Black Nationalist Tendencies and Their Association with Perceived Inefficacy of the Civil Rights Movement and of Black Elected Officials

Abstract

This study addressed whether black nationalist tendencies explain why some blacks in 1980 perceived that the civil rights movement and black elected officials failed to improve the black community’s standing, including their own life chances. Those holding positions consistent with black nationalism argue, among other things, that racial integration, political participation, and alignment with white interests could not ultimately produce racial parity. Instead, they support (cultural, social, economic, and political) separatism, constant vigilance, and community uplift as tactics for engineering racial parity. Using data from a nationally representative survey of the black population collected 35 years ago, the authors measured black nationalist tendencies using six indicators: (1) agreement that blacks should vote for black candidates, (2) agreement that blacks should shop in black-owned stores, (3) agreement that black men should not date white women, (4) support for forming a black political party, (5) the presence of black literature and/or art in respondents’ homes, and (6) a sense of common fate. The authors found that these indicators associated significantly with perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials. However, the associations’ directions and strength often varied appreciably. The authors call for future research that characterizes black nationalist tendencies and investigates their contemporary interpersonal and sociopolitical implications.

Keywords

African Americans black nationalism civil rights movement identity politics perceptions separatism

The year 1965 may be known in history as the time when the civil rights movement discovered, in the sense of becoming explicitly aware, that abolishing legal racism would not produce Negro equality.

—Rainwater and Yancey (1967:11)

As noted in the opening quotation, criticism of the civil rights movement is not new. In fact, Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) articulated perspicuously such criticism in Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, a seminal book arguing that blacks could combat racism only if they closed ranks, vested political power from whites, and turned that political power into economic power, while simultaneously reorganizing their psychological framework to center on community uplift with limited interference from whites (see also Allen 1990; Joseph 2009).

Declaring that the civil rights movement failed and that black politicians (elected, in part, because of the civil rights movement) were inconsequential to the pursuit of racial parity would raise eyebrows at an academic conference hosted today on social movements. This reaction would occur because the civil rights movement and black elected officials dramatically affected U.S. society. Specifically, they drew attention to blacks’ demands (e.g., full employment, protection from interpersonal and institutional discrimination, desegregation of public accommodations, voting rights, equal protection under the law). Moreover, the civil rights movement marked supposedly the end of state-sanctioned and unchecked racial terrorism, terrorism that meant blacks feared for their lives and livelihoods every single day. Still, we argue and will demonstrate that some blacks 35 years ago indeed perceived the civil rights movement and black elected officials as irrelevant to their everyday lives.

We invoke black nationalism to help explain blacks’ negative views of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials. Black nationalists argue, among other things, that integration, political participation, and alignment with white interests cannot produce racial parity. They instead embrace separatism and community uplift as tactics for engineering racial parity. Scholars (e.g., Allen 1990; Dawson 2001; Robinson 2001) agree that black nationalism gains support when oppression is perceived but effective means for ending it do not appear available.

Although this study’s data were collected in 1980, we assert that our arguments and conclusions are relevant today. As the second term of the first self-identified black man elected president of the United States (Barack Obama) draws to a close; as blacks’ lifestyles and life chances continue to lag relative to those of whites and in some cases grow more disparate; as police officers gun down unarmed black men in Florida, Missouri, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and elsewhere; and, most recently, as a white man murders black church congregants in South Carolina, a question in myriad guises resurfaces: how much racial progress have we actually made as a nation since the civil rights movement? Rather than relying on scholarly narratives focused on tactical shifts, resource mobilization, legislative victories, framing, and so on, we examine whether indicators of black nationalism help explain variation in blacks’ assessments of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials 35 years ago with the aim of drawing attention to blacks’ perceptions today.

The balance of the article proceeds as follows. We first describe black nationalism and present empirical evidence to disambiguate its propositions and significance. We then derive hypotheses regarding why some blacks 35 years ago would perceive that the civil rights movement and black elected officials failed to improve the lot of the black community, including their own life chances. Results reveal that indicators of black nationalism associate significantly with perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials. In the “Discussion” section, we reconcile our findings with themes in the black nationalism literature. The “Conclusion” section delineates what we can learn today about race-related social change by studying black nationalism.

Defining Black Nationalism

Black nationalism is a paradigm that challenges white supremacy and exposes systemic racism and arises from unending contestation regarding how best to advance and secure the black community’s interests (Allen 1990). Not surprisingly, black nationalists view the United States as fundamentally racist (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Dawson 2001:21, 87). Their position is not inconsistent with research demonstrating endurance of white privilege (Akbar 1974; Fanon 1968; Feagin 2006; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Lipsitz 2006; Small 1994; Smith 2013; Winant 2002). We would argue that blacks in 1980 with nationalist tendencies appreciated that the civil rights movement and black elected officials could never produce racial parity (along the same lines as Bell’s [1980] articulation of interest convergence).

Studies of black nationalism can be found in literature addressing political ideology and economy, and neocolonialism (Allen 1990; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Dawson 2001; Robinson 2001). These studies treat black nationalism with considerable care. For example, Dawson (2001:12) theorized that black nationalism belongs to a constellation of several political ideologies (e.g., radical egalitarianism, Marxism, feminism, conservativism) found in black social thought. Furthermore, Dawson (2001:86, 93–102) stated that black nationalism is a deeply racialized ideology because it centers on the establishment of a black nation; whether that actually means a contiguous land-based nation-state or an imagined community remains debatable. Regardless, most would agree that endorsement of self-determination and separatism are central themes defining black nationalism.

We suggest that the contribution of black nationalism to race-related social change has not been fully appreciated or deliberated. Our suggestion resonates with arguments Joseph (2009) made:

This fact has been complicated by conventional civil rights narratives, which, until recently, accepted as wisdom the idea that black power undermined struggles for racial justice. Those narratives differed more in their level of condemnation than in their analysis of the black power movement’s self-destructive impact. The embrace, at times, of violent rhetoric, misogyny, and bravado by black power advocates have made them and their struggles easy targets for demonization and dismissal. (p. 751)

Our present task is to focus a sociological lens on whether black nationalism associates with blacks’ perceptions of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials 35 years ago and how it might be relevant theoretically to present-day thinking about race-related social change. To accomplish that task, the following paragraphs provide richer description of the meaning of black nationalism. For instance, referring to the situation in South Africa during apartheid, Biko (1987) declared,

Black Consciousness is in essence the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression—the blackness of their skin—and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the lie that black is an aberration from the “normal” which is white. It is a manifestation of a new realisation that by seeking to run away from themselves and to emulate the white man, blacks are insulting the intelligence of whoever created them black. . . . It seeks to infuse the black community with a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion and their outlook to life. The interrelationship between the consciousness of the self and the emancipatory programme is of a paramount importance. Blacks no longer seek to reform the system because so doing implies acceptance of the major points around which the system revolves. Blacks are out to completely transform the system and to make of it what they wish. (p. 49)

Referring to circumstances in the United States approaching the institutionalization of the civil rights movement, Malcolm X (1964) implored in a fiery speech,

So this government has failed us. The government itself has failed us. And the white liberals who have been posing as our friends have failed us. And once we see that all of these other sources to which we’ve turned have failed, we stop turning to them and turn to ourselves. We need a self-help program, a do-it-yourself philosophy, a do-it-right-now philosophy, a it’s-already-too-late philosophy. This is what you and I need to get with. And the only time—the only way we’re going to solve our problem is with a self-help program. Before we can get a self-help program started, we have to have a self-help philosophy. Black nationalism is a self-help philosophy.

Thus, embracing nationalism permits persons in the black community (broadly defined) to foster healthy in-group identification (i.e., black pride) despite systemic racism (Akbar 1974; Baldwin 1984:179; Brown and Lesane-Brown 2006; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Feagin 2006; Lipsitz 2006; Smith 2013; Winant 2002). It requires nurturing a sense of black empowerment independent of whites’ machinations and independent of those blacks who prefer to emulate whites or compare themselves with whites. In this regard, consciousness is the key to black nationalism (see Allen 1990; Akbar 1974; Baldwin 1984; Dawson 2001:104–105).

Black nationalism performs additional functions in black communities (Hoston 2009; Smith 2013). First, it refutes that blackness is an inherent liability but rather a basis for pride and collective action (Akbar 1974; Allen 1990; Baldwin 1984; Biko 1987:49; Demo and Hughes 1990). Second, it encourages blacks to acknowledge systematic origins of racial inequality and reject individualistic explanations (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Dawson 2001; Smith 2013). It similarly confirms that black people have sensitive gauges when assessing race matters and the significance of race-related social change (Brown and Lesane-Brown 2006; Sigelman and Welch 1991). Finally, black nationalism explains the apparent unimportance of social class: no matter how successful (or racially integrated) individual black persons may be, they are still black to whites (Cose 1994; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Feagin 1991; Forman 2003; Lipsitz 2006).

Black Nationalism and Perceptions

Prior studies support our characterization of black nationalism and its contribution to explaining variation in blacks’ perceptions. For example, Brown and Shaw (2002) investigated evidence of black nationalism among 1,206 blacks using the 1993 National Black Politics Study. They found two dimensions of black nationalism: community nationalism and separatist nationalism. Items representing the dimensions were as follows:

(1) blacks should shop in black owned stores, (2) blacks should have control over the government in black areas, (3) blacks should have control over the economy in black areas, (4) blacks should rely on themselves and not others, (5) blacks should vote for black candidates, (6) blacks should form their own political party, (7) blacks should have their own separate nation, (8) and blacks should form a nation within a nation. (p. 23)

Community nationalists urge blacks to control and support their own communities and institutions and to accept limited racial integration as a practical reality (Brown and Shaw 2002:25; see also Bell 1980). Separatist nationalists urge blacks to maintain (cultural, social, economic, and political) separation from whites between because racism is permanent.

Furthermore, Brown and Shaw (2002) found that blacks endorsing either dimension of nationalism were more likely to believe that whites want to keep blacks down, to believe that Africa is a special homeland for all blacks, and to feel warmly toward Louis Farrakhan. Those endorsing community nationalism were less likely to believe that blacks should emphasize struggle around race yet also less likely to believe that blacks will ever achieve racial equality. In contrast, those endorsing separatist nationalism were more likely to emphasize struggle and believe blacks can achieve racial equality. In addition, Brown and Shaw (2002) found blacks with higher common fate (i.e., a connection to blacks as a group), with higher family incomes, who were younger, more liberal, and members of black organizations favored community nationalism. Blacks who were younger, male, and had lower family incomes tended to support separatist nationalism.

In a more recent study, Hoston (2009) investigated black solidarity (another titular variant of black nationalism) using survey data from 867 black registered voters in New Orleans, Detroit, Chicago, and Charlotte, North Carolina. Black solidarity was measured with the following items:

(1) How important is it for Blacks to vote for Black candidates when they run for office?; (2) How important is it for Blacks to participate in Black-only organizations whenever possible?; (3) How important is it for Blacks to have control over the government in mostly Black communities?; (4) How important is it for Blacks to have control over the economy in mostly Black communities?

Hoston (2009) found that blacks living in Chicago and Charlotte expressed higher levels of black solidarity than those living in New Orleans and Detroit. Black solidarity and common fate were positively correlated across the four cities. Moreover, highly educated blacks had lower levels of black solidarity and older blacks had higher levels of black solidarity regardless of city (note that the latter finding contradicts age patterns reported by Brown and Shaw 2002).

Hypotheses

Our review of the literature linking black nationalism with perceptions leads to two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Indicators of black nationalism will associate with the perception among blacks that the civil rights movement hurt or did not help their chances in life.

Hypothesis 2: Indicators of black nationalism will predict the perception among blacks that black elected officials have not helped the cause of blacks.

Methods

Data

We used publicly available cross-sectional data from the 1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans (NSBA) to address our hypotheses. The NSBA was the first national probability sample of self-identified blacks living in the continental United States (Jackson and Gurin 1999). Black professional interviewers conducted in-home interviews with 2,107 adults ranging in age from 17 to 101 years. The response rate was 67 percent (for a detailed description of the NSBA and sampling procedure, see Jackson 1991). The NSBA included an array of questions related to politics, media, race relations, health, and so on. Uniqueness of the questions asked and the national sampling frame make these data appropriate for the present study.

Measures

Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable asked whether the “civil rights movement of the 1960s helped your chances in life, hurt your chances, or hasn’t made any difference in the chances you’ve had in life.” The second asked whether respondents thought that the fact that “more blacks have been elected to important political offices” has “helped the cause of blacks, hurt it, or has not made any difference.” Both were dichotomized such that “helped” was coded 0 and “hurt” and “no difference” were coded 1. There were 36 and 46 missing cases for these variables, respectively. Missing cases were respondents who said “don’t know” or provided no response.

If there is overlap between views of the civil rights movement and black elected officials, then these variables should correlate. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, they were significantly related: design-based F(1, 1,948) = 126.087 (p < .000). In the weighted cross-tabulation, 65 percent of respondents agreed that the civil rights movement and black elected officials helped blacks overall. Nine percent agreed both the movement and elected officials hurt or made no difference. Approximately 25 percent of respondents held that either the movement or elected officials were irrelevant.

Table 1.

Bivariate Relationship between Perceived Inefficacy of the Civil Rights Movement and of Black Elected Officials (1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans, n = 2,107).

		Black Elected Officials
		Helped	Hurt/Made No Difference
Civil rights movement	Helped	1,306	390	1,696
		(.652)	(.208)
		[.628–.677]	[.188–.229]
	Hurt/made no difference	94	159	253
		(.050)	(.090)
		[.039–.063]	[.076–.107]
		1,400	549	1,949

Note: Analyses weighted by probability of selection within a household and for nonresponse. Survey-adjusted cell proportions are shown in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals for the cell proportions are shown in brackets.

To our knowledge, these dependent variables have not been included in another survey since the 1979–1980 NSBA and have been analyzed only one other time. Specifically, Wilcox and Gomez (1990) examined personal and public religiosity as predictors of blacks’ perceptions of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials. Their results showed that religiosity was unrelated. However, age, sex, education, personal income, region, urbanicity, and closeness to blacks were statistically significant correlates. We include those variables as controls in our regression models with the exception of closeness to blacks. We instead use common fate.

Independent Variables

Six variables indicated black nationalist tendencies: (1) agreement that blacks should vote for black candidates, (2) agreement that blacks should shop in black-owned stores, (3) agreement that black men should not date white women, (4) support for forming a black political party, (5) the presence of black literature and/or art in respondents’ homes, and (6) a sense of common fate. For the first three indicators, the question wordings were as follows: “Blacks should always vote for Black candidates when they run,” “Blacks should shop in Black owned stores whenever possible,” and “Black men should not date white women.” “Strongly agree” and “agree” responses were coded 1, and other responses were coded 0 (i.e., “disagree,” “strongly disagree,” “don’t care,” and “don’t know”). Next, support for a forming black political party was captured with the following question: “Do you think Black people should form their own political party?” An affirmative answer was coded 1, and “no” and “don’t know” were coded 0. For the fifth indicator, interviewers noted the presence of black literature and/or art in respondents’ homes. Having black literature and/or art was coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Finally, regarding common fate, respondents were asked, “Do your chances in life depend more on what happens to Black people as a group or does it depend more on what you do yourself?” Respondents could spontaneously offer “both.” We created two indicator variables to represent “blacks as a group” and “both.” “What you do yourself” was the excluded group in the regression models. The numbers of missing cases for the six indicators of black consciousness are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Inefficacy of the Civil Rights Movement and of Black Elected Officials, Black Nationalism, and Control Variables (1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans, n = 2,107).

	Mean^a	SE(m)^b	Minimum	Maximum	Missing
Perceived inefficacy variables
Civil rights movement (1 = hurt/made no difference, 0 = helped)	.140	.010	0	1	36
Black elected officials (1 = hurt/made no difference, 0 = helped)	.298	.012	0	1	46
Black nationalism variables
Should vote for black candidates (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	.380	.012	0	1	39
Should shop at black-owned stores (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	.628	.013	0	1	39
Should not date white women (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	.301	.012	0	1	46
Support for black political party (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.468	.013	0	1	54
Black literature and/or art in home (1 = observed, 0 = not observed)	.301	.012	0	1	0
Common fate
Blacks as a group (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.303	.012	0	1	47
What R does (1 = yes, 0 = no)^c	.513	.013	0	1	47
Both (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.184	.010	0	1	47
Control variables
Age (years)	41.188	.442	17	101	8
Sex (1 = female, 0 = male)	.591	.013	0	1	0
Education (years completed)	11.153	.080	0	17	20
Personal income (ordinal: 0–8)	3.823	.068	0	8	0
Region (1 = South, 0 = else)	.500	.013	0	1	0
Urbanicity
Self-representing urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.521	.013	0	1	0
Non-self-representing urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.285	.011	0	1	0
Rural (1 = yes, 0 = no)^c	.194	.010	0	1	0
Listwise n	1,949

Note: Analyses weighted by probability of selection within a household and for nonresponse. R = respondent.

Proportion or numeric mean.

Linearized standard error of the mean.

Excluded categories in the binary logistic regression models in Tables 3 and 4.

We excluded three black autonomy variables that prior studies (e.g., Allen and Hatchett 1986; Broman, Neighbors, and Jackson 1988; Demo and Hughes 1990) have included: “Black women should not date white men,” “Black children should study an African language,” and “Black parents should give their children African names.” First, distaste for black women dating white men was so highly correlated (polychoric correlation = .963, p < .000) with “Black men should not date white women” that we could not model both concomitantly and gain little from combining the two items (as was done by Demo and Hughes 1990:367). Second, the two African language questions tended to hang together in exploratory common factor analyses separately from the other items (analyses available upon request).

Control Variables

We controlled for age, sex, education, personal income, region, and urbanicity. Age was measured as years since birth. Sex was coded as 1 = female and 0 = male. Education equaled the number of years of formal education completed. Personal income was an ordinal measure. It ranged from 0 to 8, where 0 meant no income and 8 meant that the respondent earned $15,000 (which is approximately $43,146 in 2015 dollars on the basis of the Consumer Price Index) or more in annual salary. Region specified whether a respondent lived in the South or not (1 = yes, 0 = else). Urbanicity was a three-category nominal variable composed of self-representing urban areas (i.e., cities that must be included in any national sample of blacks), non-self-representing urban (i.e., cities that might be included in a national sample of blacks), and rural areas (i.e., nonurban spaces). Self-representing urban areas was the excluded group in the regression models.

Analytic Strategies

Our hypotheses were tested with binary logistic regression, a multivariate statistical technique that permits the prediction of a dichotomous outcome using a mix of categorical and numeric predictors. Analyses were weighted. The sampling weight corrected for random selection within the household and nonresponse. Analyses were conducted using Stata version 13.1. The command (*.do) file and estimation data are available upon request.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows weighted descriptive statistics for perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials, black nationalism, and the control variables. Approximately 14 percent of blacks thought the civil rights movement hurt or made no difference in their life chances. More than double that percentage (30 percent) agreed that black elected officials hurt or made no difference in terms of advancing the cause of blacks. Such nontrivial proportions show distance between blacks’ perceptions and representations of the civil rights agenda as fully realized.

Nearly 40 percent of blacks supported voting exclusively for black candidates. More than 6 in 10 (63 percent) agreed that blacks should shop in black-owned stores. Almost a third of blacks agreed that black men should not date white women. Virtually half the respondents supported formation of a black political party. Three in 10 had black literature and/or art in their homes, according to interviewers. Approximately 30 percent of blacks stated that their chances in life depend upon other blacks, 51 percent reported that their chances depend upon them alone, and 18 percent reported “both” (i.e., chances depend on blacks as a group and themselves). Thus, about half of blacks agreed that their racial group determines their life chances, at least somewhat.

In the bottom third of Table 2, control variable distributions are shown. On average, respondents were 41 years old, were disproportionately female, had completed about 11 years of formal education, reported personal incomes of about $5,000 (which is approximately $14,382 in 2015 dollars on the basis of the Consumer Price Index), were as likely to live in the South as elsewhere in the United States, and resided predominantly in urban areas. The listwise sample size was 1,949.

Binary Logistic Regression Results

Table 3 shows odds ratios and their standard errors (in parentheses) from weighted binary logistic regression models predicting perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials, respectively, using the six indicators of black nationalism. Models 1 and 2 examine perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement whereas Models 3 and 4 examine perceived inefficacy of black elected officials. Models 2 and 4 adjust for the control variables. All models explained a significant amount of variation in blacks’ perceptions.

Table 3.

Estimates from Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Perceived Inefficacy of the Civil Rights Movement and of Black Elected Officials Using Black Nationalism and Control Variables (1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans, n = 2,107).

	Civil Rights Movement (1 = hurt/made no difference, 0 = helped)		Black Elected Officials (1 = hurt/made no difference, 0 = helped)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Should vote for black candidates (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	1.431⁺	1.434⁺	.832	.947
	(.264)	(.268)	(.110)	(.129)
Should shop at black-owned stores (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	.660*	.730⁺	.701**	.772*
	(.113)	(.128)	(.087)	(.098)
Should not date white women (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	1.047	1.164	1.362*	1.498**
	(.206)	(.233)	(.180)	(.203)
Support for black political party (1 = yes, 0 = no)	1.168	1.067	1.540**	1.304*
Support for black political party (1 = yes, 0 = no)	(.193)	(.189)	(.188)	(.169)
Black literature and/or art in home (1 = observed, 0 = not observed)	.735⁺	.758	.963	.931
	(.137)	(.143)	(.124)	(.124)
Common fate
Blacks as a group (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.523**	.556**	.579**	.637**
	(.103)	(.112)	(.079)	(.090)
Both (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.770	.839	.682*	.765
	(.173)	(.196)	(.114)	(.131)
Age		.989⁺		.975**
		(.006)		(.004)
Sex (1 = female, 0 = male)		1.111		.986
		(.190)		(.125)
Education		.927*		.947*
		(.029)		(.023)
Personal income (ordinal: 0–8)		.896**		.972
		(.030)		(.025)
Region (1 = South, 0 = else)		.532**		.733*
		(.095)		(.100)
Urbanicity
Self-representing urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)		2.282**		2.221**
Self-representing urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)		(.599)		(.434)
Non-self-representing urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)		1.494		1.686**
Non-self-representing urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)		(.409)		(.328)
F	3.864**	5.111**	6.387**	7.327**
(df₁, df₂)	(7, 1,942)	(14, 1,935)	(7, 1,942)	(14, 1,935)
Listwise n	1,949

Note: Analyses weighted by probability of selection within a household and for nonresponse. Odds ratios are shown with standard errors in parentheses. Excluded groups in multiple category nominal variables include “common fate: what R does” and “urbanicity: rural.” R = respondent.

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.

In Model 1, we predict perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement. The odds of negatively perceiving the civil rights movement increase marginally by a factor of 1.431 (or 43.1 percent) when respondents think that blacks should vote for black candidates. Agreement that blacks should shop in black-owned stores was linked to lower odds of perceiving the civil rights movement as failing. The odds of perceiving that the civil rights movement hurt one’s chances in life increase by a factor of 1.047 (or 4.7 percent) when respondents strongly agree that black men should not date white women. The result was not significant though. Similarly, support for a black political party was not a statistically significant correlate. Displaying black literature and/or art in one’s home was associated marginally with lower odds of perceiving the civil rights movement as less influential. Finally, compared with those who stated that their chances in life depend only on them, respondents whose fate depended upon blacks as a group were significantly less likely to believe the civil rights movement failed.

Control variables were entered in Model 2. On the one hand, sex was not an important correlate. On the other hand, age, education, personal income, and living in the South were linked to a lower probability of discounting the civil rights movement. In contrast, living in urban areas, compared with rural areas, was associated with larger odds of thinking that the civil rights movement hurt or did not help. The inclusion of control variables reduced the significance of associations for shopping in black-owned stores and having black literature and/or art in one’s home.

In Model 3, we predict perceived inefficacy of black elected officials. Agreement that blacks should vote for black candidates was linked to lower odds of perceiving black elected officials as detrimental. However, the association was not statistically significant. In contrast, odds of disdain for black elected officials decrease with agreement that blacks should shop in black-owned stores. Agreement that black men should not date white women directly predicted unfavorable views of black elected officials. Odds of holding unflattering perceptions of black elected officials increase by a factor of 1.540 (or 54 percent) when respondents support forming a separate black political party. Observing black literature and/or art was not a significant correlate. Compared with those who thought their chances in life depended only on them, blacks who believed their fate was as least somewhat linked with other blacks were significantly less likely to think black elected officials were inept.

Control variables were entered in Model 4. On one hand, sex and personal income were not important correlates. On the other hand, older blacks and those blacks completing more years of formal education, and those living in the South, were less likely to think black elected officials hurt the cause of blacks. In contrast, respondents living in urban areas were significantly more likely to express distrust of black elected officials. The control variables attenuated the association for stating that one’s life chances depend upon blacks as a group and what one does oneself (i.e., both). Their inclusion also reduced the significance level of associations for shopping in black-owned stores and support for a black political party. Finally, we found a slight suppression effect where support for black men not dating white women became more strongly associated with perceiving black elected officials as ineffective.

Even though we focus here on perceptions, and hence the idea of specifying causality is untenable, one could speculate (as we did earlier in the article) that the civil rights movement facilitated the election of black politicians. Thus, in Table 4, we predict disdain for black elected officials using perceived inefficacy of the civil rights movement and black nationalist tendencies. Adjusting for black nationalism and the control variables, Table 1’s results were confirmed: negative perceptions of the civil rights movement correlate directly with negative perceptions of black elected officials. Specifically, odds of viewing black politicians poorly increase by a factor 5.033 when respondents perceive the civil rights movement failed. Compared with Model 4 in Table 3, after introducing perceived failure of the civil rights movement (see Model 1 in Table 4), we found that the black nationalism indicators remained robust correlates, with the exception of agreement that blacks should shop in black-owned stores.

Table 4.

Estimates from a Binary Logistic Regression Model Predicting Perceived Inefficacy of Black Elected Officials Using Perceived Inefficacy of the Civil Rights Movement, Black Nationalism, and Control Variables (1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans, n = 2,107).

	Black Elected Officials (1 = hurt/made no difference, 0 = helped)
	Model 1
Civil rights movement (1 = hurt/made no difference, 0 = helped)	5.033**
	(.867)
Should vote for black candidates (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	.864
	(.122)
Should shop at black-owned stores (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	.815
	(.107)
Should not date white women (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = else)	1.496**
	(.208)
Support for black political party (1 = yes, 0 = no)	1.317*
	(.177)
Black literature and/or art in home (1 = observed, 0 = not observed)	.982
	(.134)
Common fate
Blacks as a group (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.696*
	(.104)
Both (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.779
	(.137)
F	11.73**
(df₁, df₂)	(15, 1,934)
Listwise n	1,949

Note: Analyses weighted by probability of selection within a household and for nonresponse. Odds ratios are shown with standard errors in parentheses. Analyses control for age, sex, education, personal income, region, and urbanicity.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Discussion

This article’s front-end framing developed expectations that variables tapping black nationalism should produce higher odds of perceiving the civil rights movement and black elected officials as ineffective. Consistent with the hypotheses, indicators of black nationalism such as support for voting exclusively for black candidates, agreement that black men should not date white women, and support for starting a black political party were related to higher odds of perceiving the civil rights movement and/or black elected officials as unhelpful. Inconsistent with the hypotheses, agreement with shopping in black-owned stores, owning black literature and/or art, and maintaining that one’s chances in life depend upon other blacks were associated with lower odds of viewing the civil rights movement and/or black elected officials as irrelevant.

Altogether, we found partial support for our hypotheses but convincing support for black nationalist tendencies as a correlate of perceived race-related social change. We think that the unexpected associations in Tables 3 and 4 validate black nationalism’s complexity. For example, combining common indicators of black nationalism into a single scale obscures the fact that black nationalism could be multidimensional (see, e.g., Brown and Shaw 2002). However, we did not find that our six indicators of black nationalist tendencies formed a robust scale in exploratory common factor analyses (analyses available upon request). Furthermore, black nationalism could demand support for any activities or actors that appear to improve any black person’s life chances, even if those activities or actors are unlikely to be effective in the long-term or on a grand scale. In the subsequent section, we further interrogate black nationalism to direct future research.

Advancing the Study of Black Nationalism

Extant literature describing black nationalism is unavoidably dense because black nationalism is a moving target (Allen 1990; Robinson 2001). In fact, it is difficult to advance a decisive definition of black nationalism because of its dynamism. It has been separatist, communist, Afrocentric, community uplift oriented, religious, mystical, and so on, at various junctures, and there are complex reasons for its fluctuations over time (see Allen 1990; Dawson 2001; Sigelman and Welch 1991). So how do we make sense of black nationalism indicators that operate as expected and contrary to expectations?

First, after institutionalization of the civil rights movement, there may have been mounting reluctance to embrace racial integration, even among blacks experiencing upward mobility (see Allen 1990:19). Consistent with this reasoning, Brown and Shaw (2002) averred,

Possibly the very same African Americans who through education and class privilege have accrued greater benefits from their integration into American society are also supremely aware of that system’s racial insults, glass ceilings, and intransigencies. . . . So they hold out hope for black self-development while pragmatically but pessimistically working within the system. (pp. 40–41)

In other words, upward mobility did not (and does not today) shield blacks from the indignities and insults of racial stratification (Allen 1990; Cose 1994; Feagin 1991; Forman 2003). Thus, it seems reasonable that a sense of common fate might correlate with reluctance to discount the civil rights movement and black elected officials. Along those lines, social class may no longer divide black political interests as it once did. On one hand, Dawson (2001) stated, “As racial discontent spreads across groups within the black community, so does support for community nationalism” (p. 126). Yet on the other hand, the black middle class often finds itself between a rock (lower-class blacks) and a hard place (middle-class whites), with each side demanding loyalty (see Allen 1990:117–20). This tension explains why some middle-class blacks greet nationalism with unease: they are viewed as race traitors by black nationalists (Allen 1990:11–12, 99, 118–119; Dawson 2001:90, 117).

Second, there can be little reason to doubt that the meaning of black nationalism is historical time contingent (see Allen 1990; Hoston 2009; Robinson 2001). During the 1960s, we suspect that black nationalism pivoted on separatism and proscriptions about racial integration. During the 1970s, such underpinnings may have been eroded by the supposed success of the civil rights movement, victories against segregation, and seeming progress toward racial parity. Community uplift may have emerged then as a new pivot point: supporting black activities and actors was required—there could be no airing of dirty laundry. By 1980, though, many blacks left in sinking boats while tides rose around them returned to nationalist tendencies and proscriptions about racial integration. As such, the concept of black nationalism in 1980 may have included intertwined tenets of separatism and community uplift. Thus, shopping in black-owned stores might be seen as representing a complementary solution to political participation, rather than its antithesis.

Third, we may have inadequately measured black nationalism. For example, Hoston (2009) claimed, “There are several dimensions of Black nationalism that include, but are not limited to, Black solidarity, Black autonomy, Black identity, Black nationalism, and Black separatism” (p. 721). Systematic attention should be given to how these dimensions are distinct. Related, contemporary black nationalism may involve Afrocentrism, which stresses a connection to Africa and peoples of original African descent (Allen 1990:97, 100–101; Baldwin 1984; Brown and Shaw 2002:39; Dawson 2001:22, 88, 104; Robinson 2001:128–31). Or it may involve revolutionary (i.e., anticapitalist) nationalism or a variant of community nationalism called ethnic pluralism (see Robinson 2001:6).

Study Limitations

First, it would be ideal to examine perceptions of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials over time. Unfortunately, our dependent variables were included only in the 1979–1980 NSBA and to our knowledge have not been included in any other survey since, including subsequent waves of the NSBA. Future surveys should directly investigate blacks’ perceptions of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials.

Second, much conceptual ground could be covered by asking members of other aggrieved populations to assess failure or success of social movements retrospectively (e.g., LGBTQIA communities about the marriage equality movement). There are missed opportunities to unpack variation in individuals’ perceptions of activism that supposedly benefits them and their communities.

Third, we should examine how groups such as Hispanics, white women, Asians, and sexual minorities view the civil rights movement and black elected officials. Triangulating from various angles in a diverse world provides a robust theoretical lever for assessing the meaning of race-related social change. Similarly, it would be important to assess perceived relevance of the civil rights movement during President Barack Obama’s (now second) term given that many people view his election as decisive proof of the civil rights movement’s success.

Fourth, we found that blacks’ appraisals of the civil rights movement and of black elected officials were far from monolithic (as is the black community itself; see Small 1994:117–27). It may be the case that blacks’ appraisals were as varied in the 1960s and 1970s, but we do not have data to address that possibility (but see Lee 2002).

Fifth, it could be interesting to examine perceptions of blacks who have historically been the most and least supportive of black nationalism. For instance, a group worthy of further study might be black Muslims, whose origin story is the rejection of racial integration (Robinson 2001:120–28). Future research should also consider whether black women today align with black nationalism, given nationalism’s recurring patriarchal stance (Dawson 2001:88–89, 117; Robinson 2001:113–14). Interestingly, Dawson (2001:122) estimated that approximately 20 percent of blacks in the 1990s would be classified as black nationalists. The field knows too little about who these people are and what they stand for today.

Finally, we presented evidence concerning blacks’ reasons for doubting that the civil rights movement and black elected officials helped. A logical next step would be to conduct in-depth interviews with previously and currently elected black officials. The interview schedule should query what officials believe they have achieved, what they wanted to achieve, blacks’ perceptions of them, and, of course, their conceptions of modern-day black nationalism.

Conclusions

What does it mean to ask, How much racial progress have we actually made as a nation since the civil rights movement? It could mean that some segment of the black population does not believe racial parity is possible. It could mean that terrorism at a Charleston church in 2015 recollects terrorism at a Birmingham church in 1963. It could mean evolution of organized protest in response to enduring insults, indignities, and indecencies blacks confront daily. It could mean that similarly dispossessed people of color are joining forces. It could mean that blacks perceive contemporary black elected officials as counterproductive. For example, some blacks question the significance of President Barack Obama’s presidency and, perhaps more pointedly, his color-blind approaches to problems that differentially decimate black and brown communities. For many blacks, unflattering views of President Barack Obama will shade into questions about an unfinished civil rights agenda.

Allen (1990) argued,

If it is admitted that black nationalism is a serious component of black thought, both in the past and present, the question naturally arises why this ideology is vigorously advocated only during certain times of social stress. Does black nationalism exist only at certain historical junctures, or is it always there like subterranean stresses which precede an earthquake? (pp. 114–15)

We hypothesize that black nationalism is a perpetual undercurrent and resurfaces like an unsatisfied need (see Allen 1990:89, 120). Moreover, we suspect that black nationalism broadcasts a signal that attracts those who find themselves on the fringes (and possibly today, increasingly near the center but bitterly frustrated by the slow march toward racial parity). For instance, scholars (see Allen 1990; Dawson 2001; Robinson 2001) suggest that when assimilation, integration, cooperation, and reparations appear increasingly unreachable, black nationalist tendencies become very popular. Specifically, Dawson (2001) asserted, “Black nationalism grows in force when the nation is perceived to have turned its back on blacks” (p. 133). Allen (1990) described a deeply felt frustration that makes black nationalism appear sane and rational. We caution, though, that black nationalism may not be a panacea. Because, as Robinson (2001:1–2, 106, 116) noted, black nationalism may inadvertently support racial essentialism and the culture-of-poverty perspective. Furthermore, it has never enjoyed endorsement by a black majority (Robinson 2001), yet we theorize that it galvanizes and mobilizes a crucial segment of the black population.

We hypothesize that black nationalism will become popular again in the next few years because recent events (noted in the introduction and above) may expose the futility of political participation. Despite the ostensible impact of the civil rights movement and election of increasing numbers of black politicians since 1965 (including President Barack Obama), blacks in 2015 are not gaining steady ground on racial parity. Statistics show widening racial disparities in outcomes such as infant mortality and wealth accumulation. The mass incarceration of black men with collateral consequences for black women, children, and communities has been labeled the new Jim Crow. This marks the context that will spur the renascence of black nationalism. The continued and contemporary relevance of black nationalism represents acknowledgment that full-blown social revolution may not ever occur. In this sense, black nationalism is not as revolutionary as it is practical (Allen 1990:125–26).

What will black nationalism look like in the supposed postracial period during which we live currently? One can only speculate. It may include links to Africa. It may include community uplift themes that extend toward any group of people (at home or abroad) who feel black or othered. It may include economic self-sufficiency through support for black-owned businesses. Consequently, we advocate for rejuvenated scholarly focus on the meaning and measurement of black nationalism. Revisiting black nationalism is necessary to grok variation in blacks’ contemporary perceptions of race-related social change. We similarly previse emergence and grassroots popularity of race-conscious black politicians in the near future. These are predictions that should intrigue scholars studying racial progress and political participation and blacks’ perceptions of each.

Footnotes

Author Biographies

Tony N. Brown is Associate Professor of Sociology at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. He holds additional faculty appointments in the Program for Effective Health Communication, the Center for Health Services Research, and the Center for Medicine, Health, and Society. He is Associate Director of the Center for Research on Health Disparities. His research agenda addresses the sociological and social psychological meaning and consequence of race and racism using critical race theory and various mainstream theories. Using survey data from community samples, he is currently investigating the mental health significance of racial discrimination, the epidemiology of racial trauma, the psychological wages of whiteness, and culturally-specific conceptualizations of mental health.

Ebony M. Duncan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Education at Washington University in St. Louis. As a sociologist of education, she considers how changes in school and social contexts are associated with racial differences in educational access, experiences, and outcomes in the United States. She situates her scholarly work in educational effectiveness and critical race traditions to identify social determinants and correlates of school and school system effectiveness. Consistent with research on educational effectiveness, much of her work evaluates whether changes in educational policy, schools and school systems facilitate intended educational outcomes. However, she extends this research tradition to emphasize non-achievement and racial equity outcomes as key indicators of effectiveness. Her current work examines social correlates and determinants of school closures in predominately African American communities, and the implications of charter schools and school choice for racial disparities in education.

Heather Hensman Kettrey is a Research Associate at the Peabody Research Institute at Vanderbilt University. Her research examines inequality and violence along the lines of gender, sexuality, and race with attention to the roles of bystander intervention and collective action as means of alleviating such problems. She is currently conducting meta-analytic investigations of the effects of gay-straight alliances on school-based victimization of LGBTQ+ youth and the effects of bystander programs on the prevention of sexual assault among adolescents and college students.

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