Abstract
Increasingly, race scholars define racism as a structural and systemic phenomenon, rather than a matter of personal prejudice alone. Various theories of racism have been developed by asking “What causes racial inequality?” and defining as racist those mechanisms that reproduce it. In this essay, I ask a different question to expand the toolkit from which scholars can identify the racisms that characterize the contemporary era. Acknowledging that dramatic changes to systems of racial oppression are historically brought about by social movements, I ask, “What causes anti-racist movements to fail?” and define as racist those factors that prevent anti-racist movements from mobilizing supporters in the pursuit of change. I thus propose, define, and describe two forms of racism that connect theories of race and racism to theories of social movements. To enable success, social movements engage in (among other tasks) diagnostic and prognostic framing—that is, they identify conditions as problems and propose solutions. I thus propose the following forms of racism that manifest as sentiments that prevent anti-racist movements from successfully carrying out these tasks: diagnostic racism and prognostic racism. In conclusion, I explain how this conceptualization of racism complements and extends prevailing theories of race and racism and underscores the utility of bridging theories of race and racism and social movement theories in studies of race relations.
In Portraits of White Racism, David Wellman (1977:40) argued that “racism can be seen as a changing phenomenon, reflecting the sociopolitical exigencies of race relations in specific historical periods.” Contemporary race scholars generally agree, acknowledging that both racial ideologies and systems of racial oppression change over time (Golash-Boza 2016). Though race scholars have identified a variety of historically situated forms of racism in the United States—scientific racism (Barkan 1992), Jim Crow racism (Bobo 2011), laissez-faire racism (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997), and color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2014), to name a few—the widespread understanding of the concept remains fixated on personal prejudice (Doane 2006; Schmidt 2005; Unzueta and Lowery 2008). For many, including some social scientists, racism is a social psychological concern (Bonilla-Silva 1996, 2014). As prominent race scholar Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2001:44–45) contends, this “commonsense understanding of racism . . . does not provide an adequate theoretical foundation for understanding racial phenomena.” Defining racism as personal prejudice “limits the possibility of understanding how it shapes a race’s life chances”; moreover, embracing this traditional definition treats racism as “a static phenomenon” and assumes that today’s racism resembles yesterday’s (Bonilla-Silva 1996:467). Given the declining resonance of scientific racism, the dismantling of Jim Crow racism, and the increasing vulnerability of prejudiced attitudes in the post–World War II era, to make such an assumption would be naïve. Contemporary race scholars have thus sought to identify, define, and observe the various forms of racism that characterize the contemporary era (e.g., Bobo et al. 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2014; Feagin 2004; Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
As Bonilla-Silva (2015:75) argues, “The analytical crux for understanding racism is uncovering the mechanisms and practices . . . at the social, economic, ideological, and political levels responsible for the reproduction of racial domination.” In making this assertion, Bonilla-Silva reinforces a conceptualization of racism that includes not only “racist ideologies,” but also “racist structures”: individual acts; institutional conditions, arrangements, and practices; and laws and policies that intentionally or unintentionally “reproduce racial inequality” (Golash-Boza 2016:131). Beyond personal prejudice, racism “can be seen or detected in processes . . . and behavior which amount to discrimination” (Macpherson 1999:n.p.). A thorough understanding of racism thus necessitates that analytical attention move beyond the identification of racists (prejudiced individuals) and include observations of the various individual, organizational, and institutional “practices that subordinate” (Golash-Boza 2016:131). This requires that analysts accept Wellman’s (1993) contention that “prejudiced people are not the only racists in America” (see Bonilla-Silva 2014:8).
If we observe racism in its outcome—in those “mechanisms and practices” that are “responsible for the reproduction of racial domination” (Bonilla-Silva 2015:75, emphasis added), “reproduce racial inequality” (Golash-Boza 2016:131, emphasis added), and “amount to discrimination” (Macpherson 1999:n.p., emphasis added)—we can define as racist those “mechanisms and practices” that prevent the disruption of the prevailing racial order, derail attempts to establish racial equality, or constrain practices that might reduce the effects of or even eliminate discrimination. I thus argue that a thorough conceptualization of racism necessitates an understanding of what might uproot prevailing racist structures and what prevents such a change from coming about.
According to Bonilla-Silva (2015:78), uprooting the prevailing racial order in the U.S. “will require more than just racial dialogues, race workshops, [or] tolerance”—responses that may combat personal prejudice. “As during the slavery and Jim Crow periods,” he argues, challenges to modern racism necessitate “social movements [that] fight against contemporary racial domination” (2015:78; see also Feagin 2010). Even widespread awareness of injustice and a social interest in change do not, themselves, provoke it. As Rosino observes, though matters of racial injustice have increasingly come to be understood as human rights violations, that conceptualization alone does little to combat their persistence. Social change requires “collective actions that translate that [conceptualization] into institutional accountability and logics of everyday practice” (2018:347). That which constrains social movements, limits collective actions, or denies them success may, then, be defined as racist if it upholds and preserves prevailing racist structures. In this essay, I thus propose a conceptualization of contemporary racisms that engages both theorizations of race and racism as well as theoretical work on social movements and collective action. Instead of asking “What causes racial inequality?”—a question that usefully informs various theories of racism—I ask the following question: “What causes anti-racist movements to fail and, in turn, reproduces racial inequality and maintains discriminatory practices?” The answer I propose below—my suggestion that two distinct, yet related forms of racism prevent anti-racist movements from mobilizing supporters in the pursuit of change—supports Wellman’s (1977:22) contention that “it is necessary to broaden the definition of racism beyond personal prejudice to include sentiments that in their consequence, if not their intent, support the status quo.” As I demonstrate in this essay, distinct forms of racism are evident in the ideological and political conditions that limit, disrupt, and obstruct change efforts.
In the section that follows I discuss the cultural turn in social movement research that provides the theoretical backdrop for the conceptualization of racisms I advance. Then, drawing explicitly on collective action frames and the social movement framing tasks identified by Snow and Benford (1988), I propose, define, and describe the following forms of racism: diagnostic racism and prognostic racism. 1 Moreover, I demonstrate the analytical utility of concepts developed by social movement scholars to interpret and explain these forms of racism. In conclusion, I reiterate calls for a theorization of racisms that moves beyond personal prejudice, explain the theoretical compatibility of the forms of racism I propose with other prevailing conceptualizations and theories of race and racism, and demonstrate the utility of social movement theoretical propositions in studies of anti-racist movements and race relations.
Social Movements and Their Core Framing Tasks
Prior to the 1960s, social movements were widely characterized as spontaneous, unstructured, irrational, and reactive events (Morris 2000); however, in the wake of persistent and transformative social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (most notably in Western democracies), prominent social movement scholars developed theoretical models that centered on organization, agency, and process to explain the emergence, power, and success or failure of social movements. As various perspectives developed, many theorists highlighted the cultural and ideational dimensions of movements. Indeed, as some theories began to take root they were at times criticized for being acultural, structurally deterministic, or inattentive to meaning making processes. Those expressing these criticisms advanced a culturally attentive, social constructionist approach to social movements. Though a detailed discussion of this cultural turn in movement literature is beyond the scope of this article, below are some key theoretical critiques and claims advanced during this period of theoretical development that provide a foundation for the arguments I develop below.
In his oft-cited work, Doug McAdam (1982:33) criticizes adherents of resource mobilization theory for their common assumption of “a constancy to grievances” among the public—that is, he criticizes many proponents of the theory for their assumption that the level of discontent necessary for collective action is ever present, but access to the resources necessary to support such activities is not. He argues that there is not only variability in access to resources but “enormous potential for variability in the subjective meanings people attach to ‘objective’ situations” (1982:34, emphasis added). He thus proposes that “cognitive liberation”—a condition in which “people . . . collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action” (1982:51)—is a necessary component of social movements. This perception, he argues, is “the real catalyst of a movement” (McAdam 2013:1).
Just as resource mobilization theories have been criticized for being acultural, so too have theories of movements that center on changes in the “political opportunity structure”—that is, theories that center on social and institutional changes that open up possibilities for collective action in its various forms (McAdam 2013). The body of work spurred by this theoretical perspective has been criticized for being structurally deterministic, or at least inattentive to the subjective perception of opportunities movement participants must have to support their participation in a movement (Tarrow 1988). As McAdam (1982:48) contends, “Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations” (emphasis added). Tarrow (1988:430) thus argues that scholars must dedicate considerable “attention to the perceptions of [movement] participants and to decision-making within movements” (emphasis added). While rational choice models can help explain the decision-making of movement participants, Tarrow (1988:435) cautiously notes that “mobilization and demobilization are fundamentally social choices.”
Broadly described, rational choice theories suggest that participation in social movements results from a decision-making process in which individuals consider opportunities for and constraints to collective action, and then behave in ways that most clearly benefit themselves (Opp 2013). Among the critics of this perspective are those who argue that rational choice models often assume “a single, time-bound, rational decision” on behalf of individuals (Snow et al. 1986:467). Such critics observe that movement participants often reassess and renegotiate their engagement with a movement, spending “a good deal of time . . . accounting and recounting for their participation” (1986:467). These scholars argue that the rationale for action is negotiated through an ongoing interactional process of meaning making. They contend that rational choice models provide an asocial and untenable view of decision making that fails to account for culture and interaction.
As demonstrated here, in the wake of transformative movements of the 1960s and 1970s various scholars sought to insert meaning, perception, culture, and interaction in theoretical approaches that otherwise ignored or inadequately attended to the ideational and cultural dimensions of movements. By the end of the twentieth century Steinberg (1999:736) proclaimed, “Culture is . . . squarely on the agenda of social movement analysis.” Therefore, it is now widely accepted among contemporary scholars that there is (to borrow from della Porta and Diani 2006:74) an “attribution of meaning which lies behind the explosion of any conflict.” With a social constructionist focus, a great deal of research has focused on the process through which this attribution of meaning occurs and the contextual factors that constrain or enable it. At the heart of much of this research is the concept of “frames” (Goffman 1974) and “framing processes” (Benford and Snow 2000) (e.g., Bloemraad, Silva, and Voss 2016; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Reese and Newcombe 2003).
Defined by Erving Goffman (1974:21), frames are “schemata of interpretation” relied on by individuals to make sense of the world around them. Frames “simplif[y] . . . the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992:137). Frames provide an understanding of the world through which “people filter issues” and explain social phenomena (Bonilla-Silva 2014:74). With an emergent constructionist approach to social movements, many scholars focus not on frames themselves, but rather on the act of framing conditions as problems that warrant a response. To borrow from Blumer, these scholars generally agree that “social problems . . . are the result of a process of definition in which a given condition is picked out and identified as a social problem” (1971:301)—a process that, when successful, results in “a mobilization of the society for action on the social problem” (1971:304). It has thus been observed that social movements engage in “signifying work” to define a condition as a problem, propose solutions, and mobilize a society to act (Snow and Benford 1988:198). Benford and Snow (2000:615) thus argue that the success of a social movement depends in part upon its supporters’ attention to the signifying work and framing processes that “mov[e] people from the balcony to the barricades.”
In their influential work, Snow and Benford (1988; see also Benford and Snow 2000) suggest that social movements engage in the following core framing tasks: identifying a condition as a problem that deserves to be changed, proposing a solution to the identified problem, and justifying and eliciting action in response to the identified problem. They define the first of these tasks as diagnostic framing—the “identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” (Snow and Benford 1988:200). This task involves the establishment of a condition as a problem and an assertion of its cause (or causes) that warrants a response. The second task, prognostic framing, involves “not only suggest[ing] solutions to the problem but also identify[ing] strategies, tactics, and targets” of movement activities (Snow and Benford 1988:201). With this task, social movement supporters propose long-term solutions or, in the least, “a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan” (Benford and Snow 2000:616). The last of these tasks is motivational framing: “the elaboration of a call to arms or a rationale for action” (Snow and Benford 1988:202). This framing task involves providing clear incentives for action (della Porta and Diani 2006) and “the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” that solicit collective action and sustained participation of movement participants (Benford and Snow 2000:616). Through successfully carrying out these framing tasks, social movements are able to garner support, mobilize supporters, and demobilize antagonists (Snow and Benford 1988); however, those carrying out these tasks face social, cultural, and political obstacles.
To be sure, “movements seek to promote change, and the status quo inevitably has its defenders” (Best 2008:66); moreover, ignorance and misinformation can affect the perceived legitimacy of calls for social change (Blumer 1971), and apathy and indifference can constrain social movements (Forman and Lewis 2006). In the context of anti-racist movements, obstacles to the effectiveness of diagnostic and prognostic framing may be construed as racist when they are, to borrow from Bonilla-Silva (2015:75), “responsible for the reproduction of racial domination” through depressing motivation, action, and support of movement activities. I thus propose below the following forms of racism that manifest as sentiments and practices that prevent anti-racist movements from successfully carrying out key framing tasks that generate support, mobilize participants, and make social change possible: diagnostic racism and prognostic racism.
Anti-racist Movements and Forms of Racism
As noted above, Bonilla-Silva (2015:75) argues that “the analytical crux for understanding racism is uncovering the mechanisms and practices . . . at the social, economic, ideological, and political levels responsible for the reproduction of racial domination.” To develop a definition of anti-racist movements that is grounded in theories of race and racism rather than social movement literature, I thus borrow directly from Bonilla-Silva (2015) and define anti-racist movements as those movements that seek to expose, challenge, disrupt, change, and replace “the social, economic, ideological, and political” “mechanisms and practices” that are “responsible for the reproduction of racial domination.” Notably, this definition encompasses, but is not limited to, economic and political institutions as the target of anti-racist movements. This definition thus aligns well with the observation that movement goals include political, social, and cultural change (Andrews 2002), and even collective identity construction and discursive transformations (Whittier 2002). Moreover, by grounding this definition in a conceptualization of racial domination, it is responsive to warranted claims that social movement literature is often inattentive, or in the least inadequately attentive, to theories of race and racism. For example, the definition I propose responds to Bracey’s (2016) critique of social movement perspectives that narrowly identify the state as both the source and target of movement grievances. Anti-racist movements are those that actively contest and seek to disrupt and change the varied social, economic, ideological, and political causes of racial domination.
As with all social movements, anti-racist movements depend on the active engagement in and support of movement activities. Movements require participants and rely to some degree on strategic framing to “mov[e] people from the balcony to the barricades” (Benford and Snow 2000:615). As I assert below, there are sentiments that present as obstructions to the diagnostic and prognostic efforts of anti-racist movements that in their consequence preserve the prevailing system of racial advantage and disadvantage. After defining and demonstrating the forms of racism I propose, I return to the frame analytic approach to underscore the utility of the framing concept and its “conceptual architecture” (Snow 2013) in understanding and explaining diagnostic and prognostic racisms.
Diagnostic Racism: A Conceptualization
In his influential work, Herbert Blumer (1971:301–2) stated that if the members of a society are “not . . . aware of a social problem, [they do] not perceive it, address it, discuss it, or do anything about it.” The diagnostic framing of a condition (or set of conditions) as a problem is thus a highly consequential task, affecting the presence and persistence of social conditions that must be “perceived” in order to be challenged and changed. Recall, however, that diagnostic framing involves not only the “identification of a problem,” but also “the attribution of blame or causality” (Snow and Benford 1988:200). A failure to identify the true cause(s) of a condition a movement seeks to change can lead to the proposal of or support for ineffective or inadequate solutions that fail to address its underlying cause(s) and thus contribute to its presence and persistence. I thus define diagnostic racism as a failure to recognize racial inequality or discrimination, or the incorrect or incomplete identification of the cause(s) of racial inequality or discrimination that (1) inhibits an individual’s or society’s commitment to address it or (2) results in the proposal of or support for inadequate or ineffective solutions.
One key obstacle to anti-racist movements and change efforts in the contemporary United States is a widespread lack of awareness of racial inequality and discrimination. When asked whether “the average black person is [‘worse off than,’ ‘about as well of as,’ or ‘better off than’] the average white person in terms of income and overall financial situation,” for example, only 49 percent of U.S. adults polled in a recent study responded with “worse off than” (Pew Research Center 2016:71). This suggests that approximately half of U.S. adults are aware of the clear and significant financial disparities that exist between blacks and whites. Only 49 percent of the respondents in the aforementioned study were reportedly aware that, around the time of the survey, the median adjusted household income for whites was $28,000 greater than for blacks, the median net worth of white U.S. households was roughly 13 times greater than the median net worth for black households, and blacks were slightly more than two and a half times as likely as whites to live in poverty (Pew Research Center 2016). As another example, while empirical evidence demonstrates that people of color are treated less fairly than whites within the U.S. criminal justice system, the study reported above found that only 50 percent of white adults reportedly believe that “blacks are treated less fairly than whites . . . in dealing with the police” and only 43 percent reportedly believe that “blacks are treated less fairly . . . in the courts” (Pew Research Center 2016:5). Failures to recognize racial inequality and discriminatory conditions produce antagonists that pose a threat to anti-racist movements and motivated change agents. Through their failure to recognize inequality and discrimination, individuals express a form of diagnostic racism that impedes calls for change as they reach an uninformed or unconvinced audience. An individual will be motivated neither to address nor to support the dedication of resources to ameliorate a seemingly nonexistent condition. Through their color blindness some may even be inclined to discursively counter those who suggest inequality or discrimination exists (Bonilla-Silva 2014).
While a lack of awareness represents one type of diagnostic racism, this form of racism is also evident in incorrect attributions—that is, in a misdiagnosis of the cause(s) of racial inequality or discrimination. Consider, for example, the various racial disparities that are evident within the U.S. education system: when compared to their peers from other racial groups, white and Asian students have greater levels of access to a full range of math and science courses in high school (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights 2014a); schools serving primarily black and Hispanic students have a notably higher percentage of first-year teachers and uncertified teachers than schools serving primarily white students (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights 2014b); and there are significant funding disparities between such schools with schools serving primarily white students receiving notably higher funding per student on average (Education Trust 2015). Though disparities such as these have been found to affect academic performance—resulting in white students regularly outperforming students of color—disparities in educational achievement are commonly attributed to (falsely assumed) genetic differences, assumed differences in child-rearing practices, or presumed differing cultural commitments among racial groups. As summed by Darling-Hammond (2010:299), “The presumption that undergirds much of the usual conversation is that equal educational opportunity now exists; therefore, continued low levels of achievement on the part of students of color must be intrinsic to them, their families, or their communities.” These assumptions are politically powerful as they can affect the level of support given to calls for change or lead to the proposal of inadequate solutions. If racial disparities in academic performance are attributed to assumed biological differences between racial groups, they may be presumed to be unchangeable and thus unworthy of the time, attention, and resources called for by those promoting a social response. If families or communities of color are misdiagnosed as the exclusive causal factors at play—if the issue is diagnosed as one of “cultural inferiority” (Forman and Lewis 2006:178)—then proposed solutions are likely to revolve around cultural changes at the familial and community levels, thus leaving the material disparities and the unequal distribution of resources in place. A misdiagnosis of the cause(s) of racial disparities can, therefore, present as a form of racism that supports the status quo and preserves prevailing racist structures (the field of education providing only one example).
Another dimension of diagnostic racism is the public discourse regarding and widespread understanding of racism. The definition and understanding of racism that prevails—the diagnosis of racism itself—can impede the success of social movements that seek to dismantle its various forms (Doane 2006). Within the public domain, racism is often understood to be a matter of strongly felt or publicly expressed personal prejudice (Bonilla-Silva 2014; Doane 2003, 2006)—a condition that resides “in the hearts and minds of a small group of bigoted men who parade around in white sheets” (Schmidt 2005:110). When defined or diagnosed in this way, the material and structural dimensions of a racist society, conditions and factors that might otherwise be construed as institutionally or structurally racist and in need of remedy, are left unquestioned and unchallenged. While increasingly more people may be accepting of identifying and condemning racists (prejudiced individuals), fewer seemingly understand, perceive, and concern themselves with the various forms of racism that (re)produce racial inequalities in the United States (Doane 2006). To end racism, many contend, we need only to identify, call out, and eliminate personal prejudice. As Doane (2006:267) suggests, “To the extent that individual definitions of racism become dominant, what emerges is a social world in which it is difficult to challenge or even envision institutional racism.”
As discussed here, a variety of beliefs, assumptions, and ideas result in a failure to recognize racial inequality or discrimination, or a failure to accurately identify their cause(s). These beliefs, assumptions, and ideas can be intentionally or unintentionally racist in their outcome if they inhibit an individual’s or society’s commitment to address inequality or discrimination, or result in the proposal of or support for inadequate or ineffective solutions. By preserving prevailing racist structures, these beliefs, assumptions, and ideas thus constitute a form of racism—diagnostic racism—as they constrain change efforts and provide ideational support for the status quo.
Prognostic Racism: A Conceptualization
In addition to observing, identifying, and problematizing a condition and diagnosing its cause(s), movement supporters engage in prognostic framing by specifying “what is to be done” (Snow and Benford 1988:201). This framing often includes planning the activities of the movement itself and proposing long-term solutions to the problem the movement seeks to address (Best 2008). As with diagnostic framing, those engaged in prognostic framing face obstacles. The proposal of or enactment of disruptive yet effective movement activities can “alienate sympathizers” or lead to the active repression of a movement (della Porta and Diani 2006:174); solutions endorsed by a movement can face active opposition and counterclaims (Benford and Snow 2000); and proposed or implemented solutions may be ineffective in accomplishing the movement’s goals (Blasi 1994). Prognostic racism thus involves a failure to support the effective activities of an anti-racist movement, a refusal to endorse a social movement’s proposed solutions to racial inequality or discrimination that might reasonably affect their existence, and the proposal of or support for inadequate or ineffective solutions to racial inequality or discrimination.
Simply stated, “social movements derive power from disrupting the social order” (Fleming and Morris 2015:108). Anti-racist movements in the United States have thus historically relied on “unruly tactics” and “unconventional . . . methods” to achieve success (p. 108). Social movement organizers often frame disruptive practices as a viable means to gain the attention of and foster support among the masses. While various “unruly” and “unconventional” tactics have proven effective in bringing about change or, in the least, dialogue about the need for change, some of these activities are viewed by many as problems themselves, rather than acceptable and effective forms of protest—especially when carried out by people from marginalized groups. When proposed movement activities and protest methods—activities such as using a sea of bodies to close down a freeway—are perceived to be “dangerous or morally wrong,” for example, “people [may] define both the issue and the solution as equally problematic,” effectively supporting the status quo through failing to support potentially effective movement activities (Sumerau and Grollman 2018:331). The perception of these activities as problems, rather than as a means to an end, constitutes a form of racism—prognostic racism—that upholds the status quo through denying legitimacy to proposed movement activities that disrupt it.
In addition to lack of support for movement activities, prognostic racism includes a refusal to endorse a social movement’s proposed solutions to racial inequality or discrimination that might reasonably affect their existence. This refusal and its effects on the persistence of racial inequalities was keenly observed by Martin Luther King Jr. in Why We Can’t Wait. “Whenever [the] issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for the Negro is raised,” he observed, “some of our friends recoil in horror. The Negro should be granted equality, they agree; but he should ask nothing more. On the surface,” he argued, “this appears reasonable, but it is not realistic” (1964:147). In his opinion and in that of other supporters of the civil rights movement, it was not enough to grant blacks civil rights—that is, legal “protections against discrimination” (Golash-Boza 2015:396)—in a nation with such glaring and historically rooted inequities between blacks and whites. “It is obvious,” he thus argued, “that if a man is entered at the starting line in a race three hundred years after another man, the first would have to perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with his fellow runner” (King 1964:147). While he acknowledged the need for some form of compensation for the legacy of racism in America in order to bring about equitable outcomes—while the prognostic framing he and others engaged in included the argument that “the nation . . . must incorporate in its planning some compensatory consideration for the handicaps [blacks have] inherited from the past . . . in order to balance the equation and equip [blacks] to compete on a just and equal basis” (King 1964:146–7)—he was keenly aware of a widespread and adamant refusal to support proposals for compensatory treatment. He was aware of the presence and long-term consequences of prognostic racism expressed through a refusal to support proposed solutions that might reasonably help the movement move toward its goal of racial equality.
It is noteworthy that prognostic racism often follows from diagnostic racism. Support for proposed solutions to racial inequality or discrimination depends upon the acknowledgment, or diagnosis, of the problem. Prognostic racism is exhibited, for example, by the many (especially white) Americans who oppose affirmative action programs based on their assumption that racial discrimination in education and employment is relegated to history (as observed by Bonilla-Silva 2014). Additionally, the proposal of effective solutions that might reasonably affect racial inequality and discrimination relies on an accurate diagnosis of their cause(s). As one example, if the black-white wealth gap identified above is assumed to reflect different spending, savings, and investment habits of distinct racial groups (as opposed to historical inequalities and structural racism), the proposed solution may be to provide blacks with financial education. This, of course, would do little to affect the significant wealth disparity that, if not materially addressed, will perpetuate itself as whites disproportionately have access to much greater levels of wealth to save and invest. As another example, if racism is defined as a social psychological issue, the proposed solution may be one of promoting and fostering “race dialogues, race workshops, [and] tolerance” (Bonilla-Silva 2014:78)—a response that does little to address the material, structural, and institutional dimensions of our contemporary racist society. When individuals and groups perceive racism to be a purely “‘personal problem,’” they are likely to propose solutions that focus on “‘changed hearts’” (Allen 2000:67) rather than social, cultural, and political changes that might affect structurally racist conditions. To borrow from Wellman (1977:222), support for and the proposal of ineffective solutions such as those identified here constitute a form of racism—prognostic racism—when they preserve racist structures “in their consequence, if not their intent.”
Diagnostic and Prognostic Racisms: A Frame Analytic Approach
In their original articulation of the core framing tasks taken on by social movements, Snow and Benford (1988:205) argue that the “mobilizing potency” of these tasks lies, in part, in “the extent to which the framing effort . . . resonates within the life world of potential participants”—the extent to which the proposed frames are believable, palatable, and compatible with prevailing beliefs and assumptions. They thus argue that scholars must attend to “the phenomenological life world” of the publics for which such frames are directed and ask “Does the framing strike a responsive chord with those individuals for whom it is intended?” (1988:205). As I describe below, in the “life world” in which contemporary anti-racist movements take shape, frame resonance is undermined by frame disputes and widespread beliefs and assumptions that inhibit narrative fidelity. I contend that diagnostic and prognostic racisms are evident in the lack of frame resonance that results from various frame disputes and the lack of narrative fidelity they engender.
The social contexts within which movements take shape include protagonists who “advocate or sympathize with movement values, beliefs, goals, and practices” and antagonists who “[stand] in opposition to the protagonist’s efforts” (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994:186). Often, the conflict between these groups stems from a frame dispute characterized by the endorsement of incompatible, competing, or contradictory understandings. While frame disputes can emerge over the diagnosed cause of the condition(s) a movement seeks to problematize or a viable and preferable solution, they can also include disputes over truth or reality (Benford 1997). As Benford (1993:678) suggests, “potential adherents” to a social movement’s cause “are not tabulae rasae upon which activists may draw any picture of reality they would like”; they are individuals who maintain their own (socially constructed) version of reality that may stand in stark contrast to the version proffered by social movements. Even that which is pointed to as evidence in support of a claim “is itself subject to debate” (Snow and Benford 1988:208).
While frame disputes may result in very public and contentious “frame contests” or “fights” (Ryan 1991), their social significance does not depend on such contests. Staunch disagreement alone may limit the social support for a movement and constrain or prevent mobilization. Consider, for example, the widespread lack of awareness of racial inequality and discrimination observed above. For those who firmly believe that equality has been achieved or that racial discrimination has, in large measure, been relegated to history, the diagnostic claims of anti-racist movements that seek to expose and highlight persistent inequalities or discriminatory practices may be perceived as indefensible. Even in spite evidence to the contrary, many Americans deny the presence and significance of discrimination today and thus view those identifying its presence as unjustifiably “‘hypersensitive,’ . . . using race as an ‘excuse,’ or . . . ‘playing the infamous race card’” (Bonilla-Silva 2014:77). In this context, the diagnostic frames of anti-racist movements lack narrative fidelity—that is, the claims advanced by these movements do not resonate “with the stories, myths, and folk tales that . . . function,” for many, “to inform events and experiences in the immediate present” (Snow and Benford 1988:210). The diagnostic frames of anti-racist movements often fall on deaf ears.
As another example, consider the contradictory attributions for inequality generally promoted by anti-racist movements and those who attribute unequal outcomes to individuals or group culture. Though anti-racist movements often promote institutional or structural diagnostic frames for the conditions they seek to problematize—proposing, for example, that racial inequalities in the labor market, in educational outcomes, and in rates of incarceration are the product of racist institutions, practices, and the widespread ideologies that support them—many dispute such claims, proposing instead that these inequalities are the result of individual decision making or cultural deficiencies of specific racial groups. Claims of institutionally or structurally racist causes lack narrative fidelity among those antagonists who embrace, if not outwardly endorse, individual or group-level explanations. In turn, not only do structural explanations of inequality fall on many deaf ears, so too do the proposed structural solutions that follow from them (the prognostic frames anti-racist movements are likely to endorse). The implications and significance of this frame dispute—the competing assumptions that inequalities are individual or structural phenomena—have been observed by social movement scholars. Simply stated, “only system attributions afford the necessary rationale for movement activity” (McAdam 1982:50). As Ryan (1991:70) contends, in the midst of a frame dispute such as the one described here, explanations that stress the “social character” of the issue under consideration function as “mobilizing frames,” and individual explanations function as “demobilizing frames.” In supporting “demobilizing frames,” individual explanations for inequality present as a form of diagnostic racism.
To be sure, frame disputes involve competing and contradictory understandings about not only the proposed presence and causes of inequality (i.e., diagnostic frames) but also the proffered solutions (i.e., prognostic frames). Consider, for example, the arguments of Martin Luther King Jr. described above. While he and other activists argued in favor of “some compensatory consideration for the handicaps [blacks have] inherited from the past” (King 1964:146), those who “recoil[ed] in horror” (1964:147) at such a suggestion endorsed an alternative framing of acceptable and desirable solutions that limited the social and political response to an extension of civil rights. Expressed in these perspectives are competing definitions of equality. While those seeking compensatory treatment framed equality as “equality of condition”—that is, they embraced an understanding of equality as existing when socially and historically produced inequalities are recognized and responded to through forms of redress—their opponents framed equality in terms of opportunity—suggesting instead that equality has been achieved when there are no formal constraints to opportunity (Conley 2010). As Bonilla-Silva (2014:79) contends, the conceptualization of “equal opportunity” expressed in the latter frame—what he identifies as an ideology of political liberalism—actually “oppose[s] racial fairness” and “safeguards white privilege . . . by supporting equal opportunity for everyone without a concern for the savage inequalities between whites and blacks.” Prognostic racism is thus evident in a reliance on the ideology of political liberalism that, when present, precludes support for solutions that address such “savage inequalities.” Calls for affirmative action, for example, do not resonate with this framing of equality.
Conclusion
Given that dramatic changes to systems of racial oppression have historically relied on social movements (Fleming and Morris 2015) and challenges to its contemporary forms will arguably require the same (Bonilla-Silva 2015; Feagin 2010), I propose that theories of social movements provide useful frameworks for theorizing racisms. As social movement scholars have demonstrated, a movement’s “chances of success” are affected by the “social, political, and/or cultural context” in which it occurs (della Porta and Diani 2006:6). When social, political, and/or cultural contextual factors constrain anti-racist movements and deny them success, they can be defined as racist as they are, in part, responsible for preserving the status quo and reproducing racist structures. I thus proposed two forms of racism—diagnostic racism and prognostic racism—that bridge contemporary work on race and racisms with social movements literature. Conceptualizing these forms of racism underscores the argument that racism can be found in those mechanisms that “in their consequence, if not their intent, support the status quo” (Wellman 1977:222); complements and extends prevailing theories of race and racism; and sheds light on the utility of the frame analysist’s toolkit in studies of anti-racist movements and race relations.
In his critique of common conceptualizations of racism, Bonilla-Silva (1996:467) argues that the prevailing definition—one focused on personal prejudice—“limits the possibility of understanding how [racism] shapes a race’s life chances.” Similarly, Golash-Boza (2016:131) acknowledges that a thorough conceptualization of racism must include not only “racist ideologies” (which include, but are not limited to, prejudice and stereotypes) but also “racist structures” and those “practices that subordinate.” To be sure, the forms of racism I proposed above focus explicitly on their manifestation as mechanisms that preserve those conditions that “shape a race’s life chances” and, in their consequence, “subordinate.” As described above, diagnostic and prognostic racisms are not limited to personal prejudice or race hatred (though they may result from them) but rather are evident in frame disputes that arise between anti-racist movements and their antagonists that inhibit an individual’s or society’s commitment and motivation to address racial inequality or discrimination, prevent individuals or communities from actively opposing inequality or discrimination, or contribute to the proposal of or support for inadequate or ineffective solutions to racial inequality or discrimination. In denying anti-racist movements success, these forms of racism function to maintain racially discriminatory and unequal conditions and are therefore racist in their outcome. To borrow from Wellman (1977:222), the conceptualization of racisms I endorse is one whose “essential feature . . . is not hostility . . . but rather the defense”—that is, the deliberate or even unintentional preservation—“of a system from which advantage is derived on the basis of race.”
The conceptual framework I developed above is not the first theory of race or racism to center on a conceptualization of frames; however, the insights I provide complement prevailing theories that do. Most notably, the observation of frame disputes and the conceptualization of diagnostic and prognostic racisms I advance here expand upon Bonilla-Silva’s (2014) conceptualization of color-blind racism and Feagin’s (2010) formulation of the white racial frame.
Studies of color blindness and color-blind racism have arguably constituted “one of the most powerful and important bodies of work” exploring racial attitudes and racism in the post–civil rights era (Manning, Hartmann, and Gerteis 2015:532). At the heart of this theory are key frames that structure many Americans’ (especially white Americans’) perceptions and understandings of race issues. In addition to the frame of liberalism that is noted above to endorse a particular understanding of equality and equal opportunity (a political ideology that is applied abstractly to make sense of raced phenomena), Bonilla-Silva’s conceptualization of color-blind racism includes the frame of naturalization (an understanding of racial phenomena as “natural occurrences”; (2014:76)), cultural racism (a reliance on assumptions about racial and ethnic group cultures to explain the disadvantaged status of minorities), and the minimization of racism (the suggestion that “discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting minorities’ life chances”; (2014:77)). The conceptualization of diagnostic and prognostic racisms lends theoretical insight into the connection between these color-blind frames and their effects on anti-racist movements, collective action, and the prevailing racial order. Abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and the minimization of racism constitute elements of an observable racial ideology that manifests in sentiments and related practices that limit the ability of social movement participants and motivated change agents to successfully carry out their diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks. Color blindness thus presents as a social and cultural obstacle to anti-racist movements and collective action. Conceptualizing and observing the effects of diagnostic and prognostic racisms in connection to the frames of color-blind racism thus answers recent calls for scholars to elaborate on “causal models” that explain “how color-blind racism relates to a social system based on race” (Hughey, Embrick, and Doane 2015:1352). The “social system based on race” is reproduced in part through a color blindness that results in diagnostic and prognostic racisms that constrain those movements that might disrupt it. The frames of color-blind racism provide the content of frame disputes that limit the mobilizing power of anti-racist movements. Such movements are also hindered by diagnostic and prognostic racisms supported by what Feagin (2010) terms the white racial frame.
In his depiction of the white racial frame, Feagin (2010:3) describes it as “an overarching worldview . . . from which a substantial majority of white Americans” (and to a lesser degree, some people of color) “view our highly racialized society.” Informed by racial stereotypes, fictions about the life chances and life experiences of people of color, celebratory myths and narratives about whites, and emotionally charged racialized perceptions, the white racial frame includes “a positive orientation to whites and whiteness and a negative orientation to those racial ‘others’ who are exploited and oppressed” (2010:11). This frame has been “used” to structure society and societal institutions (in both overt and covert ways) and rationalize and legitimize the racialized and oppressive structure of society. While the conceptualization and application of the white racial frame is more nuanced and complex than suggested in this brief introduction, it is noteworthy that the “activation of it tends to suppress alternative or countering frames” (Feagin 2010:15). To be sure, the suggestion of “countering frames” implies the presence of a frame dispute. Because the white racial frame contributes to structural racism, Feagin observes that emergent counterframes are often “anti-racist.” Indeed, he notes that social movements can be born “out of” an anti-racist frame intended to counter the prevailing and persistent white racial frame (2010:170). As with the color-blind frames described above, the white racial frame and the anti-racist frames it provokes provide the content of frame disputes that anti-racist movements confront. When the white racial frame suppresses the anti-racist frames of social movements, it provides the content of diagnostic and prognostic racisms—key mechanisms, I argue, through which a structurally racist society is preserved and maintained.
As demonstrated here and in the previous sections, I provide a theoretical and conceptual link between prevailing theories of race and racism and studies of social movements. Future empirical and theoretical explorations of these and related connections may generate unique insights into anti-racist movements: their trajectory, their power, and their successes or failures. Applications and elaborations of the perspective I developed above may overcome observed shortcomings of current approaches to studying anti-racist movements.
In a recent critique of social movement literature, Bracey (2016:11) argues that social movement theorists have failed to explain “how racism impacts the emergence and trajectory of antiracist social movements.” Observations of diagnostic racism, prognostic racism, and the frame disputes that empower them shed light on the impact of distinct forms of racism on anti-racist movements. Critical of the application of the frame analytic perspective to studies of racialized social movements, Hughey (2015:147) argues that the current approach “lacks attention to . . . causal mechanisms” and “fails to explain when and why frames are not taken up.” As I have demonstrated, granting attention to frame disputes provides useful insights into the reasons for which frames may not be taken up; frames are not likely to be taken up if they do not resonate with their audience or if they lack narrative fidelity.
To be sure, there are other fair criticisms of the theoretical and empirical treatment of ant-racist social movements. A more thorough consideration of the connections (or disconnects) between theories of race and racism and theories of social movements is warranted. This article is a step in that direction. Making these connections has the potential to inform our understanding of not only anti-racist movements but theories of race and racism as well. To that end, I conclude with a discussion of the “conceptual architecture” (Snow 2013:2) that the frame analytic approach to social movements provides that future studies should consider to improve our understanding of racism, race relations, and anti-racist movements.
Directions for Future Research: A Frame Analytic Approach
In this article I have focused narrowly on a few framing concepts; however, decades of research have produced a much broader conceptual framework that informs the study of framing and social movements. Steinberg (1999), for example, notes that social movement frames develop and are professed within “discursive fields” that provide the cultural structure, tools, and rules that constrain and enable the actions and reactions of framers. Future efforts should consider the character of the discursive fields within which anti-racist movements develop. It is noteworthy that discursive fields are influenced by, for example, other social movements and countermovements, social movement organizations, cultural frameworks, master frames, social institutions, organizations, mass media, social and political elites, dominant groups, and marginalized groups. A full accounting of the presence, strength, (re)production, and (de)legitimation of diagnostic and prognostic racisms necessitates a thorough and nuanced accounting of the discursive fields that both shape these forms of racism and are shaped by them.
While it is necessary that attention be directed at the wider fields within which anti-racist movements and countermovements emerge and develop, it is also important that future efforts explore intramovement dynamics. It is noteworthy, for example, not just that frame disputes emerge between social movements and their antagonists but also that there can be disagreements internal to a movement over acceptable diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames (Benford 1993). Moreover, social movement organizations are strategic in their framing efforts and the strategies they employ can affect their strength, power, and success (Snow et al. 1986). Future studies should consider when and why intramovement frame disputes emerge within anti-racist movements and with what consequences. Furthermore, future efforts should consider what framing strategies anti-racist movements and the countermovements they provoke employ. Scholars should consider, for example, whether widely recognized “frame alignment processes”—such as frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow et al. 1986)—affect or are affected by the presence and prevalence of diagnostic and prognostic racisms.
Here, I have argued that diagnostic and prognostic racisms produce frame disputes and affect the narrative fidelity and resonance of anti-racist frames; however, I have neither explored the social, cultural, political, institutional, and historical forces that create these racisms, nor afforded adequate attention to considering who is more or less likely to practice them. To be sure, prevailing theories of race and racism have much to say about this subject. Indeed, Bonilla-Silva (2014) provides a historical backdrop for the emergence of the type of color-blind racism he describes and Feagin (2010) discusses practices that perpetuate the white racial frame; moreover, each of these scholars places the responsibility for the reproduction of the prevailing system of racial oppression squarely on the shoulders of whites. Scholars should thus consider the degree to which diagnostic racism and prognostic racism present as practices relied on by many whites (though not exclusively) to reproduce a racially oppressive society.
In their introduction of diagnostic and prognostic framing, Snow and Benford argue that among the constraints to mobilization is “experiential commensurability.” They suggest that proffered frames of a social movement will lack resonance with an audience if they are “too . . . distant from the everyday experiences of potential [movement] participants” (1988:208). When it comes to movements that target injustice, McAdam (1982:51) contends it is “the aggrieved population” that is most likely to perceive of situations as unjust and mobilize for change. Claims of racial oppression are less likely to resonate with whites than with people of color. It is thus likely that whites, more so than people of color, practice diagnostic racism and prognostic racism. Future efforts that explore the presence, persistence, causes, and consequences of diagnostic and prognostic racisms could thus lend unique insights into the effects whites have on the effectiveness of anti-racist movements and the reproduction of the racial conditions they target.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editors of Sociology of Race and Ethnicity and the anonymous reviewers whose suggestions and critical comments greatly improved this article.