Abstract
The authors review the use of denial through a complex and unstable crisis: the Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico. Denial is typically viewed as a binary response—”we did not do this”—with a binary intended outcome—”and therefore we are not to blame.” The authors argue that this interpretation is overly simplistic. They found that Transocean and Halliburton executed a strategy consisting of distancing and (counter)attack to shift blame, whereas BP pursued a strategy dominated by compassion and ingratiation intermixed with carefully used denial to share blame. This form of blame sharing is a hybrid of denial and acceptance. BP accepted responsibility but argued that others were responsible too. The authors’ analysis also shows that deny response options were restricted or relaxed dependent on situational and intertextual context. They find that the tone of the involved parties’ releases became significantly more aggressive as the situation developed toward its legal conclusion and as they responded to one another’s progressively more hostile releases.
We examine the use of denial as a crisis response strategy (CRS) in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon (DH) crisis. Denial has many noted benefits for individuals. It can be a form of self-defense (e.g., Levine and Zigler, 1975), impression management (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Von Hippel et al., 2005), and sometimes a bridge to self-deception (e.g., Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1988; Lazarus, 1998). At an organizational level, the primary objective of denial is to avert or minimize litigation costs. This alone, however, oversimplifies the strategy. This option provides the opportunity for organizations to restore their images (Benoit, 1997), to take the offensive and move from accused to accuser (Hearit, 1996; Meisenbach, 2010), to capture the moral high ground and help ward off stigmatization (Mills, 2007), to avert negative valuations (Zuckerman, 1979), and to repair stakeholder goodwill and rebuild employee morale. While “simple denial” is an outright rejection of responsibility with the aim of absolving the actor of both association and guilt, organizations are known to also use more sophisticated forms of deny response, such as scapegoating. These secondary options are also considered to be a means of blame shifting (e.g., Benoit, 1997).
We use situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) as a theoretical lens through which we examine the responses of key parties to this complex crisis. Advocates of SCCT argue that an entity should respond to a crisis dependent on the perceived level of organizational responsibility and associated threat to reputational assets (Coombs, 1995, 2006). When a crisis is deemed accidental, the SCCT framework suggests an entity should deny responsibility. Marcus and Goodman (1991) found a spike in effective—value-protecting—deny responses, especially in the immediate aftermath of an accident. SCCT also urges that once a strategy has been selected, the options (deny, deal, and diminish) should not be mixed, as this would “erode the effectiveness of the overall response” (Coombs, 2006, 2007, p. 173).
Sometimes, however, organizations have response options thrust on them. Management may wish to follow a certain path but is prevented from doing so by an external act, event, or influence. This is described as communicative avoidance-avoidance conflict (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990). An example might be when management wants to apologize to victims but cannot because an apology is tantamount to a full admission of guilt, and management’s shareholder resource stewardship responsibilities prevent this (Tyler, 1997). A combination of factors ensured that BP’s response strategy would be restricted following the DH tragedy. These included certain questionable judgments and actions prior to the explosion on April 20, 2010, the acute criticism of decisions taken to control the leak and conduct the subsequent cleanup operation, and the surge of negative political, public, and media speculation and interest. If BP’s management had not decided whether to pursue a strategy based on simple denial before President Obama’s speech on May 2, 2010, they would be left in no doubt that this was not an option afterward. “Make no mistake,” the president declared,
we will fight this spill with everything we’ve got for as long it takes. We will make BP pay for the damage their company has caused. And we will do whatever’s necessary to help the Gulf Coast and its people recover from this tragedy.
Thus, it is fair to say that BP started from the unenviable position of being forced to publicly concede organizational responsibility (Muralidharan, Dillistone, & Shin, 2011) for an apparently preventable tragedy. From that moment forward, achieving absolution from guilt would be impossible. Within the organization, however, there would have been a strong social, political, and economic desire to share some of the blame. It was in BP’s best interests to make certain that the names of the other potentially responsible parties were never far from the public (and legal) eye. Equally, those secondary actors must have been aware that any association with the tragedy could be extremely damaging.
There are occasions, such as this, when denial is not an option because the organizational responsibility appears to be self-evident. Coombs (2007) noted that denial is effective only when the stakeholders are convinced, otherwise the effects will be counterproductive. Equally, as Tyler (1997) stated in her study of the much criticized Exxon-Valdez oil-spill crisis response, apology might also not be an option because the cost of a full admission of guilt is too great. Therefore, companies are forced into insincere equivocation. Tyler (1997) proposed, with respect to Exxon’s response, that “it is, of course, entirely possible that no apology . . . would have sufficed, that some acts are so offensive to those offended that no account could be effective, no matter how convincingly it was performed” (p. 55).
Equivocation is a common factor in organizational crisis response (Tyler, 1997). An “outright apology” is as rare as an “outright denial.” Whereas simple denial seeks to shift the blame entirely, an outright apology brings with it the full burden of guilt (e.g., Tavuchis, 1991; Tyler, 1997; Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986). When selecting a response strategy, management must consider questions of morality, but they will also factor in financial implications. All corporate communication will be subject to intense scrutiny during legal proceedings following a crisis (Cooper, 1992), and a simple denial that turns out to lack integrity or validity could do as much harm (maybe more) as an admission of guilt.
There are those who have argued that honesty, openness, and candor are paramount to a crisis response and that the impact of poor, inappropriate, or incomplete corporate communication contributes to negative perceptions and value destruction (e.g., Seeger, 2006). Denial is a strategy that is often believed to conflict with these virtues. This is because, unlike apologies, there have been many occasions when individuals or organizations have denied charges that have subsequently turned out to be true allegations. Despite being a common and credible CRS, many communication theorists have been quick to point out its flaws. Benoit (1995b), for example, noted the potential costs to legitimacy. Sellnow, Ulmer, and Snider (1998) highlighted denial’s divisiveness. With the exception of a small number of studies (e.g., Dionisopolous & Vibbert, 1988; Hearit, 1996; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Tyler, 1997), the literature lacks a detailed investigation of this CRS and a detailed study of a long-run crisis response. This article addresses this gap.
We studied press releases from the primary actor, BP; the two secondary actors, Transocean and Halliburton; and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) spanning more than 2 years. Press releases have been shown to contribute incremental information (Choi, 2012; Choi & Park, 2011), and they have a broad reach and appeal (e.g., Maat, 2007). Their main benefit to the issuer is that they are regularly picked up, often copied or paraphrased, by the mainstream media (e.g., Jacobs, 1999; Maat, 2007). On this point, Turk (1986) showed that more press releases are used than are rejected. While it is possible for organizations to sway public opinion through their press releases, it is equally possible for external stakeholders to exert pressure on organizations through the same mechanism (Dunfee, 2008). Therefore, we build into our analysis the interplay of responses.
This article continues as follows. In the next section, we provide a background to the crisis. We then discuss the prior literature and establish the research questions. Next, we introduce the research methods, present and discuss the findings, and, finally, provide conclusions and recommendations for future research.
Background
The DH crisis was the explosion aboard a BP-leased Transocean rig on the evening of April 20, 2010, and the oil spill that followed. Eleven workers lost their lives and 16 were injured in the original tragedy. The subsequent oil spill has officially been classified as the biggest in history, resulting in approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil being leaked before the well was capped in August 2010 and then deemed “effectively dead” on September 19 by the overseeing senior U.S. federal official, Coast Guard admiral Thad Allen.
Not only was the level of organizational responsibility high, but the threat to BP’s reputational assets was also severe. The potential costs were acknowledged to be even greater than the sum of the observable elements, which were estimated at $41 billion. Bob Dudley, BP’s CEO, explained in his annual statement that the crisis carried “deep consequences for jobs, businesses, communities, the environment and our industry.” He continued, there is a resultant “threat [to] the very existence of the company” (BP, 2010). This, however, did not prevent BP from filing clean audit reports for 2010 and 2011, although the unpredictability of the potential outcome was noted by the auditor.
The level of attribution and the apportionment of blame were critical in every respect for BP and its stakeholders. Investors’ concerns were reflected by the fall in the share price. Shares peaked at 645 pence on April 20, 2010, lost almost 16% over the next few days (543.28 pence on May 4, 2010), and continued to fall to 302.90 pence by June 29, 2010. On August 2, 2012, the price was still languishing at 430 pence.
Other parties were also involved to a greater or lesser degree. Anadarko, for example, held a 25% stake in the Macondo well. MOEX owned a 10% stake through a subsidiary, Matsui & Company. Another firm, Cameron International, manufactured the blowout preventer that was deemed responsible for the failure. All these parties settled with BP before court action was necessary, and on each occasion, BP singled out Halliburton and Transocean, urging them to meet their portion of the financial responsibility. BP repeated the same statement six times during the period under review: “The Deepwater Horizon accident was the result of multiple causes, involving multiple parties, including Transocean and Halliburton.” Analysts understood that these two entities, Transocean and Halliburton, were different from the others because they had contracts in place with BP that made them more susceptible to financial obligations (WSJ, December, 17, 2011). BP leased the rig from its owner Transocean, and many of the workers aboard (79 of 126) were Transocean employees. Halliburton was also the contractor responsible for managing and undertaking work.
Literature Analysis and Research Questions
Crisis Communication and SCCT: A Brief Introduction
There are several reasons why crisis response is an area worthy of separate attention. Crises create a public thirst for information and a pressure on media outlets to satisfy it. Crisis coverage has become progressively more sensationalist, partly because of information availability but also because of the economic pressure brought about by increased competition (Coleman, 1993; Hickey, 1998; Shenk, 1997). The public is increasingly aware of, and interested in, crisis events regardless of their origin, nature, or scope. This is due to higher levels of physical and financial mobility, greater global connectivity, and a more diversified level of personal investment and involvement with global operations (Perrow, 1999). Therefore, the threat to an organization’s reputational assets when found guilty of involvement (or even becoming implicated) with a crisis has also intensified.
During a crisis, the media’s communication approaches, forms, and strategies fundamentally differ from those that are adopted on an average news day (e.g., Li & Izard, 2003). Often this will involve delivering greater volume, swifter immediacy, and increased (or increasingly) graphic portrayals of events, especially of those moments of crisis or catastrophe (McNaughton-Cassill, Novian, Holmes, & Smith, 2009). In turn, the response to crises from the (perceived) responsible organizations correspondingly adjust (e.g., Benoit, 1995a; Coombs, 1999a, 1999b; Venette, Sellnow, & Lang, 2003).
Crises elicit emotions from stakeholders and create an attribution effect (e.g., Weiner, 1985, 2006). Denial is a useful strategy to avert and undo attribution because responses are more positive toward a party that has been absolved of blame (Weiner, 2006). In the first draft of SCCT (Coombs, 1995), crises were classified into “types” according to attribution theory parameters. Four broad categories were created on the basis of the two variables of intentionality versus controllability (Coombs, 1995, pp. 455-457). These classifications were supplemented by three additional context-specific variables: veracity of the evidence, damage, and performance history. The objective of this exercise is to assess an organization’s level of perceived responsibility for a crisis, gauge the corresponding threat to its reputational assets, and identify the CRS that will be most effective in that scenario. SCCT provides a “framework for understanding how to maximise reputational protection for post crisis communication” (Coombs, 2007, p. 163).
Although SCCT has moved on, the flowcharts from Coombs’s (1995) original work are still helpful, as they facilitate a clear matching process between each form of crisis and an appropriate CRS. The accident decision flowchart (p. 465) suggests that the accused should use a combination of mortification and ingratiation strategies, assuming that the evidence is “true,” the damage “major,” and the performance history “positive.” 1 Importantly, however, the flowchart also states that if the evidence was “false” and the performance history “positive,” then nonexistence or denial strategies would be most appropriate.
Predictions from the SCCT response framework have been shown to hold for short-run crises, but for long-run crises such as this, there is a complex web of intertextual and situational context that is likely to influence the discourse. When parties stand accused, or accuse one another, they are expected to respond. SCCT recommends rebuttal if the evidence is false or refutable. This would facilitate their distancing and reduce perceived organizational responsibility and thus the potential for reputational damage. Otherwise, they would need to use the same mortification and ingratiation strategies as if they were responsible. If the accusations are of a transgression, as opposed to an accident, then the accused should again seek to challenge the veracity of the evidence and use denial. Otherwise, the transgression flowchart suggests a combination of mortification and ingratiation.
During their study of the effects of apology versus denial, Kim et al. (2004) established a similar framework. They initially classified events into two categories: those for which the outcome is known (i.e., innocence or guilt) and those for which it is not. They then subdivided events in those categories between violation type: those for which the initial incidents are competence-related and those that are integrity related. By examining participants’ reactions, they established that some situations were best managed with denial. Two conclusions from that study are relevant to this study: First, denial was shown to be a more successful strategy when the outcome was not known, and the initial incident was an integrity violation; second, apology was always a better strategy when there was evidence of guilt, but when there was evidence of innocence, it would be better to deny.
The SCCT framework has remained fairly constant over time. With minor exceptions, the SCCT model has been shown to hold (e.g., Cooley & Cooley, 2011; Fussell Sisco, Collins, & Zoch, 2009). One recent major revision reconsidered the crisis types into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable (Coombs, 2006, 2007). Where the entity is perceived to be a victim of the crisis and the attribution is seen as weak, there is thought to be a mild reputational threat; when the crisis is an accident and the attribution is minimal, there is a moderate reputational threat; and when the crisis is deemed preventable and the attribution is strong, there is a severe reputational threat (Coombs, 2007).
This refined version of SCCT consolidates the notion that there is a link between reputational threat, organizational responsibility, and crisis response. The higher the potential crisis responsibility, the greater the negative impact on the reputational assets of the organization (Coombs, 2007). Deny strategies should be used when there is a low level of attribution (i.e., when the organization can be seen as another victim). Diminish strategies should be used when the attribution is minimal (i.e., when the company did not have crisis intentions). Deal response options should be used when the attribution is strong and the crisis was thought to be preventable. In this instance, the threat to reputation is severe (see Table 1).
Situational Crisis Communication Theory.
Source: Coombs (2006, pp. 244, 248).
Denial
Prior work suggests that denial is a strategy designed to minimize or eliminate litigation risk (e.g., Benoit, 1995b; Sellnow et al., 1998). This interpretation, however, masks the subtlety of the response. Denial can be aggressive or defensive, simple or complex, and carry a host of intended and unintended consequences. As organizational crisis response theory largely emerged from studies of individuals, we shall start there.
Individuals have been known to use denial as a form of self-defense (e.g., Levine & Zigler, 1975) and, occasionally, self-deception (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Lazarus, 1998). Levine and Zigler (1975) studied patients suffering life-threatening illnesses and noted that “the use of denial to defend oneself against facing the full meaning of impending death, impaired functioning, and disability is a universal phenomenon that has been noted clinically in response to every form of disability and disease” (p. 751). Baumeister et al. (1998) found that individuals are more likely to deny that they face the average level of life risk. In other words, people prefer to believe that they are less likely than others to suffer misfortunes. This tendency toward unrealistic optimism can lead to increased levels of risk-taking (Burger & Burns, 1988).
Denial is also a mechanism for impression management (e.g., Edwards, 1970; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Some argue that individuals deny to ward off the stigmatization associated with perceptions of failure (e.g., Mills, 2007) and to avert negative valuations (Zuckerman, 1979). When an individual uses denial to manage external perceptions, research shows that he or she should respond quickly. It is widely believed that the timeliness of a deny response is equally important for companies as for individuals (e.g., Williams & Treadaway, 1992; Fearn-Banks, 2011). During the opening moments of a crisis, denial has the greatest positive impact (Marcus & Goodman, 1991).
Organizations will typically deny in order to reduce litigation risk and minimize the associated financial and reputational damage. This does not, however, tell the full story. There are advantages that denial holds over other strategies, including the ability to take the offensive, to allow the accused to become the accuser, and to take the moral high ground and thus to prevent future stigmatization (e.g., Hearit, 1996; Meisenbach, 2010). It has been argued that denial is a reformative strategy (Hobbs, 1995) that seeks to eliminate the connection between the entity and the crisis (Coombs, 2012). Hearit (1996), for example, argued that counterattack was a way of “inverting the direction of the communication and assuming the morally superior role of the accuser” (p. 234). Denial is an impression management method (Allen & Caillouet, 1994). It is a distancing strategy, traditionally asserted to be a means to shift blame.
The literature alerts us to several forms of denial. The first, “simple denial,” is considered to be an outright refutation (Benoit, 1997). Benoit (1997) also discussed “shifting the blame” (or “scapegoating”) as a deny response option. In addition, there are several (counter)attacking deny response options. An entity might accuse or subsequently accuse an accuser with a view to eliminating or reducing its perceived responsibility. Coombs (1999, 2012) recategorized this form of denial as kategoria-based apologia. Further examples are discrediting the discreditors (Meisenbach, 2010) and condemning the condemners (Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark, & Fugate, 2007). Allen and Caillouet (1994, p. 70) suggested that excuses and justification were post-crisis denial impression management strategies, but these have since been reclassified as diminishment strategies (Coombs, 2006). Table 2 summarizes the current categorization of CRS options, and Table 3 briefly outlines the characteristics of each deny response option.
Crisis Response Strategies by Response Option.
Deny Response Options and Their Characteristics.
It is likely that parallels will be drawn between Exxon’s response to the Valdez oil spill and BP’s to the DH tragedy. In many ways, they are comparable, while in some they are not. Regardless of the appropriateness of this comparison, we do note that Exxon’s response has been roundly criticized (e.g., Lukaszewski, 1989). The apparent lack of sincerity in its apology and its attempts to shift blame are often highlighted as an example of what not to do. Exxon’s apology showed equivocation and strategic ambiguity—presumably to defend against the costs that would follow—and this has been translated by many as a show of corporate arrogance, a reluctance to accept responsibility, and a rejection of the need to change. Williams and Treadaway (1992) claimed that Exxon’s communications failures stemmed from its ineffective use of burden sharing and scapegoating. They also pointed to a slow initial response as a failure. We reserve judgment, however, instead siding with Tyler (1997), who pointed out that Exxon’s response might have been unfairly highlighted for criticism. It is probable that Exxon felt the same legal and economic constraints as BP, which in turn stifled a full admission of guilt.
In summary, we arrive at two research questions:
Research Question 1: Was denial used as a CRS by all three involved parties following the DH tragedy? And if so, to what extent?
Research Question 2: Was there an interplay of denial between the actors? And if so, were the responses consistent between organizations and over time?
Method
During the first phase of the analysis, we manually collected, identified, classified, and coded the responses contained within the press releases from each of the three central actors—BP, Transocean, and Halliburton—between CRSs. Second, we categorized the denial responses thematically by type. The press releases were extracted from each company’s Web site. To allow us to understand the interplay among these parties more fully, we investigated whether the denial responses were an exchange occurring among, and because of, one another or a response to an external event or source. Therefore, to achieve a more balanced perspective, we also reviewed every WSJ news release containing the words Deepwater Horizon dating from the time of the original explosion. These were located using Factiva.
In line with prior research of this type, we assumed that the WSJ was an appropriate proxy for the media as a whole (e.g., Bromiley & Marcus, 1989; Jarrel & Peltzman, 1985). Between the evening of April 20, 2010 (the time of the explosion), and June 1, 2012, we identified and analyzed 763 press releases as follows: 142 from BP, 15 from Transocean, 7 from Halliburton, and 599 from the WSJ. In total, this amounted to just under 530,000 words, a little over 23,000 sentences, and approximately 8,500 paragraphs.
Although the population appears to be weighted toward WSJ releases, it is worth noting that these releases informed both intertextual and situational context. Our coding of these WSJ reports captured only “new” items. We were aware of prior research (e.g., Jacobs, 1999; Maat, 2007) which has found that press releases are regularly adopted by news outlets. Although we found limited evidence of this practice, we were still conscious of the possibility. The majority of the WSJ releases were influenced by external events (e.g., published investigation reports, court proceedings) and a minority by corporate press releases. There were a handful of occasions when the WSJ plagiarized, but when it did, it tended to reproduce facts and figures.
Manual coding makes it possible to safeguard against double counting (e.g., a BP press release denial paraphrased [or copied and pasted] into a WSJ article and coded twice). Following the completion of the initial coding exercise, we checked every item to ensure that there was no duplication. In the rare instances when the denial appeared either verbatim or paraphrased in the WSJ, we coded the deny response to the corporate press release rather than the WSJ. Rather than plagiarizing every press release, we found that instead the WSJ was selective about what it chose to pursue. We also found that it imposed its own perspective on the event to create a story. In total, there were 33 separately identifiable WSJ releases containing unique deny responses. An overview of the media interplay is provided in Table 4.
Wall Street Journal Releases Containing Deny Response Options and the Interplay With Other Parties.
We coded deny responses thematically. Even though sentences are thought to be a superior unit of measurement (because of their inherent identifiability and objectivity [Ingram & Frazier, 1980], they are a natural unit of written English [Hackston & Milne, 1996], and are thus easier to code [Linsley & Shrives, 2006]), prior work has shown that whichever unit of measurement is used, the results are more or less consistent (Hackston & Milne, 1996). We found that most instances of denial were complex and consisted of a statement that was supported by enhancing information. If we were to code each sentence, we would lose essential detail that would prevent us from being able to interpret and analyze the text appropriately.
A pre-coding reading of the press releases appeared to reveal a shift in the tone of the releases over time. Therefore, we revisited this issue once we had completed the initial coding exercise. We categorized each deny response according to a 7-point scale ranging from passive (1), through neutral (4), to aggressive (7). This is a subjective decision-making exercise, and therefore we conferred as appropriate. To undertake this coding process effectively, press releases cannot be reviewed either in isolation or without due consideration of their intertextual and situational context. As a general rule, however, we identified examples of passive verbs, such as offer, learn, and assist, and aggressive verbs, for example, fail and ignore. Passive adjectives included expressions involving parties being “close” (as in “being near in a relationship”), while aggressive adjectives include accusations of representations being “inaccurate.”
According to Smith and Taffler (2000), content analysis research can be categorized into two generic forms: “form oriented” and “meaning oriented” (p. 627). The former relates to measuring the quantity of words, while the latter focuses on the underlying themes in the observed texts. The latter involves more subjectivity but provides a greater depth of understanding. We sought to measure quantity in the first instance and then interpret in the second. Therefore, this study mixes these two forms. Prior work has considered the problems with content analysis as a research method (Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Krippendorff, 2004; Unerman, 2000; Weber,; Milne & Adler, 1999). One common way to mitigate some of the inconsistency and irreproducibility problems is to have a sole coder complete the entire task. This path was chosen. We also had a second coder undertake the exercise, and results of intercoder reliability tests show that κ coefficients were in excess of 0.85 (with a range of 0.75 to 0.97). Thus, the findings were deemed robust. Any discrepancies and disagreements were discussed and amended where appropriate.
Unlike Transocean and Halliburton’s press releases, it was clear that denial did not dominate BP’s response, although it was present. For completeness and precision, we undertook a final phase of detailed analysis. We revisited the press releases and this time coded paragraphs to their applicable CRS (whereas originally we had coded by theme). In total, BP released 704 paragraphs related to the crisis between April 20, 2010, and June 1, 2012. Again, to address any potential problems with reliability, the coding process was also undertaken by a second person. The κ coefficient for intercoder reliability was 0.85. Thus, the sensitivity analysis indicates that the results of the coding exercise are robust.
Results
General Comments
Transocean’s and Halliburton’s responses were dominated by denial. They shared two similarities: First, when challenged, they provided clarificatory counterinformation to deny the veracity of any evidence laid against them, and second, they used attack or counterattack. BP’s releases were dominated by deal (91.8%), with some denial (7.5% [41 items]), while diminishment was rarely evident (0.7%) (Table 5).
BP’s Crisis Response (Paragraphs).
In total, there were 86 separately identifiable denial themes in the press releases of the three entities (see Table 6). Responses were clustered around key events. The initial phase covered the first 10 days after the explosion, when there were 11 combined instances of denial, predominantly scapegoating by BP and (counter)attack from Transocean. The second phase related to the oil spill and attempts to stop the leak (39 deny responses). There was then a period of silence, punctuated by the occasional attack and riposte. Finally there was a third phase that commenced exactly 1 year after the explosion, triggered by the approaching legal proceedings and their financial implications. In the 2 months between October 17 and December 17, 2011, there were 18 instances of deny responses mostly consisting of attacking and accusing the accusers (n = 12).
Summary of Deny Response Options Used, Analyzed by Company (Thematic Analysis).
As prior research predicted, each denial was prompt and was followed swiftly with a riposte when appropriate (e.g., Fearn-Banks, 2011; Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Williams & Treadaway, 1992). We found that BP initially adopted a passive scapegoating strategy, which later became aggressive, while Transocean and Halliburton started on the front foot and finished even stronger. We explore this further below.
BP’s Response and Its Provocation of Interplay
Despite prior theoretical and empirical literature suggesting their likely absence, there were 4 instances of simple denial, while the remainder of the 41 deny responses were fairly evenly balanced between scapegoating (n = 17) and attack (n = 20). Finding evidence of simple denial was surprising given the context. On closer examination, however, we found that these were all made in response to media reports. This fits with Kim et al.’s (2004) denial matrix framework predictions. BP denied outright those challenges to its integrity when there was no evidence of wrongdoing (3 of the 4 instances) and challenges to its competence when irrefutable evidence existed to the contrary (1 instance).
The remainder of BP’s denial responses can be ordered chronologically into two phases: Initially, BP used defensive strategies, predominately, scapegoating, while later, BP went on the offensive with attack and counterattack. The case against BP seemed indisputable (Muralidharan et al., 2011), and therefore simple denial was not an option. Ingratiation and compassion, however, were intermixed with scapegoating. This scapegoating strategy was not intended to shift the blame, but it did allow BP to introduce new information that challenged other parties’ integrity and competence. Implicating others allows a wider distribution of organizational responsibility and reduces the threat to the reputational assets of a stand-alone guilty party.
This strategy can be seen as a hybrid of denial and crisis acceptance. The hybrid nature exists because BP’s management was neither denying responsibility nor accepting it fully. Instead, the response sought to serve two functions: to act as a form of distancing and to implicate other organizations in order to share the blame. In other words, the message can be translated as “We are not the only ones to blame, so please refrain from holding us so strongly to account.” This study is the first to present evidence of this hybrid strategy, but it is unlikely that its use is unique. Even if BP was the first, it is probable that we will see more companies taking responsibility (and benefitting from the associated long-term reputational and financial gains) for a crisis alongside sharing the blame (to attempt to minimize short-term reputational and financial losses) with suppliers, directly or indirectly, who contributed to the crisis.
How did BP exact its scapegoating blame-sharing strategy? While the mainstream media reported on the preventable tragedy that was the “BP oil spill,” BP’s management was reporting on the “Transocean Deepwater Horizon drilling rig” 2 “accident.” On six separate occasions, the company’s press releases repeated the same phrase: “The Deepwater Horizon accident was the result of multiple causes, involving multiple parties, including Transocean and Halliburton.” BP systematically used Transocean’s status as the rig’s owner to bring its name into the frame (e.g., April 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 2010) while referring to itself as a “lease operator.” The early press releases declared that BP was “working closely with Transocean,” “offer[ing] full support to drilling contractor Transocean Ltd. and its employees after fire caused Transocean’s semisubmersible drilling rig Deepwater Horizon to be evacuated overnight,” and “assisting Transocean” employees in the aftermath, investigation, and cleanup.
One of the striking features of BP’s response strategy was the shift from this passive scapegoating approach to an aggressive, attacking one. The response of the secondary parties was to adjust the tone of their releases accordingly. Transocean also opened its account with reference to its “support” role, but Transocean was far more forceful in asserting that it was not to blame. Instead, it placed itself as victim and burden bearer (April 22, 23, and 26, 2010). In fact, neither Halliburton nor Transocean at any stage acknowledged any guilt.
The combined number of instances of scapegoating during the first 3 months following the incident was 16, 14 of which were on BP’s part, and 10 occurred before April 30, 2010 (i.e., within 10 days of the explosion). This is in contrast to the period from October to December 2011, in the buildup to the anticipated court date, when there were 12 instances of outright attack (and only 2 instances of scapegoating).
We appreciate that language makes it possible for there to be “aggressive scapegoating” as much as “passive attack,” and therefore relying on counting the use of response types is not sufficient. Instead, we analyzed the press releases of the three parties over the duration of the crisis response using a 7-point scale ranging from passive (1), through neutral (4), to aggressive (7). The findings show the same pattern. Responses became significantly more aggressive over time (Figure 1). BP’s response began passively but moved toward out-and-out aggression. The other parties’ press releases began more aggressively than BP’s and intensified in tone over time to match those of the primary protagonist.
Response strategy.
The media translated Transocean’s responses as a reaction against BP’s (over)aggression. On December 9, 2011, the WSJ reported one senior analyst’s view that “the [Obama] administration wants the parties to settle, and probably sees BP’s more aggressive stance [against the other parties] as less conducive to settlement.” Around that time, there were additional citations levied against BP, and the analyst thought this was the administration “sending a reminder to BP to get back in its box.”
Exactly 1 year after the initial explosion, BP filed lawsuits against the other actors. 3 This marked the beginning of communications hostilities that would be exacerbated over the coming days and months by accusations, rebuttals, and counteraccusations. Other key events also intensified the situation and stimulated attacks: Transocean and Halliburton filed for early summary judgments, Transocean and Halliburton were subsequently granted partial indemnification, and the final court dates for settlements approached. The subtle and defensive blame-sharing strategies that were evident in the immediate aftermath of the explosion gave way to blame shifting as a set of new aggressive messages emerged.
On the day Transocean filed for indemnification (November 1, 2011), Nick Deeming, senior vice president and general counsel of Transocean, stated,
BP’s posture in this matter is not only offensive to the thousands of men and women who work together at Transocean, but it constitutes a direct threat to the sanctity of contracts and to the economic underpinnings of an industry that employs hundreds of thousands of people in the United States alone.
On November 2, 2011, BP announced, “Letting Transocean off the hook for cleanup costs would be inconsistent with the law and sound public policy.” A BP spokesman added, “To enforce the indemnification would be to allow Transocean to escape the consequences of their actions and avoid meeting its obligations in the Gulf.” After Cameron came to a settlement on December 16, 2011 BP’s press release stated, “Unfortunately, other companies persist in refusing to accept responsibility for their roles in the accident.”
Halliburton was not spared from BP’s changed strategy. BP’s releases sought to cast doubt on Halliburton’s integrity and competence, citing potential fraud and negligence. On January 31, 2012, for example, BP announced, “All official investigations have concluded that Halliburton played a causal role in the accident. . . . Moreover, the court determined that if Halliburton is found to have committed fraud, then [its] indemnity could be void.” Halliburton responded thus: “BP is attempting to divert attention from its poor decisions and practices by criticizing the work and reputation of Halliburton.”
Our findings suggest that there might be a weakness in the current deny response option categorization system. The observable shift in tone and type of denial response gives rise to two questions: (a) Is the SCCT framework flexible enough to provide a single strategy to cope with long-run complex crises? and (b) Would it be more appropriate to subcategorize denial responses between blame sharing and blame shifting rather than the existing categorization of naive and sophisticated?
Transocean’s and Halliburton’s Denial Response
BP’s releases were dominated by a mixture of compassion (71.4%) and ingratiation (16.2%) (deal). BP was offered up to the public as a scapegoat, and for the most part, journalists seemed content to accept this situation. There remained throughout, however, a level of balance to the media’s coverage. The WSJ reported issues, concerns, and grievances against all parties, not just BP, which arose from completed and ongoing investigations, court cases, speeches, and other events, including one another’s press releases. Transocean and Halliburton were singled out as the main secondary actors because of their contractual position. Transocean released a number of compassionate messages during the early stages, but the overarching strategy dominating both Halliburton and its press releases was denial, especially simple denial (15 thematic recurrences from Transocean, 7 from Halliburton) and (counter)attack (13 from Transocean, 6 from Halliburton).
Transocean’s and Halliburton’s deny responses appear to share two common objectives: first, to identify and expose evidence that ran contrary to any accusations made against them and, second, to characterize their companies and employees as victims. Their mutual objectives during this response interplay appear to have been to distance themselves and to ensure that none of the organizational responsibility heaped upon BP was transferred to them. Interestingly, we found no evidence of either of the secondary actors accusing each other.
Advocates of SCCT would have predicted these organizations’ responses. Denial is a distancing strategy (Benoit, 1995a, 1997; Coombs, 2006), intended to minimize litigation risk (Tyler, 1997), and can be used when the perceived organizational responsibility is low because the evidence presented is either false or refutable. Denial pushes the burden of proof from accused to accuser (Hearit, 1996). The relatively aggressive opening position and increasingly aggressive ripostes also tie in with the theoretical framework. By taking the offensive and casting themselves in the role of victim, the management teams sought to take the moral high ground, prevent stigmatization (e.g., Hearit, 1996; Meisenbach, 2010; Mills, 2007), and generate internal savings, for example, preservation of self-esteem (for the entity and its employees).
In addition, Kim et al. (2004) argued that denial is most effective under two conditions: first, when the accusations are challenges to integrity but the outcome is unknown and, second, when the challenges to either competence or integrity are false and the evidence is refutable. Indeed, Transocean’s and Halliburton’s responses conform to this framework. There was only one occasion when a chink was revealed in Halliburton’s armor. Halliburton was presented with evidence, which on that occasion was provided under oath, detailing fraudulent statements. This story was picked up by BP and the media. Nevertheless, the company continued to pursue its denial strategy and responded thus (February 1, 2012): “Halliburton deny the accusations of fraudulent behaviour made by BP” and, later, “[BP’s claims are] without merit . . . we look forward to contesting their motion in court.”
Transocean maintained a consistent communication strategy throughout. When competency-based concerns were raised, its response was timely and characterized by rebuttal and provision of counterevidence. An early investigation into the incident, for example, highlighted some of its potential failings. In reply (between May 22, 2010, and May 28, 2010), the company issued eight strong instances of denial, five of which were concentrated in one release. Transocean addressed each accusation made against it with a deny response and accompanied many with counterattacks. When challenged, the company provided incremental clarificatory information and supplementary technical explanations of events and processes.
On September 8, 2010, BP released its investigation report. Transocean and Halliburton held a conference call and released statements the following day, but it was Transocean’s response to the WSJ on that day that best summarizes their mutual position. The WSJ reported that these two companies rejected the findings of BP’s DH report. Transocean’s spokesperson said that the “UK company had all the final calls and should be held responsible for the billions of dollars in damage caused by the disaster, which killed 11.”
On June 22, 2011, a press release accompanied Transocean’s investigation report. This contained seven separate deny responses: two cases of simple denial (against accusations made by BP), four accusations, and one condemnation of the condemner. 4 On November 1, 2011, as the court hearing dates approached, Transocean filed a motion for a summary judgment and issued a press release that contained a combination of attack (n = 3), shifting the blame (n = 1), denial (n = 1), and condemning the condemner (n = 1).
The challenges made to Transocean were not only competence related, they were also integrity related. Court appearances made by Transocean employees led BP and the media to question Transocean’s safety and maintenance policies as well as the potential mismanagement of the rig. Transocean’s response was, again, denial. The WSJ reported on May 10, 2010, that there was a disagreement between management teams from BP and Transocean on board the DH rig in the moments leading up to the explosion. Transocean immediately denied and dismissed these accusations in a press release the following day. Two further accusations from former employees over safety concerns were reported in the WSJ during July 2010. Transocean simply denied both at their first opportunity. In the second of these reported cases, a former employee told the courts that the warning alarm was disabled to allow crew members to sleep through the night. Transocean replied promptly and strongly, saying, “Transocean denies Mr Williams claims, and witness testimonies at times have been contradictory.”
As Transocean’s crisis can be seen to be two parts—challenges to competence and integrity—so too was Halliburton’s. On the one hand, Halliburton was accused of making on-board technical errors, including incomplete cementing works and a failure to adequately interpret foam stability testing results. On the other hand, attention was also drawn to issues of managerial wrongdoing and making fraudulent statements. Both challenges were consistently met with the same response: prompt denial.
The major difference between Halliburton’s response strategy and that of the other two parties is its lack of willingness to initiate. We found that BP, and to a lesser extent Transocean, were proactive in their responses, whereas Halliburton was reactive. This is surprising given the arguments about denial and distancing. The reason might lie within Tyler’s (1997) question of whether there is an alternative to apology (and denial) that does not exacerbate legal complications. Maybe Halliburton’s silence, or a nonresponse, is the solution for a secondary party caught up in a complex multiparty scenario?
On May 11, 2010, in response to accusations from BP of failing to complete their work appropriately, Halliburton issued a press release that stated “the well owner’s representative . . . has the ultimate authority for decisions on how and when various activities are conducted.” When BP’s investigation report was released (September 8, 2010), Halliburton’s message was clear: The report was biased and did not represent an accurate or faithful rendering of events. Halliburton denied its validity and called the author’s integrity into question. They stated that there were “a number of substantial omissions and inaccuracies.” During its response to this report, Halliburton used simple denial seven separate times.
Later challenges to its competency were responded to similarly. On three occasions, Halliburton denied the authority and substance of evidence contained within news items (in the WSJ). A further three times, it denied accusations made against it by BP on the grounds of inaccuracy and incompleteness. Finally, Halliburton denied allegations and evidence contained within the National Commission report, claiming the writers “selectively omitted information provided to it by Halliburton” saying furthermore that it was a misrepresentation of the facts.
Conclusions
As the theoretical framework predicted, both Transocean’s and Halliburton’s press releases were dominated by denial, while BP’s consisted largely of deal. SCCT suggests that a successful denial strategy will cast doubt on the veracity of evidence in order to prevent false accusations from manifesting themselves. This is a distancing strategy, the objective of which is to minimize litigation risk and the threat to reputational assets by reducing perceived organizational responsibility. Transocean and Halliburton carefully used a strategy that sought to cast themselves in the role of victim to free themselves and their employees from not just financial burden but also guilt and stigmatization. We also found evidence to confirm Kim et al.’s (2004) predictions that denial would be best used when integrity was challenged and the outcome is unknown and when competence was falsely challenged and the evidence was false or refutable.
In the early phases of the crisis, BP’s crisis response options were restricted. The strength and depth of negative feeling against BP, alongside the apparent veracity of the printed, spoken, and photographic evidence, ensured that it was the perfect scapegoat. Nevertheless, alongside a strategy dominated by deal, BP also used deny responses whenever possible. The primary difference between the denial strategy BP used and that of the other parties was the use of scapegoating as a means to share blame rather than shift blame. This strategy is unique, and we would urge future researchers to investigate the use and impact of this hybrid response—denial plus acceptance—through other crises.
Crisis communication research has tended to view denial as a binary response with a binary intended outcome, the response being “we did not do this” and the intended outcome being “and therefore we are not to blame.” We argue that BP’s strategy was different. Its management team used scapegoating as a means to implicate others, to lessen its perceived level of organizational responsibility, and to influence a reduction in litigation risk and future costs. The message being put across appears to be “We were responsible, but others were too. Therefore, do not judge us so harshly.”
SCCT categorizes deny response options as naive or sophisticated. Our findings show that corporate communication shifts in tone and type dependent on the situational and intertextual context rather than according to a need for sophistication. These shifts appear to be deliberate. Therefore, we propose an extension to the SCCT framework. We suggest that future researchers consider denial, and its effectiveness, in terms of context and intention (i.e., blame shifting and blame sharing) rather than type (i.e., naive and sophisticated).
All three companies used their press releases to reveal new—often contrasting, contradictory, or confounding—information to contest accusations made against them. They sought to correct (what they perceived to be) misinformation, and when they were attacked, they promptly denied and often counterattacked. We found that BP, and to a lesser extent Transocean, were proactive in their deny responses, while Halliburton was reactive. We suggest that the latter’s silence could be an effective alternative to denial or apology in a multiparty scenario such as this. Crisis communication tends to ignore this (non)response.
This study is the first to examine CRSs during a crisis that is prolonged, unstable, and complex. Prior work has called for a study of a long-run crisis to gauge whether response strategies are stable. We found that BP’s strategy was dominated by deal responses but was also intermixed with denial and diminishment. Transocean’s was mostly denial, with a small element of deal. Halliburton’s was essentially denial. We found a clear and marked shift in the tone of all parties’ responses as the crisis developed toward its (legal and financial) conclusion. We show that in the first few weeks following the explosion and until the well was capped, the tone was broadly passive or neutral. As soon as BP, however, took a more aggressive line legalistically, it also took a more aggressive line rhetorically. It filed suits against Transocean and Halliburton 1 year after the explosion, and this was the signal for the commencement of hostilities. The deny responses became more forceful. In the early phases, responses were mainly passive and blame sharing. In the later stages, this gave way to blame shifting, attack, and counterattack. This was obvious to all interested stakeholders, and the shift in tone was noted by analysts, the media, and the administration.
We suggest that denial be considered in more detail by future researchers. An interesting study could consider surveying employees and stakeholders of an organization that has pursued a denial strategy to gauge their morale and goodwill, respectively. We urge crisis communication researchers to consider whether silence, or nonresponse, as a response is an appropriate and effective alternative to apology or denial. Further work should seek to assess the effectiveness of Kim et al.’s (2004) denial/apology, competence/integrity, guilt/innocence matrix in a corporate setting. It would also be worth exploring further whether our finding—that response tone shifts toward aggression over time—is generalizable and why this might be the case.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank seminar participants at the Financial Reporting and Business Communication Conferences (2011 and 2012, Bristol, United Kingdom) and two anonymous referees who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. We would also like to thank Zhenzhen Xu and Varitha Kulvitit for their assistance in data collection and preliminary analysis.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.