Senders’ Bias

Abstract

As environmental change accelerates and future uncertainty increases, implementation of strategy inherently involves continuous adjustment and modification. To meet the need for further research on the critical role of communication, this article contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between communication and strategy implementation. I propose that senders’ bias, which refers to the overestimation of the quality of communication (i.e., degree of sharing) with organizational members by senders (i.e., top managers), is a fundamental implementation problem. Thus, top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members is expected to have limited effects on the degree of value sharing and resulting effectiveness of strategy implementation up to a certain threshold point. Additionally, I argue that the relationship between top managers’ perceived degree of communication and strategy implementation are moderated by the type of communication (i.e., whether storytelling is used in the communication), communication medium (i.e., the use of e-mails), and top managers’ openness to the voices of organizational members. The idea of senders’ bias should provide insights into why many organizations struggle with strategy implementation.

Keywords

Voice strategy implementation management biases

In the face of constantly changing customer needs, technology, and competition, organizations need to continue to develop new strategies and implement them effectively (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Unfortunately, implementing a new strategy is not easy. Based on a survey of employees from more than 1,000 organizations, Neilson, Martin, and Powers (2008) report that 60% of employees rate their organization as weak at strategy implementation. Moreover, in response to a 2008 survey by the Conference Board, 190 executives pointed out that the most important concern is “excellence of execution” followed by a “consistent execution of strategy by top management” and “speed, flexibility, adaptability to change” (Tuna, 2008).

To improve implementation, researchers and consultants provide guidance on creating reward systems as well as organizational design (Harvard Business School Press, 2005; Hrebiniak, 2005; Neilson et al., 2008). However, to the extent that environmental change is rapid and uncertain, setting effective systems and rules upfront can be difficult. In an extreme case, organizational members may become overwhelmed with so many dos and don’ts (“Corporate Culture,” 2011). In his book, The 8th Habit, which was published following the world-best seller, Seven Habits, Stephen R. Covey (2004) introduced a soccer analogy based on the survey results of 23,000 workers, managers, and executives:

[O]nly four of the eleven players on the field would know which goal is theirs. Only two of the eleven would care. Only two of the eleven would know what position they play and know exactly what they are supposed to do. And all but two players would, in some way, be competing against their own team members rather than the opponent.¹ (p. 3)

Essentially, only 37% of the employees said they had a clear understanding of what their organization was trying to achieve and why. As a result, it is virtually impossible for members to effectively implement a unified strategy and win the game.

This article examines strategy implementation and top managers’ perceptions of their communication with employees. Among various factors that contribute to strategy implementation, I focus on communication and develop a theory in terms of importance and misunderstanding of communication in strategy implementation. Because rapid and frequent environmental change makes it virtually impossible to predict the future and develop a “perfect” strategy, incorporating voices and feedback from lower level employees in the process of implementation is critical (Detert & Burris, 2007; Milliken, Schipani, Bishara, & Prado, 2015; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004; Sull, 2007). In fact, strategy implementation is generally defined as “the communication, interpretation, adoption, and enactment of strategic plans” (Noble, 1999, p. 120). Yet the importance of communication in the context of strategy implementation has not thus far been studied in depth.

Top managers play a key role in setting the organizational conditions for effective implementation by communicating a clear vision and direction (Hamel, 2011; Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Oswald, Mossholder, & Harris, 1994; Sull, 2007) and by encouraging organizational members to provide ideas and feedback to their higher level managers (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert & Trevino, 2010; Edmondson, 1999). Drawing on the literature, I propose that senders’ bias, which refers to top managers’ bias toward overestimating the actual quality of communication (i.e., degree of sharing) with organizational members, is a fundamental problem of strategy implementation in addition to such general barriers as environmental uncertainty, organizational inertia, and employee resistance. Top managers are typically overconfident (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and can be especially overconfident about the quality and perception of their communications. Moreover, organizational members are subject to inertia arising from the organizational structures and processes that supported the old strategy and thus, they often fail to understand the real meanings embedded in the messages of top managers (Guth & MacMillan, 1986). As a result, top managers may not recognize the gap between their communication efforts and the actual effects on organizational members. The idea of senders’ bias should provide insights into why many organizations struggle with even seemingly straightforward strategy implementation (Bossidy & Charan, 2002; Neilson et al., 2008).

In the following sections, I briefly review past studies of communication and voice. I then integrate these streams of the literature and develop propositions, followed by discussion and implications.

Literature Review

Communication and Voice

In general, communication can be defined as “the process by which an idea is transferred from a source to a receiver with the intention of changing his or her behavior” (Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976, p. 9). Only when the intended meaning of a sender is shared with a receiver, communication is accomplished. Clearly, communication is an important element of an organization. Barnard (1938) points out that communication among members is essential for an organization to accomplish its organizational goals. Mintzberg (1975) also reports that managers spend a large amount of time communicating with others who continuously and unexpectedly interfere. Through communication, the members of an organization are able to share common goals and values, understand their roles, and effectively achieve the organizational goals (Barnard, 1938; Keller, 2001; Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976; Stewart & Barrick, 2000).

In many cases, research on communication samples a group of people with predetermined tasks such as manufacturing and administrative work (e.g., Stewart & Barrick, 2000). Others examine the choice of communication medium (e.g., e-mail activity) and the consequences of that decision (B. Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). Although a small number of studies examine the relation between various aspects of communication effectiveness and product development, generally finding a positive relationship (Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001; Keller, 2001), research on communication in relation to strategy implementation is limited.²

From the perspective of strategy implementation, two types of communication are important. First, communication by top managers plays a key role in sharing organizational values, goals, and strategic objectives among organizational members. Without effective communication, strategy implementation is therefore likely to fail (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Oswald et al., 1994).

Second, communication by lower level organizational members with upper managers is crucial for strategy implementation as a way in which to generate feedback and improve ideas in the implementation process (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004; Sull, 2007). One such medium is voice, generally defined as “the discretionary provision of information intended to improve organizational functioning to someone inside an organization with the perceived authority to act, even though such information may challenge and upset the status quo of the organization and power holders” (Detert & Burris, 2007, p. 869). However, it is notable that lower level members do not necessarily provide voice (Detert & Burris, 2007; Morrison, 2014). To the extent that members feel that their voice is not heard, is futile, or costs them personally as a result of the negative reaction of higher level managers, they are likely to be silent (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Milliken et al., 2015; Morrison, 2014). Unless upper-level managers show open-mindedness and develop an environment of psychological safety, members do not speak up (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert & Trevino, 2010; Edmondson, 1999). Thus, similar to the communication of vision, top managers play an important role in facilitating feedback from lower level members.

In sum, the role of communication in effective strategy implementation is particularly important in a changing environment where setting specific rules and systems ex ante is difficult and the flexible incorporation of new ideas is essential (Denrell & March, 2001; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Meanwhile research on communication almost always focuses on the sender of the message, although whether the message is actually shared or not depends on the interpretation of the receiver (Markus, 1994; Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976).

In the next sections, I first briefly review the general barriers to new strategy implementation. Furthermore, by drawing on extant research on communication and strategy implementation, I discuss how senders’ bias hinders effective strategy implementation.

Implementation Barriers

As discussed, the effective strategy implementation is difficult and often fails (Denrell & March, 2001; Nutt, 1999). Research on strategy implementation (Neilson et al., 2008; Sull, 2007) and strategic change (Ford, Ford, & D’Amelio, 2008; Hrebiniak, 2006) suggests three interrelated barriers to effective strategy implementation: Uncertainties and unexpected problems inherent in a new strategy, inadequate shared understanding of a new strategy, and employee resistance. Note that I use strategy implementation and new strategy implementation synonymously under the assumption that every organization has one strategy or another ongoing.

First, a new strategy is more risky and uncertain than the current strategy, which is already familiar to all the employees (Denrell & March, 2001). This is particularly so when environments change quickly and assumptions on the strategy developed become obsolete quickly (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Even a carefully crafted new strategy will encounter problems and unexpected issues in the implementation process (Denrell & March, 2001). Accordingly, new strategy implementation only becomes successful after continuous feedback and adjustment during the process of implementation (Sull, 2007). When the effectiveness of strategy implementation is assessed too early and/or feedback processes do not work well (i.e., when appropriate information is ignored or not shared), possibly as a result of feelings of fear or futileness by lower level employees (Detert & Burris, 2007; Milliken et al., 2015), the new strategy may be labeled as a failure and abandoned, even if the potential benefits are much higher than an those delivered by the existing strategy (Denrell & March, 2001).

Second, research suggests that organizational members at different hierarchical levels often have different perspectives and orientations (Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, & De Porras, 1987). Moreover, to the extent that organizational members are deeply embedded in the old strategy both cognitively and behaviorally, strong inertia develops (Huff, Huff, & Thomas, 1992). Some organizational members may interpret a new strategy with an old lens and behave accordingly. If so, the implementation of a new strategy by middle-level or lower level managers and employees may not be pursued as effectively as expected by top managers.

Third, in relation to the first two points, employees are often comfortably accustomed to existing operational routines and their established turfs and thus resist a new strategy that jeopardizes the status quo (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Kotter, 2008). Furthermore, when faced with a new strategy, people may feel anxiety and fear, preventing them from committing to new strategies (Kotter, 2008). To defend individual or divisional interests, employees may develop political infighting (Beer & Eisenstat, 1996; Guth & MacMillan, 1986). Even if they find useful thoughts and ideas to make the new strategy more effective, employees tend to withhold such ideas because providing potentially conflicting ideas with the formerly developed strategy can result in negative consequences to them (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert & Trevino, 2010). Hrebiniak’s (2006) survey of 200 Wharton executive program students found the inability to manage change effectively and overcome resistance to change to be the most critical obstacle to strategy implementation.

Theory Building and Propositions

Communication and Strategy Implementation: Baseline Model

To deal with the barriers discussed in the previous section, researchers and practitioners consider various control mechanisms (Goold & Quinn, 1990; Hrebiniak, 2005; Locke, 2004; O’Reilly, 2008). However, as discussed, such implementation tactics as incentive systems and organizational rules are insufficient in a changing environment (“Corporate Culture,” 2011; Hamel, 2011). While specific incentive systems may become too rigid and backfire when environments change rapidly (i.e., so many dos and don’ts), broad incentive systems that can flexibly respond to such changes may be too ambiguous to lead organizational members (“Corporate Culture,” 2011; Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000). As a result, many organizations shift their attitude toward strategy implementation from rule-based to value-based (“Corporate Culture,” 2011; Hamel, 2011), which Ouchi (1979, 1980) refers to as clan control.

When organizational goals, values, and strategic objectives are shared among organizational members, the implementation of the strategy is more in accordance with the overall goals, values, and objectives even if unexpected problems and issues emerge (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000). To accomplish such clan control (Ouchi, 1979, 1980), top managers need to clearly and constantly communicate the organizational goals, values, and strategic objectives to the remaining organizations members by using formal as well as informal opportunities (B. Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 2010; Lebas & Weigenstein, 1986). For example, Carlos Ghosn, CEO of both Nissan and Renault, vigorously pursued such communication when he first arrived at Nissan in 1999. According to a senior executive,

He takes every opportunity to communicate his vision and priority. He also goes directly to the people. . . . This was the first time in the company’s history that the president spoke directly to everyone in the organization. He addresses the entire company on a regular basis. (Yoshino & Egawa, 2006, p. 13)

Indeed, Ghosn often visited and talked with employees at gemba (the place where the actual work is done).

To this end, the communication of top managers with organizational members plays a crucial role in sharing goals, values, and objectives. However, whether the message is actually shared depends on the interpretation of the receiver (Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976). Moreover, top managers are typically overconfident (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and can be especially overconfident about the quality and perception of their communications. It is reported that 86% of managers believe that they are a good communicator, while only 17% of subordinates believe so in the United States. Thus, it is possible that while top managers might believe that they communicated well with organizational members and, thus, that the organizational goals, values, and objectives of strategy strategic objectives were well shared, members may not see this in the same way.

In my field study, I encountered such a situation multiple times. For example, a newly appointed CEO in a large corporation visited almost 50 sales offices across the country in 2 months. Whereas the CEO was satisfied because he saw all organizational members and communicated well, an employee commented, “Although the CEO spent two months communicating, we spent just an hour. It was good, but do not expect too much.” Jack Welch also confesses: “There were times I talked about company’s direction so many times in one day that I was completely sick of hearing it myself. But I realized the message was always new to someone” (Welch & Welch, 2005, p. 68).

In terms of the perception gap in communication across hierarchical levels, Nikkei (a Japanese large business newspaper company, equivalent to The Wall Street Journal in the United States) surveyed 748 nonmanagerial employees, finding that more than 70% said they had bosses they did not like because of a “lack of leadership” followed by the “inability to listen to subordinates’ opinions” and “lack of communication.” Meanwhile, about 70% of 261 sampled managers said that they had subordinates they did not like because of “too many excuses,” the “inability to understand my orders,” and the “inability to listen to others’ advice.” Consistent with this perception gap between the sender and receiver, research on e-mails demonstrates that people overestimate their number of sent messages more than their received ones and thus overestimate their contributions (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986).

It is expected that the more top managers communicate organizational goals, values, and strategic objectives, the more members understand and share them. However, owing to senders’ bias, which can be exacerbated by the overconfident nature of executives (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), a gap between the perceived degree of communication of senders (i.e., top managers) and receivers (i.e., lower level managers and employees) may develop. Moreover, members are often subject to inertia arising from the organizational structures and processes that supported the old strategy and thus they fail to understand the real meanings embedded in the messages of top managers (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Huff et al., 1992). Accordingly, up to a certain point, the more top managers perceive that they communicate with organizational members, the larger the potential gap between the perceptions of top managers and those of organizational members. In this context, despite the efforts of top managers, strategy implementation is unlikely to be effective, which often makes top managers puzzled and frustrated (Bossidy & Charan, 2002; Neilson et al., 2008). As a result, a new strategy often fails and may be abandoned (Denrell & March, 2001; Nutt, 1999). At a certain point (i.e., threshold), however, top managers’ efforts to communicate break the inertia, making goals, values, and strategic objectives shared and thus resulting in the flexible implementation of the new strategy (Huff et al., 1992). Accordingly, the following baseline proposition can be obtained.

Proposition 1: Top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members has limited effects on the effectiveness of strategy implementation up to a certain point. After this threshold point, the effects increase.

Communication and Strategy Implementation: Moderators

In addition to the degree of communication that directly influences the effectiveness of strategy implementation, three major factors moderate this relationship: types of communication, communication medium (D. Barry & Elmes, 1997; B. Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Cramton, 2001; Sarbaugh-Thompson & Feldman, 1998; Trevino, Webster, & Stein, 2000), and managerial openness (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert & Trevino, 2010; Morrison, 2014), each of which is discussed below.

Organizational management is often characterized as objective, rational, formal, and analytical (Mintzberg, 1990). Accordingly, organizational goals and values along with strategy are often communicated in plain, businesslike language as opposed to “tempered (speech designed to stimulate interest) or grand (designed to provoke emotion and move an audience to a new position)” language (D. Barry & Elmes, 1997, p. 437). Rational, organized, and analytical communication becomes less stimulating and memorable.

Meanwhile, some scholars and practitioners suggest that top managers should consider the importance of storytelling in communicating with organizational members (D. Barry & Elmes, 1997; Denning, 2004; McKee, 2003). A story can be defined as “the symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject matter and related by time” (Scholes, 1981, p. 205, cited by D. Barry & Elmes, 1997, p. 431). To the extent that the message becomes plain and boring, the communication of values and goals is less inspiring to organizational members (McKee, 2003). To convey the message to organizational members effectively and share the values and goals, which are the backbone of the new strategy, the message must inspire receivers and harnesses their imagination (D. Barry & Elmes, 1997; McKee, 2003). Communication that stresses objectivity and rationality is likely to exacerbate senders’ bias.

Accordingly, the relation between top managers’ perceived degrees of communication with organizational members and the effectiveness of strategy implementation is thus contingent on the type of communication, or how messages are conveyed. When the values and goals are communicated objectively and analytically, the effects of communication are less promising than when they are communicated in a storytelling way. When adopting objective and analytical communication, more communication is needed to reach the threshold described in Proposition 1. Formally, the following proposition can be obtained.

Proposition 2: The relationship between top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members and the effectiveness of strategy implementation is moderated by the type of communication. When the message is conveyed in an objective and analytical fashion, more communication is needed than when the message is conveyed in a storytelling fashion.

Top managers use a number of media to communicate goals, values, and strategic objectives with organizational members. Daft and Lengel (1986) argue that communication aims to reduce uncertainty and equivocality. While the former is associated with the amount of information, the latter is associated with its richness. Importantly, the richness of information depends on the characteristics of the communication medium, and media can be categorized according to how rich information can be conveyed: “Communication transactions that can overcome different frames of reference or clarify ambiguous issues to change understanding in a timely manner are considered rich” (Daft & Lengel, 1986, p. 560). The communication of organizational goals, values, and strategic objectives clearly needs rich information (Kirsch et al., 2010; Lebas & Weigenstein, 1986; Ouchi, 1979, 1980).

Daft and Lengel (1986) rank different communication media based on their capacity to process rich information, which includes immediate feedback availability, the number of cues and channels utilized, and personalization and language variety. Their ranking order runs as follows: (a) face-to-face, (b) telephone, (c) personal documents, (d) impersonal documents, and (e) numeric documents. More recently, researchers have ranked e-mails between telephone and personal documents and examined the characteristics and effects of e-mails in organizational settings (Barley, Meyerson, & Grodal, 2011; B. Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Markus, 1994; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986; Trevino et al., 2000). Given the increasing proliferation of e-mails and need to communicate organizational values and goals by using rich information channels, the following discussion focuses on the difference between the use of e-mails and richer media channels (face-to-face, telephone).

E-mail³ has several unique features as a communication medium. First, it is asynchronous (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986) and thus, top managers can send a message anytime regardless of the availability of receivers (i.e., organizational members). This also means that immediate feedback may be unavailable (Cramton, 2001; Friedman & Currall, 2003) and that e-mail communication involves limited contextual cues (Friedman & Currall, 2003; Sarbaugh-Thompson & Feldman, 1998). Second, it is fast and easy to use (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). Furthermore, e-mails can be sent to multiple receivers simultaneously (Barley et al., 2011). Third, it is text-based (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). E-mail messages not only remain but become a “backlog,” while communication conducted during a meeting can vanish when the meeting is over (Barley et al., 2011).

Top managers who deal with difficult and often equivocal issues should use communication media capable of providing rich information such as face-to-face meetings (Daft & Lengel, 1986). However, Markus (1994) finds that senior managers often use e-mails for various tasks including equivocal ones. Barley et al. (2011) also point out that e-mails are sent regardless of the conditions of receivers due to asynchrony; yet growing social norms require receivers to respond as soon as possible. When receivers respond quickly, top managers assume that they understand the messages. Such perception can be inflated as message backlogs remain. These results suggest that asynchrony and ease of use make top managers addicted to e-mails (Barley et al., 2011). This further exacerbates senders’ bias, and managers may forget that e-mails are not a rich communication medium. Instead, they believe that they can communicate such equivocal issues as organizational goals, values, and strategy by e-mail. As a result, overall organizational communication declines as the use of e-mail increases (Sarbaugh-Thompson & Feldman, 1998). Although e-mails are effective at exchanging tactical or factual information when basic values and goals are shared (Sarbaugh-Thompson & Feldman, 1998), convenience and the resulting overuse of e-mails may superficially mask the need for value sharing. To the extent that e-mails are more formal and less improvisational than face-to-face meetings, such messages will be less informal and less likely to be categorized as storytelling (D. Barry & Elmes, 1997).

Accordingly, the usage of e-mails as opposed to richer communication media is likely to influence the relation between top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members and the effectiveness of strategy implementation. When top managers often use e-mails for organizational communication including the goals, values, and strategic objectives, the degree of sharing is much less than top managers believe when they are communicated by richer media such as face-to-face meetings. When e-mails are used, more communication is needed to reach the threshold described in Proposition 1. Formally, the following proposition can be obtained.

Proposition 3: The relationship between top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members and the effectiveness of strategy implementation is moderated by the communication medium. When e-mails are often used, more communication is needed than when e-mails are rarely used in combination with richer media channels.

To effectively implement a new strategy in a changing environment, top managers need to incorporate feedback from organizational members and adjust and modify the strategy accordingly (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). One such important medium is voice. However, as discussed earlier, research on voice as a communication medium suggests that lower level employees may withhold ideas and feedback to improve implementation (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Milliken et al., 2015; Morrison & Milliken, 2000). This is partly because employees are concerned about the negative reaction of upper managers (e.g., punishments) and partly because employees feel they may be ignored or will not make a difference (Detert & Burris, 2007; Milliken et al., 2015).

Although voice communication may be encouraged through organizational systems (Goold & Quinn, 1990; Harvard Business School Press, 2005; Hrebiniak, 2005; Neilson et al., 2008), such systems often reflect senders’ bias. Detert and Trevino (2010, p. 264) find that “the more they rely on formal mechanism such as surveys, hotlines, and ombudspersons, the more they may be inadvertently cueing employees that the long-held hieratical authority schema is accurate.” To the extent that organizational hierarchy is pervasive, setting up formal mechanisms only reinforces the status quo and top managers may not even recognize that they are unintentionally inhibiting voice (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

Accordingly, what is important to encourage lower level employees to use voice is not to use formal mechanisms but rather nurture an informal environment in which employees feel sufficiently safe to speak up (Edmondson, 1999; Morrison, 2014). To do so, top managers need to send consistent cues that they are open (Detert & Burris, 2007). When top managers are perceived to be open to voices, more ideas and feedback are provided from lower level employees and thus, strategy is adequately implemented in response to changing environments. Formerly, the following proposition can be obtained.

Proposition 4: The relationship between top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members and the effectiveness of strategy implementation is moderated by the perceived openness to voice of top managers by organizational members. When top managers are perceived to be open, less communication is needed than when top managers are perceived not to be open.

The four propositions presented above are visually shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1.

Relation between the top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organization members and effectiveness of strategy implementation.

Figure 2.

Moderating relations between the top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organization members and effectiveness of strategy implementation.

Discussion and Implications

As environmental change accelerates and future uncertainty increases, it is important for organizations to adjust and modify their strategies continuously during the implementation process (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004; Sull, 2007). Although the importance of strategy implementation has been discussed, academic research is fragmented and lags behind practitioners. By observing a need for further research that indicates the critical role of communication, this article thus contributes to the literature by examining the relationship among communication and strategy implementation.

I propose senders’ bias, referring to the senders’ (i.e., top managers’) overestimation of the actual quality of communication (i.e., degree of sharing) with organization members, resulting in a perception gap. Senders’ bias is often unconsciously developed due to senders’ general overestimation of the communication quality (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986), top managers’ overconfidence tendency (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and organizational inertia that prevents members from accepting new ideas (Huff et al., 1992). Thus, top managers’ perceived degree of communication with organizational members is expected to have limited effects on the degree of value sharing (i.e., clan control) and resulting effectiveness of strategy implementation up to a certain threshold point. Additionally, by drawing on the research on communication, I argue that the relationship between top managers’ perceived degrees of communication with organizational members and the effectiveness of strategy implementation is moderated by the type of communication (i.e., whether storytelling is used in the communication), the communication medium (i.e., the extent to which e-mails are used), and top managers’ openness to voices from lower level employees. The idea of senders’ bias should provide insights into why many organizations struggle with even seemingly straightforward strategy implementation (Bossidy & Charan, 2002; Neilson et al., 2008).

The quote cited at the beginning of this article is based on a survey of 23,000 workers, managers, and executives (Covey, 2004). If the very low scores are applicable to average organizations, one may wonder why some organizations successfully implement strategy and some do not. Probably, the difference between successful and unsuccessful implementers is subtle. By paying a little more attention to communication, top managers may be able to dramatically improve the implementation capabilities of their organizations and resulting competitiveness. In doing so, I argue that top managers should consider their bias toward communication. Whether the message is actually shared depends on the interpretation of the receiver (Markus, 1994; Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976). No matter how frequently or clearly top managers believe they communicate, the effects are minimal if organizational members do not listen to or understand the messages.

In relation to communication medium choice, Markus (1994, p. 507) points out: “If they [receivers] repeatedly cancel scheduled meetings, if they do not pick up the phone if it rings or return calls quickly, their communication will be slow, no matter how fast their media have the theoretical potential to be.” Given that top managers are often the senders of messages (i.e., organizational goals, values, and strategy) to organizational members, they may forget such a basic but important idea of communication. If so, top managers’ efforts to communicate with organizational members and guide new strategy implementation will be unsuccessful. Worse, the more top managers are committed, the larger the perception gap between them and other organizational members, at least in the short run. As a result, frustrated top managers may attribute frequent failures in strategy implementation to employee resistance and abandon the strategy (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Kotter, 2008). However, it may be a simple misunderstanding as a result of top managers’ inability to understand how their messages are interpreted and shared by other members (Ireland et al., 1987). In fact, Piderit (2000, p. 784) questions such a common view that employee resistance hinders strategy implementation and points out that “the label of resistance can be used to dismiss potentially valid employee concerns about proposed changes” (see also Ford et al., 2008). If so, top managers should reconsider their more, stronger approach toward organizational members as well as toward strategy implementation. Instead, they need to understand senders’ bias and the essence of communication from the perspective of receivers. Types of communication (i.e., storytelling) as well as communication medium (i.e., dependence on e-mails) are also important.

In addition, it is important to obtain ideas and feedback from those employees actually implementing a strategy. However, employees may not voice potentially helpful ideas when they feel that it is not safe or futile to provide such feedback (Detert & Burris, 2007; Milliken et al., 2015). To encourage inputs, top managers need to consistently show that they are open to voices and make employees feel safe (Edmondson, 1999; Morrison, 2014). Such behaviors should be informal, as formal mechanisms can reinforce the current hierarchy and thus unintentionally make employees more defensive (Detert & Trevino, 2010).

It is worth referring to Change Acceleration Process model of General Electric. According to General Electric, both successful and unsuccessful change initiatives have excellent ideas and approaches. In other words, what determines success and failure is not the idea or approach; rather, it is the degree of acceptance by organizational members. Unless organizational members accept the change initiative and positively commit themselves to it, the initiative is unlikely to be successful, no matter how good or excellent the idea and approach are.

Research and Managerial Implications

Overall, this article provides a preliminary yet important step to examine strategy implementation from the perspective of communication, which is becoming increasingly important in the current changing environment (Neilson et al., 2008; Sull, 2007). By extending the ideas and implications presented in this article, future research can make more contributions to the literature. In particular, the importance of the roles of receivers (e.g., lower level managers and employees), not only senders (e.g., top managers), needs more research.

Communication is not a simple action such as sending an e-mail or having a meeting. Instead, communication is accomplished when a particular message and its meaning are shared between the sender and receiver (Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976). This basic idea of communication seems to attract limited attention in an organizational setting. Studies often pay attention only to top managers or senders. By exploring the catch-ball nature of communication, future research can contribute to the organizational control and strategy literature as well as the organizational communication literature. Empirically testing the presented propositions in the global setting is another promising future research direction (Detert & Trevino, 2010).

This article also provides several important implications to practitioners. First, most top managers understand that communication plays an important role. Yet little attention has been paid to the importance of communication partly because it is so common and mostly informal in nature and managers are easily subject to unconscious biases. Increasing the availability of convenient tools and media such as e-mail and SNS also make the idea of communication almost synonyms of information exchange, not information sharing. As a result, many top managers seem to be concerned about sending messages and information to, not so much as sharing the messages and information with, organizational members. It may thus be a good idea for top managers to assess their attitudes toward communication when they feel the frustration of not being able to implement a new strategy well.

Second, in this sense, effective feedback from organizational members is crucial. Unless managers understand how organizational members interpret the organizational goals, values, and strategy, top managers believe they have communicated, top managers never know how effective or appropriate they actually communicate, and how they might improve their communication. However, managers cannot simply ask subordinates. From his experience with the development of the legendary IBM system/360 family, Brooks (1995, p. 142) points out, “[subordinates] won’t tell you they don’t understand it; they will happily invert their way through the gaps and obscurities.” Accordingly, top managers should make every effort to receive effective feedback to their messages in addition to sending messages. Setting formal systems is less effective (Detert & Trevino, 2010). Instead, top managers should spend more time informally communicating with organizational members. Although this is time-consuming, consistently showing such behaviors will send a cue that managers are open to voices (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

Morrison and Milliken (2000, p. 707) observe a paradox whereby lower level managers and other employees are often reluctant to communicate organizational issues and problems with top managers at a time “when management rhetoric focuses on empowerment and more open lines of communication.” They point out that this paradox stems from two basic factors: top managers’ fear of negative feedback and their implicit beliefs such as “top management knows best.” Hence, managers should pay attention to exactly what they communicate with organizational members. Communication should not be a goal by itself. Instead, managers need to ask themselves how communication guides, motivates, and provides the psychological safety necessary to implement a new strategy (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000).

In conclusion, by observing the increasing importance of new strategy implementation in a changing environment and the lack of academic research in this area, this article provides a preliminary step to examine strategy implementation and two-way communication between top managers and lower level organizational members.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author acknowledges financial support for the research from Keio Gijuku Academic Development Funds and Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research.

Notes

Author Biography

Katsuhiko Shimizu is a professor of organization theory and strategic management at Graduate School of Business Administration, Keio University in Japan. Previously, he taught at University of Texas at San Antonio for 10 years (tenured). He received his PhD from Texas A&M University. He is serving editorial review boards of multiple top journals including Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of International Management, and Asia-Pacific Journal of Management. With a 10-year international strategic management consulting background based in Tokyo, he has actively researched such topics as strategy implementation under uncertainty; learning from mistakes, and managing challenges in international contexts including cross-border mergers and acquisitions. He also frequently travels Asian countries such as China, Singapore, Cambodia, and Thailand to interview executives and local scholars.

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