Abstract
Israel’s programme might be the world’s worst kept secret, Pakistan’s nuclear programme is the most talked about, for all the wrong reasons though, despite the fact that barring the recent plethora of writings on A.Q. Khan network, other than poorly written but widely quoted Long Road to Chaghi and a detailed exposé by one M.A. Chaudhry in Karachi based Defense Journal, nothing was available on the history of Pakistani nuclear programme. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb by Feroz Khan fills this void in literature. Brigadier General (retired) Feroz Khan is a noted South Asian strategic expert and lectures in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Monterey based Naval Postgraduate School. As the director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA) at the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Professor Khan was part of the elite group that worked out Pakistan’s nuclear policy and command and control setup.
A book on the history of Pakistan’s nuclear programme was long overdue. However, there are a number of reasons why nothing was published on the subject for such a long time. Firstly, Pakistan’s nuclear programme is a closely guarded secret and its details were shrouded in secrecy. Second, due to the professional rivalry between the PAEC and KRL, competing versions of its history exist which could not be easily validated especially in the absence of any access to official records and documents. Added to this is the fact that the programme was compartmentalized, most likely no one had a complete view of the programme and that the most knowledgeable persons about the programme such as Agha Shahi and Ghulam Ishaq khan have passed away. Although the author has denied that the book is an insider account, this reviewer believes that his association with the nuclear establishment of Pakistan makes professor Khan’s book even more important and him being an insider a good thing, because without this, there might still have been no book on Pakistan’s nuclear history.
The book attempts to answer several questions: What conditions sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons programme?, How was the nuclear programme organized?, What role did outside powers play in Pakistan’s nuclear decisions? and How did Pakistan overcome the many technical hurdles encountered in the process of developing nuclear weapons? (p. 2).
The book is divided into five parts: Part 1; ‘The Reluctant Phase’ (pp. 17–92) is divided into three chapters and covers the earliest history of Pakistani nuclear programme. It scans through the first two decades of Pakistan’s history and how the leadership of the time especially Ayub Khan was reluctant in pursuing a nuclear weapon despite the best efforts of a small but vocal pro bomb lobby headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was the foreign minister at the time. According to the author, Ayub Khan decided not to decide on this one. However, after the 1971 war and dismemberment of Pakistan Bhutto took over. This defeat gave birth to a resolve not to let this happen again. Among the first decisions, which Bhutto took was to replace anti-bomb Head of PAEC, Dr. Ishrat Usmani with a young and energetic upcoming engineer Munir Ahmed Khan, a position which he held throughout the crucial phase of Pakistan’s nuclear history. Part 2; ‘The Secret Nuclear R & D program’ (pp. 95–204) has six chapters and is perhaps the most important part of the book in the sense that it covers the most crucial phase of Pakistan’s nuclear history. When Pakistan embarked on the nuclear journey and especially after the Indian nuclear test of 1974, the policy makers in Islamabad felt that Pakistan is being for India’s sins. This part also details how Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto recruited A.Q. Khan to develop a uranium enrichment capability. Part 3 (pp. 207–283) has four chapters and covers the next phase of Pakistan’s nuclear history. This part scans through the nuclear relevant crises and nuclear weapons have been used as deterrent through extensive signaling. This part also details Pakistan’s efforts to work on different delivery systems for its nuclear weapons. The chapter ‘Pakistan’s Missile Quest’ points that after initially working on both fighter jets and missiles, due to various reasons, Pakistan focused on missiles as its primary delivery mean. The last chapter in this part details the actual testing of Pakistani nuclear weapon. India’s surprise decision according to the author was the sole reason for Pakistan’s decision to go for testing. The chapters put to rest all controversies regarding who actually conducted the nuclear tests and who was incharge of the testing. Part 4; ‘Toward an operational Deterrent’ (pp. 287–355) has four chapters and covers a number of very important issues of the recent South Asian history. How Kargil happened and the role of nuclear weapons in it is discussed in the chapter ‘A Shaky Beginning; Kargil and its Aftermath’. The chapter ‘Establishment of Robust Command and Control’ has the first person account as it involves events and developments in which the author actively participated. Part 5; ‘Meeting New Challenges’ (pp. 359–397) has two chapters: ‘The Unraveling of the Khan Network’ and ‘Nuclear Pakistan and the World’. Both of these chapters are important in their own right. In the chapter on A.Q. Khan network, author declared the discovering of the network as the darkest chapter of Pakistan’s nuclear history. This chapter adds to our knowledge of the network. For instance, how A.Q. Khan used the prime minister’s office—even after he was removed from his organization—to write to the ruler of another country in pursuit of proliferation activities. Nuclear Pakistan and the world is the concluding chapter of the book and details developments and provides an overview of how Pakistan is managing its nuclear arsenal following a return to civilian rule in Islamabad, while it faces unparalleled terrorist and insurgent threats. It is not only a book on the history of Pakistan’s nuclear programme but also a political history of Pakistan and how both have affected each other.
An important contribution of this book to the proliferation debate is the selective use of sanctions; technology denial and pressures on a state will not work if the state’s security concern is genuine as happened with Pakistan. Pakistani policy makers viewed all efforts against it post-Indian nuclear test of 1974 as it being punished for Indian actions and ignoring its security concerns.
Contrary to the popular perception, this book revealed that Pakistan Army got involved in Pakistan’s nuclear programme for the first time after the resignation of the then President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan who according to Professor Khan was ‘by far the greatest silent patron and contributor’ to Pakistan’s nuclear programme after 1993 political crisis when he handed over all nuclear-related documents to the new Chief of Army Staff General Abdul Waheed Kakar.
The reviewer considers the title of the book confusing especially for a non-specialist reader. Stanford university press could have done a better job on the cover. Lack of any pictures especially when a few are publically available is also surprising. The reviewer is worried that the book will be taken as a pro-Pakistan and authenticating Islamabad’s position in the West particularly in USA as well as in India. In Pakistan, at least, parts of it would be taken as an attempt to appease the West particularly USA. That nobody would be totally happy with it is perhaps the biggest proof of its objectivity that Professor Khan has been successful in maintaining throughout the book. Feroz Khan’s book about Pakistan’s nuclear programme takes its place beside the authoritative volumes on US, Soviet, Chinese, Indian and Israeli nuclear histories. An essential reading for anyone interested in nuclear history, proliferation and/ or South Asian security.