshney–Wilkinson dataset suggests that out of the 1,176 recorded Hindu–Muslim riots between 1950 and 1995, 787 (~67%) were from the 5 states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (Varshney & Wilkinson, 2006, p. 10). Thirdly, rioting is concentrated in a handful of cities that are highly riot-prone. Wilkinson (2006), Varshney (2001) and Brass (2003) support this observation, highlighting that certain cities and towns are more likely to witness Hindu–Muslim rioting. Varshney suggests that eight cities accounted for around 45.5 per cent of all the deaths in Hindu–Muslim violence (Varshney, 2001, p. 103).
Out of the three contours of spatial variation that emerge, state- and city-level spread is worth exploring further. The existing literature of communal violence largely looks at town- and city-level variations. Varshney compares city pairs, while Brass built his ‘institutionalized riot system’ based on a study of Aligarh. Tambiah (1997), who looked at rioting broadly across South Asia, built his study around individual incidents spread across Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan. While conceding that city-level variations are crucial, Wilkinson built his ‘electoral theory of violence’ on a study of state-level politics. The existing data does support the need to look more closely at the city-level spread. Between 1950 and 1995, in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, three states which emerged as the most riot-prone, spatial distribution between cities becomes relevant. Ahmedabad and Vadodara in Gujarat, Mumbai in Maharashtra and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh 3 primarily witnessed violence within these states. Therefore, the case for a city-level analysis is very strong.
However, for this study, given the nature of data available between 2006 and 2017, the analysis will need to look at state-level trends. The Government of India data is the only reliable dataset on communal violence after 2002. The data is published annually by the Ministry of Home Affairs and is compiled using police crime records. Varshney has highlighted certain issues regarding the reliability of the Government of India data (Varshney, 2001). Inflated numbers, absence of a common definition of a ‘riot’ and the fact that state-level aggregation hides various other city-level variations are some of the challenges with the government data (Varshney, 2001, pp. 89, 90). While taking note of these challenges, the Government of India data is the only consistent data available every year between 2006 and 2017. Although the IndiaSpend LynchTracker dataset provides the opportunity to analyse city level trends, it comes with multiple challenges. Firstly, the data available is only from 2011. Secondly, the data only covers ‘cow-related lynching’. This narrow definition results in multiple potential cases of Hindu–Muslim violence being excluded from the data. The Government of India data, therefore, provides the best opportunity to look at communal violence in India after 2002. Given that the government data is aggregated at the state level, this study only looks at state-level trends.
Government of India Data from 2006 to 2017
The data from 2006 to 2017 has been released by the Government of India. The data is compiled using police crime records. Table 1 shows the number of incidents recorded in states across India.
Table 1 summarizes the national figures between 2006 and 2017. Uttar Pradesh reported the most violence with a total of 1,686 incidents. This was followed by Maharashtra with 1,100, Madhya Pradesh with 1,071, Karnataka with 980 and Bihar with 742.
Statewise Distribution of Communal Violence for the period 2006–2017
The data, however, does not take into account the fact that a state like Karnataka is almost three times smaller in terms of population, when compared to Uttar Pradesh. A more useful method to analyse the violence levels is to use a weighted average. Being the largest state in the country, Uttar Pradesh will be taken as the base. Uttar Pradesh accounts for 16.49 per cent of the national population. Here, we use the formula given below,
where A denotes the weighted average;
C denotes the state’s share of the national population;
and I denotes the total number of incidents recorded in the state.
Given below is the weighted average based on the formula.
Going by the weighted average in Table 2, Karnataka emerges on top of the list, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and then Bihar. When it comes to absolute numbers, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Bihar emerge as the states witnessing the most frequent violence.
Weighted Average
While compiling the data, an interesting trend was noticed in West Bengal. Figure 1 summarizes communal incidents in West Bengal since 2006. In terms of absolute numbers, West Bengal reported a total of 277 communal violence-related incidents in this time period. Mapping out the spread of these 277 incidents over the course of the 12 years being studied, violence levels appear to be steadily increasing since 2014.
The numbers Figure 1 are straightforward, showing a steady increase in the frequency of incidents from 2014. From just 16 incidents in 2014, violence levels have steadily increased to a total of 58 incidents in 2017.
There is an important takeaway from the Government of India dataset. Between 1945 and 1995, the concentration of violence among the western and central Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Bihar suggested that that challenge of communal violence is purely a central and western Indian problem (Varshney & Wilkinson, 2006). The north-east and south were considered to be insulated from Hindu–Muslim violence. Between 2006 and 2017, with Karnataka topping the per capita weighted average, the notion that south India is insulated from Hindu–Muslim violence is challenged. Along with Karnataka, the steady rise in violence levels in West Bengal further strengthens the idea that communal violence is not an issue purely limited to western and central India.
There are two compelling reasons to pick Karnataka and West Bengal for a more detailed case study. Firstly, the data does show that both these states are witnessing increasing frequency of communal violence. Secondly, both Karnataka and West Bengal, being outside the Hindi-speaking belt, challenge the fundamental belief that Hindu–Muslim violence is a north and central Indian problem. A closer look at these two states will help contextualize the rise of communal tensions in regions beyond the Hindi heartland.
West Bengal: The Decline of the CPI(M) and the BJP–TMC Rivalry
West Bengal has seen a steady rise in the frequency of communal violence from 16 incidents in 2014 to 58 in 2017. This rise needs to be understood, bearing in mind the shifting electoral landscape. An analysis of the partywise vote share in the State Assembly and Lok Sabha elections since the 2000s will better highlight the political change West Bengal is witnessing.
Figure 2 highlights three trends. First, since 2001, the CPM has been in steady decline, with its share of popular votes dipping below 20 per cent in 2016. Second, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) has replaced the CPM as the dominant political force with a popular vote share of nearly 45 per cent in 2016. Third, the BJP has steadily increased its popular vote share and in 2016, it recorded a popular vote share of just over 10 percent.
A look at the Lok Sabha results in Figure 3, paints a different picture.
The CPM has clearly lost ground, with a popular vote share of just above 5 per cent. The TMC on the other hand has consolidated its lead, securing around nearly 45 per cent of the popular vote share in 2019. However, the real story lies in the growth of BJP’s vote share, reaching just over 40 per cent in 2019. The vacuum left behind by a declining CPM is being occupied by BJP. Clearly, West Bengal is heading towards an electoral landscape dominated by a TMC–BJP rivalry.
While BJP’s rise in West Bengal has been more clearly visible since 2010, the party’s efforts to establish a presence in the state goes back to the 1990s (Gillan, 2003). In fact, it was in the 1998 elections that BJP won its first Lok Sabha seat from West Bengal. While BJP experienced significant gains in the Hindi heartland during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party’s success in West Bengal was minimal (Gillan, 1998). The CPI(M) had a firm grip on the state. Additionally, the Bengali regional identity was particularly strong. BJP’s image as primarily a party of the Hindi heartland did not help its cause (Gillan, 1998). However, this was one of the two major challenges the party faced in West Bengal. The second and the more serious concern was the firm hold the CPI(M) had not only on politics but also on society (Chatterjee, 2009). This is particularly true in rural West Bengal, where the party had penetrated into day-to-day civic life. Land reforms and an extensive party structure gave the CPI(M) strong support in the rural areas. For BJP, a party which lacked the extensive grassroots networks that the CPI(M) possessed, breaking into the rural vote bank would be a major challenge.
In order to deal with its image as a party of the Hindi heartland, BJP attempted to develop a localized version of Hindu nationalism. The party’s focus on three key issues during the 1990s highlighted an effort to localize their appeal. Firstly, efforts were made to highlight the role Bengali figures have played in the shaping of Hindu nationalism. S. P. Mookerjee and Swami Vivekananda were used by BJP to highlight West Bengal’s contribution to the development of Hindu nationalism (Gillan, 2003; Kanungo, 2015). The party also highlighted how Hedgewar’s time in Kolkata as a medical student shaped his thinking. In using local Bengali figures, BJP was trying to highlight the Bengali roots of Hindu nationalism (Kanungo, 2015). Secondly, the party focused strongly on what it termed ‘Bangladeshi Muslim infiltration’ (Gillan, 2002). While Ram Janmabhoomi was a useful tool in the Hindi-speaking states, in West Bengal, the issue of migration from Bangladesh had the potential to strike a chord with the Bengali middle class. The migration issue was also blamed for the larger economic decline of West Bengal. Thirdly, linked to the broader economic decline and growing unemployment, the ‘Swadeshi’ campaign attempted to take on the CPI(M) economic matters (Gillan, 2001). This was particularly important because the domination of the CPI(M) meant that class-based ideological narratives were still crucial. The ‘Swadeshi’ campaign and BJP’s push for a more gradual and calibrated liberalization were projected as an alternative to Congress on the one hand and the CPI(M) on the other hand.
Despite BJP’s efforts to localize Hindu nationalism and provide an alternate economic outlook, electoral success in the 1990s was limited. Given the nature of CPI(M)’s support base in rural West Bengal, the absence of a strong organizational network proved to be a major hurdle. BJP attempted to deal with this issue by forming an alliance with TMC. The move helped it win its first Lok Sabha seat in 1998 (Gillan, 1998). Apart from this, BJP did not make any significant inroads. CPI(M) was able to retain its dominant position in West Bengal politics till the 2006 Assembly Elections. When dissatisfaction with the CPI(M) did emerge during the Nandigram and Singur agitations, TMC was at the forefront (Chatterjee, 2009; Chatterjee & Basu, 2009). In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, though they were in an alliance with Congress, it was clear that TMC benefitted from dissatisfaction with CPI(M). Having a stronger organizational base when compared to BJP and Congress worked in their favour.
The BJP clearly did not succeed in establishing a presence in West Bengal up until 2011. They had tried to localize Hindu nationalism to regional realities and tied up with TMC in an alliance in 1999; however, they were unable to take advantage of a growing public sentiment against CPI(M). Similarly, Congress, which got into an alliance with TMC in 2009, failed to make much headway. Ultimately, this meant that TMC took advantage of the changing fortunes of CPI(M) (Chatterjee & Basu, 2009). In 2011, Mamata Banerjee took over as the first non-left chief minister of West Bengal in 34 years.
The story of BJP’s success, however, began to take shape after 2011. CPI(M)’s defeat and decline opened up space for BJP to emerge. After 2011, important changes have taken place in the electoral landscape of West Bengal, which have helped BJP. Firstly, there was a significant effort by BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to strengthen their grassroots organizational presence. Membership to RSS increased from 1 lakh in 2010 to over 7 lakhs towards the end of 2013 (Kanungo, 2015). This means that the organizational structure of BJP is much stronger than that in the 1990s. Secondly, caste started to become a matter of importance. CPI(M) had managed to string together a broad-based, cross-caste support base. Chandra and Neilsen (2012) and Roy (2012) have argued that contrary to popular belief, caste was a factor in West Bengal politics during CPI(M)’s time. Roy (2012) suggests that caste is an important factor shaping political and economic dynamics of rural West Bengal. Chandra and Neilsen (2012) argue that West Bengal politics under the left parties was characterized by the dominance of upper caste ‘bhadralok’. Political discourse and power were strongly concentrated in the hands of the ‘bhadralok’ (Chandra & Nielsen, 2012). Support from the non-upper caste groups from the rural areas was secured through a system of patronage. The rise of TMC was fuelled by shifting caste alliances. According to Chatterjee and Basu (2009), during the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, while the SC and ST votes remained with CPI(M), OBCs and upper castes started moving away (Chatterjee & Basu, 2009). They suggest OBCs were unhappy with CPI(M)’s failure to extend reservations. Similarly, Muslim votes moved away from CPI(M) (Chatterjee & Basu, 2009). This suggests that in 2009, cracks emerged in CPI(M)’s social coalition, which benefitted TMC.
The breakdown of the social coalition that CPI(M) had managed to stitch together, opened the door for BJP. In particular, the upper caste votes, which traditionally has been BJP’s core vote bank, began to move away from CPI(M). After the 2011 assembly elections, in which CPI(M) was defeated, BJP once again made a push to carve out a political space for itself. This time, it enjoyed more tangible success. In the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, BJP managed to win 18 seats. Partha Chatterjee suggests that BJP has started to build a support base around urban upper caste groups (Gudavarthy, 2020). The themes used by BJP remain the same. There remains a focus on local icons like S. P. Mookerjee and Swami Vivekananda. The issue of Bangladeshi migrants has also been used extensively (Kanungo, 2015). After 2010, two things have decisively worked in BJP’s favour. Firstly, the defeat and decline of CPI(M) has opened up political space. In particular, the disenchantment of urban upper caste groups with CPI(M) has worked in BJP’s favour. Adding to this, TMC’s consolidation of Muslim votes has made BJP a more attractive proposition for the urban upper caste groups. Secondly, with the help of RSS, BJP has slowly built up local-level networks. This was something that they were lacking in the 1990s and early 2000s. Taking both factors into account, BJP has begun to position itself as the principal opposition party to TMC.
Karnataka: Bharatiya Janata Party’s First Success in South India
Karnataka has emerged as one of the most communally sensitive states according to the Government of India’s data between 2006 and 2017. The data emerging out of Karnataka challenges the notion that South India is largely insulated from communal violence. Also, Karnataka is the only South Indian state where BJP has a strong electoral presence.
When it comes to party competition, Karnataka has three major parties, BJP, Congress and JD(S). Karnataka is not exactly a tri-polar party system since JD(S)’ presence is concentrated in certain pockets. Karnataka can be classified as a ‘two-plus’ system (Yadav & Palshikar, 2006). A quick look at the vote share in the state assembly and Lok Sabha elections will provide a better understanding of the nature of electoral competition.
Going by Figure 4, apart from the blip in 2013, when a faction lead by B. S. Yediyurappa had broken away, BJP’s vote share has slowly increased, reaching just above 36 per cent in 2019. Congress on the other hand has a relatively stable vote share hovering around 35–36 per cent. Similarly, JD(S) also has a stable vote share of around 18–20 per cent.
The Lok Sabha vote share in Figure 5 suggests that since 2004, Karnataka is slowly moving towards a two-party electoral contest. The vote share of the JD(S) has steadily declined and dipped below 10 per cent in 2019. Congress has constantly held a vote share of over 30 per cent, with its best performance in 2014 and its worst in 2019. BJP on the other hand has steadily increased its vote share, securing around 51 per cent of the popular vote in 2019.
To make better sense of the emerging political scenario in Karnataka, one needs to take a closer look at how BJP has managed to emerge as one of the primary parties in the state. BJP’s strong presence in Karnataka is an exception rather than the norm with it comes to electoral competition in South India. Its presence in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh is limited and is almost entirely reliant on regional alliance partners. In Karnataka, however, BJP has successfully taken the place of JD(S), positioning itself as the primary competitor to Congress. Like West Bengal in the previous section, the success of BJP in Karnataka is down to a combination of factors. These range from decline of Congress and Janata Party (JP) to BJP’s success in localizing Hindu nationalism to regional themes and the formation of a broader social coalition, which involves backward caste groups.
Karnataka politics has traditionally been dominated by two primary caste groups; the Vokkaligas and the Lingayats. Taken together, both account for around 30 per cent of Karnataka’s population. Until the early 1970s, both the Vokkaligas and Lingayats were with Congress. James Manor (1984) suggests that between 1972 and 1977, Devaraj Urs’ government attempted to break the dominance of these two caste groups. As a result, by the early 1980s, Congress’ support base in the Vokkaliga and Lingayat community began to shrink, opening up the space for other political parties (Manor, 1984). In 1983, Ramakrishna Hedge from JP became the first non-Congress chief minister of Karnataka. The decline of Congress and its loss of support from the Vokkaliga and Lingayat community in the 1980s began to open up the electoral space. It is here BJP sensed an opportunity.
As in the case of West Bengal, BJP’s image as a party of the Hindi-speaking belt was its Achilles’ heel in the South Indian states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. In Karnataka, however, an important aspect appears to have worked in BJP’s favour. Unlike Tamil Nadu, West Bengal or Maharashtra, regional linguistic identity is not as strong in Karnataka (Nair, 1996). While the absence of a very strong regional linguistic identity proved to be a major factor, the Kannada linguistic identity did begin to emerge as a potential factor following the Cauvery Water Riots of 1991 (Nair, 1996). For BJP, which in the early 1990s was still trying to establish its presence in state, this development was concerning.
This brings up the second aspect of BJP’s route to establish an electoral presence in Karnataka, localizing Hindu nationalism to regional issues. BJP successfully managed to fuse Hindutva along with the emerging Kannada linguistic identity. The 1994 riots in Bangalore over the Urdu news bulletin proved to be a watershed moment. The agitation over Urdu news bulletin was initially led by pro-Kannada groups. While primarily a language issue, there was a religious angle to it (Engineer, 1994). Urdu is spoken predominantly by the Muslim population. While the grievance of pro-Kannada groups was primarily linguistic, groups like the VHP were able to convert this into a Hindu–Muslim battle (Engineer, 1994). The riots of 1994 ultimately resulted in around 25 people being killed. In the long term, it also resulted in the pro-Kannada movement aligning with BJP’s Hindu nationalism. Therefore, regional linguistic identity became a useful tool for BJP to mobilize voters based on Hindu nationalism.
Along with the use of Kannada linguistic identity, BJP adapted Hindu nationalism based on regional caste calculations. The Lingayat community along with the Vokkaligas are the two dominant caste groups in Karnataka. Since the 1990s, BJP has successfully consolidated the Lingayat vote (Manor, 1992; Shivasundar, 2012). The party has roped in influential Lingayat Mutts. The Mutts have openly voiced their support for BJP (Shivasundar, 2012). The strong influence they have on the Lingayat community has meant that the community has consistently thrown its weight behind BJP. The support from the Lingayat community has helped BJP form a social coalition, which Muzaffar Assadi has termed as ‘LIBRA—Lingayat and Brahmin’ (Assadi, 1998, 2013). This support base enabled BJP to perform well in certain constituencies such as Bangalore South, Tumkur, Davangere, Bidar and Coastal Karnataka (Mangalore) in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections. The 1991 Lok Sabha elections was at that time the party’s best performance in the state, winning a total of 28.8 per cent of the popular vote share and four seats (Manor, 1992).
The BJP’s performance in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections suggested that the party had the potential to break into the Congress and Janata Party–dominated political landscape. In the 1994 Assembly elections, however, BJP failed to build on its 1991 performance. In 1991, it had come first in 59 assembly segments, but in 1994, that was down to 40. Its vote share also fell from 28.8 per cent in 1991 to 16.97 per cent. BJP clearly failed to consolidate and build on its performance in the 1991 elections. James Manor suggests that it was the lack of a strong local organization that was BJP’s undoing (Manor, 1992). In regions like Coastal Karnataka, where BJP had a strong organization at the local level, it was able to build on its previous performance.
The Assembly elections of 1994 and the Lok Sabha elections of 1996 clearly suggested that BJP had a noticeable presence in certain pockets of the state. Coastal Karnataka, Bangalore city, Bidar, Davangere and Dharwad are the regions where BJP was able to establish a presence. In other parts of Karnataka, particularly South Karnataka and rural regions, the party did not have a strong presence (Manor, 1992). Interestingly, all the regions where BJP established its presence had a few factors in common. Either the party had a very strong local organization, like in Coastal Karnataka, or the region had a strong upper caste and Lingayat presence like in Bangalore, Dharwad and Davangere (Manor, 1992). Despite BJP’s effort to localize Hindu nationalism, its weak organizational base and the lack of support from non-upper caste and Lingayat groups proved to be a major setback in the 1990s.
Towards the late 1990s, two major developments helped BJP emerge as a political force. The first was the alliance with former Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde’s Lok Shakti during the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. With this alliance, BJP had hoped that it could expand its presence in North Karnataka and also consolidate its hold over the Lingayat votes (Shastri, 2004). Secondly, the split of JP, with the Deve Gowda faction forming the JD(S) opened the doors for BJP to position itself as the principal opposition party to Congress (Shastri & Ramaswamy, 2004).
In the 2004 assembly elections, the party emerged as the single largest party winning 79 seats. In the 2008 Assembly elections, it further built on its 2004 performance, securing 110 seats. The patterns in BJP’s support base after 2000s has two key takeaways. Firstly, BJP has a strong presence in certain pockets of the state. Coastal Karnataka, Bangalore city, Central Karnataka and Bombay Karnataka are the regions where BJP has a very strong presence. In these regions, BJP and Congress are locked in a bi-polar fight. However, in South Karnataka, BJP has failed to make inroads and the JD(S) remains a very strong force (Shastri & Padmavathi, 2009). This pattern suggests that following the split of the JP, BJP has occupied its space in Bangalore city and Central and Bombay Karnataka. JD(S) on the other hand has only been able to hold on to its support base in South Karnataka. Secondly, not only has BJP consolidated its upper caste and Lingayat alliance, but it has also successfully roped in backward class groups, which, in the 1990s, tended to stay away. Muzaffar Assadi (2002) highlights an example of this trend in Coastal Karnataka. Here, BJP has historically had strong support from the Brahmin and Bunt communities. Assadi highlighted how a fishing community, the Karvis, a backward caste group, joined in the violence against the Muslim community in a series of communal violence incidents near Udupi in 2002 (Assadi, 2002). In Coastal Karnataka, along with the support from upper caste groups like the Brahmins and Bunts, BJP has been able to rope in the Billavas and OBCs in its social coalition (Assadi, 2002). Taken together, both these factors have helped BJP cement its place as the primary challenger to Congress in most regions of Karnataka.
Several important issues have played a role in the emergence of BJP as an electoral force in Karnataka. Congress’ loss of the Lingayat and Vokkaliga vote bank in the 1980s opened the door for opposition parties. BJP successfully managed to fine-tune Hindu nationalism to local realities by taking over the emerging Kannada linguistic identity and aligning itself with the Lingayat community. While a localized Hindu nationalist narrative did help the party establish a presence in certain pockets, more tangible success came in the late 1990s with its alliance with Lok Shakti and the split of the JP. While the alliance with Lok Shakti helped BJP consolidate its support base among the upper castes, the split of JP left a space which BJP managed to successfully occupy. While consolidating its hold over upper caste groups and Lingayats, BJP has managed to expand its social coalition to include OBC groups.
Conclusion
Data between 2006 and 2017 challenges the previously held notions that communal violence is mainly a central and western Indian problem. The rise in violence levels in Karnataka, and more recently West Bengal, indicates that communal violence is an issue faced by states in south and eastern India. The emerging trends in Karnataka and West Bengal need to be looked at in context of the emerging electoral battle in both the states. Karnataka is the only South Indian state where BJP has a strong presence. The rise of BJP in the state goes back to political developments in the 1990s. At a time when the Kannada linguistic identity was growing in strength, BJP moved in to align Hindu nationalism with the emerging regional linguistic identity. It also successfully adapted to local caste dynamics by securing the support of the Lingayat community. With this, by the early 2000s, BJP was able to firmly establish itself as one of the dominant political parties along with Congress.
In West Bengal, BJP has seen electoral success more recently following the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Similar to Karnataka, BJP’s efforts to establish a presence in West Bengal go back to the 1990s. Similar to the Karnataka strategy, BJP attempted to localize Hindu nationalism to regional realities. However, unlike Karnataka, electoral success was limited in the 1990s. This could be due to the dominance of CPI (M) and BJP lacking a local-level organizational presence. Following the defeat and decline of CPI(M) since 2011, BJP has quickly taken up the opportunity and positioned itself as the primary opposition party to TMC.
Looking at the trajectories of BJP’s rise in the two states, a few common themes emerge. Firstly, while localization of Hindu nationalism to regional realities is an important factor, it is not the only reason for BJP’s rise. Secondly, alliances with regional partners do not always guarantee success. While in Karnataka, BJP’s alliance with the Lok Shakti helped them consolidate Lingayat and upper caste votes, a similar alliance the TMC in West Bengal did not make much of a difference to the party’s fortunes. Three factors have proved to be crucial for BJP’s success in Karnataka and West Bengal. Firstly, the presence of a strong local-level organization is important. In Karnataka, BJP has had a remarkable success in regions like Coastal Karnataka, where RSS has a very strong local presence. Similarly, in West Bengal, RSS’ expansion after 2011 has proved to be a key part of BJP’s success. Secondly, political change, in the form of the decline of an existing political party, has been important. In Karnataka, BJP occupied JP’s space, following its split in 1999. In West Bengal, BJP has been the beneficiary of the CPI(M)’s decline since 2011. Thirdly, the consolidation of upper caste votes along with the expansion of the social coalition to include OBCs and other non-upper caste groups has helped BJP. In Karnataka, BJP has been able to consolidate the Lingayat and upper caste votes. It has also increased its votes among the OBCs, helping it build a larger social coalition. In West Bengal, it is a little too early to tell if BJP has been able to form a similar social coalition. The key to BJP’s future success in West Bengal will be its ability to not only consolidate upper caste votes but also to expand the social coalition to include OBCs and other caste groups.
Looking back at the communal violence data between 2006 and 2017, it is important to contextualize the trends in West Bengal and Karnataka to their respective political landscapes. On the one hand the trends are a sign that communal violence is not a problem that is limited to central and north Indian states. Politically, it also comes at a time when BJP has expanded its footprint beyond the Hindi heartland into south and north-east India. In a sense, Hindu nationalism has been regionalized and expanded to states outside the Hindi-speaking belt. The aim of this article is to help contextualize the rise in communal violence in states like West Bengal and Karnataka to larger political trends. While it does not attempt to address the causal mechanisms of communal violence in Karnataka and West Bengal, the article draws attention to the larger political conundrum within which communal violence is taking place in these states. The main takeaway from this article is that communal politics in twenty-first-century India is not confined to states in the Hindi heartland. BJP has successfully expanded its footprint to regions in the south and north-east.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.