Book review: Christopher Clary,The Difficult Politics of Peace: Rivalry in Modern South Asia

This book systematically explores the phenomenon of the intractable conflictual situation between India and Pakistan from 1947 to 2021, characterized by cycles of alternate progress and stalemate. Its thought-provoking analysis builds upon the author’s proffered theory, ‘Leader Primacy’, which argues that ‘the policy of one rival state toward another is the product of the strategic incentives faced by the rival state and the concentration of foreign policy authority (emphases in the original) held by the national leader of that state’. Like the multitude of scholars and diplomats working on this theme, Clary too, seeks to explain why, despite economic and strategic benefits to peacebuilding, peace remains elusive in this bilateral relationship, and what accounts for phases of reconciliation and de-escalation amidst this rivalry over the years.

Drawing on existing theories and explanations, Clary characterizes the understanding of rivalry as protracted conflictual relations internalized by state institutions and publics in the first substantive chapter. He posits that, compared to existing theories (broadly dubbing them as ‘theories of cooperation’ and ‘theories of conflict’), the Leader Primacy theory offers superior explanatory capabilities, particularly in terms of causal reasoning and predictive power, in deciphering the variations in decision-making arising out of similar strategic incentives. The author employs a cautious and nuanced approach of juxtaposing competing theoretical explanations with empirical investigation to demonstrate their inadequacy. For example, economic factors and the emergence of a non-rival threat in India, in the form of insurgency in the northeast and northwest in the 1990s, did not lead to higher normalization in India-Pak relations even with the coexistence of procedural democracy in Pakistan from 1988 to 1999.

To familiarize beginners in the field, the second chapter provides an abridged account of the historical origins of the bilateral Kashmir dispute. Chapter three examines how, in the early post-independence period, Nehru’s dominant political authority in India enabled him to sign the Nehru-Liaquat pact in 1949 and sideline hardliners during the Bengal crises in 1950 and the Kashmir war scare in 1951. However, despite the de-escalation of these crises, no substantial resolution could be achieved due to the rapid political turnover in Pakistan and Nehru’s unyielding stance—an inference consistent with the Leader Primacy theory.

Clary has drawn attention to the transformatory power of a protracted rivalry to manifest in internal power centres committed to sustaining long-standing conflict. However, he posits that the complexity and dynamism of the Pakistani military’s factional politics evades generalization. On the one hand, in chapter four, he argues that contrary to some expectations, the bilateral relations did not deteriorate with Ayub Khan’s military takeover in Pakistan in 1958 and even culminated in a significant diplomatic achievement with the signing of the binding Indus Water Treaty. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime discussed in chapter seven highlights how Zia’s military rule was marked by heightened peace efforts to mitigate potential escalation from Indian actions like the Siachen conflict and Operation Brasstacks exercises. On the other hand, the civilian governments’ normalization attempts under Bhutto, and Sharif’s Lahore process triggered military coups, as demonstrated in chapters six and seven respectively. The Kargil War, he argues, was a debacle caused by Pakistani military’s factionalism in large part. Chapter eight, covering events from 1999-2021, describes how the civilian regime in Pakistan, post-Musharraf’s ousting, could never gain enough leadership primacy, and feared a military backlash in pursuing any significant rapprochement with India. The author acknowledges that military rule in Pakistan is not a prerequisite for peace in the region and cautions that a dictatorial regime is neither sufficient nor necessary for securing leader primacy. The book, however, does not adequately explore the reasons for transformatory policies of military rulers once in power.

Clary argues that even with conducive structural incentives, the path to peace-making remains treacherous, often due to fragmented foreign policy authority in one or both states. The narrative in chapter five (1960–1966) illustrates how the inertial state of conflict in a rivalrous relation is readily sustained when hawkish, unchecked veto players impede executive-led peace initiatives. For instance, the rise of Zulfikar Bhutto as a hawkish adviser to Ayub Khan led to the 1965 war. The humble success at Tashkent in 1966 is attributed to Khan’s internal struggles with Bhutto and Shastri’s relatively weaker political standing in India. The Leader’s Primary theory explains significant episodes like the modest outcomes of the Shimla Accord (1972) and the failure of ‘Composite Dialogue’ during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s tenure- all because of the authority deficit of the leadership.

Partial to a focus on the Kashmir dispute, the book refrains from making assertive claims about the Pakistani military and ISI’s role in supporting militant groups that have carried out terrorist attacks against India, even when it has been well-documented in the existing literature. A more substantive examination of cross-border terrorism, being a significant impediment to regional peace efforts, could have enhanced the work’s analytical depth. The author acknowledges the limitations of the Leader Primacy theory, particularly in explaining events such as the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, during a period when Musharraf held consolidated authority and had invited Vajpayee to the Agra summit. Additionally, the treatment of nuclear weapons is relatively cursory, and a more comprehensive discussion of related initiatives, such as a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, could have strengthened the text’s empirical grounding and theoretical insights.

The book draws on rich archival sources, including declassified diplomatic cables and official documents, biographies, and interviews with ministry officials and established scholars in the field. It methodically avoids the pitfalls of selection bias that could emanate from cherrypicked instances of peacebuilding and war-making efforts. Peace in the region, the book admits, is challenging but feasible. It recommends that a simultaneous rise of visionary leaders in both the rival states with consolidated foreign policy authority to marginalize hardliners, coupled with a willingness to pursue a conducive international strategic incentive to peacebuilding, when presented with the opportunity, can pull these countries out of protracted conflict. While the book does not delve into the wealth of literature on other contentious issues between India and Pakistan, it provides an insightful and well-written theoretical examination of the Kashmir conflict. The author’s employment of historical episodes to develop and validate the Leader Primacy theory makes for an engaging learning experience and suggests avenues for further research on India-Pakistan as well as other such rival states.