Behind the Popular Narrative: Negotiating Life and Political Engagement in Conflicted Kashmir

Introduction

Anthropologically, political actions are often analysed from a localized and experiential perspective, thereby giving room to creative cultural and social productions (Kokal, 2019). Besides being the citizens of the state, people are members of their community, whose value systems and expected modes of behaviour lay a great influence on political actions. In this backdrop, we analysed young people’s response to the Kashmir conundrum within a wider anthropological perspective, taking into account the embeddedness of political engagement and decision-making within the alternative normative orders. More particularly, this study discusses the influence of the subaltern political consciousness, i.e., Tehreeq-e-Azadi (Movement for Freedom in English) on people’s engagements with the state and its grass-root functionaries. In this scenario, the article makes three important arguments. First, Tehreeq-e-Azadi as part of Kashmiri subjective experience invokes an incantation, a utopian social realm (Azadi) and a counter-memory of the history of subjugation and sacrifice. In different ways, it mediates and incites people’s interaction, hostile and friendly, with the state and its institutions. It is argued that Tehreeq-e-Azadi as a counter discursive ideology unwittingly brings about practical emancipation of the state policies and practices by transfiguring them to timely imperatives. Theoretically, such a perspective is useful to analyse and understand diverse cultural and political movements within a multi-ethnic country like India (see for discussion Na’puti, 2014). This point has been coherently illustrated in Nilsen’s (2016) study on Bhils of MP. By using different forms of protest and insurgent actions, Bhils were able to inflict effective emancipation of citizenship entitlements. Communities within super-diverse India use localized subterranean mechanisms to attune national policies to regional issues. Most of the existing literature analyses movements around Tehreeq-e-Azadi merely as confrontational and secessionist, ignoring the vital dimension of how it may act as a creative site for political negotiation between the state and the people.

Secondly, to explicate the relationship between Tehreeq-e-Azadi and political negotiations with the state at the grass-root level, we focus on various forms of micro appropriations or Jugaads used by an individual as socio-political actor. We use case studies of Sarpanchs and the unemployed youth to substantiate this argument. The word Jugaad has been a popular North Indian polysemy, broadly defined as a low-cost ‘quick-fix’, or a set of improvisations offering timely solutions to everyday problems (Kaur, 2016). It may also include a set of behaviours transmuting existing norms and expectations to fit the extant situation. Jugaad includes an informal and alternative system of illicit political actions exercised to make things happen when the existing politico-legal systems create undue limitations (Goodfellow, 2020; Jauregui, 2014). Jugaad is used in the context of this study to include a range of creative political manoeuvres by political subjects, more particularly highlighting various forms of ‘tactical engagements’ with the state on different scales, which may be used to get things done, particularly to avoid any vulnerability: as agents or as victims. In this respect, Tehreeq-e-Azadi is largely enacted by the improvisation of everyday personal and political actions (Junaid, 2019; Spencer, 2013).

Thirdly, people’s political participation may merely reflect underlying desperation to survive normally and safely. Therefore, it is argued that the process of political engagement is driven largely by the lifesaving Jugaads, rather than by propitiating emancipatory aspirations and democratic inclinations. For silently managing ones’ own life, people may construe the state, in fact, as a ‘safe heaven’ and may pragmatically utilize ‘state in everyday life’ for knitting possibilities of normal life (Hoffman & Duschinski, 2020). This conceptualization challenges the conventional dichotomy of separatism vs the mainstream or the state vs the people. The complexities posed by war-like situations in zones of armed conflict lends such conceived notions of political polarization and associated political engagements unintelligible and inconsequential for long-term political interpretations and the process of positive democratic becoming.

Methodological Framework

Researching in conflict zones is always a baffling pursuit, particularly about locating and selecting reliable sources for data collection. Looking at the lived experiences of people inside Kashmir offers a far more convincing account of events than the documented official archives, which often serve the interests of those in power. Faheem (2020) illustrates this situation as:

To understand the protest and contestations of the past in a conflict zone, researchers often use key informant interviews to complement archival research or to substitute it in case of insufficient documentary sources. The possibility of locating personal archives is to a large extent a by-product of the political activism of the individuals and also of pressing political need. The archive in such contexts is predicated on a particular concept of collective identity. Such archives are often informal and fragmented and reflect the precarious contexts in which they are produced. (pp. 15)

This study is particularly aimed at understanding the nuances of political belonging and engagement on different levels. More particularly, the predicaments of local Kashmiris caught between the cacophonies of competing ideologies. We use three instances to illustrate such situations. Firstly, case study of a Sarpanch has been used to understand how subaltern ideology influences political actions. Secondly, a case study of an unemployed young man is used to explain how personal struggles and aspirations might at times overwhelm sympathizing with a particular ideology. Thirdly, instances where people use verbal improvisations to manage hassle-free mobility are narrated.

We have used face-to-face interviews together with the long-term ethnographic presence as the primary method to collect data. One might call it participant observation, but given that author of this research is native to Kashmir, he had to virtually de-familiarize himself to reflect upon the taken-for-granted social realities around himself. On the other hand, the possibilities of producing a genuinely emic perspective are more warranted. The interviews were undertaken post-abolition of article 370, over a period of 1 year. As a shortcoming of this research, these multi-sited ethnographic experiences may appear to be extremely fleeting and disparate. However, they are selected and presented by an underlying logic of salience to the specified research agenda. It is very pertinent to mention that these cases have been selected among a range of similar cases and may be said to roughly correspond to the lived experiences of others. These cases represent instances where individuals exercise agency to improvise and attune to situations, by desperately using political idioms and institutions for instrumental ends. The study takes critical care of ethical dilemmas emerging while researching in such tricky situations. The identity of all the participants has been anonymized. Moreover, the participants were apprised about the aim of interviews and proper permission has been sought about the usability of the data.

Background

The genesis of the Kashmir conflict lies in the incomplete partition of South Asia into India and Pakistan. In 1947, when the British left India, the fate of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir remained undecided. J&K despite being a Muslim-dominated princely state was ruled by Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. Just like the other princely states, the ruler of J&K was given the choice to accede to either India or Pakistan, or remain independent. Initially, the Maharaja wanted to remain independent, though we have little evidence about it in the convoluted archives, later the Maharaja was forced by the prevailing environment to conditionally accede to India. An UN-arbitrated plebiscite was promised to the people of J&K, which unfortunately was not allowed to happen by the geo-strategically interested states of India and Pakistan. The relations of the state of J&K with the Union of India were regulated by article 370, which gave a special constitutional position, in fact, an independent constitution and flag to the state. Article 370, which gave legal shape to the special status and relationships between the centre and the state, allowed J&K to maintain autonomy in all matters, except defence, currency and foreign affairs within the Union of India (Snedden, 2015). The special position was abrogated on 5 August 2019, without due consultation of the state assembly (Zia, 2019a).

Kashmir conflict is a multi-dimensional issue and has a considerable impact on South Asian politics. Firstly, it refers to the anti-state resistance of the people of Kashmir against the states of India and Pakistan, though the agitation is more intense on the Indian side. Secondly, it refers to the conflict between India and Pakistan about laying claims on the territories of J&K. A number of wars have been fought between India and Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Moreover, the Kashmir conflict has a far-reaching impact on the foreign policies of both countries (Snedden, 2015).

This article is mainly concerned with the people of Kashmir and their relationships with the state of India. Kashmir has seen a rise in mass mobilizations by the turn of this century and an associated decrease in armed rebellions (Ganie, 2021). Kashmiris had started an armed rebellion in 1989, for secession from India, based on the right to self-determination promised in the Instrument of accession between India and Kashmir (Iqbal et al., 2014). There has been a continuous prevalence of human rights violation in the regions, at the hands of Indian security agencies and armed rebels (Zia, 2019a). India has tried to legitimize its position in Kashmir by the establishment of democratic political institutions and engagement of young people in the process of governance and administration. The process has been broadly referred to as ‘mainstreaming’, which has been directed against obliterating and annihilating the ideology of Tehreeq-e-Azadi. The latter broadly refers to anti-state sentiment, aimed at separate nationhood for Kashmir or the struggle for the right to self-determination. Separatist political parties represent a manifested and institutionalized facet of Tehreeq-e-Azadi. Separatist action largely includes the boycott of mainstream political spaces. Moreover, in popular and political discourses, separatism and mainstream are viewed as antagonistic and mutually exclusionary, the position which this article challenges. Recently from 2007 onwards, increasing anti-state protests (separatism) have simultaneously been accompanied by increased participation in mainstream political institutions such as elections (Chowdhary, 2009).

Political Participation

In formal parlance, separatism and mainstream are understood as two antithetical political ideologies directed against each other. But this study illustrates that in ‘spaces of everyday negotiation’, both entities are juxtaposed by a complex interplay of agency and context. The murky border crossing between separatism and mainstream becomes inevitable and natural due to existing political limbo and an equally unsatisfying state of affairs resulting from both sides.

The nature of the Kashmir movement for Azadi (Freedom in Urdu) has intensified and changed dramatically in the last couple of decades with people relying more on peaceful mass mobilizations and violent Sangbazi (stone-pelting in Urdu) as means of protest (Mohanty, 2018; Ganie, 2021). With these transformations, changes were also experienced in young people’s attitude and perception of the state and its institutions hitherto considered Haram (forbidden in Urdu). As most of the Elections of the 80s and 90s were allegedly rigged and legal institutions were only meant to provide immunity to security agencies for carrying on atrocities (Duschinski & Ghosh, 2017), people’s participation in Jhummori Nizam (democratic institutions in Urdu) was negligible. The young adults of the post-80s phase, who have grown in the shades of violence lost their trust and confidence in the political and legal institutions of the state (Bhat, 2018).

But young Kashmiris do not live in isolation, they were influenced by the changing socio-political scenario and the increasing developmental marginalization (Bhat & Rather, 2013) induced by unrealistic taboos imposed by the ridged polarization between mainstream and separatism. In the first decade of this century, young people started realizing that they can no longer distance themselves from the reality of the state. In 2002 assembly elections, there was some sort of positive response from people towards state assembly elections, which subsequently led to a popular coalition government between PDP ¹ (People’s Democratic Party) and Congress led by Mufti Syed. PDP gave vent to people’s separatist aspirations in mainstream politics, which led to a huge success of PDP in 2008, accompanied by the impression of PDP as Tehreeq pasand (freedom-loving in Urdu) political party among people. However, such opinions were reversed after PDP–BJP coalition in 2015. This gave a hint of experience to people about how the state political platform can be used to easing out people’s sufferings without inflicting damage to the separatist ideology. During this period from 2002 to 2007 while Vajpayee was promoting Jhumoriyat ² and Kashmiriyat ³ for resolving the Kashmir issue, people in turn were wondering about how to reconcile Jhumoriyat with Hurriyat (democracy and separatism in Urdu).

Due to the failure of the government to address people’s political grievances, an election boycott had become a norm in the valley. People considered the Indian democratic political process and electioneering as meaningless and wily, vying as a substitute for the right to self-determination. In some recently held elections, people’s participation increased significantly, as illustrated by the recently held local body election. Such responses from people towards the process of electioneering are not simply the result of democratic inclination, but the need of managing conditions for a good life. Both local governance and assembly politics operate within the milieu of the separatist agenda (Chowdhary, 2008). This was only after people realized that mainstream political spaces can be used for separatist ends, which was mainly fostered by the political campaigning of PDP after the 2002 elections. PDP manifesto borrowed issues from the separatist camp and brought them to the centre of mainstream political space. Mufti Syed suggested ‘dialogue’ with the militants and separatists as the only possible way to resolve conflict. People experienced the difference at the grass-root level, as the pressure of the excessive presence of the security forces was easing out and cases of human rights violations were also getting reduced (Chowdhary, 2009).

By the beginning of this century, people’s opinions regarding mainstream politics and subsequently elections transformed, which are now considered as part of day-to-day civil governance necessary for managing ‘bijli, sadak aur pani’ (electricity, roads and water in Urdu) (Zia, 2019b, p. 59). The point is that in the process of fulfilling political and survival needs, people through evasive secrecy crossover the arbitrary boundary, making the distinction obsolete. In reality, both the resistant and democratic political process remain relevant, operate side by side, sometimes overlap at several points and impact each other in interesting ways (Chowdhary, 2008).

Right from the 90s due to the prevalence of intensely violent conflict, the major proportion of the young generation was either kept out of educational institutes or they dropped out in large number (Singh, 2018). While a major challenge to the government was to neutralize anti-state sentiments and rising militancy, youth empowerment, developmental projects and educational policies remained the last priority, with higher education given the least preference (Shah, 2012). There were only a few government-run colleges in the state during the 1990s and the question of private colleges was out of imagination. The state of secondary education was also in bad shape. Consequently, a generation of young people was not able to realize their educational aspirations. Their transition into adulthood and a successful future were blocked. In the midst of all this, Kashmiri young people seem to have learned to cope up successfully with such conditions (Mishra, 2013). Searching for a middle ground between Jhumoriyat and Hurriyat, they have started to reinvent their political agency. With a spectre of Tehreeq in their mind, they have to counterbalance their aspirations (Mahajan, 2021). The key to them is how to negotiate the boundaries between Hurriyat and Jhumoriyat.

The Predicament of Sarpanch

In their different capacities, local Kashmiris find themselves morally and socially impelled to give symbolic or actual support to Tehreeq-e-Azadi. As already pointed out, in the middle of stressed circumstances, local Kashmiris are forced to covertly compose possibilities of a good life. In the post-370 scenario, the Gupkar ⁴ decided to take part in local body elections to defy BJP’s efforts to conquer amorphous political space created after abolition of the article 370. Most of the elected candidates became subjects of ridicule and criticism on social media. People from local body elections have become victims at the hands of their people and some of them virtually ‘left to die’ (The Print, 9 June 2020). Many Sarpanchs in order to legitimize themselves had to actively give actual support to people in times of sufferings inflicted due to armed conflict. We present a case of Mr Bilal (name changed) who had been recently elected as Sarpanch. The narratives of Bilal illustrate the complex of forces that are at play in the lived realities of the Kashmir conflict.

In January 2021, I went to meet Bilal at his residence, 30 km away from Srinagar. Before this, I had only a short conversation with him through one of our common friends. I received a warm welcome from his family and we were offered tea. Bilal told me that his family included his mother, four elder brothers and a younger sister. Twenty-eight-year-old Bilal Ahmad used to be a separatist sympathizer right from his childhood. He was outraged by the actions of the army and police against people. Early in his career, Bilal’s family met a tragedy, his father died due to a stray bullet hitting him during an encounter in the village neighbourhood. Bilal couldn’t further his educational career because as he explains ‘I just couldn’t focus once my father died, there was a lot of turbulence within the family and my mind was always occupied with haunting thoughts’. When he grew up he was struck with the importance of contributing to family income. He tried his fortunes with a small shop in the neighbourhood during 2016, but he failed to make genuine progress as it had to be closed for around 6 months due to recurring curfew during that year. Later he started as MGNREGA ⁵ contractor in the village. Frustrated with the way MGNREGA works, particularly the behaviour of MNREGA officials, Bilal decided to contest Sarpanch elections to get rid of these kinds of problem. In popular opinion, Sarpanchs are construed as stooges of the Indian army and are often ostracized and victimized within their community. Bilal while talking about people’s reaction said:

I am like other Kashmiris, I share their views and beliefs but I had to do this as I had no other option. I wanted to keep away from all this mess, but the situation just forced me into this. I thought this was the only option left for me. I was not educated enough to pursue a job.

But once I filed my nomination papers for the Sarpanch elections, some people stopped talking to me, it was like I have committed a crime. Even my family member opposed my decision. I started feeling very fearful, sometimes regretting my own decision to file a nomination. I have helped many people with different kinds of problems, even though they were against my decision. But, this made me realise that I have to be very careful as my actions may hurt people’s emotions. Once I became sarpanch people called me Ghadhar (Traitor) and Mukhbir (Informer). But once their children are in police custody due to stone pelting, I am expected to rescue them. Although it is not my duty, I negotiate with police and army.

Sarpanchs play a very crucial role at the village level, particularly concerning the decisions about the implementation of community block development schemes. Besides this, Sarpanchs remains key to the army and police in the process of law and order. They are the most reliable persons for security agencies. Although labelled as ‘Hindustan nawaz’ meaning pro India people, Sarpanchs play a crucial role in negotiations between security agencies and people in times of violent eruptions. Bilal tells us about how local people approach him when their children are arrested:

Two young men were arrested last week and they were in army custody. The families contacted me to help them rescue their sons. They were taken up from their home by the army during a night raid. The family was in a very precarious situation. We know how the army treats people, anything can happen in army camps. I had met the army officer twice, I knew the two guys who had been abducted so I approached the army officer and talked to him about the two guys, I had to assure him that the guys are innocent and are not involved in any kind of anti-national activities. As a sarpanch, I fearlessly went inside the army camp and convinced the army major about the innocence of the two young men. Later the guys were released and the family had a sigh of relief. I had to do this to legitimize myself in the village and remove that ‘Hindustan Nawaz’ tag imposed upon me.

The case illustrates the dynamics of factors responsible for political participation within armed conflict. The decision about joining the mainstream political arena was induced by the need to find a reliable livelihood niche. The situation of employment instability created by armed conflict induces political judgements in desperation. The political identity of Sarpanchs remains diluted due to grass-root refitting of their responsibilities. They are expected to help families and individuals arrested by police or the army for cases of anti-national activities or stone-pelting. Although this is not their official responsibility, they need to rescue protestors from police and the army, to reinforce their social standing within the community. There is a resistance-sensitive code of conduct that one cannot breach as a member of Kashmiri society, irrespective of social and political standing. This surreptitious normativity governing the behaviour of ordinary Kashmiri springs from the deeply embedded separatist ideology. Zia understands desperate political engagement as a necessary condition for knitting a safety network for survival within the situation of militarized administrative setup, such as in Kashmir (Zia, 2019b, pp. 115–143). Bilal’s account reflects that conceiving political participation within existing categories of separatist vs mainstream is redundant from an experiential and lived perspective.

No doubt, both the state and separatists use people’s political engagement and disengagement respectively to contest and legitimize their stand. Behind these political contestations lies people’s actions and struggles for making a life and living possible. This contestation over people–state relations has in an unanticipated manner complicated people’s lives. Hyperbolic propaganda has confused people in their endeavour to balance life amid conflict. More importantly, such propaganda also ignores critically localized meanings and engagements with the state that shapes the practices of citizenship and politics.

Unemployed Youth

On a different scale, people use illicit negotiations for getting a government job for eschewing the possibilities of becoming victims and agents of violence. In J&K, state remains the largest employment provider, people are exceedingly dependent on the state for their survival. Everybody is engaged in a tussle to be a government ‘mulazim’ (employee in Kashmiri/Urdu), which is construed as the most reliable survival strategy because most of the business and private enterprise remains badly affected by the unrest and curfew.

Imran (name changed) is a 28-year-old guy, residing in Batamalo, which is one of the most prominent violence-affected areas in Srinagar. He lost his father early because of the conflict; later his mother took the responsibility for his nurture and education. Imran was in 12th when he was allegedly arrested in a stone-pelting case, which eventually resulted in stagnation of his further education. Right now he is running a small shop near the national highway. The shop often remains closed due to Hartal and does not work up to his expectations. Imran remains only partially satisfied with his private enterprise and falls short of making anticipated progress. Imran paid two lakh rupees to a broker to enter his name in a list of daily wagers, whose monthly remuneration is less than five thousand. When asked why he paid this much money, he replied:

I was arrested during a night raid, I didn’t know at that movement what was going on with me, later I was shown a video of me present near a stone-pelting site. I was in the police station for one week, after which I was released, now my case is pending in the district court. I couldn’t focus on my studies after this event and later decided to quit my studies and started to do some work. I didn’t do anything wrong; I was forced into this, maybe, I could have continued my studies.

‘Yeth cha barosi ma dop thaff rozi’ balken paga permanent gy, sarkaras nish kos kath gayi’. Panin kaem chus ba yepaer karan (in Kashmiri).

You don’t know what will happen tomorrow, better if you hold your grip on this, and maybe tomorrow they regularize us, the government can do anything. I am doing my work besides hanging on with this daily waged government job.

In a situation of political unrest, when everything remains uncertain, government employment has been a symbol of stability and regularity. Private enterprise culture has been discouraged by unrest from the last few decades. The hope of making successful adulthood revolves around a government job. A majority of young people use available bureaucratic networks, politicking, to negotiate with government official a ‘backdoor entry’ into the state administrative departments, these efforts are partly supported by some political leaders for their ends. More than one lakh Kashmiri youth are engaged in 25 different administrative departments of the state (excluding police and army), whose annual honorarium is less than 50,000 INR. Besides, there are a huge number of under-paid special police officers (SPOs) who are lowest ranked police officers. In a recently held recruitment drive in response to some 5,000 SPO vacancies in J&K, over 77,000 applied (The Economic Times, 2019). These applicants are not motivated by the desire to serve the state rather by despair and disconsolation.

Because of political unrest post-1990, much educated youth could not complete their education as desired. Alleged involvements in militancy and stone-pelting incidents terminated the educational careers of many desirous young people. The cycles of violence and political uncertainty caught many aspiring young people of Kashmir in an abyss, which led to many of them terminating their education and career-related ambitions. Most of them in early adulthood face two kinds of problems, on the one side is the haunting feelings of under-achievement, on the other side is excessive surveillance by security agencies and temptations of separatism. Security agencies keep eye on Baekar Jawan (unemployed young men in Kashmiri) and frequently ask them for interrogation or ‘pooch taach’. As part of responsible parenting, youth are encouraged to have a government job which potentially reduces separatist temptations. In this kind of situation, young people and their parents are psychologically impelled to use various kinds of ‘Jugaads’ to get rid of the perilous situation.

Verbal Jugaads

In this section, we have tried to illustrate how people in their everyday life manage hassle-free mobility with creative verbal improvisations. Mobility is an extremely vital aspect of contemporary lifestyle, particularly in conflict zones where commuting across places is full of security checkpoints and vulnerabilities (Junaid, 2019). Two cases have been selected for presentation, in both cases, participants are government employees. This was in line with the theme of the study, aiming to understand how any relationship with the state might facilitate one’s everyday life. People devise different verbal expressions to evoke preferential treatment from security forces.

Below is an anecdote narrated by a government employee, sharing his experiences about incidents of frisking and mobile phone checking. Over the years, the participant has learned to evade such situations by extemporizing language and gestures.

When article 370 was scrapped on 5 August 2019, the whole of the J&K state was put under curfew and all modes of communication were blocked (Zia, 2020). After the restoration of the Internet in February 2020, people could access only some selected banking and government websites. As the Internet has become a vital part of daily survival, young people in Kashmir use many Jugaads to access the blocked websites. One of the most frequent is the use of virtual private networks (VPNs), which besides enhancing the Internet speed enables Internet users to access blocked websites (Outlook, 29 January 2020). Military agencies as part of their counter terrorism operations not only enforce social media ban through practices like this but also make their presence felt, annihilating people’s private spaces (Junaid, 2013). Young people defy such efforts, use VPNs to not only express their dissent towards censorship but also fulfil their digital needs. In a militarized zone, everyday life becomes a series of counter-hegemonic negotiations and tactical decisions about defying weaponized precarity and managing risk and vulnerability (Junaid, 2019).

In another anecdote, a teacher narrates how he and his students were exempted from the checking and frisking by security men after learning about his identity.

In this case, the physical education teacher uses the nationalistic idiom ‘Khelo India’ to not only capsize this form of militarized manoeuvre but also navigate his way out of the situation. Both these situations illustrate how Jugaads are used to overcome military checkpoints. A ‘strategic confession’ about being a government employee in front of security agencies came in handy in eschewing humiliation and avoiding symbolically enforced encroachment into the private domain. It is reflected that this verbal Jugaad, as a micro engagement, was not driven by a desire to express political belongingness, but to escape being frisked. In a militarized zone, everyday life becomes a series of counter-hegemonic negotiations and tactical decisions about defying occupation, evading military control and balancing life (Junaid, 2019).

The word ‘Jugaad’ has been used as an alternative meaning for low-level, borderline illegal activities in the South Asian context (Birtchnell, 2011). Appearing busy to other people, particularly security agencies and armed rebels, is a conflict avoidance tactic adopted by young Kashmiris. Many young men successfully escape the surveillance of the army and militants by becoming a ‘Mulazim’, which means becoming part of the state administration. Here ‘Mulazim’ means more than just a salaried government employee, it means an ‘Awur Nafar’ (a busy person in Urdu), which enables the person to avoid getting caught in the webs of perpetual violence. In the middle of uncertainty and militarized violence, such strategies become part of complex subaltern ideology, tantamount to subversion. Zia (2016, 2019b) using case studies of female APDP ⁶ activists, understands such acts which are representative of an agency, as forms of everyday resistance, which are usually hidden from the dominant group but are critical in producing counter-memory amid censorship (Zia, 2019b, pp. 64–90).

Similarly, a system of illicit negotiations is so pervasive in Kashmir that, people do not see any kind of immorality or illegality in bribing someone for a government job. This activity which shall be labelled as corruption from a normal perspective is deemed as an intelligent move that ensures safe and stable livelihood for a person. There is a growing body of literature that suggests that the notion of corruption should be fluid to the interpretations of everyday life and other conditions (Pardo, 2018; Polese, 2008; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2018). Most often, they would recognize the illegal or immoral character of such actions but they will simply decide to ignore it or underestimate it. The act also implies defying the government system as redundant for not having an ability to cover up the needs of the people (Goodfellow, 2020; Jauregui, 2014). Bayat (2007), for example, calls such ‘Jugaads’ as practices of the marginalized subaltern, where informal and illegal everyday political practices are used to ensure survival. People in India deploy a variety of euphemisms for corruption, one of which is Jugaad, which refers to goal-oriented improvisation, especially the use of informal social networks to advance one’s interests. But as often as it is conflated with corruption, Jugaad is also conceived as necessary for ‘getting by’ and even as virtuous practice. Anjaria (2011), drawing on from fieldwork on the unlicensed hawkers of Mumbai, illustrates how the marginalized slums use different Jugaads, such as illicit dealings with low-level state functionaries, to negotiate claims to city space. This explains why the rigid neoliberal definitions of state and citizenship ignore critically important localized meanings and engagements that shape the practices of politics at the experiential level.

Conclusion

With these case studies of young Kashmiris, we have tried to illustrate the contradictions of conceiving a ridged dichotomy between separatism and mainstream. The former is largely based on the ideology of Tehreeq-e-Azadi, which is conceived as a subaltern discursive arena shaping up the relationships between people and the state. The situation can be compared to a ‘grey zone’, where political choices of people are not amenable to interpretation under extant norms of good and bad and moral liminality is a predominant feature of actions (Craps, 2014). Silent disappointments with one’s political actions and ambiguities in political decision-making elucidate the existence of a ‘grey zone’ within the conflict-hit Kashmir (Zia, 2019b). People’s political actions reflect micro improvisations invoked merely for knitting possibilities of survival without looking confrontational towards either side of the ideological dichotomy, as illustrated people may often engage in covert boundary-crossing (Faheem, 2018). Although such a boundary may exist at the macro level in political debates discussing people’s resistance against the state, at the experiential and pragmatic level such an entity is obscure. Different inferences can be made from this analysis. Firstly, it is argued that in the context of Kashmir, different forms of pro-state affiliations are conditioned largely by the will to survive, rather than by a progressive desire or political emancipation.

Secondly, the article argues that the creative application of Tehreeq offers not only ample space for negotiation with the state but also the sustenance of counter discursive subaltern undercurrents. To elaborate the relationship between Tehreeq and a politics of negotiation is examined through experiential modalities, e.g., Jugaad, in a social and political context where long-drawn conflict has resulted in diminishing of public spaces, democratic institutions and opportunities for employment and education.

Thirdly, challenging the ridged formal conceptualization of state and its institutions, it argues that at the bottom-most tier, how otherwise ridged official responsibilities are attuned to serve local interests and imminent problems. In this context, it has been argued that Tehreeq presents a context for mainstream political and legal institutions, serves both ends, above and below. Even in the post-370 scenario (Zia, 2020). It has provided mainstream politics with a proper context and legitimacy to operate (Chowdhary, 2008), on the other hand, it provides a vent to the plurality of needs and aspiration among people in their everyday life (Behera, 2016).

Lastly, understanding political judgements within a ‘Grey Zone’ must not lead us to label people as political dopes, which are treated as pawns in political gamesmanship (Faheem, 2013). Decisions for political participation are neither impulsive nor result of long-term well-thought-out democratic desires. Circumspect boundary-crossing between antithetical political ideologies reflect people’s intelligent use of political agency. They strategically negotiate the boundaries between state and anti-state demonstrating cautious neutrality in evaluating the possibilities of using both state and non-state arenas for pursuing their interests (Duschinski & Hoffman, 2018). This article exposes the risks of refusing to acknowledge the complexities of decision-making and nuances of political subjectivity in situations of armed precarity. This study reflects that political participation and civic engagement in regions like Kashmir do not reflect long-term progressive and democratic inclinations, but underpin creative cultural improvisations in response to vulnerabilities infused by armed precarity.