Religion,Race,and Othering Barack Obama

Abstract

The nascent literature on the propensity to endorse conspiratorial views of President Barack Obama suggests that such sentiments may be grounded in racial animus or political partisanship. Yet to date, little attention has been paid to the religious elements that may underlie such claims. We extend the research in this area by using a national survey to assess the relationship between white conservative Protestant affiliation and an inclination to endorse the idea that Obama is a Muslim and/or a noncitizen. The results show that white conservative Protestant affiliation is associated with a greater tendency to support these characterizations of Obama. Importantly, this relationship is substantially mediated by racial resentment. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the United States’ increasing ethnic and religious pluralism.

Keywords

political sociology race religion

One notable element of President Barack Obama’s rise to political prominence is the array of conspiratorial claims leveled against him. Dubious machinations about Obama have rapidly spread since his 2008 presidential candidacy. Perhaps most salient have been claims that (1) Obama is secretly a Muslim and (2) he is not eligible to be president because he was not born in the United States. Despite ample evidence to the contrary, these characterizations persist among both the general public and high-ranking public officials (e.g., Hollander 2010; Howell 2012). Such othering beliefs are important not only because they may shape views about the president’s policy agenda but also because they may delegitimize the president and identify him as a moral threat. Extant literature on the claims levied against Obama points to racial attitudes (Hughey 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010) and political conservatism (e.g., Hollander 2010; Howell 2012) as underlying sources. Yet our primary interest is in the potential religious aspects of othering Obama—an area that has received far less attention (but see Layman, Kalkan, and Green 2014).

Despite the fact that President Obama was born in Hawaii and is a longtime member of the United Church of Christ, it seems that some individuals either do not have this information or elect to disregard it. For instance, a 2010 Pew survey reveals that about 30 percent of white conservative Protestants endorse the idea that Obama is a Muslim (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010). Perhaps the prevalence of othering sentiments among these white Christians is unsurprising given that they have historically been prominent stalwarts of conservative politics (Brint and Schroedel 2009; Diamond 1995; Martin 1996). Conservative Protestants are often defined by their resistance to broader social norms and social change (Iannaccone 1994). Conservative Protestantism has been shaped by an imagery of contrasting worldviews that casts them in opposition to secular reason (Sherkat 2011; Worthen 2013). In this framework, topics such as racial and other minority rights, as well as abortion, constitute related threads of the same overarching moral threat of secularism (Ansell 2001; Hill, Moulton, and Burdette 2004; Roof and McKinney 1987; Sherkat 2014; Steensland and Wright 2014). Accordingly, conservative Protestants form tight social networks and uncompromising group boundaries to insulate their moral worldview against outsiders (Olson and Perl 2011; Rhodes 2012; Scheitle and Adamczyk 2009). Such boundaries may be enforced at least in part by demarcating perceived threatening others (Emerson and Smith 2000; C. Smith 1998, 2000:144). It would thus seem that many white sectarian Protestants view Obama as an embodiment of their broader concerns about social change, such as increasing religious and ethnic pluralism.

In light of the foregoing, our central research question is as follows:

Research Question 1: To what extent do conservative Protestants endorse the Muslim and citizenship conspiracy theories regarding Barack Obama?

Extant literature speaks to public sentiments toward minority politicians and their policies (e.g., Hajnal 2007; Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Yet there remains a dearth of research focused on the potential link between religion and the particular forms of othering directed toward the United States’ first black president. Accordingly, we draw from national survey data to assess whether white conservative Protestants demonstrate an inclination to label Obama as a Muslim and a noncitizen. In addition, we examine the extent to which the relationship between religious affiliation and othering Obama is mediated by racial attitudes, political conservatism, and media consumption.

Prior Research

Conservative Protestantism and Symbolic Boundaries

Religion provides a framework for the construction of symbolic boundaries. Such boundaries are shaped through religious socialization, which constitutes an “important process of exclusion and inclusion,” and, as a result, fuels perceptions of belongingness and even moral worth (Grasmick et al. 1993:178; see also Dahinden and Zittoun 2013:194; Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006:216). With respect to white conservative Protestants, studies illustrate that most individuals in this group maintain relatively narrow social ties and exhibit little tolerance for those external to their religious network (Merino 2010). Such narrow social bonds restrict sources of information, and may shape group members’ capacity or willingness to attain higher levels of education and/or meaningfully engage with secular phenomena like scientific ideas (Sherkat 2011). Another aspect of this insularity is that white conservative Protestants are more likely than others to subscribe to religious exclusivism, or the sentiment that only their religion is “true” (Rhodes 2012; Smith 2000; Trinitapoli 2007). This view casts what constitutes a proper Christian (or even a proper American) in particularly narrow terms and prompts intolerance toward perceived out-group others (Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Jelen and Wilcox 1990).

The literature on religion and symbolic boundaries has frequently focused on the white conservative Protestant subculture (e.g., Edgell 2012; Emerson and Smith 2000; Tranby and Hartmann 2008). Numerous studies have shown that conservative Protestants often subscribe to the idea that America is embattled and in need of defense to maintain its supposed white Christian character (Emerson and Smith 2000; C. Smith 1998, 2000). In addition, studies have found important links between conservative religious and national identity. McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle (2011), for example, emphasized the prevalence of “Christian nationalism” among conservative Protestants. Adherents to this perspective view the United States as a uniquely Christian nation. This viewpoint is associated with opposition to immigration in an effort to defend a particular vision of America’s identity (Froese and Bader 2010; McDaniel et al. 2011). Stated in terms of symbolic politics, many conservative Christians endorse the idea that America has a special covenant with God, “and thus must be protected from [often nonwhite] outsiders and those who would do it harm” (Dingley 2011:212). Evidence suggests that some white conservative Christians view Islam, and religious pluralism in general, as a threat to their faith, leading to increased “othering” of Muslims and members of other non-Christian religious groups (Cimino 2005; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009). Although drawing these distinctions may undermine interfaith relationships, this boundary making may also strengthen white conservative Christian identity (Cimino 2005).

Among many white conservative Protestants, President Obama has been cast as a threatening outsider and as a non-Christian. In some respects, Obama is an easy target for such sentiments given that he is African American, is of mixed ethnicity, was born and raised in “exotic” Hawaii, has a foreign sounding name, and has a Muslim father. Several examples make this point rather clearly. In response to criticisms of his book Making a Strong Christian Nation, in which he refers to Obama as the antichrist, Reverend Steven Andrew (2012) posted on his Web site that “While there is one main antichrist, the Bible teaches that there are many antichrists. An antichrist denies Jesus Christ. One could say that Obama’s obsession against Jesus Christ makes Obama an antichrist.” Similarly, while speaking at a political rally, evangelical pastor Rafael Cruz stated that Obama is an “outright Marxist” who “seeks to destroy all concept of God,” and he urged those in attendance to send Obama “back to Kenya” (Hardball with Chris Matthews 2013). Along similar lines, a book written by a Texas pastor Robert Jeffress (2014) includes a passage that reads as follows:

While I am not suggesting that President Obama is the Antichrist, the fact that he was able to propose such a sweeping change in God’s law and still win reelection by a comfortable margin illustrates how a future world leader will be able to oppose God’s laws without any repercussions. (P. 113)

We provide only a few examples, but many similar accounts can be found. Although such claims may seem hyperbolic, they reflect a Christian nationalist perspective prevalent among some conservative Christians (Dingley 2011; Ishio 2010; R. H. Williams 2013). Such boundary work and resulting worldviews are thus fertile ground for framing perceived others as both a religious and national threat.

In light of the foregoing discussion, we posit that religious views can shape judgments about belongingness and the legitimacy of political officials. Such religious views may be implicated in individuals’ conspiratorial views of Barack Obama. Because the literature suggests that many white conservative Protestants use their dedication to upholding a narrow brand of Christianity as an explanation for their commitment to protecting a “white, Christian America” (Edgell and Tranby 2010), we hypothesize that, all else equal and in contrast to others, white conservative Protestants will display increased odds of othering Obama through denial of his Christianity (H1a) and citizenship (H1b).

Racial Resentment

Recent scholarship on contemporary racial attitudes focuses largely on “symbolic” sentiments such as racial resentment. This substantial literature argues that because overt racial expressions have become socially unacceptable, dominant group members express racial hostility in more subtle ways (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tarman and Sears 2005; Tesler and Sears 2010; Tuch and Hughes 2011). For example, symbolic racism helps predict whites’ opinions toward various policies such as those related to criminal justice and social welfare, which are often viewed through a racial lens (Krysan 2000; Pickett, Tope, and Bellandi 2014; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). Research has also shown an association between racial resentment and opinions toward legislation attributed to Obama (Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg 2010). For instance, Tesler (2012) recently demonstrated that racial resentment became a stronger predictor of attitudes toward health care reform during President Obama’s time in office; in essence, health care became a racialized issue when it was associated with Obama.

In addition, some whites view increased black political representation as a threat to their interests (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Block 2011). Accordingly, racial resentment has been shown to have a powerful influence on whites’ political candidate preferences (Tesler and Sears 2010). Within the context of racial resentment, many scholars have suggested that the questioning of President Obama’s citizenship is influenced by racial bias (e.g., Owen 2010; Pyszczynski et al. 2010; Tope, Pickett, Cobb, and Dirlam 2014). Similar patterns have been found with respect to policy support where white conservative Protestants have been among the staunchest opponents of policies that might benefit racial minorities (Layman 2001).

Extant literature indicates that whites’ negative racial attitudes toward blacks significantly predict the tendency for them to question Obama’s Christianity (Maxwell, Dowell, and Shields 2013; Pyszczynski et al. 2010; Tesler and Sears 2010; Tope et al. 2014). Pyszczynski and colleagues (2010) also provided evidence that racial resentment is a contributing factor to negative evaluations of Obama. Furthermore, Piston (2010) found that endorsement of racial stereotypes predicts support for Democratic presidential candidates, indicating that white voters punished Obama for his race rather than his party affiliation. Some scholars argue that denying Obama’s citizenship is a way to “suggest Obama does not hold presidential authority legitimately” and is an “implicit locating of Obama on the margins (if not entirely outside of) whiteness” (Owen 2010:118). Moreover, the identification of Obama as a noncitizen has been related to a “specific ideal type of ‘hegemonic whiteness’ that aligns with authentic citizenship” (Hughey 2012:178). These “narrative practices” have been identified as a way to emphasize and maintain racial boundaries (Hughey 2012).

Research has also suggested that racial/ethnic bias is a significant characteristic of some conservative Christians’ boundary-making processes. McDaniel et al. (2011), for instance, found that among a variety of groups, conservative Protestants held the most bias toward immigrants. They contended that the prejudice toward immigrants, situated in “Christian Nationalism,” originates from the desire to “defend America’s identity,” and is a way to protect individuals’ “most salient identities by policing their boundaries and those who might undermine them” (p. 212). These sentiments are arguably reinforced by conservative Protestants’ relatively homophilous social networks that isolate them from other religious communities and differing points of view (Eiesland 2000; Rhodes 2012). This group separation may foster prejudices against various minority groups and is likely related to white conservative Christians’ historical antipathy toward African Americans (Morris 1984; Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek 2010; Sherkat et al. 2011). In addition, Tranby and Hartmann (2008) argued that white conservative Protestants’ individualism is intertwined with their racial attitudes, producing both individual explanations for racial differences and racism toward blacks, who are seen as nonconforming to white American ideals. Related research argues that white conservative Protestants tend to view inequality in rather individualistic terms (Emerson and Smith 2000) and may be “especially antagonistic toward blacks because they see [them] as violating key tenets of conservative Protestant theology—the work ethic in particular” (Calfano and Paolino 2010:136; see also Edgell and Tranby 2007).

Taken together, the foregoing discussion provides a firm basis for considering that particular forms of othering Obama may be racialized. We thus hypothesize that racial resentment will, net of other factors, be positively associated with endorsing the view that Obama is a Muslim (H2a) and a noncitizen (H2b). Being a white conservative Protestant has been linked to antiminority sentiments, racial resentment should be an important mechanism in the process of white Protestants’ othering of Obama. We therefore suggest that racial resentment should mediate the relationship between white conservative Protestantism and the othering of Obama (H2c).

Political Conservatism

Unsurprisingly, political ideologies are associated with evaluations of elected officials. Research has shown that identifying as a Republican is significantly associated with negative evaluations of President Obama (Howell 2012; Saad 2013). Moreover, a CNN poll taken during Obama’s first term showed that only 57 percent of Republicans identified President Obama as a citizen, compared with 85 percent of Democrats and 68 percent of independents (Travis 2010; see also Crawford and Bhatia 2012; Howell 2012). Thus, for political conservatives the simple fact that Obama is a Democrat is likely to prompt negative and possibly even conspiratorial evaluations.

Scholars have consistently found an association between conservative Protestantism and political conservatism (Brooks and Manza 2004; Piston 2010). Political conservatives and conservative Christians share conventional perspectives often framed as a desire to maintain particular aspects of a traditionalism-based way of life (Crawford and Bhatia 2012; Emerson and Smith 2000; C. Smith 1998). Previous research has revealed that political orientations are important mechanisms that link religious conservatism with various social attitudes. For instance, a study by Hill et al. (2004) shows that political conservatism provides a conduit between religious views and attitudes toward presumed “others.” In sum, previous research provides a compelling basis for considering that political conservatives should display increased odds of endorsing the belief that Obama is not a citizen (H3a) and that he is a Muslim (H3b). In addition, political conservatism should mediate the relationship between white conservative Protestantism and othering Obama (H3c).

Media Consumption

Media consumption has also been used as an explanation for individuals’ evaluations of political candidates. Research shows that those whose political ideologies are central to their identity have a greater likelihood of seeking out information that confirms their partisan beliefs (Federico and Hunt 2013; Prior 2013). For instance, scholars have attributed Fox News’ success to the network’s ability to shape public opinion by drawing political boundaries and creating a sense of community among viewers (Jones 2012). A recent Gallup poll found that 94 percent of Fox News viewers identify as or “lean” Republican and a large portion were white, Protestant, weekly church attendees (Saad 2013). Moreover, some researchers have shown that Fox is the trusted news source of approximately 50 percent of white conservative Protestant news watchers and that conservative Christian pastors were more likely than those of other denominations to trust Fox news as a reliable news source (Stetzer 2012). It is also noteworthy that Fox News has frequently given credence to the notion that Obama is a Muslim and a noncitizen (Haines 2011; Rutenberg 2009).

Studies note that some of the appeal of Fox News is grounded in its ability to cultivate an “intensive relationship with . . . [its] viewers” by adhering to and reinforcing strict ideological values (Jones 2012:180; see also Della Vigna and Kaplan 2007). In addition, by dramatizing ideological fears (e.g., of Muslims, immigrants, etc.), the network frames itself and its viewers as in opposition to perceived threats (Jones 2012:182). Because Fox imparts particular symbols and meanings, it serves as a tool for group identity formation and reinforcement, as well as for distinguishing between those who are acceptable members of a particular imagined (conservative) community and those who are not (p. 180). In light of the existing media-related literature, we expect that greater Fox News consumption will be associated with increased odds of labeling Obama as a Muslim (H4a) and a noncitizen (H4b). In addition, it is likely that higher levels of Fox News consumption will mediate the relationship between white conservative Protestantism and othering Obama (H4c).

Figure 1 presents our conceptual model. The hypothesized relationships in the figure are drawn from related literature that provides reason to suspect an association between white conservative Protestant affiliation and othering out-group members (e.g., McDaniel et al. 2011; Tranby and Hartmann 2008). Indeed, some white conservative Christian figures have repeatedly cast Obama as a possibly threatening outsider, and expressed doubts about his religion and citizenship. Among the subset of conservative Protestants who question President Obama’s religion and citizenship, the link to othering may be direct, but it may also be partly indirect or channeled through several mechanisms. The literature suggests a role for several such intervening factors. Specifically, white conservative Christians’ tendency to other Obama may be shaped by media consumption, racial sentiments, or even political ideology. As we note below, our analyses empirically test each link in the chain of hypothesized relationships.

Figure 1.

Conceptual model.

Data and Measures

Data

Here, we draw from Vavreck and Rivers (2008) as well as Jackman and Vavreck (2010) to describe the data source and the opt-in Internet survey design. To test our hypotheses, we use data from the 2007–2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP; Jackman and Vavreck 2009). This project involved a collaborative effort on the part of 27 research teams to field a national Internet panel survey of registered U.S voters during the months leading up to and immediately following the 2008 presidential election. The potential respondent pool is made up of individuals with Internet access who have opted in by voluntarily completing an online demographic survey. Pool members are continually recruited, which yields a rather large pool (more than a million individuals; Vavreck and Rivers 2008). Individuals from the established pool are then invited to participate in a particular research panel. The size of the pool allows for the use of a novel “matching” approach that turns the opt-in pool into representative samples. Samples are extracted in a two-step matching process. First, analysts construct a sampling frame from the American Community Study, with additional data from the Current Population Survey voter supplement and the Pew Religious Life study. From this frame, the analysts draw a stratified random sample of people similar in size to their desired sample from the original opt-in survey (Jackman and Vavreck 2010). This is labeled as the target sample. The matched sample design has been shown to have high predictive validity, and multiple studies have found that opt-in survey research performs similarly to random digit dialing surveys (Ansolabehere and Shaffer 2014; Vavreck and Rivers 2008). Opt-in surveys do not produce a traditional response rate indicator (Baker 2010). Yet our October 2008 panel contained 10,221 potential respondents, and 8,458 completed the survey for a within-panel response rate of 83 percent (Jackman and Vavreck 2010).

The year leading up to the 2008 presidential election represents an ideal time period for studying the sources of othering beliefs because it was during this year that the social construction of the candidates’ public images first occurred, and when these images were most heavily scrutinized and debated. Respondents were oversampled in both battleground states and states with early primaries. All of our measures, save for racial resentment, which is discussed below, were drawn from the October 2008 wave. The sample upon which our study is based includes all white respondents for whom complete data on the measures are available (N = 1,483).¹

Measures

Dependent variables

Othering Obama: Muslim and not citizen

Our outcomes of interest, Muslim and not citizen, represent the extent to which respondents endorse two different characterizations of Obama that are consistent with the construction of him as a threatening outsider. Consistent with related research, we focus on what are the two most recurrent but nevertheless inaccurate descriptions of Obama: that he was not born in the United States and that he is a Muslim. Two questions in the CCAP asked respondents (1) whether Obama was born in the United States and (2) whether he was Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or something else. These questions constitute our two dependent variables, and are coded 1 if the respondent endorsed the respective othering belief and 0 if he or she did not.

Primary independent variable

Our focal independent variable, conservative Protestant, was created following a modified version of the coding scheme developed by Roof and McKinney (1987). We measure conservative Protestantism with dummy variable capturing conservative Protestant affiliation (e.g., Southern Baptists, Pentecostals, Assemblies of God) as compared with those holding any other religious affiliations or categorizing one’s self as a nonaffiliate. For a precedent in the literature, see Sherkat and colleagues (2010, 2011) and Sherkat (2011).

Although certainly not a monolithic group, examination of descriptive statistics suggest that there appears to be a connection between being a conservative Protestant and othering Obama. A substantial proportion of respondents who identified as conservative Protestants endorsed the idea that Obama is a Muslim, noncitizen, or both. About half (51 percent, n = 158) of conservative Protestants identified Obama as either a Muslim, noncitizen, or both, compared with only 36 percent (n = 309) of the nonconservative Protestants in the sample.

Mediating variables

Racial resentment is an indicator of what scholars describe as symbolic or modern racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; Tesler and Sears 2010). The theoretical notion of racial resentment stems from scholars’ attention to the United States’ evolving racial norms—especially with respect to black-white relations. Analysts have focused on the fact that over time, racial discourse has become more implicit or subtle (sometimes called “color-blind”). Researchers have noted that in the post-civil rights era, a more opaque vocabulary associated with “modern” or “new” racism has largely (yet not entirely) displaced the language of overt racism. Scholars argue that racial resentment represents the more historically recent and more opaque symbolic expression of racial animus. More specifically, racial resentment may be defined as a subtle form of prejudice that combines whites’ belief in traditional values such as the Protestant work ethic with whites’ negative feelings about African Americans.²

Social psychologists have conducted extensive research on these frequently used measures (see Tarman and Sears 2005 for a review). We follow extant research on contemporary racial attitudes (e.g., Henry and Sears 2002; Sears and Henry 2005) and construct a racial resentment scale based on the following four CCAP questions:

Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements: 1) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for African Americans to work their way out of the lower class; 2) Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors; 3) Over the past few years, African Americans have gotten less than they deserve; 4) It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if African Americans would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

We recoded the responses to these items in each of the waves so that higher values indicate greater racial resentment. Next, we created three separate indices—one for each of the waves—by averaging across responses to the four items in each wave (Cronbach’s α = .86, .86, and .88 in the March, September, and October waves, respectively). Finally, we averaged across these three separate indices to develop a global measure of racial resentment (Cronbach’s α = .94).

Next, we included measures for individual political orientation and media consumption. Conservatism is a measure of respondents’ personal political ideology. Respondents positioned themselves on a 5-point scale ranging from “very liberal” to “very conservative.” In addition, because media consumption has been viewed as an explanation for individuals’ evaluations of political candidates, we include a measure of Fox News consumption. It has been noted that Fox News has lent credence to the notion that Obama is a Muslim and a noncitizen (Haines 2011; Rutenberg 2009). This item is measured by aggregating the total number of time periods during which the respondent reported watching Fox News the previous day. This item was drawn from the October wave of the survey. The specific question asked was as follows: “We are interested in the kinds of things people watch on TV. Did you watch any of these stations at these times yesterday?” Eleven separate time periods were listed: 4:00 p.m., 4:30 p.m., 5:00 p.m., 5:30 p.m., 6:00 p.m., 6:30 p.m., 7:00 p.m., 8:00 p.m., 9:00 p.m., 10:00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m. A respondent’s value on the Fox News consumption variable is equal to the number of affirmative answers given and thus can range from 0 to 11.

Control variables

We control for a range of factors identified in extant theoretical and empirical work. First, we controlled for respondents’ demographic characteristics: Age is measured in years. Education is measured as follows: 1 = did not graduate high school, 2 = graduated high school, 3 = some college, 4 = two-year college degree, 5 = four-year college degree, and 6 = post-graduate work. Income is equal to the respondent’s total household income, where 1 = less than $10,000 and 14 = $150,000 or more. Finally, we also control for sex (male = 1).

In addition, because research has pointed to religious involvement and commitment as an underlying explanation of some religious groups’ out-group bias (e.g., Emerson and Smith 2000; C. Smith 1998), we control for other indicators of religiosity to better account for the particular effect of conservative Protestant affiliation. Church attendance is measured by how often individuals attend church weekly, where 9 = more than once a week, 8 = once a week, 7 = about once a week, 6 = two or three times a month, 5 = once a month, 4 = several times a year, 3 = once or twice a year, 2 = less than once a year, and 1 = never. The mean frequency of church attendance among respondents in the sample is two or three times a month. Religious centrality or the importance of religion to individual respondents is assessed with a binary measure (0 = not important and 1 = important).

Finally, we control for some of the characteristics of the counties in which the respondents reside. Population structure is an indicator of the size and density of the local population. To have a more precise estimate of population concentration, we follow other research (e.g., Stults and Baumer 2007), and create a composite index by summing standardized log-transformed versions of the county population size and county population density in 2010.³ We also control for residence in a Southern state (South = 1). Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics for the measures described above. The correlation matrix is available in the appendix.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation
Muslim	0.20	0.40
Not citizen	0.25	0.43
Conservative Protestant	0.21	0.41
Racial resentment	3.69	1.05
Conservatism	3.30	1.19
Fox TV consumption	1.31	2.31
Church attendance	4.26	2.96
Religious centrality	0.66	0.47
Education	3.53	1.48
Income	8.35	3.38
Age	51.80	14.50
Male	0.52	0.50
Population structure	0.01	1.93
South	0.33	0.47

Source. Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project 2007–2008.

Note. N = 1,483.

Analytic strategy

Recall that we have two outcome measures with respect to othering Obama. The first measure is agreement with the idea that President Obama is a Muslim. The second measure is endorsing the idea that Obama is not a U.S. citizen. Because both outcomes are dichotomous, we use logistic regression to examine whether, ceteris paribus, conservative Protestant affiliation predicts these “othering” sentiments. Multicollinearity is not a concern in any of the models; the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.98, and the largest mean VIF was 1.36. Because we include variables measured at both the individual and county level, correlated errors are a concern. Accordingly, we estimate all models using Stata’s vce(cluster) command, which generates robust standard errors that are unbiased in the context of clustered data by generalizing the Huber/White/sandwich estimate of variance to take clustering into account (see R. L. Williams 2000). The results from the logistic regression models are presented in Tables 3 and 4.⁴

We also formally assess the extent to which the hypothesized intervening variables mediate the relationship between conservative Protestant identification and the othering of Obama. Testing for mediation in nonlinear probability models, such as logistic regression, requires taking into account the fact that the magnitude of coefficients often varies across models simply because of the rescaling of coefficients due to differences across models in residual variances (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013). For this reason, we use the Karlson/Holm/Breen (KHB) method introduced by Karlson, Holm, and Breen (2012) for testing for indirect effects in nonlinear probability models to conduct the mediation analysis. This method regresses the mediating (or Z) variable(s) on the independent variable (X) and uses the residuals in the reduced model to estimate the total effect of X. The unresidualized Z variable(s) is then used in the full model. The indirect effect of X is the difference in the coefficient for X in the reduced and full model; the significance of the effect is calculated using the delta method (Sobel 1982). We present these results in Table 4.⁵

Results

Extant literature suggests that conservative Protestants should be more inclined to label President Obama as an “other.” Table 2 presents the results of five logistic regression models estimating this relationship in the case of the belief that Obama is a Muslim, controlling for other covariates. Model 1 includes our key predictor, conservative Protestantism, as well as our controls. Models 2 through 4 include only the measure of religious affiliation and one of the three mediators—racial resentment, political conservatism, and Fox News viewing—along with the controls. Model 5 incorporates all of the measures into a single equation to better specify the extent to which conservative Protestantism is linked with the idea that Obama is a Muslim.

Table 2.

Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Endorsement of the Belief that Obama Is a Muslim.

Variables	Dependent variable = Muslim
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE
Religious identity
Conservative Protestant	1.668**	(.305)	1.350	(.263)	1.542*	(.305)	1.702**	(.312)	1.378	(.275)
Mediators
Racial resentment			2.883***	(.373)					2.319***	(.333)
Conservatism					1.843***	(.196)			1.348*	(.173)
Fox News consumption							1.193***	(.039)	1.101**	(.039)
Controls
Church attendance	0.975	(.032)	0.974	(.035)	0.918*	(.032)	0.973	(.032)	0.944	(.037)
Religious centrality	2.311**	(.573)	1.834*	(.487)	1.850*	(.467)	2.111**	(.542)	1.713*	(.459)
Education	0.792***	(.051)	0.875	(.061)	0.842**	(.055)	0.791***	(.051)	0.877	(.060)
Income	0.982	(.026)	0.941*	(.026)	0.950	(.026)	0.966	(.025)	0.924**	(.026)
Age	1.009	(.006)	1.012*	(.006)	1.009	(.006)	1.005	(.006)	1.008	(.006)
Male	0.925	(.150)	0.794	(.143)	0.804	(.143)	0.841	(.141)	0.717	(.137)
Population structure	0.877**	(.034)	0.888**	(.037)	0.889**	(.035)	0.865***	(.034)	0.883**	(.037)
South	1.400*	(.236)	1.359	(.239)	1.413	(.245)	1.317	(.226)	1.336	(.239)
McFadden R²	.093		.179		.143		.121		.198
Wald χ²	90.54***		146.80***		136.25***		127.15***		162.75***

Source. Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project 2007–2008.

Note. N = 1,483. CSE = standard error clustered by county.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

As shown in Table 2 Model 1, all else equal, there is a positive relationship between conservative Protestant religious affiliation and the belief that Obama is a Muslim. In support of hypothesis H1a, the significant odds ratio indicates that being a conservative Protestant is associated with increased odds of indicating that Obama is a Muslim. More specifically, Model 1 suggests that the odds of labeling Obama as such are about 67 percent higher for white conservative Protestants as opposed to other individuals. Models 2 through 4 include each mediator of interest separately and assess the presence of a relationship between those factors and othering. In every case, consistent with our hypothesis, significant associations emerge between the mediators and othering Obama.

Model 5 in Table 2 is the comprehensive model. Here, we assess the persistence of our hypothesized relationships net of all other measures. Our primary hypothesis is that the association between whites’ conservative Protestantism and othering Obama will be reduced in Model 5, relative to Model 1. This is confirmed. With respect to the additional predictors in Model 5, the results suggest that the odds of othering Obama as a Muslim increase by 132 percent with each unit increase in racial resentment, 35 percent for each unit increase in political conservatism, and 10 percent for each unit increase in Fox News viewing. Hence, all of our direct-effect hypotheses regarding racial attitudes, political conservatism, and viewing Fox News are supported. When we look at the control measures, we also see that, all else equal, those with greater income as well as those who reside where there is greater population density are somewhat less likely to agree that Obama is a Muslim.

Table 3 examines the odds of claiming that Obama is not a U.S. citizen. Similar to Table 2, the key hypothesis here is that white conservative Protestants should be more likely to support the claim that Obama is not a U.S. citizen. Model 1 suggests that, net of controls, conservative Protestants have about 102 percent higher odds than do other individuals of believing Obama is not a citizen. In Models 2 through 4, we add our mediating variables. Taken together, these models suggest that racial resentment, political conservatism, and Fox News viewing are also associated with the noncitizen claim.

Table 3.

Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Endorsement of the Belief that Obama Is Not a Citizen.

Variables	Dependent variable = not citizen
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE	Odds ratio	CSE
Religious identity
Conservative Protestant	2.022***	(.346)	1.639**	(.288)	1.862***	(.320)	2.047***	(.353)	1.622**	(.284)
Mediators
Racial resentment			3.518***	(.422)					2.767***	(.381)
Conservatism					2.247***	(.198)			1.618***	(.166)
Fox News consumption							1.130***	(.037)	1.016	(.033)
Controls
Church attendance	1.016	(.030)	1.020	(.033)	0.940	(.031)	1.016	(.031)	0.971	(.034)
Religious centrality	1.765**	(.370)	1.289	(.293)	1.303	(.282)	1.642*	(.353)	1.195	(.274)
Education	0.873*	(.046)	0.998	(.056)	0.951	(.052)	0.876*	(.048)	1.014	(.058)
Income	1.023	(.023)	0.982	(.024)	0.984	(.023)	1.013	(.022)	0.963	(.025)
Age	1.017**	(.005)	1.023***	(.006)	1.018**	(.005)	1.014*	(.005)	1.021***	(.006)
Male	0.981	(.149)	0.787	(.131)	0.793	(.124)	0.921	(.144)	0.705*	(.119)
Population structure	0.876***	(.030)	0.885**	(.032)	0.887**	(.031)	0.870***	(.030)	0.887**	(.032)
South	1.012	(.154)	0.937	(.145)	0.997	(.152)	0.963	(.148)	0.952	(.147)
McFadden R²	.082		.203		.167		.096		.226
Wald χ²	96.78***		181.47***		150.70***		120.01***		204.99***

Source. Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project 2007–2008.

Note. N = 1,483. CSE = standard error clustered by county.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Model 5 of Table 3 is the full model for the belief that Obama is a noncitizen. Again, we assess support for our hypotheses. Our key predictor of conservative Protestantism continues to show a statistical association with the notion that Obama is not a citizen, but the association is weakened relative to Model 1. In addition, the effects of racial attitudes and political ideology remain substantial. Each unit increase in racial resentment and political conservatism is associated with a respective 177 percent and 62 percent increase in the odds of claiming Obama is not a citizen. Yet Fox News viewing fails to achieve significance in the full model. These findings suggest a direct relationship between conservative Protestantism and denial of Obama’s citizenship. Although not the focus of this study, there is also some evidence that this style of othering is more prevalent among older white registered voters, and less common among men and those residing in areas of high population density such as major cities.⁶ The results for the sex measure appear to be influenced by the inclusion of the mediators as opposed to any particular relationship to religion.

We now turn our attention to the formal mediation analysis. Recall that we hypothesized a mediation role for racial resentment, political conservatism, and consumption of Fox News media (see Figure 1). Here, we use the KHB method to examine whether conservative Protestantism in fact has significant indirect effects on endorsement of both othering beliefs through the hypothesized mediators. Table 4 presents the results of the mediation analysis. Test results indicate that conservative Protestantism has a significant (p < .01) indirect effect on endorsement of both othering beliefs—the view that Obama is a Muslim and the view that he is not a citizen. Indeed, about 48 percent of the effect of conservative Protestantism on the notion that Barack Obama is a Muslim and about 44 percent of the effect on the idea that Obama is a noncitizen is indirect. Most of the indirect effect is through racial resentment. More specifically, when we look at claims that Obama is a Muslim, about 78 percent of the indirect effect of white conservative Protestantism is channeled through racial resentment. A similar pattern holds for claims that Obama is not a U.S. citizen, with about 73 percent of the total conservative Protestantism effect operating indirectly through racial resentment. Interestingly, and contrary to our hypotheses, we also see that neither political conservatism nor media consumption significantly mediate the association between religious affiliation and endorsing the idea that Obama is not a citizen or is a Muslim. Hence, the association between being a conservative Protestant and endorsing either of the erroneous claims about President Obama is closely linked to racial sentiments.

Table 4.

Total and Specific Indirect Effects of Conservative Protestantism on Othering Beliefs about Obama.

Indirect effects	Dependent variable = Muslim				Dependent variable = not citizen
Indirect effects	b	CSE	% indirect effect	% total effect	b	CSE	% indirect effect	% total effect
Total indirect effect	.295**	(.099)	—	47.88	.379**	(.118)	—	43.95
Specific indirect effects
Racial resentment	.231**	(.071)	78.40	37.54	.280**	(.085)	73.71	32.39
Conservatism	.062	(.040)	20.95	10.03	.099	(.052)	26.20	11.52
Fox News consumption	.002	(.018)	0.65	0.31	.000	(.003)	0.08	0.04

Source. CCAP 2007–2008.

Note. N = 1,483. CSE = standard error clustered by county.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Discussion

Despite contrary evidence, a nontrivial proportion of U.S. residents have suggested that President Barack Obama is a Muslim, a noncitizen, or both. For instance, during the summer of 2010, Pew surveys showed that approximately 18 percent of respondents believed that Obama was a Muslim (Harris Polls 2010). In addition, a CNN poll conducted in July 2010 found that 16 percent of respondents doubted that Obama was born in the United States (Travis 2010). Research suggests that religious affiliation may be associated with a propensity to endorse such claims inasmuch as they reflect out-group othering. Accordingly, our central aim was to examine a relatively straightforward but as of yet unexplored aspect of such sentiments: To what extent is identifying as a white conservative Protestant associated with a propensity to characterize Barack Obama as a Muslim and a noncitizen. We review our key findings below. We also discuss some of the broader implications of the study, recommendations for future research, as well as the project’s limitations.

The most general conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that religious affiliation is an important factor in the process of othering the United States’ first black president. White conservative Protestants are likely to endorse the idea that Obama is a Muslim and that he is a noncitizen. The literature suggests that ideas about the criteria for delineating the acceptable from the distasteful or the welcome from the threatening may be cultivated in relatively insular conservative Protestant congregations that advance the notion of an exceptional America that must be shielded from outsiders (Edgell and Tranby 2010; Emerson and Smith 2000). In addition, these groups have also been known to maintain rather homophilous social ties that ultimately foster an oppositional religious culture intolerant of out-groups.

Also noteworthy is the evidence that the association between white conservative Protestant affiliation and endorsing either the Muslim or noncitizen myths is largely filtered through racial resentment. Consistent with other research, it thus seems that for many white conservative Protestants, ideas about religion, nation, and belonging are intertwined with notions of maintaining America’s supposedly white Christian character (e.g., Edgell and Tranby 2010). Such sentiments thus pose a challenge for minority politicians—such as Barack Obama—who embody difference and do not visibly promote a white conservative Protestant worldview (Calfano and Paolino 2010).

Group boundaries are so fervently policed because of the profound meaning members have invested in symbolic categories. Recall that Durkheim ([1893] 1984) noted that social solidarity is founded, at least to some degree, on marking who does or does not belong. Yet although such solidarity bestows group benefits, it also has, as Putnam (2001) argued, a “dark side.” Indeed, identity and group cohesion are informed by the symbolic creation of the other. It thus follows that for some conservative Protestants, the othering labels attached to Obama likely reflect their expression of cultural boundaries regarding his perceived symbolic or moral distance—which includes a racial component—from their group.

Despite our findings, readers should be aware that white conservative Protestants are not ideologically monolithic (Harvey 2005; Wadsworth 2014). Survey data show that conservative Christians constitute a relatively diverse, internally heterogeneous population who hold a wide range of views on different topics (Gay, Ellison, and Powers 1996). For instance, recent research has shown that young conservative Protestants’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage, premarital sex, cohabitation, and pornography are more liberal than the views of older conservative Christians (Farrell 2011). In another study, B. G. Smith and Johnson (2010) found that conservative Christian youth are more likely than their older counterparts to support policies designed to protect the environment. Gay et al. (1996) suggested that conservative Protestants have diverse opinions regarding gender roles. Others have noted an increased interest among this group in social justice issues such as poverty and environmentalism (Banerjee 2008; Goodstein 2008). There is also some indication of conservative Protestants—particularly youths—being more open to the less conservative Democratic Party. For example, President Obama garnered about 3 percent more of the conservative Christian vote (about 24 percent total) than did the last Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2008).

We should take account of some limitations and potential avenues for future research. First, a broader survey instrument may be better able to assess different dimensions of religious identity as it relates to othering processes. For instance, given that some research suggests that racialized views of Obama may have diminished among some segments of the population during the course of Obama’s campaign and presidency (Goldman 2012), subsequent research should assess the temporal stability of links between religion and anti-Obama attitudes. Second, while we examine attitudinal phenomena, it would be useful to assess the extent to which a propensity to label Obama as a noncitizen or Muslim translates into political behavior (e.g., voting, protest, and monetary donations) among white conservative Protestants and others. Finally, despite our findings, it is important to note that roughly half of the conservative Protestants in our sample did not endorse the notion that Obama is a noncitizen or Muslim. Future analyses, especially qualitative studies, might be able to illuminate why some white conservative Christians reject such claims. Also recall that our data are from an opt-in Internet panel survey. The results should be verified against data obtained through traditional random sampling designs.

Studies such as this one can help one understand religious, political, and other social cleavages, as they relate to group boundary formation and maintenance. Such distinctions in the United States have been made more salient of late by world events such as war and terrorism. Among many white conservative Protestants, increasing religious pluralism is likely to be seen as a threat to America’s supposedly “exceptional” status and thus an affront to God. Indeed, among some white Christians, religious pluralism may foster a sense of threat via perceived social fragmentation and possibly an associated apparent rise in autonomy of religious belief. But reactions to religious pluralism are not only other directed. The increasing salience of religious pluralism also likely reinforces white conservative Christians’ identities in contrast to other religious and cultural forces.

Failure to account for the religious underpinnings and associated mechanisms of othering yields a limited capacity to explain why some individuals (e.g., a subset of white Christians) endorse demonstrably false conspiratorial claims. It is thus plausible that such processes of in-group and out-group maintenance could foster not only additional forms of othering but also extended political conflict, as some groups cohere against what they see as out-group threats to their ways of life and/or belief systems. In light of the United States’ rapidly shifting demographic profile, symbolic conflicts linked to ethnic and religious pluralism will likely continue to be a salient feature of U.S. politics.

Footnotes

Appendix

Correlation Matrix.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Muslim	1.00
2. Not citizen	.501*	1.00
3. Conservative Protestant	.183*	.220*	1.00
4. Racial resentment	.333*	.386*	.225*	1.00
5. Conservatism	.282*	.366*	.265*	.624*	1.00
6. FOX	.220*	.218*	.073*	.312*	.315*	1.00
7. Church attendance	.114*	.166*	.320*	.181*	.371*	.081*	1.00
8. Religious culture	.180*	.185*	.302*	.261*	.359*	.123*	.594*	1.00
9. Education	−.169*	−.154*	−.118*	−.282*	−.178*	−.041	.036	−.088*	1.00
10. Income	−.104*	−.054*	−.111*	−.011	.058*	.111*	−.033	−.097*	.330*	1.00
11. Age	.086*	.123*	.082*	.043	.117*	.174*	.080*	.074*	−.132*	−.040	1.00
12. Male	−.006	.009	.020	.105*	.155*	.106*	−.006	−.067*	.042	.150*	.015	1.00
13. Pop	−.154*	−.136*	−.193*	−.152*	−.131*	−.026	−.113*	−.140*	.183*	.207*	−.053	.044	1.00
14. South	.081*	.065*	.106*	.105*	.107*	.096*	.035	.056*	−.036	.031	.059*	.026	−.024

p < .05 (two-tailed).

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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