State Securitization and Internal Ethnic Conflicts in India: Re-visiting the Naga Imbroglio

Introduction

Violent conflicts between the state and its organized communities of people have been a subject of much concern, and international relations has systematically endeavoured to theorize their tendencies, causes, dynamics and possible redressal since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Ethnic identity and allegiances have emerged as a prominent function of such conflicts, attracting extensive research. India has grappled with the burning threat of internal ethnic conflicts since the immediate post-independence era. These zones of turmoil have crucially impinged on national security policy as well as external strategizing. As India marches ahead to emerge as a major global power in the present century, with boundless geo-political ambitions, committed strategic relations and a sharpened framework of foreign policy, the ongoing internal ethnic conflicts are likely to pose a retarding influence for dual broad reasons. First, they often become a source of friction with India’s immediate neighbours in South Asia. Second, they jettison India’s domestic stability, questioning the credibility of her image as a ‘consolidated’ democracy.

The concept of securitization pioneered by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies has theorized the state’s predilection to tackle perceived threats to national security through measures that are beyond the normal bounds of political procedures. Since India has historically both used, and justified the use of, armed forces to tackle insurgencies as existential threats to national security, the paper argues that the Indian state has in fact, securitized its internal ethnic conflicts, thereby establishing a theoretical link between securitization and internal ethnic conflicts in a particular context (Indian insurgencies). The efficacy of such state securitization demand an audit though, as in many cases conflicts still simmer despite prolonged periods of armed state response. The situation in various parts of India like Kashmir and the Northeast, where tensions spurted immediately after independence, are cases in point. Insurgent activity for Greater Nagaland in the northeast of India continues for more than 60 years now and has witnessed a prolonged bloody armed conflict between the Naga rebels and the Indian armed security personnel. The Naga insurgency is also India’s first experiment in armed intervention and counter-insurgency operations; a reality which at once renders stark the prolonged period of state securitization in motion.

Taking cue from this reality of a conflict much discussed and yet unresolved, and articulating arguments within the theoretical premise of securitization of internal ethnic conflicts, the present paper takes a closer look at the dynamics of the Naga imbroglio. The paper adopts a two-pronged investigative framework. The first examines why the Indian state adopted the securitization approach in the Naga case. These are tackled by the first three sections of the paper. The theoretical meaning and scope of securitization (as conceptualized by the Copenhagen School) and its causal link with the problem of internal ethnic conflicts are examined in the first section. The Indian case and the making of the Naga crisis are contextualized to delineate the chasm between the project of nation-building of the post-colonial Indian state and the Nagas’ resistance to assimilation on grounds of ethnic, historical and geographical isolation. The contending perspectives on the ethnic origins of the Nagas are highlighted in the second section of the paper to normatively link their persistent demand for independence in the post-colonial state. The third section of the paper conducts a detailed investigation of the causes and conditions of the securitization approach of the state. The second dynamic investigated by the paper is the impact and efficacy of securitization on the Naga crisis. The fourth and the fifth sections audit the securitization approach through two lenses. First, the intense conflicts of the 1990s despite securitization, high-pitched political dialogues by the government to broker the ceasefire agreement and its impact on ground-level realities would be analyzed. Second, critical reflections of the civil society members who demand peace through reconciliation would be examined to theoretically link their nature of their mandate on securitization. The paper concludes by suggesting possible trajectories of state approach in the future to effectively overcome the Naga imbroglio.

Securitization and Internal Ethnic Conflicts: Brief Sketch

The concept of securitization (and de-securitization) was first formally postulated in 1995 by Ole Waever as part of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. ¹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde subsequently substantiated its theoretical remit in Security: A New Framework of Analysis (1998) while attempting to define what is, and what is not security. The primary concern of the Copenhagen School is how security ‘works’ in world politics. Their approach developed in the context of post-Cold War calls to broaden definitions of security that sought to include a range of pressing and hitherto neglected concerns such as environmental change, poverty and human rights on state security agendas.

The Copenhagen School simultaneously contributed to these calls for broadening the concept and attempted to place analytical limits on it. Its adherents have focused on how security itself is given meaning through inter-subjective processes and (to a lesser extent) what political effects these security constructions have (MacDonald, 2008, p. 68). Martin Sheehan observes that the broadening of the concept of security by the Copenhagen School was an important development in both intellectual and policy terms. Opening up security to embrace new sectors was valuable in itself, but more importantly it served to break the intellectual stronghold of the ‘national security’ concept. Also, security now became amenable to new meanings, analysis and negotiations (Sheehan, 2005, p. 48).

In Security: A New Framework of Analysis, the authors retained the traditional military–political understanding of ‘security as survival’. Their theorization established the need for securitization of a referent object of security (in many cases, though not always or exclusively the state) in the presence of an existential threat to the survival of the referent object. They claimed:

The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally, it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21)

Securitization is thus the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics, or as above politics. Any public issue can theoretically be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning that the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is a part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures). Depending upon the situation, any issue can end up on part of the spectrum (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24). Another significant dimension of security is that it is a ‘self-referential practice’. They assert that textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. If the issue is ‘presented as an existential threat’, then it has successfully met the criterion of conveying that the situation overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against each other because it can upset the entire process of weighing as such: ‘If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).’ Thus, they emphasize that a security issue is brought into being by this practice of ‘reference’—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). The exact definition and criterion of securitization is constituted by the inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Ralf Emmers observes that the criterion of existential threat enables the Copenhagen School to link a broadly defined security concept to the question of survival and thus, to the reasoning found within a traditional approach to security studies. This avoids a broad and loose conceptualization of security that could too easily become meaningless (Emmers, 2007, p. 113).

The authors build two inter-related characterizations of securitization, based on the above explanation. First, securitization can be studied directly, it does not need indicators. By analyzing the discourse and political constellations, if we find that an argument by the securitizing actor, about the priority and urgency of an existential threat has achieved sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules and break free from procedures or rule he/she would otherwise be bound by, then it is a case of securitization. In this specification of what makes securitization, Buzan et al. subsume the twofold steps of a securitizing move (when the discourse takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat) and actual securitization (when the ‘relevant audience’ accepts that discourse), emphasizing that simply the ‘move’ is not sufficient to create securitization. The security act is negotiated between the securitizer and the audience, that is, internally within the unit. Second, Buzan et al. explain that lifting of existential issues above politics requires a specific rhetorical structure, which can construct a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. Taking cue from the language theory, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 26) define securitization as a ‘speech act’—the utterance of security itself is the act of security. Ralf Emmers notes that the articulation in security terms conditions the audience and provides securitizing actors with the right to mobilize state power and move beyond traditional rules (Emmers, 2007, p. 113).

Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not the least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization in successful) (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). A successful securitization has three components—existential threats, emergency action and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rule (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). Securitization thus has a certain modality (a general pattern of operation) that is constant and identifiable, even if the context in which securitizing speech acts occur may vary.

At this juncture, dual observations could me made; first, securitization presents itself as a characteristic framework, which defines the idea of state security and its maintenance by adopting a sociological construction of threat and insecurity. This marks a radical shift from the traditional, purely militaristic characterization of security. Second, and as a continuation of the first argument, by legitimizing the use of ‘emergency measures’ securitization approach in effect prescribes military action by the state on a short-term, unilateral basis to counter the threat to security and sovereignty.

The situations of internal conflicts find a variety of nomenclature in the existing literature. The most frequently used are internal wars, secessionism, self-determination movements, insurgencies, armed conflicts, low-intensity conflicts and separatism. Essentially, these may be characterized as domestic situations of violence in any state, when the citizens position themselves in an armed confrontation against the state, demanding secession, regional autonomy or higher political representation in the government. Irrespective of the prospects of success, internal conflicts usually sustain rebellion. Writings seeking to theorize such conflicts as well as case studies from around the world have revealed that ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are a characteristic, durable cause, especially in South Asia, which remains a hotbed of ethnic-based claims against the state. ² For example, according to the Peace Research Institute (Oslo), between 1946 and 2008, there were 174 internal and internationalized internal conflicts. Importantly, the same data also reveal that of these 174 conflicts, 90 fall into the category of ethnic conflicts (Cordell & Wolff, 2011, p. 3; PRIO, 2009). Statistical analysis of violent self-determination conflicts reveals that since the 1950s, 79 territorially concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy and independence (Cordell & Wolff, 2011, p. 3). As internal ethnic conflicts directly impinge on national security, a clear case is made for a concomitant state response to protect sovereignty. This marks the theoretical entry point for state securitization. Deliberating on ethnic sub-nationalist movements in South Asia, Jugdep S. Chima argues that the central political elites in these post-colonial states are unwilling to entertain wholesale alterations to the dominant constructions of nationality and polity. Thus, they exercise their coercive ability to control inevitable ethno-nationalist insurgencies within their borders in the short run, but not address the possibility of their re-emergence in the long run (Chima, 2009, p. 922). As India has faced prolonged internal conflicts predicated on ethnic assertions, Chima’s argument serves as an appropriate cue for discussing the securitization of the Naga crisis by the Indian state.

Nagas: Contending Perspectives on Origin and Implications

Very little is known about the early history of the Nagas (Mao, 1992, p. 9), but from what can be inferred through writings by historians and indigenous accounts they evolved as a distinct ethnic group, geographically isolated and unique. This reality at once problematizes the project of assimilation and integration, which the Indian state assumed upon gaining independence. In fact, the Nagas have posed the longest challenge to this project and, by statist interpretation, to the conventional realm of national security. Articulating a fierce, albeit fragmented discourse of autonomy from any form of ‘outside’ political rule, Naga insurgents have unequivocally asserted their right to a homeland of all the Nagas—the ‘Greater Nagalim’, based on their ethnic identity. Statehood within the Indian Union has not appeased the radicals who demand greater autonomy. While it may not be meaningfully relevant to romanticize their struggle, the implications of its formidable security challenges to India have acutely informed internal security policies.

The existing academic literature discusses at length the possible sources of origin of the Nagas as a group of migrant settlers and the various etymological interpretations. The writings mostly contextualize the history of the Nagas as residents of India’s complex ‘Northeast’. ³ Arguing that the emergence of the Northeast as a separate geopolitical region is ‘fairly recent’, Samir Kumar Das links it with Indian independence and the reorganization of international borders with East Pakistan (Bangladesh), China (Tibet), Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan. As it presently stands, the Northeast is connected precariously with the ‘Indian mainland’ by a narrow, 21-kilometre (approx.) long ‘Siliguri corridor’, popularly known as the ‘chicken neck’. The region is characterized by extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, with more than 160 Scheduled Tribes belonging to five different ethnic groups and over 400 distinct tribal and sub-tribal groupings speaking about 175 languages and dialects, and a large and diverse non-tribal population as well concentrated mainly in Assam and Tripura (Das, 2010, p. 4).

The physical features of the Nagas are at once indicative of their racial stock and the Nagas have expressed proud consciousness of their distinctiveness, which to them defines their anthropological and social demarcation from other peoples more sharply than might have been the case for someone who lacked their vibrant customs and strong sense of independence (Borgohain & Borgohain, 2011, p. 11). It is interesting to take a leaf out of a school textbook of Nagaland, which describes the origin of the Nagas. It asserts at the outset that the ‘people outside’ gave the name ‘Naga’; the Nagas did not call themselves by that name and they did not have any generic term for the whole ‘nation’ (Nagaland, 1994, p. 1). In fact, till the end of twelfth century AD, they were not even known to the outside world (Senba, 2001, p. 6). Regarding the racial origin, some scholars believe that the forefathers of the Nagas migrated in their present habitat sometime between 1128 BC and 759 BC, from Central Asia through the Himalayan region and the Burmese corridor. So they belong to the Sino-Mongoloid race (Iralu, 2009, p. 4). Others hold that Nagas migrated from Southeast Asia as they have similar customs and lifestyle practices. Naga folklore, headhunting, terrace cultivation, embroidery and weaving also indicate a strong cultural connection with the people of Southeast Asia (cited in Goswami, 2008, p. 118). Chandrika Singh writes that it is ‘unanimously accepted’ that the Naga tribes primarily known as non-Chinese Chiang tribes, migrated from Central Asia and the cause of their migration, perhaps, was the inhospitality of the land that they had been occupying in the beginning. They migrated first to the northwest border of China and later on spread over to China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bhutan, Burma and Nagaland (Burma Census Report, 1911, cited in Singh, 2004, p. 5). However, U.M. Shimray writes that almost all Nagas point to Makhel and its surrounding areas as their place of origin and dispersion. This view is evident from the fact that the Naga people bear similarity with some tribal groups like Dyaks and Koyans of Indo-Chinese countries (Shimray, 2007, p. 24). ⁴ Again, some Naga tribes like Chakhesang, Sema, Rengma and Lotha believe that the first Naga came out of a stone in a place known as ‘Khezakenoma’, which is a few miles away from Makhel. Naga Christians believe that they are the generations of Adam and Eve who were the first to come on Earth and spread all over the world as the Bible says (Mao, 1992, p. 11). Nagas have certain indigenous accounts on their origin also. As Homen and Pradipta Borgohain point out, ‘there are several Naga tribes, each with an account of their origins. It is difficult to pinpoint chronology in the absence of written chronicles but the Nagas have a pretty antiquated history’ (Borgohain & Borgohain, 2011, p. 15). But the lack of a common language across Naga tribes or written script for any of the languages complicates the documentation.

Regarding the etymology of the term ‘Naga’, its first mention as a people inhabiting their present lands was made by Claudius Ptolemy, who variously mentioned the Nagas as—Nagaloi (Iralu, 2009, p. 4), Nagalok (Singh, 2004, pp. 3–4), Nanglong (Mao, 1992) or Nagalogoi (Nagaland, 1994, p. 1). The meaning of this is held unanimously as the land of the naked people. W.C. Smith and E.A. Gait believe that the term is derived from word ‘Nok’, which means people (cited in Singh, 2004, p. 4). Gait clarifies further that the term ‘Nok’ means folk in some of the tribal dialects. When strange parties meet in the plains, they are said to ask each other ‘Tem nok e’ or ‘O nok’ meaning ‘what folk are you’ (Gait, 1967, p. 366). Besides these accounts, the Nagas are mentioned in the Royal chronicles of the Manipur kingdom and the Ahom kings. Closer home, the Vedas also refer to the Kiratas, some of whom could very well have been Naga tribes.

The place of origin of the Naga tribes and their perceptions to the non-Nagas are crucial for the paper from three inter-related vantage points. First, from an anthropological sense, it helps us understand the roots of a distinct, isolated ethnic group, which involuntarily fell within the geographical ambit of the post-colonial Indian state. Taking cue from B.G. Verghese (2003, p. 118), who had stated that the Northeast’s very diversity makes identity a marker of self and community, the theories on the historical origins prove vital in locating the fierce ‘in-group’ traits and aloofness from the rest of India. This, in turn, normatively and practically acted as a catalyst in articulating sustained demand for independence by a section of radicals. While subsequent decades witnessed deepening of fratricidal ridges within the various Naga tribes in their approach to the movement, dispelling the scope for a unified pitch, it cannot be overlooked that across clans, their acceptance of the mandate of the Indian state has remained conditional at best. The tribal divisions have unfortunately never rendered easy the task of dealing with the multi-headed ethnic group for the Indian state.

Making of the Naga Crisis and State Securitization

The Ahoms and the British had virulently clashed with the Nagas and even established their military and political supremacy, but the fiercely isolationist tendencies of the Nagas prompted them to desist from interfering in their internal affairs. Against this historical backdrop of resisting outside rule, the present section will briefly delineate the juncture at which the Nagas challenged the authority of independent India over them and the latter securitized the issue.

Even before the departure of the British from India, the Naga National Council (NNC) became instrumental in officially organizing the people to raise their voice in favour of formulated policies regarding the future political status of the Naga people (Singh, 2004, p. 38). When the British Cabinet Mission came in 1946, the NNC sent a delegation with a Memorandum on 4 April 1946, stating that the future of the Nagas would not be bound by any arbitrary decision of the departing British government if such decisions were taken without prior information and approval of the Naga people. The NNC also published a book where the desire for full independence was clearly outlined. In June 1946, the Council submitted a four-point memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, stating:

This Naga National Council stands for the solidarity of Naga tribes including those in the un-administered areas. The Council strongly protests against the grouping of Assam with Bengal and that the Naga Hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam, free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interests of the Nagas. Finally, it demanded that the Naga tribes should have a separate electorate. (Mao, 1992, p. 34)

In June 1947, the NNC issued an ultimatum to the effect that the Naga Hills would cease to be a part of India on attainment of independence. It proclaimed: ‘Nagas are not Indians and do not want to become Indians. Nagaland was never conquered by India. The British conquered a part of the Naga Hills and once the British left; it should revert to its original free status’ (Singh, 2002, p. 64).

With the growing popularity of the NNC, the future government of India had found its political adversary for the incipient Naga problem. Early political solutions failed as the nine-point Hydari Agreement was interpreted differently by these two parties. One clause read that the Governor of Assam, as the agent of the Indian Union would have special responsibility for a period of 10 years for the due observance of the Agreement. The Agreement further stated that at the end of this period ‘the NNC will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people be arrived at’. The Naga separatists interpreted this passage to mean that after a 10-year apprenticeship they could ask for, and presumably hope to be granted, complete independence. The Indian government, on the other hand, has always maintained that the passage in question only referred to the possibility of altering the relationship within the Union (Means & Means, 1966–1967, p. 293). The divergent interpretations created an irresolvable controversy and the Agreement could not be implemented. Homen and Pradipta Borgohain lament the agreement to be a lost opportunity rather than a Covenant of endearing and positive change, at a crucial decisive moment in Naga history (Borgohain & Borgohain, 2011, p. 118). Although the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution provided for some measure of autonomy for tribals under Articles 244 (2) and 275 (1), the NNC rejected them outright and the hardliners within the organization insisted that the clause relating to the 10-year period in the agreement was tantamount to recognizing independence for the Nagas (Misra, 2009, pp. 163–164).

The political negotiations over administrative future of the Nagas soon demarcated the moderate and radical factions within the Naga leadership. The pull of support deterministically passed the reign from the moderate Aos under Aliba Imti Ao’s leadership (who supported being a part of India) to the radical wing headed by Angami Zapu Phizo. On 14 August 1947 (on the eve of the Indian independence), the Nagas under the leadership of Phizo declared their own independence, which marked the beginning of a new chapter of confrontation and conflict, of armed insurrection by a section of the Nagas and counter-offensive launched by the Indian security forces (Barpujari, 1990, p. 316). As the inheritor of the British colonial powers and by the British Parliament’s Indian Independence Act, especially the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, the Indian government was empowered ‘to continue its administration in the Naga Hills’ (Chasie & Hazarika, 2009, p. 5). Having openly defied the nation-building project, the Naga issue ripened into an ‘existential threat’ for the Indian government. The radical demands of the NNC implied that any violation of Constitutional provisions would qualify as an ‘emergency condition’ demanding securitization.

Securitization theory expounds that the presence of an actual existential threat has to be defended by the state to legitimize emergency measures (or other steps). If no signs of such acceptance exist, there can only be securitizing move but not actual securitization of the referent object (Buzan et al., 1998). From this prism of analysis therefore, it is important to identify a relevant episode in the Naga crisis that prompted the state to launch securitization. This catalyst was the plebiscite of 16 May 1951, which witnessed extensive propaganda by the NNC in the Naga villages, but had been conducted without approval or recognition by the government. The NNC launched a campaign of civil disobedience against the government and its representatives, involving refusal to pay taxes, student demonstrations and strikes, and non-cooperation with governmental authorities, boycotting the first general election of independent Indian in 1952, and finally a mass walk-out by thousands of Nagas during a speech by Prime Minister Nehru in Kohima in 1953. The latter was one of the most infamous incidents of this period, marking the intensity of misunderstanding. ⁵ The government now declared the Naga situation as a law and order problem and launched a formal crackdown on the NNC. The Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act was promulgated in 1953 for application in the Naga Hills District; all Naga tribal councils and courts were dismissed. Pandit Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha on 23August 1956 that force had been sent to the Naga Hills with a view to protecting the life and properties of the people and not to harass and kill them (Nehru, 1958, pp. 451–52). The Assam Disturbed Areas Act paved the way for the enactment of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) for Assam in 1958 by the parliament. Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika emphasize that at this juncture, the Home Minister Shri Govind Ballabh Pant did not speak of the threat to ‘national security’ or national integrity or sovereignty; he spoke of the problem as a law and order issue that needed to be sorted out for the ‘protection of people in those areas’. He did add the caveat that the law had been introduced to help the armed forces ‘handle the situation effectively whenever such problem arises hereafter’, indicating that even in the 1950s New Delhi was concerned about a future increase in challenges like that posed by the Nagas (Chasie & Hazarika, 2009, p. 6). Thus, in sync with the theory, the Indian state securitized the Naga crisis and also proffered the legitimate discourse of national security to justify its stance.

State securitization of the movement compelled Phizo and his associates to go underground and continue their freedom struggle against security forces and civil officials. Kidnapping, murder, plunder, ambushing of conveys of the armed forces were the common tactics resorted to. An underground Naga government was set up in the Tuensang area in September 1954, termed as ‘Khunak kautang Ngeukhum’nt’ (literally meaning the People’s Sovereign of Free Nagaland). Perennial safe havens were offered to Naga fighters by east Pakistan (till the late 1960s), China and Pakistan, firmly entrenching the role of external actors in an otherwise internal security problematique. Between 1958, when the daring Naga rebel commander Kaito Sema took the first batch of guerrillas to East Pakistan through the North Cachar route, to 1962 when the Sino-Indian war broke out, more than six batches of Naga fighters had undergone training and received weapons from East Pakistan. There were also frequent accounts of escape of a section of Nagas to Manipur, in an attempt to avoid the government’s military operations in the area. Gun-running and mobilization were reported from parts of Manipur territory, North Cachar and Sibsagar (Bhaumik, 1996, p. 43). Prime Minister Nehru informed the Lok Sabha in December 1963, as the Nagaland state was being created, that hundred hostiles had crossed into East Pakistan to bring arms into Nagaland, while another similar batch had been resisted by Indian security forces (Hindustan Standard, 18 December 1963). Reports of regular clandestine links between Nagaland and Pakistan were established through the Lushai Hills, the extreme eastern part of Tripura and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. D.B. Shekatkar makes a relevant observation that the Indian Army’s lack of capability in counter-insurgency operations produced outcomes that fed the anti-Indian narrative of the Naga insurgency. The civilian officials had no ability to engage in counter-propaganda to blunt the psychological campaign Phizo and the NNC had waged from the late 1940s onwards (Shekatkar, 2009, p. 17). The Naga guerrillas could not be brought to submission by the Indian Army. Thus, deviating from theoretical prediction, securitization at this stage failed to remove the existential threat.

B.N. Mullick, former chief of India’s Intelligence Bureau and Nehru’s security advisor, now decided to ‘shift tracks, arguing that the ultimate solution to partisan guerrilla warfare invariably lies in a political settlement’. Mullick sought to separate the Naga Hills from Assam and the ‘plains people’, who were perceived as part of hostile India by the tribals. Once made into a separate entity, Naga ethnic identity could be safeguarded under the special provisions of the Indian constitution for scheduled and backward tribes and castes (Lintner, 2012, p. 75). Nehru encouraged Fazl Ali, the Governor of Assam to persuade the willing Nagas for a political solution. At the Kohima Convention held on 22 August 1957, with nearly 1735 representatives of different Naga tribes, Imkongliba Ao and John Bosco Jasokie were elected as office bearers. Fazl Ali advised these Naga leaders to pass a resolution at the outset, stating categorically that the Naga Hills District would be within the Indian Union and that the Nagas would accept the Indian Constitution if their recommendations were to be accepted (Gangte, 1993, p. 11). The successive Naga People’s Conventions in Ungma (1958) and Mokukchung (1959) laid the basis for the creation of the state of Nagaland within the Indian Union, on the basis of an understanding between the government and the moderates. Thus, deviating from the linear motion of politicization, securitization and de-securitization as prescribed by the theory, the Naga crisis now witnessed complete securitization being complemented, even tempered by partial politicization, the normal political procedures of negotiations.

The efforts of the Indian government were successful in polarizing the Nagas and creating a definite fissure in the Naga movement. The moderate wing was carefully steered by the government to execute the discourse of ‘maximum autonomy within the Indian Union’. With the creation of Nagaland as the 16th state in December 1963, the Government of India had accomplished accommodation of Naga aspirations within the realm of ‘administrative practicability’. Active participation of the Naga people in the electoral process marked the start of a new era as part of the Indian Union. While political negotiations with the moderate Nagas had reached a successful fruition, the persistent low-intensity guerrilla activities of the Naga extremists rendered it increasingly clear that the process of political integration was building itself on shallow waters. Having no intentions of establishing peace with the government, Isak Muivah, chief aide of Phizo established ‘diplomatic relations’ with the Kachin Independence Army, which had been fighting for freedom from Rangoon for more than two decades, and visited China for military training. Sanjoy Hazarika comments that this transformed the history of the Northeast, and turned a battle between two unequal sides into an international arena of espionage, insurgency and conflict (Hazarika, 1995, p. 104). The internal ethnic conflict situation and its prolonged securitization for over a decade had thus crystallized in the Indian state.

Monirul Hussain comments in retrospect that the creation of Nagaland as a legal-constitutional measure paved the way for cooptation of newly emerged Naga elites into the post-colonial Indian political system. It gave birth to a parallel polity in Nagaland, dividing them into rebels and loyals (Hussain, 2003, p. 985). Jonathan Glancey opines that ‘overnight, Naga freedom fighters became Indian dissidents, terrorists, even traitors. The Naga independence movement from now on would increasingly be referred to as an insurgency’ (Glancey, 2011, p. 163). By April 1967, Chief Minister T.N. Angami lent authentication to the Chinese adventure of the rebels by informing that about 150–200 Naga rebels had found their way into China via Upper Burma through the Tirap frontier division of the NEFA (The Hindustan Times, 15 April 1967).

We may now turn our attention to the post-Nagaland dynamics of the Naga crisis and its securitization. A fratricidal break in the Naga Federal Government had begun to undermine the rebel movement from the late 1960s. Many Angamis, who saw themselves as the founders of the Naga National Movement, resented being pushed away by a group of Semas, who were increasingly dominating the Federal Government and the Naga Army. Gradually, the Sema Nagas broke away from the Phizo party and under the former Federal Government President Scato Swu, they formed the ‘Revolutionary Government of Nagaland’ (Mao, 1992, pp. 130–133). The Federal Government and the NNC denounced the formation of a rival entity and branded its leaders as ‘traitors’, renegades’ and ‘quislings’ (Lintner, 2012, pp. 88–89). The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 lent a blow for the Naga and Mizo hostiles as they lost a place of refuge. Thus, the strength of the movement was fractured in its scope, organization and ideology. At the same time, the victory in the 1971 war boosted the morale of the Indian security forces and rendered confidence in the government to deal sternly with insurgents. On 1 September 1972, the ceasefire with the Nagas was formally withdrawn by the centre and both the NNC and FGN were declared illegal under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The rebel camps soon started crumbling on account of intensive military operations (Mao, 1992, p. 143).

On 1 December 1973, Indira Gandhi visited Kohima to mark the 10th anniversary of Nagaland becoming a full-fledged state of the Indian Union. In her speech, she urged the underground to ‘come out and shoulder the responsibilities of building up Nagaland’. Thus, the official discourse on the situation at this juncture emphasized politicization tactics to garner public mandate. Securitization at the lower (regional interiors) levels, however, continued as per the situational demands. This strategy was successful on dual counts; it was able to lure some of the rebels into abandoning the confrontationist approach with the Government of India and come to the negotiating table and it was able to curb the operations of the hostiles along the border. Several hundred rebels had already surrendered and more came over-ground before the state elections of February 1974 (Guha, 2012, p. 476). Noticeably, the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland surrendered on 16 August 1973 along with prominent members like the President Lessumo and the Prime Minister Scato Swu. This created a demonstration effect and prompted large-scale surrender of the underground Nagas.

The Shillong Accord of 1975 and is after-effects weakened the Naga movement further. On the one hand, the Naga signatories to the Accord accepted the Constitutional status of Nagaland, effectively abandoning the demand for sovereignty (The Statesman, 12 November 1975, p. 1). On the other hand, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which swore to purge the Naga movement splintered into the NSCN-Isaak and Muivah [NSCN (I-M) and NSCN-Khaplang [NSCN (K)] and engaged in a brutal game of one-upmanship. Udayon Misra opines that this was easily one of the bloodiest internal clashes in the history of Naga insurgency and in a joint statement issued in July 1989, the NSCN chairman, Isaac Swu and secretary Muivah, accused the vice-chairman of the NSCN (Khaplang) of killing scores of ‘Christian Socialist revolutionaries’ who were Tangkhul Nagas (Misra, 2013, p. 58). Over the following nine years, the two factions fought one another, while Phizo’s National Government of Nagaland occasionally waded in on the side of the NSCN (K) (Glancey, 2011, p. 189). An author observed that it is common knowledge in Nagaland that each political persona is on the hit list of one faction of NSCN and under the protection of the other; it is difficult for them to take action against either of the underground organizations (Patel, 1994, p. 1332). In 1995, the NNC also bifurcated into two groups—the NNC (A) and NNC (K)—while the former was headed by Phizo’s daughter Adinno, the other was headed by Khodao Yanthan, the vice president of the NNC. The NNC (K) soon merged with the NSCN (I-M).

Notwithstanding these internecine wars, the secessionist call in the northeast of India reached an alarmingly unified pitch in the early 1990s. The NSCN (I-M) grew strong symbiotic ties with underground movements running parallel to that of the Nagas, thereby turning the whole of the Northeast into a hotbed of internal conflicts. At one level, the contiguous ‘states’ in the region had similar historical backgrounds in terms of colonization under the British and subsequent annexation to the Indian Union, thereby informing their discourse of ‘restoration of sovereignty’. At another level, each maintained strong in-group ethnic loyalties, thus not abandoning contesting claims of supremacy and leadership to the underground movements. The Indian intelligence played a crucial role trying to break the back of these factions through various means like encouraging clashes, and pumping in huge amounts of money to lure them into providing information, thus adding another dimension to the state securitization approach. ⁶

In the face of the increasingly violent and chaotic dynamics, the government assumed a two-pronged policy: it attempted to persuade the insurgents to come to the negotiating table and simultaneously made a determined effort in collaboration with the Burmese government to flush out the insurgents from their hideouts there. By 1991, the Government of India had banned all factions of the NSCN and the NNC under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967. The centre reiterated that security operations would continue as long as the threat of violence existed. Hence, as witnessed in the state strategy from the 1960s onwards, politicization and securitization continued to complement each other to tackle the conflict.

Auditing Securitization of the Naga Crisis

We may now turn to an audit of the securitization approach by the state. As mentioned in the outset, the paper undertakes this task by factoring in dual realities; the dynamics of state securitization in the 1990s and the ground-level political situation; and the reflections from select members of the civil society who form the ‘relevant audience’ of the securitization act in the language of the theory.

The developments in the early 1990s revealed concerted political efforts by the government to initiate dialogues with the Naga rebels. Theoretically, this move could be analyzed as the failure of securitization approach to resolve the Naga crisis by then. Ground-level realities betrayed deteriorating political climate, war-weariness of soldiers and increasing casualties. Moreover, the crisis had assumed multiple dynamics (domestic and international) and heightened virulence. International bodies like the United Nations Human Rights Commission and organizations of indigenous peoples’ rights criticized the Indian government for atrocities against the Naga population of the Northeast, and encouraged New Delhi to negotiate (Economic and Political Weekly, 1997, p. 1939). Under the able leadership of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, Minister of State for Home, Rajesh Pilot, established contact with the NSCN (I-M) leaders and suggested the opening of negotiations at some neutral place (The Telegraph, 5 July 1995, p. 9). The government must have received inputs from the Army that the NSCN (I-M) had become the strongest rebel group in terms of their organizational strength and offensive power, owing to its cadre-based structure and discipline. Significantly, this bilateralism between the NSCN (I-M) and the Indian government shaped many aspects of the future political prospects of the resolution of the conflict.

Even with a change in leadership, Prime Minister Deve Gowda hand-picked Rajesh Pilot from the Opposition to continue with the task of negotiations. Pilot met the underground leaders in Bangkok, in his capacity as a special emissary of the Congress leadership on 17 November 1996. The ceasefire agreement was finally brokered during the tenure of Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and formally announced on 25 July 1997 in the Indian Parliament. A mutual decision of ceasefire was taken for a period of three months effective from 1 August 1997 to embark upon political-level discussions (Singh, 2004, p. 185). It was also decided that the talks shall be unconditional from both sides, conducted at the level of the prime minister and the venue of the talks shall be anywhere in the world, outside India (Singh, 2004, p. 185). Both the parties agreed for ‘monitoring the ceasefire process by drawing members from both sides including some NGOs’. The declaration was followed by setting up of a Ceasefire Monitoring Cell to enforce the Ground Rules as laid down by the Government of India (Government of Nagaland, 2013). Since 1 August 1998, the ceasefire has been continually extended on an annual basis (Singh, 2004, p. 186).

However, a few problems mired these political efforts. First, the Khaplang group, which was not initially included in the talks, condemned the ceasefire agreement, terming it an act of treachery to divide the Nagas. Second, though the NSCN (I-M) and the government engaged in carving out the modalities of an acceptable solution through substantive talks, the memory of the prolonged armed confrontation and unmet political aspirations for decades have consistently marred quick agreements and negotiations have repeatedly run into deadlocks. Significantly, right into the ceasefire period post 1997, the NSCN leaders spoke about a ‘crisis of confidence’ in the government of India owing to the activities of the Indian Army in Nagaland (Subramaniam, 1997, p. 7). The ceasefire has witnessed innumerable and brutal violations through the decades. The entrenched fratricidal conflicts have also instigated such violations on many counts. For example, due to violent area-domination attempts by both Khaplang and Isak-Muivah factions, in the second half of 2005, both factions clashed at least five times [Kohima (1 August), Peren (10 September and 5 December), Tuensang (26 September), and Mon (5 October)] (Routray, 2008).

The separate ceasefire agreements of the Isak-Muivah group (1997) and the Khaplang group (2001) have virtually become redundant in the light of such violence. Securitization was renewed in 2008 as fresh guidelines were issued by the Home Minister Shivraj Patil. The new set of rules called Standard Operating Procedures empowered the security forces to not only evict cadres found outside designated camps but also fire upon them if the situation so demanded (Indian Express, 11 June 2008, p. 7). The ambush on a military convoy in Chandel district bordering Myanmar in Manipur on 4 June 2015, by the NSCN (K), Kangleipak Communist Party and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) left at least 20 soldiers of the Indian Army’s 6 Dogra Regiment dead. A retaliatory trans-border raid was immediately led by the Indian para-commandos under 21 Para-Regiment (Special Forces in Myanmar) on June 9 (Roy, 2015). The central government in India directed security forces in Nagaland and Manipur to be put on high alert to prevent any attempt by the militants to cause any more havoc (Firstpost, 4 June 2015). Three militants, including two NSCN (K) insurgents, were arrested in Manipur, which include the self-styled ‘chairman’ of NSCN (K)’s ‘Amamchat region’, Khumlo Abi Anal; NSCN (K) activist Pammei Kakilong alias Kaling 9310; and another activist of the outlawed Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP-MC) outfit (The Hindustan Times, 13 June 2015). Judged through ground-level realities, therefore, the audit reveals the irony that while the securitization approach has not offered sustainable resolutions, yet the government has had to fall back on it repeatedly to rein in the virulent conflict.

The second index to gauge the efficacy of state securitization is through select reflections from civil society. ⁷ The active voices assert the ethnic distinctiveness of the Nagas from the rest of India, and are critical of the state approach following colonial withdrawal. They hold military excesses to be responsible for the consolidation, and increasing radicalization of the movement; the extremists are considered products of the machinations of the Indian state to integrate an unwilling community. They express discontent that the ‘Indians’ (people outside the Northeast region), erroneously lump them together as an ethnic ‘collective’ with the rest of the northeastern folks. But at the same time, their multiple tribal differentiations confound the same Indians to the extent of preferring ignorance. This, at the very outset builds a sense of otherization, of which the Nagas are acutely conscious. When the vexed issue of the state of armed conflict between the Nagas and the Indian state is broached, their sense of ‘us’ emerges as strong as its juxtaposition with the sense of ‘you/them’. ⁸ They consider it doubtful, if a non-Naga (the writer) can empathize with the Nagas, and their troubles with the Indian state.

Arguing that securitization of the Naga crisis has been more than the mere use of the army by the state, the Nagas remark that the perpetual presence of the army since the 1950s have created a perennial sense of insecurity among the people, against the intentions of the Indian state. Some argue that the army introduced the elements of military dominance in the ordinary lives of the people through physical occupation of region (personal interviews with activists in Dimapur, 2014). Moreover, the imposition of laws like the AFSPA, which provide state’s security forces the impunity to act any which way with the possibility of limited judicial relief led to unimaginable brutalization of society and spawned further violence (Economic and Political Weekly, 2010, p. 8). However, Sanjoy Hazarika, who was a member of the Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee to Review the AFSPA (2005) has recently argued that conflicts in the region have drastically decreased over the last few years (Firstpost March 2015a). Reports show that Nagaland has shown a marked improvement with 77 incidents of violence in 2014 compared to 272 incidents in 2007 (Lyngdoh, 2015). The people now demand the withdrawal of AFSPA (Mukhim, 2013), which Sanjib Baruah laments has been converted into a ‘routine emergency’ (Baruah, 2014, pp. 189–211). The select narratives from the Naga civil society thus emphasize that mandate for securitization amongst the effected population or relevant audience, as emphasized by securitization theory, is lost in the Naga case.

Conclusion: Need for Review and Alternatives

The mainstream Indian society is quick to counter the Naga discourse of uniqueness and sovereignty. M.S. Prabhakara calls their ‘armed struggle’ against the Indian state a mere ‘unrealistic Naga nationalist rhetoric’. He claims that the ‘separatist agenda’ continues to simmer even though it cannot immediately overcome the might of the Indian state, simply because the rebels hope to gain their objective in the long run, when the Indian state succumbs to its own internal contradictions and clumsy organizational structure (Prabhakara, 2007, p. 729). However, others like Verghese argue that it would be ‘unreal and even uncharitable’ to expect the Nagas, to unilaterally abandon the Naga ‘cause’ (Verghese, 2003, pp. 120–121). Delineating this divide that essentially informs the Naga imbroglio, the present paper has sought to argue that despite the long history of ethnic distinctiveness and geographic aloofness of the Nagas, the state sought to integrate them within India and launched securitization to isolate the rebel groups, which attempted to wrest power and independence from India. However, the overwhelming military response sat oddly with the sociologically underpinnings of the problem. Prolonged securitization and unyielding stances have hardened stances in political processes and also loom large in the public memory.

In the light of such pressing realities, it is imperative to look for fresh solutions and understand the sociological underpinnings of the Naga crisis, beyond the traditional idioms of branding it as a ‘law and order issue’. Conceding the need for their revision, R.N. Ravi, the current interlocutor of the Indo-Naga peace talks, highlighted in front of a Naga audience in Khonoma in May 2015 that the Nagas have a long history of strong sense of independence, but the Naga areas have been within the political map of India for too long now. ‘Facts have to be accepted and we must find ways on how to reconcile with the two’, asserted Ravi, stressing on the need for the honesty of processes that is morally legitimate and politically vibrant. He assured that Prime Minister Modi is serious about solving the Naga political problem and working towards having a mutually honourable solution before it is too late (The Morung Express, 2015). In the same conference, Naga representatives asserted that the Government of India has accepted the Naga as a political issue, which is proof that it is serious about solving the issue. They reiterated that solution cannot be by the ‘barrel of the gun but through actual talks’ (The Morung Express, 2015).

Senior social activist Niketu Iralu argues that Naga reconciliation has to happen at three levels: within Naga society, including the factions, with the non-Naga society and with the government (personal interview with Niketu Iralu, 2014). Reverend Wati Aiers, a chief exponent of the ongoing Naga Reconciliation Forum asserts that the solution reached between the NSCN (I-M) and the government cannot be imposed on the rest of the Nagas. Even for adopting any agreement reached between these two parties, there should be a referendum where the people should be asked if they want that solution (personal interview with Reverend Aiers, 2014). In an editorial article last year, a scribe had argued that Khaplang has been incommunicado for many years. After the 2010 split in his organization and signing a ceasefire accord in April 2012 with the Myanmar government, he supposedly had been paying more attention to the southern neighbour rather than the reconciliation process (Lama, 2014, p. 13). But the ambush in Manipur on 4 June 2015, has rung clear the fallacy of this observation and reiterated what local activists and observers such as Dr Aiers have expressed. Not only have the NSCN (K), KCP and KYKL claimed responsibility for the attack, but also sought to send out the message that despite being based in Myanmar, the NSCN (K)’s sphere of influence and strike capability extends deep inside India (Roy, 2015). Dr Bhaumik opines that India’s constant talks with the Muivah faction finally provoked Khaplang, a warlord to renege the ceasefire and form the rebel coalition in March 2015, the United National Liberation Front of West South East Asia (UNLFWSEA), with motley rebel factions like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) (Independent), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) (Songjibit) and the KLA (Jibon). He is partly dictated by his urge to end his isolation in the jungles of Myanmar, ‘if only to remind New Delhi that he cannot be ignored; a point he seeks to make by getting together all those in the Northeast who still intend to fight India’ (Bhaumik, 2015). This stance significantly mars the chances of the peace talks yielding any real dividends for the Naga crisis in the long run. However, other social representative bodies located in various part of Nagaland like the Ho Ho and the Naga Church retain faith in the potential of the peace process provided they are included as stakeholders. At present, R.N. Ravi has committed that all the Naga groups, including the civil societies would be on board for the final solution (DNA, 2015). While the exact nature of the ‘final solution’ is ambiguous at the moment, broad participation of civil societal groups in the negotiation process is crucial in restoring the confidence between the Naga people and the state. In the light of the recent ambush and Khaplang’s open dissent, concerted efforts to broker peace and reopen negotiations with the Khaplang faction is indisputably vital for any meaningful resolution.

Looking back at history may make one cynical about the fate of the peace process despite its current momentum. Allegiances are hard to crack and the support for different factions though at times muted, are very strong in the Naga conflict. In such a scenario, any derailing of the peace process would widen the gap of understandings between the Indian government and the Nagas and re-create the need for renewed securitization. To break the circularity, the political leadership must make a concerted effort to render the peace process a success. Untangling the Naga imbroglio would not only be a victory of Indian democracy but also a contributing factor in a successful ‘Act East Policy’ announced recently by the government. To that end, the paper urges continued efforts at problem-solving, carefully guided by the desire of the Nagas to talk on an equal footing and the inclusion of both political and social representatives of the civil society.