Abstract
This article examines various theoretical viewpoints, assessing their success in explaining Japan’s current security policy towards China. With a variety of theoretically salient factors in place, including a dynamic balance of power, extant regional institutions, economic interdependence and a highly publicized pacifist identity, Japan’s China policy presents a prime opportunity to test different international relations theories. We review four theories of interest, structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, liberal interdependence and constructivism, finding limited support for structural realist and constructivist predictions. We then offer a neoclassical realist model, building from a realist foundation but accounting for the influence of state structure, strategic culture and parochial interests of governing elites.
Keywords
Introduction
Fundamental differences over the drivers of foreign policy and the potential for international cooperation mark the study of international relations (IR). Realist, liberal and constructivist frameworks draw the greatest attention; however, consensus on the explanatory power of any particular theory remains elusive. During the Cold War, realist explanations were ascendant; yet, the current dominant strand thereof, structural realism, failed to explain the Cold War’s end or the increased economic interdependence that rose sharply thereafter (Gaddis, 1992–1993, pp. 31–34). Liberal theories explain cooperation, but have more trouble accounting for the seemingly irrational (inefficient) conflicts that plague the interstate system. Constructivist works offer insight into how norms can arise and how they might influence foreign policy, but to date, constructivism struggles to explain actual state policies better than other alternatives.
Dismissive of theoretical purists, some scholars contend ‘the complex links between power, interest, and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm. They are made more intelligible by drawing selectively on different paradigms—that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony’ (Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001, p. 154; see also Manicom, 2006). Yet, if eclecticism is understood as supporting the competitive application of multiple theories to the same scenario, it becomes of limited use for policy makers. As different assumptions result in different policy prescriptions, the policy maker must still determine which theory applies in which context. A more useful approach is to work towards what Makinda terms a ‘self-conscious eclecticism’—the melding of variables from different approaches into a ‘single coherent framework’ (2000, p. 206). With that goal, the emerging theory of neoclassical realism provides some promise. To be sure, neoclassical realism is not ‘agnostic’ regarding ‘first principles’ of epistemology, as encouraged by some advocates of eclecticism (Sil, 2000, pp. 376–380; Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 421). It privileges positivist notions and is built upon a rationalist foundation emphasizing power; yet it recognizes that perceptions, structure, culture and self-interested agents can influence particular policy choices. While eclectic in terms of seeking to integrate insights from liberal and constructivist scholarship in a context-dependent manner, neoclassical realism remains grounded in the realist tradition. 1
This article examines various theoretical viewpoints, assessing their success in explaining current Japanese security policy towards China. As China’s material power has increased, Japanese policy makers have had to assess what this change means for Japan’s security and how Japan should respond. At the heart of the matter are basic questions: should Japan balance against increasing Chinese power, why or why not, and, if yes, how? Although a single case study lacks external validity, it can offer insight as to causation. Given the abundance of theoretically important factors present in the bilateral relationship between Japan and China, it provides a unique opportunity to test theories against one another while minimizing the possibility of confounding influences.
Herein, we review theories from each of the three leading IR frameworks, examining structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, liberal interdependence and social constructivism. Deriving specific hypotheses from each theory, we consider the evidence, looking specifically for indications of the theory’s causal logic at work in the security policy of Japan towards China. In the following section, we briefly recount the theories, generating hypotheses and considering the evidence for each. Finding some support for structural realist and constructivist explanations, we then advance a version of neoclassical realism that starts with realism’s emphasis on power, yet incorporates domestic considerations of state structure, strategic culture and parochial interests of governing elites.
Testing the Theories
Structural Realism
Structural realism contends that the anarchic structure of the international system requires sovereign states make security their primary goal if they are to survive. To obtain security, states, assumed to behave as rational, unitary actors, must pursue power. Although states have myriad domestic differences, the only difference that matters in the long run is the distribution of power. States that fail to act in accordance with their share of systemic power will be punished by the system (Waltz, 1979). Thus, structural realism is able to dismiss domestic-level variables, providing it with an unrivalled degree of parsimony. However, this theoretical elegance comes at the cost of descriptive accuracy. In essence, structural realism provides an ideal baseline of rational behaviour that claims to describe international politics generally, rather than the specific foreign policy of a state (Glaser, 2010).
Structural realism would expect Japan, a mid-sized state in close proximity to two larger countries, China and Russia, and located across the Pacific Ocean from the system’s most powerful state, the United States, to choose among balancing, buck-passing or bandwagoning with respect to these states. Denied recourse to domestic variables, context or history, structural realism can only look to objective measures of power to determine which state or states constitute the greatest potential danger. In this case, US power could appear dominant, suggesting Japan pursue a strategy of balancing against the United States by allying with China, or buck-passing to China. Alternatively, Japan could decide that the growing power of China supersedes that of the United States and choose to ally with the United States in a balancing or buck-passing strategy, or perhaps with South Korea and the Southeast Asian states in a separate balancing pole. 2 Lastly, Japan could surmise that the power of the United States (or potentially China) cannot be offset through balancing, and opt instead to bandwagon with the dominant power. In sum, pure structural realism is indeterminate in terms of identifying a particular policy (Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001–2002, p. 168).
If one adds Walt’s (1987) ‘balance of threat’ modification to structural realism, allowing the consideration of not just capabilities, but rather perceived threats, then a clearer picture emerges. 3 A Japan–US alliance becomes more likely, given China’s geographic proximity to Japan and the Japanese perception of China as a rising power with territorial ambitions in the region (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2014a, Part 1, Sec. 2). Stationing of US forces in Japan increases the credibility of the alliance, given the geographic locations of the relevant state parties. Still, this would not determine whether the alliance would be based on the partnership of balancing, or the sloughing-off of buck-passing. 4 American military dominance over the threats Japan faces would make possible a Japanese policy of buck-passing. Yet that same US power advantage would allow the United States to insist upon a greater contribution from its ally. Thus, even with Walt’s modification, structural realism is left with indeterminate predictions as to the exact nature of Japan’s foreign policy.
Leading structural realists have predicted increasing balancing behaviour by Japan towards China. Waltz expected Japanese balancing in response to Chinese growth ‘in every dimension: internal economy, external trade and military capability’ (Waltz, 1993, p. 68), arguing that China’s nuclear arsenal and rising military power, combined with a reduction of US military forces, would eventually compel Japan to develop a nuclear deterrent of its own (Waltz, 2000, pp. 33–35). Mearsheimer has likewise envisaged Japan blocking China’s advance towards regional hegemony (2001, pp. 140–143, 156–157). Whether premised on balancing, as above, or buck-passing, structural realism, informed by the balance of threat, would expect increasing Chinese military capabilities to result in Japanese policies designed to constrain China’s power.
A key objective indicator of China’s increasing military capabilities is its military spending. China’s public defence budget has risen dramatically since 1990, increasing by a minimum of 10 per cent each year but one through 2015. Notably, the announced figures omit categories of spending that other states regularly include, such as foreign procurement, making the absolute figure less relevant than the fact of rapid relative increase.
In the same period of time, Japanese defence spending has been far less dynamic. As shown in Figure 1, from a baseline of approximately $45 billion in 1990, Japan’s defence budget has risen to roughly $60 billion in terms of constant dollars. From FY2003–2012, Japan’s defence expenditures actually declined slightly in real terms. In 2013, Japan’s defence budget increased by 0.8 per cent, followed by an increase of 2.2 per cent for fiscal 2014 and 0.8 per cent in fiscal 2015 (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2015, p. 50). 5 Nonetheless, in stark contrast to China’s defence spending, which is 29.41 times greater in 2015 than it was in 1990, Japan’s defence spending in 2015 is only 1.35 times that of its 1990 spending. Thus, Japan’s defence spending does not support structural realism’s expectation that Japan will attempt to balance China’s capabilities, at least with respect to indigenous forces.
However, while Japan’s defence spending has remained fairly stable, Japan’s 2014 Defense White Paper notes ‘As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe … it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance for the security of Japan’ (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2014a, Part 3, Ch. 2). The Japan–US alliance is then described as playing an ‘indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region’. Japanese government actions have been consistent with this, suggesting Japan is attempting to balance China’s capabilities by pulling closer to the United States. For example, despite public pressure to close US bases in Okinawa, Tokyo has ultimately refused to make uncomfortable demands on its alliance partner. Meanwhile, Tokyo continues to pursue greater interoperability of Japanese and American forces, ranging from revised strategic guidelines to improved tactical integration.
While these actions, combined with the relatively flat defence spending, could be seen as evidence of buck-passing, Japan has taken measures to suggest it is not only relying on US capabilities. In a bid to boost the value of the alliance to the United States, the Abe Administration has adopted a domestically contentious re-interpretation of the Constitution permitting greater Japanese participation in collective defence. 6 It has also announced plans to develop new capabilities, many designed for defending the Ryukyu Islands, such as creation of a new amphibious force with supporting air and naval assets; acquisition of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, P-1 maritime patrol aircraft, F-35 joint strike fighters, aerial refuelling tankers and Global Hawk surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles; expansion of the Soryu-class submarine fleet; upgrading of the Seahawk helicopter’s anti-submarine warfare capacity; deployment of a small contingent of ground forces to Yonaguni Island near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands; bolstering the Japanese Coast Guard; and strengthening of nation-wide ballistic missile defence. 7 In November 2013, as part of defensive exercises, Japan deployed Type-88 surface-to-ship cruise missiles on Miyako Island, south of Okinawa, for the first time (Hiyama, 2013). In addition, the then Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera noted that Japan was considering purchasing an amphibious assault ship (Takahashi & Hardy, 2014). Such a platform would provide Japan with a complement to two newly built 24,000 ton Izumo-class destroyers, and its two existing 18,000-ton Hyuga-class destroyers. Tokyo has also attempted to modernize its security policy-making structure, establishing a new National Security Council and adopting a new National Security Strategy in 2013. In April 2014, Tokyo eased restrictions on defence exports in an attempt to strengthen the domestic defence industry (Kallender-Umezu, 2014). The October 2014 interim report on revised US–Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines—the first revision in 17 years—specifically claimed to ‘envision the expansion of the Self-Defense Force activities consistent with the Constitution of Japan’ and noted ‘In case of an armed attack against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to repel the attack’ (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2014b). Japan has also upgraded defence relationships with Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and India, since 2006. Combined, these factors indicate that Japan is doing more than simply buck-passing.
Further evidence of balancing rather than buck-passing includes Japan’s response to China’s increased activity in and around Japan’s airspace. In 2012, Chinese aircraft approaches towards Japanese airspace caused double the number of Japanese fighter scrambles as in 2011. 8 This was not simply a Chinese reaction to the Japanese governmental purchase of the Senkakus. As Figure 2 shows, Chinese incursions had already reached a new high prior thereto. In 2013, this figure again increased by over one-third. In late November 2013, China announced the creation of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) encompassing the Senkakus. Both Japan and its US ally rejected the new ADIZ, pointedly flying military aircraft through the zone. In May 2014, the stakes were raised further when armed Chinese fighters reacted belligerently to a Japanese P-3 flight near the Senkakus, reportedly approaching within 50 metres of the Japanese aircraft (Hume, 2014). In response, Japan has regularly launched aircraft to defend its territory, recording yet another record high, with the 164 instances of Japanese fighters scrambled against China from October through December 2014 representing the largest quarterly figure since records were first kept in 1958 (Kelly, 2015; Yamaguchi, 2015).
In addition to efforts to balance China by increasing its own capabilities either independently or through alliance, Japan would be expected under structural realism to try to diminish China’s strength. Thus, as the perception of a Chinese threat rises, we should see Japan reject cooperation that enhances Chinese strength. One major category of such cooperation is Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in China. Structural realism would expect Japanese FDI in China to decrease, even at the cost of diminished absolute gains for Japan. However, as displayed in Figure 3, Japanese FDI rose precipitously, increasing from $934 million in 2000 to nearly $13.5 billion in 2012, despite the increasing Chinese threat. Only after the fall 2012 Chinese boycott of Japanese businesses, driven by the Senkakus dispute, did FDI recede. While Japanese investors cited increased labour costs in China, increased competition, and uncertain Chinese legal standards as primary concerns, references to security and social instability in China more than tripled from the prior year (Tanimoto, 2014). Japanese FDI into China in the first half of 2014 continued this sharp decline. Thus, the record of FDI is mixed, as the growth from 2000 to 2012 runs counter to structural realism’s expectations, while the drop since 2012 is consistent with structural realism’s predictions.
Overall, Japan appears to be pursuing a strategy of limited balancing, by re-directing its defence resources rather than substantially increasing them, while focusing heavily on strengthening the US–Japan security alliance. As Japan believes China prioritizes stable relations with the United States in order to continue its economic development, the US military presence in Japan is perceived to have formidable deterrent effect towards China. Given China’s pattern of incremental advances—a strategy that diminishes the utility of the American-provided nuclear deterrence—the US conventional capabilities in Okinawa, close to the Senkakus, are deemed essential. Still, Japan’s relatively flat defence spending and pre-2013 FDI pattern run contrary to structural realism’s expectation of balancing, fitting better with an explanation based on buck-passing.
In sum, structural realism provides a range of alternatives when it is denied contextual information from levels of analysis it rejects. Even when informed by Walt’s balance of threat, it is unclear as to predicting either active balancing or buck-passing. Looking backwards, structural realism does a better job explaining broad policy choices. In the face of an increasing Chinese threat, structural realism, as modified by Walt, accurately predicts that Japan would move to strengthen the US alliance. Yet, by refusing to look at domestic-level factors, structural realism is unable to explain why the Japanese government accepts the greater risks inherent in extended deterrence compared to developing its own nuclear deterrent force, avoids developing offensively oriented capabilities, or supports the relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. It is unable to consider the impact of constitutional constraints on Japan’s defence capabilities and how these affect the Japan–US alliance. It is unable to take into account the anti-war identity inculcated in Japanese civil culture since World War II. Accordingly, structural realism alone offers only limited understanding of Japan’s modern security policy.
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism, as developed by Keohane and Nye (1977), accepts some of the structural realist foundations, but contends the presence of international institutions can further cooperative relations by establishing transparency, creating norms of behaviour and developing interstate confidence, thereby limiting the mistrust inherent in the security dilemma. Accordingly, states may be more willing to accept some limited vulnerability under the belief that those adopting institutional rules will be unlikely to forego future benefits attendant to repeated interactions, simply for short-term gain. Institutionalism is not, however, idealism. Cooperation must still be perceived by the individual states as offering greater benefits than unilateral action. Where it does not, conflict is still expected. Thus, whereas structural realism focuses on the international distribution of power, institutionalism emphasizes the importance of information and the confidence building effects of integration as the key variables in explaining foreign policy.
Under this theory, China’s rising power need not be seen as threatening. Rather, it can be managed and space can be made to accommodate China’s reasonable national interests. By engaging China and providing it with a stake in maintaining the stability of the current international system, the threat of conflict can be abated. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism counsels a policy of integrating China into the international community. The chief means of doing so is through international and regional institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). As China participates in these institutions, so the theory holds, it will gain a greater stake in the existing order and see that peaceful conflict resolution is more profitable for all concerned. Accordingly, Japanese military balancing would not only be unnecessary but could be seen as provocative. Advocates of institutionalism thus predict increased Chinese integration will result in pacific behaviour by China and less need for Japan to engage in traditional balancing behaviour (Shambaugh, 2005).
Japan played a key role in the 1990s and early 2000s in promoting and supporting Chinese accession to international institutions, pursuant to neoliberal logic (Smith, 2009, p. 248). This appeared to bear fruit, as many scholars noted China’s shift from a strongly bilateral approach to joining and participating in multilateral institutions (Foot & Walter, 2011; Han & Jianbo, 2012; Ikenberry, 2011; Zhou, 2010). These same scholars have generally noted that China’s rise has been peaceful and has come within the framework of existing institutions. However, in practice, the institutions in the Asia-Pacific have enjoyed only modest success in developing deep integration. For example, economic organizations are plenty, but they struggle to overcome nationalism. Founded in 1989, with China joining in 1991, APEC remains a limited institution in terms of concrete progress towards free trade. Newer initiatives, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) free trade agreement, the ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China and South Korea), the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, all have sought to bring greater institutional influence to the Asia-Pacific economy. While these are aimed at broadening integration, the redundancy also indicates their limits. The nascent Trans-Pacific Partnership promises stronger free-trade measures that could bring deeper integration; however, China, unlike Japan, has declined to negotiate accession, seeing the agreement as an attempt to lock in US preferences.
The ARF represents the premier regional security institution. Yet the ARF’s primary accomplishment to date appears to be its survival. Created as a forum for dialogue and consultation, it has yet to see a maritime Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China, despite the parties declaring their intent to do so more than a decade ago. 9 With a foundation of non-interference and a preference for consensus, the ARF avoids crisis relevance, remaining a shallow institution (Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001, p. 174; Simon, 2013).
While China has joined many institutions, China has not demonstrated a willingness to abide by institutional norms in accordance with neoliberal institutionalism’s logic. Rather, China’s participation has been consistent with the realist explanation of institutions that holds powerful states use institutions when they are beneficial and ignore them when they are not (Mearsheimer, 1995). For example, although participating in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, China provided key assistance to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program (Bracken, 2012, p. 234), has been a prime supplier for Iran’s nuclear program (US GAO, 2007; Warrick, 2012), and has failed to restrain North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite its considerable leverage. China is a member of both the WTO and the International Monetary Fund, but has engaged in currency manipulation to enhance Chinese exports, contrary to the norms (legal and informal) of both institutions (Bergsten, 2010). China has been accused of using its WTO membership to facilitate access to foreign intellectual property, then tacitly approving the illegal exploitation thereof to overcome lagging domestic innovation (Economy, 2010). China ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but appended claims of sovereignty over much of the South China Sea to its ratification. As UNCLOS does not govern pre-existing claims of sovereignty, and as China’s ratification statement rejected voluntary compliance with UNCLOS dispute resolution measures, the peace-building function of integration assumed by the logic of neoliberal institutionalism is undermined. In 2013, the Philippines brought its dispute with China over South China Sea Islands to arbitration pursuant to UNCLOS; however, China has denied jurisdiction and refused to participate in the arbitration, asserting that claims of sovereignty are beyond the arbitral panel’s competence (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Meanwhile, China continues to send military troops to garrison existing posts and to build new artificial structures in the islands, strengthening its physical presence in the disputed region. Government scepticism of institutions is mirrored in Chinese public opinion: a 2014 poll revealed only 13.5 per cent of Chinese respondents thought the Senkakus dispute should be submitted to the International Court of Justice, compared to 41 per cent of Japanese respondents, even though Japan currently administers the islands (The Genron NPO, 2014, pp. 30–31). 10 China’s refusal to pursue international adjudication reflects its preference to handle issues bilaterally, so as to exploit its power advantages. 11 Indeed, after agreeing with 20 other Pacific states in April 2014 to a ‘Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea’, Chinese officials then noted it was non-binding and that the code did not pertain to territorial waters (Page, 2014).
In addition to the formality of state accession to international institutions, the degree of China’s integration into the international community might also be reflected by informal contacts between Chinese citizens and the external world. Illustrative indicators include Chinese citizens’ participation in tourism, use of the Internet, or number of students studying abroad. Figures 4 through 6 provide data on each of these, all showing the same trend. Since 1995, both foreigners coming to China and Chinese visiting foreign states have steadily increased. In 2010, the number of Chinese departing to visit foreign states surpassed the number of foreign arrivals for the first time. Thus, more Chinese are exposed to international travel as well as to foreigners coming to visit China. Figure 5 shows how Chinese usage of the Internet has expanded markedly, surpassing 45 users per 100 people in 2013, a 450 per cent increase over the preceding seven years. With this, far more Chinese are exposed to the multiplicity of media sources and alternative viewpoints than was previously possible. 12 Lastly, Figure 6 illustrates the rapid increase in Chinese students studying in the United States. Theoretically, this greater exchange should result in greater integration of China into the international community.
Yet, while each of these figures demonstrates increasing contact with those beyond China’s borders, Japanese policy makers are dubious that this has translated into more cooperative or peaceful Chinese state policy. Contrary to neoliberal institutionalism’s predictions, increased integration and exposure to the outside world have not resulted in modification of China’s behaviour to conform to the existing rules-based system. Rather, as noted by the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s internal think-tank, China has demonstrated a ‘growing willingness to transform the existing international order’ (National Institute, 2015, p. 17) (italics added). In this view, Chinese leaders view international norms as providing ‘an institutionalized system of hegemony’ for their creators (Kagan, 2012, p. 58). Institutions are used opportunistically, with the aim of modifying norms in accordance with Chinese preferences as China’s power increases (Kupchan, 2012, p. 7). Manifestations of this include China’s creation and funding of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as competitors to the US- and Japan-backed World Bank and Asian Development Bank, respectively. Accordingly, Japan’s increasing concern over rising Chinese military capabilities has not been ameliorated by China’s institutional participation or global integration; instead, Japan has undertaken limited balancing as previously described.
Liberal Interdependence
Liberal interdependence relies on economic intercourse to drive more peaceful IR. According to this theory, free trade will provide states with the resources they need while avoiding the costs of acquiring these resources via coercion. Moreover, as states develop profitable trading relationships, they will accrue sunk costs in the liberal economic system, rendering physical coercion less attractive. Through trade and financial integration, states will achieve absolute gains in a cooperative manner, reducing destabilizing tendencies in IR (Angell, 1910; Rosecrance, 1986).
If this is correct, then we should expect that as China is drawn more deeply into the international economic order, it will have less incentive to act aggressively, diminishing the impact of its growing military capabilities (Calder & Ye, 2010). In the post-World War II era, Japan has emphasized positive economic instruments of statecraft as means of developing its own influence. Thus, we might expect that Japan will be particularly attuned to evidence supporting the liberal interdependence thesis. One way to assess China’s economic interdependence is to consider the percentage of China’s GDP constituted by international trade. A second measure is to compare the amount of bilateral Sino-Japanese trade.
Over the past four decades, China’s international trade as a percentage of GDP has increased from approximately 5 per cent in 1970 to nearly 70 per cent by 2006, before falling back with the global economic downturn to roughly 50 per cent (see Figure 7). According to liberal interdependence theory, this remarkable rise should result in a stabilized security environment in which hostility is reduced. Yet, as described earlier, Japanese policy makers have not perceived such an environment. Rather, in accord with Hirschman’s (1980) concept of using international trade as a tool of national power, they see China as pursuing asymmetric trading relationships that can be leveraged for other purposes—as when China limited export of rare earths to Japan in 2010 to pressure Tokyo to release the Chinese sea captain arrested for ramming Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the Senkakus region (Smith, 2012, pp. 375–376). With this in mind, Tokyo views China’s planned creation of a new ‘Silk Road’ and maritime belt as a dangerous concentration of power in Beijing.
Because the huge majority of China’s international trade involves maritime shipping, the logic of liberal interdependence should make maritime disputes particularly costly, resulting in greater Chinese efforts at peaceful resolution. However, while China did adopt a muted policy with respect to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s, the past few years have seen an increasingly assertive China. 13 These actions have escalated tensions in the region, driving the smaller claimant states into effective alliance against China, as well as pushing them to pursue stronger ties with larger powers. Fearing the increased Chinese power, Japan has recently concluded agreements to provide ten 120-foot vessels to the Philippines and six patrol vessels to Vietnam in 2015 (Cheney-Peters, 2014). The same interdependence logic should drive resolution of the Senkakus dispute; however, this issue has recently achieved unprecedented public salience. In short, there is little evidence that China’s growing economic interdependence has had any effect in creating a more pacific security environment such that Japan could disregard China’s military rise.
This hypothesis applies the causal logic of liberal interdependence to the Japanese government. As Japan has long been a trading state by geographic necessity, rather than looking at its trade as a percentage of GDP, a better indication of the logic at issue is to look at its trade with China specifically. The higher the amount of Sino-Japanese trade, the greater the loss to be suffered in the event of hostilities.
Bilateral trade between Japan and China has steadily grown over the past two decades, with the exception of a levelling-off during the recent global economic crisis (see Figure 8). In 2012, Japan was the second leading exporter to China, the third leading importer from China, and the third leading state in terms of bilateral trade with China (not counting Hong Kong). The percentage of Japan’s total trade value that trade with China accounts for has risen from 3.5 per cent in 1990, to 10 per cent in 2000, to 20.7 per cent in 2010. Meanwhile, total trade with the United States has fallen from 27.4 per cent in 1990, to 25 per cent in 2000, to 12.7 per cent in 2010 (ASEAN-Japan Centre, 2014). Thus, as the significance of Sino-Japanese trade has increased, according to liberal interdependence theory, hostility between China and Japan should have decreased.
However, as with the first hypothesis, rising tension between China and Japan is not consistent with the predictions of liberal interdependence theory. While China is now both the top exporter to Japan and the top market for Japanese exports, the purported pacifying effects of trade have not been apparent. Both sides perceive the other as engaging in increasingly nationalist conduct with overtones of militarism. In addition to the Senkakus dispute, Chinese officials criticized visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese textbooks that were perceived as presenting a distorted view of Japanese responsibility for World War II, whereas Japanese officials were concerned by China’s increasing military budget and perceived desire for maritime territorial aggrandizement. Likewise, the Japanese public appeared to separate economic relations from security policy. A 2014 Pew Research Center poll found that 47 per cent of Japanese respondents believed Chinese economic growth was an overall ‘good thing’ for Japan, compared to 39 per cent who believed it to be a ‘bad thing’ for Japan, despite the fact that 91 per cent of Japanese respondents viewed China unfavourably, 85 per cent believed territorial disputes with China could lead to military conflict, and 68 per cent believed China was Japan’s ‘greatest threat’ (Pew Research Center, 2014, pp. 9, 26, 28, 38).
There does not appear to be a connection between the declining importance of US–Japanese trade and support for the US security alliance too. While US trade with Japan has dropped to approximately half its relative standing from 20 years ago, the security alliance between the United States and Japan is strengthening.
The dispute over the Senkakus provides a clear look at the causal logic of liberal interdependence. Theoretically, both states would gain from a joint effort to exploit the energy resources surrounding the Senkakus. Cooperative efforts would not only permit mutual gains, but would eliminate the costs either side would accrue by unilaterally pursuing economic development in the disputed area. Accordingly, the rationalist logic of liberal interdependence should prevail over the nationalist refusal to compromise. Yet, in the actual conduct of affairs, the domestic political motivations underlying nationalist behaviour have proven too much to overcome.
Constructivism
Constructivism emphasizes the malleability of state interests, noting that identities are socially constructed from subjective interpretations (Wendt, 1992). International interactions constitute an ongoing process in which collective learning occurs, thereby permitting dynamism in both national identities and state interests. As a result, state policy preferences vary dependent on context and beliefs rather than objective power positions.
Various constructivist scholars, as catalogued in Lind (2004, pp. 92, 101–102), have pointed to Japan’s pacifist identity as evidence in support of the concept that states are not condemned to militarization in a Hobbesian international world. Japan’s decision to reject ‘war potential’, including nuclear arms, despite its obvious capability to construct such, is heralded as evidence of its adoption of a pacifist norm. If constructivist ideas are correct, than with pacifism having been in place for several decades, it should have become institutionalized in Japanese culture, rendering a militarized approach to international differences unlikely (Midford, 2011). Accordingly, support for balancing power should decline. Conversely, if the pacifist identity falls by the wayside as new threats emerge, as suggested by Singh (2002) and Samuels (2007), this would be evidence against constructivism.
Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution attempted to emplace a degree of pacifism in both the normative and the legal structure of the state. However, Article Nine has been interpreted as a rejection of offensive military capabilities, not of the inherent right of self-defence. Accordingly, it has not prevented the development of a modern, highly capable self-defence force. Moreover, the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) demonstrate the futility of attempting to clearly delineate between offensive and defensive force in the modern environment. Strategy, rather than the nature of hardware, determines the character of force. As Lind notes, the limit on defence spending to no more than 1 per cent of GDP is misleading in that it fails to account for the large absolute figure that 1 per cent of the world’s third largest economy constitutes (2004, pp. 95–96). Thus, Japan has never embraced the purely pacifist identity of renunciation of force; rather, it has adopted a more limited notion of pacifism.
Yasuhiro Izumikawa (2010) challenges the belief that anti-militarist norms have had the effect on Japanese security policy that constructivists contend. Reviewing post-War policy, he finds that fear of entrapment and popular concerns about reversion to traditional elitism have motivated much of the anti-militarism commonly ascribed to pacifism. Although this does not eliminate norms as influential variables, he argues that it does diminish the purported salience of pacifism specifically.
Critical studies, such as that of Yonetani (2001), attempt to locate the pacifist identity within an anti-capitalist ideology hostile to both the Tokyo government and its alliance partner, the United States. Other critical studies (Mantle, 2006; Tanji, 2008) emphasize human security, pitting it in opposition to national security and contending that ‘but for’ the military presence, all would be well throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region.
The evidence suggests that these works overstate the pacifist character of modern Japan. Indeed, a 2011 public opinion poll found divided opinion in Japan regarding changing the Constitution to permit a broader international role for the JSDF, with 38 per cent in favour, 31 per cent neither in favour nor opposed and 28 per cent opposed (Associated Press, 2011, p. 8). Tsuneo Watanabe, of the Tokyo Foundation, expressly notes, ‘The voice of pacifism is getting lower because of tensions with China’ (Einhorn & Philips, 2014).
As the above poll suggests, the deteriorating security environment in Northeast Asia has brought new attention to the issue of constitutional constraints on defence. In June 2014, the Abe Administration engineered reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution to permit Japanese participation in collective defence operations, generating expected criticism from China. However, reactions from other regional actors were muted. Korean officials registered relatively mild concerns while authorities in the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand indicated support (Japan Times, 2007; Martin, 2014). Reflecting the tenor of the mood in Tokyo, the Ministry of Defense’s 2014 White Paper holds as follows:
The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to maintain the determining of its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as its culture, tradition, and sense of values. However, peace, safety and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them…. The reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by only non-military means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means. (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2014a, Part 2, Sec. 1)
Over the past decade, Japan’s SDF has adopted a more expansive role in collective security, including deployment of forces to the Arabian Sea in 2001–2010, Iraq in 2004–2006, Timor-Leste in 2010–2012, Haiti in 2010–2013 and ongoing missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2009, Djibouti since 2011, and South Sudan since 2012. In 2006, the JSDF’s civilian oversight, the Japanese Defense Agency, was raised to a cabinet-level ministry.
In December 2013, members of the government, including Prime Minister Abe, visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which memorializes Japanese killed in World War II, including some classified as war criminals. A large contingent of Japanese lawmakers, although not Abe, visited Yasukuni in April 2014.
The increased Japanese defence budgets of 2013–2015, the evolving Japanese military role, and visits to Yasukuni Shrine by governmental leaders suggest the pacifist identity is losing strength. However, the continued repudiation of an indigenous nuclear deterrent by Japan suggests that the pacifist identity remains to some degree. In either case, this pacifism has not so impacted the Japanese identity as to cause wholesale unwillingness to pursue defence.
A second constructivist argument is based on the possibility of a reconceptualization of identity, drawn from geography. ‘Constructivist analysis argues that stability is predicated on a growing sense of pan-Asian identity, based on shared norms, values and regimes’ (Manicom, 2006, p. 1). If this is so, then a regional identity would result in less need for the Japan–US security alliance and would see the treaty as a destabilizing foreign presence.
As Chinese Communist Party policies move farther from Maoist ideology, the Party has increasingly emphasized Chinese nationalism in pursuit of legitimacy. Nationalism necessarily involves identifying an ‘other’ against whom the state can claim superiority. To build nationalism, the Party has turned to regional territorial claims and historical grievances (Yahuda, 2014). China is involved in disputes over the Paracels, Spratlys and Senkakus, among other maritime and continental territorial disagreements, publishing maps incorporating nearly all of the East and South China Seas as Chinese territory. This has alienated Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, each of which has competing claims to some of the areas claimed by China. To its west, China is engaged in a border dispute with India that saw both sides mobilize troops in September 2014. In addition to its territorial claims, China regularly criticizes a perceived Japanese failure to atone ‘for its wartime aggression’ (Calder, 2006). In so doing, it highlights a Chinese identity juxtaposed against the Japanese identity. China’s primary security partnership is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which China’s chief ally is a European-centred power, Russia. Thus, in contrast to the idea of a pan-Asian identity, China has moved in the opposite direction.
Importantly, China’s nationalist activities have graduated from rhetorical claims to tangible actions. In May 2014, China towed a billion-dollar deep-water oil drilling rig, accompanied by as many as 80 Chinese vessels, into waters Vietnam claims as part of its Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS. 14 When challenged, Chinese ships rammed smaller Vietnamese vessels, injuring Vietnamese sailors, and turned water cannons on other Vietnamese ships. Exemplifying China’s nationalist propaganda, General Fang Fenghui, the PLA’s Chief of Staff, explained that the subject territory ‘was “passed down by our ancestors” and that China would not concede “an inch”’ (Carroll & Harper, 2014). Further south, Chinese vessels continued to block Filipino fishermen from accessing the waters around Scarborough Shoal while also attempting to blockade resupply of a handful of Filipino troops near Mischief Reef. Moreover, Chinese dredges began land reclamation projects in 2014–2015 at Johnson South Reef, Gaven Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, with the latter apparently designed to host an airstrip that would substantially upgrade China’s aerial capabilities in the disputed area.
Although the Democratic Party of Japan sought to expand the concept of an ‘Asian’ identity when it came to power in 2009, it had little success (Yahuda, 2014, pp. 53–54). Japan’s current government has noted the Chinese policy that emphasizes Chinese national power. In August 2013, Minister of Defense Itsuno Onodera noted,
China has made more and more advancement into the seas. When it did not have as much military capability, China tried to promote dialogue and economic cooperation, setting territorial rows aside. But when it sees a chance, any daylight between a nation and its ally, it makes blunt advancements. This is what is happening and this is what we should learn from the situation in Southeast Asia. (Ozawa, 2013)
Public opinion polls from Japan and China offer little evidence of an emerging regional identity. As shown in Figure 9, joint public opinion surveys carried out in both countries in 2014 demonstrated extraordinarily unfavourable impressions of each other. In both cases, the Senkakus dispute was an important driver of negative impressions; however, perceived Chinese selfishness with respect to resources and refusal to abide by international rules were the top complaints provided by Japanese respondents, whereas historical grievances were significant for Chinese respondents (The Genron NPO, 2014, pp. 5–6). A 2014 Pew Research Center poll found similar negative sentiments, with 91 per cent of Japanese respondents holding an unfavourable view of China, while 86 per cent of Chinese respondents held an unfavourable view of Japan (Pew Research Center, 2014, pp. 26, 68). 15 Nonetheless, high negative opinions of China began in 2007, well before the Senkakus flare-up of 2010–2012. Although not addressed in the 2014 poll, the 2013 version of the same poll reflected the increased importance of nationalism in China, where 59 per cent of Chinese respondents asserted that nationalism had intensified in China, compared to only 29 per cent of Japanese who believed nationalism had intensified in Japan (The Genron NPO, 2013, p. 18).
As there is little evidence to suggest a growing pan-regional identity, it is impossible to evaluate a hypothesis that assumes such exists. Rather, the evidence suggests growing nationalism. In such an environment, support for the Japan–US alliance resonates with not only the state, but with the Japanese public as well. A 2011 AP-GfK poll reported that 57 per cent of respondents favoured keeping a US military presence in Japan compared to 34 per cent who favoured withdrawing the US military presence. When the same question was asked in 2005, there was an even 47–47 split.
Neoclassical Realism
Neoclassical realism starts with the structural realist concept that power is the most important factor in international politics; however, as a theory specifically focused on foreign policy rather than the larger patterns of international politics, it layers in the domestic level variables that structural realism omits. 16 As Glaser (2010) suggests, structural realism’s assumption of a rational, unitary state actor allows it to establish a baseline prediction for a power-driven foreign policy. Yet, in practice, few would argue that states actually follow a rational-choice formula. Neoclassical realism recognizes that this assumption, while helpful in predicting general patterns of state behaviour, does not reflect how particular policies are made (Rose, 1998). Instead, states are dependent on agents—the individuals within the government—to act in the name of the state. Governments must first try to interpret and understand the distribution of power with respect to a particular issue—an endeavour fraught with uncertainty. Second, governments face varying constraints in attempting to exercise power. Third, governmental elite interests are not necessarily identical with state interests. Accordingly, neoclassical realism attempts to provide a framework for including these domestic level variables when explaining foreign policy.
The first issue to consider is the difficulty of assessing power. At heart, power, defined by Dahl (1957) as the ability ‘to get someone to do that which they otherwise would not have done’, is a psychological relationship. Structural realists have generally focused solely on material capabilities when assessing power. However, while material capabilities have obvious bearing on the dyadic balance of power, they are not the only elements of power. Power can include intangible qualities such as will, perseverance and risk propensity. Accordingly, a state’s power may vary markedly depending on the subject matter at issue. In other words, to understand power, one must look beyond mere capabilities; the relative importance of interests must also be considered. Trying to derive interests with clarity, when states often prefer ambiguity in order to maximize their flexibility, introduces a large measure of uncertainty. In such cases, pre-existing biases of the evaluator are apt to play a large role.
The second issue to consider is the difficulty governments face in their attempts to exercise power. To date, this has been the central feature of neoclassical realist scholarship. Both Zakaria (1998) and Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman (2009) have focused on the ability of governments to mobilize and extract power. Others, including Dueck (2006), have looked at constraints through the prism of strategic culture.
Yet a third factor is the principal-agent issue. Governments, as well as the individuals that comprise them, may at times place parochial interests ahead of state interests. ‘Most senior officials are guided by a mixture of considerations: on the one hand, unselfish conceptions of the national interest; on the other—less conspicuously perhaps—partisan or personal motivations. If one emphasizes only the personal and factional element, or only the unitary view of the nation’s interests, one does not do justice to reality’ (Ikle, 1971, p. 15).
Herein, we use a version of Dueck’s model of neoclassical realism, which is appropriate for a Western democracy. Dueck asserts that the international distribution of power is the most important influence on state policy; however, it is not deterministic. Rather, the balance of power establishes the range of options available to a state, with strategic culture further limiting these choices. Culture affects policy makers by establishing normatively acceptable behaviour. Policies inconsistent with these norms threaten domestic stability. Accordingly, a policy must be both practically possible, as determined by the balance of power, and culturally acceptable, as determined by the norms of the nation. If it meets these tests, it must then gain the backing of political leaders who can create coalition support to enact it. As part of this, the policy must be considered in light of how it will affect the parochial interests of the ruling party/coalition and the personal interests of incumbent government officials.
Japan’s political elites perceive Japan as facing a severe power imbalance with China with regard to territorial security. First, Japan’s objective resources and manpower are far inferior to China. While Japan has turned towards the US–Japan alliance to offset this inferiority, Japanese elites question the reliability of the US commitment. Apprehensive over a potential ‘G-2’ condominium of power between China and the United States, the Japanese government no longer fears the entrapment aspect of alliance as it did during the Cold War, but rather its converse—abandonment. Exacerbating this fear are doubts over both the capability and the will of the United States to maintain global military dominance in a time of relative US economic decline. China’s anti-access, area-denial strategy, designed to threaten US bases and deter US military vessels from operating in the region, heightens these doubts. Historical factors have limited Japan’s ability to develop stronger ties with other potential allies, such as South Korea. Second, Japanese policy makers recognize constraints on the state’s ability to extract military capabilities from society. Although the Japanese state has a larger and more direct role in administering the economy than does its American counterpart, it is a far smaller role than that of the autocratic Chinese state. Because the Japanese government is popularly accountable, its ability to extract resources is encumbered by both formal legal restrictions and informal norms to a greater degree than China’s ruling elites. Moreover, as China’s ruling party replaces communist ideology with nationalism as its primary source of domestic legitimacy, China is likely to be more risk acceptant than Japan in sparring over territorial issues. Lastly, Japan’s strategic culture, as explained below, constrains the use of force as an instrument of power. Post-war Japanese governments have attempted to compensate for this by emphasizing diplomatic and economic power. However, with China’s explosive economic growth, Japan’s advantages in the economic realm have dissipated, limiting Japan to soft power means that Japanese elites fear will be ineffective in influencing China.
Japan’s strategic culture and identity affect the development of its national security strategy. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has typically approached foreign policy from a sense of vulnerability and insecurity. This is a consequence, in part, of being a relatively late arrival into the international order and having to play catch up with industrialized Western powers. Of greater consequence, however, is Japan’s geography and the constraints imposed from being a homogenous island nation with few natural resources (Pyle, 2007, p. 49). From an identity standpoint, Japan’s total defeat in World War II, including suffering the devastation of two atomic bombs, had a profound and lasting impact on the Japanese psyche, and thus on Japan’s strategic culture and security policy. The war left a majority of the Japanese public wary and distrustful of the military establishment, a fear that has influenced debates over security policy throughout the post-war period (Berger, 1993, p. 131). The post-war constitution and Japan’s reliance on the United States as its security guarantor have also been influential in seeing that anti-militarism and pacifism have become dominant themes in domestic political discourse. As a result, the Japanese state has been limited to an all-volunteer force traditionally limited to defensive missions. Capabilities perceived as offensive, such as strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, or expeditionary forces, are forbidden. Legal and budgetary strictures further institutionalize the minimization of military force. Thus, for example, when policy makers previously wanted to increase maritime defence capabilities, domestic constraints funnelled the effort into the civilian Coast Guard rather than the Maritime Self-Defense Force (Samuels, 2007/2008).
Parochial interests of the governing elites serve as another filter for Japanese security policy decisions. Prime Minister Abe has prioritized a series of domestic economic policies designed to restore economic growth while also reducing the national deficit. Known collectively as ‘Abenomics’, these policies include providing greater liquidity in the monetary supply, increasing government spending, and emplacing structural reforms, all while raising the consumption tax. Although Abe, a conservative nationalist, would like to build Japan’s military capabilities to match its non-military instruments of influence and complete Japan’s restoration as a ‘normal’ great power, economic goals are the immediate focus due to domestic politics. Similar to any other elected government, the current government wishes to retain office. This ensures that the LDP will pay careful attention to public opinion as a consideration in choosing policies.
To date, the results of Abenomics have been ambiguous, although the LDP won convincingly in national elections in December 2014. Abe’s tenure in office has coincided with a marked increase in the Nikkei 225 Index, rising from 10,395 on 1 December 2012, to 20,208 by 20 May 2015, yet after GDP growth of approximately 1.6 per cent in 2013, GDP appears to have declined by 0.5 per cent in 2014. Moreover, the stimulus policies have failed to produce the desired inflationary effect. In order to emplace desired structural reforms, Abe will likely have to rely on the political cover provided by the TPP’s free-trade rules. In short, full pursuit of Abe’s security agenda is dependent on amassing political capital via domestic economic success that is itself dependent on a foreign policy issue—accession to an acceptable TPP deal.
The ruling elites’ perceptions of Japanese power, coupled with constraints of strategic culture and parochial interests, affect Japan’s security policymaking in several ways. First and foremost, Abe must temper the realist preference of developing indigenous military capabilities to redress the imbalance with China. Despite uncertainty over the US security guarantee, Abe and the LDP are limited by the anti-militarist sentiment within the nation as well as by the extent to which their Komeito coalition partners will support them. For example, in June 2014, Abe abandoned efforts to permit SDF logistical assistance in designated ‘combat’ zones due to Komeito objections (Mie, 2014). Rather than embarking upon a rapid military build-up, Abe and the LDP must implement changes in a measured way. Major transformations such as development of an indigenous nuclear deterrent or re-writing Article Nine of the Constitution cannot occur absent the shock of a major security crisis. Second, Abe’s domestic political requirements limit his ability to address the power imbalance with China. His desire to kick-start the Japanese economy requires both domestic reform and regional stability, the latter of which threat of conflict with China disrupts. Although conflict with China could conceivably mobilize public opinion in support of greater sacrifice, thereby allowing Abe to drive through controversial developmental measures, the attendant commercial jitters would undermine economic recovery. As a consequence of these constraints, Japan remains dependent on its primary alliance partner and invested in diplomacy and international law to a greater extent than realism would expect.
Conclusion
In considering Japanese security policy, none of the theories evaluated is able by itself to explain the entirety of Japan’s policy. Structural realist considerations of power appear key; however, the theory’s indeterminacy and inability to account for important domestic issues are serious shortcomings. Neither neoliberal institutionalism nor liberal interdependence find much support here. Constructivist theories attempt to employ culture and context, but struggle to outperform the security-based theories. In short, realism, liberalism and constructivism each offers some part of the answer. Neoclassical realism provides one possible approach for combining the best of each of these three paradigms. Making power primus inter pares, it nevertheless offers an opportunity to bring domestic and individual level variables into play. Weakening the neoclassical realist approach is the lack of generalizability born of considering context for any particular power relationship. Nonetheless, it does present a systematic and inclusive means of combining key insights in accordance with Makinda’s ‘self-conscious eclecticism’.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their time and constructive criticism.
1.
Sil and Katzenstein hold that ‘Casual gestures in the direction of pluralism risk reproducing the clash of paradigms in the form of competing strategies of subsumption proffered under the label of flexibility and moderation’ (
, p. 482). To the extent neoclassical realism could be so indicted, we believe the alternative of complete epistemological equality bears the greater risk of devolution into ‘anything goes’ that eviscerates any chance of progress.
2.
With China and Russia having signed a treaty of friendship in 2001, creating a regional security institution in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization the same year, and engaging in joint military exercises since then, Japan could surmise that China and Russia have chosen to jointly balance against the United States.
3.
4.
5.
Some reports indicate an increase of 2.8 per cent in FY2015; however, this figure includes administrative costs outside of Ministry of Defense expenditures.
6.
In April 2014, President Obama publicly pushed for such a measure, seeking greater contributions from Japan ‘within the framework of [the] alliance’, and praising Abe ‘for his efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense forces and to deepen the coordination between our militaries, including by reviewing existing limits on the exercise of collective self-defense’ (Matsumoto, 2014).
7.
For ease of reference, the Japanese name ‘Senkaku’ will be used herein rather than the Chinese name ‘Diaoyu’.
8.
Data are based on fiscal years rather than calendar years.
9.
In 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; however, as of 2015, no Code of Conduct has been written.
10.
Under UNCLOS, the parties could submit the dispute to the ICJ.
11.
China evidences even less regard for informal multilateral organizations. According to a US State Department official speaking no background in October 2014, ‘The Chinese have publicly indicated that they don’t “join coalitions” …’ (US State Department, 2014).
12.
Internet freedom in China is limited, as reflected in China ranking 63rd of 65 states assessed in Freedom House’s 2014 report (Kelly, Earp, Reed, Shahbaz & Truong, 2014); however, the logic of integration should still apply, even if constrained by government policies.
13.
Even Alastair Johnston, who denies that China’s conduct since 2010 is increasingly assertive, admits that its conduct in the South China Sea has been ‘more hard-line’ (Johnston, 2013, p. 19).
14.
The rig, belonging to a subsidiary (China Oilfield Services, Limited) of a state-owned enterprise, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, left the disputed region after finishing its exploratory drilling in mid-July.
15.
The same poll revealed unfavourable ratings of China in Vietnam (78 per cent), and the Philippines (58 per cent), but favourable ratings of China in Malaysia (74 per cent), Thailand (72 per cent), Indonesia (66 per cent) and South Korea (56 per cent).
16.
Consideration of domestic-level variables does not remove neoclassical realism from the realist family of models (Rathbun, 2008; Sterling-Folker, 1997). Classical realism has long pointed to domestic factors as having a major influence on international behaviour. For example, Morgenthau (1978, p. 211) notes ‘National character and, above all, national morale and the quality of government, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs, are the most important, but also the most elusive, components of national power’, while Kennan () discusses national character and ideology as major influences on Soviet conduct.