Abstract
The Mizo War of Independence, also labelled as the Mizo Insurgency Movement, spanned over a period of nearly 20 years, during which significant events and developments occurred, which greatly shaped and moulded the socio-political landscape of the state. Accounts and narratives of what took place during those turbulent years are aplenty. However, not much literature or narrative could be found about the ideological dimension of the movement and its ramifications. Hence, the main aim of the article is to emphasize on the underlying two strands of nationalism, that is, the nationalistic ideals pursued by the Mizo National Front (MNF) as an organization, on the one hand, and the strand of nationalism championed by its president and leader, Laldenga, on the other hand. The first part of the article examines the strand of nationalism of the MNF, the main perpetrator of the independence movement and the role of its founding president, Laldenga, in formulating that ideology. The second section of the article traces and analyses the so-called ‘Laldenga’s nationalism’. Finally, the article attempts to draw conclusion on how the two strands of nationalism impacted the outcome of the Mizo War of Independence as a whole.
The very term ‘nationalism’ is a complex one. It encompasses a variety of definitions, terminology, conceptions and interpretations. Nationalism has been used to refer to a process, a kind of sentiment or identity, a form of political rhetoric, an ideology, a principle or set of principles and a kind of socio-political movement (Norman, 1999, p. 56). However, for the purpose of this article, our discussion shall be confined to the domain of what Wayne Norman labelled as ‘ethnic nationalism’, (Kymlicka, 1999, p. 132), since the nationalistic tendency and strand of nationalism of the Mizo War of Independence could be firmly placed within the context of ethnic nationalism. In this vein, the term ‘nationalism’ is interpreted as having a cultural connotation to it. In fact, ethnic nationalism has a cultural component deeply embedded within it. Throughout history, several nations have often identified or defined their cultures in terms of specific ethnic or religious parameters. The variations in such definitions and identifications could greatly influence the type of nationalism that a particular nation or race is based upon, namely, peaceful, violent, democratic, authoritarian, etc. The Mizo society is no exception. The definition of culture in Mizo terminology is inherent in how the Mizo fondly associated their ethnic distinctiveness as compared to their counterparts in mainland India and the Christian doctrines and principles to which they conform to with their cultural practices and traditions. To further substantiate this argument, one has to analyse and examine the socio-political development that took place in the build-up to the birth of the MNF, particularly the establishment of the Mizo Cultural Society in 1958 and the Mautam famine of the late 1960s. 2 The Mizo Cultural Society was the product of ethno-political consciousness of some socio-politically conscious Mizo intellectuals to serve the purpose of promoting and preserving the customs, traditions and values of the Mizo society and polity (Zarzosanga, 2016, p. 60). In fact, the Independence Movement launched by the MNF was not accidental or sudden occurrence. Rather, it was deeply rooted in the socio-political development that took place since the 1930s, and especially after the establishment of the first political party in Mizoram, the Mizo Union in 1946 in the then Lushai Hills. Thus, the roots of ethnic nationalism that culminated in the Independence Movement could be said to be sown with the emergence of political consciousness among the Mizo people while the British and the chiefs administered them (Zarzosanga, 2016, p. 60). In other words, the seed for the Independence Movement had been sown and was deeply rooted in the social, political and cultural milieu of the society that supported the movement (Chawngsailova, 2012, p. 44). Against this backdrop, the Mizo Cultural Society was greatly aware and worried about the popularity of non-Mizo songs and music, particularly Hindi songs and music among the Mizo youths since the early 1950s, which they feared, if unregulated, would turn out to be a serious cultural invasion of the Mizo cultural values and ethnic identity. However, the activities of the Mizo Cultural Society as well as the society itself were hampered and curtailed severely with the outbreak of the Mautam famine in the later part of 1959. At this juncture, the leaders of the Mizo Cultural Society, in which Laldenga 3 was the junior secretary, shifted their activities and purview towards famine relief efforts and eventually assumed the nomenclature of Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF), in which Laldenga was the secretary. Apart from undertaking famine relief efforts, the leaders of the MNFF took the opportunity to popularize and disseminate their discontentment against the Assam State Government as well as the Indian Government in their handling of the famine situation in the Mizo Hills District. 4 Eventually, when the famine was over by 1961, the leaders of the MNFF, the same individuals who established the Mizo Cultural Society, converted the organization into a political party as the Mizo National Front (MNF). The ethnic and nationalistic tendencies of the leaders of the Mizo Cultural Society were further popularized and inculcated in the minds of the Mizo public by their commendable famine relief efforts during the Mautam famine. In fact, their call for MNFF volunteers to undertake famine relief efforts greatly fascinated the people, particularly, the youths (Shyamkishor, 2016, p. 106). Thus, when the MNF was established in 1961, the spirit of ethnic nationalism as well as the urge and appeal for secessionist movement by its leaders were greatly reinvigorated and widely supported by the Mizo people as a whole. In fact, the pan-Mizo feeling in the aftermaths of the Mautam famine greatly contributed to the growth of Mizo ethnic identity formation. The MNF reinforced this identity formation, designating tribes other than Mizo and the Indian armed forces as outsiders (Goswami, 2009, p. 584). In other words, in the case of the MNF, the leadership employed ethnic nationalism to define the movement and to rally support for Mizo separatism (Ladwig, 2009, p. 46). Therefore, it could be stated that both the strands of nationalism pursued and adopted by the MNF, on the one hand, and that of its founding president, Laldenga, on the other hand, although quite contrasting and conflicting to each other, could both be included and analysed within the large canvas of ethnic nationalism.
At the same time, the strand of nationalism pursued by the MNF, on the one hand, and that of Laldenga, on the other hand, were quite contrasting and, in fact, opposite to each other. The strand of nationalism espoused by the MNF, of which Laldenga played a crucial role in its formulation, was secessionist in ideology, and its main purpose was to achieve independence based on ethnic propaganda and ethnic socio-political integration. However, the strand of nationalism that Laldenga discreetly advocated was based on an integrationist ideology, and its main goal was to achieve the highest possible political and diplomatic settlement for the Mizo people within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Although, the two strands of nationalism both based themselves on ethnic principles and ethnic sentiments to further their cause, the end in sight was quite opposite to each other. As a result, the pursuance of two contrasting strands of nationalism by the MNF, on the one hand, and Laldenga, on the other hand, had far-reaching consequences on course as well as on the overall outcome of the Mizo Independence Movement.
At the very outset, the MNF adopted ‘self-determination’ as its main political goal and outlined the following as the foundational principles of the party (Zamawia, 2006, p. 117): (a) to procure the highest possible level of self-determination for Mizoram and to place all Zo-ethnic tribes and clans under a single and uniform jurisdiction; (b) to safeguard Christianity; and (c) to uphold, promote and preserve Mizo culture.
Controversies often shrouded the underlying ideological motives of the MNF leaders when they proclaimed ‘political self-determination’ as their ultimate objective. Do the MNF, a legitimate political party within the framework of the Indian Constitution, dare to publicly challenge the Indian Government and announce their secessionist ideals right after its establishment, or do they mean to fight for the highest level of political autonomy permissible within the framework of the Constitution? R. Zamawia best summarizes this issue, when he stated that the Indian Government or its forces were no match for an ill-equipped MNF militarily. Hence, the objective for launching an armed rebellion was primarily intended to draw the attention of the Indian Government to listen to their cause for establishing an independent nation after a series of failed diplomatic efforts and to bring them to the negotiating table only, but not for waging a prolonged war against it. 5 Zoramthanga, the current chief minister of Mizoram, has also reiterated the same. According to Zoramthanga, achieving the highest level of political autonomy for the Mizo people had always been the ultimate objective of the MNF since its inception and the independence movement was a ploy to bring the Indian Government towards diplomatic settlement of their demands. 6 Therefore, it can be safely concluded that political autonomy had been the underlying ideological principle of the MNF and in order to turn that ideal into action, they started a War of Independence against the Indian Government. Thus, as Walter Ladwig rightly puts it, ‘In the case of the Mizo National Front (MNF), the leadership employed nationalism to define the movement and to rally support for Mizo separatism’ (Ladwig, 2009, p. 46).
Laldenga had all along been at the centre stage in the formulation of the MNF’s policies and ideologies, which, as stated earlier, could be traced back to the formation of two voluntary organizations in the Mizo Hills District, namely, the Mizo Cultural Society and the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) in 1958 and 1960, respectively. Laldenga played a considerable and integral part in both of these organizations’ activities. The two organizations provided the much-needed platform, both for Laldenga himself as well as for his colleagues, many of whom went on to form the MNF in 1961, to further their credentials and popularity in the political field. To be more specific, their passion for Mizo nationalism and Mizo ethno-cultural identity was felt by the public through their efforts in the Mizo Cultural Society. The organization was established with the main objective of inculcating a sense of Mizo society and to promote nationalistic feeling and to lay stress upon integration of all Mizo contiguous areas of the neighbouring states (Zarzosanga, 2016, p. 61). Furthermore, the famine-relief efforts of the MNFF, which reached and penetrated even the remotest parts of the district, enabled them to arouse the nationalistic sentiment of the starving common people. Thus, when the MNF was established as a political party, with Laldenga as its president in 1961, he had no problem in propagating his party’s ideology, nor to arouse the nationalistic sentiment of the Mizo people. It was against this backdrop of heightened nationalistic fervour that the MNF issued its Declaration of Independence, in which they stated their rightful claim and demand for independence and self-determination and their plea for all independent countries worldwide to recognize the independence of Mizoram.
However, although the War of Independence dragged on for nearly 20 years since it was launched in 1966, questions have been often asked on whether the nationalism of the MNF, that is, its resolve to establish a sovereign independent nation, as an organization and that of Laldenga, as its elected president, personally, stayed true and faithful to their cause till the very end. The answer, which is crucial to the core and which could alter the whole conjecture and context of the Mizo War of Independence lay within the MNF organization itself, with Laldenga at the forefront.
After launching of counter-insurgency measures by the Indian Government and the fleeing of Laldenga and most of the MNF personnel and leadership to East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), communication, maintenance of law and order within the organization and the functioning of the Provisional Government of Mizoram became more and more difficult. In fact, the attempt of the MNF to run a full-fledged governmental machinery, with all its administrative and military departments, greatly drained manpower and resources vital for the organization to survive in a war zone. This had been one of the most profound political blunders that the MNF committed, which backfired and severely affected the whole Movement in the later years. 7 Moreover, the village grouping counter-insurgency operation of the Indian Government, the fervent plea of the church leaders, financial constraints, scarcity of arms and food supplies, internal rifts and discontentment within the ranks of the organization further weakened the strength and resolve of many of its members, including some of its leaders. The situation further worsened when Pakistan, the main benefactor of the MNF in its War of Independence, was defeated in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. Laldenga and the MNF had no choice but to move out from East Pakistan, which had been their safe haven since their launch of the Independence Movement and head towards the Arakan tracts of Burma (present day Myanmar). The series of events that preceded the 10-year period, that is, from the launching of the movement in 1966 until the signing of the July Agreement in 1976 could be regarded as the most crucial and arduous period, both for the MNF as well as for Laldenga, personally. For Laldenga, while he was negotiating with the Indian Government to conduct peace talks, he could not abort his military agenda due to the significant presence of hardliner cadres in the group that blindly believed in the struggle for independence and were ready to go to any extent to achieve their aspirations (Panwar, 2017, p. 989). On 15 April 1969, Lalkhawliana, finance minister of the underground MNF government, arrived at the MNF Capital Headquarters at Chhippui, inside the East Pakistan territory with the information that a delegation of church leaders, Rev. Lalsawma and Rev. Zairema had met him on 24 February 1969 (Zamawia, 2006, p. 760). Lalkhawliana further stated that the delegation pleaded for the MNF to begin peace talks with the Indian Government. It seemed that Lalkhawliana’s report prompted Laldenga to make up his mind to start negotiations with the Indian Government. Accordingly, he sent a two-man secret mission, consisting of Vanlalngaia and R. Rozama to directly contact the central government, bypassing both his colleagues in the MNF and B. P. Chaliha, the then chief minister of Assam. This act of Laldenga was the first among many other initiatives undertaken by him to negotiate with the Indian Government in the latter years. However, the security forces unfortunately arrested his secret envoys near Karimganj on 27 June 1969. After this incident, tensions and suspicions began to rise for Laldenga from both sides, that is, from his own party, the MNF as well as the Indian government. This may have been one of the factors that prompted Lalnunmawia, the vice president of the MNF, and who had certain differences with Laldenga from the very beginning of the movement, to tender his resignation from both his position as vice president of the MNF government and the MNF party on 20 August 1969 (Zamawia, 2006, p. 666). With the resignation of Lalnunmawia, one of Laldenga’s formidable critics was removed from the picture. In effect, while it seemed that a majority of the MNF members of parliament supported Laldenga, a majority of the MNF cabinet members supported Lalnunmawia (Zohmangaiha, 2017, p. 682). However, at this juncture, internal politics and feuds within the MNF hierarchy did not blow up into a full-fledged problem nor dented Laldenga’s position as the undisputed leader of the organization. However, the defeat of East Pakistan in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1970–1971 posed a serious problem for Laldenga, on the one hand, as well as for the future of the Independence Movement, on the other hand. The situation had already been worsened by the fact that Laldenga failed to garner any diplomatic support or recognition of the sovereignty of Mizoram as an independent country from any other sovereign nations, including East Pakistan itself. Thus, after the defeat of East Pakistan, Laldenga was faced with a daunting task—to quickly find diplomatic solution to the problem within the framework of the Indian Constitution, while, at the same time, not jeopardize the nationalistic spirit of his colleagues in the MNF, particularly the hardliners including Malsawma Colney, R. Zamawia and Biakchhunga, among many others. Hence, while he was fervently negotiating with the Indian Government, underlining his willingness to find diplomatic and political solutions within the framework of the Constitution, Laldenga tried his level best to convince his colleagues within the MNF that his brand of nationalism, although, now starkly different from the one that the MNF espoused prior to the Independence Movement was best for Mizoram and its people. In November 1973, Laldenga entrusted his confidante, Zoramthanga, with a mission to solicit prospects of initiating negotiations with the Government of India and thereafter met with Indian intelligence officers in Geneva (Panwar, 2017, p. 986). But his early attempts to reach the Indian prime minister or the home minister seemed to bear no results. This was reflected in his handwritten personal letter, addressed to the then prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, dated 28 August 1975. In this letter, Laldenga reiterated, among other things, his attempts to establish communication with her since 1973 and his willingness to discuss the problem within the Constitution of India. He also underlined his belief that the resolution of the Mizoram political problem could be achieved within the Constitution of India and that his current situation did not permit to tell his colleagues in the MNF government about his agreement and desire to discuss the solution of the problem within the framework of the Constitution. 8 During the second week of November, 1975, while negotiations for peace talks were under way, Laldenga summoned Tlangchhuaka, vice president, Chawngzuala, party president, Biakchhunga, army chief and Lalhleia, cabinet secretary to Cologne, Germany (Zamawia, 2006, p. 886). It was at this meeting that Laldenga convinced his leadership colleagues in the MNF, or so it seems, to agree to his proposals for holding talks with representatives of the Indian Government. Consequently, during 11–18 February 1976, Laldenga and representatives of the Indian Government met and issued a Joint Press Statement, which became the precursor of the National Emergency Convention, popularly known as the Calcutta Convention and the July Agreement. After their meeting with the representatives of the Indian Government, Laldenga sent a letter to Ngurkunga, secretary, Information & Publicity on 20 February 1976. This letter was a calling letter for all members of parliament, all cabinet members, all-party executive members as well as all senior officers and battalion commanders of the Mizo National Army to attend the National Emergency Convention proposed to be held at Calcutta during 13–20 March 1976. 9 This was a ploy planned by Laldenga to convince all important and high-ranking dignitaries within the MNF hierarchy to adopt and support his brand of nationalism, that is, to achieve the highest possible political settlement for the Mizo people within the framework of the Indian Constitution. On the fourth and fifth day of the convention, that is, on 27 and 28 March, Malsawma Colney, the senate pro-tempore president, posed a direct question to Laldenga. Malsawma Colney asked Laldenga that while they were arresting many of their own colleagues during 1971–1972, charging them of conspiring with the Indian Government to have a diplomatic settlement, labelling them and humiliating them as Dumpawl (blue party), how could he possibly plead to his own colleagues, the same people whom he had ordered to arrest their own colleagues earlier, straight at their faces, to accept his proposals to settle their problems within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Malsawma then stated that he would never accept the sort of settlement proposed at the Convention. Col. Lalzama, Khuangchera, battalion commander, Mizo National Army and V. L. Muana, party executive member, also supported Malsawma’s stance (Zamawia, 2006, pp. 891–892). Malsawma Colney even went to the extent of asking Laldenga whether he had made a verbal or written commitment with the Indian Government to settle their problems within the framework of the Indian Constitution, to which Laldenga replied, ‘No, I haven’t made any verbal or written commitment as such. In fact, it was decided that I would consult all of you, my leadership colleagues in this Convention and proceed according to our mutual and collective decisions reached at this Convention’. However, by this time, as mentioned earlier, Laldenga had already corresponded with the Indian Government through personal letter to the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi labelled as ‘top secret’, whereby he underlined his willingness to settle matters within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Although the National Emergency Convention approved Laldenga’s proposals to proceed with the task of finding diplomatic and political settlement within the Indian Union, many members who attended the convention were still unconvinced even after the signing of the July Agreement. It was this secret diplomatic cable sent by Laldenga to the Indian Government that primarily led to a series of negotiations culminating in the Calcutta Convention and July Agreement of 1976, which marked the paradigm shift of the MNF’s policy from that of independence to autonomy within the Indian Union. Furthermore, even after the conclusion of the Calcutta Convention, Laldenga sent another personal letter, addressed to the then prime minister of India, Morarji Desai, dated 30 July 1977, in which he declared, among others, his wilful acceptance of the citizenship of India (Zamawia, 2006, p. 1001). In yet another personal letter, addressed to the then home minister of India, Charan Singh, dated 14 November 1977 and labelled ‘Personal/Top Secret’, Laldenga further underlined his commitment by stating that, ‘I propose to lay down our arms straightaway unconditionally at suitable places’. 10
The outcome of the National Emergency Convention at Calcutta and the developments that took place after the convention had far-reaching consequences within the MNF. In a personal letter, addressed to Brigadier General Biakchhunga, army chief, Mizo Army, dated 29 November 1976, Laldenga stated his desire for Biakchhunga to meet him at Calcutta as soon as possible (Personal Archives of Biakchhunga [L], 2013). It is interesting to note that Laldenga seldom passed on official information or progress of his ongoing negotiations with the Indian Government either with Ngurkunga, secretary of Information & Publicity or with his cabinet colleagues in the underground MNF Government. In effect, Biakchhunga, the army chief, mostly served as the liaison of Laldenga with his colleagues in Mizoram. It may be for this very reason that in a private letter to his friend, Daniel, dated 22 October 1977, Ngurkunga mentioned his frustration about Laldenga’s lack of prompt response to his enquiries as secretary of Information & Publicity and even questioned Laldenga’s commitment to the cause of Mizo nationalism and independence (Political Diary of Ngurkunga, 2013). Lalmalsawma Colney also stated the fact that the MNF Government nor its parliament was never officially notified or informed about Laldenga’s diplomatic negotiations with the Indian Government, and, hence, the MNF never ratified or authorize him to carry on such peace talks or negotiations. 11 Many of the hardliners, including Malsawma Colney, Tlangchhuaka, R. Zamawia, Biakchhunga and others were unwilling to conform to the framework of the July Agreement. But at the same time, Laldenga also had number of supporters within the organization. When the news of the signing of the agreement reached the MNF Headquarters in Arakan Hills and other hideouts in Bangladesh and Mizoram, the hardliner faction led by Biakchhunga was not ready to surrender and deposit their arms. Instead, they prepared a plan to oust Laldenga from his position in the MNF (Panwar, 2017, p. 987). Thus, a serious internal rift began to arise within the organization. This resulted in the change of leadership at quick successions and even led to the expulsion of Laldenga from the MNF. He was expelled on the ground that he had ‘betrayed the policy of the MNF’ at the 17th General Assembly of the Party on 26 October 1978 until his reinstatement, after yet another round of political arrests within the MNF, by the 19th Special Assembly of the MNF held on 24 April 1979 (Zamawia, 2006, pp. 914–915).
Therefore, in retrospect, it could be concluded that Laldenga skilfully managed to push through his proposals for settlement of their problem within the constitutional framework of India amidst heavy pressures from the Indian Government as well as from his hardliner colleagues within the MNF, who wanted to achieve self-determination for the Mizo people through independence at all costs. Laldenga’s inability to convince many of his colleagues to fall in line with his strand of nationalism had great repercussions in the course of the Independence Movement. Moreover, Laldenga’s inability to call for a general meeting to deliberate group members on internal issues led him to develop a hostile and suspicious attitude towards other high-ranking leader in the MNF (Panwar, 2017, p. 984). This resulted in the expulsion of several senior members from the party, including R. Zamawia, Lalnunmawia, Malsawma Colney and Biakchhunga, among others, who had been there since the launch of the movement.
The Calcutta Convention and the July Agreement marked a turning point in the history of the MNF, its struggle for independence and its strand of nationalism. Although Laldenga, unbeknownst to his colleagues in the MNF, corresponded with representatives of the Indian Government, the Calcutta Convention was the first time where the MNF, as an organization, discussed and deliberated about settling their disputes within the framework of the Indian Union. Before the Calcutta Convention, negotiating with the Indian Government was never discussed at any parliamentary or party sessions of the MNF. 12 Hence, when the July Agreement was signed on 1 July 1976, upon the framework laid down by the Calcutta Convention, the event marked the shift of policy of the MNF from that of independence to integration and settlement within the constitutional framework of the Indian Union. Besides, the agreement underlined the formal and official acceptance to do the same by the organization. 13 As a result, although the movement continued for another 10 years, it could be concluded that the MNF’s struggle for independence ceased with the signing of the July Agreement on 1 July 1976. From that point on, a new strand of nationalism emerged for the MNF, that is, a strand of Mizo nationalism that would strive for the most amicable and beneficial settlement of disputes for the Mizo people. But, this new strand of nationalism was no more on their own terms, but on the terms of the Indian Government and within the framework of the Indian Constitution, the very same Constitution that they considered as ‘imposed’ upon them 20 years beforehand and by the same government, which they earlier vehemently and violently opposed and fought against. This strand of nationalism was the one that Laldenga had all along, personally and secretly endorsed and pursued throughout the course of the movement. The Calcutta Convention and the July Agreement only underlined Laldenga’s intent to garner and convince his colleagues in the MNF to support his stance. As a result, since the signing of the July Agreement, the MNF had, in essence, reframed its core demand for complete independence in the 1960s to one of greater autonomy in the 1970s (Goswami, 2009, p. 582).
In all the above developments, Laldenga played an integral part for two reasons. Firstly, being the president of the MNF, he was required to be at the forefront of all negotiations and deliberations within the MNF, on the one hand, and between the MNF and other sovereign governments, including the Indian Government, on the other hand. Secondly, from the very beginning till the very end of the movement, what I would refer to as ‘Laldenga’s nationalism’, the personal, somewhat clandestine diplomacy, negotiations and undertakings of Laldenga was one of the main reasons that led to most of the political outcomes during the course of the movement and beyond. The Mizo peace process also reveals the important role played by insurgent leaders in changing the outfit’s goal and resolving the issue. Without Laldenga’s realization that their armed struggle for independence was a futile exercise, resolution might have proved difficult (Goswami, 2009, p. 582).
Laldenga’s Nationalism
From the above observations, it could be concluded that the leaders of the MNF, including Laldenga, developed secessionist tendencies that led to the outbreak of the Mizo War of Independence purely based on their urge for the preservation and promotion of the Mizo socio-political, cultural and economic integrity, in short, Mizo nationalism. However, due to their political and organizational inexperience, their commitment and resolve began to wane and waver with the passage of time. Moreover, the failure of the organization as well as Laldenga, in particular, to garner any diplomatic or political support and recognition of their independence greatly dented the credentials of the leaders of the MNF in the eyes, not only of their main benefactors, Pakistan and China, but also of the Indian Government as well. The establishment of the pro-Indian Bangladesh nation further worsened the situation after the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1970–1971. This development greatly crippled the logistical support of the MNF, which had been their lifeline for taking their movement forward since 1966. Hence, without their largest benefactor, East Pakistan now gone, and still with no other hope for substantial support and recognition from other sovereign countries, the only viable option for Laldenga, in order to save himself and his supporters, was to open negotiations with the Indian Government and seek political solutions to their problem within the framework of the Indian Constitution as soon as possible. Hence, the resulting Calcutta Convention and the July Agreement of 1976 officially marked the end of Mizo nationalism of the MNF, a nationalism based on Mizo ethnocentric ideals and political objectives. Moreover, the War of Independence also effectively came to an end with the signing of the July Agreement of 1976. The following 10 years that preceded the signing of the Memorandum of Settlement in 1986 was, as Lalduhawma, current member of the Mizoram Legislative Assembly aptly remarked, ‘A period of negotiations and re-negotiations within the framework of the Indian Constitution’. 14
As for Laldenga, his commitment to the cause of Mizo independence seemed to wither away as far back as 1969, when he secretly sent a delegation to set up negotiations with the Government of India. In fact, R. Zamawia stated that from the very outset, Laldenga never dared to achieve an independent Mizo nation. 15 In the same vein, Lalmalsawma Colney also opined that it was Laldenga, who first deviated from the objectives and principles of the MNF, when he sent a secret envoy to the Indian Government in 1969. 16 Even Vanlalngaia, one of the members of the secret envoy sent by Laldenga stated that the MNF’s cause and main principle of procuring self-determination and Zo-ethnic integration effectively ceased to exist with the sending of a secret envoy to the Indian Government by Laldenga, of which he was a part of it. 17 Moreover, there were certain allegations in the build up towards the Mizo District Council Elections in 1962. The allegations were regarding a tacit understanding between Laldenga, the President of the MNF party and B. P. Chaliha, the then Chief Minister of Assam in their common confrontation against the Mizo Union, the then ruling party and the most influential political party in the Mizo Hills District during the time (Roy Burman, 2013, p. 265). Besides, based on the series of secret letters sent by Laldenga to the prime minister of India and union home minister between 1971 and 1975, Biakchhunga also concluded that from the very beginning, Laldenga never intended to realize the ultimate objective of procuring political self-determination for Mizoram and integrate all Zo-ethnic tribes and clans under a single administration. He also stated that it was evident from his secret correspondence with the leaders of the Indian Government that his main objective was to negotiate a diplomatic settlement within the framework of the Constitution by fulfilling his demands, which, according to Laldenga, was only some ‘minor administrative adjustment’ (Biakchhunga, 1996, p. 102). Biakchhunga’s argument seems to finely fall in line with Laldenga’s personal quest for political leadership when he demanded for the establishment of an interim government, in which he would be the chief minister, for his signature in the proposed Memorandum of Settlement. R. Zamawia also went to the extent of stating that in retrospection, Laldenga never intended to achieve political self-determination for the Mizo people through secession from the Indian Union. Rather, he just wanted to utilize the weight of the ethnic consciousness and nationalism of the Mizo people as well as the Independence Movement as a leverage to achieve a political settlement within the Indian Union. 18 He further stated that after all political campaigns had been carried out and all preparations done for the launch of the Independence Movement, Laldenga wanted to cancel their impending movement at the very last minute on the night of 28 February 1966, in a final meeting of the MNF leaders before the launch of the movement. The movement was launched and Laldenga refrained from stopping it altogether only because the other MNF leaders forced him to do so, not wanting to jeopardize and endanger the lives of thousands of volunteers who were awaiting final orders to strike at various defence establishments all across Mizoram. 19 However, Malsawma Colney, who was also present at the meeting on the night of 28 February 1966 along with Laldenga and R. Zamawia, stated that Laldenga just wanted to postpone the launch and not cancel it altogether. 20 On the other hand, Zoramthanga held that Laldenga never betrayed the MNF’s ideology or objective. Rather, due to the mounting pressure from the Mizo public and civil society organizations, particularly, the church, the only option for Laldenga to bring an end to the misery and sufferings of the Mizo people was to negotiate with the Indian Government. 21 He further stated that any negotiation with a sovereign nation, having an independent Constitution, necessarily has to be within the framework of that Constitution. No sovereign nation ever held diplomatic peace talks with an insurgent organization outside its own Constitution. 22
From the above arguments and accounts, it seems that although Laldenga was the mastermind and the brain behind all the conceptual formation and popularization of Mizo ethnic nationalism as well as in the formulation of the founding principles of the MNF party, of which he was among the founding members and which he publicly endorsed, he had all along moulded and shaped his own brand of nationalism, that is, to achieve the highest and most amicable diplomatic and political settlement for the Mizo people within the Indian Union, in which he would hold an integral position. This was in clear contrast to the brand of nationalism that he endorsed and propagated publicly as president of the MNF, particularly with regards to the procurement of the highest possible level of self-determination for Mizoram and integration of all Zo-ethnic tribes and clans under a single and uniform jurisdiction. This was the most important principle of the MNF and which would have the most far reaching socio-political and economic consequences for the Mizo people.
In other words, the brand of nationalism that Laldenga propagated and instigated was integrationist in character, as opposed to the secessionist tendencies of his colleagues in the MNF. The line that differentiated Laldenga’s strand of nationalism as against the strand of nationalism pursued by the MNF could be found in the ‘Declaration of Independence’ issued by the MNF prior to the launching of the Independence Movement and Laldenga’s secret correspondence with the Indian Government. The declaration, of which Laldenga was among the signatories, stated, among others that ‘India is unworthy and unfit to rule over the civilized Mizo people’ (Zamawia, 2006, p. 978). On the other hand, in his secret personal letters to the prime minister of India and the union home minister, among others, Laldenga repeatedly pledged his allegiance to the Indian Union and his acceptance and willingness to settle matters within the framework of the Indian Constitution. 23 Hence, the strand of nationalism propagated by the MNF and Laldenga’s strand of nationalism, although both embedded in the foundations of ethnic nationalism, are quite different and contrasting to each other. From the very outset, as Namrata Panwar puts it, ‘Laldenga, belonging to a former Chief family, had aspirations to wrest powers from his seniors (Commoner elites) of the District Council and needed a platform to translate his political ambitions into reality’ (Panwar, 2017, p. 979). At the same time, a clear indication that Laldenga was pursuing his own personal strand of nationalism while publicly endorsing the MNF’s strand of nationalism could be found at the content of his speech at the celebration of the 5th Mizoram Independence Day on 1 March 1971 at the MNF Headquarters in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh). In his ceremonial speech, Laldenga said that, ‘I have led you out from the Indian union and hence, am not qualified to let you back in. If you want to do so, you need to select a new leader’ (Zamawia, 2006, p. 721). Thus, although the type of ethnic nationalism propagated by the MNF as well as the strand of nationalism pursued by Laldenga could both be identified within the realm of Mizo ethnic nationalism, both forms of nationalism are quite different and contrasting in terms of motives, perspectives and direction. In other words, it could be concluded that the ‘urge’ for the MNF to preserve and promote the Mizo socio-political, cultural and economic integrity and which was driven by the organization’s foundational principles, of which Laldenga played a key role was also the same urge that instigated Laldenga to strive for his own brand of nationalism for the Mizo people in which he would again occupy an integral role.
However, it would be unwise to condemn or label Laldenga as anti-nationalist and traitor of Mizo nationalism. In fact, analysing his change of stance, in other words, ‘Laldenga’s nationalism’ from a different perspective, the decision of Laldenga to seek diplomatic solution to the problem as early as 1969 could be regarded as the trait of a far-sighted statesman, who have a clear foresight and apprehension that the further the independence movement waged on, the larger the number and extent of fatalities and misery of the Mizo people. After the launching of Operation Jeriko, 24 Laldenga, president and Lalhmingthanga, foreign secretary of the MNF, were the first individuals to leave Mizoram for East Pakistan on 6 March 1966, after Lunglei came under the control of the MNF. Other MNF leaders and majority of the volunteers also left for East Pakistan on 13 March 1966 due to the impending arrival of the Indian armed forces at Lunglei (Zamawia, 2006, p. 365). From this time onwards, the Laldenga-led underground government conduct all functions and operations in Mizoram from their headquarters within the borders of East Pakistan. With the president of the organization, Laldenga spending the most part of his time during the movement in foreign countries, Vice President Lalnunmawia shouldered the responsibility of supervising all operational functions within Mizoram, while Laldenga issued instructions and orders from foreign land. This led to an internal rift between the two most important leaders of the MNF, namely, Laldenga, the president and Lalnunmawia, the vice president right, from the very outset of the movement. It is this disagreement and rift in terms of policy and operations between the two topmost leaders of the MNF right from the beginning of the movement that greatly hampered the future prospect of the movement. It even led to the expulsion of Lalnunmawia and the emergence of Dumpawl (blue party), the alleged faction within the MNF ranks that supported diplomatic solution within the Indian Union during the latter years of the movement in the 1970s. 25 In short, the internal feuds and factionalism within the MNF, the root cause of which could be traced back to the rift between Laldenga and Lalnunmawia in the early period of the movement greatly dented the whole Independence Movement. Moreover, with the Indian Government implementing its plan of village grouping in what was known as protected and progressive villages (PPVs) from January 1967 till early 1971, the mobility of the MNF within Mizoram and more importantly, the aids and assistance that they received from the local people were greatly curtailed. Besides, the grouping of villages operation also caused severe sufferings and hardships for the common people, who suffered great loss of livelihood and property as a result of the operation. Furthermore, the defeat of East Pakistan, the main benefactor of the MNF in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1970–1971, greatly jeopardized the future course of the Independence Movement. At that critical juncture, when their main support was gone with the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, Laldenga came to the realization that rather than prolonging the armed struggle, the time was ripe to come to the peace table (Panwar, 2017, p. 990). Hence, although the possibility of settling their demands within the framework of the Indian Constitution was never discussed in the MNF Parliament sessions or at any party meetings, 26 the decision of Laldenga, unbeknownst to his colleagues in the MNF, to negotiate peace and statehood for Mizoram within the Indian Union seems to be the most pragmatic, immediate and amicable means for their survival as well as for the Mizo people, given the circumstances. It is for this reason that Lalduhawma praised Laldenga and called him a ‘patriot’, who, seeing the futility of the movement, had the courage and audacity to change his stance from complete independence to autonomy within the Indian Union in the early stages of the independence movement. 27 Nevertheless, there is no doubt of the fact that Laldenga had developed his own strand of nationalism, independent of the type of nationalism that was pursued by the MNF. Besides, he not only skilfully led the MNF to endorse and adopt his own strand of nationalism. Laldenga, while, at the same time, deviated from the nationalism that he himself endorsed and instigated in the early 1960s, which led to the launching of the Mizo War of Independence, he also managed to include his strand of nationalistic tendencies in the Memorandum of Settlement, also known as the Peace Accord, signed in 1986. 28 This accord marked the end of the Mizo Independence Movement.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.