Between ‘Concern’ and ‘Opportunity’: US Pivot to Asia and Foreign Policy Debate in India

Abstract

Underlined by China’s growth and the relative decline of the US, a transition of power is taking place in Asia-Pacific. To arrest its declining influence, the US has initiated a pivot to the region. India, being a regional rising power, has received special attention from the US as part of its strategy to manage Asia’s changing balance of power. On pivot, domestic foreign policy debate in India is highly fractured, however. Perceptions of the pivot in India range between viewing it as a ‘strategic concern’, on the one hand, and a ‘strategic opportunity’, on the other. This debate reflects the divide between two major schools in Indian foreign policy: Traditional Nationalists versus the Great Power Realists. Under Manmohan Singh, India foreign policy practice indicated a preference for ‘strategic autonomy’ as suggested by the Traditional Nationalists. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ascension to power suggests that India is now ready for greater engagement with the US on balancing China’s growing power in Asia, a position espoused by the Great Power Realists.

Keywords

US decline pivot balance of power Indian Foreign Policy Asia-Pacific

Introduction

The perception that America is in decline appears to be commonly held by its allies and adversaries (Cohen 2011; Pew Research Survey, 2013; Stokes, 2013). Overwhelmed by financial crises, military overstretch and the rapid rise of China, two decades after the end of the Cold War, the primacy of the US globally is being challenged. To counter an increasingly assertive China and perceptions of its decline, the US announced a pivot towards Asia in late 2011. In January 2012, the term ‘pivot’ was renamed ‘strategic rebalancing’ by the Pentagon. Both terms, however, indicate America’s desire to balance China’s growing economic and military influence in Asia.

The pivot emphasizes strengthening of America’s existing alliances as well as building partnerships with like-minded states in the region. From the very beginning, India was viewed as an important element of America’s pivot strategy. From Hillary Clinton to Chuck Hagel, the Obama administration has insisted that India has a large role in Asia’s new balance of power politics. In fact, the erstwhile Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, called India one of the ‘lynchpins’ of America’s pivot strategy (Panetta, 2012). American expectations notwithstanding, it is also important to understand how India has reacted to these overtures. This article attempts to answer this question by examining the various debates on the issue within India’s strategic community.

India’s strategic elite are divided into four major streams in their perceptions of the pivot: ‘strategic autonomy’, ‘strategic engagement’, ‘strategic independence’ and ‘strategic bandwagoning’. These foreign policy themes derive from four conceptual schools in Indian foreign policy: the Traditional Nationalists, the Great Power Realists, the Hard Nationalists and the Bandwagoners.¹ The article argues that given the current uncertainty enveloping the pivot, the theme of ‘strategic autonomy’ advocated by Traditional Nationalists dominates Indian foreign policy discourse, though constantly challenged by Great Power Realists who stand for greater engagement with the US. This was most evident during the term of the Manmohan Singh government. The foreign policy of the Modi government, however, seems to be shifting towards greater engagement with the US, as prescribed by Great Power Realists.

The article undertakes the following path. First, it provides a historical background to the emergence of the pivot in US foreign policy. Second, it delineates on the importance of India in the new US strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Third, it maps the domestic foreign policy debate in India on US pivot to the Asia-Pacific. Borrowing from Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan’s work (2012) on conceptual impulses prevalent in Indian foreign policy, it creates an analytical map of how the foreign policy elites have positioned themselves on the issue of the pivot and delineates on their policy prescriptions. Even though the article borrows from the existing literature on conceptual impulses prevalent in Indian foreign policy, its novelty lies in the fact that such conceptual classifications have not yet been applied to understand India’s responses to specific foreign policy issues. The last section therefore attempts to correlate the domestic foreign policy debate with Indian foreign policy practice on US pivot under the Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the Narendra Modi-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments. A short conclusion follows summarizing some of the major findings of the article.

The Pivot: A Historical Overview

In November 2011, President Obama announced his pivot strategy while addressing the Australian Parliament. Calling America a ‘Pacific Power’, Obama declared that the US is not leaving Asia: ‘our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence’ (The White House, 2011). One of the most vital US interests in the region, as the president himself, declared was the peace and security of Asia. Within two years of Obama taking office, China had emerged as the most potent threat to US and its allies’ interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Since early 2010, China’s assertiveness in Asia has increased several fold. It entered into a serious confrontation with Japan over the Senkaku Islands and, as one consequence, terminated the export of rare earths to Japan, a commodity of importance to Japanese manufacture (Joshi, 2010); started claiming disputed territories in the South China Sea, threatening smaller states like Vietnam and the Philippines with military consequences (Glaser, 2012); labelled the South China Sea as a ‘core national interest’ (Glaser, 2012) and rebuffed American overtures to stabilize the situation (Wenzhao, 2012). It also failed to condemn provocative acts of its ally and protégé—North Korea—for bringing a war-like scenario to the 38th parallel (Gill, 2011). These incidents created an impression that China is now going to behave aggressively in pursuing its many territorial disputes with Asian states. This assertive behaviour was clearly a result of Beijing’s astonishing economic and military growth in the last two decades (US Department of Defense, 2010a, p. 32). The series of confrontations in the East and South China Sea sent a message that, if left unchecked, the margins for smaller Asian states to satisfactorily negotiate these disputes with Beijing would only decrease (Joshi & Pant, 2014). They also supported a perception in the US that a rising China may jeopardize its basic commitments in the region such as the respect for international law; free and open commerce; open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space and cyberspace; and the principle of resolving conflict without the use of force (Gates, 2010).

This was the strategic context in which the strategy of pivot was announced (The White House, 2011). The pivot is aimed at addressing the negative fallout of China’s growing military clout and assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific. As a report from Congressional Research Service report argues, the ‘(pivot) represents a simultaneous attempt to warn China away from using heavy-handed tactics against its neighbours and provide confidence to other Asia-Pacific countries that want to resist pressure from Beijing now and in the future’ (Congressional Research Service, 2012, p. 4). With the announcement of pivot, there have been conspicuous declarations on reallocation of US military resources to the Asia-Pacific theatre. In Australia, President Obama announced the formation of a new marine base in the Northern Territory, indicating that the US is going to recalibrate its military resources to the Asia-Pacific, the primary theatre of potential conflict and power projection in the coming years (The White House, 2011). The Pentagon’s vision document—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities of the 21st Century—reinforced American military focus on the region (US Department of Defense, 2012). At a major conference in Singapore, the Secretary of Defense explicated on the pivot strategy that 60 per cent of US naval and air assets will be shifted to the Asia-Pacific theatre (Hagel, 2013; Panetta, 2012). Satisfying regional anxieties have also figured heavily on American pivot strategy. Military alliances with several of America’s traditional allies have been beefed up, including new military pacts with the Philippines and the stationing of littoral combat ships in Singapore (Eilperin, 2014; Hunt, 2012; Luke, 2012). Also, the US and Japan now seek new mechanisms to extend their military alliance and intensify military cooperation (Smith, 2013). In April 2014, while in Japan, President Obama declared that the Senkaku Islands were under the protection of the US–Japan Security Treaty (Singh, 2014). New missile defence systems have also been installed in East Asia, and there are plans for installation of further missile defence systems in Southeast Asia (Joshi, 2012).

These efforts notwithstanding, a number of factors have dampened the enthusiasm for the new US strategy among Asian states. Though the American economy has shown some signs of recovery in the last one year or so, it will still take a lot of time and effort to arrest the decline it had suffered after the 2008 financial crisis (Sharf, 2014). Until and unless the American economy recovers fully from the financial shock of 2008, its renewed politico-military commitments in the Asia-Pacific would remain clouded in doubts (Walker, 2013). Military sequestration has continued even as the Pentagon has announced a major military reconfiguration in the region (Simeone, 2014). On the other hand, even when numbers indicate that China’s economic growth may be reaching a plateau, it still maintains a robust growth rate of 7.4 per cent (International Monetary Fund, 2015). According to the latest World Economic Outlook report of the International Monetary Fund, in purchasing power parity terms, China has already overtaken the US in being the world’s largest economy.² In recent years, the limits of America’s economic power have started slowly manifesting themselves even when it continues to pursue an expansive strategic agenda across the world. These contradictions and their import for US foreign policy were evident in Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks during the Sixth Annual Washington Dialogue: ‘We are behaving like we are the richest country on the face of the earth. We are still critical to everything that happens in the world. And we are not sufficiently committing to the resources necessary to do what we need to do in this world’ (Kerry, 2014).

Many in Asia are asking the US the same question. In an era of resource crunch, Washington’s focus remains divided among multiple crises around the world. Syria, Iraq and Ukraine have diverted US attention away from Asia precisely when the region is witnessing a slow transition of power. Many Asian states view US commitments in the region as a digression from the more pressing concerns of balancing China’s growing power in the region (Joshi & Pant, 2014). China had taken full advantage of such digressions in the past, especially after the events of 9/11, even when initially George W. Bush had every intention to focus on the incipient threat posed by Beijing. Asian countries are now wary that Beijing may once again use this shift in American focus to consolidate its position in the region. Lastly, the most important factor that has not allowed the pivot strategy to bloom to its fullest is a perception that the US, at any future date, can form a ‘great power condominium’ with China, leaving the Asian states to either fend for themselves or at Beijing’s mercy. During Obama’s early years in power, the US did make an attempt to form a close strategic partnership with Beijing (Brzezinski, 2009; Bush III, 2011). If Hillary Clinton proclaimed that America’s relationship with Beijing is the ‘most important bilateral relationship in the world this century’, Obama declared that ‘relationship between US and China will shape the 21st century’ (Curtsinger, 2009; Telegraph, 2008). From the global economy to climate change and regional issues such as North Korea and Afghanistan, the US and China were perceived to co-ordinate their policies at the expense of other states. This strategic alignment was given the nomenclature of ‘strategic reassurance’, as Undersecretary of State James B. Steinberg put it (Steinberg, 2009). With ‘strategic reassurance’, the US declared its intentions of welcoming China’s arrival in the global scene as an equal or so was at least the perception in many Asian countries, including India (The White House, 2009). In parts of Asia, this strategy came to acquire a different name: Group of Two or G-2. Though China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia forced the US to adopt a more forceful strategy in the form of the pivot, strategic commentators opine that the re-emergence of the G-2 in the future cannot be ruled out completely (Mohan, 2013c).

India and the Pivot to Asia

Addressing a gathering of the Asia Society in New York on 11 March 2013, then National Security Adviser to President Obama—Thomas Donilon—declared that ‘U.S. and Indian interests powerfully converge in Asia-Pacific, where India has much to give and much to gain’ (Donilon, 2013). Donilon’s speech, titled ‘United States and Asia-Pacific in 2013’, was clearly a signal to the global community that President Obama would continue to strengthen the pivot to Asia and support the strategy of rebalancing in his second term. His focus on India and especially its role in the Asia-Pacific was also not without precedent.

From the very beginning of the new strategy, the US has unequivocally expressed its desire to cooperate with India in the region. This was most evident in Hillary Clinton’s article in Foreign Policy, where she underlined the critical contribution India could make to Asia’s balance of power (2011). She was the first American leader to openly advocate the geographical reality of the Indo-Pacific as a new geo-strategic space in which the future tussle for supremacy in Asia would unfold; India was central to this geostrategic imagination. In a similar vein, Leon Panetta, during his visit to New Delhi in June 2012, called India ‘a lynchpin of USA’s rebalancing strategy’ and exhorted New Delhi for a deeper engagement in US strategy (Panetta, 2012). His successor—Chuck Hagel—conveyed similar views on India: ‘The world’s largest democracy, India’s role as a stabilizing power is of growing importance with the increase of trade and transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The United States considers India’s efforts to enhance its military capabilities as a welcome contribution to security in the region’ (Hagel, 2013).

Clearly, the US would like India to play a major role in the current power transition in Asia where the Chinese juggernaut is increasingly changing the geo-political milieu of the region and challenging established patterns of power. For the US, India is a wonderful strategic partner (Nehru, 2013). First, in terms of economic and military wherewithal, India is the only Asian nation capable of challenging China’s growing hegemony in the region: it is the world’s third largest economy and its defence budgets are second highest in Asia. Along with China, India is seen as one of the major rising powers in the world (National Intelligence Council, 2012). Second, India is also the world’s largest democratic state. The confluence of democratic values between the two countries has often been used to describe their relationship as one of ‘natural partners’. Projecting India as an alternative model of political, economic and social development in Asia helps the US in countering China’s influence not only in the region but around the world.

India is also extremely concerned with China’s growing economic and military power. India–China relations, as Harsh Pant describes, are increasingly characterized by a sort of ‘global convergence and bilateral divergence’ (2013, p. 2). Whereas globally India and China are working together on issues such as climate change, trade negotiations and the restructuring of global financial institutions, the bilateral divergence between the two states is on the rise. This is evident in China’s assertiveness on the border issue while its military modernization proceeds a pace (Bhaskar, 2010; Sahgal, 2012). The nuclear commerce between Pakistan and China is increasing as is the military component of their all-weather partnership (Malik, 2012; Raja Menon, 2013a). China has publicly indicated its commitment to build six nuclear reactors in Pakistan even when it has received no waivers from the NSG and IAEA as India did through the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal (Parameswaran, 2015). Recently, China has accepted Pakistan’s request to supply modern submarines (Haider, 2015). Lastly, India is concerned with China’s creeping influence in the Indian Ocean region. Simultaneously, Beijing’s attempts to impose its control over the South China and East China Seas have unnerved New Delhi equally. The geo-politics of Asia, therefore, is being conducted in the ‘same spatial arena’—Indian Ocean and Eastern Pacific (Scott, 2008). This quest for ‘mastering space’ in Asia-Pacific has led to a naval competition between the two Asian giants (Scott, 2008, p. 2). The probability that any future conflict over the unsettled Himalayan frontier may spill over into the Indian Ocean and Eastern Pacific is substantial (Joshi, 2013; Raja Menon, 2013b). Also, maintaining stability in Indo-Pacific waters is of crucial importance to Washington both for economic and military reasons (Powell, 2012). Maritime security cooperation between India and the US therefore has become a strategic necessity especially to ‘sustain a favourable strategic equilibrium as Chinese power rises’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012). These factors underscore a measure of mutual compatibility in US and Indian interests vis-à-vis balancing China’s growing influence in the region.

This section explained why Washington, DC views India as an important constituent of its pivot strategy. It also emphasized the fact that the US and India share similar interests when it comes to restraining China’s assertive behaviour in the Asia-Pacific. However, the compatibility of interests does not necessarily amount to a similar view on strategy as is evident in the debate among India’s foreign policy elites on the issue. The next section elaborates on India’s domestic foreign policy debate on the pivot issue.

Indian Foreign Policy Schools Debate the Pivot³

Opinion in India on the US’s pivot to Asia can be divided into four different schools: the Traditional Nationalists, the Great Power Realists, the Hard Nationalists and the Bandwagoners. These schools come with defined worldviews and ideological commitments leading to a particular interpretation of the current strategic environment. In turn, they offer very distinct recommendations for Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis the pivot. Table 1 lays out these four groups along three dimensions: (i) their reading of the current strategic environment; (ii) their perception of the pivot as a strategic opportunity or a strategic concern and (iii) their policy recommendation. Given that the pivot implies a renewed commitment on the part of the US to maintain its influence and presence in Asia, this article distils views on the strategic environment in large part by perceptions regarding the ‘U.S. decline’ thesis; it also holds China’s rise as a given for purposes of current analysis.

Table 1.

Indian Foreign Policy Schools of Thought and Policy Preferences

Foreign Policy Schools	Strategic Environment	Perception of Strategic Flux	Foreign Policy Prescription
Traditional Nationalists/Nehruvians	US in relative decline; China rising	Strategic concern	Maintain strategic autonomy
Great Power Realists	US in relative decline; China rising	Strategic opportunity	Increase strategic engagement with US
Hard Nationalists	US in relative decline; China rising	Strategic concern	Strategic independence from US
Bandwagoners	US decline a myth; China rising	Strategic opportunity	Strategic alignment with US

Source: Author’s calculations.

Traditional Nationalists on Pivot

The first of these categories comprise the Traditional Nationalists, also called the Nehruvians.⁴ Ideologically, they detest alliances and military pacts in great power politics (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2012). Historically speaking, they are supportive of the idea of non-alignment and have prescribed a policy of equidistance from great powers. Their view of the current power transition in Asia is underpinned by the perception of a weakening US and a rising China: the period of US unipolarity is over and the argument that non-alignment serves no strategic objective for India is ‘rooted in the global power equations that are a decade and a half old when the U.S. strode the world like a colossus …. It does not take into account the subsequent relative decline of the U.S.’ (Sikri, 2009, p. 277). The impression of decreasing US influence in global politics is strong. As two eminent Indian historians put it, ‘colossus it may be, but both wars (Afghanistan and Iraq) have exposed America’s limitations’ (Raghavan & Rangrajan, 2010). President Obama’s pivot to Asia, for this segment of the Indian foreign policy community, is an attempt by the declining hegemon to wrestle control of the power transition currently occurring in the Asia-Pacific. The pivot, for them, represents a strategic concern mainly for three reasons. First, active rebalancing against China would lead the latter to become more aggressive (Interview, 2013a). Second, it might motivate smaller states in the region to undertake risky endeavours vis-à-vis China, feeling confident under the protection of a US pivot. Lastly, the greatest strategic concern lies in the fact that active rebalancing against China might force India to choose sides and hence, restrict its foreign policy choices. In other words, a declining hegemon may force India into a conflict, which might not be of its own choosing (Interview, 2013e). They prescribe a policy of strategic autonomy and equidistance from both the US and China (Khilnani et al., 2012). The widely noted report Nonalignment 2.0, co-authored by some distinguished former government officials and academics, which was published in early 2012, captures the sentiments of this group (Khilnani et al., 2012). To put the whole argument in perspective, as Vinod Mehta did during President Obama’s visit to Delhi in 2010: ‘As a risen, not rising, power, India is not willing to fall into Uncle Sam’s trap’ (2010).

Pivot and Great Power Realists

The second major school comprises the Great Power Realists (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2012).⁵ This school of thought has gained prominence in the last couple of decades especially after the end of the Cold War and more so after the 1998 nuclear weapons tests. A ‘growing minority’ in Indian foreign policy thinking, their fundamental assumptions on international politics vary considerably compared to that of Traditional Nationalists. Great Power Realists view policies such as non-alignment as a futile attempt to escape from international power politics; the need instead, as they argue, is to engage in power politics rather than to completely abandon it. They view India’s Cold War foreign policy practice of aligning with the Soviet Union as motivated by balance of power considerations. In the contemporary times, they consider that close economic and military cooperation with the US is in India’s interests in so far the primary threat emanates from Beijing. In opposition to the Traditional Nationalists, therefore, Great Power Realists view pivot as a strategic opportunity. In their reading, the pivot represents the US’s willingness to share space and power with New Delhi in the Asia-Pacific region (Mohan, 2013a). The logic of seeing the pivot as an opportunity emanates from their reading of the India–China equation: prone to conflict yet underlined by India’s incapacity to balance China on its own (Tellis, 2012a).⁶ In other words, since India and China are long-term rivals and India’s capacity to internally balance China is limited, the only option is to balance China with US help. The pivot, for them, represents a rare occasion where America’s constellation of interests is allied in favour of a larger strategic footprint for India in the Asia-Pacific. Great Power Realists or these ‘strategic opportunists’ are inclined to pursue a close relationship with the US, including an extensive military component. However, they remain wary of using the ‘alliance’ word in any India–US partnership since alliances have no market value in Indian domestic politics. Some have called this ‘balancing sans alliance’ kind of behaviour as ‘soft balancing’ (Rajagopalan, 2013). Great Power Realists therefore vouch for greater ‘strategic engagement’ with the US both at the level of diplomacy and defence cooperation.

Hyper-nationalists and Pivot

The third group includes those who prescribe ‘strategic independence’ for Indian foreign policy as the US pivots towards the Asia-Pacific. Comprised largely of Hard Nationalists or Hyper-realists, these foreign policy elites espouse an ideology of strategic independence from the great powers, especially in matters concerning India’s national security (Bajpai, 2010; Bajpai & Sahni, 2008; Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2012).⁷ Their policy preference amounts to a kind of ‘security mercantilism’, suggesting that India should eschew reliance on other powers for its national security. Instead, it should opt for internal balancing, through the development of military power and especially large nuclear arsenals (Karnad, 2002). In the context of the pivot, their focus is not so much on US decline but on China’s rise; some, however, have also concluded that the US has declined relatively from its position of global pre-eminence (Chellany, 2012). As one noted commentator suggested, ‘The fact that U.S.—the global hegemon—has to prioritize the Pacific over the Atlantic suggest that U.S. is adjusting to its material decline’ (Interview, 2013c).

Emphasizing America’s relative decline, this group considers the Asian pivot to be unsustainable in the long run. One of their key concerns is the possibility of a grand accommodation between the US and China, leaving India vulnerable. For them, the prospect of a ‘G-2’ makes the US a very unreliable ally. This unreliability is further accentuated by the fact that the US has no direct stake in Asia-Pacific unlike the locals—Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and India—with territorial conflicts to be settled with China. As such, these countries have an intrinsic interest in maintaining a balance of power in the Asian continent. Hence, Hard Nationalists argue against over-reliance on the US strategy of rebalancing against China. As one noted commentator argued, ‘America’s security coattails are not long enough anymore for a strategic partner such as India to ride on, alongside America’s treaty allies in Asia’ (Karnad, 2013). Instead, they prescribe strategic independence built upon a large-scale nuclear arsenal comprising hydrogen weapons and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles. Hard internal balancing, according to them, should be the Indian strategy and if pivot is about balancing China, India should either balance by hard internal balancing or by creating a concert of power with the help of local Asian powers such as Japan and Vietnam.

The Bandwagoners

The last set of opinions belongs to the ‘Bandwagoners’,⁸ who differ from Great Power Realists in one important aspect: they not only seek US support for maintaining a regional balance of power but also for other perceived gains, both material and prestigious. ‘Gain’ in addition to ‘survival’ motivate Bandwagoners to maintain a close strategic partnership with the US. Contrary to general impressions of the current decline in US power, this group is sceptical of the decline thesis. The US, according to them, can easily recuperate from its ongoing economic woes as it has demonstrated on a number of previous occasions (Interview, 2013c). They also emphasize the point that the US is still the most potent military power in the world. To them, it makes sense for India to be on the side of the hegemon given that it shares common goals with the US, particularly on the containment of China. As one retired military commander argued: ‘we should team up with them (U.S.)’ (Interview, 2013f). Unlike the Soft Nationalists and Nehruvians, Bandwagoners see a clear conflict of interests between India and China. However, unlike the Hard Nationalists who prescribe strategic independence, Bandwagoners call for increasing alignment with the US, especially in the military domain. The pivot, therefore, represents an excellent opportunity for India to forge close military ties with the US. They also prescribe bandwagoning for other strategic reasons. According to them, India’s rise depends upon US goodwill: in the defence sphere, it is the only country that can provide India with the advanced technology it requires; in the global political realm, the US is best placed to accommodate India’s ascent by supporting its candidacy in institutions such as the UN Security Council.

Clearly, the domestic debate in India over American pivot to Asia is intense yet multi-faceted. Different ideological moorings of these groups lead them to different readings of the current strategic situation and therefore different policy prescriptions. As will be evident in the discussion on the correlation between the domestic foreign policy debate and foreign policy practice, the real contestation exists between the Nehruvians and the Great Power Realists. Both Hard Nationalists and Bandwagoners are on the margins insofar their impact on foreign policy is concerned. To substantiate this observation, the next section focuses upon Indian foreign policy practice under the Manmohan Singh government. It will also provide some pointers of continuity and change under the current government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The Pivot and Foreign Policy Practice: Comparing the Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi Governments

Under the Manmohan Singh government, Indian foreign policy towards the pivot was punctuated by reluctance and caution. Indian decision-makers viewed the pivot as largely a manifestation of growing uncertainty in Asia’s strategic environment, as was evident in the Prime Minister’s words:

If you survey the global strategic environment over the past decade, it would not escape your notice that, just as the economic pendulum is shifting inexorably from west to east, so is the strategic focus, as exemplified by the increasing contestation in the seas to our east and related ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ by the U.S. in this area. This to my mind is a development fraught with uncertainty. (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013; emphasis added)

The official response indicated a preference for strategic autonomy: India would not like to take sides in this great game, at least not before the strategic fog around the pivot cleared and allows it to make informed choices. The impression made by strategic uncertainty on Indian thinking can also be gleaned from the Prime Minister Singh’s comments a few months after ‘the pivot’ was announced. Speaking to a South Korean daily on the eve of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Singh declared that India’s ‘aim is to have cooperative ties with both China and the US. It is not zero-sum game. I do not think that large and dynamic countries like China can be contained’ (The Times of India, 2012). In a similar vein, the prime minister’s special envoy to the US, Shyam Saran, argued that given the uncertainty in Asia’s strategic environment, India’s foreign policy should avoid getting trapped in the looming conflict between the US and China (Saran, 2009). The association of the pivot with strategic uncertainty and the policy of maintaining strategic autonomy were evident in the consequences it had on India–US relations following the announcement of the pivot. The defence relationship steadily deteriorated, starting with New Delhi’s decision to bypass American vendors for the multi-billion Medium Multiple Role Combat Aircraft deal as it lost out on an opportunity to ‘build a strategic partnership with the US based on this lucrative deal’ (Rajagopalan, 2011). The UPA regime also persistently declined to consummate the 2005 defence agreement with the US. Three crucial elements of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)—Logistics Sharing Agreement, Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation—were given short shrift by the UPA government (Pant & Joshi, 2015). Also, the nuclear deal could not be fructified as India’s domestic liability laws were in conflict with US expectations. On the other hand, nuclear deal benefited New Delhi’s other strategic partners such as Russia, which was able to build nuclear reactors in India because of pre-existing agreements of 1998 (Balachandran & Patil, 2012). Moreover, the domestic nuclear liability legislation was still far from becoming a law when new contracts were signed for additional nuclear reactors at Kudankulam in 2007–2008. All this engendered a lot of frustration in Washington, DC, as the pace of transformation in Indo-US relations was extremely slow especially when the Americans had gone the extra miles to accommodate India’s concerns during the negotiations on Indo-US nuclear deal (Tellis, 2012b). For Washington, India’s inclination to pursue strategic autonomy as the US moved towards the Asia-Pacific was perplexing since the two countries, at least during the presidency of George W. Bush, were moving towards a loose alliance against China’s growing influence. Two reasons account for such transformation in Indian foreign policy.

Compared to the Bush era, the India–US strategic partnership lost some of its momentum under the Obama administration. As Daniel Twining points out, ‘Signs of trouble in U.S.-India relations emerged early on in Barack Obama’s road to the White House and continued since then’ (Twinning, 2010). A few months after President Obama took charge, Robert Blackwill also warned that ‘in the immediate period before us, our bilateral ties are likely to be more problematical than we have seen in recent years’ (2009, 2012). As a senator, Obama had opposed the civilian nuclear agreement. He also, in formulating his Afghanistan policy, tried to re-hyphenize India and Pakistan into one single bracket bringing Kashmir back in the agenda, which drew a lot of criticism from New Delhi (Padmanabhan, 2010: Rozen, 2009). And most importantly, the idea of a G-2 was contested heavily in New Delhi (Saran, 2009). In fact, according to one close observer, in 2009, US officials indicated to their Indian counterparts their reluctance to pursue any balance of power politics in the region (Twinning, 2012a, 2012b). In India, this was seen in strong contrast to the more muscular China policy of George W. Bush and the growing bonhomie between the two countries brought back the nostalgia of the first term of the Clinton Presidency when India had become a joint target of both US and China (Mohan, 2012). Even when a course correction occurred with the announcement of the pivot, the perception of New Delhi’s vulnerability in the face of a US–China condominium had gained traction in the minds of Indian decision-makers.

Strategic uncertainty and the perception of American decline also allowed the Congress party’s residual anti-Americanism and nostalgia for non-alignment from the great powers to surface once again. As Sanjay Baru has chronicled in his memoirs of the UPA government’s first term, many in the Congress were not very pleased with Manmohan Singh’s efforts to realign India with the US (Baru, 2014). During negotiations for the nuclear deal, Manmohan Singh put his foot down and the Congress Party had no other option but to rally behind the prime minister. In his second term, however, Singh’s position had weakened a lot, due to both massive corruption cases against his government and increased interference from Congress’ high command. This allowed individuals like Defence Minister A.K. Antony, who was close to the Congress Party President, Sonia Gandhi, to walk roughshod over the India–US defence relationship. Under him, the Ministry of Defence persistently declined to engage with the U.S. even when the latter was keen on upgrading its defence relationship with New Delhi (Pant & Joshi, 2015; Shukla, 2012). The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) not only resisted the idea of a 2+2 (Defence Minister plus Foreign Minister) dialogue but when in June 2012, the Pentagon delegated the responsibility of boosting defence ties and trade with India to the then Deputy Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter, it refused to engage with him, leaving the enterprise entirely to the foreign office (Shukla, 2012). The MoD also resisted the revival of the India–US Political and Military (Pol–Mil) dialogue. Clearly therefore, the signals sent out by Obama administration in its first two years of power and the weak leadership of Manmohan Singh in his second term led Indian foreign policy towards ‘strategic autonomy’. However, it is equally important to appreciate the fact that even when official policy under Manmohan Singh appeared to be inclined towards the Traditional Nationalist preference for autonomy in foreign policy decision-making, it was vehemently contested by the Great Power Realists, as is evident in the debates around the pivot.

The logical question therefore is the degree of change the Modi government will bring to India’s foreign policy. A change of guard from the Congress-led UPA to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance could facilitate India’s embrace of the US’s pivot strategy. The BJP, in its earlier stint in government, ushered a shift in Indian foreign policy (Bajpai, 2002). This was evident in its decision to test nuclear devices in 1998, shattering the veil of ambivalence, which had shrouded India’s nuclear status (Ganguly, 1999). But it also took India–US relationship to new heights by supporting George W. Bush’s Missile Defence Plans and offered military bases for America’s operations in Afghanistan (Tellis, 2006). It even considered sending the Indian military for peacekeeping operations in Iraq, not under the UN mandate but as a part of the US-led coalition. These foreign policy decisions were in huge contrast to the ideal of non-alignment that had guided Indian Foreign Policy for most of its independent history. The BJP, with its ideological moorings based on conservative Hindu nationalism, has been historically averse to the idea of non-alignment. It also professes to a more forceful articulation and practice on India’s national security (Chaulia, 2002; Das, 2003). The coming of the BJP may therefore change India’s hedging strategy to an active partnership on the issue of the pivot.

Some signals are already perceivable. Modi’s reading of Asian strategic environment is also underlined by a feeling of strategic uncertainty. However, according to India’s new prime minister, this should translate into more responsibility for countries like India and Japan (Press Information Bureau, 2014a). This emphasis on responsibility is quite different from that of the previous government. Also, while the new government wants to improve relations with Beijing, Modi has been forthright in expressing India’s concerns. On his visit to Japan, taking a shot at China’s policies in the East and South China Seas, he said that some states still follow the nineteenth-century mindset of expansionism (Press Information Bureau, 2014a). He also emphasized the freedom of navigation in those seas during his speech at the UN general assembly (Press Information Bureau, 2014b).

However, his discussions with Barack Obama have sent the strongest signals in this regard (Pant, 2014). In a first, the two leaders co-authored an op-ed in the Washington Post signalling that the relationship is set to receive a major boost (Modi & Obama, 2014). The joint statement issued by the two leaders did not disappoint. From the content of the joint statement, it is evident that peace and security in the Asia-Pacific and China’s increasing assertiveness in the region figured prominently in the dialogue. The joint statement expressed concerns over the ‘rising territorial disputes’ and threats to freedom of navigation and maritime security. Taking aim at China, the two leaders also ‘called upon all parties to avoid the use, or threat of use, of force in advancing their claims’ (The White House, 2014). To achieve these objectives, the need for complementing each other’s Asia-Pacific strategies was also underlined: ‘Noting India’s ‘Act East’ policy and the United States’ rebalance to Asia, the leaders committed to work more closely with other Asia Pacific countries through consultations, dialogues, and joint exercises’ (The White House, 2014). This is definitely a break from the UPA era, when India remained obsessively shy of any engagement with the US on its pivot to Asia. The India–US defence relationship also received a major push. The 2005 Defence Pact has been extended for another 10 years. Also, the Pol–Mil dialogue, scuttled under A.K. Antony, would be resuscitated.

Modi’s American outreach did lead to one of the most celebrated visits by any American President to India. In a significant gesture signalling US recognition of India’s rising power, President Obama visited New Delhi as the chief guest of the Republic Day parade on 26 January earlier this year. The visit helped in resolving the logjam over civilian nuclear cooperation by settling the controversial nuclear liability issue between the two countries. This in itself will provide a significant boost to US–India relations. In defence, not only was the Defence Framework Agreement renewed but the two states also decided to start co-development and joint production of military equipment under the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative. Four pilot projects have already been identified: Raven mini UAVs, mobile hybrid power source, chemical/bio-protection gear, roll on-roll off intelligence and surveillance modules for C-130J aircraft. Lastly, the US–India Delhi Declaration of Friendship places equal emphasis on both strategic defence ties and the prospects for commercial links between the two countries. In fact, the strategic dialogue between the two countries has now been upgraded to strategic and commercial dialogue (The White House, 2015). In a boost to ‘Modinomics’, Obama also announced fresh investment into Indian markets to the tune of $4 billion.

Bilateral discussions notwithstanding, in a first, the two leaders highlighted the growing turmoil in the Indo-Pacific (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015). The ‘U.S.–India Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean’ is the first comprehensive enunciation of a collaborative approach to regional security issues. The statement underlined the fact that cooperation between the two largest democracies in the region is ‘indispensable to promoting peace, prosperity and stability’. That the concurrent tensions in the South China Sea found an emphatic resonance in the document indicates that a convergence of interests and strategies to manage China’s increasing assertiveness in the region is now on the offing. In a veiled warning to China, the document clearly stated that ‘Regional prosperity depends on security. We (India and US) affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.’ The two countries also indicated their preferences for negotiated solutions of territorial and maritime disputes in the region calling upon all stakeholders to ‘void the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’. Being the first instance in which India and US have issued joint vision on Indo-Pacific indicates that the concerns of the region have attained special relevance in India–US bilateral relationship. It appears that under the current dispensation in New Delhi, India’s Look East Policy and America’s Pivot to Asia seem destined for a common strategic endeavour in the Indo-Pacific. Under Modi, India–US strategic engagement on the pivot is set to increase. This position is much closer to that being advocated by Great Power Realists.

Clearly, on the issue of the pivot, Indian foreign policy practice seems to be vacillating between ‘strategic autonomy’ prescribed by Traditional Nationalists and ‘strategic engagement’ argued for by Great Power Realists. However, ‘strategic independence’ argued for by the Hard Nationalists and ‘strategic bandwagoning’ prescribed by Bandwagoners has remained on the margins insofar their impact on real policy is concerned. This may be due to a number of reasons. First, Indian Foreign Policy has always witnessed a tussle between idealist and realist thought and practice. If Nehru could be considered as quintessential example of Traditional Nationalists, Sardar Patel was the realist in the ranks. These categories have always existed in the Indian strategic discourse, most evident in the debate on India’s nuclear weapons programme (Perkovich, 2001). Historically, therefore both these schools have always found more traction in policy. Second, if Traditional Nationalists dominated the foreign policy discourse till the end of the Cold War, subsequent events in the last two decades such as the opening-up of the Indian economy, 1998 nuclear weapons tests and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal has strengthened the hand of Great Power Realists. The recent history of heated struggle on the direction and substance of Indian foreign policy has helped the two schools attain pole positions in foreign policy thinking. Third, even when there is an ideological divide between the Congress and the BJP, when in power, their foreign policy practice suggests an inherent resistance to any extremities. In so far, both Hard Nationalists and the Bandwagoners represent two different extremes on foreign policy thinking, their influence on policy is equally diluted. Lastly, there may also be a perception in New Delhi that neither of these two strategies can actually be implemented. Strategic independence requires a lot more internal resources and India cannot balance China on its own. Bandwagoning, on the other hand, would lead to security overdependence on the U.S. and may also be costly in terms of independence in foreign policy decision-making.

Conclusion

This article explained the US’s pivot to Asia as a strategy to contain China’s growing power and assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific. It further described how Washington views New Delhi in its new strategy for the region. The US expects India to play a major role in Asia’s emerging balance of power politics. However, the domestic foreign policy debate in India remains highly divided. As the article argued, Indian foreign policy elites have espoused four distinct positions vis-à-vis New Delhi’s role in US’s pivot strategy. First, Traditional Nationalists argue that India should remain equally distant from both the US and China and should follow a foreign policy underlined by the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. Great Power Realists, on the other hand, are more inclined to engage with the US on pivot mainly because it helps New Delhi to effectively balance China. Hyper-realists or Hard Nationalists espouse a policy of ‘strategic independence’: they argue that India should either balance China by hard internal balancing or by creating a concert of power with the help of local Asian powers such as Japan and Vietnam. The last set of opinions comes from the Bandwagoners who believe that India should ally with the US in an era when China has emerged as the most potent threat in Asia. These contending opinions notwithstanding, the real debate exists between the Nehruvians and Great Power Realists. As this article argued, under the previous Manmohan Singh government, India opted for a foreign policy underlined by ‘strategic autonomy’ and was seen to be distancing itself from the US’s pivot to Asia. This was largely a result of perceptions in New Delhi that Obama, at least during the first couple of years in his tenure, was keen to create an understanding with Beijing. The perception of a G-2 therefore created a lot of uncertainty for Indian foreign policy. However, the Indian Congress party’s anti-Americanism, evident in the policies of A.K. Antony while Defence Minister was equally responsible. With the coming of new government to power, however, India’s foreign policy appears to have shifted towards the position taken by the Great Power Realists. The Modi government’s engagement with Japan and the US has sent signals that New Delhi may now be more inclined to participate with like-minded states in balancing China’s growing power in the region.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This article is based upon a co-authored issue brief written by the author with Dr Deepa Ollapally during a visiting fellowship at Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University in Spring 2013. The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr Ollapally for granting him the permission to use the issue brief for the purposes of this article. The author would also like to thank the research and administrative staff at Sigur Center for making his fellowship fruitful at George Washington University. The author also expresses his gratitude to Dr Rajeshwari Rajagopalan and Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan for their help in organising interviews with a number of academics and policy makers in New Delhi. Lastly, the author is thankful to two anonymous reviewers, Prof. Harsh V. Pant, Prof. Rajat Ganguly and Dr Frank O’Donnell for their very insightful comments and suggestions which helped in improving the manuscript.

1.

It is important to note rather than targeting individual personalities, these categories actually represent the differences in the ‘lines of arguments’ regarding Indian foreign policy (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2011, p. 145). It is not the case that these categories have remained undefined before. In fact a number of Indian scholars have used these categories to understand how different constituencies within India try to associate themselves with global concerns (Bajpai, 2010; Bajpai & Sahni, 2008; Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2011). Kanti Bajpai has used some of these categories to explain India’s strategic culture (2010). Kanti Bajpai and Varun Sahni have availed a similar conceptual scheme to explain how Indians think about hegemony (Bajpai & Sahni, 2008). Most recently, Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan have tried to construct a conceptual map of foreign policy thinking in India based on value judgments on part of Indian scholars and practitioners on issues concerning foreign policy (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2012). My own attempt to build a conceptual map on how scholars and practitioners understand domestic foreign policy schools on pivot borrows from all these three academic renditions but mostly from Ollapally and Rajagopalan. This is because their conceptualization is most detailed in terms of classification of foreign policy thinking in the Indian case. However, an additional category of Bandwagoners is used here in order to fully capture the debate on the pivot.

2.

According to the World Economic Outlook report prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s GDP in 2014 was $18.976 trillion (PPP terms) and $11.212 trillion (absolute dollar terms). US GDP, on the other hand, was $18.125 trillion (PPP terms) and $18.125 trillion (absolute dollar terms). See, International Monetary Fund (April 2015), World Economic Outlook ().

3.

This section is based on a co-authored issue brief written with Dr Deepa Ollapally for the Rising Powers Initiative of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. The author is grateful to Dr Ollapally for granting him the permission to develop the argument further and use it for this paper (Ollapally & Joshi, 2013).

4.

Embedded in the discourse of India’s freedom movement, Traditional Nationalists (also called Nehruvians) can be defined as those who emphasize on strategic autonomy in matters concerning foreign policy, recommend eschewing power politics, believe in the intrinsic importance of India as the basis of its claim to a great power status and support the idea of an equitable global order based on democratic decision-making. They also prescribe maintenance of cordial relationship with China based on the fact that the two neighbours are civilizational powers and have never been hostile to each other in their history, at least before independence (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2011, , pp. 83–89).

5.

Under this category come those thinkers who want India to become a great power and are not shy of engaging with other great powers especially the US to achieve the desired ends. For them, China is a clear long-term threat but rather than engaging China on its own, they recommend strategic engaging with other like-minded nations such as the US. For them, if India wants to be a great power, it cannot escape the logic of power politics. Objective national interests rather than anachronistic ideals, for them, should be the benchmark for foreign policy decision-making (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2011, , pp. 92– 96).

6.

As one interviewee puts it, ‘India’s differences with China are formidable but irreconcilable’ (Interview, 2013b).

7.

The most important attribute of these thinkers is the fact that they want India to behave like a great power but solely on its own. They advocate use of force more often in order to realize national objectives and a touz azimuth nuclear deterrent. For them, since the international system is highly anarchic and the logic of self-help rules, it is foolish to depend on other great powers. India, at best, will remain a secondary power if it piggybacks on the US because the latter will never allow India to challenge its pre-eminence. The belief regarding China is that India must rely on superior military capabilities and force it to submission from a position of military dominance (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2011, , pp. 89–92).

8.

‘Bandwagoners’ is a new category. It has not been elaborated before in any of the major works concerning various Indian foreign policy schools of thoughts. In fact, this category was included here because in some of the interviews conducted by the author, few expressed the desire to bandwagon with the US for realization of India’s great power interests. Bandwagoners are similar to Great Power Realists except that their motivation to bandwagon is not only inspired by the need to balance China but also gain—technology transfers and membership in global institutions.

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Between ‘Concern’ and ‘Opportunity’: US Pivot to Asia and Foreign Policy Debate in India

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

The Pivot: A Historical Overview

India and the Pivot to Asia

Indian Foreign Policy Schools Debate the Pivot 3

Indian Foreign Policy Schools of Thought and Policy Preferences

Traditional Nationalists on Pivot

Pivot and Great Power Realists

Hyper-nationalists and Pivot

The Bandwagoners

The Pivot and Foreign Policy Practice: Comparing the Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi Governments

Conclusion

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

1.

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

References

Indian Foreign Policy Schools Debate the Pivot³