The Value of Brand Fans during a Crisis: Exploring the Roles of Response Strategy,Source,and Brand Identification

Abstract

Using a two (crisis response strategy: diminish vs. rebuild) × three (source: brand organization vs. brand executive vs. brand fan) experimental design, this study examines how brand fans (i.e., consumers who identify with a brand) can be prompted to protect a brand’s reputation during crises and how the selection of a crisis spokesperson can influence consumers’ evaluations of the crisis communication. Being buffers for their preferred brands, brand fans are more likely to accept their brand’s crisis response and engage in positive electronic word-of-mouth on social media. Brand fans are more likely to evaluate other brand fan’s social media accounts as a credible crisis communication source, whereas those who are not brand fans are more likely to evaluate brand and/or brand executives as credible. Findings provide theoretical applications in paracrisis literature pertaining to social media but also practical implications for brand managers to strategically utilize brand fans in crisis communication.

Keywords

brand crisis communication paracrisis brand fan buffering effects source credibility social mediated crisis communication Apple

Social media has greatly altered the crisis communication process by enabling interactive communication between an organization and its stakeholders. Researchers argue that the Internet and social media have increased audiences’ demand for immediacy regarding organizational responses during both crises and paracrises (Coombs, 2014; Malone & Coombs, 2009). The interactive and dialogic nature of social media makes it possible for stakeholders and organizations to disseminate crisis information while also participating in crisis communication (Austin et al., 2012; Valentini, 2015). While Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 2007) has been widely used for guiding crisis response strategies intended to minimize organizational reputation damage caused by a crisis, crisis communication scholars have recently called for its limited theoretical application to the current crisis communication environment including paracrises and the increasing role of social media. A paracrisis “can look like a crisis and does require action from a brand/organization but does not need to make a crisis team and operate actual crisis management” (Coombs & Holladay, 2012, p. 408). Researchers have noted the influence of social media on increasing the number of paracrises, which calls for timely crisis prevention plans (Coombs & Holladay, 2012; Lim, 2017; Roh, 2017). In order to address this gap in the SCCT literature, this study investigates the effectiveness of SCCT in an actual paracrisis, 2018 iPad Pro Bending. Specifically, we explored (1) how the rebuild strategy vs. Apple’s diminish strategy (following SCCT’s guideline) influences stakeholders’ evaluations of organizational reputation and crisis communication outcomes, (2) the influence of different crisis response sources on the evaluation, and (3) the role of Apple brand fans in crisis communication. It is of particular interest how brand fans (i.e., consumers who identify with a brand) can be prompted as a crisis communication source to protect a brand’s reputation during crises. In addition, this study aims to shed light on how the selection of a crisis spokesperson can influence consumers’ evaluations of source credibility and the crisis communication outcomes.

Scholars have previously evaluated how crisis information sources influence the public’s crisis emotions (Jin et al., 2014) and evaluations of credibility (van Zoonen & van der Meer, 2015; Yang et al., 2010), both of which contribute to differing levels of post-crisis organizational reputation (Opitz et al., 2018; Park & Cameron, 2014). However, crisis scholars have paid limited attention to how brand fans can be prompted to engage in crisis communication. In this study, we conceptualize brand fans as those who have high levels of consumer brand identification, memorable brand experience, brand loyalty, brand advocacy, and brand commitment (Stokburger-Sauer et al., 2012; Tuškej et al., 2013). We suggest brand fans can function as a credible crisis communication source as well as buffers, who will be more accepting of their brand’s crisis response and more likely to engage in positive electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM). Indeed, Ma (2020) identified that consumer brand identification (CBI) increases the effectiveness of corporate response strategies in the context of preventable corporate crises. The concept of consumer brand identification refers to how similar consumers, themselves, feel toward a brand, and has been found to profoundly impact consumer satisfaction and loyalty (Tuškej et al., 2013). Namely, consumers’ identification with a brand can contribute to buffering effects, which protect organizations during crises (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Koerber & Zabara, 2017). Extending from the buffering effects of CBI suggested by Ma (2020), this study further explores the effects of brand identification and the extent to which highly identified stakeholders, or “brand fans,” can function as a influential crisis communication source.

Previous research has predominantly examined the buffering effects of a pre-existing, favorable relationship that prompts stakeholders, including brand fans, to perceive less negativity associated with a crisis, and accept the organization’s crisis response. Recently, researchers have recognized the role of sports fans as “active stakeholders” who display a willingness to speak out on behalf of an organization with which they identify and attempt to protect it in times of crises (Brown et al., 2015), which could serve as another buffering effect in crisis communication. In this study, we seek to extend this concept to the corporate branding context, particularly “cult brands,” arguing that brand fans have the potential to bring buffering effects by siding with a brand during a paracrisis and speaking on its behalf as a source of social mediated crisis communication.

This study uses a two (crisis response strategy: diminish vs. rebuild) × three (source: brand vs. brand executive vs. brand fan) experimental design to explore the role of crisis information sources and brand identification in crisis communication during a paracrisis. Moreover, we investigate how source credibility and brand identification influence the overall effectiveness of a crisis response strategy, which will shed light on how Apple and other brands should foster relationships with key stakeholders and brand communities to aid them during paracrises.

Case Background: 2018 iPad Pro Bending

In 2018, Apple was inundated with complaints from consumers who noticed a bend in their newly purchased iPad Pros. While Apple confirmed that some 2018 iPad Pros shipped with a very slight bend, they claimed it was a normal result of a cooling process involving the product’s manufacturing (Welch, 2018). Given Apple’s recent history of bending issues with their iPhone 6 models, consumers soon began referring to this issue as “Apple Bendgate 2.0” (Cook, 2018). Following Apple’s initial response, Apple’s Vice President (VP) of hard engineering, Dan Riccio sent an email providing additional explanation in response to the bend issue. While the 2018 iPadPro bending issue did not develop into a full crisis situation that evokes serious consumer activism (e.g., boycott), there were divergent—mostly negative and unsatisfying—reactions from consumers and reviewers, leading some to go “viral” in various online media platforms including news articles, digital forums, and YouTube channels.

Literature Review

Paracrisis

Given that the 2018 iPad Pro bending issue did not develop to a crisis level, we consider it as a paracrisis which “can look like a crisis and [does] require action from a brand/organization but does not need to make a crisis team and operate actual crisis management” (Coombs & Holladay, 2012, p. 408). Coombs and Holladay (2012) define a pracrisis as “a publicly visible crisis thereat that charges an organization with irresponsible or unethical behavior” (p.409). A paracrisis is considered as a crisis threat which could escalate into a crisis. As researchers noted, social media’s influence has likely led to an increase in the number of paracrises affecting individuals and organizations, which calls for timely crisis prevention plans (Coombs & Holladay, 2012; Lim, 2017; Roh, 2017). Indeed, the 2018 iPadPro bending issue received public attention mostly on social media and from online newspapers. Furthermore, a majority of related communication was also on online (e.g., Apple VP’s email, Apple’s response on their official website). While consumers reacted to the 2018 iPad Pro bending with online complaints, their reactions did not escalate to more substantial actions of consumer activism such as boycotts, which supports the classification of this scenario as a paracrisis. When managing a paracrisis, researchers suggest timely crisis prevention plans are especially required in social media environment (Lim, 2017; Roh, 2017). Moreover, brand managers must carefully navigate online, visual mockery which may exert more power in evoking negative consumer affects (Lim, 2017) and may reemerge if faced with future, similar situations (i.e., consumers’ continuation of “Apple Bendgate” moniker). Therefore, studies of such paracrisis management, particularity in an online setting, is timely important for both practitioners and researchers.

Situational Crisis Communication Theory

Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) is a key theoretical approach that guides crisis mangers in their selection of crisis response strategies based upon the type of crisis that envelops an organization (Coombs, 2007). Along with attribution theory (Weiner, 1986, 1995), SCCT divides the crisis types into three categories depending on the level of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization: (1) victim crises—very little attribution of crisis responsibility; (2) accidental crisis—certain, but low attribution of crisis responsibility; and (3) preventable (or intentional)—strong attribution of crisis responsibility to the organization. In order to repair or reduce the damage to an organization’s reputation, SCCT suggests four main response postures, each of which contain various response strategies: (1) deny—arguing no organizational responsibility or casting doubt on the very existence of a crisis, (2) diminish—reducing organizational responsibility or negative effects of the crisis, and (3) rebuild—using compensation and/or an apology. According to SCCT, deny, diminish, and rebuild strategies are most appropriate respectively for victim crises, accidental crises, and preventable crises (Coombs, 2006; 2007).

With SCCT, Coombs and Holladay (1996) suggest that the more responsibility consumers attribute to an organization involved in a crisis, the more accommodating the organization should be in their selected crisis response strategies. Thus, matching the correct level of accommodation to the level responsibility attributed to the type of crisis an organization faces will lead to a more positive reputational perception than either no response or a mismatched response. However, Claeys et al. (2010) argued that matching crisis types and crisis responses does not necessarily prompt a more positive organizational reputation than mismatches. According to their research, regardless of crisis types, the reputations of an organization using rebuild strategies are more positive than the reputations of organizations using diminish strategies

SCCT in Paracrises

In addition to the contrary findings regarding the effectiveness of matching response strategy and crisis type, researchers have recently addressed the limitations of SCCT in paracrises (e.g., Dutta & Pullig, 2011; Freberg, 2012; Kim et al., 2016). Coombs and Holladay (2012) recommended that SCCT be applied to paracrises and altered the response strategy names from apology to reform, justification to refute, and denial to refuse. However, other scholars suggest that the SCCT application is not adequate to tackle paracrises, alleging that it does not fully consider the situation, audience, and social media environment. For instance, Freberg (2012) notes that the SCCT approach to praracrisis is too focused on reputation management and is insufficient in predicting how publics intend to comply with crisis safety messages. Dutta and Pullig (2011, p. 1281) also argued “a ‘one type fits all’ strategy for post-crisis responses can be suboptimal.” Furthermore, Kim et al. (2016) suggest that paracrisis management allows for unique approaches, as they determined that humor and self-mockery can be effective in turning a severe situation (close to crisis) into an entertaining situation.

Regarding the 2018 iPad Pro bending issue, Apple used a diminish strategy, addressing it as accidental with a certain, but low attribution of organizational crisis responsibility and attempting to minimize the negative effect of the bending (e.g., It did bend, but it is normal). According to SCCT, Apple’s response seemingly matched the crisis type. Apple did not deny their defective products (deny strategy), nor did they take full responsibility for them (rebuild strategy). However, it is important to note that this approach reflects Apple’s perspective and understanding of their bending issue rather than the consumers and publics’ perspectives (Dutta & Pullig, 2011). In addition, SCCT has not fully been investigated in the context of paracrises as researchers increasingly note. Given the public’s mostly negative and unsatisfying reactions to Apple’s statement, it is crucial to question the effectiveness of matching response and crisis type in case of the 2018 iPad Pro bending issue as a paracrisis. According to Claeys et al. (2010), Apple would have received more positive evaluation from publics if they used a rebuild strategy, by apologizing and taking responsibility on the bending issue. To wit, adopting a rebuild strategy might bring Apple better crisis communication outcomes including a greater acceptance of their crisis response and post-crisis organization reputation, as compared to the diminish strategy Apple actually used. Following Claeys et al. (2010)’s suggestion, we hypothesize:

H1: The use of response strategies from the rebuild posture will result in a greater acceptance of the crisis response (H1a) and higher post-crisis organizational reputation (H1b) as compared to the diminish strategy (Apple’s actual response).

Source of Social Mediated Crisis Communication

Besides the effectiveness of crisis response strategies and understanding crisis landscape changes (e.g., paracrises), scholars have increasingly explored the role of crisis information sources (Eaddy & Jin, 2018; Jin et al., 2014; Snoeijers et al., 2014; van Zoonen & van der Meer, 2015). An organization/company has been predominantly regarded as the crisis communication source. However, recently, the impact of employees’ participation in social-mediated crisis communication is of growing interest to researchers (Opitz et al., 2018; Snoeijers et al., 2014; van Zoonen & van der Meer, 2015). As Dreher (2014) states: “Today, employees’ participation in social media is more important than ever before, as they embody an organization’s corporate character and shape its reputation by functioning as powerful representatives of their organizations” (p. 345). Previous crisis communication research on the role of individual employees lies in the perceived credibility of their messages (van Zoonen et al., 2015) and themselves as sources (Opitz et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2010).

Here, the credibility perception of the employee refers to source credibility (e.g., expertise, trustworthiness). Researchers suggest that perceived credibility of employees as a crisis information source is tied to their unique psychological dimension during a crisis; they are closer to the organization and the crisis than other stakeholders (Helm, 2011), but they may be still viewed distinctly from their organization (Dreher, 2014). Employees are often not to blame for the company being involved in a crisis. Therefore, previous research explored the individual employees who are less burdened with the crisis responsibility in terms of their position level. van Zoon et al. (2015) suggest that individual employees are viewed as being more credible, and yet impartial sources of information during a crisis when using their personal social media accounts; however, research has not fully examined the effectiveness of brand executives, who possess a higher, more formalized company title, utilizing their personal social media accounts for crisis communication.

Regarding the source credibility of different sources in social-mediated crisis communication, scholars have also noted non-organizational sources such as well-trained spokesperson and customer (e.g., Kim & Park, 2007). Given that online third-party sources (e.g., electronic word-of-mouth) are more effective in influencing organizational credibility, researchers have examined source credibility of non-organizational sources in crisis communication. Previous studies suggest that individuals are likely to scrutinize organizational responses as they perceive organizations and organization-affiliated public relations practitioners as less credible in crisis communication (Callison, 2001; Stephens & Malone, 2010). Publics may distrust organizations and public relations practitioners, perceiving their affiliation to present the company favorably and often concealing some facts about the crisis (Callison, 2001). On the other hand, the third-party sources, in other words, non-organizational sources are perceived as more credible for their independence from the company (e.g., Wang & Doong, 2010; Van Hoye & Lievens, 2007). Contrary to previous online information processing research, non-organizational sources have not been found as more credible in recent online crisis communication studies. For example, Park and Cameron (2014) found that a public relations blogger was perceived as more credible and knowledgeable than a non-organizational blogger. In addition, the source credibility of bloggers was found to have the minimal effect on postcrisis outcomes including positive word-of-mouth intentions and attitude toward the company (Yang et al., 2010). According to Kim and Park (2007), the organizational sources were more likely to be perceived as more credible than the non-organizational sources, which was contradicting their hypothesis. Interestingly, CEO was found to be evaluated as the most trustworthy and credible in delivering crisis response (Kim & Park, 2007; Park & Cameron, 2014). To shed lights on these contradicting findings, the source credibility of source types and its effect on online crisis communication needs to be further examined.

Furthermore, scholars increasingly emphasize the influence of message credibility as well as source credibility from different source types in online paracrisis communication. Kim et al. (2016) revealed that stakeholders evaluated the CEO as a positive response source in online paracrisis communication. Roh (2017) also examined the effects of message source (e.g., CEO vs. individual real estate agent) on online paracrisis communication evaluation; the study found that CEO’s Twitter posts were evaluated as a more responsible message source when compared to an individual real estate agent’s Twitter posting. In addition, a body of online information-processing literature provides empirical support regarding the influence of credibility perceptions on individuals’ evaluations of a message (e.g., Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Metzger et al., 2010; Sundar, 2008) and implies the application in paracrisis communication, such that credibility judgements can be an important determinant for the effectiveness of crisis responses (Liu et al., 2011; Park & Cameron, 2014). Taken together, this study examines both source credibility and message credibility of different sources in online paracrisis communication, such as brand vs. brand executive vs. brand fans in case of Apple’s iPad Pro 2018 bending issue. Findings expectedly incorporate the scattered previous findings about the credibility of source types in crisis communication literature, while providing insights for online paracrisis communication with re-evaluation of an actual event management (Apple’s 2018 iPad Pro bending issue). In order to fully investigate the influence of source and message credibility on crisis response, the following research questions and hypotheses are proffered:

RQ1: Will the source that delivers the crisis response strategy (i.e., Apple, Apple’s VP, brand fan) impact how consumers evaluate the source’s credibility?

RQ2: Will the source that delivers the crisis response strategy (i.e., Apple, Apple’s VP, brand fan) impact how consumers evaluate the acceptance of crisis response (RQ2a) or the evaluation of post-crisis organizational reputation (RQ2b)?

H2: There will be a positive correlation between source credibility and acceptance of crisis response (H2a), and evaluation of post-crisis organizational reputation (H2b).

The Buffering Effects of Brand Identification and Brand Fans

Crisis communication researchers have emphasized that organizations who foster a favorable relationship history among their stakeholders can prompt a buffering effect that can help shield them from the negativity that a crisis can inflict on an organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Koerber & Zabara, 2017). Given the previously studied buffering effect of a favorable prior relationship, we propose that stakeholders with a more favorable prior relationship with a corporate brand—brand fans—are more likely to side with their preferred brand and accept the brand’s crisis response regardless of whether the crisis response strategie theoretically matches the crisis type or not. That is, brand fans would be more receptive to their brand’s crisis response strategy than others who are not brand fans given their heightened levels of identification with the brand, itself.

However, the classification of being a “brand fan” requires more than a simple, favorable relationship history with a company. Rather, brand fans include consumers who identify with their favorite brands and perceive the brand as a part of their self-concept, referred to as brand identification (Tuškej et al., 2013). McEwen (2005) also argues that consumers build powerful relationships with brands which help express and enhance their identities. Primary consumer-brand identification research lies in the perspective that brands help consumers fulfill their identities and projects (e.g., Belk, 1988; Escalas & Bettman, 2009; Fournier, 2009; Stokburger-Sauer et al., 2012). Theoretically, researchers have examined consumer-brand identification through the lens of both social identity theory and social psychology. According to Belén del Río et al. (2001), consumers can personally identify with a specific brand and develop their psychological state in relation to the brand; yet, they can also socially identify with the brand in order to associate or disassociate from the social groups.

Among the conceptualizations of consumer-brand identification, scholars have agreeably recognized the significant impact of consumer-brand identification on consumer behaviors including: brand loyalty (Bhattacharya et al.,1995; Kim et al., 2001), brand repurchase (Kuenzel & Vaux Halliday, 2008), psychological sense of brand community and brand commitment (Casaló et al., 2008), and positive word-of-mouth (Belén del Río et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001; Kuenzel & Vaux Halliday, 2008). Specifically, Tuškej et al. (2013) demonstrated a positive relationship between consumers’ brand identification and their commitment to the brand. Taken together, we conceptualize brand fans as those who have high level of consumer brand identification, memorable brand experience, brand loyalty, brand advocacy, and brand commitment (Stokburger-Sauer et al., 2012; Tuškej et al., 2013).

Recently, Ma (2020) suggested the buffering effects of consumer brand identification on consumers’ sympathy, such that consumer brand identification increases the effectiveness of corporate response strategies by consumer mitigating consumers’ negative reactions to crises. In other words, the potential influence of brand fans as a crisis information source has not yet been fully explored by crisis scholars. In the context of a paracrisis (Apple’s iPad Pro bending issue), we propose to further explore how varying levels of consumer brand identification could prompt potential buffering effects for brands in social mediated crisis communication.

Such powerful consumer-brand relationships, especially built on a consumer’s identification with a brand, can also be extended to include others (Koerber & Zabara, 2017). Brown et al. (2005) noted that a consumer’s increased identification can influence heightened levels of commitment to the brand that result in a higher willingness to engage in positive word-of-mouth on the brand’s behalf. Thus, in addition to coping with a crisis response from their brand, brand fans may conduct actual protective actions by speaking out on the brand’s behalf and attempting to persuade other consumers in favor of the brand. In fact, sports crisis communication scholars have recently identified the role of fans as “active stakeholders” who are highly identified with their sporting organization and thereby, are willing to speak out publicly on behalf of their organization during a crisis (Brown et al., 2015). Like sports fans, brand fans show loyalty to their brand, share identification and values with it, and feel emotional attachment to it (Fournier, 1998). They also form online brand communities and post assorted brand content (Habibi et al., 2014). Brand fans advocate for their preferred brands on their social media pages and may even attack rival brands (Ilhan et al., 2018).

Here, we suggest that such social media activities can also occur with efforts to protect their preferred brand during a crisis. More importantly, brand fans can go beyond their network and reach other stakeholders and publics, which influences their perceptions of brand reputation and evaluations of crisis communication response strategies. Indeed, Opitz et al. (2018) suggest that consumers have equally effective power on their organization’s reputation as employees have, during a crisis. Thus, it is critical to examine the extent to which brand fans are willing to speak out on behalf of their preferred brands during a crisis. This is especially important to examine within the context of “cult brands” such as Apple, as they have strong, highly identified consumer bases (Belk & Tumbat, 2005; Kahney & Pierini, 2019; Muniz & Schau, 2005).

Given that brand fans actively engage in brand crisis communication, we propose to view brand fans as a potentially influential sources of social-mediated crisis communication. In the modern social media environment, it is highly possible for an individual to learn of a company’s crisis response from an individual stakeholder before reading it from the official organizational source. However, the potential influence of brand fans as a crisis information source has not yet been fully explored by scholars. More and more, reputations are managed on a “person-to-person” basis, as increasingly “in social media, people talk with people, not organizations” during the times of crisis (Rokka et al., 2014, p. 818; p.819). Thereby, brand fans may have the potential to influence consumers’ perception of the brand’s crisis communication by personalizing it. As such, the following hypothesis and research questions will explore the influence of brand identification and its influence on consumer crisis evaluations and their evaluations of source credibility:

H3: Consumers who have higher levels of brand identification (i.e., brand fans) will be more likely to (H3a) accept Apple’s crisis response and (H3b) report more positive evaluations of post-crisis reputation, regardless of selected response strategy.

RQ3: To what extent does a consumer’s level of brand identification affect their evaluations of source credibility?

RQ4: To what extent does a consumer’s level of brand identification influence their willingness to engage in positive electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) communication on Apple’s behalf?

RQ5: Do selected crisis response strategy and source interact to impact (RQ5a) source credibility, (RQ5b) acceptance of crisis response, (RQ5c) post-crisis organizational reputation, and (RQ5d) positive electronic word-of-mouth when controlling for one’s level of brand identification?

Method

Design and Procedure

A two (crisis response strategy: diminish vs. rebuild) × three (source: brand organization vs. brand executive vs. brand fan) full factorial experimental design was conducted in this study. In order to check the validity of stimuli and study design, a pretest of twenty-nine college students was conducted. After completion of their study participation, the student participants received extra course credits. Following the pretest results, some questionnaire items were edited for clarity.

For the main study, participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) study participation. Given the voluntary participation of MTurk users and its representativeness, researchers have indicated its validity for testing theory-based relationships (Kees et al., 2017). First, participants reported whether or not they were fans of Apple, by self-reporting and indicating their brand identification, memorable brand experiences, brand loyalty, brand advocacy and brand commitment (i.e., brand fan measurement). In the experiment, they were instructed to read a selection from an article that was published in The Verge regarding Apple’s iPad Pro bending issue (Welch, 2018). After reading the article, respondents were asked to assess the responsibility of Apple on their bending issue, and were, then, exposed to either one of three Twitter timelines (i.e., Apple’s official Twitter vs. Apple Vice President’s Twitter vs. Apple fan’s Twitter) which delivered Apple’s response to the bending issue (i.e., diminish strategy vs. rebuild strategy). Lastly, participants answered post-questionnaires including an evaluation of the tweet messages, acceptance of Apple’s response, Apple’s post-crisis reputation, and demographic information. After completing their study participation, the participants were compensated.

Stimulus

Six conditions of stimulus: two (crisis response strategy: diminish vs. rebuild) × three (source: Apple vs. Apple VP vs. Apple fan) were constructed for this study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. In order to make a clear distinction between the organization’s official Twitter account and the two individuals’ (e.g., Apple VP, Apple fan) Twitter account, the Apple account had a professional touch using their actual official website image, while the Apple VP account and the Apple fan account were personalized with a personal biography including their professional identifications. The Apple VP’s account and the Apple fan’s account have the same number of following and followers, to control for similar perceived social influences of the two individuals.

In turn, each crisis-response strategy (e.g., diminish vs. rebuild strategy) contained four tweets that were posted on the Twitter timeline of either the brand account, the brand executive account, or the brand fan account. For the diminish strategy, the tweets contained the actual statements that Apple and Apple’s VP used in response to the news report over the bending issue, such as: “Our new iPad Pro model meets or exceeds all of Apple’s high quality standards of design an precision manufacturing (Owen, 2018),” and “We confirm some iPad Pros ship slightly bent but it’s normal” (Welch, 2018). The rebuild strategy included tweets admitting Apple’s defect and their apologies such that: “We will do our best to make our new iPad Pro model meet or exceed all Apple’s high quality standards of design and precision manufacturing,” and “We sincerely apologize to all those that have been affected by the deficiency to our new 2018 iPad Pro models.” By only changing the subject of each statement, we manipulated the sources of Twitter while keeping the same message content. To sum up, in the diminish strategy condition, participants were provided with the actual crisis response strategy that Apple and Apple’s VP used, whereas participants in the rebuild strategy condition were asked to evaluate a manipulated statement including an apology from. See Appendix A.

Participants

Participants (N = 197) who are U.S. residents, were recruited from an online labor market service, Amazon MTurk. Respondents were compensated for their participation. After filtering out two unqualified responses, the current study used the data from a total of 195 participants for analysis. The average age of the participants was 38.83 (SD = 11.71), and 54% were female and 46% were male. Majority of participants were Caucasian (n = 141, 72.3%) followed by Asian (n = 21, 10.8%), Hispanic (n = 20, 10.3%), African American (n = 8, 4.1%), Others (n = 5, 2.6%). Median annual household income was between $50,000 and $59,000. A majority of participants (n = 146, 75.4%) reported that they did not know about Apple’s iPad Pro (2018) bending issue before participating in our study.

Manipulation Check

For the manipulation check, participants were required to answer three questions after reviewing the Twitter timeline stimulus. To check the source manipulation, participants were asked to identify who the sender of the Twitter message was; the answer options were (a) Apple or (b) Apple VP—Dan Riccio or (c) Apple fan—Mark. To check the manipulation of the crisis response strategy and participants’ understanding of the Twitter messages, the following true/false questions were asked: “According to the Twitter message, does Apple consider the iPad Pro bend to be a defect?” and “According to the Twitter message, was there Apple’s apology for their iPad Pro bend?” According to the survey setting, only participants who had correctly answered the manipulation check questions were allowed to continue their study participation.

Measures

All self-reported items were measured using a 7-point Likert-scale. The measurement items are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1.

Scales Used in the Post-Questionnaire.

Scale	Mean (SD)	Questionnaire items
Brand fans	4.48	“I feel a strong sense of belonging to Apple.”
	(1.91)	“Thinking of Apple brings back good memories.”
	α = .99	“I am very loyal to Apple.”
		“I love to talk about the good points of Apple to people I know.”
		“I am very fond of Apple.”
Crisis responsibility	5.51	“The cause of this crisis was something the Apple could control.” “The blame for the crisis lies with Apple.”
	(1.05)	“Circumstances, not Apple are responsible for the crisis.” (reverse-coded)
	α = .80	“The cause of the bending issue is something that was manageable by Apple.”
		“The cause of the bending issue is something over which Apple had power.”
		“The blame for the bending issue lies in the circumstances, not Apple.”(reverse-coded)
Source credibility	4.40	“The sender of the Twitter message was believable.”
	(1.45)	“The sender of the Twitter message was trustworthy.”
	α = .88	“The sender of the Twitter message was biased.”(reverse-coded)
		“The sender of the Twitter message was completeness of information.”
		“The sender of the Twitter message was accurate.”
Acceptance of crisis response	4.42	“How acceptable do you think the actions taken by Apple are?”
Acceptance of crisis response	(2.00)	“How acceptable do you think the Apple’s response stated in the Twitter message is?”
	α = .80
Organizational post-crisis reputation	4.59	“Apple is concerned with the well-being of its publics.”
Organizational post-crisis reputation	(1.50)	“Apple is basically honest.”
	α = .87	“I do not trust Apple to tell the truth about the incident.” (reverse-coded)
		“Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what Apple says.”
		“Apple is not concerned with the well-being of its publics.” (reverse-coded)
Positive electronic word of mouth intention	3.18	“I would post messages on social media websites encouraging people to support Apple.”
Positive electronic word of mouth intention	(1.50)	“I would post messages on social media websites to support Apple’s response to their crisis”
	α = .98	“I would post messages on social media websites encouraging people to accept Apple’s response to their crisis.”
		“I would post messages on social media websites to make sure that others know I support Apple.”
		“I would post message on social media websites to help others’ understanding of Apple’s response to their crisis.”
		“In a way of supporting Apple, I would do social media activities (e.g., emoji like, comment, retweet) on the Twitter message I read.”

Brand fans

Participants were asked to report whether they are a fan of Apple (n = 139, 71.3%)) or not (n = 56, 28.7%). Participants also answered brand fan-scales based on previous consumer brand-identification literature (Stokburger-Sauer et al., 2012). In the current study, brand fandom was operationalized as the construct of brand identification, memorable brand experiences, brand loyalty, brand advocacy and brand commitment (see Appendix B). That is, we expect brand fans to score a higher mean of each construct and a higher overall mean than those who are not brand fans. The seventeen-item brand fan score measurement achieved the high reliability level with an alpha of .99. (M = 4.48, SD = 1.91). As expected, the respondents who identified themselves as fans of Apple (M = 5.48, SD = 1.03) showed a significantly higher score on the brand fan measurement than those who identified themselves not fans of Apple (M = 1.96, SD = 1.07), t(193) = 21.43, p < .001.

Crisis responsibility was measured using Griffin et al. (1992) three-item scale for blame and three-items from McAuley et al.’s (1992) scale assessing the dimensions of attribution such as the locus of causality, external control, and personal control. After reading an article about iPad Pro (2018)’s bending, participants were asked to assess Apple’s crisis responsibility (M = 5.51, SD = 1.05, Cronbach’s α = .80).

Source credibility indicates how credible consumers perceive the crisis communication source is. participants. It was measured (M = 4.40, SD = 1.45, Cronbach’s α = .88) adopting the five measurement items from Metzger et al. (2003).

Acceptance of crisis response represents how “agreeable” and “acceptable” consumers think the brand’s crisis response is (Jin, 2010), which is also called as ‘account acceptance’ (Park & Cameron, 2014). Participants’ acceptance of the response strategies offered by Apple was measured with two-items (M = 4.42, SD = 2.00, Cronbach’s α = .80).

Post-crisis organizational reputation was measured using five 7-point Likert scales adapted from Coombs and Holladay’s (1996) Organizational Reputation Scale (M = 4.59, SD = 1.50, Cronbach’s α = .87).

Positive electronic word-of-mouth intention

Adopting from previous literature (Brown et al., 2005), we developed positive electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) intention scale with five items, which assesses the extent to which consumers would actively voice their support for the brand (M = 3.18, SD = 1.50, Cronbach’s α = .98).

Results

Hypothesis 1 stated that strategies from the rebuild posture would result in a greater acceptance of the crisis response (H1a) and higher post-crisis organizational reputation (H1b) as compared to the diminish strategy (Apple’s actual response). Regarding the 2018 iPad Pro bending issue, the rebuild strategy resulted in a significantly greater acceptance of the crisis response (M = 5.37, SD = 1.46) than the diminish strategy, which Apple actually used (M = 3.40, SD = 2.00), t(193) = 7.87, p < .001, and a significantly more positive evaluation of organizational reputation (M = 5.37, SD = 1.46) than the defensive strategy (M = 3.97, SD = 1.46 ), t(193) = 6.09, p < .001. Therefore, both H1a and H1b were supported. Research question 1 queried whether different crisis response strategies would influence how consumers evaluated the source’s credibility. Results determined that when Apple used the rebuild strategy, participants also evaluated the source credibility (M = 4.87, SD = 1.39) significantly higher than when they actually used the diminish strategy, (M = 3.89, SD = 1.36), t(193) = 4.95, p < .001, thus, answering RQ1.

Using a General Linear Model (GLM), we examined the effects of sources that deliver the crisis response strategy (i.e., Apple, Apple’s VP, Apple fan) on the crisis communication outcomes along with source credibility. Participants did not evaluate source credibility significantly differently upon who delivered the crisis response strategy (i.e., Apple vs. Apple’s VP vs. Apple fan), F(2, 189) = .64, p > .05. However, interestingly, the evaluation of source credibility was significantly different upon what crisis response the source delivered, F(2, 189) = 6.62, p < .01. More specifically, when Apple fan delivered the diminish response strategy, participants perceived the source credibility significantly higher (M = 4.57, SD = 1.19) than when Apple (M = 3.70, SD = 1.25) and Apple’s VP (M = 3.51, SD = 1.42) delivered the crisis response, F(2, 91) = 5.66, p < .01. However, when it comes to the rebuild strategy, there was no significant difference in the evaluations of the source credibility between Apple, Apple’s VP and Apple fan, F(2, 98) = 1.61, p > .05. Regarding research question 2 (whether sources that deliver the crisis response strategy (i.e., Apple, Apple’s VP, Apple fan) impact how consumers evaluate the acceptance of crisis response (RQ2a) or post-crisis organizational reputation (RQ2b), results determined that participants did not evaluate the acceptance of crisis response and post-crisis organizational reputation significantly different upon the sources that deliver the crisis response strategy (i.e., Apple vs. Apple’s VP vs. brand fan), F(2, 192) = .36, p > .05; F(2, 192) = .37, p > .05, respectively . Thus, RQ2 was answered.

Hypothesis 2 posited that a positive relationship would exist between source credibility and (H2a) acceptance of crisis response and (H2b) consumers’ evaluation of organizational post-crisis reputation. Results showed that source credibility had a significantly positive influence on the acceptance of crisis response, β = .68, p < .001, and the evaluation of organizational post-crisis reputation, β = .65, p < .001.Thus, H2 was supported.

Hypothesis 3 suggested that participants who have higher levels of brand identification would be more likely to (H3a) accept Apples crisis response and (H3b) have a more positive post-crisis evaluation of Apple’s reputation. Results determined that participants who have higher levels of brand identification, memorable brand experiences, brand loyalty, brand advocacy, and brand commitment (i.e., Apple fans) were more likely to (H3a) accept Apple’s crisis response, β = .50, p < .001 and (H3b) report more positive evaluations of post-crisis reputation, β = .58, p < .001, regardless of the selected response strategy. Therefore, H3 was supported.

Research question 3 queried the extent to which a consumer’s level of brand identification would affect their evaluations of source credibility. We found that a consumer’s level of brand identification brings a positive impact on their evaluations of source credibility, β = .52, p < .001, which answered RQ 3. Research question 4 asked the extent to which a consumer’s level of brand identification would influence their willingness to engage in positive electronic word-of-mouth communication. Results determined that a consumer’s level of brand identification also had a positive effect on their willingness to engage in positive electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) communication on behalf of Apple, β = .69, p < .001, answering research question 4.

Lastly, General Linear Model (GLM) analysis was used to explore if the selected crisis response strategy and the source interact to impact the source credibility and the outcomes of post-crisis communication such as acceptance of crisis response, post-crisis organizational reputation, and positive electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) communication intention, when controlling for an individual’s brand fan score including brand identification, memorable brand experiences, brand loyalty, brand advocacy, and brand commitment (RQ5). There were no significant interaction effects of the crisis response strategy and the source on the acceptance of crisis response, F(2, 188) = .65, p > .05, and the post-crisis organizational reputation, F(2, 188) = .08, p > .05. However, we found that the selected crisis response strategy and the source significantly interacted to influence the source credibility, F(2,188) = 5.50, p < .01, the positive eWOM intention, F(2, 188) = 3.41, p < .05. Therefore, RQ5 was answered.

We furthermore examined how those results can change by self-identified brand fans (i.e., self-report of whether a participant is an Apple fan or not), not controlling for an individual’s level of brand identification. According to the GLM result, the interaction effects of the selected crisis response strategy and the sources did not change upon whether an individual is an Apple fan or not. However, the self-identified brand fan and the source significantly interacted to influence the source credibility, F(2, 183) = 6.20, p < .01. More specifically, participants who self-identified themselves as Apple fans evaluated the Apple fan account (M = 5.05, SD = 1.05) more significantly credible compared to Apple VP (M = 4.42, SD = 1.50), t(85) = 2.25, p < .05. On the other hand, participants who were not Apple fans evaluated Apple VP (M = 3.99, SD = 1.66) more significantly credible than Apple (M = 2.84, SD = 1.16), t(33) = 2.33, p < .05. Overall, Apple fan was evaluated the most credible for those who were Apple fans, whereas Apple’s VP was evaluated the most credible for those who were not Apple fans.

Discussion

This study sought to examine how crisis communication source and response strategy selection impacts crisis communication outcomes, especially in the context of paracrisis on social media. First, results of this study confirmed the findings of Claeys et al. (2010), suggesting that utilizing a response strategy from the rebuilding posture resulted in greater account acceptance and higher post-crisis reputation scores as compared to a strategy selected from the diminish posture. Furthermore, the rebuilding strategy also resulted in stakeholders rating the source as more credible. These findings add further support for the scholars’ recent assertion that SCCT is not sufficient to manage paracrises (Kim et al., 2016), especially its limitation of reputation management focus and the ‘one type fits all’ strategy (Dutta & Pullig, 2011; Freberg, 2012). Furthermore, this study sought to better understand how brand fans and source credibility influence crisis communication including stakeholders’ crisis response evaluations. Findings suggest brand fans can be prompted as a crisis communication source to protect a brand’s reputation during crises, which is more effective to other consumers who identify with the brand.

The Influence of Brand Fan and Consumer Brand Identification

Perhaps the most notable finding of this study pertains to the influence of brand fans on the crisis communication process as a potential crisis communication source as well as important stakeholders. Our results determined that brand fans who have higher levels of brand identification, memorable brand experience, brand loyalty, brand advocacy, and brand commitment (i.e., brand fan score) predict higher rates of crisis account acceptance, more positively rated organizational reputation scores, and higher scores of source credibility, suggesting that brand identification can act as a buffer for organizations in crisis and prompt more successful crisis outcomes. Notably, those scoring higher in our brand fan measurement also reported a greater willingness to engage in positive electronic word-of-mouth communication on the organization’s behalf, confirming previous research on consumer brand identification (Tuškej et al., 2013). This result suggests the possibility of highly identified consumers aiding brands during a crisis. As such, brands should harness and develop their relationships with customers as a necessary and integral component of the pre-crisis phase (Coombs, 2014).

Crisis communication scholars have noted that favorable relationships with stakeholders can provide a buffer to organizations during a crisis, resulting in less negative post-crisis evaluations (Kim, 2017). The current study extended previous crisis work (Brown et al., 2015) beyond the context of sport by examining brand fans– the most favorable relationships a company or brand can have with its stakeholders—in a corporate context. Indeed, participants who identified themselves as Apple fans reported higher scores in every construct of brand fan those who were not Apple fans including consumer brand identification. Ma (2020) recently identified the buffering effect of consumer brand identification on consumer’s sympathy, mitigating consumers’ negative reactions to crises and thereby, increasing the effectiveness of corporate crisis response. In support of previous studies, our study not only found the buffering effects of consumer brand identification on crisis response including crisis response acceptance and organizational reputation, but also suggested the potential of bolstering brand communities (i.e., the role of brand fans as a crisis information sources) during a crisis.

However, to highlight the role of brand identification in crisis communication (Ma, 2020), we suggest future studies for developing brand fan measurement in order to fully explore the interactive relationships between brand identification and other different outcomes of favorable relationship history (e.g., brand satisfaction, brand loyalty, and brand commitment). It is important to note that a favorable relational history may not necessarily lead an individual to identify with a brand. For example, consumers who have satisfaction with a brand may not identify with a brand and evaluate corporate crisis response differently despite previous brand satisfaction; indeed, Kuenzel and Vaux Halliday (2008) suggested that satisfaction impacts consumer-brand identification especially in the for-profit sector context, whereas Van Dick’s et al. (2004) proposed that organization identification mediates satisfaction to behavioral outcomes (e.g., turnover intention). Moreover, according to Stokburger-Sauer et al. (2012), consumer brand identification requires the congruity of consumer and brand values, but also mediates its impact on brand commitment. In a similar vein, the positive effect of consumer brand identification on corporate crisis response strategies is moderated by a threat to the self-defining attributes shared between consumers and a brand (Ma, 2020). Therefore, additional research needs to further examine the role of brand identification and interactions with likely moderators such as individual differences, self-defining attributes and other characteristics of favorable relational history with stakeholders in crisis communication. In order to tailor crisis communication to assorted stakeholders in favorable brand relationships, it is important to examine whether they identify with the brand and ascertain their relationship depth (i.e., brand fan), as our current study suggests.

Furthermore, given that social media prompts stakeholders to ask for more responsive and tailored crisis communication in terms of crisis information sources, as well as crisis information (Coombs, 2014; Jin & Liu, 2010; Malone & Coombs, 2009), future studies should further explore why brand fans would like to listen to other brand fan community members and what motivates them to speak out during a crisis. With the rise of social media and the increased prominence of active stakeholders (Brown et al., 2015), brands should cultivate brand communities to engage highly identified customers, especially “cult brands” such as Apple. Future research should explore whether such brand communities can be effective outlets for the dissemination of information during a crisis and whether they can inspire highly identified consumers to engage in positive eWOM communication.

Brand Identification and Source Credibility

Overall, the effectiveness of post-crisis communication was predominantly influenced by the crisis response strategy rather than the actual source that delivered the crisis response. Consumers have a greater account acceptance and a more positive evaluation of the organization’s post-crisis reputation when Apple used the response strategies from the rebuild posture than when Apple actually responded with the diminish strategies for the 2018 iPad Pro bending issue. Still, our finding suggests the positive impact of source credibility on the effectiveness of the crisis response strategy, including account acceptance and organizational post-crisis reputation, supporting van Zoonen & van der Meer’s (2015) previous research.

Broadly, participants did not perceive differing levels of source credibility based upon the source types (i.e., Apple vs. Apple’s VP vs. brand fan). However, differences in source credibility were observed when examining the influence of consumers self-identifying as a “fan” of Apple. Findings suggested that whether one self-identified as a “fan” of Apple impacted how they evaluated the credibility of the source who delivered the crisis response message and the credibility of the message, itself. For instance, self-identified brand fans rated both Apple and an Apple brand fan as being more credible than the Apple’s VP. In fact, self-identified Apple brand “fans” rated the Apple brand fan account as the most credible source, perhaps showcasing the strength of “in-group” membership.

Social identity theory (Turner & Tajfel, 1986) notes that people’s adherence to such social groupings can contribute to both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Thus, self-identified Apple “fans” likely view other Apple brand fan accounts as being a member of their “in-group,” and as such, ascribe heightened levels of credibility to their statements during times of crisis. This suggests that as brands seek to cultivate stronger relationships with their brand communities that influencer marketing could be a prominent and effective tactic. Thus, crisis scholars should continue to examine the influence and effectiveness of brand fans as potential paid spokespeople during times of crisis. Conversely to self-identified Apple brand “fans,” those who self-identified as not being “fans” of Apple rated both Apple’s VP and Apple brand fan as being more credible than Apple’s organizational account. Thus, for such casual consumers, it would seem that having an actual person, rather than an official, corporate account deliver crisis response messaging would result in higher levels of source credibility.

Combined, these results point to the importance of brands identifying their most loyal, identified customer base, as those who self-identify as “fans” of their brand evaluate crisis messages and brand spokespeople very differently from those who do not self-identify as “fans” of a brand. As targeting abilities improve, especially within digital media, using a more targeted, personalized crisis response strategy for different target audiences (e.g., brand fan vs. casual consumers) might prove to be effective. Thus, crisis scholars should continue to investigate the effectiveness of more personalized crisis response strategies and determine how brand communities and brand fan accounts can participate in the crisis response process.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

As the current study included only a single crisis and one brand company, future studies should examine different types of crises and brands to build empirical support for our findings. Although Apple was an appropriate “cult brand” to explore brand fans and consumer-brand identification in this present study, future studies need to analyze other cult brands to check the generalizability of our research findings. Product-harm crises can range from discrete, minor problems that simply inconvenience consumers to more serious problems that could result in more considerable damages and even deaths. Depending on the product-harm crisis severity, consumers attribute different levels of blame to a brand (Laufer et al., 2005), which may affect the outcomes of post-crisis communication in a function of different crisis response strategies and sources. In a product-harm crisis resulting in product-recalls and/or severe outcomes, the effectiveness of matching crisis response strategies to crisis type would be bigger as the literature on SCCT mainly suggests. Given the comparably lower degree of severity regarding the 2018 iPad Pro’s bending issue, which was treated as a paracrisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2012), findings still offer practical insights for brand managers. Consumers appreciate a brand’s rebuild posture though it may not theoretically match the level of crisis responsibility attributed to the brand. Scholars also documented an increase of paracrises prompted by social media and noted a growing importance of paracrisis management during crisis prevention (Lim, 2017; Roh, 2017). By exploring the different levels of crisis-severity, future studies may delineate certain crisis circumstances that demonstrates the effectiveness of matching crisis types and crisis responses strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).

Given that all three sources used in the experiment had a large number of followers, which indicates considerable social influence, this study did not seek to determine the influence of differing levels of social followings, which may be of particular importance to consumers’ evaluations of source credibility. Future studies need to explore what factors (such as follower counts) lead an individual to evaluate the source credibility differently in the social media environment. Furthermore, the social influence of brand fans (i.e., brand influencer vs. ordinary brand fan) might be rated far differently by consumers in terms of their credibility as a crisis information source.

It also needs to be noted that our current study used Apple’s VP which has authority in the position but also responsibility on the problematic products, unlike previous research using an ordinary employee (e.g., Opitz et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2010). Previous studies have focused the crisis information source credibility of individual employees in that they are less burdened with the crisis responsibility and often viewed distinct from their organization. Future research calls for a comparison of a high-status employee and a low-status employee in the credibility of the crisis source and following the effectiveness of post-crisis communication.

Lastly, it is recommended for future studies to have a larger sample size but also a better proportion of Apple fans and those who are not Apple fans. Given the tremendous popularity of Apple in its home country, United States, it might be difficult to recruit a balanced number of Apple fans and those who are not Apple fans from Amazon MTurk based on the voluntary participation. Current research has indicated the potential role of consumer brand identification in crisis communication even within a comparatively disproportionate participants in terms of consumer brand identification (e.g., Apple fan: n = 139, 71.3%; those who are not a fan of Apple: n = 56, 28.7%) However, using the quota service in other online panels or crowdsourcing websites, researchers would be able to recruit more proportionate samples. Thus, future studies are worthwhile to replicate the current findings with a larger sample and a balanced ratio of brand fans and those who are not.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the current study provides strong empirical support for the buffering effects of brand fans (e.g., Ma, 2020) boosting the effectiveness of crisis response strategies but also their potential role of being the influential crisis information source. That is, the selected crisis response strategy also interacts with the source to influence the outcome of the socially mediated crisis communication, including positive eWOM communication. In the context of paracrises, this study demonstrates the effectiveness of the rebuild crisis response strategy (Claeys et al., 2010; Dutta & Pullig, 2011) and different types of crisis information sources (Jin et al., 2014; Snoeijers et al., 2014; van Zoonen & van der Meer, 2015). This study applied SCCT to a paracrisis by examining Apple’s actual response (i.e., diminish strategy) versus the manipulated response (i.e., rebuild strategy) and analyzed the influence of brand fan twitter account being utilized as a crisis response source. Our findings contribute to the theoretical understanding of paracrises but also provide implications for developing SCCT in the context of paracrises on social media. As a practical implication for managing paracrises, we suggest the tactical use of brand fans in social mediated crisis communication during times of crisis.

Footnotes

Appendix A

Appendix B

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Hayoung Sally Lim

Author Biographies

Hayoung Sally Lim is a Phd candidate for Advertising in the Unviersity of Texas at Austin. Her research focueses on brand crisis communication on social media, consumer-brand relationship and consumer psychology. Her recent studies examines how social media empowers brand fans as well as consumers and stakeholders during a corporate crisis including paracrisis.

Natalie Brown-Devlin is an asssitant professor in the Stan Richards School of Advertising and Public Relations, Natalie Brown Devlin researches crisis communication and digitial media in the context of sport. Her work examines how social meida empowers organizational stakeholders during sports-related crises. She previously worked in digital advertising as a senior analyst of strategic account analytics, where she provided custom analyses and consumer insights to client marketing executives.

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