Abstract
This paper offers estimates of US foreign-born populations that are eligible for special legal status programs and those that would be eligible for permanent residence (legalization) under pending bills. It seeks to provide policymakers, government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers, and others with a unique tool to assess the potential impact, implement, and analyze the success of these programs. It views timely, comprehensive data on targeted immigrant populations as an essential pillar of legalization preparedness, implementation, and evaluation. The paper and the exhaustive estimates that underlie it, represent the first attempt to provide a detailed statistical profile of beneficiaries of proposed major US legalization programs and special, large-scale legal status programs.
The paper offers the following top-line findings:
Fifty-eight percent of the 10.35 million US undocumented residents had lived in the United States for 10 years or more as of 2019; 37 percent lived in homes with mortgages; 33 percent arrived at age 17 or younger; 32 percent lived in households with US citizens (the overwhelming majority of them children); and 96 percent in the labor force were employed. The Citizenship for Essential Workers Act would establish the largest population-specific legalization program discussed in the paper. 7.2 million (70 percent) of the total undocumented population would be eligible for legalization under the Act. Approximately two-thirds of undocumented essential workers reside in 20 metropolitan areas. The populations eligible for the original Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and for permanent residence on a conditional basis and removal of the conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 are not only ready to integrate successfully, but in most cases have already done so. A high percentage are long-term residents, virtually all have completed high school (or attend school), a third to one-half have attended college, and the overwhelming majority live in households with incomes above the poverty level. The median household income of California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey residents that are eligible for the original DACA program is higher than the US median household income. New York and New Jersey residents that are eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 also have median incomes above the US median household income. The total eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 have median household incomes that are 99 percent of the US median income. Unlike populations eligible for most special legal status and population-specific legalization programs, childhood arrivals can be found in significant numbers and concentrations in communities throughout the United States, particularly in metropolitan areas. More than 1.8 million persons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras would be eligible for TPS if the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated Guatemala for TPS and re-designated El Salvador and Honduras. Local communities can best prepare for legalization by collaborating on: (1) the hard work of assisting individual immigrants to meet their immigration needs; (2) dividing labor, integrating services, screening the undocumented for status, and building legal capacity; and (3) implementation of special legal status programs. This collective work should be viewed as a legalization program in its own right. The populations eligible for legalization and legal status under the programs analyzed in the paper have overlapping needs and large numbers of immigrants would be eligible for more than one program. However, substantial differences between these populations in size, geography, length of residency, education, socio-economic attainment, and English language proficiency argue for distinct preparedness and implementation strategies for each population.
The paper also makes several broad policy recommendations regarding legalization bills, special legal status programs, and community-based preparedness and implementation efforts. In particular, it recommends that:
Congress should pass broad immigration reform legislation that includes a general legalization program or, in the alternative, a series of population-specific programs for essential workers, childhood arrivals, agricultural workers, persons eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), and long-term residents. In the interim, the Biden administration should also designate and re-designate additional countries for TPS. Immigration reform legislation should allow the great majority of US undocumented residents to legalize, should reform the underlying legal immigration system, and should provide for the legalization of future long-term undocumented residents through a rolling registry program. Congress, the relevant federal agencies, and advocates should ensure that any legalization program be properly structured and sufficiently funded, particularly the work of CBOs, states, and localities. Local communities should continue to build the necessary partnerships, capacities, skills, and resources to implement a legalization program. They should do so, in part, by collaborating on special legal status programs such as DACA, TPS, and naturalization campaigns, as well as through the steady-state work of assisting immigrants in their individual immigration cases and funding their representation as necessary in removal proceedings.
Section I of the paper describes the populations that would be eligible for legalization under pending bills and that are potentially eligible for special legal status programs. Section II presents top-line findings based on the Center for Migration Studies’ (CMS’s) estimates and profiles of these populations. The report offers estimates of each population by characteristics — such as length of time in the country, English language proficiency, education, household income, health insurance, and homeownership — that are relevant to preparedness and implementation activities. Section III makes the case for immigration reform and a broad legalization program. Section IV offers detailed recommendations on the substance, structure, and implementation of these programs.
Introduction
This paper provides estimates of US foreign-born populations that could be eligible for legalization (permanent residence) 1 under pending bills, whether as principal or derivative beneficiaries. It also analyzes populations eligible for temporary status or a reprieve from removal under special legal status programs. In producing these estimates, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) seeks to provide policymakers, government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers, and others with an important tool to assess the potential impact, implement, and analyze the success of these programs, including in real-time. CMS initiated this study in partnership with Ready to Stay, a national coalition of agencies “working to build field capacities and coordination for effective implementation of a large-scale immigration legalization program” and to facilitate “coordination and resources for implementation efforts” (Ready to Stay 2021).
The lengthy table in Appendix A sets forth the legislative and administrative programs analyzed in the paper, program eligibility criteria, the American Community Survey (ACS) characteristics CMS used to derive its estimates, the status of these programs, and the size of potentially eligible populations. The report analyzes the following special legal status programs and populations:
The original Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for former residents of Hong Kong, Liberians, and Venezuelans.
2
Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
3
for the following designated states: Burma/Myanmar, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (USCIS 2021a). Four TPS-designated states — El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Sudan — that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should consider for re-designation. Re-designation would extend eligibility to a larger number of their nationals, by advancing the date from which they must have lived in the United States. A non-exclusive list of states — Guatemala, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone — not yet designated for TPS, but with underlying conditions that would justify a designation. The American Dream and Promise Act of 2021
4
: conditional permanent resident status for childhood arrivals; removal of the conditions on permanent resident status; and adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status for persons eligible for TPS in 2017 and DED in 2021. Dream Act of 2021
5
: conditional permanent residence for long-term residents who entered as children and persons eligible for removal of conditions on residence. Citizenship for Essential Workers Act
6
: LPR status for essential workers and their spouses, children, and parents. Farm Workforce Modernization Act of 2021
7
: certified agricultural worker (CAW) status, which can lead to LPR status. US Citizenship Act of 2021
8
: general legalization program; LPR status for DACA recipients and other childhood arrivals; LPR status for persons eligible for TPS and DED in 2017; LPR status for agricultural workers; and the immediate family members of US citizens that would potentially benefit from the elimination of the three- and 10-year bars on admission for unlawful presence.
9
Liberians eligible for permanent residence under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness (LRIF) law.
10
The pending bills and potential legalization programs analyzed in the paper are:
The paper uses the term “legalization” to refer to federal programs that offer a path for undocumented residents to permanent residence and subsequently (under a separate process) to naturalization. This term encompasses general legalization programs, which are open to persons who have been living in the United States since a set date and who meet other conditions, and narrower, population-specific programs. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), for example, included a general legalization program for persons who had been undocumented prior to January 1, 1982, as well as population-specific programs for agricultural workers and Cuban-Haitian entrants.
11
The paper uses the term “special legal status programs” to refer to TPS, DED, DACA, and other programs that offer temporary status or a reprieve from removal for members of designated groups.
12
These estimates were derived from detailed data collected in the US Census Bureau’s 2019 ACS. Legal status of each noncitizen in the survey was assigned based on CMS’s methodology described in Warren (2021). Estimates are available for populations eligible for legalization or legal status on a national, state, county, metropolitan, and public use microdata area (PUMA) of roughly 100,000 persons. CMS does not report numbers that round to less than 500 (which reflects roughly five persons surveyed) because the sampling variability is too large for samples below that number.
II. Findings
The US Undocumented Population
The US undocumented population remains large (10.35 million in 2019), but has fallen by 1.4 million since 2010, driven principally by a 28 percent decrease in the Mexican undocumented population and large-scale return migration to Mexico (Warren 2021). Over the same period, the undocumented populations from Central America increased by 360,000 and from Asia by 165,000 (ibid.). Since 2010, nearly two times more newly undocumented residents have overstayed temporary visas after entering legally than have illegally crossed the border (Warren 2019).
The top countries of origin of the US undocumented population are Mexico (46 percent), El Salvador (7 percent), Guatemala (6 percent), India (6 percent), and Honduras (5 percent). Sixteen percent of undocumented residents are married to US citizens or LPRs. Ninety-six percent of those in the labor force are employed. A large number of US undocumented residents are low-income, working-class persons: 20 percent lives at or below the poverty threshold, 50 percent lacks health insurance, 40 percent has less than a high school diploma, and 14 percent does not speak English (ibid.). The undocumented are mostly long-term residents who have made their homes in the United States. They live in nearly 5.4 million US households, more than 6 million (58 percent) have lived in the United States for more than 10 years and 2.4 million for more than 20 years. Most enjoy strong family and socio-economic ties to the United States: 3.4 million arrived at age 17 or younger and 3.3 million live in households with US citizens, including 2.9 million US citizen children. 13 Essential workers constitute 74 percent of US undocumented workers (Kerwin and Warren 2020).
Populations Eligible for Special Legal Status Programs and for Legalization Under Pending Bills
Table 1 provides estimates and characteristics of populations that would be eligible for general and population-specific legalization programs and for special legal status programs. The authors have selected these characteristics for their relative importance in assisting CBOs, government officials, and others to allocate their limited resources and to craft outreach, public education, self-help, and capacity-building strategies. They can also assist policymakers to assess the potential impact of these programs and researchers to evaluate and to identify key determinants of participation in them.
Estimates of the Number and Characteristics of the Population Affected by Legislative/Administrative Programs: Estimates Derived from 2019 ACS Data.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Estimates derived from data collected in the 2019 ACS; see Appendix in Warren (2021) for methods of estimation. Source of ACS data: Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Sophia Foster, Ronald Goeken, Jose Pacas, Megan Schouweiler, and Matthew Sobek. IPUMS USA: Version 11.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2021. https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V11.0.
Many populations have overlapping needs and many immigrants are eligible for multiple programs. For example, 91 percent of TPS-eligible persons in 2017, who entered pre-2017, are essential workers, and virtually all the persons eligible for population-specific legalization programs would also be eligible for a general legalization program. That said, the chart also demonstrates that a one-size-fits-all approach to legalization preparedness and implementation would be counter-productive given the substantial differences between these populations in size, length of residency, socio-economic attainment, education, and English language proficiency. For example, about 86 percent of the 2.2 million covered by the Dream Act of 2021 speak English well, very well, or only English (Table 1). By comparison, only 28 percent of those eligible for CAW status under the Farm Workforce Modernization Act are proficient in English. Nearly all childhood arrivals have graduated from high school, but only a third of the CAW-eligible are high school graduates. Seventy-seven percent of Venezuelans eligible for DED have attended college, compared to 13 percent of Salvadorans eligible for TPS. Eighty-three percent of TPS-eligible Nepalis have health insurance, compared to 26 percent of the Hondurans that would be newly eligible for TPS if DHS re-designated Honduras for TPS (Table 1).
Table 1 also provides an opportunity to assess the relationship between the detailed characteristics of different populations. We would expect, for example, for English proficiency to be associated with completing high school, going to college, having household incomes above the poverty level, having health insurance, and buying a home. The correlations in Table 2 confirm these expectations and show the relative strengths of these relationships.
Correlation Between Selected Characteristics of Populations Affected by Proposed Programs. a
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Correlation coefficients derived from the data for programs with 30,000 or more are in Table 1.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the figures in Table 2. The correlation coefficients are based on data from multiple programs; some immigrants are included in more than one proposed program; and the correlations are derived from percentages that have a range limited to − 100 to + 100 percent.
The data and analysis in Tables 1 and 2 show the importance of designing immigration assistance programs tailored to the diverse characteristics of each population. Populations with low levels of English language fluency, education, income, health insurance, and homeownership would need sustained attention before, during, and in the aftermath of a legalization program, while populations on the other end of the spectrum may need more targeted and limited assistance.
Some populations may be able to self-file at higher rates and negotiate legalization or special legal status programs with less or different kinds of support. Researchers and service providers, for example, have recognized the potential advantages of technology in implementing legalization and legal status programs, compared to earlier programs. Kamasaki et al. (2015, 288), for example, argue that improved technology “should make the application assistance process less burdensome today than under IRCA” and the “widespread availability of information via the Internet should ease access to documentation of continuous residence and workforce participation, should facilitate increased outreach efforts, and should enable high numbers of self-filers” (ibid). While undoubtedly true, immigration applications have also become far longer and more complicated than they were during IRCA, and applicants for many immigration benefits must also complete a separate employment authorization form.
Those eligible for the Dream Act of 2021 should have few difficulties because 86 percent speak English well, very well, or only English, 95 percent have completed high school, and 42 percent have attended college (Table 1). Populations that have been in the DACA or TPS programs over the past several years should be familiar with the application and renewal process.
Other immigrants, particularly newly eligible populations and recent arrivals, will need more assistance to understand and negotiate these processes. Only 8 percent from Venezuela and 6 percent from Nepal, for example, have resided in the United States for 15 years or more (Table 1). Agricultural workers and their spouses could also encounter difficulties because fewer than two-thirds speak English well, very well, or only English, and roughly two-thirds have not completed high school.
Table 3 reveals the “readiness” of the largest legalization and legal status populations — as measured by years in the United States and English language proficiency — to apply for programs for which they are potentially eligible.
Percent in the US 15 Years or More and English Proficiency: Selected Programs.
Source: Center for Migration Studies
The populations with shorter tenure in the United States and lower rates of English language proficiency would likely require more outreach and greater support in the event of a legalization program.
Tables 4–6 provide estimates and several characteristics — nationally and for the top 10 states of residence — for the populations eligible for the original DACA program, and for conditional permanent residence and removal of the conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021. They demonstrate that these populations are not only ready to integrate successfully, but have mostly already done so.
Estimated Total Eligible for Original DACA and Selected Characteristics for the Top 10 States.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Estimates based on data from the ACS; see text for methods.
Estimated Total Eligible for Removal of Conditions on Permanent Residence Under the Dream Act of 2021 and Selected Characteristics for the Top 10 States.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Estimates based on data from the ACS; see text for methods.
A high percentage are long-term residents, virtually all have completed high school (or are in school), a third to one-half have attended college, and the overwhelming majority live in households with incomes above the poverty level. The median household income of those eligible for original DACA residing in California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey is, in fact, higher than the US median household income (Table 4). Residents of New York and New Jersey that are eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 also have median household incomes above the US median household income (Table 5). The total eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 (Table 6) have median household incomes that are 99 percent of the total US median income. However, two states in Table 6 — Arizona (71 percent) and North Carolina (82 percent) — have median household incomes well below the US average.
Estimated Total Eligible for Conditional Permanent Residence Under the Dream Act of 2021 and Selected Characteristics for the Top 10 States.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Estimates based on data from the ACS; see text for methods.
Table 7 provides estimates and characteristics of TPS-eligible Venezuelans for the five US states in which more than 81 percent of this population reside, with Florida home to 53 percent of this population. As shown in Table 7, only 8 percent have resided in the United States for more than 15 years. CMS estimates for 2019 (Warren 2021) show that 150,000, or 78 percent, of the 192,200 total TPS-eligible population from Venezuela arrived after 2013. Table 7 also illustrates the geographic concentration of select populations and the need to focus preparedness and implementation resources for federal programs in particular areas.
Estimated Total Eligible for Venezuelan TPS and Selected Characteristics for the Top Five States.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Estimates based on data from the ACS; see text for methods.
Table 8 provides estimates of the populations that are eligible or may be eligible — nationally and in the three top states — for TPS. The table includes two countries that have not been designated for TPS, but that meet the criteria for a designation (Guatemala and Sierra Leone) and four countries that should be re-designated for TPS (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Sudan). The table illustrates the concentration of TPS and potential TPS populations in states such as California, Florida, and Texas, as well as the small size of several populations. It also suggests the dramatic effect of a TPS designation for Guatemala (662,500 would be eligible), and of re-designating El Salvador (523,000 would be newly eligible, in addition to the 193,800 now eligible) and Honduras (409,400 would be newly eligible, in addition to the 56,500 now eligible). If the DHS Secretary designates Guatemala and re-designates El Salvador and Honduras, more than 1.8 million nationals from these three Central American countries — which have been the source of significant migration to the United States in recent years — would be TPS-eligible.
Estimated Population Eligible for TPS, by Country: Total and Top Three States.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. Derived from ACS data; see text for method of estimation.
Metropolitan Areas
Tables 9–12 provide information by metropolitan area for four of the programs shown in Table 1. It is not surprising that the large metropolitan areas around New York, Los Angeles, and Miami consistently appear at the top of these tables. However, this concentration should not obscure the fact that potential participants in these programs are widely dispersed geographically. For example, the metropolitan area that ranks 94th in the total number of undocumented residents — Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA — has just 13,500 undocumented residents, but a high number, 5,600 or 41 percent of them, would be eligible for legalization under the Farm Worker Modernization Act.
Estimated Population Eligible for Legalization Under the Citizenship for Essential Workers Act, by Metropolitan Area of Residence: Top 20 Metro Areas.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. See text for data sources and methods of estimation.
Estimated Number of TPS-Eligible that Would Be Eligible for Permanent Residence Under the US Citizenship Act, by Metropolitan Area: Top 20 Metro Areas.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. See text for data sources and methods of estimation.
The Citizenship for Essential Workers Act would establish the largest population-specific legalization program discussed in the paper and would have the greatest impact on the undocumented population: 7.2 million or 70 percent of the undocumented population would be eligible to legalize under the Act (Table 9). Approximately two-thirds of the undocumented essential worker population reside in the 20 largest metropolitan areas shown in Table 9.
Table 10 shows estimates of the number of farm workers that would be eligible for legal status under the Farm Workforce Modernization Act. Forty-one percent (140,000) reside in California. In fact, California has as many eligible workers as the sum of the next 11 states, and it has 11 of the top 20 metropolitan areas for farm workers (Table 10).
Estimated Population Eligible for Certified Agricultural Worker Status Under the Farm Workforce Modernization Act, by Metropolitan Area: Top 20 Metro Areas.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. See text for data sources and methods of estimation.
Table 11 illustrates the dispersal of childhood arrivals eligible for conditional permanent residence under the American Dream and Promise Act. Unlike populations eligible for country-specific legal status programs (TPS and DED) and the TPS-eligible that would be eligible for permanent residence under the US Citizenship Act (Table 12), childhood arrivals can be found in significant numbers and concentrations in communities throughout the United States, particularly in metropolitan areas.
Estimated Number Eligible for Conditional Permanent Residence under the American Dream and Promise Act, by Top 20 Metro Areas.
Source: Center for Migration Studies. See text for data sources and methods of estimation.
Table 12 shows the number of TPS-eligible that would be eligible for permanent residence under the US Citizenship Act by the top 20 metropolitan areas. About 225,000, or 60 percent, live in the top eight metropolitan areas, again emphasizing the importance of having data distributed by geographic area. The four metropolitan areas with the largest numbers are Miami, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC.
III. The Case for Immigration Reform and a Broad Legalization Program
The case for a general legalization program or a series of population-specific programs rests on two interrelated points; first, the positive impact of legalization on beneficiaries, their families, and US communities; second, the negative effects of lack of status, which a legalization program would obviate for millions of US residents.
Affirmative Benefits of Legalization
Legal status can significantly reduce the inequalities, threats, and hardships caused by lack of status, and can put formerly undocumented immigrants and their families on an entirely different trajectory. 14 Past programs broadened the possibilities and expanded the horizons of immigrants and their families, as measured by education, work, housing, English language acquisition, and health insurance. They led to dramatically increased investments by the newly legalized in themselves and their lives in the United States.
Congress mandated that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) survey IRCA beneficiaries to determine the law’s effects on their labor trajectories. The resulting Legalized Populations Surveys (LPS) compared the wages of IRCA’s general legalization beneficiaries during their first year in the country, their last week of undocumented residence, and in 1992, roughly four to five years after the program went into effect. The study found that the mean hourly wage of applicants (in 1992 dollars) did not increase between their arrival and last week of undocumented residence (Smith, Kramer, and Singer 1996, 43). However, it rose 15 percent in the four to five years following IRCA (ibid.). The study concluded that IRCA appeared to be a “turning point” for many beneficiaries, leading to a “surge of investment in language skills, education, and training” and “more than a doubling of the previous rate of human capital accumulation for most origin groups” (ibid., 45). 15
A study of LPS men similarly found that “post legalization changes in wage determinants for legalized workers” were “consistent with labor market mobility, which provides workers with an opportunity to move into jobs that reward existing human capital” (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002, 618). Workers who were proficient in English or had higher levels of education began “to earn a significant wage premium after legalization” (ibid.). The same scholars found, however, that IRCA did not significantly improve legalized Latina workers’ labor market outcomes, concluding that it failed to “alter the structure of wage determinants leaving human capital unrewarded” or to change “the penalties associated with traditional migrant employment” (Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji 1999).
Although a more modest and a provisional program, DACA likewise has led to “better-paying jobs, access to higher education, an increased sense of belonging, and improved mental health” for recipients (Alulema 2019, 127). A national survey of 3,139 undocumented millennials in 2013 and 2014 found that DACA prompted many beneficiaries to begin their first jobs, move to new jobs, buy their first cars, obtain their first credit cards, become more financially independent, and return to school (Wong and Valdivia 2014, 18). Many also reported a greater sense of belonging in the United States and diminished fear of removal (ibid.).
Undocumented immigrants contribute to every aspect of the nation’s life. 16 During the COVID-19 pandemic, the case for legalization has become increasingly evident to the public and policymakers due, in part, to the fact that a remarkable 74 percent of the nation’s 7.3 million undocumented workers meet DHS's definition of essential workers (Kerwin and Warren 2020). As the nation ages and its population over age 65 exceeds that under age 15 (Chamie 2021), the need for immigrant workers will only increase. US fertility rates fell for five consecutive years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the US birth rate decreased by four percent in 2020 (Barroso 2021). 17
Legalization programs benefit the larger society: they “raise wages, increase consumption, create jobs, and generate additional tax revenue” (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2012, 191). 18 One study has estimated that broad immigration reform legislation, including a legalization program and a flexible, rights-respecting, legal immigration system, would add $1.5 trillion to the US gross domestic product over 10 years (ibid., 176). Another study found that a legalization program would increase the productivity, earnings, and taxes paid by the legalized, resulting in increased contributions to the Social Security (SS) program, which would more than offset the SS benefits that they would receive (Kugler, Lynch and Oakford 2013).
Negative Effects of Status Quo
Among its cascading effects, lack of status negatively impacts employment, wages, housing, health care, education, and political integration (NAS 2015, 118–120). The US citizen children of undocumented parents experience “negative multiple effects” that can affect their integration, including the destabilization of their families, poverty, lost income, chronic stress, fewer years of schooling, and diminished life chances (NAS 2015, 122–123). Undocumented parents often do not access the services and benefits for which their children may be eligible for fear it might compromise their own ability to gain status or might lead to their deportation or the deportation of another household member (Bernstein et al. 2020).
In addition, the households of undocumented taxpayers, even those with US citizen children, are not eligible for anti-poverty programs, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Child Tax Credits (CTCs) in most cases, and relief under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (Suro and Findling 2021). The status quo contributes to child poverty and the second-class citizenship of the children of undocumented residents (Kerwin, Alulema, and Nicholson 2018; Ryo and Peacock 2019; Suro and Findling 2021).
Lack of status also disadvantages subsequent generations (NAS 2015, 14). A study of undocumented immigrants from Mexico and their progeny found that while the third generation experienced “notable” integration gains, these gains could not overcome the “legacy effect of unauthorized grandparents” (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015, 185–86). Another study based on the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey from between 2000 and 2002 found, with two caveats, 19 that undocumented residents had lower levels of civic engagement than naturalized citizens, LPRs, and those with temporary status (Lai 2021). 20
Of course, lack of status also exposes immigrants and their family members to the massive immigration enforcement system and the resulting risk of deportation, pervasive insecurity, impoverishment, and the curtailment of social rights (NAS 2015, 95).
A survey of 125 “established” households in Pima County, Arizona, for example, sought to quantify the economic hardship caused by an immigration arrest. It measured hardship in terms of lost “assets seized at the moment of arrest; the cost of hiring an attorney to fight one’s case; the cost of bonding a loved one out of detention (which frequently also includes the accumulation of considerable household debt); disruptions to employment; and various additional costs” (Boyce and Launius 2020, 302). The study found that immigration arrests affect “poverty, employment, education, housing security, health and development, and generational wealth inequality” (ibid.). It calculated that arrests led to “an average of $24,151 in accumulated and permanent financial losses to each affected household,” including seized assets and bond payments ($4,907); lost household income ($4,242) from the apprehended family members or other household members; job loss and long-term unemployment or underemployment ($15,129) (ibid., 304).
Children in “mixed-status” families who experience family separation due to the deportation of an undocumented parent can suffer from schooling disruptions, housing instability, diminished ability to concentrate, eating and sleeping problems, crying, clinging, fear of separation, fear of law enforcement, aggression, and other developmental difficulties (Chaudry et al. 2010; Zayas and Heffron 2016; Kerwin, Alulema, and Nicholson 2018). The deportation of undocumented parents can also result in the termination of parental rights (Hall 2011).
The default alternative to a legalization program is to pursue enforcement policies that do little to reduce the size of the undocumented population and lead to an even longer-term undocumented population akin to a caste, with all the related stresses, cruelties, and lost human potential. An even worse alternative would be to try to arrest, detain and remove the nation’s 10.35 million undocumented residents from the country. A 2005 study conservatively estimated the costs of a mass deportation program, along with increased border enforcement, to be $206 billion over five years, not counting the “negative shock to the economy” of removal of several million US workers (Goyle and Jaeger 2005).
Another study found that that the median income of US mixed-status households — those with undocumented residents and US citizens (often children) — would plunge by 47 percent (to $22,000) if the income of their undocumented residents were lost due to deportation, forcing millions of US families into poverty and the wide-scale loss of housing (Warren and Kerwin 2017, 5). This analysis estimated that the amount of financial support available to raise these US citizen children to their majority would fall by $118 billion, that 1.2 million mortgages would be in peril, and that US gross domestic product would be dramatically reduced over 10 years (ibid., 6–7).
IV. Recommendations
This paper highlights the need for timely data on populations eligible for legalization and special legal status programs on national, state, and sub-state levels. To that end, CMS’ Democratizing Data project makes detailed estimates of the US undocumented and eligible-to-naturalize populations available through a publicly accessible data tool (CMS 2021). The paper also recognizes the underlying need for effective legislation and a strong commitment by government at all levels and by local communities to the success of these programs. It offers the following recommendations on immigration reform legislation and on community-based implementation efforts.
As it stands, Congress has failed to pass a general legalization program for 35 years or the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act for the last 20 years. It has not meaningfully reformed the US legal immigration system for 31 years since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990. 21 It has not overhauled the US legal immigration laws for 56 years since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. 22 For 25 years, Congress has failed to fix the most glaring problems created for immigrants and their families by a triumvirate of 1996 laws on immigration enforcement, 23 national security, 24 and public benefit policies 25 (Kerwin 2018).
Each year that Congress fails to pass meaningful reform legislation, the US undocumented population becomes more entrenched. Between 2010 and 2019, the percentage of undocumented residents living in the United States for 15 years or more grew from 25.2 percent to 42.5 percent (CMS 2021), including large numbers of persons stranded for years in family-based visa backlogs (Kerwin and Warren 2019b). Eighty-three percent of the DACA-eligible had lived in the United States for at least 15 years, according to the 2019 ACS (Table 1).
The US immigration system has also become more dysfunctional with each passing year of legislative inaction. As of November 2, 2020, for example, nearly 3.8 million applicants for numerically limited family-based visas languished in backlog (DOS 2020), with projected backlogs for some applicants exceeding their life expectancies (Kerwin and Warren 2019b). Immigration court backlogs had reached 1.34 million as of May 2021 (TRAC 2021), and pending affirmative asylum cases exceeded 386,000 by the fourth quarter of 2020 (USCIS 2020).
While passage of immigration reform legislation would be far preferable, the Biden administration should also utilize its authority to designate and re-designate additional countries for TPS. Table 8 provides a non-exclusive list of countries that should be considered. Conditions would clearly justify, for example, a TPS-designation for Guatemala and a re-designation of El Salvador and Honduras. CMS estimates that these steps would make more than 1.8 million nationals from these three countries eligible for TPS, which would benefit recipients, their families, and their communities in both the United States and abroad.
Congress should pass legislation that would legalize the overwhelming majority of US undocumented residents. General legalization would achieve this goal and yield the most benefits for the legalized population, their family members, and US communities.
However, general legalization programs have been exceedingly rare in US history (Kerwin 2020). Moreover, such a program — as IRCA illustrated — should be coupled with the reform of the underlying legal immigration system. IRCA failed to anticipate future labor needs, leaving the nation with no way to accommodate its subsequent need for additional workers, except through illegal migration. It also failed to legalize sufficient numbers of undocumented persons, which led in part to the re-emergence of a large undocumented population (Chishti and Kamasaki 2014, 6; Kerwin and Warren 2017, 316). Finally, it did not extend derivative status to family members of beneficiaries. As a result, when IRCA beneficiaries obtained LPR status, they needed to petition for visas for their immediate family members (Kerwin 2010, 8), thus laying the groundwork for visa backlogs that now extend for decades for certain national groups in heavily subscribed family-based preference categories.
The US Citizenship Act of 2021 and other pending legalization bills also lack mechanisms to legalize prospective long-term residents. Congress established the “registry” program in 1929, 26 to create admission records for the growing number of persons with “sympathetic cases,” many of whom had US families and were “interwoven” in their communities, but nonetheless lacked documents to regularize their status (Boswell 2010, 113). Registry offers permanent residence to undocumented residents who have continuously lived in the United States for very long periods, have good moral character, are not ineligible for citizenship, and are not inadmissible on security and other grounds.
Since registry was created, Congress has advanced the entry cutoff date for eligibility several times. Most recently, IRCA moved ahead of this date to January 1, 1972. As it stands, undocumented residents must have been continually present for nearly 50 years to qualify. While registry has become a dead letter in recent decades, it was available historically to undocumented residents who lived in the United States from between eight to 18 years (Kerwin and Warren 2017, 322–323). Congress should advance this date as a one-time fix to legalize persons who have lived in the United States for at least 10 years. This step would make 58 percent of the US undocumented population eligible to legalize, including virtually all DACA-eligible US residents. It should also provide that the registry date move up automatically each year thereafter by one year. A rolling registry provision of this kind would obviate the need for future legislation to legalize very long-term residents.
Advancing the registry eligibility date would also recognize that no legalization program can cover everyone that may be prima facie eligible for it, or that Congress intends to cover. Eligible undocumented residents will invariably slip through the cracks. Some will not qualify for technical reasons or because of oversights or deficiencies in the law or problems with its implementation. As IRCA, DACA, and other legal status programs show, some legalization-eligible immigrants will not be able to afford application fees or meet documentary requirements. Others will not come forward due to fear of removal, insufficient knowledge, misinformation, or a combination of reasons. Over time, these undocumented residents will build further equitable ties to the country, but may not be able to obtain legal status through the standard pathways. A rolling registry program would promote the nation’s interest in immigrant integration and seek to depoliticize a phenomenon (long-term undocumented residency) that can be minimized, but not eliminated (ibid.). It would also acknowledge the deep and longstanding connections of these residents to US society.
Effective implementation of a legalization program will depend, in part, on technical issues related to the program’s structure, such as the length of the application period (the longer, the better), documentary requirements, whether to establish a one-step or two-step legalization process, and well-defined statutory terms and eligibility criteria (Kerwin and Laglagaron 2010).
The federal government must also be able to accommodate the increased workload. A general legalization program might generate 6 million applications. These applications would be added to the high volume of applications, petitions, and requests for benefits that USCIS receives each year (8.1 million on average between 2018 and 2020) (USCIS 2021b, 3), and its pending applications (6.1 million by the fourth quarter of 2020) (USCIS 2020).
Past legalization and special legal status programs have demonstrated the need to mobilize and leverage community resources for legal screening, community outreach, public education, application and fee assistance, and other services. The success of such programs requires that federal, state, and local government and private foundations support capacity building in all of these areas, and that they also fund national and regional coordination and community-based planning efforts.
Kamasaki et al. (2015), representing the Committee on Immigration Reform Implementation (CIRI) during the early years of the DACA program, produced one of the most thoughtful assessments of the need for government and private support for the legalization preparedness and implementation work of CBOs and national support organizations. The study analyzed the cost to CBOs of implementing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) and the expanded DACA program, which was announced by President Obama in 2014. CMS estimated that more than 5 million persons would have been eligible for these two programs, had they gone into effect (Kerwin and Warren 2016).
The study offers a valuable typology of the legal capacity available to low-income applicants from federally recognized organizations and their accredited non-attorneys, law school clinics, pro bono and low-cost attorneys, and “non-traditional” immigrant legal service providers, such as libraries, community centers, and places of worship (ibid., 293–297). 27 It also considered the important contributions of “community navigators,” which offer public education, outreach, referrals, and other non-legal services to immigrants.
Based on the experience of IRCA and DACA, the authors estimated that 3.75 million (75 percent of 5 million) would apply for DAPA and expand DACA. Most low-income immigrants opt to apply for such programs on their own and some use private attorneys. CBOs educate and assist large numbers of potential program beneficiaries, but they formally represent far fewer. During IRCA, for example, about one-fifth of applicants filed their applications through Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs). However, these community-based groups assisted roughly one-half of applicants in a wide variety of ways (Chishti and Kamasaki 2014, 8). The CIRI authors then estimated that from 960,000 to 1.2 million DAPA and expanded DACA applicants would need assistance from charitable immigrant-serving agencies due to their low incomes and inability to afford private attorneys.
The analysis took into account non-government sources of funding for this work, particularly fees-for-service, which the authors viewed as both an essential source of revenue and a tool to build charitable legal service capacity. It then estimated the staffing and funding needed from government sources based on different scenarios related to staff costs and time spent with applicants. It concluded that CBOs would need between $34.4 million (its lower-end estimate) and $132.5 million (its midpoint) estimate, to assist 1.08 million expanded DACA and DAPA applicants. Of course, a larger program, whether general legalization or some combination of population-specific programs would require significantly more funding.
As the CIRI authors recognized, CBOs lack sufficient capacity to meet the existing demand for their services, much less to accommodate a legalization program (ibid., 302). This challenge has become more acute in the interim, as under-resourced CBOs struggle to assist immigrants to negotiate all the anomalies and pathologies of the US immigration system in the aftermath of the Trump administration. CBOs need significantly more support to prepare for a large legalization program, such as the general legalization set forth in the US Citizenship Act of 2021. This program could legalize more persons than the sum of all other legalization programs in US history (Kerwin 2010, 13).
Since many of the costs and responsibilities of federal programs fall on local communities (Kamasaki 2019, 231–232), states and localities should likewise receive significant legalization preparedness and implementation funding. Congress and private funders should support research to assess community-based needs in order to inform funding decisions and additional research to evaluate the implementation of legalization and special legal status program. A national analysis of the capacity of charitable immigrant legal service organizations, compared to the size and density of the undocumented population on a sub-state level, could significantly inform where investments are most needed to build community-based capacity.
Since 2007, different configurations of groups on local, regional, and national levels have prepared for legalization. They have integrated services, divided responsibilities, collaborated on special legal status programs, recruited new partners, and advocated for reform.
Beyond establishing important community-based partnerships, CBO networks have charted how agencies from different sectors should interrelate locally, across geographic areas, and nationally. Select states and localities have also prioritized legalization preparedness. Preparation is essential given relatively short application periods, the size and diversity of affected populations, and the life-altering consequences of these infrequent programs. In particular, CBOs would need to pre-screen potential applicants, provide application assistance, offer technical support to self-filers, advocate on how the program should be structured, and educate the public on eligibility criteria, consumer rights, and community resources. Legal training and support agencies would need to mobilize to train CBOs in the complexities of the law, regulations, and procedures.
Some argue that the steady-state work of securing immigration benefits, employment authorization, and relief from removal is less impactful than high-profile advocacy for immigration reform. In fact, the two are complementary. Community-wide collaboration in expanding public education and legal support to low-income immigrants may be the best way to prepare for a general or other large-scale legalization program. In addition, direct legal assistance should be viewed as a kind of continuous legalization program in its own right — in fact, the only large legalization program that has been available for more than 35 years. 28 In its systematic efforts to dismantle legal pathways to permanent residence and citizenship (Aleinikoff and Kerwin 2021; Guttentag 2021), the Trump administration paid a kind of backhanded compliment to the efficacy of this work. In making the flawed US immigration system work for immigrants, communities can both legalize the undocumented and prepare for a formal legalization program.
In 2016, a team of researchers from CMS and the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism and the Sol Price School of Public Policy initiated an intensive study of the implementation of the DACA program (Kerwin et al. 2017). The study aimed to “assess the progress of the NGO/CBO community in building legal, public education, and organizing capacity in order to ensure maximum participation in DACA, to prepare for a future legalization program, and to enlist DACA beneficiaries and others in service, advocacy, and community organizing work” (ibid., 7). The research team interviewed 66 individuals from 40 agencies that were heavily involved in the program’s implementation.
The DACA report found that collaboration on the day-to-day provision of legal services and on large-scale legal status programs, such as DACA, TPS, and naturalization campaigns, not only allowed immigrants to advance in status, but helped “to build many of the skills, partnerships and capabilities” needed to implement a large legalization program (ibid., 12). The study viewed DACA’s implementation not as a one-off effort, but as part of a multi-year process to build community-based capacity through diverse partnerships, services, and programs.
The report highlighted two processes that particularly contributed to capacity building during DACA. First, legal screening of potential DACA recipients allowed CBOs to establish relationships with immigrants that could be re-activated in response to a legalization program. The report characterized legal screening as an “access to justice” tool and a legalization program in its own right. In fact, several studies have found rates of undocumented persons, ranging from 14 to 25 percent, who may be eligible for immigration benefits or relief that would put them on a path to permanent residence, independent of a formal legalization program (Wong et al. 2014; Kerwin et al. 2017, 9; Atkinson and Wong 2018).
Second, the report found that community-based groups had built significant legal and other capacities in implementing DACA. In particular, they had strengthened their ability to serve undocumented immigrants through:
Expansion of federally recognized charitable legal programs and offices for immigrants, and of their non-attorney accredited representatives that can represent immigrants before DHS/USCIS and fully accredited representatives that can represent immigrants in removal proceedings; Improved use of digital information technology; Publicly accessible demographic information on eligible immigrants; New partnerships between diverse agencies and across sectors as part of a “whole of community” service-delivery strategy; and A rise in civic engagement and program leadership by the populations most affected by the program.
These findings suggest that community partnerships to meet legal immigration needs and to implement special legal status programs, such as TPS, DED, and DACA, prepare communities for legalization “by doing.”
The DACA study examined the program’s implementation in five communities. The resulting case studies highlight the importance of building on pre-existing partnerships, and of tailoring their responses to the unique needs and challenges of diverse communities. They point to the need for a broad, integrated response in each community to include:
Public education, particularly on the benefits of the program, eligibility requirements, and combatting notario fraud; Legal screening; Direct service provision; Leadership development “with the goal of building collective power” (Kerwin et al. 2017, 32); Special outreach and application assistance initiatives for underrepresented populations; Continuous capacity building in all its programmatic dimensions; Inter-sectoral collaborations; and The use of demographic information to plan, organize services, and build capacity.
The DACA report also envisioned a central role for local government in providing documentation for applicants, funding for legal screening and representation, classes tied to eligibility standards, public education, space, volunteer coordination, and partnerships between diverse institutions.
The Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) produced a manual in 2006 based on interviews with 20 “veterans” from the IRCA program on the steps immigrant legal service agencies should take to prepare for a legalization program, both before legislation passes and afterward (Shea 2006). The manual, which CLINIC updated in 2010 and 2013 (CLINIC 2013), addresses many of the issues raised in subsequent DACA implementation reports, albeit with an eye toward planning by individual charitable legal service programs. It also sets forth several elements of a successful legalization preparedness campaign. 29
The CLINIC report also recognizes the need to continue to grow community infrastructure in order to support immigrant communities after the program ends. In particular, federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and CBOs should prioritize the expansion of English classes, educational opportunities, upskilling initiatives, career counseling, and other programs that legalized immigrants and their children will want to access at high rates. In short, these reports view legalization preparedness and implementation as an important step in a longer national process of incorporation, integration, and empowerment of US residents that are ready to stay.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Melissa Katsoris for her careful research on the bills and administrative programs analyzed in this paper, as reflected in Appendix A. They thank Daniela Alulema, Eric Cohen, Anna Gallagher, and Charles Kamasaki for reviewing the report.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
Appendix A: Legislative/Administrative Program,Eligibility Criteria,and Estimates of Total Populations Affected: November 1,2021.
| Legislative/Administrative Program | Program Eligibility Criteria | ACS Characteristics Used to Derive Estimates | Status of Program (As of 11/1/21) | Estimated population eligible for program (Rounded to 100) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
||||
| Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): Original Program |
Under age 31 as of June 15, 2012; 15 years or older at time of application; Came to the US before turning age 16; Maintained continuous residence in the US since June 15, 2007; Physically present in the US on June 15, 2012, and at time of application; Had no lawful status as of June 15, 2012, or their lawful status expired on or before that date; and Obtained a high school (HS) diploma or GED, b are enrolled in school, or are an honorably discharged veteran of the US. |
Respondent is:
Under the age of 31 as of 2012 and 15 years or older when applying; Came to the US before turning 16; Entered pre-2008; and Is in school, obtained HS diploma, or is or was active duty in the military. a |
Existing Program | 926,400 |
| Liberia Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) | A Liberian national or person who last habitually resided in Liberia who:
Was a DED beneficiary as of January 10, 2021; and Has continuously resided in the US since October 1, 2002. |
Liberian and entered before October 2002. | Available to current DED recipients until June 30, 2022 | (Fewer than 500) c |
| Venezuela DED |
A national of Venezuela or person who last resided in Venezuela; and Present in the US as of January 20, 2021. |
Venezuelan and entered pre-2021. | Existing program | 192,200 |
| Hong Kong DED |
Last resided in Hong Kong; and Present in the US as of August 5, 2021. |
Respondent is from Hong Kong and entered pre-2021. | Existing program. | 9,300 |
|
|
||||
| Burma/Myanmar TPS |
National of Burma/Myanmar or no nationality and last habitually resided in Burma/Myanmar; and Has continuously resided in the US since March 11, 2021. |
Respondent is Burmese/Myanmar, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Existing program | 1,800 |
| El Salvador TPS |
National of El Salvador or no nationality and last habitually resided in El Salvador; and Has continuously resided in the US since February 13, 2001. |
Respondent is Salvadoran, entered pre-2001, and undocumented. | Designation terminated, but extended for current beneficiaries to October 4, 2021. | 193,800 |
| Haiti TPS |
National of Haiti or no nationality and last habitually resided in Haiti; and Has continuously resided in the US since July 29, 2021. |
Respondent is Haitian, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Existing program has given a new designation. In addition, past designation terminated, but extended for current beneficiaries to October 4, 2021. | 115,300 |
| Honduras TPS |
National of Honduras or no nationality and last habitually resided in Honduras; and Has continuously resided in the US since December 30, 1998. |
Respondent is Honduran, entered pre-1999, and undocumented. | Designation terminated, but extended for current beneficiaries to October 4, 2021. | 56,500 |
| Nepal TPS |
National of Nepal or no nationality and last habitually resided in Nepal; and Has continuously resided in the US since June 24, 2015. |
Respondent is Nepalese, entered pre-2015, and undocumented. | Designation terminated, but extended for current beneficiaries to October 4, 2021. | 29,100 |
| Nicaragua TPS |
National of Nicaragua or no nationality and last habitually resided in Nicaragua; and Has continuously resided in the US since December 30, 1998. |
Respondent is Nicaraguan, entered pre-1999, and undocumented. | Designation terminated, but extended for current beneficiaries to October 4, 2021. | 14,300 |
| Somalia TPS |
National of Somalia or no nationality and last habitually resided in Somalia, and Has continuously resided in the US since July 19, 2021. |
Respondent is Somalian, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Existing program | (Fewer than 500) |
| South Sudan TPS |
National of South Sudan or no nationality and last habitually resided in South Sudan; and Has continuously resided in the US since January 25, 2016. |
Respondent is South Sudanese, entered pre-2016, and undocumented. | Existing program for those eligible. | (Fewer than 500) |
| Sudan TPS |
National of Sudan or no nationality and last habitually resided in Sudan; and Has continuously resided in the US since January 9, 2013. |
Respondent is Sudanese, entered pre-2013, and undocumented. | Designation terminated, but extended for current beneficiaries to October 4, 2021. | 1,300 |
| Syria TPS |
National of Syria or no nationality and last habitually resided in Syria; and Has continuously resided in the US since March 19, 2021. |
Respondent is Syrian, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Existing program | 8,800 |
| Venezuela TPS |
National of Venezuela or no nationality and last habitually resided in Venezuela; and Has continuously resided in the US since March 8, 2021. |
Respondent is Venezuelan, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Existing program. | 192,200 |
| Yemen TPS |
National of Yemen or no nationality and last habitually resided in Yemen; and Has continuously resided in the US since July 5, 2021. |
Respondent is Yemeni, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Existing program | 5,700 |
|
|
||||
| El Salvador: Possible TPS Re-designation | El Salvador not yet re-designated. | Respondent is Salvadoran, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet re-designated. | 523,000 |
| Honduras: Possible TPS Re-designation | Honduras not yet re-designated. | Respondent is Honduran, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet re-designated. | 409,400 |
| Nicaragua: Possible TPS Re-designation | Nicaragua not yet re-designated. | Respondent is Nicaraguan, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet re-designated. | 35,500 |
| Sudan: Possible TPS Re-designation | Sudan not yet re-designated. | Respondent is Sudanese, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet re-designated. | 6,800 |
|
|
||||
| Ethiopia: Possible TPS Designation | Ethiopia not yet designated for TPS. | Respondent is Ethiopian, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet designated. | 30,000 |
| Guatemala Possible TPS Designation | Guatemala not yet designated for TPS. | Respondent is Guatemalan, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet designated. | 662,500 |
| Sierra Leone: Possible TPS Designation | Sierra Leone not yet designated. Former designation terminated. | Respondent is Sierra Leonean, entered pre-2021, and undocumented. | Not yet designated. Past designation terminated. | 6,700 |
|
|
||||
| Conditional permanent residence for those who entered as children under the Dream Act (Title 1 of Act) | Anyone who is inadmissible or deportable, under DED grant, has TPS, or is son or daughter of certain non-immigrants is eligible if they:
Have had continuous physical presence since January 1, 2021, entered at age 18 or younger, AND:
Have been admitted to an institute of higher education or career and technical education (CTE) school at post-secondary level; Have obtained in the US a HS diploma or HS equivalency diploma, GED, credential or certificate from CTE school at secondary level, or a recognized post-secondary credential; or Are enrolled in secondary school or education program assisting students to obtain HS diploma or recognized equivalent, pass GED test, or obtain CTE credential at secondary level. |
Respondent:
Entered the US before 2021; Came to the US before their 18th birthday; and Graduated from HS, or is enrolled in HS or higher education program. |
No existing program: Bill passed in House, but not Senate. | 1,425,900 |
| Removal of conditions on permanent residence for DACA and childhood arrivals under the Dream Act (Title 1 of Act) | A CPR recipient can adjust to lawful permanent residence (LPR) status if they:
Have not abandoned US residence during CPR period, and have:
Graduated from a college or university, completed at least 2 years in good standing in the US leading to bachelor’s degree or higher, or have a recognized postsecondary credential from CTE; Served in uniformed services for at least 2 years or received an honorable discharge; or Earned income at least 3 years and had employment authorization at least 75 percent of that time. |
CPR-eligible and:
Graduated from college/university; Completed at least 2 years of college; Is or was active-duty military service; OR Has worked for 3 years or more. |
No existing program: Bill passed in House, but not Senate. | 951,700 |
| Direct adjustment to LPR Status for TPS recipients or those eligible under the Promise Act (Title 2 of Act) | Nationals of countries designated for TPS who had or were eligible for TPS on January 1, 2017, and have been continuously physically present in the US for at least 3 years. | Eligible for TPS in 2017 and entered the US pre-2017. | No existing program: Bill passed House, but Senate. | 375,200 |
| Direct adjustment to LPR Status for DED recipients or those eligible under the Promise Act (Title 2 of Act) | Nationals of countries designated for DED who were eligible for DED as of January 1, 2021, and have been continuously physically present in the US for at least 3 years. | Eligible for DED as of 2019 and entered the US pre-2018. | No existing program: Bill passed House, but not Senate. | 189,600 |
|
|
||||
| Conditional permanent residence for long-term residents who entered as children | Persons inadmissible or deportable, under DED grant, or have TPS are eligible if:
They have continuous physical presence from 4 years before Act’s enactment and entered the US before age 18; AND:
Admitted to an institution of higher education. Earned an HS diploma, HS equivalency diploma, or GED; or Enrolled in secondary school or education program assisting students to obtain HS diploma or recognized equivalent, or to pass GED or HS equivalency. |
Entered pre-September 2017 and prior to age 18, and has HS diploma or is in school. | No existing program | 2,245,400 |
| Removal of conditions on permanent residence for long-term residents who entered as children | CPR recipients can adjust to LPR status if they:
Have not abandoned US residence; and Complete one of the following:
Acquired degree from a college or university, or completed at least 2 years of a bachelor’s or higher degree program in the US; Served at least 2 years in Uniformed Services and, if discharged, received an honorable discharge; or Have worked for a period totaling at least 3 years, and at least 75 percent of that time with employment authorization. |
CPR-eligible and:
Graduated from college/university or completed at least 2 years of college; Is or was active-duty military; or Has worked for 3 years or more. |
No existing program. | 595,500 |
|
|
||||
| Adjustment to LPR status for essential workers and surviving family members | Continuous physical presence in the US since January 1, 2021, and:
Performed essential labor or services — as defined by DHS, state or local government, or in enumerated sectors, industries and occupations — during the COVID-19 public health emergency — and the parents, spouses, and children of these essential workers; or Have earned income as an essential worker, but unable to continue due to risk to health/safety; are the surviving parent, spouse, or child of an immigrant who performed essential labor and died due to COVID-19; or are a member of the Armed Forces. |
See ACS characteristics below. | No existing program. | 7,201,700 |
| Essential Workers: Adjustment to LPR status | See above program eligibility criteria under LPR Status for Essential Workers and Surviving Family Members. | Worked in critical worker industry/occupation and is in the labor force. | No existing program. | 5,469,700 |
| Spouses of Essential Workers: Adjustment to LPR status f | See above program eligibility criteria under LPR Status for Essential Workers and Surviving Family Members. | Spouses of respondents who worked in critical worker industry/occupation and are in the labor force. | No existing program. | 909,400 |
| Children of Essential workers: Adjustment to LPR status | See above program eligibility criteria under LPR Status for Essential Workers and Surviving Family Members. | Children of respondents who worked in critical worker industry/occupation and are in the labor force. | No existing program. | 719,100 |
| Parents of Essential Workers: Adjustment to LPR status | See above program eligibility criteria under LPR Status for Essential Workers and Surviving Family Members. | Parents of respondents who worked in critical worker industry/occupation and are in the labor force. | No existing program. | 103,500 |
|
|
||||
| Certified Agricultural Worker (CAW) status. Note: CAW can adjust to LPR status if “performed” agricultural labor or services for at least 575 h or 100 work days for enumerated periods prior to Act and as a CAW. |
Performed agricultural labor or services for at least 1,035 hours or 180 work days during the 2-year period preceding March 8, 2021; On date of Act’s introduction, was inadmissible or deportable, under DED grant, or had TPS; and Continuously present from Act’s introduction to grant of CAW. |
Worked for 2 years in occupations listed as Farm Labor by the USDA. | No existing program: bill passed House, but not Senate. | 343,400 |
|
|
||||
| Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness (LRIF) Program: LPR status | Eligible for lawful permanent residence if national of Liberia and continuously present in the US from November 20, 2014, until filing adjustment of status application. | Liberian and entered pre-2014. | Passed into law, existing program. | 7,200 |
|
|
||||
| General legalization program | Undocumented immigrants who were physically present in the US on or before January 1, 2021, would be eligible for temporary lawful prospective immigrant (LPI) status. After 5 years, they could apply for LPR status. | All US undocumented residents as of 2019. | No existing program. | 10,348,900 |
| LPR Status for DACA Recipients and Childhood Arrivals | Must have:
Been younger than age 18 on date of initial entry to the US; Earned an HS diploma or GED; Achieved one of the following:
Graduated from a college or university, or completed at least 2 years of a bachelor’s or higher degree program in the US; Completed at least 2 years of honorable military service; or Have worked for a period totaling at least 3 years; AND Have registered for the Selective Service if they are a male over the age of 18. |
Entered US before age 18. Graduated from HS or has a GED, and either:
Graduated from a college/university or completed 2 or more years; Is or was active-duty military; or Earned income for 3 years. |
No existing program. | 951,600 |
| DACA recipients eligible for LPR status | See directly above. | Respondent satisfied the characteristics above and is eligible for DACA. | No existing program. | 591,200 |
| Other Childhood Arrivals: eligible for LPR status | See above. | Respondent satisfied the characteristics above but is not eligible for DACA based on entry age or continuous residency requirement. | No existing program. | 360,300 |
| Total TPS-DED recipients: eligible for LPR status | Nationals of countries designated for TPS or DED who have been continuously physically present in the US since January 1, 2017, and had or were eligible for TPS or DED on January 1, 2017, are eligible for LPR status. | Respondents who may have been eligible for TPS/DED in 2017 and who entered pre-2017. | No existing program | 375,200 g |
| Spouses of TPS/DED recipients: eligible for LPR status | Spouses of TPS-DED recipients above would also be eligible for LPR as derivatives. | Spouses of respondents who may be eligible for TPS/DED and who entered pre-2017. | No existing program | 188,900 |
| Children of TPS/DED recipients: eligible for LPR status | Children of TPS-DED recipients above would also be eligible for LPR as derivatives. | Children of respondents who may be eligible for TPS/DED and who entered pre-2017. | No existing program | 459,400 |
| Agricultural workers: eligible for LPR status | Agricultural workers who performed labor or services for at least 2,300 hours or 400 work days, including seasonal or temporary work, for a 5-year period immediately preceding the date they file their AOS application would be eligible for LPR status. | Respondent worked for 2 years in occupations listed as Farm Labor by the USDA. | No existing program. | 343,400 |
| Spouses of agricultural workers: eligible for LPR status | Spouses of agricultural workers are eligible for LPR as derivatives (see criteria above for Agricultural Workers). | Spouses of respondents who worked for 2 years in occupations listed as Farm Labor by the USDA. | No existing program. | 193,400 |
| Children of agricultural workers: eligible for LPR status | Children of agricultural workers are eligible for LPR as derivatives (see criteria above for Agricultural Workers). | Children of respondents who worked for 2 years in occupations listed asFarm Labor by the USDA. | No existing program. | 472,900 |
| Immediate family members of US citizens that might benefit from removal of 3- and 10-year bars. | The Act would remove the 3- and 10-year bars based on unlawful presence. h Therefore, it would benefit those who are now subject to the bars, including spouses of US citizens, parents of US citizen children over age 21, and children with US citizen parents. Members of these groups that cannot adjust to LPR status in the US become subject to the bars when they leave the country for consular processing; i.e., to secure family-based visas. | Respondent is married to a US citizen, has a US citizen child over age 21, or has a US citizen parent; and is from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, or Mexico. | No existing program. | 1,282,600 |
In particular, the ACS asks whether the respondent is “[c]urrently on active duty or Training for Reserves or National Guard, or [was] active duty in the past."
In the ACS, a high school degree includes a standard high school diploma, a GED, or an alternative credential.
CMS is not reporting on estimates below 500 because the sampling variability is too large for samples below that number.
TPS designations were terminated for Haiti, Nepal, Sudan, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. However, DHS extended TPS-related documentation for TPS beneficiaries from these countries until October 4, 2021, in response to preliminary injunctions in federal court cases challenging the terminations. “Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and Nepal,” 85 Fed. Reg. 79208 (December 9, 2020). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/09/2020-27154/continuation-of-documentation-for-beneficiaries-of-temporary-protected-status-designations-for-el.
A TPS re-designation advances the date by which members of designated states must have resided in the United States, thus broadening TPS eligibility for more recent arrivals (Warren and Kerwin 2017). CMS’s estimates in this section of the chart cover over only those who would be newly eligible for TPS if the US residence cut-off date were moved forward to January 1, 2021, and not those eligible under the original TPS designation.
In CMS’s estimates, all of the spouses, children, and parents of essential workers are undocumented.
CMS’s estimates — which are based on 2019 ACS data — identified fewer than 500 DED-eligible as of 2017 and, thus, CMS did not count any DED-eligible in these totals.
INA §212(a)((9)(B)(i)(I) and (II).
