Rights and Tolerance Support in U.S. Presidential Elections,1992

Abstract

Do attitudes toward issues such as abortion, LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights, and tolerance of diversity matter to U.S. voters and elections? Scholarship on rights and tolerance support has failed to take into account the potentially confounding influence of racial resentment as a factor behind voter choice. This is a serious limitation that we seek to address with American National Election Studies data for presidential elections from 1992 through 2016. We bring together for the first time rights and tolerance support and racial resentment, alongside further consideration of anti-immigrant sentiments and white identity. Racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments shape the behavior of voters, but there is new evidence for the large influence of rights and tolerance attitudes, including with respect to the 2016 presidential election. The results suggest a growing dependence of Democratic candidates on high levels of rights and tolerance support. We discuss implications for theory and research on voter choice.

Keywords

political sociology comparative and historical sociology human rights

Do attitudes toward issues such as abortion, LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights, and tolerance of diversity matter to voter choice in the United States? This is the expectation of research reporting that voters’ degree of support for rights and tolerance shapes their choice of candidates in national elections (e.g., Brooks 2000; Claggett and Shafer 2010; Shafer and Spady 2014). For electoral politics scholarship, a focus on attitudes toward rights and tolerance is novel in going beyond such established factors as partisanship, economic evaluations, and redistributive policy attitudes (e.g., Abramowitz 2013; Aldrich et al. 2019; Campbell 2016; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Moreover, because rights and tolerance support has steadily increased over time, it is said to have shaped presidential elections by consistently benefiting Democratic candidates (Wurgler and Brooks 2014).

To date, however, a serious limitation in rights and tolerance scholarship is its lack of attention to a sophisticated body of work on racial resentment toward African Americans, which has been found to shape a variety of public policy attitudes and also voter choice during the past three presidential elections (e.g., Hanley 2018; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Tuch and Hughes 2011). Of further relevance is a separate line of research on the 2016 presidential election that identifies anti-immigrant sentiments as having contributed to the eventual victory of Donald Trump (e.g., Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018).

For scholarship on rights and tolerance, the implications are potentially negative and increasingly risky to ignore. The activation of the racial resentment (or anti-immigrant sentiments) during the 2016 election may have limited or displaced the impact of rights and tolerance attitudes among voters. But whether this is (or is not) the case is unclear, as scholars within the rights and tolerance tradition have yet to investigate the 2016 election.

The absence of attention among rights and tolerance scholars to racial resentment is relevant to earlier elections as well. Estimates of the effects of rights and tolerance for elections prior to 2016 may have been upwardly biased by virtue of this omission. That would call into question the evidence reported in all rights and tolerance studies conducted to date (of which we are aware).

These issues must be addressed for rights and tolerance research to be taken seriously by scholars in the contemporary historical era. We seek to do so through an investigation that is the first to integrate research on rights and tolerance support with racial resentment scholarship (alongside recent work on anti-immigrant sentiments and also white identity). The imperatives for rights and tolerance scholarship are clear, yet there are also benefits for the traditions of research on racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. Taking into account factors that are otherwise candidates for omitted variable bias strengthens estimates and puts all traditions of scholarship on solid foundations.

We start with the 2016 presidential election. We evaluate the magnitude of rights and tolerance influence over voter choice and the degree to which its influence is independent of racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. We move next to presidential elections from 1992 through 2016, evaluating whether the effects of rights and tolerance support on voters has declined over time (including when racial resentment is taken into account). Study results offer new evidence for the notably large influence of rights and tolerance on voter choice, alongside the substantial impact of trends in rights and tolerance opinion on recent election outcomes.

In the first part of the article, we review contributions and limitations of research on rights and tolerance support. We discuss challenges posed by racial resentment scholarship, considering in turn the relevance of recent work on anti-immigrant sentiments and white identity. The article’s second part outlines data, measures, and models. Results are presented in the article’s third section. We discuss implications in conclusion, including with respect to the position of rights and tolerance scholarship within established theory and research on voter choice.

Rights and Tolerance Scholarship and Its Unmet Challenges

Rights and Tolerance Attitudes

Americans have become more liberal in their attitudes toward issues pertaining to rights, sexuality, and a tolerance for diversity, what we will refer to under the rubric of “rights and tolerance.” Stouffer’s ([1955] 1992) analysis of civil liberties attitudes in the 1950s was an intellectual landmark, motivating a vigorous debate concerning the extent and trajectory of rights support in the United States (e.g., Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Wilson 1994). During the next three decades, researchers unearthed evidence of liberal opinion trends on a wide variety of rights and tolerance issues (Schuman et al. 1997; Smith 1990; Yang 1997). While the pace of opinion change varied across issue (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; Davis 1992; see also Theiss-Morse et al. 2018), together they established that attitudes toward rights and tolerance had moved in notably liberal directions over time.

These trends have been of interest to a wide variety of scholars by virtue of the constitutional and political importance of the issues in question. Mid-twentieth century scholarship viewed civil liberties, African American civil rights, and a tolerance of diversity as central to the operation and promise of American democracy (e.g., Hartz 1955; Prothro and Grigg 1960; see also Lipset [1960] 1981; Sniderman et al. 1996). The rights and tolerance concept provides a means of capturing the underlying dimension of conflict, where the poles range from liberalism versus illiberalism, or, equivalently, from support versus opposition to rights and tolerance.

Key to this dimension is its inclusive and open-ended character, where new conflicts of relevance have come to be viewed by intellectuals, activists, and politicians as sharing an underlying commonality, as exemplified in the rights revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s (Epp 1998; Skrentny 2002). Indeed, since the 1950s, scholarly interest in public support for First Amendment liberties have broadened to encompass such subsequent conflicts as civil rights for African Americans and other minorities, gender and reproductive rights, and more recently sexual diversity and LGBTQ rights (Adamczyk and Liao 2019; Hyman and Wright 1979; McClosky and Brill 1983).

A key extension of rights and tolerance scholarship has been to research into voter choice and elections. Questions about the relevance of rights and tolerance are relevant to theory and research on U.S. electoral politics. Rights and tolerance represent a relatively novel factor behind voter choice,¹ contrasting with such better-established forces as party identification, redistributive policy attitudes, economic evaluations, and racial resentment (e.g., Aldrich et al. 2019; Campbell 2016). In turn, the existence of trends in rights and tolerance attitudes are a potential source of pressure on election outcomes and the competitiveness of Democratic versus Republican candidates.

In an early study analyzing attitudes toward abortion rights from 1972 through 1994, Adams (1997) found that voters changed their identification as Democrats versus Republicans in response to their views of abortion. Investigating presidential elections between 1972 and 1992, Brooks (2000) reported that attitudes toward civil rights and women’s rights shaped voters’ choice for president. Claggett and Shafer (2010) considered presidential elections from the 1970s through 2004, arguing that issues relating to abortion, gender, and gay/lesbian rights formed a coherent dimension of attitudes with respect to which voters evaluated politicians and political candidates.

The influence of rights and tolerance issues with respect to voter choice can be understood as a two-stage process in which individuals consult their beliefs and choose the candidate closest to their own position (Brooks 2000). For rights and tolerance to matter to voter choice, a requirement is that attitudes toward these issues do not reduce to a more fundamental cleavage. The inclusion of relevant controls is critical. For example, if party identification is not controlled, it is possible that the rights and tolerance/voter choice relationship is simply an artifact of partisanship.

Recent studies of rights and tolerance support and voter choice have sought to strengthen the evidence by adding additional controls to their models. Analyzing Pew survey data from 1984 through 2008, Shafer and Spady (2014) found the influence of a scale of attitudes toward issues including gender roles, civil liberties, peace, and sexual tolerance had effects on voters that were largely independently of social group memberships relating to religion, race, gender, and income. Wurgler and Brooks’s (2014) analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys from 1992 through 2012 incorporated controls for partisanship and domestic and foreign policy preferences; they reported that the influence of a scale of rights-related attitudes on voter choice was significant, exceeding the influence of defense spending preferences and attitudes toward social services.

Racial Resentment

To this point in its development, rights and tolerance research has yet to consider the potential relevance of scholarship on racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tuch and Hughes 2011). Growing evidence of racial resentment’s relevance to recent elections raises a critical and unanswered question for rights and tolerance scholarship. Have estimates of rights and tolerance’s influence on voters been exaggerated because of a lack of consideration of racial resentment?

Racial resentment is defined as the view that African Americans lack commitment to the values of hard work and self-reliance, alongside a belief that racial discrimination has largely disappeared. First identified by scholars in the 1980s (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988), racial resentment is hypothesized to have largely replaced older forms of antiblack racism that were organized around support for Jim Crow institutions and racialized ideas of biology. Modern racial resentment is viewed as activated by politicians or media discourse, particularly when attention turns to issues such as welfare that have racialized associations for many voters (Wetts and Willer 2018).

The 2008 election of America’s first black president, in particular, has been seen by scholars of racial resentment as enhancing its political salience (Tesler 2012). Several studies found the margins of Barack Obama’s 2008 and 2012 electoral victories to be smaller than expected due to racial resentment on the part of voters (Knuckey and Kim 2015; Lewis-Beck, Tien and Nadeau 2010). A related strain of research by Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2017) reported that subtle racial cues are not necessary for modern forms of racism to influence the formation of policy attitudes. With respect to the 2016 election, scholars have reported large effects of racial resentment on voter choice (Hanley 2018; Schaffner et al. 2018; Tien 2017; see also Setzler and Yanus 2018).

Accumulating evidence for the relevance of racial resentment to voter choice presents an inescapable challenge for rights and tolerance scholarship. By ignoring racial resentment, the influence of rights and tolerance on voters may have been substantially overestimated, if, for instance, it is primarily racially resentful voters who are disposed toward illiberal views on matters of rights and tolerance. But the existence of such an interrelationship is unclear in the absence of sustained analysis. Both rights and tolerance and racial resentment traditions of research have developed independently of one another, so relevant empirical tests have yet to be conducted. Analyzing the dependence versus independence of these factors is important with respect not only for research on rights and tolerance and voter choice but also for racial resentment scholarship.

Anti-Immigrant Sentiments

A second factor that has been largely ignored by rights and tolerance scholars is anti-immigrant sentiments. The focus here is on negative affect toward immigrants stemming from the belief that immigrants pose a threat to American traditions and institutions. In the twentieth century, immigrants from Mexico and other Latin American nations elicited a variety of racialized responses with respect to social policy restrictions and stereotyping by politicians (Fox and Guglielmo 2012). Scholars have unearthed evidence of negative attitudes toward Latinos using implicit association methods, and in surveys when the topic is defined as “illegal immigration” or information about Hispanic population growth is presented (Abascal 2015; Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Pérez 2010).

Anti-immigrant sentiments have begun to powerfully inform voting behavior scholarship. Analyzing the 2016 Republican presidential primary Sides et al. (2018) found that negative views of immigration contributed to the initial surge that culminated in Donald Trump’s nomination victory. Investigating the general election, Hooghe and Dassonneville (2018) reported that anti-immigrant sentiments were a significant factor motivating support for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton, controlling for racial resentment and established factors behind voter choice.

Scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiments presents, then, a second, unmet challenge to scholarship on rights and tolerance support. Scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiments has already sought to take into account racial resentment in making the case these represent independent influences over voter choice (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). It is appropriate for rights and tolerance scholars to do the same with respect to anti-immigrant sentiments (and racial resentment).

White Identity

Complementing our consideration of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments is a third factor recently introduced by Jardina (2019): white identity. Jardina argues that patterns of population change undermine whites’ status as a majority. The election of Barack Obama, alongside the recent emergence of nativist movements and politicians, is said to have amplified the political salience of demographic change, triggering a new set of threats on the part of many white voters.

Jardina theorizes that white identity is distinct from the phenomenon of racial resentment and other forms of negative attitudes toward out-groups. She defines white identity as combining a high degree of salience with respect to whites’ in-group identification with the belief that discrimination against whites calls for protective measures. Taking into account racial resentment and a variety of established factors, Jardina (2019, Chapter 8) found evidence for the relevance of white identity to voters’ 2016 choice of Donald Trump versus Hillary Clinton.

White identity is a new factor for consideration with respect to voters’ preferences and choice processes. Like racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments, it is possible that white identity may operate as a confounder with respect to the influence of rights and tolerance on voter choice (if, for instance, there is a strong association between white identification and intolerance). Incorporating white identity in the analysis provides a means of guarding against this scenario. This puts estimates of rights and tolerance’s influence on a stronger footing.

Research Questions

Racial resentment research, alongside recent work on anti-immigrant sentiments and white identity, presents three challenges for scholarship on rights and tolerance and voter choice: (1) Does inclusion of racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity change estimates of the influence of rights and tolerance attitudes on voter choice? (2) What are the interrelationships of these four factors with respect to voter choice, and does rights and tolerance support have a more peripheral influence when the other three are taken into account? (3) Has the linkage between rights and tolerance attitudes and voter choice declined over time, in conjunction, for instance, with the hypothesized, rising influence of racial resentment?

If the underlying expectations of rights and tolerance scholarship are correct, the inclusion of racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity should do little to diminish its relevance to voter choice. But these expectations have been based on no suitable analysis or engagement with the literatures on racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. Moreover, rights and tolerance scholarship has yet to investigate the 2016 presidential election, the contest in which many scholars have identified anti-immigrant sentiments and white identity (alongside racial resentment) as of particular relevance. To this end, we analyze in detail the 2016 presidential election. We supplement this analysis with further investigation of a longer time period stretching from the 1992 through 2016 presidential elections.

Data, Measures, and Methods

ANES Data

We analyze data from ANES time-series surveys of presidential elections (Center for Political Studies 2018). The ANES surveys have been the key source of data for the majority of the scholarship on rights and tolerance support, racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. Our analysis starts with the 2016 presidential election, which has yet to be investigated by rights and tolerance scholars. The 2016 ANES data enable consideration of rights and tolerance support, racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity within the same model. We consider whether the influence of rights and tolerance attitudes on voter choice was small versus large in magnitude, including when contrasted with the influences of racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. Also using the 2016 data, we evaluate the impact on estimates of excluding versus including measures of rights and tolerance support, racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity.²

The second part of the analysis considers a larger set of presidential elections from 1992 through 2016. Items with which to measure rights and tolerance support and racial resentment (but not anti-immigrant sentiments and white identity) are available in ANES surveys from 1992 through 2016, with the exception of the 1996 survey (in which the racial resentment items were not fielded). Our analysis of the five 1992 to 2016 surveys evaluates the possibility that rights and tolerance attitudes’ influence has declined over time. As before, we compare the predicted effects of rights and tolerance support and racial resentment with respect to presidential candidate choice.

Measures of Rights and Tolerance, Racial Resentment, Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, and White Identity

Past studies guide our measurement of rights and tolerance, racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. Within their respective traditions, researchers have conceptualized these factors as representing separate clusters of attitudes. By design, items in our analyses thus serve as indicators of only one factor (e.g., an item cannot be used to measure both rights and tolerance and racial resentment). Also following past scholarship, we restrict items that share specific content/keywords to measurement of a specific latent variable (e.g., items making reference to “blacks” are used to measure racial resentment, not white identity).³

To measure rights and tolerance attitudes, we make use of two scales in analyzing the five 1992 to 2016 ANES surveys and the single 2016 ANES survey. The first is a scale of five items that are available from 1992 through 2016 with identical question-wording and response formats across surveys. As summarized in Table 1, these items make reference to the following rights and tolerance-related issues: abortion, “newer lifestyles,” “tolerance,” the “traditional family,” and the “world changing.”⁴ Items are coded so that higher scores indicate greater rights and tolerance support. We use factor analysis to combine responses into a scale (α = .742) for analyzing voter choice from 1992 through 2016.

Table 1.

Rights and Tolerance Items from the American National Election Surveys.

1992–2016 rights and tolerance items^a
Abortion: There has been some discussion abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? (1 = by law, abortion should never be permitted; 2 = the law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman’s life is in danger; 3 = the law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established; 4 = by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice) 2.974 (1.076)
Newer lifestyles: The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society. (1 = strongly agree . . . 5 = strongly disagree) 2.431 (1.327)
Tolerant of people: We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards even if they are very different from our own. (1 = strongly disagree . . . 5 = strongly agree) 3.464 (1.251)
Traditional family: This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. (1 = strongly agree . . . 5 = strongly disagree) 1.970 (1.184)
World changing: The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes. (1 = strongly disagree . . . 5 = strongly agree) 2.830 (1.470)
2016 rights and tolerance items^b
LGBTQ: Job discrimination: Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination? Do you favor such laws strongly or not strongly?/Do you oppose such laws strongly or not strongly? (1 = strongly oppose . . . 4 = strongly favor) 3.468 (1.017)
LGBTQ: Marriage equality: Which comes closest to your view? (1 = there should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian’s couple’s relationship; 2 = gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry; 3 = gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry) 2.471 (0.705)

Note. LGBTQ = lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer.

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 1992–2016 estimation sample.

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 2016 estimation sample.

The second scale of rights and tolerance attitudes is for analyzing the 2016 presidential election. We add to the preceding five items a pair of additional items fielded in the 2016 ANES relating to the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer individuals. LGBTQ rights are central to modern ideas of rights and tolerance (McThomas and Buchanan 2012), and measures of LGBTQ tolerance have figured centrally in past analyses of rights and tolerance and voter choice (e.g., Claggett and Shafer 2010; Wurgler and Brooks 2014). As summarized in Table 1, the first item asks about protection from job discrimination, the second about legal recognition for same-sex marriage.⁵

We use a scale of four items to measure racial resentment (see Table 2). As summarized in Table 2, these items probe respondents’ attitudes toward deservingness, slavery, “special favors,” and the work ethic (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996; Setzler and Yanus 2018; see also Kinder and Sears 1981).⁶ The racial resentment items are available for analyzing voter choice from 1992 through 2016 (with identical question-wording and response format across surveys).

Table 2.

Racial Resentment, Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, and White Identity Politics Items.

1992–2016 racial resentment items^a
Gotten less: Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (1 = agree strongly . . . 5 = disagree strongly) 3.365 (1.272)
Slavery: Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (1 = agree strongly . . . 5 = disagree strongly) 3.008 (1.404)
Special favors: Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (1 = disagree strongly . . . 5 = agree strongly) 3.704 (1.319)
Try harder: It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (1 = disagree strongly . . . 5 = agree strongly) 3.151 (1.343)
2016 anti-immigrant sentiments items^b
Culture: America’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants. (1 = disagree strongly . . . 5 = agree strongly) 2.195 (1.180)
Crime: Immigrants increase crime rates in the United States. (1 = disagree strongly . . . 5 = agree strongly) 2.538 (1.292)
Economy: Immigrants are generally good for America’s economy. (1 = agree strongly . . . 5 = disagree strongly) 2.312 (1.139)
Take jobs: How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here. (1 = not at all likely . . . 4 = extremely likely) 2.160 (1.026)
2016 white identity items (white respondents only)^c
Being white: How important is being white to your identity? (1 = not at all important . . . 5 = extremely important) 2.487 (1.344)
Change laws: How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites? (1 = not at all important . . . 5 = extremely important) 2.855 (1.445)
Unable to find a job: How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead? (1 = not at all likely . . . 5 = extremely likely) 2.384 (1.186)

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 1992–2016 estimation sample.

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 2016 estimation sample.

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 2016 estimation sample (white respondents only).

The next four items in Table 2 are for the anti-immigrant sentiments scale (α = .808). They ask respondents about the effect of immigrants with respect to culture, crime, the economy, and whether immigration “will take jobs away from people already here.” These items were fielded only in the 2016 ANES; they are available for analyzing voter choice in 2016 but not over time.⁷

Table 2’s remaining covariates are for three items comprising the white identity scale (α = .602). Asked only of white respondents in the 2016 ANES, these items probe the importance of “being white,” working “to change laws that are unfair to whites,” and the likelihood that “many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities.” These items were analyzed by Jardina (2019), and we follow her coding and scaling of the three items.

Other Independent Variables

The remaining covariates in our analysis are for established influences behind voter choice (and for year of survey in the over-time analysis). Partisanship-centered scholarship argues for the impact of voters’ identification with the two major parties (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2015; Jacobson 2017), and its inclusion represents a suitably conservative modeling choice. As summarized in Table 3, partisanship is coded as a 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating greater identification with the Democratic Party.

Table 3.

Additional Independent Variables.

1992–2016 items^a
Partisanship (1 = strong Republican . . . 7 = strong Democrat) 4.048 (2.205) Social services: Some people think the government should provide fewer services . . . in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. (1 = fewer services/reduce spending . . . 7 = more services/increase spending) 4.008 (1.608)
Defense spending: Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. (1 = spending increased . . . 7 = spend less) 3.780 (1.509)
Female(0, 1) 0.505 (0.500)
Race (0 = black; white = 1; other = 1) 0.823 (0.382) 0.088 (0.284)
South (0 = other regions; South = 1) 0.317 (0.465)
Labor force participation (0 = else; 1 = full-time/part-time) 0.649 (0.477)
Age (years) 48.690 (16.832)
Education(years) 14.089 (2.373)
Church attendance (0 = never . . . 5 = attend every week) 2.528 (1.984)
2016 egalitarianism items^b
Equal opportunity: Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. (1 = disagree strongly . . . 5 = agree strongly) 4.394 (0.946)
More of a chance: It is not really that big a problem is some people have more of a chance in life than others. (1 = agree strongly . . . 5 = disagree strongly) 3.555 (1.200)
Treated more equally: If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. (1 = disagree strongly . . . 5 = agree strongly) 3.942 (1.124)
Worried less: This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. (1 = agree strongly . . . 5 = disagree strongly) 3.043 (1.431)
2016 economic evaluations and race items^b
Economic evaluations (1 = much worse off . . . 5 = much better off) 3.270 (0.979)
Race (0 = Hispanic black; Hispanic white = 1; Hispanic Asian = 1; Hispanic Native American = 1; Hispanic other = 1; Hispanic = 1) 0.738 (0.440); 0.018 (0.133); 0.004 (0.059); 0.031 (0.174); 0.102 (0.303)
2016 Big Five personality trait items^b
Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you . . .
disorganized, careless (1 = extremely well . . . 7 = extremely poorly)	5.214 (1.625)
dependable, self-disciplined (1 = extremely poorly . . . 7 = extremely well)	6.088 (1.068)
Conventional, uncreative (1 = extremely well . . . 7 = extremely poorly)	4.732 (1.560)
Open to new experience, complex (1 = extremely poorly . . . 7 = extremely well)	5.455 (1.255)
calm, emotionally stable (1 = extremely well . . . 7 = extremely poorly)	2.529 (1.305)
anxious, easily upset (1 = extremely poorly . . . 7 = extremely well)	3.691 (1.738)
critical, quarrelsome (1 = extremely well . . . 7 = extremely poorly)	5.785 (1.198)
sympathetic, warm (1 = extremely poorly . . . 7 = extremely well)	4.517 (1.702)
reserved, quiet (1 = extremely poorly . . . 7 = extremely well)	3.628 (1.871)
extraverted, enthusiastic (1 = extremely well . . . 7 = extremely poorly)	4.928 (1.576)

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 1992–2016 estimation sample.

Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) are from the 2016 estimation sample.

The next two controls are for attitudes toward social services and defense spending. These are 7-point scales where higher scores indicate more liberal attitudes. Like partisanship, inclusion of these established factors behind voter preferences (Aldrich et al. 2019, Chapter 6) provides a further guard against spuriousness with respect to the influence of rights and tolerance support.

Eight additional covariates are available for all ANES surveys in the analysis. Female, race (two dummy variables for white and other race, with black as the reference), South, and labor force participation are binary variables for social group factors behind voter choice (Achen and Bartels 2016). Next are continuous variables for age (years), education (years), and church attendance (higher scores indicate more frequent attendance).

Table 3’s remaining covariates are available in the 2016 ANES survey (and not in all 1992–2012 surveys). The first four items are for measuring egalitarianism (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; see also Carmines and D’Amico 2015), a value that potentially confounds the influence of rights and tolerance.⁸ Economic evaluations are measured with a five-category response item asking respondents about their financial situation. The 2016 race item enables a more detailed set of contrasts than the 1992 to 2016 analysis. In all, there are five binary variables for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic Native American, non-Hispanic other race, and Hispanic (with non-Hispanic black as the reference).

The final 10 covariates are for measuring Big Five personality traits. An important strain of political behavior scholarship has argued for greater consideration of Big Five traits (Fortunato, Hibbing, and Mondak 2018; Gerber et al. 2011), and we include controls for these traits to buttress estimates. As summarized in Table 3, respondents are asked to self-classify themselves with respect to keywords reflecting poles of five established dimensions of personality: conscientiousness, openness to experience, nonneuroticism, amiability, and extraversion. Five scales for these traits are constructed by summing together the pairs of items listed in Table 3.

Dependent Variable and Predicted Probability Calculations

Our dependent variable is voter choice in presidential elections, coded “1” for the choice of the Democratic candidate and “0” for the choice of the Republican candidate. We analyze this binary dependent variable with logistic regression. We first present results from our analysis of the 2016 election. Next, we consider the 1992–2016 presidential elections to evaluate evidence for interactions between election year and both rights and tolerance support and racial resentment. Using these data for multiple elections over a 24-year period, we can test whether predicted effects of these two covariates have been temporally stable, and if not, whether a pattern of change has been linear or instead confined to a subset of elections.

To gauge the magnitude of key effects of interest, we calculate predicted probabilities across a fixed range of a covariate, holding all other covariates at mean values (or modal values, for categorical covariates). For the rights and tolerance, racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity scales, we calculate predicted probabilities across a range of ±0.5 standard units. The use of a standardized range for these calculations allows us to directly take into account variation in the covariates being manipulated. In this way, we can evaluate hypotheses about the relative magnitudes of predicted effects across covariates for rights and tolerance and racial resentment (alongside anti-immigrant sentiments in the 2016 analyses).

In addition to calculating predicted probabilities by holding all but one covariate of interest at fixed values, we present parallel estimates using a second technique: the average marginal effect (AME). For nonlinear probability models, AMEs take into account the observed levels of covariates that are fixed when calculating probabilities by holding covariates at mean/modal values. AMEs can thus be informative as to the impact on calculations of relatively infrequent or rare cases in the estimation sample (or sample variation in covariates, more generally). For nonlinear models, the partial derivative with respect to a covariate of interest is calculated for each individual in the estimation sample (using observed levels of covariates); then, the average of these calculations is calculated to arrive at the AME (Long and Freese 2014, Chapter 6).

Results

Rights and Tolerance Support and 2016 Voter Choice

Did rights and tolerance attitudes matter to voter choice in the 2016 presidential election? In Table 4, the 1.788 coefficient for rights and tolerance support (SE = 0.413) easily reaches statistical significance at a conventional, p < .05 level.⁹ The same is true with respect to coefficients for racial resentment (−0.858; SE = 0.343) and anti-immigrant sentiments (−1.181; SE = 0.346).

Table 4.

Logistic Regression Model of 2016 Voter Choice..

	Coefficient	SE
_constant	−6.435*	2.315
Rights and tolerance	1.788*	0.413
Racial resentment	−0.858*	0.343
Anti-immigrant sentiments	−1.181*	0.346
Partisanship	1.048*	0.188
Social services	0.433*	0.160
Defense spending	0.189	0.173
Egalitarianism	0.470	0.427
Economic evaluations	0.003	0.282
Female	−0.362	0.463
~Hispanic white	−3.234*	0.984
~Hispanic Asian	−2.516	1.410
~Hispanic Native American	2.496	1.763
~Hispanic other	−2.617	1.379
Hispanic	−1.932	0.004
South	0.282	0.546
Age	0.016	0.016
Education	0.134	0.128
Church attendance	0.199	0.141
Labor force participation	−0.380	0.607
Conscientiousness	−0.106	0.251
Open to experience	−0.013	0.298
Neuroticism	−0.067	0.140
Amiability	−0.300	0.196
Intraversion	−0.103	0.186
Number of obs.	528

Note. Dependent variable is coded “1” for choice of the Democratic presidential candidate, “0” for choice of the Republican presidential candidate; an asterisk indicates significance at p < .05.

We consider the magnitude of rights and tolerance attitudes’ influence using calculations displayed in Figure 1. These calculations show the change in the predicted probability of choosing the Democratic presidential candidate due to a one-standard unit increase in a covariate of interest, holding all other independent variables at means (if continuous) or modal values (if categorical). Starting with Figure 1’s first set of estimates, a one-standard unit increase in rights and tolerance support is predicted as increasing the probability of choosing the Democratic candidate by .38.

Figure 1.

Predicted effects of key covariates from model of 2016 voter choice.

Figure 1’s estimate for racial resentment suggests a smaller yet still-ample effect. A standard unit increase in resentment decreases the probability of Democratic candidate choice by −.19. With respect to Figure 1’s third estimate, a parallel movement toward higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiments anticipates a larger influence (−.25) on candidate choice. Anti-immigrant sentiments and racial resentment appear to have mattered considerably in the 2016 presidential election, while falling short of the larger influence of rights and tolerance attitudes among voters.¹⁰

Regarding Figure 1’s remaining estimates, egalitarianism and defense spending have no significant influence on voter choice (see also the logistic coefficients in Table 4). In contrast, attitudes toward social services had a significant effect (.17). The latter effect is comparable in magnitude to the effect of racial resentment (−.19) on voter choice discussed earlier.

Interrelationships of Rights and Tolerance, Racial Resentment, Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and 2016 Voter Choice

Does inclusion of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments lower estimates of the influence of right and tolerance support with respect to voter choice? This question applies symmetrically to racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments. This is because scholars have yet to consider whether the influence on voter choice of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments differs when rights and tolerance attitudes are taken into account.

We use statistical tests that compare coefficients across models—a first model that has only one of the three scales of interest (along with the other controls) versus the full model (see again Table 4) that includes the three scales (along with the other controls). These tests return evidence that estimates for rights and tolerance support and anti-immigrant sentiments (but not racial resentment) are influenced by inclusion of controls for the other two scales.¹¹ Extending tests to other covariates, we find that estimates for defense spending attitudes also differ when controls for rights and tolerance, racial resentment, and anti-immigrants sentiments are included in the model.¹²

Given the three significant test results, we use Figure 2’s calculations to gauge how much key estimates shrink in the presence of controls. Estimates are the change in predicted probability of choosing the Democratic presidential candidate stemming from a one-standard unit increase in a covariate of interest, holding all other independent variables at means (if continuous) or modal values (if categorical). The 95 percent confidence intervals (horizontal bars) are displayed for each estimate.

Figure 2.

Initial versus preferred estimates of 2016 voter choice.

The initial estimate (.45) for rights and tolerance support’s influence over voter choice is from the model that excludes racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments. By contrast, the .38 preferred estimate takes racial resentment and inti-immigrant sentiments into account. The .07 drop in the rights and tolerance effect is not trivial. But even so, the influence of rights and tolerance support remains large in both absolute and relative terms, exceeding the parallel estimates for racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and defense spending.

Figure 2’s estimates show a somewhat more extensive pattern of divergence for anti-immigrant sentiments. The initial estimate of −.34 declines to a preferred estimate of −.25. Defense spending attitudes decline profoundly, from the initial, significant estimate of .21 to a (nonsignificant) estimate of .07.¹³

Taken together, these results support the inclusion of all three scales in the model as a means of lowering the risk of omitted variables. This risk appears to be higher with respect to defense spending attitudes (and anti-immigrant sentiments) in comparison with rights and tolerance support (and racial resentment or social services). As regard this study’s main focus, there is evidence that the influence on voter choice of rights and tolerance support is mostly independent of the parallel influence of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments.

White Identity

The third factor we consider that may confound estimates for rights and tolerance support is white identity. White identity is measured by a set of questions available in the 2016 ANES survey and asked only of white respondents. We analyze this second estimation sample using the same model (dropping the nonestimable dummy variables for race). We estimate the model by first excluding, then including, the scale for white identity.¹⁴ Figure 3 presents the subsequent estimates of change in the predicted probability of Democratic candidate choice stemming from a one-standard unit increase in a covariate. As in our preceding calculations, all other independent variables are held at means (if continuous) or modal values (if categorical), and 95 percent confidence intervals (graphed as horizontal bars) are displayed for each estimate.¹⁵

Figure 3.

Controlling for white identity in 2016 voter choice.

Figure 3’s two estimates for rights and tolerance support are identical at .26. Racial resentment’s estimates are very similar in magnitude (−.16 vs. −.15), although both are also nonsignificant as well.¹⁶ Estimates for anti-immigrant sentiments are identical at −.25. Insofar as key estimates are largely unchanged when white identity is controlled in the model, there is no evidence that it operates as a confounder in the current study, particularly as regard our central focus on rights and tolerance support.¹⁷

Rights and Tolerance Support and 1992–2016 Voter Choice

We analyze rights and tolerance attitudes’ influence on voter choice from 1992 through 2016. This longer series of elections allows us to evaluate evidence for interactions between rights and tolerance (and other covariates) and time. For the tests reported in Table 5, we evaluate interactions using the following constraints with respect to time: linear (election year is coded as a continuous variable), unrestricted (election year is a coded as a set of dummy variables), elections before versus after 2008 (election year is a dummy variable coded “1” for elections after 2004, “0” otherwise), and 2016 versus earlier elections (election year is a dummy variable coded “1” for 2016, “0” otherwise).

Table 5.

Wald Tests for Interactions for Models of 1992–2016 Voter Choice.

	χ²(df)	Prob > χ²
1a. Rights and Tolerance × Year(continuous)	0.00(1)	.952
1b. Rights and Tolerance × Year(indicator)	4.20(5)	.510
1c. Rights and Tolerance × Year(2008–2016)	0.13(1)	.723
1d. Rights and Tolerance × Year(2016)	2.37(1)	.124
2a. Racial Resentment × Year(continuous)	2.65(1)	.105
2b. Racial Resentment × Year(indicator)	8.77(5)	.118
2c. Racial Resentment × Year(2008–2016)	1.37(1)	.241
2d. Racial Resentment × Year(2016)	5.88(1)	.015
3a. 2d + Rights and Tolerance × White	0.13(1)	.467
3b. 2d + Rights and Tolerance × Partisanship	0.50(1)	.480
3c. 2d + Rights and Tolerance × Racial Resentment	0.32(1)	.573
3d. 2d + Racial Resentment × White	0.02(1)	.900
3e. 2d + Racial Resentment × Partisanship	1.39(1)	.239
4a. 2d + Partisanship × Year(continuous)	1.53(1)	.217
4b. 2d + Partisanship × Year(indicator)	2.71(5)	.744
4c. 2d + Partisanship × Year(2008–2016)	1.38(1)	.241
4d. 2d + Partisanship × Year(2016)	0.25(1)	.621
5a. 2d + White × Year(continuous)	9.17(1)	.103
5b. 5a + White × Year(indicator)	8.88(4)	.064
5c. 5a + White × Year(2008–2016)	8.84(1)	.003
5d. 5c – White × Year(continuous)	0.69(1)	.407
5e. 5d + White × Year(2016)	0.00(1)	.931
Number of obs.	3,598

These tests return evidence for two significant interactions. Racial resentment had a different effect on voter choice in 2016 than in earlier elections (2d), and white voters changed their pattern of voter choice in the 2008 through 2016 presidential elections (5c, 5d).¹⁸ These interactions are incorporated into our model of 1992 to 2016 voter choice, whose coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 6.

Table 6.

Logistic Regression Model of 1992–2016 Voter Choice.

	Coefficient	SE
_constant	−4.652*	0.825
Rights and tolerance	1.060*	0.127
Racial resentment	−0.609*	0.119
Racial resentment × 2016	−0.598*	0.276
Partisanship	0.925*	0.048
Social services	0.308*	0.056
Defense spending	0.228*	0.065
Female	−0.022	0.147
White	−1.219*	0.355
White × 2008–2016	−1.685*	0.424
Other	−1.878*	0.447
South	−0.288	0.167
Age	0.010	0.006
Education	0.001	0.037
Church attendance	−0.021	0.044
Labor force participation	−0.005	0.180
2000	−0.356	0.273
2004	−0.230	0.206
2008	1.021	0.467
2012	1.191*	0.434
2016	0.760	0.463
Number of obs.	3,598

Rights and tolerance support had a significant effect on voter choice (1.060, SE = 0.127), and the temporal stability of this effect cuts against scenarios of declining influence. For racial resentment, the −.609 (SE = 0.119) main effect estimate provides evidence of its relevance for elections prior to 2016. In 2016, the influence of racial resentment over voters is predicted as changing by an additional −.598 (on the logit scale).

We present in Figure 4 predicted probability calculations for a one-standard unit change with respect to rights and tolerance, racial resentment, defense spending, and social services. For rights and tolerance support, a single standard unit change anticipates a .22 increase in the probability of favoring the Democratic presidential candidate. As established by the tests summarized in Table 5, the magnitude of this difference was temporally stable between 1992 and 2016.¹⁹

Figure 4.

Predicted effects of key covariates from model of 1992–2016 voter choice.

From 1992 through 2012, the influence of racial resentment on voter choice was nonnegligible (−.11) but also smaller than the influence of rights and tolerance. The 2016 estimate for racial resentment (−.22) is larger, illustrating the time-varying effect of racial resentment on voter choice. This is an interesting result for racial resentment scholarship. Yet, for the current study, it is important to emphasize again that racial resentment’s recent increase in political relevance did not displace the large (and temporally stable) impact of rights and tolerance support on voter choice.

The last two estimates in Figure 4 are for defense spending attitudes and attitudes toward social services. The .09 estimate for defense spending attitudes is small though distinguishable from zero. The .12 estimate for attitudes toward social services also represents a statistically significant effect.

Aggregate Opinion Trends and Election Outcomes

The analyses to this point provide evidence for the influence of rights and tolerance support over voter choice. We now consider the bearing of trends in the level of rights and tolerance with respect to the outcome of elections. In line with past scholarship, scores from our five-item scale show a liberalizing pattern of opinion change, particularly from 2000 to 2016.²⁰

To gauge the impact of rights and tolerance opinion trends on election outcomes, we compute predictions from our 1992 to 2016 voter choice model for specific elections, varying the rights and tolerance index score while holding all other covariates at their means. We start by substituting the 1992 score for the 2016 score to predict the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. This change anticipates an 8 percentage point decline in the likelihood of a Democratic victory. The predicted change is significant (p = .000) and would have represented a major alteration to the 2016 election, providing a much larger mandate for Republican candidate Donald Trump.

A second calculation is to predict the outcome of the 2016 election using the 2012 level of rights and tolerance support. This returns a 4 percentage point decline (p = .000) in the chance of a Democratic victory. Even over the shorter period of time between 2012 and 2016, liberal trends in rights and tolerance appear to have substantially buttressed Democratic Party competitiveness.

Turning to the 2012 presidential election, we can predict the outcome using the 2008 level of rights and tolerance support. This returns a 1.6 percentage point drop (p = .000) in the likelihood of a Democratic victory in 2012. In the past two presidential races, rights and tolerance opinion trends appear to have substantially shaped election outcomes. Democratic candidates have consistently benefited by, and may also depend upon, high level of rights and tolerance support among voters.

Discussion

Do Americans’ rights and tolerance attitudes influence their voting behavior? Scholarship has reported large effects on voter choice. Because support for rights and tolerance has increased over time, it is said to have reshaped presidential elections by consistently benefiting Democratic candidates.

These results have potentially far-reaching implications, yet they also face a fundamental challenge. Studies conducted to date have failed to take into account racial resentment as a relevant and potentially confounding factor behind voter choice. The lack of attention to racial resentment flies in the face of accumulating evidence of its far-reaching influence over voters (Hanley 2018; Knuckey and Kim 2015; see also Kinder and Sanders 1996). Separate evidence for the political relevance of anti-immigrant sentiments offers a related and unmet challenge (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides et al. 2018). So too does scholarship on the novel, in-group factor of white identity in the 2016 presidential election (Jardina 2019).

This study has sought to address these omissions and new challenges by extending scholarship on rights and tolerance support to investigate the 2016 presidential election, and by bringing together for the first time rights and tolerance research with scholarship on racial resentment, anti-immigrant sentiments, and white identity. Taking into account racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments (alongside well-established factors such as partisanship), we find new evidence for the influence of rights and tolerance support in presidential elections. This influence is large in magnitude. Using our estimates for voter choice in 2016, a one-standard unit increase in rights and tolerance support is predicted as raising the probability of Democratic candidate choice by .38. The parallel estimate for racial resentment’s effect on voter choice is −.19, and for anti-immigrant sentiments, −.25. Racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments mattered considerably in the 2016 presidential election. Yet, their relevance did not displace the very substantial influence of rights and tolerance support.

Regarding interrelationships among key covariates, estimates of the effect of rights and tolerance support on voter choice vary significantly yet modestly across models that include (vs. exclude) measures of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments. Estimates for anti-immigrant sentiments show greater variation across models. Rights and tolerance support is largely distinct from these two factors, operating as an independent influence over voter choice.²¹

Our over-time analysis of the 1992 through 2016 elections provides evidence for temporal stability in the effects of rights and tolerance support on voter choice. This is striking in light of how we also find that the influence of racial resentment on voter choice was higher in 2016 than in earlier elections. This suggests that racial spillover effects (Tesler 2012) and Donald Trump’s notably illiberal 2016 presidential campaign (Hanley 2018; see also Inglehart and Norris 2017) did not diminish liberal trends in rights and tolerance or their powerful relevance to voting behavior.

These results may be surprising to commentators on American politics who see recent elections as dominated by forces that work to the advantage of conservative or reactionary political candidates. Our results suggest the existence of a factor whose influence has helped to offset the political influence of modern forms of racism and xenophobia. In turn, this raises new questions about the view that contemporary patterns of cultural conflict spell doom for liberal candidates or the Democratic Party, more generally. We would emphasize that these insights are enabled by a theoretical focus (and relevant evidence) with respect to the influence of rights and tolerance attitudes on voter choice.

Turning to the outcome of elections, we find evidence for the political relevance of changes in the level of rights and tolerance support over time. For instance, if we predict the outcome of the 2016 election with 2012 levels of rights and tolerance, this lowers by approximately four percentage points the chance of a Democratic victory. Holding constant rights and tolerance at 1992 levels anticipates an even greater disadvantage for Democratic candidates in recent elections. These simulations suggest that trends in rights and tolerance attitudes have generated a net electoral advantage for Democratic presidential candidates. An intriguing corollary is that the viability of Democratic candidates in coming elections is likely to depend on the existence of high levels of rights and tolerance support and a strong connection to voter choice.

Conclusion

In light of the results we have presented, it is informative to ask in closing about the place of rights and tolerance support within established theory and research on U.S. electoral politics. To date, it is notable that there has been virtually no serious consideration beyond the specific strains of research discussed in this study’s introduction. Of the last six major monographs we have identified that investigate the American electorate (Abramson et al. 2016; Achen and Bartels 2016; Aldrich et al. 2019; Campbell 2016; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Theiss-Morse et al. 2018), only two make any reference to attitudes toward rights and tolerance-related issues, and these are far from representing a significant engagement or incorporation.²²

To be sure, a reasonable objection to taking rights and tolerance support seriously is the possibility of omitted variables, particularly with reference to the importance of racial resentment (and anti-immigrant sentiment) in recent elections. Indeed, this is precisely the motivation for the current study, including with reference to the inclusion of well-established factors such as partisanship and redistributive attitudes. Given the evidence at hand, we believe the time has come for more systematic attention to rights and tolerance attitudes in theory and research on voter choice and elections. Without consideration of this sort, scholarly understanding of electoral politics during the past several decades will risk being incomplete, missing a key factor of relevance to both voter choice and election outcomes.

Supplemental Material

appendix – Supplemental material for Rights and Tolerance Support in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1992–2016

Supplemental material, appendix for Rights and Tolerance Support in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1992–2016 by Clem Brooks and Kyle Dodson in Social Currents

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We thank Timothy Hallett, Timothy Hellwig, and Amanda Weiss for comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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Supplementary Material

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Rights and Tolerance Support in U.S. Presidential Elections,1992–2016

Abstract

Keywords

Rights and Tolerance Scholarship and Its Unmet Challenges

Rights and Tolerance Attitudes

Racial Resentment

Anti-Immigrant Sentiments

White Identity

Research Questions

Data, Measures, and Methods

ANES Data

Measures of Rights and Tolerance, Racial Resentment, Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, and White Identity

Other Independent Variables

Dependent Variable and Predicted Probability Calculations

Results

Rights and Tolerance Support and 2016 Voter Choice

Interrelationships of Rights and Tolerance, Racial Resentment, Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and 2016 Voter Choice

White Identity

Rights and Tolerance Support and 1992–2016 Voter Choice

Aggregate Opinion Trends and Election Outcomes

Discussion

Conclusion

Supplemental Material

appendix – Supplemental material for Rights and Tolerance Support in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1992–2016

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Supplemental Material

Notes

References

Supplementary Material