Onwards and ...eastwards? EU-Azerbaijan relations as an example of crisis-driven agenda-setting within the framework of the European neighbourhood policy

Introduction

We have reached the 20-year anniversary of the European Neighbourhood Policy or ENP, “launched in 2004 to foster stability, security and prosperity (…), both in the South and the East” (European Union External Action Service, 2021b). This policy framework is a great example for how the European Union as an entity entertains bilateral relations with non-EU countries in order to further its own geostrategic, economic and political interests.

At this present moment, the ENP applies to a total of 16 countries across three continents, with six of them also being part of the so-called Eastern Partnership, inaugurated in 2009 so as to deepen relations with post-Soviet states (Carmona et al., 2023). One of these long-standing strategic partners within both formats is the Republic of Azerbaijan, a particularly interesting case, as its relationship with the EU can be characterised by a high level of mutual dependency across policy sectors. For instance, it was already estimated in 2006 that the EU will rely on external imports for more than 70% of its energy supply by 2030 (Geden et al., 2006). This need will undoubtedly only be exacerbated in the upcoming years due to the Russian war in Ukraine, while Azerbaijan is sitting on approximately 2.6 trillion cubic metres of untapped gas reserves with prospects for more discoveries in the future (Karimli, 2023). While the EU is therefore considering Azerbaijan as one of the key players in its long-term energy diversification strategy, Azerbaijan is currently putting its trust in the EU as Baku’s main trading partner (European Commission, 2023; Urciuolo, 2022). This ever-evolving relationship is rooted in four main areas of cooperation, enshrined in the so-called ‘Partnership Priorities’ and derived from the ENP principles, namely a) strengthening institutions and good governance, b) economic development and market opportunities, c) connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate action and d) mobility and people-to-people contacts (European Council, 2023).

Based on these initial considerations, the overarching research inquiry that this paper aims to answer is the following: How have the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 impacted bilateral relations between the EU and Azerbaijan in the realm of security and energy policy? In order to render this main question more digestible, it is accompanied by the following sub-questions: What are the recurring patterns and interpretative repertoires used within the European Commission and European Council’s political communication on Azerbaijan issued between the Agreement on four new ‘Partnership Priorities’ in 2018 and 2022? Upon analysing the sample, are there palpable shifts with regards to the weight that is attributed to energy and security throughout the time-frame?

This paper argues that the EU’s mode of operation is first and foremost reactionary rather than proactive. More specifically, we illustrate that EU communication primarily focuses on the bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan, with limited references to broader regional dynamics involving other influential powers like Russia, Iran, and Türkiye. The EU adopts a neutral yet optimistic attitude towards Azerbaijan, offering constructive criticism aimed at policy improvement without jeopardizing further cooperation. Furthermore, we show that the EU’s approach to crises, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, involves swift, reactive measures like mediation and investment, while often neglecting the root causes of these crises. This reactive stance contrasts with the EU’s more consistent and long-term strategies in areas like energy policy.

To clarify, the aforementioned notion of interpretative repertoire hereby refers to clusters and patterns that can be found within media texts such as political discourse, as defined by Wetherell and Potter (Wetherell and Potter, 1988).

The existing literature typically portrays the EU’s foreign policy as continuous and comprehensive, largely overlooking the concept of crises. In contrast, we contend that “in-between crises,” such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, hold the potential to significantly reshape foreign policy dynamics. Our overarching goal is to demonstrate how a series of crises can impact bilateral policy-making and supranational political communication, fundamentally altering the dynamic between actors. In addition, there is limited literature focusing on EU external governance in the South Caucasus before, during, and after crises, particularly in energy and security policy. We seek to understand the impact of recent crises, like the Nagorno-Karabakh War’s resurgence in 2020 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, on EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations.

Before delving into this study, it is essential to grasp its structural framework. Hereby, each main section plays a distinct role in addressing the overarching research inquiries. For instance, the literature review and theoretical framework are followed by a comprehensive methodology section and an in-depth discussion of the various research findings.

A relevant debate: the anatomy of the EU’s foreign relations with the east

The EU’s efforts can be categorised within the context of the highly debated concept of external democratisation. This concept is founded in the belief that the factors contributing to peace and prosperity within the EU over the past decades can and should be applied beyond the borders of the European Community (Pace, 2009). While some, like Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, take a somewhat critical perspective, suggesting that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) may offer limited benefits to the countries the EU aims to collaborate with, other scholars adopt a more assertive stance in their critique of the policy and, by extension, the EU itself (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008). Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl’s central argument revolves around the notion that the inherent flexibility of the European neighbourhood policy, coupled with its continuous normative and geopolitical reevaluations, results in a Brussels-centric, hierarchical dynamic that bears “striking similarities with policies of colonialism and neo-colonialism” (Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl, 2014: 252).

One aspect that certainly shines through across all of the works discussed thus far is the level of ambiguity that is attributed to the EU’s foreign involvement, with many scholars weighing in critically on the actions that have been taken abroad.

Double standards in both foreign policy and internal affairs, such as the often criticised vastly diametrical treatment of refugees from a war-torn Ukraine and from Africa and the Middle East, can thus be said to hinder the EU in reaching its “full potential as an international actor” (Hellquist, 2012; Meißner, 2022). Other policy dimensions that could be cited here are enlargement policy and trade policy, both of which have and continue to be associated with EU institutions turning “a blind eye to overwhelming evidence of systematic human rights violations at EU external borders”, such as in the case of Croatia’s admission into the Schengen area in 2022 despite known and documented human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Nuriyev (2015) suggests the South Caucasus faces a choice between historical models of cooperation, impacting relations with the West and regional powers like Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Even a decade ago, Azerbaijan showed interest in diplomacy for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution, aiming to prevent regional conflicts and provide the EU access to energy resources (Bayramov, 2020; Shiriyev, 2013). This highlights the significance of security and energy in EU-Azerbaijan relations, underlining the need for a contemporary assessment of crisis management and political agenda-setting in EU external governance.

However, some argue that Azerbaijan sees itself as independent and may need the EU less than vice versa. In the era often referred to as the ‘New Great Game’ for influence in the Caspian Sea region, Azerbaijan engages with the EU primarily in areas like energy, energy security, and transportation (Bayramov, 2020; Delcour and Wolczuk, 2021; Iskandarov and Gawliczek, 2020). While the Azeri political elite values economic cooperation but resists EU-driven political reforms, civil society appears more critical. More specifically, Azerbaijan is critical of the EU for several reasons. Firstly, it perceives the EU’s human rights criticisms as biased and politically motivated, particularly regarding democratic processes and civil society suppression. Secondly, Azerbaijan is unhappy with the EU’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, especially the condemnation of its military actions and the call for sanctions. Additionally, Azerbaijan finds it hypocritical that the EU does not show the same concern for the rights of Azeri internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by the conflict. Furthermore, Azerbaijan accuses the EU of double standards and interfering with its sovereignty (Bayramov, 2016). Recent findings by Delcour and Wolczuk indicate that civil society perceives the EU as prioritising economic interests over politics and human rights, leading to distrust towards Brussels (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2021).

The EU has positioned itself as an actor that, since the inception of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, aims to balance its strategic interests while presenting itself as a benevolent actor in the South Caucasus, without aspirations of establishing a hard power sphere of influence (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2021). However, studies like Delcour and Wolczuk’s, which examine the on-the-ground perception of EU policies in economic, political, and societal contexts, reveal that Azerbaijan’s contemporary view of the EU is, at best, neutral and slightly critical. According to these scholars, the EU struggles to adapt its policies to partner countries’ expectations and often falls short of achieving its ambitious policy goals, leading to a weakened overall perception in partner countries (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2021). This aligns with Barbé and Johansson-Nogués' arguments but falls short of the level of criticism expressed by Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl, 2014).

Conceptual framework: the EU’s external crises governance and agenda-setting

In this study, we embark on an exploration of crises within the context of the European Union’s (EU) external governance and agenda-setting. This section provides a comprehensive analysis of crises within the framework of external governance, agenda-setting, and the EU’s role in global affairs. Additionally, we examine the role of political agenda-setting in shaping crisis narratives and responses. Moving beyond crises, the discussion expands to encompass the EU’s external governance, emphasizing its principles of good governance and its evolving role in global governance amidst geopolitical shifts and challenges.

When historicizing the term crisis, it rapidly becomes apparent that its meaning differs based on the context it is used in and across scientific disciplines (Dafermos, 2022). Derived from Ancient Greek and originally closely tied to medicine, the word refers to a decisive moment and critical point of a disease “when everything is possible” (Dafermos, 2022: 3). Taking this as a springboard and adopting a more socio-political vantage point, longevity can also be added as a defining characteristic, meaning that in order for such a critical moment to happen, there needs to be a before and after, which help to both set up the crisis and to consider past crises with contemporary knowledge (Dafermos, 2022). For the sake of conciseness, this paper’s definition of crisis is derived from early conceptualizations stemming from the field of international politics.

These early conceptualizations include two schools of thought in the absence of a clear-cut definition of the term crisis, namely that of the substantive and that of the procedural approach (Phillips and Rimkunas, 1978). Hereby, the former refers to crisis as contingent on a particular problem or situation, e.g., a specific policy, while the latter designates a more normative understanding of crisis based on fixed and generic characteristics irrespective of the context of the crisis (Phillips and Rimkunas, 1978). The procedural approach can be further broken down into the more internal decision-making approach that centres policy processes, public opinion and perceptions, as well as the rather external systemic approach that focuses on “the exchange of actions and reactions of crisis participants” (Phillips and Rimkunas, 1978: 259).

The notion of a systems perspective also appears in other classifications, which locates crisis at two levels: a) the macro-objective, systemic, level sees crisis as a catalyst for drastic change that affects the international system, and b) the micro-subjective level, that hones in on (foreign policy) crisis as a psychological stress situation that jeopardises basic values, is time sensitive and has the potential to provoke military aggression (Bloch-Elkon, 2007). According to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997), the timeline of a crisis can be divided into four phases, namely onset, escalation, de-escalation and impact. Lastly, perhaps the most interesting theoretical aspect of crisis conceptualization emerges when studying crisis in practice, such as in Johnson’s study on the topic of the COVID-19 pandemic: The author finds that this particular interdisciplinary crisis has prompted the emergence of three distinct patterns that have the potential to also act as markers of crisis in other contexts (Johnson, 2020). These patterns were not limited to one country but rather transcended borders and appeared organically across the globe and on a national level, reinforcing the idea that they might constitute a predictable human response to stress (Johnson, 2020). The aforementioned patterns are a) “a tendency to blame intergovernmental organisations, b) a temptation to prioritise narrow or short-term interests and c) a divided reaction to experts” (Johnson, 2020: 150).

Drawing on these preliminary considerations and definitions, we can now apply the literature to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In essence, both represent distinct crises, characterized by key elements identified in scholarly research. They mark pivotal moments in long-standing bilateral, and international conflicts, featuring clear onsets, escalations, de-escalations and yet uncertain impacts. For example, the Karabakh War in 2020 presented a challenge for the EU by destabilizing its eastern neighborhood, challenging its role as a mediator, and testing its commitment to regional stability and conflict resolution. The escalation threatened EU energy interests, given Azerbaijan’s role as a crucial energy supplier, and highlighted the limitations of the EU’s influence in the South Caucasus. Additionally, the EU’s reliance on France, which took a partisan stance favoring Armenia, further complicated the situation, revealing the EU’s internal divisions and undermining its credibility as a neutral actor.

Furthermore, each crisis operates at both micro and macro levels, involving a range of strategic factors that influence actor behaviour. Notably, the identified patterns are equally applicable to both events, such as Putin’s swift attribution of Russia’s actions to NATO and the EU, the EU’s prioritization of short-term energy interests in the South Caucasus, and a growing tendency to disregard expert opinions that deviate from a country’s own understanding of objective truth. Additionally, the invasion of Ukraine has left a significant imprint on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy landscape, triggering strategic recalibrations across multiple fronts. One noticeable aspect is Azerbaijan’s response to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. The country’s stance on providing aid to Ukraine reflects its delicate diplomatic balancing act between expressing solidarity with the conflict’s victims and avoiding potential tensions with Russia. Moreover, the conflict has increased Azerbaijan’s pivotal role in the European energy domain. As Europe seeks to lessen its reliance on Russian energy sources, Azerbaijan’s significance as a key energy supplier has gained prominence.

One possible explanation which the authors do not explicitly mention is that of political agenda-setting, which might require a country to act in a certain way in order to craft a specific narrative that can be unique to one situation (Maurer, 2021). It originates from a place of power, as it is heavily associated with the concept of gatekeeping, meaning the purposeful withholding of one kind of information in order to push another to the foreground (Agenda Setting Theory, 2010). Based on this, political agenda setting is a conceptual extension of the original theory, referring to the direct link between and influence of the media agenda on a given political agenda, that puts into question how societal stakeholders interact with each other (Maurer, 2021). Within the scope of this study, ‘political agenda setting’ refers to a political institution’s practice, e.g., a national or supranational government, of prioritising one policy, talking point or topic over another in order to create a narrative of any kind, coming from a place of power.

Agenda-setting can take on different forms according to some scholars, who distinguish between agenda-as-usual, symbolic agenda, conflicting agenda, competing agenda and hidden agenda (Liu and Chan, 2018). In any case, political agenda-setting influences the policy-making process and vice-versa, in direct relationship with the original definition. Or, to say it in other words, “agenda setting is defined as the process of turning public issues into actionable government priorities” (Liu and Chan, 2018: 19).

According to Liu and Chan (2018), crises reveal vulnerabilities in the fabric of society and help governments to prioritise, e.g., by also taking into account widespread civic grievances within democracies. In the cases of Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, long-standing simmering issues have become problems as they have been accompanied by focusing events, such as the Russian invasion on February 24th 2022 or the reignition of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, following a summer of frequent cross-border hostilities between the two neighbours (Center for Preventive Action, 2023).

Speaking of the South Caucasus, upon studying the corresponding literature, it quickly becomes apparent that while sometimes appearing in conjunction, the four aforementioned terms of crisis, (political) agenda setting, the EU and the South Caucasus rarely all explicitly co-exist in empirical studies or even theoretical contemplations. Rather, works often zero in on mutual perceptions of the two regions, the EU’s normative power at large and similar talking points. Winn and Lord’s chapter on The European Union’s policy towards the Caucasus between 1996 and 1999 provides valuable insights into agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy implementation during a crucial period (Winn and Lord, 2001). This coincided with Armenia and Georgia facing repercussions from the 1998 Russian financial crisis and Azerbaijan dealing with economic and humanitarian challenges due to oil price fluctuations and North Caucasus instability (Winn and Lord, 2001). Regarding agenda-setting in the region, the authors argue that in the 1990s, the EU was missing a strong political view of affairs in the region, blaming “an uncertain policy agenda in Brussels that is confused between organisational interests, functional requirements, levels of responsibility within and between DGs, clashes of personality between external relations/trade Commissioners, and between the EU and its member governments” (Winn and Lord, 2001: 147).

Schumacher and Günay (2021) find that the EU conducted itself in a very forthcoming way that reinforced friendly relations, including, “a) not interfering in regional and domestic affairs, unless requested, b) not holding regimes accountable for international (humanitarian) law violations, c) only investing political leverage when asked and d) providing quick and unconditional aid,” e.g., during the COVID-19 pandemic (pp. 146). However, Schumacher and Günay express doubt about the EU’s bargaining power in the South Caucasus, emphasizing the significance of local and regional factors, willingness to engage, and available resources for EU influence. They note the challenges in asserting hard power, citing the EU’s limited geopolitical influence, inadequate hard power resources, and the tendency of many Member States to overlook the EU’s neighbourhood (Schumacher and Günay, 2021). Schumacher and Günay (2021) highlight that EU relations with the South Caucasus countries remained relatively unaffected by domestic crises and regional conflicts, while EU responses varied significantly. This variation was attributed to factors such as EU passivity, internal disagreements, local conditions, and the influence of other regional actors.

External governance

Governance is a multifaceted concept that holds immense significance in the corporate world (Payne and Moore, 2022). The United Nations (2012) defines it as the management of a country’s affairs through political and administrative authority. James Rosenau’s perspective underscores governance’s action-oriented nature, encompassing both formal governmental institutions and informal mechanisms (Rosenau, 1992). Within the EU, external governance entails the extension of EU regulations beyond its borders, a phenomenon observed in multiple institutions (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). This expansion is influenced by the EU’s history of integration, its supranational foreign policy, and its propagation of core values (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). However, the scope of this influence varies across different regions and policy domains, manifesting through initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and bilateral agreements with nations such as Switzerland (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009).

Scholarly works by Lavenex and Wichmann (2009), Hyde-Price (2006) and Schimmelfennig and Wagner (2004) delve into various aspects of EU external governance. Lavenex and Wichmann (2009) explore how the EU establishes internal transgovernmental networks to enhance security in ENP countries, emphasizing trust-building through horizontal hierarchies. Hyde-Price (2006) characterizes the EU as a multipolar actor proficient in employing both soft and hard power. Meanwhile, Schimmelfennig and Wagner (2004) define the EU by its multi-level organizations, diverse institutional contexts, and transformative impacts.

The EU’s approach to governance centres on “good” governance principles, emphasizing transparency, democratic decision-making, and sound public financial management, with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement serving as a prime example of this commitment (Hackenesch, 2016). Furthermore, discussions encompass the EU’s role in global governance, interactions with non-EU actors, potential governance models, and regional governance in our increasingly globalized world (Rosamond, 2005). Scholars such as Costa, Barbé, and Morillas emphasize the EU’s need to adapt to a world characterized by the dominance of global powers like Russia, China, and India, highlighting the relevance of “soft security” issues, such as justice, environment, and energy, in the realm of external governance. (Barbé and Morillas, 2019).

Lavenex argues that “shifts in the territorial scope of EU governance and the choice of policies which develop an external Dimension are conditioned by perceptions of interdependence and institutional roles and capacities” (Lavenex, 2004: p. 681). The EU seeks to ensure nothing less than the continued existence of “its fundamental identity as a security community in an altered geopolitical context” (Lavenex, 2004: 681).

Operationalising the main concepts: Strategy, focus, attitude

Three key variables, “Strategy,” “Focus,” and “Attitude,” serve as critical analytical tools to understand EU-Azerbaijan relations and the EU’s approach to crisis management, energy, and security.

Strategy: This variable assesses whether EU communication conveys a long-term strategy, future objectives, and a commitment to fostering cooperation with Azerbaijan. It gauges whether the EU adopts a proactive or reactive stance.

Focus: The ‘Focus’ variable evaluates whether EU communication centres solely on EU-Azerbaijan relations or frames this relationship within a broader regional context involving other influential powers. It reflects the EU’s recognition of interdependence and its policy implications.

Attitude: This variable delves into the EU’s stance towards Azerbaijan during crises and in the realms of energy and security. It reveals the EU’s contemporary self-perception, its interests, and its overall attitude towards Azerbaijan as a partner.

These variables offer a structured framework for a comprehensive analysis of EU-Azerbaijan relations, providing the study with both a solid theoretical foundation and flexibility to explore emerging sub-themes during data analysis. Together, they facilitate an in-depth examination of the EU’s communication and actions in response to recent geopolitical events.

Methodology and data collection

This section explains why qualitative discourse analysis is chosen, details the sampling process, and outlines the analysis and reporting methods. ¹

In the words of Talja (1999), discourse analysis is considered “part of the linguistic turn in the social sciences and the humanities that emphasises the role of language in the construction of social reality” (p. 460). Amongst others, it serves to study instances of serious speech acts, stemming from ‘explicit institutional habitats’ of authority (Frohmann, 1994). The EU can very well be subsumed under this. Moreover, the method “systematises language in order to study the perspectives and starting points on the basis of which knowledge and meanings are produced in a particular historical moment”, e.g., the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Talja, 1999: 461). What is more, Gill (1996) holds that when conducting a discourse analysis, discourse should be considered the solution to a problem. In the case of this paper, the problem lies in a potential need or desire for the EU to recalibrate its foreign policy towards the South Caucasus in general and Azerbaijan in particular in response to a crisis. With regards to discourse analysis in the political realm, Schäffner (1996) remarks that while using different theories and methods, politics and language are intimately connected and any “more narrow linguistic analysis of political discourse cannot ignore the broader societal and political framework in which such discourse is embedded” (p. 201). Translating this into the context of this research project means acknowledging that the analysis does not take place within a vacuum but rather has to be considered within the broader context of EU-Azerbaijan relations. Keeping in mind the limited scope of this paper, the historical context of the topic as well as the sample size and the timeframe, it is integral to note that this paper sheds light on only a fraction of the complex dynamic between the two partners at a very distinct point in time. Indeed, the narrative and policy of the EU towards the South Caucasus have made significant strides throughout the past decades, moving from moderate involvement in the 1990s to considering the region a key political and trade partner in recent years. This shows that any political communication analysed at any point in time is but a snapshot of relations and should consequently be interpreted as such. These and further research limitations are going to be discussed at the end of this paper.

Type of data

As for the content of the sample, the data consists of 15 EU policy documents published by the European Commission and the European Council between 2018 and 2022. Among these documents are eight Commission Implementing Decisions, two Working Documents, two ‘Cooperation Implementation Reports on Azerbaijan’, two Proposals and one Annual Report. More about the selection of these specific documents is revealed in the upcoming paragraphs. For now, though, why these types of policy documents and why not, say, speeches? Within the context of this research project, written communication is considered as the most official form of political communication as it is most likely to be used for creating and documenting permanent agreements crafted between partners such as the EU and Azerbaijan. Policy documents published by the EU also include detailed accounts of the EU’s position on issues before final decisions are made and formally communicated, longer reports about successes and failures of policies and ideas of how to proceed in the future. Whereas spoken discourse by EU representatives equally harbours great potential for analysis of bilateral relations, this study aims to venture deeper into the EU’s rationale for taking action. What is more, a study of this scope requires choices with regards to the size of the sample and including both written and spoken political discourse for a period of several years, with different policy areas and crises would have severely impacted the quality of the analysis. Even now, the sample size is undoubtedly ambitious but a well-thought-out strategy of analysis and clear focus on the overarching research question is going to remedy this.

Sample selection

The data was sampled from two different online EU registers, namely the ‘Register of Commission Documents’ and the ‘Document Register’ of the European Council. These archives were used to streamline the sampling process, to limit the degree of subjectivity and to increase transparency. Naturally, a certain amount of subjectivity is unavoidable in qualitative research, but since this paper uses a purposive sampling approach with pre-determined parameters, such as the timeframe, data sources, policy areas and crises, it seems prudent to not simply pick any ‘interesting’ or ‘relevant’ documents from the large amount of publicly available content. All 15 policy documents sampled were published in English, as it is the working language used between the EU and Azerbaijan.

But why 15 documents specifically? This number was chosen to account for three searches conducted within the two archives, and from picking one result for each of the 5 years between 2018 and 2022 from each one. More specifically, one search was conducted in the European Council register, using the keyword ‘Azerbaijan’ to limit the search. This search yielded 30 results within the chosen time period. The other two searches were conducted in the European Commission register, using the keyword combinations of ‘Azerbaijan Energy’ and ‘Azerbaijan Security’ respectively. Given that this register offered more options to limit the search, including searching for several terms at once in both title and content of the documents, it only made sense to take advantage of this option to link back to the two policy areas from the overarching research question. Whereas ‘Azerbaijan Energy’ yielded 104 results, ‘Azerbaijan Security’ yielded 153. These three lists of results were then sorted from ‘Oldest to Newest’ and used for the sampling procedure, applying specific rules and a ‘priority system’, which can be found within the Supplemental Appendix of this document (see Figure S1). These rules further serve to account for a clear rationale of why one document was chosen over the other in order to craft a sample that is both interesting and conducive to a fruitful data analysis.

The time frame chosen as a search criterion in all three cases was July 11th 2018 to December 31st 2022. The former date marks the end of negotiations of the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership Priorities between representatives of the European Commission, the European Council and the government of Azerbaijan (European Union External Action Service, 2018). It therefore serves as a natural starting point for the moment in which the relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan was consciously taken to a new level by updating an agreement in force since 1999 (European Council, 2023). Starting the timeframe in 2018 also permits to later draw conclusions regarding the evolution of EU-Azerbaijan relations from a time when the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had not yet happened to the aftermath of these crises. Meanwhile, December 31st 2022 was selected as an organic endpoint to take as much as possible of this aftermath into account, to limit the sample size to no more than 5 years and to not drift off into ‘too recent to analyse and contextualise’ territory.

Research findings

Though not part of the final sample, the ‘Provisional Agenda’ documents for the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council meetings in 2019, 2020, and 2022 provide intriguing insights. In all three documents, energy is mentioned as a minor agenda item related to sectoral cooperation. However, the 2022 document does not mention the invasion of Ukraine. In contrast, security and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gain more prominence during this time. The conflict is explicitly mentioned in all three documents, evolving from a main agenda point in 2019 to a more minor item in 2020 and 2022, indicating a shifting perception of the impact of these two crises on the relationship.

A second preliminary finding can be derived from the lists of search results: When using the keywords ‘Azerbaijan Energy’ in the European Commission register, the number of results skyrockets from 9 documents in 2018 to 43 in 2022. Similarly, ‘Azerbaijan Security’ yields 17 results in 2018 and 45 in 2022. This suggests that both policy areas have continued to grow in relevance for the EU throughout the timeframe. The number of results for the European Council is considerably more stable, suggesting that since the new Partnership Priorities in 2018, the mechanisms used by the EU to govern relations with Azerbaijan have been steadily applied and documented.

Both of these findings already paint a picture of how the EU’s communication and agenda setting regarding energy and security have evolved throughout the 2018-2022 timeframe and what impact the two crises could have had on the relationship with Azerbaijan. The following two subsections of the analysis provide even more context to prove or disprove these initial contemplations.

Main interpretative repertoires

This subsection briefly and comprehensively presents the four main interpretative repertoires that have been created during the coding process.

A chronology of political agenda-setting

With the four repertoires and the sample in mind, it is now possible to re-introduce the two crises and the policy areas of energy and security into the analysis in order to determine how the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have impacted bilateral relations between the EU and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the realm of security and energy policy. Previously, the preliminary findings have already provided somewhat of an insight into how time and the two crises have influenced the wording of some non-sample documents and how the topics of energy and security have gained in relevance across the years based on the search results. But what about the 15 documents of the sample? And how can they best be analysed following the strategy of analysis introduced earlier?

Given that the EU has been more actively involved in the South Caucasus region and Azerbaijan specifically in recent years, e.g., with regards to the 2018 Partnership Priorities, the quest for energy diversification and mediation efforts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the general assumption that can be made is that this change in dynamic also becomes evident in the language used by the EU within the sample. In order to find out more, the following questions are answered for each of the four time periods indicated below: How pervasive are each of the four repertoires in the texts from this time period? How big of a role does energy play in the documents published? What about security, which in the context of this analysis refers to regional security and the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia rather than the matters of domestic security such as fraud prevention, organised crime and cybersecurity? Moreover, from the second time period onwards, the questions of ‘Is the crisis mentioned? Is there a palpable shift in how it’s referred to?’ are added. Due to the scope of the paper, the analysis does not feature extensive citations from the documents but it provides a concise overview of each of the time periods in question. Proceeding this way then later allows for drawing conclusions about whether or not the EU adapts its policies organically over time or whether crisis seems to be taken into account within the EU’s political communication. These results are further analysed and put into context during the discussion of research findings.

2018 – 2019: a new age of partnership

Beginning with the aftermath of the 2018 Partnership Priorities and the time leading up to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, the coding and analysis of the first six documents of the sample yield the following results: To begin with, the repertoire that is most frequently and widely used across the texts is that of ‘Concrete plans’. This could be due to the fact that this time period in particular was very planning-intensive for the European Union, given the new Partnership Priorities and new strategies to get the relationship ready for the next decade. Other repertoires, such as ‘Maintaining neutrality’ and ‘Too focused?’ also appear, but to a lesser extent and mostly in the context of in depth-analyses of the status quo to point out Azerbaijan’s issues and opportunities.

Interestingly, although these documents predate the outbreak of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is referred to in all three documents from 2019, whereas none of the previous texts mention it. This leads into the topics of energy and security, where cooperation in the energy sector is consistently framed as a priority and shared objective of the EU-Azerbaijan relationship. One text in particular points out the strong mutuality between the partners in this sector, stating that whereas Azerbaijan contributes to the EU’s energy diversification, the EU can help to enhance the energy security sector in Azerbaijan (Council of the European Union, 2018). Meanwhile, security is mentioned much less frequently or only as part of a larger strategy with many agenda points. Between the 2 years however, one can notice an increase in discourse about regional security when it comes to the abovementioned focus on Karabakh. The upcoming paragraphs are going to show whether this trend continues throughout the next few, more crisis-ridden years.

2020: The second Nagorno-Karabakh war

The second time period covered by this analysis focuses on the EU’s political communication at a moment during which the previous, relatively undisturbed cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan is challenged by the escalation of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As the following paragraphs demonstrate, this crisis also has an effect on whether and how topics are mentioned.

Once again, ‘Concrete plans’ is most used, but when ‘Maintaining neutrality’ and ‘Too focused?’ appear, it is to critique Azerbaijan for remaining political shortcomings and critically reflect on its place in the South Caucasus region. This is a good counter-example for the findings stated within previous sections but is part of only a small number of documents that go the extra mile and reflect on interdependence and regional powers such as Russia, Türkiye and Iran. Even if these neighbours are mentioned, it is mainly in relation to Azerbaijan rather than in relation to the EU-Azerbaijan relationship.

Moving on to energy and security, there is a distinct shift in 2020, moving from the previous status quo of energy at the forefront of the communication to security matters taking precedence. The greater focus on security, at least in the one text that explicitly focuses on Azerbaijan, could be linked to the mention of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war outbreak in September 2020 in the document, which focuses on providing context on the contemporary state of the South Caucasus region (Council of the European Union, 2020). In any case, said European Council document also adopts a much more serious and alert perspective on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by using more stern language to discuss the situation, with examples being “the EU called on all parties to continue to strictly respect the ceasefire”, “Full withdrawal”, “firm opposition” and “the EU underlined the importance” (Council of the European Union, 2020). Overall, security as a policy area is catapulted into the foreground of EU discourse, at least in comparison to previous years.

2021: in-between crises

Just as for the previous time periods, the most frequently used repertoire across the three sample documents is ‘Concrete Plans’, thereby cementing the fact that the EU certainly has many ambitions when it comes to organising its relations with its external partners. More specifically, neither energy nor security are frequently mentioned across this part of the sample, with energy only sometimes being referred to as one of the thematic areas of cooperation, and security only seldomly being brought up in the context of domestic- and cybersecurity initiatives to support Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war that was so widely discussed in the previous year is not mentioned at all. One could relativise these findings by stating that perhaps, the documents of the sample were just not relevant enough, but given the sampling rules used, this means that almost no Azerbaijan-specific documents were published in the timeframe. This in itself is an interesting observation which might point to the EU reacting to crises as they happen but then moving on to other ‘seats of fire’.

According to Ahmadzada, (2024), despite the EU-Azerbaijan economic strides, political integration has remained elusive, with bilateral relations primarily centered around energy and trade, and to a lesser extent, human rights. The landscape shifted dramatically following Azerbaijan’s 6-week war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, and again with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These events prompted a recalibration of Azerbaijani-EU ties, though Baku’s disengagement from the West has so far been largely performative, reflecting a strong mutual dependence that discourages drastic moves by either side (Ahmadzada, 2024). This is largely because of a strong mutual dependence: should either side make a dramatic move, it will result in serious consequences for both sides. Both sides are actively working to strengthen their bonds when it comes to energy and trade. Still, disruptions are possible. Baku appears inclined to exploit its growing influence by pursuing a “business only” arrangement with Brussels, prioritizing economic interests over everything else (e.g. civil society) (Ahmadzade, 2024).

Kamilsoy and Zamejc, 2022 argue that as Baku seeks to prioritize economic interests through a “business only” arrangement with Brussels, the degree of EU alignment with this approach remains uncertain. The EU’s focus on energy cooperation has, at times, tacitly supported Azerbaijan’s tendencies, sidelining civil society development. This is further underscored by Azerbaijan’s resistance to EU criticism and the lack of political will to integrate into the EU. According to Kamilsoy and Zamejc, 2022 findings, non-governmental actors in Azerbaijan, once united in their call for an ambitious Association Agreement with the EU, have seen their efforts overshadowed by the EU’s growing focus on the Association Trio—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—perceived as having a more promising environment for EU integration.

Consequently, the EU’s direct aid policy has often bolstered government-organized NGOs at the expense of grassroots civil society, highlighting the EU’s contradictory approach to promoting democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan (Kamilsoy and Zamejc, 2022). Although the awareness among civil society of the EaP framework is very high, one-third of the respondents said they have never participated in any EU-organised or supported activity (Kamilsoy and Zamejc, 2022). The recent suspension of the Azerbaijani delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) over its human rights record further underscores the growing tensions between Baku and Western capitals and the EU’s uncertain and incoherent civil society policy (Ahmadzada, 2024).

2022 onwards: Russian invasion of Ukraine

In comparison to previous years, 2022 can be seen as a return to typical EU communication patterns, marked by the recurring theme of ‘Concrete Plans’, a continued focus on energy with specific long-term strategies, and a resurgence of security discussions, although not as frequent as in previous crisis years.

The analysis reveals variations in how crises, specifically Ukraine and Karabakh, are mentioned in the sample documents, with Karabakh consistently referenced and the Ukrainian crisis appearing less frequently, but overall, the EU expresses concern and commits to support in response to both. For instance, Karabakh is mentioned or referenced in all three texts, whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine, technically the more recent crisis, only appears in two. Moreover, whereas the 2020 events are referred to as past hostilities for Azerbaijan, the war in Ukraine is said to possibly have collateral effects on Azerbaijan. However, despite these observations, there also is a similarity. After expressing its disdain about violence and hostilities, the EU pledges its support, be it financial or humanitarian. Based on the close reading of the sample texts, the year 2022 highlights more explicitly than any other time-period that crisis means that swift action has to be taken. This action can manifest as mediation, investments or deepening of bilateral relations. Overall, this could be seen as yet another hint at the EU swiftly reacting to crises in its communication, consistently helping Azerbaijan to stay afloat while largely ignoring the roots of the problems, at least in its written communication. Again, while the ‘Too focused?’ repertoire does appear in some of the documents in the sample to mark instances of the EU looking beyond its own policies, there still does not seem to be enough awareness of possible out-of-the-box solutions to crisis.

The four interpretative repertoires which appear throughout the sample allude to a long-term strategy, a focus on bilateral relations, a neutral but optimistic attitude towards Azerbaijan and mutual interests. The second half of the analysis has demonstrated several crucial points: Firstly, the strategy-focused repertoire appears most consistently across the 5 years’ worth of documents. Secondly, the policy area of energy is more or less a constant priority from 2018 onwards and this does not change even in crisis times. If anything, the analysis shows that energy ‘mentions’ are at their lowest in-between crises, although this could once again also be due to the relevance of the documents. Thirdly, the policy of security is consistently mentioned but is highlighted in crisis times and does not appear in-between the two wars. Without getting too deep into the territory of discussion and interpretation, these findings suggest that the EU both organically develops and adopts its policies over time, i.e., in the case of energy, and takes more spontaneous, rapid decisions in the realm of security and in response to crisis.

Conclusion

Given the seemingly ever-accelerating nature of incisive geopolitical events in recent years, including but not limited to a global pandemic, renewed flare-ups of territorial wars and ongoing inflation, the international community has been forced to recalibrate in response. For the EU, this has meant a departure from old alliances and a move towards alternative sources of both energy and diplomacy. Indeed, the past few years have evidenced a palpable shift in the diligence that the EU exercises towards the South Caucasus region and Azerbaijan specifically. Whereas the 2018 Partnership Priorities were meant to consciously revitalize the bilateral partnership, a series of crises such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have lastingly impacted the relations as well as the political communication used to frame them.

Having set out to draw conclusions on both the influence of crisis on political agenda-setting and the way that this type of discourse reflects back on the EU’s external governance, our findings reveal that the EU’s communication demonstrates a desire to support the country and surrounding region for decades to come while also ensuring that the EU’s own interests are met. However, the analysis equally shows that the EU’s policies in regards to crises are often communicated within a vacuum that rarely takes into account the surrounding powers. Based on the literature and theory explored above, this speaks to the importance of considering factors such as interdependence and power dynamics in the study of policy-making processes.

However, at the end of this study, one question remains: Had the crises not happened, would the EU have invested as much effort into its security and crisis architecture as it has in other policy areas? The present findings suggest that that while the Union both organically develops and adopts its energy policies over time, it takes more spontaneous, rapid decisions in the realm of security and in response to crisis. This speaks to a surprising lack of proactivity in a policy sector, which should be treated with the highest level of vigilance and priority.

Recognizing that the paper is limited by its scope and EU-centric nature, further work is needed to both investigate Azerbaijan’s communication on cooperation with the EU through the ENP and to better understand how differently the EU member states view such foreign politics instruments. This type of research is particularly relevant in a time where discussions about the future of the EU’s external governance are complemented by the emergence of comprehensive, auspicious dialogue formats such as the European Political Community that seemingly pursues similar objectives as the ENP did in its beginnings, inclusive enough to build a strong counterweight to Eastern powers, but exclusive enough to write off EU enlargement for the foreseeable future.

In any case, the paper has shown that despite the long-standing criticisms of the European Neighbourhood Policy, current crises and newer, shinier formats of dialogue such as the European Political Community, the EU’s direction for the foreseeable future is onwards… and eastwards.

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