Abstract
This study attempts to understand, explore and analyse how Bangladesh public administration has made considerable progress in fostering public service innovation (PSI) by instilling empathy among the public bureaucrats through the Empathy Training Programme (ETP). By employing qualitative methods, this study collected data from both primary and secondary sources. The empirical findings of the study suggest that ETP has been able to change the paternalistic and colonial mindset of public bureaucrats. In addition, the study further reveals that public bureaucrats are bringing this knowledge of empathy-led innovation to their workplaces, where they are effectively practising it, indicating that the ETP has not only been able to generate a cultural change in the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) but also has created a sense of responsiveness and self-accountability among public bureaucrats. However, there are still areas of concern in terms of the sustainability of the ETP approach. The study also identified some critical building blocks, which have been considered responsible for the limited scaling up of the pilot projects. Finally, the study has come up with a set of recommendations for making this intrepid approach to Bangladesh public administration more effective.
Keywords
Introduction
Over the past three and a half decades, public sector management has undergone substantial reforms in both developed and developing economies (Cheung, 1997; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Peters & Savoie, 1998; Sarker, 2006). However, the impact of these reforms has not been symmetric across the globe. Haque (1997) and Hossain et al. (2017) argue that most of these reforms were framed taking into consideration the Western context. Despite being prescriptive and parochial in nature, these reforms were popularised globally by developing partners such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Department of International Development (DfID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and often imposed on developing nations and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the name of ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ (Hossain et al., 2017).
Evidence suggests that public sector reforms in Bangladesh, since its independence in 1971, continue to experience a bumpy ride (Islam, 2018). Over the years, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) constituted as many as 17 administrative reform commissions to modernise the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). Islam (2018) and Kim and Monem (2009) argue that the achievements of these reform initiatives yielded limited benefits. To cater for a critical mass in the BCS, a new breed of civil servants who are capable of shouldering the challenging governance environment, as well as able to respond to the increasingly changing citizens’ needs, GoB launched programmes such as ‘Managing at the Top’ (MATT I 1 & MATT II 2 ) and ‘Civil Service Change Management Program’ (CSCMP 3 ) (Islam, 2018; Sarker & Zafarullah, 2020). Jacobs (2009) recognised that MATT programmes were relatively successful in achieving their objective in changing the mindset of senior-level bureaucrats in Bangladesh. However, several studies (Hossain et al., 2018; Islam, 2018; Khan, 2013a, 2013b; Majeed, 2011; Sarker & Zafarullah, 2020) have contested such claims and have argued that the returns from these projects were quite limited. This argument stems from the reality that these projects were mostly donor-driven but implemented through a collaboration with the GoB. The problem with such supply-reliant exogenous initiatives is that they often overlook the context and culture of the host country, which, in turn, makes them relatively less successful (Islam, 2018; Khan, 2013a, 2013b). In Bangladesh, evidence suggests that policymakers largely do not learn lessons from the reforms failure—rather, they continue to repeat the same mistakes, which makes various policy initiatives ineffective. For example, Majeed (2011) pointed out that MATT II was formulated and implemented in isolation, without incorporating the lessons learned from the MATT I, which could have enhanced the success rate of MATT II. In addition, internal challenges like the politicisation of civil service also had a direct impact on the transfer and promotion of civil servants, which negatively contributed to the dividends of these initiatives (Hossain et al., 2018). Consequently, Bangladesh’s public administration suffers from various wicked problems.
Recently, a considerable number of studies (e.g., a2i, 2021; Chowdhury 2018a, 2018b; Chowdhury & Beresford, 2017; Chowdhury et al., 2019; Hasanuzzaman, 2018; Hussain, 2017; Monem & Osman, 2018; Rahman et al., 2019) have highlighted that there has been a paradigmatic shift in the BCS owing to the contribution of the Empathy Training Programme (ETP). These studies have also argued that Bangladesh’s public bureaucracy has long maintained a colonial legacy by always resisting change and innovation, thwarting any reform attempts to limit its discretionary power (Shahan & Jahan, 2014; Zafarullah, 2007; Zafarullah & Khan, 2005). This has, however, changed with the introduction of ETP, which has created a more empathetic, citizen-centred system that embraces new changes. In addition, Bangladesh’s public administration is now looking for ways to simplify the public service delivery process by removing major barriers as well as taking services to the doorsteps of service recipients. In fact, a culture of innovation is in the making, which is gradually changing the mindset of the country’s public bureaucrats (Chowdhury & Beresford, 2017). In other words, public bureaucrats are attempting to provide public services in ways that are much more effective, efficient and economical from the service providers’ perspective, while enabling service recipients to receive public services that take relatively less time, cost and visits (TCV) than in the past (a2i, 2021; Hussain, 2017).
In light of the earlier discussion, a few questions emerged. First, what is the ETP, the much-covered subject and emphasis of contemporary literature in the field of public administration and management? Second, who organises the ETP and how is it imparted? Third, who are the participants of this training given the huge size of the BCS? Fourth, what is the connection between public service innovation (PSI) and empathy? In other words, how can infusing empathy in the public bureaucrats per se aid in fostering PSI? Fifth, it appears that most of the claims that have been made in the literature are either from the GoB or donor-sponsored consultancy reports; to what extent are they valid given the fact that there is very limited academic discourse in this particular area?
This empirical study, derived from Ehsan (2021), aims to understand, explore and analyse how Bangladesh’s public administration has been able to make progress in fostering PSI by instilling empathy in public bureaucrats. More specifically, the first objective of this study is to analyse the role of the ETP in promoting PSI in Bangladesh. The second objective is to shed light on the challenges of the empathy-led innovation model and suggest some mitigating strategies to overcome them. The next section discusses the theoretical context of PSI and the role of empathy in public service. The following section provides an overview of the ETP, which is carried out by the GoB for the members of the BCS. This is followed by a critical assessment of this intrepid approach of the GoB, drawing on both the narratives of the respondents as well as the data collated from secondary sources. The latter part of the article unveils both the prospects and challenges of this Bangladeshi version of the ETP model. The article also highlights the implications of the study and identifies some areas for further exploration into this aspect of PSI that would be useful for academics and practitioners. Finally, the concluding section sheds light on a few recommendations that might aid relevant stakeholders in making this version of ETP more effective.
Conceptual Discussions
Public Service Innovation
There has been renewed interest among researchers to pursue studies on PSI (Bloch & Bugge, 2013; Borins, 2001; Chen et al., 2020; Moore & Hartley, 2008; Walker, 2008; Windrum, 2008), which resulted in a plethora of published scholarship. Despite such progress, Damanpour and Aravind (2012) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argue that most of the existing studies explain PSI from the perspective of the private sector. However, one of the few exceptions has been a definition put forth by Bertot et al. (2016, p. 212) as ‘a combination of both the notion of innovation and what it means to innovate in the public sector’. There are various types of PSI: service innovation, service delivery innovation and conceptual innovation (Hartley, 2005; Windrum, 2008). In light of the purpose of our study, we have adopted the narrative that the GoB employs for denoting PSI, that is, any idea, initiative or method that aids in reducing TCV usually required by citizens for availing on the public services or information (Hasanuzzaman, 2018). In fact, the core goal for PSI these days in the BCS has become reducing TCV in public service delivery (Chowdhury, 2018a, 2018b, 2020).
Empathy in Public Service
The term empathy means the ability to recognise, understand and respond to others’ feelings (Edlins, 2021; Edlins & Dolamore, 2018). In a more general sense, it refers to stepping into someone else’s shoes (Krznaric, 2015).
Several studies (Brewer et al., 2017; Fenley, 2022; Guy et al., 2008; Lewis & Gilman, 2012; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008) have listed empathy as a prominent pro-social behaviour alongside other related attributes that are commendable for public officials. Zanetti (1998) was a pioneer in exploring how empathy can play an important role in the process of institutional transformation. Zanetti (2011) opined that the core value of public administration is ‘empathy’. In the same vein, Zanetti and King (2013) recognised a close affinity between empathy and public service. Reflecting these views, Edlins (2021) developed a model which offers sequential steps to practising empathy in the operations of public administration. Based on the conclusions of several relevant studies (e.g., Dolamore, 2021; Edlins, 2021; Hussain, 2017; King & Zanetti, 2005; Solomon, 2014; Zanetti, 1998, 2011; Zanetti & King, 2013), it is understood that ‘empathy’ has the potential to positively transform the delivery of public services. However, a question arises: How exactly would empathy transform public service delivery?
The role of empathy in transforming public service delivery may well be linked to the process of how the public sector operates in practice. Zanetti (2011) indicates that public officials play a mediating role between citizens and politicians (elected representatives) to ensure a timely and cost-efficient delivery of public service. In doing so, public bureaucrats, especially street-level bureaucrats, enjoy discretionary authority in implementing public policies in both ordinary and unprecedented times (Bhuiyan, 2022; Lipsky, 2010). As public/street-level bureaucrats remain in close proximity to service recipients, this often gives them the opportunity to interact with the clients as well as the ability to identify loopholes in the public service delivery system. Admittedly, when these public bureaucrats become empathetic, public service delivery gets a positive push (Box, 2015). Simply put, by applying a little empathy, bureaucrats can connect with citizens’ perspectives, which can further help them understand the restraining factors of the public service delivery process. Since street-level bureaucrats enjoy discretionary authority, they can make the ‘compensatory adjustments’ that ultimately improve the public service delivery process (Box, 2015; Steinberg, 2014). Compensatory adjustment denotes that street-level bureaucrats can make minor adjustments/modifications to their functions in order to simplify the service delivery system without stepping out of their jurisdiction (Arnold, 2014; Lipsky, 2010). Such timely interventions benefit the effective delivery of public services.
Evidence suggests that empathy aids street-level bureaucrats in enhancing their capacity to make better discretionary decisions (Jensen & Pedersen, 2017). However, the existing characteristics of the work environment in the public sector, such as strictly enforced rules and regulations, limited resources, tremendous work pressure and dependence on electronic means of communication are not conducive to practising empathy (Dolby, 2013; Edlins, 2021; Halpern, 2003; Zanetti & King, 2013). Despite the presence of such obstructive circumstances, scholars have advocated different ways of fostering empathy in public bureaucrats. Edlins (2021) has urged that PSOs champion empathy as a valued practice. In addition, Edlins recommended integrating the practice of empathy in the organisational culture of the bureaucracy through policy endorsement, whereby the use of empathy would be recognised in the performance evaluation system of public bureaucrats. Edlins (2021) further suggested that the training curriculum of public bureaucrats should be designed to promote empathy as the core of public dealings.
Methodology
This study, being exploratory in nature, has adopted the qualitative methodology of social research. Usually, in qualitative research, a researcher explores a natural setting by adopting a range of data collection methods, such as documented sources, in-depth interviews (IDI), focused group discussion (FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) in order to meet the research objectives (Creswell, 2014; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2010). Data for this study have been collected by employing both primary and secondary sources. By secondary sources (see Robson & McCartan, 2016), we are referring to the documented sources: for example, books, book chapters, journal articles, newspaper articles, policy documents, annual reports, TCV reports, online documents and other archival documents, which were extensively reviewed through the adoption of the desk review and a content analysis technique (Ehsan, 2020). Such a rigorous review of literature has provided some valuable insights in understanding how ETP is imparted to bureaucrats and was useful in facilitating pathways for PSI. Data from the primary sources were obtained by interviewing various groups of respondents using IDIs through the adoption of semi-structured, open-ended questionnaires (Robson & McCartan, 2016). This has allowed us to elicit the views of the respondents, which helped generate a much deeper understanding regarding the role of ETP in triggering PSI in BCS. Besides, IDIs also facilitated probing the answers of the respondents that needed more clarifications (Saunders et al., 2009). Moreover, FGDs were also employed because of their potential benefits. In other words, FGDs have helped in providing more elicit, insightful and spontaneous information from the respondents, which could have been relatively difficult to extract through the mere adoption of IDIs (Kitzinger, 1995; Wong, 2008). Data obtained from both IDI and FGD were further supplemented by information extracted through KIIs. Given the onslaught COVID-19 pandemic, all interviews, that is, IDIs, FGDs and KIIs were organised through virtual platforms such as Zoom and WhatsApp from June 2021 to August 2021 and included 24 participants. These were individuals who had participated in the ETP, the facilitators who provided the training, and the office staff of the a2i programme. However, some respondents were not quite interested in sharing their thoughts on the factors that have resulted in discontinued innovation. To overcome this challenge, five relevant consultants and three academics were interviewed to further supplement the information provided by the respondents. The collected data were later analysed, interpreted and processed by using qualitative data analysis tools. Analysis of the empirical data was done considering three broader themes: (a) role of ETP in fostering PSI in BCS (b) factors that have been responsible for discontinued innovation and (c) challenges of rolling out the innovation projects at the regional and national level.
An Overview of ETP in BCS
In order to overhaul institutionalised inefficiency in the BCS, the GoB initiated the ETP using the design thinking approach of ‘d.school’, UK’s Nesta 4 and Behavioral Insight Team as a source of inspiration (Chowdhury & Beresford, 2017). In fact, customisation of the popular design (d.school) thinking models was performed to ensure that the newly formulated homegrown model fits well with the socio-cultural and institutional identity of the country (UNOSSC, 2018). Sustainability and its long-term impact were other factors that prompted the formulation of a tailor-made local model. The key purpose of this type of ETP was to help public bureaucrats in designing ways to improve service delivery and thereby reduce TCV that is usually needed in accessing services (UNOSSC, 2018). Moreover, since the first principle of PSI is empathy (a2i, 2021), ETP also included components like experimental learning and secret shopping, which allowed trainees to be put into consideration citizens’ perspectives (UNOSSC, 2018). This process helped public bureaucrats gain an in-depth understanding of bottlenecks in the public service delivery mechanism, which is arguably more effective than what they could glean information derived from external assessments and secondary sources (Hussain, 2017).
ETP, as it presently appears, did not develop overnight. Rather, it has been refined and remodelled through a decade of trial and error. Currently, ETP is conducted in four consecutive phases: (a) a five-day training, (b) a cascading workshop, (c) a three-day project design workshop and (d) an implementation phase, which have been briefly discussed here.
Five-day Training
ETP starts with a five-day training programme with a cohort of 30 mid-level to senior public bureaucrats at the Divisional Commissioner’s office 5 (Chowdhury, 2020; Chowdhury et al., 2019). The individual ministries and their attached departments nominate the bureaucrats to be trained following a criteria for selection of candidates stipulated by a2i.
The first day of the training is an introduction to the concept of empathy and TCV to the trainees. On the second and third days, participants do secret shopping in which trainees visit the office of other participants to receive a first-hand experience of the service delivery process (Chowdhury et al., 2019). For example, a physician would be asked to go to a passport office to file an application for her/his passport renewal. Similarly, a land officer might be asked to go to a government-owned college to review the application submission process (UNOSSC, 2017). However, the facilitators ask the participants not to communicate with the office staff and disclose their real identities. Rather, the objective is to simply observe the interactions between citizens and service providers. During secret shopping, the facilitators usually divide the total number of participants into three groups. One group observes the visiting office’s official activities, while the other group observes what is happening outside the visiting office. The final group reaches out to citizens. In other words, they pretend that they are the real service recipients and try to map out the citizens’ perception about the public service delivery process. After the end of the visit, when the participants return to the training site, they present criticism regarding what they have physically observed.
A similar exercise is repeated on day 3. This time, trainees are asked to go to field offices other than their own—that is, a land officer would visit another land office. This sort of secret shopping allows the participants to be ‘put into the citizens’ shoes’ and experience the service delivery process by themselves. On days 4 and 5, the training is centred around reflecting on what the participants have observed on days 2 and 3, defining the problems in the service delivery process in their respective offices and then coming up with innovative solutions about how the delivery process can be simplified and improved (Chowdhury et al., 2019).
Cascading Workshop
After the end of the five-day training, participants return to their respective field offices from where the execution phase starts. In a workshop setting, participants share knowledge they have gathered from the training. This platform becomes a helpful way of getting all the stakeholders together to discuss the malfunctions in the service delivery process in their offices and find ways of addressing them. By stakeholders, one is referring to the concerned officials of various ranks of that particular office who are directly or indirectly involved in the service delivery process in that particular locality. In addition, representatives from NGOs, civil society organisations (CSOs) and local government institutions are also invited to attend the workshop and share their views. Consequently, such a workshop produces a meaningful discussion among various stakeholders that can further generate valuable insights into resolving perceived challenges (Chowdhury et al., 2019).
Three-day Project Design Workshop
Usually, after 1.5–2 months from the five-day training, participants must update their progress status to a2i. Participants who can meet the progress criteria get an invitation to join a follow-up three-day workshop on ‘Innovation Project Design’. The key purpose of workshop is to help participants finalise their innovation implementation plan so that they can move on to the piloting phase (Chowdhury et al., 2019). In doing so, the initial plan for piloting that the innovator usually develops is revisited to assess its feasibility for implementation. Simultaneously, the resources that the innovator would need to kick-off the pilot projects are also gauged. In addition, the sectorial experts who attend the workshop further support the innovators in aligning the project design with available resources. The innovators then present the finalised version of the pilot project to the concerned ministry for their approval. Once formal clearance is obtained, innovators launch their pilot projects.
Implementation Phase
The implementation phase is not merely about piloting the innovation plan. Rather, it consists of sequential activities, such as a piloting of the innovation plan, a documentation workshop, a showcasing of the pilot project and finally a follow-up plan and scaling up. Generally, 4–6 months from the piloting phase, participants are invited to join another workshop on ‘Documentation and Dissemination of Innovation’, where they get training in knowledge management. In addition, they are also trained on how they can grasp their learning experience from their particular innovation journey. This training is instrumental in documenting successful pilots, which creates pathways for scaling up at the regional and national levels (Chowdhury et al., 2019). Once the piloting is completed successfully by the innovators, then a2i holds the innovation showcases around the ministries to highlight the efforts of the innovators. At the same time, each piloted project’s progress was assessed and further evaluated to check its suitability for replication at the regional and national levels. This eventually leads to a more national-level intervention (UNOSSC, 2018).
To make sure that the participants/innovators can make the best use of their experience from the ETP and further develop and transform their idea into an implementable prototype, they are assigned individual mentors or sector specialists (UNOSSC, 2018). In addition, the GoB now has innovation teams (i-teams) 6 in each ministry, directorate and line agencies, even at the district and upazila (sub-district) levels, who have been shouldered with the responsibility of supporting the innovators at all levels (Rahman et al., 2019; UNOSSC, 2018). In order to sustain the ETP initiative, the GoB has already allocated USD 12 million to cover innovation-related activities such as training, piloting and other relevant activities across the ministries (UNOSSC, 2018). Alongside this, the GoB has also created a separate fund known as the ‘Service Innovation Fund’ for facilitating the scaling up of successful pilot projects throughout Bangladesh.
Analysing the Role of ETP in fostering PSI in BCS
A majority of existing literature on ETP in BCS were either the GoB or donor-sponsored consultancy reports, which largely captured the promotional side of this new model. The literature lacks an in-depth understanding of the role ETP plays in fostering PSI in BCS supported by field data. In this context, the current study is an attempt to fill the research gap.
Available evidence suggests that most of the participants of ETP who were interviewed expressed that the 5-day ETP was highly effective. For instance, one of the participants stated:
Among the government trainings I attended before, this one (ETP) was the most effective. This followed a very structured approach, which helped the participants get exposed to the service recipients’ real-life situation. I can say with conviction that the training has made me more empathetic to the service recipients than ever before.
In fact, the responses that we received suggested that the positive notion existing literature portrays on ETP has not been overstated. Rather, participants have agreed that ETP has helped them change their paternalistic mindset and become more empathetic and responsive towards their clients. Regarding this, one of the respondents said the following:
I had no idea before I attended the ETP and visited the office of a primary school in the guise of a pensioner to know the process of receiving pension benefits. I was totally in shock after knowing the fact that it requires 23 different documents by a retiree just to process her/his pension file. I just imagined myself in a similar situation, roaming around different government offices to process my pension file after a few years. After all, we all have to retire one day!
Further evidence suggests that, in many cases, the ETP participants showed empathy in delivering public services. For instance, one of the graduates of ETP who worked as a UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Officer) stated,
after the successful completion of ETP, I returned to my workplace and implemented the prototype on Grievance Redress System, the project that my group experimented on during the training. This resulted in a quick disposal of grievances received, which made service users greatly satisfied.
What makes ETP different from past capacity-building programmes such as MATT I and MATT II is that it aims to change the mindset of street-level bureaucrats, which stands in contrast to previous trainings where the focus was on senior-level bureaucrats. However, the ETP also involved senior officials who would need to extend their support and cooperation to participants in order to scale up their innovative ideas and projects. The a2i has also organised short ETPs of two days and one day for sensitising these higher-level bureaucrats (additional secretary and secretary) to the concept of empathy-induced innovation. This approach of creating different versions of ETP, targeting various levels of public bureaucrats, has proven to be significant as the reports suggest that over 1,500 pilot projects have been implemented successfully, of which 91 have been replicated regionally, while 28 have been scaled up at the national level (Rahman et al., 2019).
It appears that the GoB has drawn some lessons from MATT I and MATT II by developing a home-grown training module for ETP, taking insights from the ‘d-school’ model of design thinking, which is being imparted locally at various regional locations through qualified facilitators. Unlike MATT I and MATT II, ETP does not have the component of foreign trips for participants, which has perhaps saved a substantial amount of public funds. Consequently, this has allowed the organisers to bring considerable number of government officials under the coverage of this training (i.e., over 7,000 officials). This number does not reflect the overall number of participants in different versions of ETP but only the five-day ETP. And so, to understand the real impact of ETP and the number of government officials who have been brought under the direct or indirect coverage of this training, the number of cascading workshops also has to be taken into consideration. Recent reports suggest that the previous trainees of ETP have organised 2,175 workshops, reaching 33,450 bureaucrats (a2i, 2021).
Factors Resulting in Discontinued Innovation
It is almost certain that ETP has been able to bring significant changes in BCS. However, there has also been evidence of discontinued innovation. For example, Chowdhury et al. (2019) noted that, although over 7,000 government officials took part in the five-day ETP, the number of innovative pilot projects that have been implemented successfully is only over 1,500. Apparently, these numbers reveal that not all the participants who attended the five-day ETP have gone on to implement their pilot projects successfully. Interestingly, though, the responses from a2i officials clarified that the way the ETP is structured needs to be taken into consideration—where the participants have to work in groups (i.e., starting from going to secret shopping, defining the problem, generating an innovative idea and finally developing a prototype) and where each group ultimately develops only one prototype. So, upon returning to the workplace, all the group members further fine-tune that same prototype and many succeeded in implementing them.
While this elucidates the case of innovation discontinuity to a certain extent, it does not, however, mean that all ETP participants were equally successful in implementing their innovative pilot projects. In fact, some of the respondents informed us that they could not progress much with their pilot projects because of factors such as lack of monitoring and follow-up from i-teams, resistance from seniors and co-workers, and immature transfer (see Figure 1).

It appears that resistance from seniors and co-workers was a key factor constraining participants from implementing their prototypes. While the actual reason for resistance from seniors cannot be adequately explained due to the paucity of data, a possible scenario is that these senior officials had not received either a two-day or a one-day ETP. This scenario cannot be totally negated given the fact that the overall size of BCS is around 0.3 million, and no documented data can provide the actual number of senior public officials who have received the shorter version of ETP. In any case, when the innovators face resistance from their higher authority, it is quite natural that they would face difficulty in mobilising work system resources for launching their pilot projects. Another reason for which the participants of ETP received minimal cooperation from their co-workers is because of the existing specialist-generalist conflict in the civil service. In the words of one of the respondents,
[O]rganizing the cascading workshop was itself a challenge due to long standing specialist-generalist conflict in the civil service. As I do not belong to the BCS (Administration) cadre, many of my senior colleagues who were members of the BCS (Administration) cadre refrain from joining the cascading workshop organized by me. As a result, under such duress, my pilot project could not kick-off.
Again, it was found that inadequate collaboration and follow-up from i-teams have also created constraints for some of the participants. In this regard, one of the participants, a mid-career official, who was with the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives at the time of interview, mentioned that he was unable to implement the prototype—a project to simplify the service delivery process in the Deputy Commissioner’s (DC) offices—due to lack of support from the relevant government unit.
It is quite perplexing to explain the reasons for inadequate collaboration from i-teams since they have been created with the sole purpose of monitoring and facilitating the pilot innovations that are running in various sectors. However, while shedding light upon this, it is pertinent to understand the makeup of the innovation team. Each innovation team is composed of 3–5 members. The chief innovation officer (CIO) usually leads the team at the ministries and the divisions, while the innovation officer (IO) leads the innovation teams at the directorates, districts, and in the upazilas (Monem & Osman, 2018). Suffice to note that the posts of CIO and IO in the ministries, districts, and upazilas are usually held by public bureaucrats of different tiers, namely the Additional Secretary, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, and the Senior Assistant Secretary. The commonality among all these CIOs and IOs is that they all belong to the BCS (Administration) cadre, who are primarily generalists. Therefore, the inclusion of non-specialised persons within the i-teams itself creates difficulty for them to facilitate the innovators who work in various fields, such as education, health, agriculture, livestock and fishery.
Furthermore, during interviews, some facilitators pointed out the issue of subjective participant selection in some ETPs, which has also been one of the factors behind the low performance of those participants in relation to their peers. Allegedly, some ministries selected relatively less committed and senior (50+ years) participants, bypassing the selection guidelines. Several interviewees indicated that such participants not only inject negative energy within the group in which they work but also do not feel obliged to organise the cascading workshop to share their learnings with their colleagues because of their low-level commitment.
Challenges of Scaling-up at the Regional and National Level
Available published scholarship suggests that out of 1,500 successful ETP pilot projects, only 119 have been scaled up at the national and regional levels (Chowdhury et al., 2019). Thus, it appears that there have been many initiatives that created excitement, but only a handful of those successful pilot projects were ultimately scaled up. One thing is obvious: Not every innovative pilot could be scaled up because of geographical and context-specific reasons; however, many other challenges have constrained the pace of scaling up (see Figure 2).

First, there has been limited scaling up of successful pilot projects because of the lack of ownership by public bureaucrats. One might wonder why, despite the recent inclusion of extrinsic rewards for bureaucrats, namely the Public Service Innovation Award and the Public Administration Award, for recognition of their work. Despite the existence of these awards, there is no such recognition or award scheme for senior bureaucrats who will take the lead in the scaling-up phase of those projects. Consequently, this demotivates them. In many instances, they themselves start a different innovative project with the hope of getting exposure before the senior officials so that they can be considered for those awards. This scenario could have been different had the missing link between APA, 7 ACR 8 and career planning been resolved.
Second, inadequate coordination of the Cabinet Division has also been responsible for the limited scaling up of successful pilot projects. The administrative reform wing of the Cabinet Division is mandated with overseeing, monitoring and following up on the progress of the projects being scaled up. In fact, it was expected that the Cabinet Division would follow-up on the rate of progress during the scaling-up phase to identify the implementation challenges, with an aim to overcome them by remodelling the project(s). However, it was revealed in some interviews that the Cabinet Division has not been able to effectively monitor implementation.
Third, the transfer of the a2i division from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Division has been one of the reasons why the scaling up of the innovation projects has slowed down. With this organisational change, a2i has now totally stopped organising any sort of ETP. ETP is currently being organised by ministries, divisions, line agencies, directorates, the DC’s and the UNO offices. Apparently, the idea of shifting the organisational responsibility of ETP from a2i to concerned ministries seems to be quite promising as it ensures the sustainability of this programme. However, the worrying factor is that ministries and other government offices are only arranging shorter versions of ETP (i.e., two days or one day) instead of the more effective five-day model. Consequently, they are not able to take the participants’ secret shopping, which is perhaps one of the core components of ETP. And so, it is not clear to what extent these ministerial empathy trainings have been able to create an impact on the mindset of those participants by just showing video content demonstrating empathy. Moreover, the way the ministerial empathy training is organised is such that it does not usually require the participants to develop an innovative prototype and later work on it and report to the ministry regarding the progress they have made on their project. Also, from the ministries’ side, there is no mechanism of following up on the impact of this training on the participants. Thus, the bottom line is that, with the shift of responsibility from a2i to ministries with regards to organising ETP, the generation of pilot projects has decreased quite significantly.
Fourth, the lack of cooperation from political leaders (ministers) and ministerial secretaries has also resulted in limited replication and scaling up in certain cases. It might seem quite confusing as to why this has happened as each ministry now is required to prepare an innovation plan at the beginning of a fiscal year and is allocated separate funding (by the GoB) for carrying out the plans and programmes. One possible explanation is that when each ministry drafts the innovation plans, most often they include new innovation plans rather than prioritise existing pilot projects that need further scaling up. The reason is political: Successful pilot projects that were deliberately dropped out might have brought transformational change that could have antagonised the local support base of the ruling party. Therefore, considering the political cost of scaling up that project, such decisions are made.
Fifth, in a few instances, there has been evidence that the Cabinet Division and a2i did not succinctly explain the successful pilot projects in documentation reports before they were launched for replication and scaling up. This resulted in improper comprehension of the context of the successful pilot project by the bureaucrats, which ultimately caused the partial implementation of those projects elsewhere.
Sixth, a limited collaboration of a2i with the Governance Innovation Unit (GIU) has also been responsible for the limited scaling up of successful pilot projects. It is not really known why these two units based in the PMO have not collaborated despite having a similar mandate of simplifying public service delivery mechanisms through innovations.
Implications
This study is valuable in understanding how Bangladesh has been able to change the mindset of its bureaucrats by injecting empathy through a home-grown empathy-led innovation model. The novelty of this article lies in the fact that it has identified some of the constraining factors that have led to innovation discontinuity, both at the regional and national levels, rather than only touching upon the shiny side of this novel public sector capacity-building model. The pertinent areas of intervention that this study has pinpointed to be food for thought for Bangladeshi policymakers involved in this relevant sector. In addition, the public sector in some South Asian developing countries, such as the Maldives and Bhutan, which are replicating the Bangladeshi version of the ETP model as part of South-South cooperation (Chowdhury & Beresford, 2017; Hussain, 2017), may draw lessons from this study to further hone their local version of the empathy-induced innovation model.
Limitations and Scope for Future Research
Despite the fact that this study has adequately been able to find answers to the research questions posed, there are certain limitations that need to be taken into account. We have adopted the principles of cross-sectional research in contrast to a longitudinal one. Nonetheless, in the future, researchers need to carry out longitudinal studies on this topic, which might help generate new findings, such as additional factors that have led to discontinued innovation, which this study might not have fully explored.
Again, for understanding the impact of empathy-led innovations on service delivery mechanisms, this study relied on the narratives of various secondary sources, including the TCV reports of a2i. While the TCV reports are prepared through surveying the perception of the service recipients, these are mostly sponsored and prepared by a2i. This means that the claims that are made in those reports might not be entirely valid and reliable. This is another potential area for research to explore in the future, such as knowing how the service recipients perceive these recent innovations in BCS, to what extent has it eased the process of using public services and how they perceive the BCS as a whole.
Since our study mainly focused on the five-day ETP that is organised by a2i for public bureaucrats, it has superficially touched upon the shorter versions of ETP that are organised by a2i, ministries and other government agencies. Part of the reason was that limited insights were obtained from the respondents about it. The dearth of literature about the different versions of ETP has not helped either. This is yet another unexplored area that relevant researchers might feel interested in investigate in the future to know the impact and the possible returns of these trainings.
Researchers could also take it upon themselves to conduct comparative studies by taking two specific cases, a pilot project that has been able to scale up nationally with a high degree of success, and another successful pilot that was not able to scale up at the regional or national level. This might generate some critical insights that this study has not been able to produce, given that a different methodological approach has been adopted.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to understand, explore and analyse how Bangladesh’s public administration has made progress in fostering PSI by instilling empathy among public bureaucrats through the ETP. By delving into the literature and getting insights from a range of respondents, this study has found that ETP has, in reality, been able to create a positive mindset among bureaucrats in Bangladesh, who have now become relatively more empathetic, citizen-friendly and are looking for ways to simplify the public service delivery process through innovative initiatives. The number of successful innovative pilot projects that these bureaucrats have implemented in the past few years testifies to the fact that ETP has been able to create a wave of change in BCS. Perhaps the greatest achievement of this training has been that bureaucrats are carrying and effectively practising this learning of empathy-led innovation in their work. Thus, it implies that the ETP has not only been able to generate a cultural change in BCS but also has created a sense of responsiveness and self-accountability among these bureaucrats.
Interestingly, though, the existing literature does not discuss the issue of discontinued innovation and the factors that have resulted in limited scaling up of the successful pilot projects. However, this study, through getting insights from the respondents, has adequately filled that void by addressing those constraining factors both in the phases of piloting (see Figure 1) and scaling up (see Figure 2). Therefore, in order to make this intrepid approach more effective, certain initiatives have to be taken by the organisers. Reflecting on the earlier discussions, this study proposes some key recommendations for improving the outcome of ETP:
First, a2i should restart organising all versions of ETP the way it used to do it till 2018 before its shift from the PMO to the ICT Division considering its potential returns. Alongside that, ministries should continue organising shorter versions of ETP in parallel to a2i, as that would bring more government officials and supporting staff under the coverage of this training programme.
Second, both the Cabinet Division and Ministry of Public Administration (MoPA) have to follow-up and monitor the progress of the pilot projects. In doing so, it is pertinent that the administrative reform wing of the Cabinet Division is strengthened, as it appears to be rather under capacitated.
Third, the composition of existing i-teams needs urgent reformation and should include more specialised and technical government officials in comparison to generalists.
Fourth, the existing extrinsic-award-centric approach for motivating bureaucrats to innovate needs to be revisited as it has not been proven to be very effective in the long run. Rather, the missing link that is prevailing between ACR, APA and career planning must be fixed.
Fifth, considering the fact that the support from the senior political leadership (i.e., ministers) is crucial for scaling up the pilot projects, a2i and the Cabinet Division needs to organise short workshops targeting these ministers to make them amenable to the concept of empathy and the value of empathy-led innovation.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
