Abstract
The Zimbabwean government commissioned the Command Agriculture Programme as one of the follow-up programmes to the land reform programme in 2016–2017 seasons. The programme sought to increase food and nutrition security and reduce import bill by increasing sustainable agricultural production. Mixed sentiments and debates have emerged on whether the programme has been effective enough to fulfil its objective. In light of this background, this research sought to assess the effectiveness of Command Agriculture among communal farmers in Murehwa district who have been part of the beneficiaries of the scheme. The research is evaluative in nature as it adopted one of the OECD evaluation criteria of establishing the effectiveness of a programme. The evaluation placed much emphasis on the outcome level results as well as on implementation processes. Key informant interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires were used in this study. The major finding was that there has only been a marginal improvement in food security and productivity in the beneficiary households. This means that sustainable food access, availability, utilisation and stability, which entails food security, has been low in the district in terms of feeding to the overall objective of the programme. Strict monitoring and evaluation is recommended for programme efficiency and effectiveness.
Keywords
Introduction
The turn of the new millennium was accompanied by a Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which altered Zimbabwe’s economic landscape and more precisely the agricultural system through transfer of land from the former commercial white farmers to the indigenous people (Moyo, 2004; Sachikonye, 2004). Various follow-up programmes have been commissioned and rolled out over the years to support the FTLRP. According to Mananavire (2019), some of these programmes include Operation Maguta (Operation Feed the Nation), Farm Mechanisation Programme, the Presidential Input Scheme and the currently running Command Agriculture Programme, which was commissioned in the 2016/2017 agricultural season. Improved agricultural productivity falls within the realm of Sustainable Development Goals adopted in the year 2015, more precisely goal number two which seeks to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture (UNDP, 2017).
The FTLRP and its sister programmes such as the Command Agriculture have drawn mixed and varying interpretations with regard to their implementation and success stories (Chitsike, 2003). For non-proponents of the land reform programme, it was ill timed and resulted in Zimbabwe’s agricultural trajectory taking entirely a nosedive with no meaningful and tangible benefits reaped out of it. According to the Guardian (2020), by the end of 2020, projections indicated that the number of hungry Zimbabweans will have risen by almost 50 per cent to 8.6 million proving that the Command Agriculture Programme is failing to meet its targets (Mananavire, 2019). Zimbabwe has been on average spending around $800 million annually on grain imports (Sunday Mail, 6 September 2020). This again substantiates that the Command Agriculture Programme is failing to transform the country’s agricultural system. The same sentiments have been echoed by UNICEF (2020), which has posited that Zimbabwe remains in the grip of severe food insecurity with millions of people being affected. Thus, indications are that the country is experiencing a serious food crisis despite the initiatives to address the crisis.
The land reform has been regarded as a mere political gimmick which was meant to redeem or restore lost pride and a dwindling support base of the ZANU PF party following the emergency of the MDC party (Kriger, 2007). Scholars who attach a political connotation to the land reform and its associated programmes relate the food security crisis in Zimbabwe to the haphazard nature of the land reform programme and uncoordinated stances on such programmes meant to support or boost the FTLRP. For instance, Mananavire (2019) dubs Command Agriculture as a legacy of food crisis. This is so because the Command Agriculture has failed to restore Zimbabwe’s lost breadbasket status in the region and instead the country has become one of the largest food importers in the region.
However, proponents of the FTLRP and its sister programmes view any attempts to perceive it as a failure as rather imperialist tendencies geared on discrediting noble black economic empowerment programmes meant to address colonial imbalances. Scoones (2008) and Masunungure (2009) concur that while productivity might have dwindled on a national scale and in terms of contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP), productivity improved among smallholder farmers hence food security at household levels. Kinsey (2004) regards the FTLRP as having yielded some form of success citing agrarian communities in Mazowe, which showed modest improvements in agricultural output. This rise in output also transformed the livelihoods of the farmers in the area.
Matondi (2012) posits that communal farmers have immensely contributed to food security through annual supplies to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). For instance, prior to the FTLRP, the real value of production in communal areas grew by 40 per cent between 1982–1984 and 1996, while in commercial farmers, the real value grew by 35 per cent in the same period (Matondi, 2012). Elsewhere, Moyo (2004) points out that the contribution of the communal farmers has been largely in staple food production, such as groundnuts and maize, while the commercial farmers mainly diverted to cash crops like tobacco. Thus, communal farmers have played a critical role in food security in Zimbabwe.
Promoting agricultural production and food security through inclusion and participation of rural and smallholder farmers is not unique to Zimbabwe as other countries across the globe have made that a priority. Agricultural support schemes since India’s independence, such as Self Help Groups-Bank Linkages and the Kisan Credit Scheme, have helped to promote food security through rural and smallholder farmers over the years (Kambali & Niyaz, 2021). India has a population of approximately 60 per cent relying on agriculture for livelihoods (CFA Institute, 2021). With a strong alignment to the idea of community development, there have been signs of agricultural growth and food security in the country as shown by exports and contribution to the GDP. According to CFA Institute (2021), exports have grown at a compound rate of 14.6 per cent from 2010 to 2019, indicating a significant growth in the economy and food security. Notably, the agricultural and allied sectors have contributed more to the economy as exemplified by a $368 billion contribution to the fiscus from 2018 to 2019. However, while there has been growth in exports and contribution to the economy by agriculture in India, production among smallholders is reportedly still lower than expected among the smallholder farmers due to issues of access to support, especially in underdeveloped regions of the country (Kambali & Niyaz, 2021; Mandal et al., 2005).
Brazil’s agricultural economy has had massive transformation and growth from the 1960s, becoming an agricultural power in the world through inclusive and subsidised credit schemes, research and technical support for rural and smallholder farmers (Nascimento & Santana, 2012). This is against a background that the country used to import its food requirements. The country has become one of the largest exporters of crops like corn, soya beans, coffee, cotton, bananas, beef and orange juice among other agricultural produce (Nascimento & Santana, 2012). Thus, mechanisms to support agriculture have evolved in different countries over the years with rural and communal farmers being viewed as important to the food security promotion efforts.
The Land Reform and Agricultural Production Patterns in Zimbabwe
The Command Agriculture Programme fits into the land reform discourse as a supporting programme meant to boost agriculture. The government of Zimbabwe started land reform in the early 1980s using the willing buyer willing seller concept but shifted to a radical stance on land acquisition at the turn of the millennium in the year 2000 (Mapuva & Muyengwa, 2014). It is therefore critical to discuss how the land reform has altered or impacted the production patterns before the Command Agriculture Programme. According to Moyo (2004), a major agricultural production shift occurred during the FTLRP period, and this affected the major crops and livestock differently, particularly those produced by large-scale white farmers. For example, field crops like wheat, tobacco, soya beans and sunflower witnessed both reduced area plantings and output volumes ranging between 30 per cent and 70 per cent (Moyo, 2004). This sharp decline indicates how the FTLRP negatively affected production patterns in Zimbabwe.
There are arguments pointing to the effect that the newly resettled farmers did not take farming seriously promoting a sharp decline in production yields. Sachikonye (2012) posits that a considerable amount of the new inhabitants of the commercial agriculture areas did not take farming seriously. This aggravated the situation, causing a sudden drop in food production. Amanor and Moyo (2008) cement that production in agriculture suffered because of the inter-related drop of the macroeconomic situations and their consequences on the provision of agricultural inputs. Lack of seriousness among farmers and lack of input support exacerbated by the macroeconomic conditions have been responsible for decreased agricultural production.
The main crops like maize, small grains and groundnuts produced by smallholder farmers in communal and resettlement areas for food and cash experienced reduced output despite the marginal increase in the areas planted after the FTLRP (Moyo, 2004). The decrease in the volume of maize output resulted from crop failures as a result of recurrent droughts during the FTLRP and reduced inputs like fertilisers. Matondi (2012) concurs that there was an increase in the land area under production, but a significant reduction in output. Further, there were discontinuities in some forms of agriculture (e.g., horticulture in Mazowe dropped to 2 per cent of its potential). Thus, the production pattern in comparison to the area cultivated has largely dwindled.
Theron (2011) echoes similar sentiments with the view that the land reform consisted of a fast decrease in production since the year 2001 for products created mainly by commercial farmers with production lasting at around a third of pre-2001 levels in 2004. This is certainly true as evidenced by the large number of people having to rely on donor assistance for food provision despite the FTLRP in place which parcelled out land to the indigenous farmers.
A relatively different scenario was witnessed before the FTLRP. According to Moyo (2004), there are indications that between 1980 and 1999, Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector grew steadily, albeit slowly. Producing a diverse range of domestic and export commodities, agriculture contributed over 40 per cent of national exports and 18 per cent of GDP, employed 30 per cent of the formal labour force (350,000 full-time and part-time workers) and 70 per cent of the population (Moyo, 2004). Thus, it is apparent generally that growth was experienced but slow in agricultural productivity before the FTLRP. The adoption of the FTLRP worsened the situation by undermining the slow growth previously experienced.
Background of the Study
The Command Agriculture Programme is closely aligned with Sustainable Development Goals, particularly the second goal which aims to promote sustainable agricultural production, to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition as well as achieve sustainable food production by the year 2030 (Fuller et al., 2019). To date, the programme has expanded to command fisheries and command livestock (Fuller et al., 2019). The programme draws its technical and financial support from both the public and private sectors. It gives selected farmers support in the form of inputs like seed, lime fertilisers, chemicals and fuel upon pledging their land for use.
It fits into the broad sustainable development agenda and FTLRP initiatives meant to restore Zimbabwe’s lost pride and breadbasket status. Mabhena (2013) posits that the Command Agriculture is geared mainly towards boosting cereal production to boost national food reserves. This agricultural model targeted irrigation schemes nationwide (Mabhena, 2013). This study answers pertinent questions on the effectiveness of the Command Agriculture Programme in improving food production and security among communal farmer households.
The Command Agriculture Programme supports communal farmers across several districts in Zimbabwe. The communal farmers are selected and recommended by the extension officers in their respective districts or wards. The criteria for communal farmers are not as strict as those of A1 and A2 model farmers in terms of the size of land to be farmed and the availability of water bodies (Chisango & Tichakunda, 2018). Farmers are required to indicate the amount of land they have and they are then given inputs enough for the piece of land they can put under crop. Establishing how the communal farmers have performed in contributing to the objectives of the programme as beneficiaries of the programme is therefore pertinent. There have been unanswered questions with regard to the effectiveness and sustainability of Command Agriculture as a strategy to achieve agricultural productivity and food security, and this forms the basis of this study.
The programme also supports players in the agro-processing and manufacturing sector through the provision of raw materials. For instance, production of 2 million tons of maize from 400,000 hectares will cater for both industrial requirements (millers and stock feeds manufacturers) and home consumption (Chikwati, 2017). Further to that, production of wheat and soya beans is expected to promote and stimulate the oil pressing industry through reduction of raw materials import bill (Chikwati, 2017). With such set targets of the programme, it becomes important to have studies evaluating how the targets have been met more than four years after the programme has been implemented.
Despite the perceived benefits of the Command Agriculture as illustrated above, the persistent food crisis in Zimbabwe poses more questions than answers to the programme. According to Mananavire (2019), the food crisis has exposed the government’s Command Agriculture shortcomings despite initial claims that the country’s subsidised farmer support programme had yielded enough grain to last several years. According to ZimVac (2019), 59 per cent of rural households in Zimbabwe are cereal insecure and in Murehwa district, 58.8 per cent of households are also reportedly cereal insecure. This development necessitated this study particularly focusing on smallholder farmers as part of the beneficiaries of the agriculture scheme.
An estimated $1.4 billion was needed in Zimbabwe to cater for food aid of about 7.5 million people experiencing serious food deficit in 2018 (Ndebele, 2020). On average, 5.3 million Zimbabweans are said to be in need of food aid or support annually despite the existence of programmes such as the Command Agriculture (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020). Moyo (former government minister) has termed the scheme ‘ugly culture’ alluding to its failure (Mananavire, 2019). However, from within the government structures, Command Agriculture has been viewed as a success albeit facing numerous challenges. Mupamhanga (who oversees the programme in the office of the president) and Charamba (the Presidential spokesperson) have concurred at different platforms that the Command Agriculture Programme has been largely a success and managed to fish Zimbabwe out of the raw material importation zone (ZANU PF Central Committee Report, 2019). These developments therefore necessitate the need to evaluate the Command Agriculture scheme to establish how it has fared among smallholder farmers in terms of improving productivity and food security.
Agricultural Financing, Production and Food Security in Other Countries
Countries across the globe have made varying efforts to promote agricultural production and food security as has been the attempts in Zimbabwe. India, since its independence, has made various efforts to finance agricultural production and food security hinged on the idea of community development with considerable success. According to Hoda and Terway (2015), since independence, rural branches of commercial banks, regional rural banks, priority sector lending, self-help groups-bank linkage programme, special agriculture credit plan, 2004 initiative for doubling agriculture credit, Kisan credit cards and financial inclusion programmes have been some of the initiatives for supporting and financing agriculture in India, including the rural and smallholder farmers. For example, the Etawah district’s agricultural production and infrastructure have been greatly transformed since the 1966 India famine through the self-help programme (Cohen, 1987; Vernon, 1984). Despite the efforts, the notable challenge in rural and smallholder farmers has been creditworthiness as farmers have failed to repay (Kambali & Niyaz, 2021).
The policies adopted in Brazil at various phases have boosted agricultural growth and food security in the country. According to FAO (2012), policies bent on import substitution and industrialisation from 1960 to 1980, the transition years from 1980 to 1990s, and economic stability and growth years from 2000 to 2010 have influenced massive agricultural growth. Precisely, to support its agriculture growth from the lower levels in the 1960s, Brazil has supported its agriculture sector through agricultural credit systems in which there has been heavy subsidies to local producers (FAO, 2012). Research and extension services were prioritised as well. Other notable agricultural support initiatives have included Agricultural Certificate of Deposit, Agribusiness Credit Note, Rural Promissory Note, Certificate of Agribusiness Receivable, Certificate of Agribusiness Credit Rights and Rural Insurance scheme among others (Nascimento & Santana, 2012). Thus, policy and commitment to agricultural financing are key to the promotion of food security as witnessed in the Brazilian case.
In countries like Ethiopia, agricultural support has been through programmes like Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit largely influenced by the integrated rural development approach, Mexico has had support schemes such as the Puebla Project, Kenya has had the Vihega Project, and Malawi has had schemes like the Lilongwe Project (Cohen, 1987). However, like the Zimbabwean schemes, these strategies have been criticised for being costly in relation to the minimal gains and weak coordination (Cohen, 1987). Thus, as is the case in Zimbabwe, countries across the globe continue to make efforts to address agricultural production and food security as a key developmental goal through policy and financial commitments, programmes or pledges.
Agricultural Financing, Production and Food Security in Zimbabwe
The policies and programmes initiated by the Zimbabwean government have determined the financing of agricultural production in Zimbabwe over the years. According to Zhou and Masunungure (2006), Growth with Equity Policy of 1981 aimed at achieving a sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy development. This was meant to raise incomes and standards of living of all the people and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers (Sachikonye, 2012). The policy initiative recuperated the economy significantly in the early years of independence, averaging 10 per cent growth during 1980–1982 (Muzerengi, 2019). Food security was improved, and the production levels of grains like maize were between 0.8 million tons to 1.5 million tons between the 1980 and 1983 seasons.
Between 1985 and 2000, various programmes were implemented to resuscitate the economy in general and agricultural production in particular. These include the five-year development plan (1985–1990), the Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). This period preceded the FTLRP.
The turn of the millennium saw the implementation of the 10-point plan whose thrust was promoting an agro-based economy. It was also rooted in the ongoing FTLRP which had witnessed around 1,400 farms being seized from commercial white farmers in less than two years (Muzerengi, 2019). However, food production and security still suffered from lack of proper funding, and the newly resettled farmers lacked farming expertise to undertake meaningful production on the acquired farms despite the reserve bank chipping in with the Farm Mechanisation Programme.
The National Economic Revival Program (NERP) of 2003 had an emphasis on an agriculture-led economic revival strategy. However, agriculture productivity suffered in this phase due to a compound of issues, which among others included lack of funding and inadequate farming skills by the newly resettled farmers. The proportion below the total poverty line had risen to 80 per cent, with 59 per cent of the population also being below the Food Poverty Line (FPL) (Zimbabwe MDGs Progress Report 2004). Thus, food production suffered at the hands of NERP.
Operation Maguta adopted in 2005 had the goal of boosting food security by strengthening the national strategic grain reserves (Manyeruke & Hamauswa, 2012). The farmers received inputs such as fertilisers, seeds and herbicides to grow targeted crops like maize and wheat. However, Mudzonga and Chigwada (2009) suggest that the scheme failed to yield intended results due to a lack of proper coordination and militarisation of the scheme. A number of farmers who profited from this system did not pay off their loans, and side marketing was witnessed as farmers decided to avoid selling to GMB and sold obtained inputs.
Farm Mechanisation Programme launched in 2007 and financed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe aimed to revive and rebuild the capital of the agriculture sector in the long term (Manyeruke & Hamauswa, 2012). The scheme witnessed the distribution of farming implements such as tractors, ploughs, disc harrows and combined harvesters. The aim was to improve farm output through the use of modern machinery. However, according to Mudzonga and Chigwada (2009), the mechanisation scheme failed to yield meaningful results due to corruption which saw undeserving individuals like politicians getting allocations.
The Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility Development (ASPEF) Loans were adopted to support the farmers through commercial banks. According to Muzerengi and Tirivangasi (2019), banks like CBZ and Agribank received allocations from the Reserve Bank to be used to support farmers. This facility is the one which has been supporting the Command Agriculture Programme since 2016. Indications are that the facility has been marred by irregularities in allocations and also lack of proper monitoring and evaluation.
Available literature on Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe is limited in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of the programme in relation to productivity, food and nutrition in communal areas at household level. Nemuramba (2017), in a related paper, is concerned with Command Agriculture and macroeconomic performance fundamentals. This does not, however, address the concerns of this article which assesses the effectiveness of Command Agriculture in promoting food security and productivity at grassroots level. Chisango and Tichakunda (2018) are preoccupied with challenges and prospects of command farming. The paper is not evaluative in nature and there are limitations in terms of establishing the smallholder household food security and nutrition levels. Mazwi et al. (2019) look closely at Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe in relation to the impact of profitability of maize production. Their research looks at the general cost of production and does not make direct analysis of food security issues at household level. This article, therefore, evaluates the effectiveness of Command Agriculture Programme on productivity and food security in communal farmer’s households in Murehwa district as a way of filling the gap.
Conceptual Framework of the Study
Food security has emerged as a multifaceted and complex concept yielding various definitions from different scholars making reference to time and geographical context to which it is discussed. According to The Hot Springs Conference of Food and Agriculture (1943), food security entails safe, enough and appropriate supply of food for everyone. This definition fits well into this study. Critical to note is that the concept of food security definition is ever evolving. According to Maxwell (1996), food security as a concept has emerged, multiplied, developed and diversified. This is certainly evident in definitions propounded at other platforms such as the World Food Summit in November (1996) which posited that food security is when every individual every time has economic, physical and social access to sufficient, nutritious and safe food which addresses their nutritional requirements and food choices for healthy and active being.
There are basically four dimensions to food security which were adopted in this study, namely food availability, food access, food utilisation and food stability. Availability is a major dimension in food security. According to World Food Programme (2009), ‘food availability’ refers to ‘the amount of food that is present in a country or area through all forms of domestic production, imports, food stocks and food aid’. FAO (2018) also agrees with the same definition of availability by indicating that ‘food availability’ is the extent to which food is within reach of households with regard to sufficient quantity and quality. It is critical to note that availability alone does not entail food security because food may be available yet people are unable to purchase it. According to Riely et al. (1995), in reference to availability, the expression is usually associated with food that is available at a national or regional and not confined to the household level. Policies and programmes such as the Command Agriculture Programme have the potential to promote food availability in communities. Thus, the study sought to establish the extent to which food availability has been promoted in Murehwa District.
Food accessibility is one of the critical dimensions of food security. The World Food Summit (1996) posited that ‘access’ involves having physical, economic and social access to food. Muzerengi and Tirivangasi (2019) argues that ‘food access’ denotes having capabilities, assets and activities required to guarantee food at the household level. Food may be available in one area yet transport challenges might inhibit certain people from accessing it.
Food utilisation is another dimension to food security. According to the World Food Summit (1996), ‘food utilisation’ refers to nutritious and safe food, which meets people’s nutritional requirements. This means issues of availability and access are not complete determinants of food security as people do not need mere food but food which is safe and nutritious. According to Muzerengi and Tirivangasi (2019), it should not be mistaken to assume that traditional communities know the best way to use food resources. Thus, it became critical to assess the Command Agriculture Programme in terms of its ability to promote food utilisation in communal households of Murehwa district.
Food stability is also critical in determining food security. Broca (2002) posits that ‘food stability’ is when availability, access and utilisation can reliably and sustainably occur over time. According to Muzerengi and Tirivangasi (2019), food stability denotes steadiness and constancy in availability, access and utilisation over different periods. This condition was also critical in assessing the strength of the Command Agriculture scheme.
Theoretical Framework
The research adopted two theoretical underpinnings, namely Empowerment Theory and Sen’s Entitlement Theory. The theories played a complementary role to each other in articulating key issues in the study. Human beings are entitled to food security as a fundamental human right. Sustainable Development Goal number two aims to reach ‘zero hunger’. Thus, the government has an obligation to ensure food security as an entitlement through programmes and policies that ensure stability, availability, accessibility and utilisation of food across communities. According to Sen (1984), entitlements refer to a set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that they face. This encompasses everything that a person has that can bring food to the table; it could be in the form of food or non-food material. Sen (1981) posits that the law stands between food availability and food entitlement. This means that there are barriers to food security not only limited to law but also policy and programme gaps undermining food production. The Command Agriculture in this case can be viewed as a programme aimed at promoting human entitlement–food security by availing funds and inputs to promote farm production.
Sen’s Entitlement Theory basically approaches food security from access point of view. The theory points out the barriers such as the law that can stand between food availability and food access. The Command Agriculture Programme is one of the ways through which the government of Zimbabwe has tried to promote access and availability of food to communities. The Entitlement Approach aims to describe all legal sources of food. Sen (1981) reduces these sources to four categories, namely production-based entitlement, trade-based entitlement, own labour entitlement and inheritance and transfer entitlement. In this regard, the production-based entitlement focuses on growing food, and this has been the thrust of the Command Agriculture Programme to support farmer’s productive capacity.
The study is also hinged on the empowerment theory which suggests that empowerment is a combination of personal strengths, initiative and natural helping systems to bring about change (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995). Empowerment theory is applicable to development initiatives like Command Agriculture Programme aimed at empowering farmers to improve their productive capacity. It is envisaged that the Command Agriculture Programme can promote change in terms of shifting from food insecurity to food security in the communities participating in the programme.
According to Ledwith (2005), empowerment is an alternative solution to the redistribution of unequally divided resources. Traditionally, farmers from communal areas have not been comprehensively supported in their production endeavours. Empowerment encompasses providing the resources for people to help themselves out of poverty. In this case, the Command Agriculture Programme has attempted to empower the communal farmers in Murehwa through the provision of agricultural inputs at the household level (Figure 1).
Likewise, the Command Agriculture Programme carries with it the potential to change the face of food security in beneficiary communities which have been participating in the programme since its inception in 2016.
Objectives of the Study
The central objective of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of Command Agriculture in promoting productivity and food security among communal farmers in Zimbabwe in relation to availability, access, utilisation and stability. The other objectives were:
To establish challenges impeding smooth running and success of Command Agriculture Programme among communal farmers. To identify possible remedies for improving the Command Agriculture Programme among communal farmers.
Methodology
The research is grounded in a mixed methodology approach through a case study analysis to answer questions pertaining to programme targeting, reach, access, utilisation of project deliverables and farmers’ outputs, outcomes and impacts. Key informant in-depth interviews were utilised to obtain qualitative data from district programme command centre officials and local authorities, particularly the DA’s office, which has been at the forefront of the programme implementation. Focus group discussions were utilised on project beneficiaries to get collective sentiments and stories on the effectiveness of the project according to Command Agriculture Programme participants or beneficiaries. For quantitative data, questionnaires (analysed using SPSS for descriptive statistics) were distributed to purposively selected respondents. Besides, smallholder farmers who have participated in the Command Agriculture Programme since its inception were targeted through simple random sampling. Observations and document analysis in terms of secondary sources also formed part of data collection methods to corroborate the empirical study findings. In order to have a comparative and balanced assessment of the Command Agriculture Programme, a control group was adopted and subjected to the same research instruments used on programme beneficiaries. The total number of farmers who participated in the research was 100, with n = 50 being beneficiaries of the Command Agriculture Programme and n = 50 being non-beneficiaries of the Command Agriculture Programme.
Findings from the Study
Demographic Reflections
Seventy per cent of the research participants were male while 30 per cent were female. Most of the participants were aged between 36 years and 59 years with 65 per cent, 18 years and 35 years with 15 per cent and 60 years and above with 20 per cent. Seventy-five per cent of the participants were married, 10 per cent divorced and 15 per cent widowed (Figure 2). The limited number of youthful age groups was a cause of concern as there is a need to incorporate the youth in the Command Agriculture Programme as the future of the programme lies in this age category, which happens to be the productive and reproductive age group. The programme is also benefitting a limited number of widows yet these should immensely benefit from the programme. It was revealed during the focus group discussions that women and youth do not own means of production (land) hence they became ineligible to access Command Agriculture loan facility. One of the participants commented:
The criterion was that people who own land should come forward and express interest in the programme and local extension officers did the vetting exercise. So men are the household heads who accessed the inputs on behalf of their families.
This shows that programmes still shun the marginalised with regard to accessing resources meant to empower and enhance productive capacity. Programmes should make efforts to incorporate previously marginalised groups so that they participate in programmes to ensure food security.
Food Availability, Access and Utilisation in Murehwa
The Command Agriculture sought to promote food availability through four components, namely inputs provision, extensions services, implements and land preparation services and marketing services. The farmers indicated that they were aware of the provisions of the Command Agriculture, although access to all services differed across the farmers. Ninety per cent of the farmers indicated that they knew and had always received the inputs for the Command Agriculture Programme as well as the extension services. This means that in terms of inputs and extension services coverage, the Command Agriculture Programme is well above average. However, the farmers expressed dissatisfaction with the marketing, land preparation and implements components of the programme. One hundred per cent of the farmers felt duped by the GMB marketing provision where they are forced to sell their produce at less competitive prices. One hundred per cent as well indicated that they have never accessed the land preparation and provision of farming implements despite the fact that they lack draught power for land preparation as a result of death of their cattle. The inconsistencies in the provision of the four components were noted as affecting productivity, hence availability is limited. One of the beneficiaries of the programme noted:
There is no uniformity in the provision of the said components. They said they would help us prepare our fields with the tractors since we have lost most of our cattle due to the January disease….if you ask most of us here we have not accessed land preparation facility besides the inputs, fertiliser and seeds.
This development has negatively affected the sustainability in food availability. Another participant noted:
We are better than before but I wouldn’t want to say that we have fully succeeded in conquering hunger. People still experience food shortages, especially towards the beginning of another rainy season because silos would have run empty.
In this light, it can be concluded that while the situation might have improved, the provision of inputs through Command Agriculture has failed to address the food availability challenge. The implication is that communities still face the challenge of food insufficiency as they fail to reach the next farming season with enough food.
The non-beneficiaries expressed displeasure with the way the Command Agriculture was handled, arguing that it undermined food availability. One of the participants expressed the level of discontentment:
Kwedu inzara dzoga. Unotoshaya kuti vanoshara havadi kuti kwedu kugutwewo. (In our households, we are experiencing serious hunger. We don’t know how those who select do their selection as if they want us to starve).
Such sentiments indicate that the Command Agriculture Programme has not been able to save the whole community in order to address the aspect of food availability. There are no mechanisms to ensure that even those community members not participating in the programme can access the available food.
The study established that 90 per cent of the farmers agree that they had improved production of maize crop, which is their main crop since 2017. On average, the farmers indicated that they produce at least 4 tons of maize and above in a good season. Before the Command Agriculture Programme, the farmers indicated that they produced a maximum of 2 tons on a good farming season. The reasons for the low yield were mainly lack of agricultural inputs, even if good rains were received and in the absence of pests and diseases. One of the respondents noted:
Yes, there is an improvement, especially in maize production because we now get the fertilisers and seed. As for me, I have improved my yields double-fold because of the programme… but I would still need other foodstuffs. If I see that I have plenty, I may sell some…
While it is good that farmers managed to increase production, it should be noted that an increase in maize production does not necessarily mean access to food as the food requirements are not restricted to only maize meal. Those with surplus have the option to sell some to fetch other food provisions. Given that the increase in production yield is just marginal, food availability is yet to be realised in Murehwa district as presented in Figure 3.
The interviews with officials of the Command Agriculture indicated that while Command Agriculture has had a marginal increase in productivity at individual household level, the tonnage per hectare compared to inputs provided was still low. An official noted:
The people are getting inputs, yes, but there is a problem. A farmer is expected to produce at least 7 tons of maize per hectare but they fall far short. There is an improvement but it does not suffice. Remember these farmers are not just supposed to feed themselves but the whole nation.
This comment reinforces the fact that the cost-effectiveness of the programme is at stake in the communal areas. It is only the direct beneficiaries of the Command Agriculture who are in a position to realise food security, yet everyone else has to source food elsewhere or depend on food handouts from the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Sustainability of the Command Agriculture Programme and food accessibility remain at stake in a situation where the returns in yield in relation to inputs used do not tally.
While the standard number of meals per day is three, the study revealed that it is only the beneficiaries of the Command Agriculture who are in a position to attain this level. This study gathered that 25 per cent of the households which did not benefit from the programme took a single meal per day.
One of the beneficiary participants said:
I wouldn’t say I am really starving with my family. Ever since I started receiving inputs, I eat at least two meals a day. I have never slept on a totally empty stomach.
The situation was different for the non-beneficiary households where one participant indicated that:
Food can be scarce here. Just before the next farming season, you may sleep on an empty stomach or probably have a single meal. Those with the maize will be selling at very high and unaffordable prices.
It was also noted that 55 per cent of the respondents who are participating in the Command Agriculture still cannot afford three meals in a day and they settled for two. This proves that food access, availability and utilisation have not been fully gained in Murehwa district. While there is a difference between the control group and the treatment group, failure to meet the expected standards in terms of the number of meals taken is an indication of weaknesses in the Command Agriculture Programme in terms of meeting its targets (Figure 4).
The household food nutritional composition indicated that the availability and access to all nutritional requirements were erratic. Command Agriculture is mainly supporting the production of maize yet maize in itself does not constitute a balanced diet. One hundred per cent of the research participants indicated that carbohydrates are dominant in their meals. Other nutrients like proteins were missing and one of the participants remarked that:
When I say I eat two meals a day, I mean I eat sadza (thick maize meal porridge) around mid-morning most probably with some green vegetables and I eat sadza again for supper with the same relish... as for meat, I hardly afford that unless I have surplus to sell and buy meat.
The inconsistencies in the availability of nutrients to determine a balanced diet mean that the Command Agriculture Programme has not been able to fulfil its objectives in terms of a balanced nutritional composition which is part of food security requirements.
Food Stability and Self-sufficiency
The communal farmers generally produce their own grain for household consumption for the greater part of the year. Ninety-five per cent of the respondents indicated that they usually produce their own maize through crop farming supported by Command Agriculture. Five per cent indicated that they partly produce and purchase their food requirements. Thus, in terms of maize production, there is a marginal improvement among beneficiary households as compared to non-beneficiary households. However, it was noted that the farmers also rely on other sources for food and this is an indication that food stability is yet to be achieved. It was remarked that:
When we are in short supply of food, donors like World Vision, Care Zimbabwe and Christian Care usually come to our rescue with food handouts like maize, wheat and cooking oil. It saves us a lot from starvation.
The fact that farmers benefitting from Command Agriculture still look up to donors or NGOs for food provision substantiates that the Command Agriculture Programme has not been able to promote food stability and food self-sufficiency in Murehwa district.
The study also revealed that all households make efforts to produce their own food, yet the respondents indicated that Command Agriculture has failed to promote food stability and self-sufficiency in the district. This is buttressed by the fact that both groups of respondents have had to rely on donor assistance, food for work programme and family or friends’ assistance for food (Figure 5). In this light, one of the respondents remarked:
Zhara inomboruma mwanangu kana mvura dazacho dzanetsa asi tinotenda zvirongwa zve kushandira nemapoka aka siyana-siyana anotigamha. (Sometimes we do starve but we thank the food for work programmes and various organisations which help us a lot.)
An official in the Command Agriculture Programme also remarked that:
The continued existence of donors and donor aid as well as food for work among the beneficiary communities raises the issue of sustainability of the programme. There is a need to promote a sustainable agricultural growth and development scheme which can entirely do away with the donor syndrome.
Given that 15 per cent of the households have engaged in food for work and a further 35 per cent in the treatment group have been assisted through NGOs for food, it becomes apparent that the improvements brought by Command Agriculture in Murehwa district have just been marginal. The reliance on donors and other sources was, however, more pronounced among the control group as indicated in Figure 6. Food stability and food self-sufficiency could have been achieved if households had enough food reserves to take them through to the next farming season or food to consume even in the event of a drought leading to a poor harvest.
Household Food Sources for the Control Group.
Both the treatment group and the control group indicated that they have experienced incidences of food shortages at household level, although the prevalence was more rampant in the control group which did not benefit from the Command Agriculture Programme. In the treatment group, only 15 per cent indicated that they had never experienced any food shortages ever since they got into the Command Agriculture Programme. For the control group, 56 per cent of respondents indicated that they always had incidences of food shortages at household level. A local village head commented:
All the people surely have to endure some food shortages here. The situation is even worse with some of us not getting any inputs. Where will they get the fertilisers and the seed for a better yield?
This means that the Command Agriculture has had a marginal improvement in food security in beneficiary households, but with incidences of food shortages being experienced, it can be asserted that the programme has not been able to bring about food stability and self-sufficiency (Figure 7).
The research was also concerned with an overall measure of the household food security level as perceived by the respondents themselves. For the treatment group, only 15 per cent of the respondents indicated that they have a high level of food security, 75 per cent intermediate level and 10 per cent indicated to have a low level of food security. The smaller rate of farmers under Command Agriculture indicating a high level of food security is an indication that Command Agriculture is yet to promote sustainable food security in Murehwa district.
One of the participants remarked:
People assisted with inputs should achieve a high level of food security at household level immediately as long as things are done properly but here it is something we still anticipate and we are yet to achieve that.
For the control group, only 5 per cent indicated to have high level of food security. Fifty-five per cent indicated to have low level of food security and 40 per cent indicated to have an intermediate level rating. There is, therefore, an indication that for the treatment group, there have been marginal improvements as compared to the control group. It was also noted that the high rates in the intermediate level category only referred to maize availability, not all food requirements which may constitute food security. Thus, the levels of food security in Murehwa district show that the Command Agriculture Programme has not been able to promote food security to the expected levels.
With regard to implementation of the Command Agriculture Programme, there were mixed feelings in relation to each component of the programme. The input provision component and the extension services drew more satisfaction from the farmers. Majority of the farmers (80 per cent) indicated that they were moderately satisfied with the input provision, and 5 per cent indicated that they had high satisfaction level. However, land preparation and marketing components recorded low satisfaction levels of more than 90 per cent each.
One of the respondents remarked:
We are not satisfied with the land preparation component. The tractor never comes. If it comes, it comes late into the season. Even the issue of selling our produce is not fair. They set prices for our produce and only GMB should buy our grain.
Given such weaknesses in the programme components as perceived by the farmers, agriculture productivity is failing to reach sustainability levels due to lack of a comprehensive strategy.
Relevance, Appropriateness and Adequacy of the Command Agriculture Programme to Needs
The Command Agriculture is relevant and appropriate to the needs of the communal farmers. Twenty per cent of the communal farmers vouched that the programme is appropriate and relevant to an extremely higher extent. Seventy per cent of the respondents indicated that the programme was appropriate and relevant to a high extent. Meanwhile, 10 per cent of the respondents indicated that the relevance and appropriateness of the programme were minimal.
One of the community heads retorted:
The programme has the potential to go a long way in improving our food security situation. But there are areas which really need to be looked at. The implementers are not time conscious. Reports of corruption are also awash. If you are not in good books with the extension office, you may not get the inputs.
Thus, the farmers generally agreed that the programme was appropriate and relevant to their needs. Therefore, if it is implemented well, it has the potential to promote sustainable development in the community in terms of food security and improved household incomes.
With regard to the adequacy of the programme, 65 per cent of the farmers said the programme deliverables should be increased, especially inputs. Thirty per cent were neutral on the programme adequacy (Figure 8). Only 5 per cent felt that the programme deliverables were adequate to support agricultural productivity. One respondent highlighted that:
The inputs are not enough. We are forced to outsource but at times we won’t be having the money to go and purchase and we end up just planting selected grain from previous harvest.
There is a need to increase the programme deliverables in order to promote sustainable agricultural growth and development among the communal farmers.
Communal Farmers’ Contribution to the Objectives of Food Security in Zimbabwe Through Command Agriculture
The objective of Command Agriculture is to improve maize productivity in the country in order to cut maize imports. Farmers indicated that they have been only sending between 1 ton and 2 tons to GMB as a way of repayment of loaned inputs. The surplus is either not there and just enough to feed their families or will find its way to the informal markets, which the farmers regard as offering competitive prices compared to GMB. There is a discrepancy between the amount of inputs that were provided to the farmers and the maize delivered to the national silo. The marginal improvement in yields, which the farmers have been realising, does not suffice to promote food security in the district and in the country at large. The programme’s contribution towards achieving Sustainable Development Goal number two has been minimal given the amount of produce the farmers have been sending to the national silo. Mananavire (2019) posits that despite the programme, the country still experiences severe food crisis. According to Ndebele (2020), the Command Agriculture has been a huge flop. At the same time, Mazwi et al. (2019) have indicated that the production costs of maize judging by costs per hectare have not been profitable on the part of the government. Indeed, the objective of the government has not been met, thereby vindicating the critics of the programme who argue that the incumbents use it to gain political mileage.
Factors Affecting Food Security and Productivity
Livestock, especially cattle, play an important role in supporting the Command Agriculture Programme. The communal farmers indicated that their cattle have succumbed to disease over the years. At the time of the research, 15 per cent of the respondents indicated that they had zero cattle, 50 per cent had one to four cattle, and 35 per cent had 5 to 10 cattle.
It was noted:
Cattle have been dying. We have lost big numbers due to the stubborn waterborne disease. Most of us have no draught power. We delay planting because land preparation is done using cattle. Some may combine their cattle and help each other to prepare their fields.
The limited numbers of cattle across the respondents indicate a need to restock the farmers’ livestock through other forms of Command Agriculture such as command livestock, which has not been fully extended to the communal farmers. Agricultural production has been affected immensely by the unavailability of draught power.
The general requirement for a farmer to participate in Command Agriculture is that they should possess at least 5 hectares of land. The farmers indicated that they hardly meet the 5-hectare plot requirement. Eighty per cent of the farmers indicated that their plots or pieces of land are below the required 5 hectares. Only 20 per cent have land that is just enough. Fears were expressed by the farmers during focus group discussions that they may be elbowed out of the Command Agriculture Programme due to lack of enough land required by the programme (Figure 9).
One of the research participants noted:
We are a communal area. Our land is limited because we have been parcelling out some to our children. The population is growing so fast and there won’t be any land to plant. If we had managed to go to the resettlement areas, the situation would have been different. We may even lose the support because they say our fields are not the recommended size.
Pests and diseases such as fall armyworm have affected productivity. Agricultural inputs that are usually delivered late also negatively impact on productivity. Old age and death were also identified as some of the factors that affect productivity at household level. Poor rains have also constantly affected productivity in the area, and the low productivity has been attributed to poor rainfall patterns experienced since the 2016/2017 agricultural season.
The research noted massive delays in programme implementation in terms of adhering to programme timelines in terms of inputs distribution to farmers. The programme is marred by the long process, which starts from registering as an interested farmer to the eventual collection of the inputs. The farmers expressed that there was a lot of movement to GMB depots and to the banks to process the paperwork. After the paperwork is processed, GMB does not deliver the inputs on time as farmers receive some inputs well into the agriculture season. A farmer noted:
There is a lot of travelling and paperwork involved my son. Sometimes you are called that your papers are missing. The inputs don’t come on time. You may receive the seed and fertilisers halfway through the farming season.
Thus, inefficiency in terms of adhering to timelines and processing of paperwork has affected agricultural productivity and food security in the district. This calls for a contingent one-stop shop system where farmers can be served at one point.
The success of the Command Agriculture is hinged on the working relationship between the programme implementers and the communal farmers. Only 15 per cent of the farmers indicated that they had an excellent working relationship with the implementers. Fifteen per cent were neutral in terms of relationship with the implementers, and 70 per cent indicated that they have a bad working relationship with the implementers. The focus group discussions uncovered that the GMB staff and some extension officers were arrogant and disrespectful of the farmers, hence the existence of a bad working relationship. It was noted:
They take us for granted these GMB people and extension officers. They treat us like little kids. If something goes wrong in your papers, the problem always goes to the farmer. But we just endure the ill treatment because we are at the receiving end. Extension officers don’t come easily to our fields to check, they say they have no means to travel like motorbikes.
Thus, Command Agriculture has been affected by various factors in its implementation. The extension officers have not been mobile enough to supervise the programme. Concerning marketing, the farmers felt the standards were very low as 75 per cent indicated that marketing of the produce was below expected standards while 25 per cent indicated that marketing moderately met expected standards. Same sentiments of below expected standards were echoed in relation to implements and land preparation as 95 per cent indicated this component of the programme as below standard and only 5 per cent indicated a moderately met expected standard answer. Thus, food production and security remain affected in the district.
Recommendations
Among the key impediments of the Command Agriculture Programme is the fact that there is weak monitoring and evaluation. The study, therefore, recommends that monitoring and evaluation need to be strengthened to address the challenge of abuse. It was reported that some farmers even bypassed the extension officers who were supposed to recommend them and went straight to GMB where they bribed GMB officers to get inputs. The errand farmers sell the inputs, which include seed, fertiliser and chemicals instead of using them to farm. Thus, the programme is being affected by corrupt tendencies as well as patronage that are making it obscure and prone to abuse. Indeed, there have been claims that politicians in the ruling ZANU PF party determine who gets what, when and how inasmuch as the farming inputs are concerned. This development is, therefore, derailing the noble objectives of the agricultural development policy.
The programme should have a one-stop facility where farmers are served at one point. The farmers spent a lot of time moving from GMB offices and to the CBZ bank during the course of processing paperwork. The process proved draining to the farmers as they spent even days processing the papers as the process was not as swift as anticipated. The administrative and logistical requirements of the programme, therefore, need to be improved so that they become more efficient and transparent to the farmer who is the implementing agent on the ground.
It is critical that the Command Agriculture budget be reviewed in order to improve coverage. Indications were that some communal farmers have not been able to benefit from the programme as inputs are not enough. Some farmers felt that some of the bottlenecks experienced are a means to cut numbers due to a shoestring budget for the inputs. This has, in a way, promoted patronage as well as corruption since people will be afraid of losing out when the inputs are finally distributed.
Elsewhere, the billing system of the programme needs to improve. The development and sustainability of the programme are at stake as the programme implementers who operate through CBZ bank are also unable to follow up on repayments. Farmers indicated that when they deliver part of their produce to GMB, they expect CBZ to deduct the inputs loan, but the CBZ has failed to do so. In most instances, farmers have received money in full, indicating that the billing system is not intact and strict. The farmers fear that such inconsistencies on the part of the billing system may jeopardise their creditworthiness in the long run. This loophole also reinforces the argument that the monitoring and evaluation of the programme is weak and should be improved so that all those who owe something pay back.
Targeting of beneficiaries should be improved by coming up with a selection committee. The beneficiaries of the programme are largely selected and recommended by the extension officers. This means that the programme is prone to abuse or favouritism. The selection criteria should involve a committee, which goes on the ground to verify the farmer’s capacity. Some farmers raised concerns that some people benefiting from the programme were not bona fide farmers and did not use the inputs to support Command Agriculture but diverted the inputs for other uses.
There is a need to improve on input distribution or disbursement times. Indications were that the farmers have largely received inputs very late in the season, and this has affected productivity. The farmers also questioned the efficiency of the administrators of the programme as they have had to travel to and from the offices several times, something they blamed for draining their meagre financial resources and productive time.
Respondents also recommended that the extension workers’ mobility needs to be improved. This is because a section of the farmers indicated that they do not always meet the extension officers whenever they want to. The reason for this lack of contact between the farmers and the extension workers was attributed to the lack of transport on the part of the extension workers to move around the working area or wards. For instance, in case of disease outbreak and pests, there is a need to receive on-farm advice right on time to avoid severe crop losses. Having key knowledge on managing potential risks to the farming activities can help promote sustainable growth and development of the programme.
The Command Agriculture Programme also needs a policy shift in which such programmes should be development oriented than being politically oriented. The programme needs to be depoliticised for it not to divert from its mandate. Some respondents indicated that the programme carries a political connotation or tag hence some farmers are not bothered to adhere to its provisions concerning repayments and use of the provided resources. It is also arguable that political reasons explain the loose monitoring of the programme. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the Command Agriculture Programme is not treated in the strictest sense. Thus, the sustainability of the programme is at stake as loans may not be recovered as has happened to similar programmes in the yester years (Figure 10).
Conclusion
Agricultural production is the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. The agricultural sector remains a key sustainable development concern. Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of the Southern African Region but this has experienced serious food shortages since 2000. In this light, initiatives such as the Command Agricultural Programme are critical in addressing the food security challenges. This study concludes that Command Agriculture has the potential to improve agricultural productivity and food security among communal farmers. The beneficiaries of the programme have been able to improve food production and security at household level. However, the programme falls far short in terms of feeding the national basket, which is the thrust of the programme. The number of tonnage delivered to GMB against the inputs provided does not tally and this may affect the efficacy and sustainability of the programme. The programme can immensely benefit from monitoring and evaluation, and there is a need to improve its effectiveness by minimising such loopholes like patronage, corruption and diversion of inputs. This can be done through a system of checks and balances that ensures the recovery of all the inputs loaned to the farmers. The programme needs to be separated from political machinations and be strictly treated as an agricultural developmental programme meant to restore Zimbabwe’s breadbasket status in the SADC region.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
