Crisis Management and Corporate Apology: The Effects of Causal Attribution and Apology Type on Publics’ Cognitive and Affective Responses

Abstract

This study examined how corporate apologies influence cognitive and affective public responses (public anger, negative impression, distrust) during an aviation crisis. A total of 192 participants were exposed to one of the two types of causal attribution (internal vs. external) and one of the two types of corporate apology (responsibility-oriented vs. sympathy-oriented). This study found that a responsibility-oriented apology significantly more reduced public anger, negative impression, and distrust of an airline company than a sympathy-oriented apology in an internal/controllable crisis situation. Theoretical and practical implications as well as directions for future research are discussed.

Keywords

crisis management corporate apology responsibility sympathy causal attribution

Introduction

In recent years, we have frequently received news of massive aviation crises from across the globe (e.g., Malaysia Airlines disappearance, Germanwings crash). When such a crisis occurs, it is often serious, with a high rate of mortality among passengers. The damage resulting from an aviation crisis also draws a huge amount of media attention, which subsequently puts great pressure on the affected airline company in communicating with its publics. The way an airline company responds to the media and its publics affects the public perceptions of the organization and eventually its reputation (Coombs, 2007). To evade any reputational damage, crisis managers must prepare effective crisis messages to negative events.

Many crisis communication researchers have studied how an organization effectively responds to a crisis to protect its reputation (Coombs, 2006). Among the various crisis message strategies, an apology is favored (Choi & Lin, 2009a). Coombs and Holladay (1996) maintained that an apology serves to protect an organization’s reputation after a crisis when its publics view the organization as responsible for the crisis. Also, Goodwin and Ross (1992) found that an apology from a company raised consumers’ satisfaction and the perceived fairness of responses when service failures were involved.

Despite the advantages of an apology in protecting reputations, the value of an apology has been questioned (Choi & Lin, 2009a). Scholars have pointed out that offering an apology can be used against the organization in legal court proceedings because it is regarded as accepting responsibility (Patel & Reinsch, 2003). To avoid lawsuits, demonstrating sympathy for victims is an alternative form of apology that can help shape public perceptions of an organization positively (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). This notion is supported by an empirical study showing no significant difference between the effect of accepting responsibility and expressing sympathy on public responses when an organization has a moderate level of responsibility for causing a crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2008).

Although the previous notion has significant implications, a theoretical question remains to be answered. Can sympathy be as effective as accepting responsibility in generating publics’ favorable responses in all crisis situations? Or are the effects of the two different messages related to how much responsibility the publics attribute to the organization? Given that the perception of causal attribution for a crisis differently influences the effectiveness of accepting responsibility on organizational reputations (Verhoeven, Van Hoof, Ter Keurs, & Van Vuuren, 2012), the effects of expressing sympathy on the reputation might be affected by the level of organizational responsibility for the crisis. Thus, this study will examine which of the two different messages is more appropriate for the different levels of crisis responsibility.

The purpose of this study was to conduct an empirical analysis to determine the effects of causal attribution (i.e., internal vs. external) and apology type (i.e., responsibility-oriented vs. sympathy-oriented) on public responses (i.e., public anger, negative impression, and distrust) during an aviation crisis. To test these relationships, this study employs a fictional airplane crash case in an experimental design setting. Considering that an airplane crash tends to result in heavy casualties, an appropriate and compassionate corporate apology is important in generating a favorable public response in a crisis situation. Also, the three outcome variables in this study are strongly related to major behavioral outcomes (e.g., purchase intentions, negative word-of-mouth) in a crisis situation (Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Coombs, 2007), which may provide meaningful theoretical and practical implications for the field of crisis management.

Literature Review

Aviation Crisis and Causal Attribution

An aviation crisis is not an unusual event (Grundy & Moxon, 2013). According to the Aircraft Crashes Record Office (2015), 694 aviation crashes happened globally between 2011 and 2015, leading to 4,313 casualties. In 2014 alone, the number of casualties from airline crashes reached 1,328, including 401 deaths in the Malaysia Airlines disappearance and Indonesia AirAsia crash (Aircraft Crashes Record Office, 2015). When a serious aviation crisis happens, an airline company becomes the target of overwhelming media exposure (International Air Transport Association, 2012). Also, media tend to investigate who is to blame and the factors that cause the incidents, which, subsequently, affects how people attribute the cause to the company (Coombs & Holladay, 2010; Ray, 1999).

According to situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), people identify the cause of a crisis and decide where to place responsibility for the crisis when a negative and unpredictable event occurs (Coombs, 2007). In an aviation crisis scenario, people are likely to make attribution for the crisis and assess whether an airline company is responsible for the crisis due to the uncertain and threatening nature of an aviation crisis (Ray, 1999). The various publics’ causal attributions affect the way people view an airline company, which in turn can seriously affect the organization’s reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2007).

To better understand the causal attribution process in a crisis situation, Coombs (1995) adopted the concepts of locus and controllability from Weiner’s (1986) attribution theory. Locus refers to whether the cause of a crisis is internal or external to the organization. Controllability refers to whether the cause of a crisis is intentional or unintentional. SCCT posits that publics attribute the cause to an organization along causal dimensions when a crisis occurs (Coombs, 1995). Also, determining the cause along causal dimensions leads to a responsibility judgment that, in turn, influences the crisis outcomes, such as emotions, organizational reputation, and behavioral intentions (Coombs, 2007).

Although conceptually distinct, previous crisis studies have shown that the two causal dimensions of controllability and locus are indistinct in their operationalization and do not separately influence crisis outcomes (Lee, 2004; McDonald, Sparks, & Glendon, 2010; Moon & Rhee, 2012). According to Lee (2004), people who perceive that the crisis responsibility is within the boundaries of an organization (i.e., internal locus) are likely to regard the crisis as controllable, whereas those who perceive that the crisis responsibility is outside the realm of an organization (i.e., external locus) are likely to view it as uncontrollable. Eventually, the two causal dimensions tap the same concept, existing “somewhere along a continuum of internal/controllable–external/uncontrollable” (Lee, 2004, p. 602). For this reason, this study employs the dimension of internal/controllable and external/uncontrollable when testing the effects of causal attribution in the context of an aviation crisis.

Causal Attribution and Public Responses

Crisis studies using attribution theory and SCCT have found that the causal attribution publics make strongly influences their affective response (Choi & Lin, 2009b; Coombs, 2007; McDonald et al., 2010). To elaborate, attribution theory posits that people attribute responsibility for a negative event and show different types of emotional responses to the event depending on the causal attribution (Weiner, 1986). Applying attribution theory to the context of crisis, previous studies have revealed that if an organization was judged to have been in a controllable negative event, anger was evoked, whereas if the organization was judged not to have been able to control a crisis, pity was elicited (Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Hareli & Weiner, 2002).

In line with previous studies, the current study employs anger as a public’s affective response. Anger is defined as a strong feeling ranging from annoyance to rage (Allcorn, 1994; Rubin, 1986). This negative emotion is affected by how much publics believe a crisis is caused by internal factors of an organization (Coombs, 2007). Choi and Lin (2009b) supported this notion after analyzing consumer responses toward the 2007 Mattel product recall. They found that anger was strongly elicited when consumers attributed the cause of a crisis to a company. This finding leads us to assume that an airline company being obviously responsible for a crisis is a strong predictor of public anger.

Moreover, causal attribution can influence a public’s cognitive response toward an organization (Choi & Lin, 2009b). The current study used negative impression and distrust as major cognitive responses. Negative impression represents the overall negative and immediate belief in an organization (Sherman, 1999; Wan & Schell, 2007). It reflects a public’s cognitive perceptual response toward the organization (Lee, 2005; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Distrust is understood as a cognitive perception that an organization is incompetent, exhibits irresponsible behavior, and violates obligations (Cho, 2006). This concept involves the public’s expectations that the statements and commitments of an organization are reliable in light of social norms (Adams, Highhouse, & Zickar, 2010). According to SCCT, people who think a crisis is caused by internal factors of an organization attribute more crisis responsibility to the organization than those who think a crisis is caused by an external factor (Lee, 2004). If people attribute a greater amount of crisis responsibility to an organization, they are likely to rate the organization more negatively (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Hence, it is assumed that publics hold a negative impression and distrust an airline company when the company is obviously responsible for a crisis.

Apology Type and Causal Attribution

Previous crisis studies have maintained that selecting an effective crisis message for the given type of crisis is critical to reduce negative public responses (Coombs, 2006; Moon & Rhee, 2012). Researchers have argued that an apology is the most effective crisis message strategy among the many such strategies (Benoit & Drew, 1997). An apology is viewed as acceptance of responsibility (Benoit & Drew, 1997; Coombs & Holladay, 2008), while different conceptualizations of apology include other components, such as expressions of sympathy, compensation, and a promise of corrective action (Patel & Reinsch, 2003). In this regard, an apology can contain various sets of components that determine its different definitions.

Accepting responsibility can contribute to lessening negative public responses. For instance, apologies focusing on accepting responsibility are more likely to be accepted by various publics than denial, excuses, or justification when an organization is responsible for a crisis (Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2009; Kim, Cha, & Kim, 2008). Similarly, Pace, Fediuk, and Botero (2010) revealed that when an organization accepted more responsibility after a transgression, its publics felt less anger toward the organization. Also, they found that an apology focusing on accepting responsibility resulted in less reputation damage than not accepting responsibility.

Accepting responsibility can positively influence public responses, but such an apology may be the most expensive message strategy for an organization (Martinelli & Briggs, 1998). When an organization delivers an apology admitting responsibility for a crisis, the organization potentially opens itself to lawsuits and the apology may be used as evidence in court to win lawsuits against the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). This creates tension between public relations professionals and corporate attorneys because each party takes a different stance in delivering an apology admitting responsibility (Myers, 2016).

To craft legally protected apologies, expressing sympathy, a less expensive strategy, offers an alternative form of apology in protecting an organization’s reputation during a crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). To be specific, after analyzing 38 jurisdictions that have “I’m sorry” laws, Myers (2016) concluded that statements and actions expressing sympathy are less risky because they are excluded from evidence. In the context of crisis communication, scholars have emphasized the strategic value of expressions of sympathy in that they indicate a high level of accommodation in a crisis situation through the focus on victims’ needs (Sturges, 1994) and, as a result, help increase the perceived sincerity of the statement (Weiner, 1986) and rebuild the relationship with the public (Diers-Lawson & Pang, 2016).

Given that both responsibility and sympathy are important apology components in producing favorable reactions from various publics during a crisis, it is imperative to explore the effects of responsibility and sympathy on the publics’ cognitive and affective responses in an aviation crisis. For this study, two types of corporate apology are proposed: (1) responsibility-oriented apology and (2) sympathy-oriented apology. A responsibility-oriented apology focuses on whether an organization accepts responsibility in describing how the organization deals with the crisis. On the other hand, a sympathy-oriented apology focuses on expressing the organization’s sincere sorrow and concern for those affected by a crisis to stimulate positive public emotions toward the organization (Moon & Rhee, 2012).

Previous research has found no significant difference in the effects of a responsibility-oriented apology and sympathy-oriented apology on public responses. For instance, Coombs and Holladay (2008) revealed that a responsibility-oriented apology generated outcomes (e.g., anger, negative word-of-mouth) equivalent to a sympathy-oriented apology using an oil industry crisis scenario. Similarly, Choi and Lin (2009a) found that lay people did not perceive the difference in a responsibility-oriented apology and a sympathy-oriented apology in a food recall crisis scenario. Despite the significant implications, a theoretical question remains as to whether the two types of apologies generate similar public responses in that the studies did not mention the cause of the crisis or employ a moderate level of crisis responsibility in their experiments.

Clearly, the impacts of the two types of corporate apology (i.e., responsibility vs. sympathy) are contingent on a causal attribution level (Moon & Rhee, 2012). Each apology in different crisis situations has a different level of effect on public responses due to the different level of causal attribution. SCCT provides a theoretical link between causal attribution and a crisis message strategy. Coombs and Holladay (2002) argued that the greater the responsibility the organization takes for a crisis, the higher the level of responsibility acceptance a crisis manager selects when developing a crisis message. Also, Coombs and Holladay (1996) found that when the crisis type matched the crisis communication response in terms of causal attribution, it led the various publics to perceive the organization in a more positive way than in either a no-response or a mismatched-response situation.

To examine the interaction effects between causal attribution and apology type, this study assumes that people who think a crisis is caused by an organization’s internal factors show more positive responses to a responsibility-oriented apology than a sympathy-oriented one. As noted, if people attribute more crisis responsibility to an organization, a causal attribution process will elicit their anger (Pace et al., 2010). The induced anger tends to facilitate individuals’ active information processing (Nabi, 1999), which motivates them to carefully think about the message characteristics of an apology. Thus, it is assumed that when a crisis is perceived as internal/controllable, the various publics might respond sensitively to the level of responsibility an organization takes in an apology. On the contrary, if a sympathy-oriented apology is delivered in an internal crisis situation, it may be seen as defensive or inadequate in the eyes of the organization’s publics. A previous study supported our assumption, showing that an apology actively admitting crisis responsibility contributed to relieving public anger in an internal/controllable crisis situation (Lee & Chung, 2012), whereas an apology focusing on sympathy did not reduce public anger. Based on the discussion above, we posit the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Under an internal/controllable crisis situation, participants who read a sympathy-oriented apology are more likely to (a) feel angry, (b) hold a negative impression, and (c) distrust an airline company than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology.

On the other hand, people who think a crisis is caused by factors external to an organization have more positive responses to a sympathy-oriented apology than a responsibility-oriented one. When people perceive that an organization is not clearly responsible for a crisis, a responsibility-oriented apology may fuel the perception that the organization contributed to causing the bad situation rather than suffering its consequence (Hill & Boyd, 2013). Also, a sympathy-oriented apology might generate positive public responses in an external crisis because sympathy reflects a deep acknowledgment of victims’ suffering (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006) and, as a result, increases the sincerity of the apology. Given that an aviation crisis tends to result in heavy casualties, an apology showing concern for victims significantly increases the perceptions of an airline company’s sincerity in an external/uncontrollable crisis situation. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Under an external/uncontrollable crisis situation, participants who read a sympathy-oriented apology are less likely to (a) feel angry, (b) hold a negative impression, and (c) distrust an airline company than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology.

Method

Design and Stimuli

To examine two hypotheses, this study employed a 2 × 2 factorial design with between-subjects comparison. The independent variable was a type of causal attribution (i.e., internal vs. external) and a type of apology (i.e., responsibility-oriented vs. sympathy-oriented).

For the experiment, we developed a fictional news story describing an airplane crash and an apology from a fictional airline company, EF Airlines. To develop crisis scenarios, an organizational misdeed (i.e., an inexperienced pilot had an error due to the company’s cost savings) was employed for an internal crisis. Also, the other crisis caused by an environmental factor (i.e., exceptionally bad weather involving a storm and heavy rain) was used as an external crisis (see Appendix A). To control the severity of a crisis, massive damage and causality was described in both internal and external crises. For this hypothetical crisis, this study developed four types of apology messages from the airline company through different combinations of causal attribution and apology type (see Appendix B). All types of apologies were six lines long and contained about 80 words.

Participants

A total of 205 subjects took part in an online experiment through Qualtrics, the online survey software. Participants were sampled from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). To select the sample, the online experiment, titled “Corporate Apology during a Crisis,” was posted on MTurk. This study was available to U.S. resident workers only. Each participant received 0.4 dollars for the survey. After deleting 13 incomplete responses 192 responses were valid and used for further analysis. Among 192 participants, male respondents were 94 (49%) and female respondents were 98 (51%). There were 155 Caucasians (80.7%), 15 Hispanics (7.8%), 10 African Americans (5.2%), 8 Asians (4.2%), and 4 others (2.1%). Also, educational levels were 45 high school graduates (23.4%), 120 college graduates (62.5%), and 27 with a graduate education (14.06%). Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 62 years (M = 30.52 years, SD = 9.87).

Preliminary Test

To check the manipulation of causal attribution of two news stories and four types of apology messages, forty-seven subjects on MTurk participated in the preliminary test through Qualtrics. We checked the manipulation of causal attribution through the assessment of locus of responsibility. Adapted from Griffin, Babin, and Darden’s (1992) study, locus of responsibility was measured using three-item scale for blame: (1) “Circumstances, not EF Airlines, are responsible for the crisis”; (2) “The blame for the crisis lies with EF Airlines”; and (3) “The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not EF Airlines.” Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Item 2 was reversely coded. The index produced acceptable reliability (α = .87).

The instrument also included four other items to assess organizational control. Organizational control refers to “the degree to which an event is controllable or uncontrollable by EF Airlines” (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). It was measured using four items: (1) “The cause of the crisis is something EF Airlines could control”; (2) “The cause of the crisis is something over which EF Airlines had no power”; (3) “The cause of the crisis is something that was manageable by EF Airlines”; and (4) “The cause of the crisis is something over which EF Airlines had power” (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Item 2 was reversely coded. The index produced acceptable reliability (α = .93).

The study checked the manipulation of a responsibility-oriented apology and a sympathy-oriented apology. For the responsibility-oriented apology, participants were asked to answer the question, “The apology from EF Airlines took responsibility for the crisis.” Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). To check the manipulation of a sympathy-oriented apology, participants were asked to answer the question, “The apology from EF Airlines expressed sympathy toward the victims and their families.” Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Procedure

Participants on MTurk saw an invitation message that explained the purpose of the study. The informed consent was also given to participants in the message. When participants clicked the link to an online experiment after reading the invitation message, they directly entered into the online experiment on Qualtrics. If participants chose to participate in the study, they were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. Each group was asked to read one of the two types of news stories randomly assigned by Qualtrics. One story reported the EF Airlines’ misdeed for the crisis and the other story described severe weather in the airplane crash.

After reading the news article, each group of participants read one of the two types of apologies randomly assigned by Qualtrics. One message was a responsibility-oriented apology and the other message was a sympathy-oriented apology. Participants read an apology in a format of a news release issued by EF Airlines dated one day after the airplane crash happened. After reading an apology, participants were asked to answer the questions about their feeling of anger toward EF Airlines, their negative impression of EF Airlines, and the degree of distrust in the company. The questionnaires included demographic questions that asked participants’ gender, an education level, ethnicity, and age. The experiment took about 15 to 20 minutes per each participant.

Dependent Measures

Anger Toward EF Airlines

To measure the participants’ anger toward EF Airlines after reading an apology, five self-appraisal items constituted the subscale: (1) angry; (2) mad; (3) irritated; (4) annoyed; and (5) outraged. For each item, participants were asked to answer the question, “To what extent do you feel _____ toward EF Airlines?” Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The five measurement items were adapted from Lee and Chung (2012). The index produced acceptable reliability (α = .96).

Negative Impression Toward EF Airlines

To measure the participants’ negative impression toward EF Airlines, two items constituted the subscale. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following items: (1) “I don’t like EF Airlines”; and (2) “I have a negative impression of EF Airlines”. Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The two measurement items were adapted from Lee (2004). The index showed acceptable reliability (α = .91).

Distrust in EF Airlines

To measure the participants’ distrust of EF Airlines, seven items constituted the subscale. Participants were asked to respond to the following items: (1) “I lost my confidence in EF Airlines”; (2) “EF Airlines is trustworthy”; (3) “EF Airlines is reliable”; (4) “I doubt about the quality of EF Airlines”; (5) “I lost my confidence in the EF Airlines’ planes and services”; (6) “The EF Airlines’ planes and services are trustworthy”; and (7) “The EF Airlines’ planes and services are reliable”. Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at the extremes ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The seven measurement items were adapted from Lee (2004). Items 2, 3, 6, and 7 were reverse coded. The index was also reliable (α = .90).

Results

Manipulation Check

To ascertain whether the experimental manipulations were effective, independent t tests for causal attribution by news story type were conducted. First, for the locus of responsibility, the higher the value was for the variable, the more likely the participant was to perceive an external crisis, whereas the lower the value was, the more likely the participant was to perceive an internal crisis. The mean for the manipulation check was higher in the external condition (M = 4.55, SD = 0.80) than in the internal condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.07), and there was a significant difference in the means, t(45) = −2.95, p = .005. Regarding the organizational control, the higher the value was for the variable, the more likely the participant was to perceive a controllable crisis whereas the lower the value was, the more likely the participant was to perceive an uncontrollable crisis. The mean for the manipulation check was higher in the controllable condition (M = 4.78, SD = 0.58) than in the uncontrollable condition (M = 3.24, SD = 0.85), and there was a significant difference in the means, t(45) = 7.24, p = .001.

Second, for checking the level of responsibility in an apology, the higher value reflected the greater degree of perceived responsibility, and the lower value indicated the less degree of perceived responsibility. The mean for the manipulation check was higher in a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 4.65, SD = 2.27) than in a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 3.21, SD = 2.21), and there was a significant difference in the means, t(45) = 2.21, p = .032. Regarding the level of sympathy in an apology, the higher value reflected the greater degree of perceived sympathy, and the lower value indicated the less degree of perceived sympathy. The mean for the manipulation check was higher in a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 6.50, SD = 0.72) than in a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.83, SD = 2.01), and there was a significant difference in the means, t(45) = −6.12, p = .001.

Hypotheses Testing

This study proposed two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 stated that under an internal/controllable crisis situation, participants who read a sympathy-oriented apology are more likely to (a) feel angry, (b) hold a negative impression, and (c) distrust an airline company than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology. Also, Hypothesis 2 presented that under an external/uncontrollable crisis situation, participants who read a sympathy-oriented apology are less likely to (a) feel angry, (b) hold a negative impression, and (c) distrust an airline company than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology. The two hypotheses were tested by comparing appropriate cell means with Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) test (see Table 1). To place the results into a larger context, hypotheses tests were conducted as follow-up tests to a series of two-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs).

Table 1.

A Series of Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of Causal Attribution and Apology Type on Public Anger, Negative Impression, and Distrust of EF Airlines After Reading One of the Four Types of Corporate Apologies.

Main and interaction effects	Degree of anger toward EF Airlines					Degree of negative impression toward EF Airlines					Degree of distrust in EF Airlines
Main and interaction effects	M	SD	F	df	p	M	SD	F	df	p	M	SD	F	df	p
Factors
Causal attribution			8.86	1	.003**			5.55	1	.020*			4.89	1	.028*
Internal-controllable crisis (N = 96)	4.05	0.91				4.05	0.93				4.17	0.88
External-uncontrollable crisis (N = 96)	3.68	0.83				3.76	0.79				3.89	.94
Apology type			2.28	1	.133			1.25	1	.265			3.53	1	.062
Responsibility-oriented apology (N = 96)	3.77	0.79				3.84	0.73				3.91	0.74
Sympathy-oriented apology (N = 96)	3.96	0.97				3.98	1.00				4.15	1.06
Interaction (Causal attribution × Apology type)			4.87	1	.029*			4.64	1	.033*			2.89	1	.091
Internal × Responsibility (N = 48)	3.82^a	0.73				3.85^a	0.67				3.94^a	0.62
Internal × Sympathy (N = 48)	4.28^a	1.02				4.25^a	1.10				4.41^a	1.04
External × Responsibility (N = 48)	3.72	0.86				3.83	0.78				3.87	0.85
External × Sympathy (N = 48)	3.64	0.80				3.70	0.79				3.90	1.03

Significant group difference between responsibility-oriented apology and sympathy-oriented apology in an internal/controllable causal condition.

p < .05. **p < .01.

A two-way ANOVA test showed that anger revealed a significant main effect for causal attribution, F(1, 192) = 8.86, p = .003, η² = .044, and a significant attribution-by-apology interaction, F(1, 192) = 4.87, p = .029, η² = .024. We tested Hypotheses 1a and 2a with LSD tests. As Table 1 shows, the group who read a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 4.28, SD = 1.02) felt angry more about the company than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.82, SD = 0.73, p = .009) in an internally caused crisis situation. Hypothesis 1a was supported.

Results also showed that the group who read a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 3.64, SD = 0.80) felt angry slightly less than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.72, SD = 0.86, p = .622) in an externally caused crisis situation. These results while consistent in direction with our prediction were not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2a was not supported.

A two-way ANOVA test showed that negative impression demonstrated a significant main effect for causal attribution, F(1, 192) = 5.55, p = .020, η² = .028, and a significant attribution-by-apology interaction, F(1, 192) = 4.64, p = .033, η² = .023. We tested Hypotheses 1b and 2b with LSD tests. As Table 1 showed, the group who read a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 4.25, SD = 1.10) held more negative impression about the company than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.85, SD = 0.67, p = .022) in an internally caused crisis situation. Hypothesis 1b was supported.

Results also revealed that the group who read a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 3.70, SD = 0.79) held slightly less negative impression than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.83, SD = 0.78, p = .465) in an externally caused crisis situation (see Figure 1). These results while consistent in direction with our prediction were not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2b was not supported.

Figure 1.

Interaction effects of causal attribution and apology type on public anger and negative impression toward EF Airlines.

A two-way ANOVA test showed that distrust revealed a significant main effect for causal attribution, F(1, 192) = 4.89, p = .028, η² = .025. The attribution-by-apology interaction approached but did not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance, F(1, 192) = 2.89, p = .091. We tested Hypotheses 1c and 2c with LSD test. Results indicated that the group who read a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 4.41, SD = 1.04) distrusted the company more than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.94, SD = 0.62, p = .012) in an internally caused crisis situation. Hypothesis 1c was supported.

Results also showed that the group who read a sympathy-oriented apology (M = 3.90, SD = 1.03) distrusted the company slightly more than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology (M = 3.87, SD = 0.85, p = .900) in an externally caused crisis situation. These results were not statistically significant and, in fact, were contrary in direction to our prediction. Hypothesis 2c was not supported.

Discussion

Significance of the Study

This study examined the effects of causal attribution and apology type on publics’ cognitive and affective responses: (1) public anger, (2) negative impression, and (3) distrust. To be specific, this study focused on testing whether two types of corporate apology (i.e., responsibility-oriented vs. sympathy-oriented) are contingent on causal attribution.

The study found that participants who perceived a crisis as being caused by EF Airlines’ internal factors showed a significantly higher level of anger, negative impression, and distrust toward the company than those who perceived the crisis as being caused by external factors. This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., McDonald et al., 2010; Moon & Rhee, 2012). More importantly, participants who read a sympathy-oriented apology showed a significantly higher level of anger, negative impression, and distrust toward EF Airlines than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology in an internally caused crisis situation. In contrast, in an externally caused crisis situation, participants who read a sympathy-oriented apology showed a slightly lower level of anger and negative impression toward EF Airlines than those who read a responsibility-oriented apology, but the difference was not statistically significant.

Therefore, the type of apology moderated the relationship between causal attribution and the publics’ cognitive and affective responses. Previous studies showed that when a crisis situation had a moderate level of causal attribution or the cause of a crisis was not identified, both responsibility and sympathy had similar effects on public responses (see Choi & Lin, 2009a; Coombs & Holladay, 2008). However, this study showed that when publics perceive a crisis as being caused by internal factors, a responsibility-oriented apology is more effective than a sympathy-oriented apology in generating positive public responses. This finding is consistent with the results of a previous study demonstrating that although an apology actively admitting responsibility contributed to reliving pubic anger, an apology focusing on sympathy failed to reduce public anger in an internally caused crisis situation (Lee & Chung, 2012). As the results of the main effects showed, publics tend to have the higher level of negative responses toward an organization in an internally caused crisis situation than an externally caused one. This may lead publics to be more critical about responsibility issues in a crisis message. Also, it is possible that as people generally have a skeptical and negative attitude toward an organization in an internally caused crisis situation, they may perceive a sympathy-oriented apology as self-defense or flowery rhetoric when the attribution of the crisis is obvious.

In contrast, a sympathy-oriented apology produced a slightly lower level of anger and negative impression than a responsibility-oriented apology when publics perceived a crisis as being caused by external factors. Although statistically insignificant, these findings were consistent in direction with our predictions. If a sympathy-oriented apology generates a more positive or at least a similar level of anger and negative impression as a responsibility-oriented apology in an externally caused crisis, the sympathy-oriented apology can be a strategically better option because it ensures a legal protection in court (Myers, 2016). On the other hand, the findings showed that although statistically insignificant, a sympathy-oriented apology produced a slightly higher level of distrust than a responsibility-oriented apology in an externally caused crisis situation. In general, the two outcome variables, anger and negative impression, can be immediately changed after individuals evaluate crisis responsibility or the message from an organization, whereas it takes considerable time to recover trust after an organization is involved in a crisis issue (Adams et al., 2010). This finding suggests that although a sympathy-oriented apology might be a smart choice to relieve immediate negative public responses and protect an organization from potential litigation in an externally caused crisis situation, crisis managers should not think that the one-time delivery of a sympathy message will be sufficient to reduce distrust from the various publics. Thus, it is important for an organization to make a continuous effort (e.g., a promise of corrective action and its fulfillment) to rebuild trust with publics in the postcrisis stage.

The findings of the current study have theoretical and practical implications for crisis communication research. First, the current study highlighted the importance of a corporate apology in an aviation crisis scenario. As noted, a massive airline accident captures the attention of government, the media, and the public. A large number of casualties leaves an indelible impression on those who are directly or indirectly affected by the tragic event (Ray, 1999). This situation requires an airline company to engage ethically with many different groups of people (Kim, 2013; Xu & Li, 2013). A corporate apology can be an appropriate communication tool for the company from an ethical perspective. When a crisis is the result of internal causes, the airline company is responsible for the situation, so a crisis message admitting its fault is an optimal approach to meet the ethical demand from the various publics. Also, when a crisis is caused by an external factor, a corporate apology expressing concern about the affected groups of people helps amend the negative situation and win forgiveness from the public by demonstrating the company’s ethical authenticity (Bauman, 2011; Diers-Lawson & Pang, 2016). The recent AirAsia crisis reflects the importance of ethical communication in an airline crisis. Once the AirAsia crash occurred, the company’s chief executive, Tony Fernandes, continuously expressed his condolences to victims and compassion for the victims’ families on Twitter. His quick and sincere response to the crisis generated positive media reports and public evaluations of the company (Stevenson & Gough, 2014).

Second, the current study incorporated causal attribution into the effect of responsibility and sympathy and found significant interaction effects on public responses (i.e., anger, negative impression). Although previous studies tested the effects of responsibility and sympathy, they simply compared the impacts of two components without identifying a causal attribution level or assigned a moderate causal attribution level (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 2008; DiStaso, Vafeiadis, & Amaral, 2015; Hill & Boyd, 2013). This led the researchers to inconsistent results when they examined the effects of the two components in different contexts. In contrast, applying the mechanism of SCCT to an aviation crisis scenario, this study showed that causal attribution is pivotal to predicting various publics’ cognitive and affective responses.

Third, this study demonstrated the strategic value of a corporate apology from both public relations and legal perspectives. When an aviation crisis occurs, crisis managers are responsible for developing and managing a crisis communication strategy. The findings of this study suggest that the public perception of causal attribution should be considered to determine an appropriate communication strategy. For example, when an airline company has clear fault in a crisis, crisis managers need to consider that a crisis message accepting responsibility is a better option to reduce negative public responses than a message expressing sympathy. On the other hand, when an airline company is not obviously responsible for a crisis, a sympathy-oriented apology is a viable option because it helps the company immediately relieve negative public responses and place itself in a less risky legal position. However, the one-time transmission of a sympathy message might have adverse effects on an airline company’s reputation and thus the apologetic communication should be continuously implemented to demonstrate its sincerity.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study

The current study has several limitations. First, this study may have oversimplified the complicated nature of crisis communication when examining the effects of apology messages on public responses. In general, a crisis management process concerns two broad objectives: (1) protecting publics from any potential risk and (2) protecting an organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2009). In the light of these goals, scholars have recommended that organizations address the physical and psychological threats to victims by providing risk information before delivering a crisis message to repair a reputation (Coombs, 2007; Chung & Lee, 2016; Sturges, 1994). Although both responsibility and sympathy are major components of a corporate apology, they are used in attempts to lessen negative reactions from the organization’s various publics and protect its reputation. To better understand the effects of apology messages as a part of the crisis management process, future research should incorporate a risk communication element (e.g., information) into a corporate apology when examining its effects.

Along with risk information, a risk perception perspective must be considered. Scholars have maintained that individuals’ beliefs or values strongly affect their judgment of potential risks (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1981). For instance, when individuals perceive that a certain risk is uncontrollable and involuntary, they tend to express greater concern about the issue (Slovic, 1987). This conceptual approach suggests that laypeople’s perceptions can be appropriately understood when we consider three major points: (1) what the risk is about (i.e., risk perception), (2) who is to blame for the problem (i.e., causal attribution), and (3) what can be done to remedy the situation (i.e., risk information) (Rodriguez & Lee, 2016). Indeed, a massive aviation crisis involves a serious safety issue that occurs randomly. This may influence the way publics perceive an aviation crisis regarding its potential risk and subsequently affect how they respond to causal attribution and the apology from an airline company. Thus, future research should embrace a risk perception perspective to investigate how publics “actually” perceive an aviation crisis.

Third, the manipulation of apology messages is limited to a text format. Although the operational definitions of apology messages were properly suggested in the study, it was difficult to compare the two types of messages (i.e., responsibility vs. sympathy) in a text format because the apology messages can be processed differently, depending on the causal attribution. According to the elaboration likelihood model, when message recipients are motivated to process information, they assess a message argument via a central route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, when message recipients have little or no motivation to process information, they tend to rely on a simple inference or an affective association (e.g., visual image, sound) via a peripheral route. In an internally caused crisis situation, participants may be motivated to centrally process information, so they may evaluate an apology message by focusing on a concrete argument. In contrast, in an externally caused crisis situation, participants may be less motivated to centrally process information and thus they may rely on a simple inference rather than the argument quality when assessing the message. Thus, future research can use a video format to examine how participants process information from an apology message in a different causal attribution level.

Fourth, the current study measured the participants’ cognitive and affective responses with survey questionnaires right after reading the apology. It is unclear how this artificial setting of apology timing influenced people’s responses even though the participants were informed that two documents were dated one day apart in the description of the apology. Also, using a single message design based on an airplane crash limits the generalizability of the findings. Since the effects of apologies may differ from one message to another, the apology used in this study may not apply to all aviation crisis cases or contexts. To obtain more valid results, employing multiple messages in the experiment should be considered in future research.

Footnotes

Appendix A

Appendix B

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Surin Chung is a doctoral student of the School of Journalism at University of Missouri Columbia. His research interest includes public relations, crisis and risk communications, and digital media. He received his master’s degree in Journalism and Communication from Iowa State University. He is a former public relations professional in South Korea.

Suman Lee is an associate professor at the Greenlee School of Journalism and Communication, Iowa State University. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on international public relations, image/reputation management, public diplomacy, and strategic communication. He received his PhD in mass communication from Syracuse University.

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