Concurrent Displacements: Return,Waiting for Asylum,and Internal Displacement in Northern Mexico

Abstract

This paper explores the ways in which contemporary mobility dynamics in Mexico have changed over the last decade, leading to protracted displacement. It focuses on three populations: (1) the internally displaced due to violence; (2) Mexican nationals returning from the United States, both voluntarily and due to deportation; and (3) populations seeking asylum in Mexico and the United States. These three populations are not usually analyzed together and do not squarely fall under the traditional legal definitions. The paper outlines ways that situations of protracted displacement and insecurity present challenges in four interconnected arenas of life: housing, legal status, employment, and emotional well-being. For governments and local communities, protracted displacement requires immediate humanitarian responses and the development and implementation of public policies focused on integration. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations based on its findings.

Keywords

asylum refugees forced internal displacement return migration deportation Mexico protracted displacement the United States Central America

Introduction

The past years have shown a substantial increase in attempts to cross the Mexico–US land border to request asylum in the United States. Central Americans, Haitians, Venezuelans, and Cubans fleeing conditions of dire violence, poverty, persecution, and political unrest are joined by Mexicans fleeing generalized insecurity and violence in their states of origin, all in search of obtaining international protection in the United States. Concurrently, asylum applications in Mexico have grown exponentially in the last decade — from less than 2,000 in 2014 to more than 130,000 in 2021 (COMAR 2022), turning Mexico into the third-largest country for asylum requests, behind only the United States and Germany (Roldán 2021). Therefore, at least two populations in need of international protection — people requesting refugee status in Mexico and people seeking asylum in the United States, but who are unable to enter United States’ territory — co-exist within Mexican territory. This increase occurs jointly with a growing diversity of nationalities, ages, and reasons for displacement. Simultaneously, regional efforts to block mobilities have materialized into restrictive policies and systems of deterrence that limit obtaining asylum, impose long waiting times, and generate situations of entrapment.

Policies such as metering,¹ the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), and mobility controls implemented by the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic and, particularly, expulsions justified on public health grounds under Title 42 have denied hundreds of thousands the right to apply for asylum, forcing large numbers to wait in border cities. These border cities are also destinations for involuntary return from the United States due to deportations and adverse economic conditions following the Great Recession (post-2008). Although returnees reside dispersed throughout Mexico, Mexican states along its northern border host the largest share of deportees and their families, both Mexican nationals and US–born citizens. Some returnees opt to stay in these places to remain close to the United States, where their family has remained or with the intention of crossing north, but others stay for potential employment opportunities since wages of returnees and U.S.-born immigrants are higher than in other regions in Mexico (Denier and Masferrer 2020).

Mexican northern states have traditionally been sites of migration where different populations coexist. For many decades now, Tijuana in Baja California has been (1) a destination for internal migrants as a result of market liberalization, economic development, industrial growth, and economic integration with San Diego in California (Zenteno 1995; Villarreal and Hamilton 2012) as well as (2) a steppingstone toward the United States (Fussell 2004). Similarly, but at a slower rate, Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua (coupled with El Paso, Texas) grew as a result of internal migration and attracted returnees from the United States searching for economic opportunities in the maquiladora industry since the 1990s (Vega Briones 2004). In this context, some border lives unfold dynamically between both countries among commuters who are able to pay frequent visits to el otro lado (the other side), whereas for others who are unable to cross, the border is a reminder of being stuck in a place while desiring to enter/reenter the United States (Chávez 2016).

We focus on three populations: (1) the internally displaced due to violence — mainly criminal violence; (2) Mexican nationals returning from the United States, both voluntarily and due to deportation; and (3) populations seeking asylum, both in Mexico and the United States. By focusing on these three heterogeneous populations — that are not usually analyzed in tandem and that do not fall under the traditional legal definitions — our paper aims to contribute to this special issue on protracted displacement by complicating the usual notion of livelihoods trapped in a limbo, especially by analyzing intended and unintended consequences of policy and questioning the usual meaning of home.

We explore the ways in which contemporary mobility dynamics in Mexico have changed over the past decade, leading to the prevalence of protracted displacement. Situations of protracted displacement and insecurity present challenges in four interconnected arenas of life: housing, legal status, employment, and emotional well-being. For governments and local communities, protracted displacement requires immediate humanitarian responses and the development and implementation of public policies focused on integration.

First, we provide background on the concept of protracted displacement. In this section, we aim to engage with more nuanced conceptualizations of protracted displacement, which transcend legal definitions and emphasize situations of prolonged uncertainty, precarity, and marginalization.

We then turn to the question of what generates protracted displacement situations, focusing on northern Mexico. In the section Concurrent Displacements in Mexico we engage in an analysis of migration and asylum policy changes in the past decades and how these have impacted mobility dynamics and generated diverse situations of protracted displacement, liminality, and entrapment.

We follow with a brief description of the data and methods used for our analysis. Results are structured along two dimensions: (1) characteristics of these populations, based on the analysis of current data from the 2020 Mexican census; and (2) consequences of these situations for asylum seekers, internally displaced and deportees, in which we emphasize the importance of the notion of home and the impossibilities of home building and inhabiting in contexts of protracted displacement. We conclude with a set of policy recommendations.

Background

Revisiting the Concept of Protracted Displacement

The term protracted displacement was coined in 2004 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), when it became evident that large shares of displaced populations around the world were facing prolonged and precarious situations of displacement. Protracted refugee situations and other situations of protracted displacement were defined by the UNHCR Executive Committee as “ones in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country” and in “which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo” (UNHCR 2004).

According to a UNHCR report, the average duration of refugee situations, protracted or not, increased from nine years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003 (ibid.). Since this report was published, others have tried to estimate the number of years that refugees remain in exile, without permanent solutions to their situations of displacement. Permanent solutions have been one of the objectives of refugee law since the formulation of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The idea is that forced displacement — and refugee status — should be only temporary and that displaced populations should have the possibility of local integration, resettlement, or repatriation to their home countries, which would enable them to “regain a degree of normality and to rebuild their lives” (Kraler, Etzold, and Ferreira 2021, 49). However, for the past decades, not only has the number of displaced populations grown, but so have the lengths and obstacles of bureaucratic processes of asylum or other forms of protection. In fact, by the end of 2020, more than 75 percent of the global refugee population (nearly 16 million people) was in a situation of protracted displacement, without considering those internally displaced (UNHCR 2021).

An analysis of recent data divides the global refugee population into cohorts according to the number of years they have been in exile. They range from four years or less (i.e., recent refugees) to those who have been in exile for more than 35 years (Devictor 2019). Moreover, this analysis estimates the mean duration of situations of exile at the end of 2018 to be 10.3 years; but for those in situations of protracted displacement, the duration significantly increased over time, leading to situations of exile surpassing the 20-year average. In other words, data show that temporary situations of forced mobility have turned into situations of prolonged displacement for millions of refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide. This growth of protracted displacement has materialized into the establishment of more refugee camps, buffer zones, and even centers for Temporary Permanence, such as the one established in Lampedusa (Anderson 2015; FitzGerald 2019). In Latin America, refugee camps are less common, but weak asylum systems have led to long waiting times, informal settlements, and many bureaucratic hurdles for those requesting asylum (Carreño Calderón et al. 2021).

Along with the increase in situations of protracted displacement worldwide, there has been increased interest in analyzing these situations from an academic and policy perspective, as illustrated by this special issue. From a policy perspective, analyses have focused on how the implementation of restrictive mobility policies and obstacles to asylum make it harder to obtain refugee status (FitzGerald 2019) and impose longer waiting times and a general sense of uncertainty among those requesting asylum (Auyero 2012; Abad Miguélez 2018; Gil-Everaert 2020). The internally displaced, on the other hand, are rendered invisible in many instances, as reflected in the absence of regulatory frameworks and actual protection mechanisms. Finally, in spite of increasing situations of limbo, protracted uncertainty, and obstacles toward rebuilding their lives, returnees and deportees have traditionally been excluded from discussions on protracted displacement. We argue that all these populations share several characteristics of immobility and that they should be included within debates around protracted displacement.

From an academic standpoint, recent works on protracted displacement have called for more nuanced understandings of contemporary protracted displacement and acknowledgment of the “long-term experiences of precarity as well as the political forces that contribute to prolonging displacement” (Etzold and Fechter 2022, 1). Along these lines, current debates have called for transcending legal — and politicized — definitions of protracted displacement. This perspective calls attention to the “long-lasting condition of economic precarity, marginalisation, rightlessness and future uncertainty, which displaced persons experience after their initial displacement, and which is coupled with consistently and systematically blocked options for both social and spatial mobility” (Etzold et al. 2019). In other words, these studies call for an analysis of situations of protracted displacement that focuses on the social dynamics of displacement, imposed immobilities, prolonged waiting, uncertainty, and entrapment; and identifying the causes and the consequences of protracted displacement, as well as the ways in which populations contest and actively resist and cope with these situations.

We build on this definition to explore concurrent situations of protracted displacement in Mexico. To our knowledge, most recent work focuses on protracted displacement in Africa (Bakewell 2008; Adugna, Rudolf, and Getachew 2022; Jacobs et al. 2022), Asia (Mielke and Etzold 2022; Tobin, Momani, and Al Yakoub 2022), and Europe (Christ and Etzold 2022; Cingolani et al. 2022; Ferreira et al. 2022; Papatzani et al. 2022). However, there has not been an analysis of the characteristics, causes, and consequences of current protracted displacement situations in Mexico.

Concurrent Displacements in Mexico

As the previous section illustrates, protracted situations of displacement, rather than inevitable, are the result of a combination of “the prevailing situations in the country of origin, the policy responses of the country of asylum, and the lack of sufficient engagement in these situations by a range of other actors” (Loescher and Milner 2009). In other words, protracted displacement and refugee situations are a result of:

Political impasses and the result of political action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution or violence that led to flight) and in the country of asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the countries of origin and stagnate and become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and confinement to camps (UNHCR 2004).

In broader terms, we note the interaction of “displacing forces, marginalizing forces and immobilizing forces” (Kraler, Etzold, and Ferreira 2021, 50), resulting in extended waiting times, spatial entrapment, and situations of liminality and pervasive uncertainty for millions. Building on this contribution by Kraler et al., we propose an understanding of protracted displacement that includes both situations of involuntary immobility and people on the move who are often displaced from one precarious situation to another. Following this line of thought, we analyze the manifold causes of protracted displacement in Mexico. We aim to show how the immigration and asylum policies — or the lack thereof — in the United States and Mexico have caused thousands of forcibly displaced persons to be stranded in cities along the Mexican northern border, waiting to start their asylum applications or in a post-deportation impasse. We focus on policies implemented in the past decade on both sides of the border and analyze their differential impacts and consequences — planned and unintended — for different groups of people on the move.

Increasingly, asylum seekers, refugees, and internally displaced persons in Mexico face prolonged immobility and waiting and are forced to wait in spaces determined by governments with little possibilities of resuming their life projects. This section focuses on different situations of protracted displacement that currently occur in Mexico. Although the case of asylum seekers, refugees, and the internally displaced due to violence and insecurity resonate with more traditional notions of protracted displacement, other cases such as the situation faced by deportees and returnees have not been included in debates on protracted displacement worldwide.

“Locking People In”: From Circular Migration to Prolonged Limbo in Mexico and the United States

As a result of increased US immigration enforcement following the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (President Clinton), the back-and-forth seasonal movement that characterized historical Mexico–United States migration was interrupted, “locking” many in the United States (Massey 2005). This arrangement resulted in people remaining longer in the United States without legal status, an increase in the number of mixed families with US–citizen children and populations that define home as in the United States but live in uncertainty fearing deportation every day. Lack of legal status and other situations of “liminal legality” (Menjívar 2006) abound among the Mexican population in the United States. The term Unauthorized Permanent Residents (UPRs), as coined by Emily Peiffer, used by Martínez, Slack, and Martínez-Schuldt (2018) and others, refers to this population that identifies the United States as home.

Approximately 10 percent of the Mexican population live in the United States: 11.2 million persons in 2019. The highest number was 12 million in 2007. That figure declined when the number of returnees began increasing in 2008 as a result of increasing deportations, immigration enforcement, the return of those whose financial circumstances were impacted by the 2008 economic crisis, and a decline of emigration from Mexico (Villarreal 2014; Warren 2017). Many returnees were joined by US–born family members, especially minors under age 18, which resulted in more than half a million US–born children living in Mexico (Masferrer, Hamilton, and Denier 2019). Mexican census data show declining return migration and arrivals of the US–born since 2010: from 825,000 returnees from 2005–2010 to 294,000 from 2015–2020, and from 316,000 US–born recent arrivals from 2005–2010 to 181,000 from 2015–2020. Mexican returnees are spread throughout Mexico, although traditional sending states and northern states have larger shares (Masferrer 2021). However, deportees are concentrated along the Mexican border, mainly at the border cities where they arrived.

A study of future post-deportation intentions of migrants in five cities along the Mexico–US border shows clearly how those UPRs with strong family ties and subjectively identifying home in the United States (rather than in Mexico) intend to re-emigrate to the United States (Martínez, Slack, and Martínez-Schuldt 2018). A study using Encuesta sobre migración en la frontera (EMIF) data shows similar results for remigration intentions, particularly for returnees leaving family members behind in the United States (Vargas Valle, Hamilton, and Orraca Romano 2022).

Uncertainty is a significant characteristic of post-deportation life, not only in border cities but also in rural and urban areas. As Boehm describes, the lives of deportees and their family members are often defined by the notion of “¿Quién sabe?” (“Who knows?”), and their narratives often highlight uncertainty and insecurity (Boehm 2009). Intentions to re-emigrate depend on how they reintegrate socially or economically in Mexico (Rivera Sánchez 2013), how they deal with the risk of being caught upon re-entry, and other aspects of post-deportation life, such as isolation and loneliness (Caldwell 2019). Readiness and preparedness for return have been considered key for reintegration of returnees, and deportation is a disruptive event of involuntary and unprepared return (Cassarino 2004). Returning home is often considered a key element to rebuilding life and normality among forced migrants (Black and Koser 1999), but the case of deported Mexicans shows a different story.

We do not know exactly how many returnees living in Mexico today have been deported in the past or how many US–born immigrants arrived due to a relative’s deportation process. According to the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS 2021), approximately 1.6 million Mexicans were deported during the two President George W. Bush administrations (FY2000–2008), nearly two million under two President Obama administrations (FY2009–2016), and 608,000 under President Trump’s presidency (FY2016–2019) (see Figure 1). Changes in the definition of removal with or without a criminal charge over time (see Figure 1), implied increased penalties if apprehended after being removed with a criminal order and other changes in consequences for removals on criminal grounds (Kerwin 2018). These US policy changes deterred many from trying to return to the United States.

Figure 1.

Annual Number of Mexicans Removed from the United States by Criminal Charge, 1993–2020.

Most of the deportees are men (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013), and this has directly impacted millions of families in the United States by forced family separation (Cardoso et al. 2016), although an important share of US–born children are de facto deported to Mexico as they join a deported parent to avoid separation (Hamilton, Masferrer, and Langer 2022). Uncertainty and fear of deportation affects another couple of million Mexicans (and their US–born family members) in the United States, who live “deportability” given that foreign-born immigrants are subject to deportation, even if they are permanent residents (De Genova 2002) and regardless of how long they have lived in the United States. According to 2017 estimates, of the 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States, 4.95 million are Mexican; one-half of them have lived in the United States for more than 17 years, and 83 percent for more than 10 years (Lopez, Passel, and Cohn 2021). In other words, most are long-term US residents who live in an irregular status without a clear path for regularization. If they do return to Mexico, particularly if they were to be deported or removed, returning home (i.e., to the United States) where their family often remain will be very difficult given the legal implications of irregular re-entry and limited channels for documented migration.

Barriers to Asylum: Metering and the Migrant Protection Protocols

In the past decade, policies implemented at the US–Mexico border regarding asylum seekers have changed several times. Before 2016, non–US nationals who crossed the border without authorization were subject to expedited removal under Title 8 unless they expressed fear of persecution if returned to their country of origin, and a US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer considered this fear to be credible. According to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, all people have the right to claim asylum in a foreign country when fleeing violence and persecution, but in the past years, a number of restrictions and obstacles have complicated this possibility for those attempting to cross the Mexico–US border to request protection. However, in 2016, and framed as a response to an “unprecedented rise in asylum seekers,” which resulted in a lack of processing capacity of CBP (Leutert et al. 2018), the U.S. government implemented metering.

This policy was implemented through the use of lists — some in notebooks — whereby asylum seekers signed up while waiting on the Mexican side of the border. CBP officers then informed the bearer of the list how many people would be allowed to enter and start their asylum process each day, sometimes allowing as few as one person per day and extending waits to an average of a year in places like Tijuana (ibid.). By May 2021, close to 20,000 people remained on these lists waiting for their turn (Arvey and Yates 2021).

Metering involved an additional step in the asylum process — namely, restricting the possibility of crossing the border — and making it de facto impossible to claim asylum because legal frameworks require one to be “physically present in the United States.”² Plus, by turning back those who crossed the border to ask for asylum in the United States, metering violated one of the main bases of asylum law: the principle of nonrefoulement. Those turned back camped along border crossing points waiting for an opportunity to cross and request asylum, living in conditions of extreme precarity and risk. To provide some safety and protection, Mexican government agencies and civil society organizations moved many of those camping along the border to shelters, some of them in improvised spaces without adequate infrastructure (Leutert et al. 2018).

Beyond the legal contradictions and violations of this policy, metering was perhaps the first time in this century when waiting and uncertainty were institutionalized in an attempt to deter and deny access to the asylum process. Uncertainty permeated not only the duration of the wait but the process as a whole. In many instances, asylum seekers did not know where to sign up, and those who oversaw the “lists” varied widely by city. In some places, lists were held and managed by shelters or civil society organizations; in others, by the Mexican Institute of Migration or local government institutions. The requirements to be able to be on the list also varied, ranging from writing your name in a notebook to providing photos and detailed information, and even getting a bracelet identifying those waiting to cross the border (ibid.).

Metering was challenged by advocacy organizations and asylum seekers, who argued that it violated “asylum seekers’ constitutional right to due process” (CRS 2022). In a class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs averred that while waiting their turn in the metering lists, “[A]sylum seekers are subject to dangerous conditions of rampant crime and violence by gangs and cartels on the Mexican side of the border” and that this system “creates unreasonable and life-threatening delays in processing asylum seekers” (ibid., 3). In 2021, almost four years since the complaint was filed, the US District Court of Southern California³ ruled that “[T]he metering policy violated Immigration and Nationality Act provisions that require the inspection and processing of asylum seekers arriving at the U.S. border and violated the asylum seekers’ constitutional right to due process” (ibid.).

In spite of the court ruling and repeated complaints by advocates, human rights activists, and asylum-seekers, the tendency toward restrictive measures and “entrapment policies” (Colef 2021) has solidified since 2021. Three years after the implementation of metering lists, a new policy was implemented at the US–Mexico border in March 2019: the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), also known as the “Remain in Mexico” Program. MPP was the result of a bilateral agreement between the US and Mexican governments. Following the arrival of the “migrant caravans” in 2018, the US government put pressure on the Mexican government to halt the flow of people traveling north. The Trump administration threatened to impose tariffs on products exported from Mexico if migrants were not stopped before reaching US territory. After months of intense pressure from the US government and negotiations, Mexico agreed to receive asylum-seekers and host them in Mexican territory while they waited for their court dates in the United States. Again, a blatant violation of the non-refoulement principle, MPP has resulted in long and uncertain waiting times in some of Mexico’s most dangerous cities.

From 2019 to 2021, between 71,000 and 78,000 people were returned to Mexico under this program, about one-third from Honduras (see Figure 2).⁴ “Remain in Mexico” posed significant challenges for asylum-seekers. Finding a place to stay was one of the main challenges for many because many points of return did not have sufficient shelters. Many stayed in overcrowded spaces or improvised camps along the border (PHR 2019; Schrank 2019), and others found temporary shelter in places offered by local churches or civil society organizations. In Ciudad Juárez, the city that received more than 30 percent of the persons subject to MPP, shelters were at full capacity since late 2019 and remained so through October 2021 (Many 2021).

Figure 2.

Sex and Country of Birth of People under MPP (January 2019–November 2021).

Although status as MPP returnees implies that they are legally allowed to work in Mexico, most people under MPP were unable to find jobs or found temporary, precarious employment, in many cases under conditions of exploitation (Colef 2020; MSF 2020; OIM 2020). MPP not only forced people to remain in Mexico but also to remain in place, restricting international mobility and also impacting their possibilities to move even within waiting spaces, as well as to access basic services, find employment, and integrate into the local communities (Albicker and Velasco 2016; París Pombo 2020; París Pombo and Díaz Carnero 2020; Colef 2021; Velasco 2021).

Cases processed under MPP were added to the more than one million pending cases in US immigration courts. By early 2019, waiting times for asylum-seekers were already close to two years (DHS 2019; Isacson, Meyer, and Hite 2019; AIC 2020). Prolonged waiting and procedural difficulties resulted in a systematic hindrance of access to international protection. Several studies show that access to legal representation of those under MPP is significantly lower (15 percent) than the rate among asylum seekers outside the program (84 percent)⁵ (TRAC Immigration 2022). Furthermore, many MPP hearings were held inside “tent courts,” which posed significant translation issues, technical difficulties, and violations to due process (ABA 2022). It is not surprising that more than three years since it was implemented, only 742 people returned through MPP had been granted relief; 45 percent were issued removal orders, and 36 percent of the cases remained pending (TRAC Immigration 2021).

“Sanitary Measures”: Restrictions to Mobility and Protection in Pandemic Times

As metering and MPP complicated access to international protection, the final blow to the asylum system was the implementation of US Title 42 in March 2020 and the indefinite suspension of asylum processes as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Title 42, a section of the US Code from 1944,⁶ “empowers federal health authorities to prohibit migrants from entering the country if it is determined that doing so could prevent the spread of contagious diseases” (Gramlich 2022). This translates into immediate expulsions of any “non-essential” attempts to cross the US border by land, even those seeking asylum. Despite Title 42 existing as a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provision since 1944, this was the first time it was used as an immigration control mechanism (García Cabezas 2022).

An estimated 2.5 million expulsions have taken place under Title 42 since the beginning of the pandemic (Santana 2022). This number refers to the number of expulsion events and not the number of people expelled: the same person can be expelled under Title 42 and counted multiple times. In fact, many of those expelled to Mexico under this provision have been repeatedly apprehended attempting to cross the border: “1 in 3 apprehensions and returns under Title 42 have been of a person on at least their second attempt to cross the border” (AIC 2022). However, for those who are not seeking asylum, Title 42 may have the unintended consequence of incentivizing multiple attempts at crossing the border because expulsions do not impose sanctions for repeated attempts to cross the border (Isacson 2022).

The impact of Title 42 varies across nationalities. According to information from CBP, the number of encounters of Mexicans at the US southern border has increased since May 2020. As a result, expulsions of Mexicans under Title 42 rose from 4,670 in March 2020 to 77,423 in March 2022, along with a drop in removals of Mexicans since April 2020 (Figure 3). Title 42 expulsions represent almost nine of 10 expulsions of Mexicans, a proportion that has remained stable since its implementation in March 2020. For nationals from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, approximately six of every 10 expulsions have been under this policy, showing a decline since February 2021. Among other nationalities, Title 42 represents slightly more than one in 10 expulsions, while most occur under Title 8.

Figure 3.

Southwest Land Border Encounters by Title 8 and Title 42 by Country of Birth, FY 2018–2021.

High rates of return under Title 42 evidence how access to international protection among certain groups has been particularly affected. The overwhelming proportion of Mexicans returned by Title 42 means that at least eight in 10 of those who attempt to cross the border did not even have the possibility of requesting asylum. This is worrying, especially with growing numbers of internally displaced populations in Mexico due to violence post-2007 with the onset of the so-called “War on Drugs.”

Unacknowledged Displacements: The Lack of Policies Regarding Internal Displacement Due to Violence and Insecurity

Violence and insecurity in Mexico have increased significantly since the so-called Mexican War on Drugs began in late 2006. Within this strategy, armed forces confronted criminal groups — in particular, Mexican drug cartels — with the aim of bringing down or capturing the main leaders of these organizations (Botello, Dávila-Cervantes, and Pardo 2019). However, this strategy resulted in the division of cartels into smaller cells that disputed the territories of production, distribution, and sale of drugs, as well as a diversification of their sources of income, including extortion, kidnappings, and robberies. Despite its lack of any positive results, this security policy has remained unchanged for more than 15 years, and homicide rates in Mexico reached the highest level in 2019 (27.83 homicides per 100,000) in the last two decades (Rodríguez Chávez 2020).

The increase of violence and insecurity, particularly in the northwest, northeast, and western regions, forcibly displaced thousands of people and families, who fled to different places within Mexico. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC 2022) estimates that 379,000 people were internally displaced in Mexico between 2009 and 2021 due to conflict and violence. These internally displaced originated mainly from the states of Guerrero, Chiapas, Michoacán, Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, and Oaxaca. From northern and western states, the displacements have been mainly due to the impact of organized crime, whereas displacement from southern states has been mostly the result of political violence and social and territorial conflicts (Pérez Vázquez et al. 2021).

Since 1998, nine initiatives have been presented at the Mexican federal level for the creation of specialized laws for the assistance and prevention of forced internal displacement in Mexico (Figure 4). From these, only the draft decree to issue the General Law to Prevent, Attend and Comprehensively Repair Internal Forced Displacement was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on September 29, 2020, and turned over to the Mexican Senate for ratification, although there has not been any progress since then (CMDPDH 2022; UPMRIP 2022). Despite not having a specialized federal law on forced internal displacement, current Mexican law mentions victims of internal displacement. Specifically, the General Law on Victims and the Social Assistance Law mentions internally displaced persons and their needs for specialized care. However, because these laws do not define forced internal displacement, it is left to interpretation, which generates obstacles to their recognition and assistance (CEAV 2021; CMDPDH 2022) .⁷

Figure 4.

Timeline of Law Initiatives for the Assistance and Prevention of Forced Internal Displacement in Mexico (1998–2022).

Three Mexican states have specific laws on forced internal displacement: the Law for the Prevention and Assistance of Internal Displacement in the State of Chiapas (2012)⁸; the Law to Prevent and Treat Internal Displacement in the State of Guerrero (2014)⁹; and the Law to Prevent, Comprehensively Treat, and Repair Internal Forced Displacement in the State of Sinaloa (2020).¹⁰ However, none of these laws have operational regulations, and thus they have not benefited victims of forced displacement (CMDPDH 2022; OIM 2022).

As a result of the increase in violence and insecurity in various regions of Mexico and the lack of laws and programs for the protection and care of victims of forced internal displacement, thousands of people have moved to the northern border of Mexico to try to request asylum in the United States because they cannot find security in Mexican territory (Rodríguez Chávez 2021). Once reaching the border, most are returned under Title 42. Mexican nationals who have been able to cross face low possibilities of being granted protection — only 12 percent are able to begin a process in US immigration courts — because criminal violence is not recognized as a reason for granting asylum (TRAC Immigration 2022).

In short, these laws and policies limit the possibilities of Mexicans to enter the United States, condemn them to protracted displacement, and prevent them from returning to their communities of origin or migrating further to other regions. Mexican nationals are also restricted from other options for international protection. For example, Canada imposed a visa requirement for Mexican nationals in 2009, claiming this was necessary due to the large number of so-called bogus refugees: this measure created a barrier to applying for asylum upon arrival (Van Haren and Masferrer 2021). Even though this requirement was lifted in 2016, the share of Mexicans receiving refugee status in Canada has been declining in the last decade in tandem with increases in homicides and other types of violence in Mexico (SESNSP 2023).

Data, Measures, and Methods

We use a two-step analysis of a particular case study of Mexican northern states located along the Mexico-US border: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. These states show a high spatial concentration of populations in situations of protracted displacement. We use data sources to describe the characteristics, causes, and consequences of the populations that we identify as living situations of protracted displacement.

As a first step, we use the 2020 Mexican census data available from the basic tabulations (INEGI 2021) that allow for identifying basic sociodemographic (sex, age, educational attainment, marital status, and economic activity) as well as household (type and size) and dwelling (type and access to basic services) characteristics of recent internal and international populations by cause of migration. Chi-squared tests show statistically significant differences (p < .05) by cause of migration, although we are aware that this could be driven by large sample size differences between non-migrants and migrant populations.

We define internal and international migrants using identifiers of municipality, state, and country of residence five years prior to the census, as well as country of birth. Migrants refer only to populations aged five and older. We use the variable of cause of migration to distinguish between international and internal migrants who explicitly stated that they migrated due to violence and insecurity, Mexicans who stated that deportation was the cause of their migration, migrants stating that they moved for other reasons, and non-migrants. This variable is dependent on information reported by the person answering the census questionnaire and is likely to undercount deportation and forced migration due to fear or lack of trust by interviewees and to potential stigma. We also use public data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) to estimate the population under MPP and removed or expelled from the United States under Title 8 and Title 42 respectively.

For the second step, we analyze policy changes and its impacts on these populations to determine the extent to which they live in situations of protracted displacement. For this purpose, we analyze policy memos, laws, and bylaws as well as press releases, journalistic accounts, and reports issued by international organizations and human rights advocacy groups.

Results

Data from the 2020 Mexican census estimate that 251,500 people between 2015 and 2020 migrated internally for reasons of insecurity and criminal violence (4 percent of 6.3 million recent migrants), particularly from Mexico City, Mexico (state), Guerrero, Veracruz, Jalisco, Michoacan, and Tamaulipas. These migrants mainly arrived in the Mexican states of Estado de México, Yucatán, Ciudad de México, Querétaro, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Puebla, Veracruz, and Nuevo León. Due to violence and insecurity, more than 80,000 migrants crossed into another municipality within their states; 168,000 went to other states; and nearly 23,000 arrived in Mexico from other countries. However, the lack of laws and programs for comprehensive care and reparations for damages to victims of forced displacement caused thousands of households in Mexico to seek to migrate to the United States to safeguard their lives, including asylum seekers, visa holders, and undocumented persons (García, Rodriguez, and Contreras 2021).

The 2020 Mexican census estimates that between 2015 and 2020, nearly 8,000 people emigrated from Mexico to other countries due to insecurity and violence, and most moved to the United States. However, this estimate is a lower-bound estimate because it does not take into account migration of entire households. Additionally, 41,400 people were deported or returned to Mexico mainly from the United States between 2015 and 2020 and arrived mostly in northern border states and western states (Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí) according to census data. In this case, it is relevant to analyze the characteristics of migrants and deportees who reside in northern border states of Mexico as their residence may be conditioned by their desire to enter or stay close to relatives in the United States.

Characteristics of Migrants Due to Insecurity and Deportees Residing in Municipalities in the Northern States of Mexico, 2020

Migrants due to insecurity and violence in northern states account for more than 32,000 people: almost one in four of all migrants stated that violence and insecurity led to their migration in the period between 2015 and 2020. Of these, almost 27,000 moved internally, and more than 5,000 moved from other countries. Deportees in northern states add up to just over 14,000 and correspond to more than one-third of all recent deportees (INEGI 2021).

The main countries of origin of international migrants who identified insecurity as the reason for migrating to northern Mexico, are Honduras, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Cuba accounting for 90.6 percent of the total of international migrants on the Mexican northern border.

Two-thirds of internal migrants, due to insecurity, on the northern border originate from other northern states such as Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Chihuahua, as well as Guerrero and Michoacán. As expected, 99.3 percent of deportees residing in northern states returned from the United States. One-half of the rest of the migrants residing in northern Mexico come from Nuevo León, Veracruz, Tamaulipas, and Sonora. Those who migrated due to insecurity or violence, as well as deportees, are concentrated in large cities along the border: Tijuana, Mexicali, and Ensenada in Baja California; Juarez and Chihuahua in Chihuahua; Apodaca, Monterrey, García, Escobedo, Juárez, and Guadalupe in Nuevo León; Matamoros in Tamaulipas; and Saltillo in Coahuila. These cities make up 56.9 percent of the total migrant population in northern states. Many of these cities have experienced high levels of violence and insecurity as a result of disputes between criminal groups for control of drug trafficking routes, which overlap with traditional migration routes (see Figure 5).

Figure 5.

Internal and International Migrants Who Stated Insecurity and Violence as Cause of Migration, and Mexican Deportees Living in a Northern Border State in Mexico, 2020.

We now turn to a basic sociodemographic analysis of the population who left their homes and countries of origin due to violence and insecurity, or were deported, and we compare them with other recent migrants living in a Mexico–US border state in March 2020, when the Mexican census was carried out (see Table 1). Our data consider migration over the period 2015–2020 and include internally displaced populations, deportees, returnees, and non-Mexican asylum-seekers.

Table 1.

Basic Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Population in Inhabited Dwellings in the States of the Northern Border of Mexico, 2020.

Variable	Migrants	Violence and insecurity			Deported	Other migrants	No migrants
Variable	Total	Total	International	Mexican	Deported	Other migrants	No migrants
Total (N)	1,464,424	32,245	5,383	26,862	14,090	1,418,089	19,472,452
Sex
Male	51.9%	49.4%	52.0%	48.9%	85.8%	51.6%	49.5%
Female	48.1%	50.6%	48.0%	51.1%	14.2%	48.4%	50.5%
Age (mean)	29.6	31.9	31.4	31.9	40.2	29.5	34.8
Level of education (ages 25–64)
No formal education	1.6%	2.1%	2.7%	2.0%	2.7%	1.6%	1.8%
Basic	44.0%	47.9%	37.0%	50.3%	60.4%	43.7%	49.3%
Middle	23.8%	24.0%	27.0%	23.3%	30.5%	23.7%	22.8%
Higher	30.5%	25.8%	33.0%	24.2%	6.3%	31.0%	26.0%
Affiliation to a health service	74.9%	66.5%	39.5%	71.8%	48.9%	75.3%	81.5%
Members per household (mean)	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.4	2.9	4.0	4.2
Type of household
Family	91.2%	93.7%	87.9%	94.9%	67.3%	91.4%	95.1%
Nuclear	57.0%	57.3%	46.1%	59.5%	39.0%	57.2%	63.7%
Extended	30.2%	31.9%	29.9%	32.3%	24.8%	30.2%	30.0%
Mixed: family and nonfamily	3.9%	4.6%	11.9%	3.1%	3.4%	3.9%	1.4%
No family	8.8%	6.3%	12.1%	5.1%	32.7%	8.6%	4.9%
Unipersonal	5.4%	4.5%	5.7%	4.2%	28.9%	5.3%	4.5%
Co-residence	3.3%	1.8%	6.5%	0.9%	3.8%	3.4%	0.4%
Marital status (ages 12+)
Cohabiting union	28.7%	23.7%	27.9%	22.8%	30.6%	28.8%	17.1%
Separated	5.0%	6.1%	4.7%	6.5%	14.0%	4.9%	4.9%
Divorced	2.2%	2.4%	2.1%	2.5%	4.9%	2.2%	2.8%
Widow	2.2%	3.0%	2.3%	3.1%	1.7%	2.1%	4.6%
Married	30.0%	32.8%	28.8%	33.6%	19.8%	30.1%	36.9%
Single	31.8%	32.0%	34.3%	31.6%	29.1%	31.8%	33.7%
Economic activity (ages 12+)
EAP	69.0%	65.1%	68.2%	64.5%	85.0%	68.9%	61.7%
Unemployed	2.3%	3.5%	6.3%	2.9%	5.8%	2.2%	1.9%
Not EAP	30.9%	34.7%	31.6%	35.4%	14.8%	31.0%	38.1%

Note: Border states refer to Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. EAP refers to economically active population. Chi-squared tests show that all characteristics vary significantly (p < .05) by cause of migration.

Source: 2020 Mexican Census, basic tabulations available at https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ccpv/2020/#Tabulados.

The gender composition of these populations differs. Whereas the deportee population is predominantly male, and only one in seven deportees is female, the forced internally displaced have a slightly larger share of women (51.1 percent) compared with the foreign-born populations of forced migrants to Mexico, and other migrants (around 48 percent) who have larger shares of men. Deportees are the oldest population (average age 40.2), followed by the internally displaced and international migrants fleeing violence and insecurity (both slightly above age 31) and other migrants (below 30).

Educational attainment also varies among the populations aged 25–64 years: two-thirds of deportees and one-half of the forced internally displaced have basic education or less, whereas one-third of forced international migrants and other types of migrants have high school education and higher.

In terms of marital status, two facts stand out: (1) deportees have the largest share of being divorced or separated (almost one in five compared with shares ranging from 6.8 to 8.5 percent among non-deportees) and of civil or cohabiting unions; and (2) international migrants fleeing violence and insecurity have the largest share of single persons (more than one-third). In other words, deportees include larger shares of older men with lower levels of education and show larger marital disruption than other forced migrant populations.

Forced migrants from other countries and deportees have lower rates of access to health services compared with the other types of migrants, which could be partially related to work. IDPs have smaller shares of economically active population (less than two-thirds), and the highest unemployment is observed among forced international migrants, followed by deportees.

Protracted Homelessness: The Impossibility of Building Homes in Mobility

We now focus on the ways in which protracted displacement translates into the “impossibility of building a home”: that is, the ways in which for these populations “feeling at home is not a given but an everyday challenge” (Belloni and Massa 2021, 14). Moreover, we extend this notion for the populations in the United States living in conditions of deportability as well as those who were actually deported to Mexico. We build on conversations of protracted displacement as a state of protracted uncertainty, where those displaced “live with a status that is not supposed to last, often in dwellings that are temporary: they do not know how long they will stay, when they will move on, and what will happen when the causes of the displacement change” (Brun 2015, 33). Among the almost 10.5 million people from all over the world living in an irregular migration status in the United States, and their US–born family members, protracted uncertainty is an everyday life issue where no real solution seems clear as discussions on comprehensive US immigration reform vanish. Studies show that not only deportation itself but also the fear of being deported permeates the lives of a large number of Latino immigrants and natives in the United States (Asad 2020).

Census data reveal that living arrangements are also different among migrant populations. Data on household characteristics reflects that those displaced due to violence (internal and international) live in larger households (4.1 members on average), and a vast majority (eight of 10) live in extended or compound household arrangements. Deportees tend to live in smaller households (2.9 members on average), and almost one of three live in single person households.

While migration and displacement essentially involve leaving one’s home in search of a home elsewhere, people in situations of protracted displacement face increasing hardships in achieving the sense of stability, control, security, and familiarity that normally attaches to places labeled and experienced as homes (Boccagni 2017). Migrants and refugees endure a process of “accumulated homelessness” wherein homes are repeatedly lost and lacking throughout the mobility process (Belloni and Massa 2021).

For some migrants in Mexico, homelessness is close to literal: almost one in five international migrants displaced due to violence, 4.2 percent of deportees, and 2 percent of internally displaced persons live on the streets or in collective dwelling spaces (Table 2). For those who find places to live, it is common to inhabit mobile dwellings, shelters, spaces not fit for habitation, or single rooms in housing projects. This experience of precarious housing is more prevalent among international forced migrants (almost 6 percent) and deportees (4 percent) than among internally displaced due to violence (1.5 percent) and other types of migrants (1.9 percent).

Table 2.

Characteristics of Inhabited Dwellings in the States of the Northern Border of Mexico, 2020.

Variable	Migrants	Violence and insecurity			Deported	Other migrant	No migrant
Variable	Total	Total	International	Mexican	Deported	Other migrant	No migrant
Type of private inhabited dwelling
Unique house on property	75.8%	75.5%	59.7%	78.7%	72.0%	75.8%	87.1%
House in shared property	10.0%	12.0%	19.8%	10.4%	15.9%	9.8%	8.4%
Duplex house	7.6%	5.5%	6.4%	5.4%	4.3%	7.7%	2.5%
Apartment in building	4.4%	4.4%	8.1%	3.6%	3.6%	4.4%	1.5%
Housing in neighborhood	1.7%	2.0%	5.5%	1.3%	3.3%	1.7%	0.4%
Premises not built for housing	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%
Mobile housing	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%
Shelter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
NS (not specified)	0.4%	0.4%	0.1%	0.5%	0.1%	0.4%	0.1%
Private housing^a
Running water	98.7%	98.2%	99.1%	98.2%	97.7%	98.8%	98.7%
Sewer system	98.2%	98.0%	99.1%	98.0%	96.9%	98.2%	96.9%
Electricity	99.5%	99.3%	99.4%	99.5%	98.5%	99.6%	99.4%
Rooms (average)^a	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.7	3.3	3.6	4.1
Collective housing and homelessness^b	1.7%	5.5%	19.8%	2.0%	4.1%	1.6%	0.2%

Note: Border states refer to Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Chi-squared tests show that all characteristics vary significantly (p < .05) by cause of migration.

Source: 2020 Mexican Census, basic tabulations available at https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ccpv/2020/#Tabulados.

Excludes premises not built for housing, mobile housing, and shelters. ^bCalculated as the difference between the total population five years and older and population five years and older in private dwellings, which excludes population of collective dwelling and homelessness. Therefore, because only migrants and deportees were selected, it is assumed that most of these people are in migrant shelters or homeless.

A large body of research focusing on conditions of deportees living in border cities, mainly in Tijuana, has documented how deportation is an event that materializes and amplifies previous vulnerabilities (Caldwell 2019; Santiago Vargas, Alarcón, and Calva Sánchez 2021). Several studies show that processes associated with deportation and its associated stigma (París Pombo 2010) — such as lacking networks and resources, and not integrating economically and socially — result in many living in the streets after spending time in shelters (Albicker and Velasco 2016). Those living in the streets are predominantly male and, as expected, many suffer mental health problems (Bojorquez et al. 2014). Interestingly, Bojorquez et al. provide data on the length of stay in the United States among this population: one in five lived in the United States for five years or less, almost four in 10 are between six and 15 years, one-third are between 16 and 35 years, and almost 7 percent are more than 36 years old (ibid.).

A sense of home is both an internal sense of security and stability as well as a result of a reciprocal process of recognition in a given social and institutional context (Belloni and Massa 2021). For those in protracted displacement situations, both the sense of internal stability and certainty and the institutional and social recognition of settlement and integration tend to be lacking. On the one hand, they face continuous movement from one place to another, staying in shelters, refugee camps, or precarious dwellings and with no certainty of how long they will be in a given place. On the other, many migrants and displaced persons endure long journeys without regular migratory status, excluded from basic services, unacknowledged by local institutions as bearers of rights, and often victims of quotidian xenophobic attitudes and discriminatory practices in everyday interactions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Increasing returns from the United States, significant growth in internal displacement due to violence, and sustained increases in asylum applications have generated diverse situations of protracted displacement in Mexico over the last decade. These situations create tensions and challenges for those displaced as well as for the receiving communities and the governments at the local and federal level. Prolonged waiting times, pervasive uncertainty, and contexts of generalized violence complicate the situations of displaced populations, particularly in border regions.

In this article, we have focused on situations of protracted displacement in northern Mexico in order to analyze: (1) the causes of protracted displacement; (2) characteristics of these populations; and (3) consequences for asylum seekers, both the internally displaced and deportees. Specifically, we analyzed three populations: (1) the internally displaced due to violence — mainly criminal violence; (2) Mexican nationals returning from the United States (voluntarily and due to deportation); and (3) populations seeking asylum, both in Mexico and the United States.

The article shows how these situations of protracted displacement result from immigration and asylum policy decisions by analyzing how “migration regimes and asylum systems that shape the conditions of protractedly displaced persons are continuously transformed” (Etzold and Fechter 2022, 2) with the purpose of keeping people in place (Bakewell 2008). Overall, the article has sought to highlight how legal limbos create uncertainty in everyday life and difficulties in defining a sense of home. Future policies on protracted displacement should address these concerns.

A long list of reports and policy briefs published in recent years have included considerations for creating new legal pathways for migration, strengthening asylum systems, and creating better conditions for those waiting for protection in Mexico and the United States (Aleinikoff, Meissner, and Hipsman 2018; HRW 2019; Selee et al. 2019; IMUMI 2020; Colef 2021; Gil-Everaert 2021). Many emphasize the need for resuming and facilitating regional discussions with international organizations (IOM, UNHCR) and local governments to foster cooperation for long-term solutions. Our recommendations build upon previous conversations and proposals but stem from the findings of this paper. We propose that:

The Mexican and US governments should resume negotiations to: (1) regularize long-term residents who have created families in the US; (2) consider the best interests of children and families in deportation procedures; and (3) facilitate family reunification procedures in the United States for Mexican returnees.

The Mexican government should resume negotiations with the US government to include criminal violence as a reason for obtaining asylum in the United States.

Mexico should change the Mexican Asylum and Refugee law to allow asylum seekers to move freely within the Mexican territory.

Mexico should strengthen efforts to approve and implement the Law on Internal Displacement in Mexico.

The US and Mexico should create a binational initiative focused on access to dignified employment, stable housing, health services, and education initiatives for populations in situations of protracted displacement at the US–Mexico border.

Mexico should foster the creation and implementation of integration programs based on inter-institutional cooperation between government agencies and private sector Mexican entities.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We appreciate the comments received from anonymous reviewers and editors for improving our manuscript. We also thank Sebastián Estremo Paredes for producing the maps included in .

1

Under the metering system, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) significantly limited the number of asylum seekers permitted daily to enter an entry port of the US–Mexico border.

2

Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. 1158 (1952).

3

Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (United States District Court Southern District of California. Sept. 2, 2021)

4

Data on the total number of people returned under MPP differs depending on the source. The TRAC Immigration Statistics Portal shows a total of 71,076. However, data obtained from the Mexican National Institute of Migration through a request via the Freedom of Information Act reveals that more than 78,000 people were returned under MPP.

5

Rates of representation were calculated using data from TRAC Immigration. The percentage of representation takes into account total number of MPP cases and the number of cases with representation. The representation rate for asylum cases in general is calculated in the same way. Both percentages are calculated for the period 2019-2022.

6

The Public Health and Welfare. 42 U.S.C. §265 (1944). .

7

Ley General De Vìctimas (LGV), Diario de la Federación [DOF] 9-1-2013, últimas reformas DOF 28-04-2022 (Mex.).

8

Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en el Estado de Chiapas, Periódico Oficial del Estado de Chiapas, No 355, 22-2-2012 (Mex.). .

9

Ley para Prevenir y Atender el Desplazamiento Interno en el Estado de Guerrero, Periódico Oficial del Estado de Guerrero No 58, 22-7-2014 (Mex.).

10

Ley para Prevenir, Atender y Reparar Integralmente el Desplazamiento Forzado Interno en el Estado de Sinaloa, Periódico Oficial del Estado de Sinaloa, No 481, 21-8-2020 (Mex.).

Disclosures

This article did not involve human or animal subjects, which obviates the need for informed consent.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work has been supported by the Seminar on Migration, Inequality, and Public Policies (MIGDEP) from El Colegio de México.

ORCID iDs

Isabel Gil-Everaert

Oscar Rodríguez Chávez

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