Abstract
The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 paved the way for the addition of a nuclear dimension to an already tumultuous bilateral relationship fraught with distrust and at least three major conflicts. The Indo-Pakistani security nexus in the context of nuclear weaponry remains a source of regional contention even in the contemporary period and adds complexity to sub-systemic stability in South Asia. Bhumitra Chakma’s book, South Asia’s Nuclear Security, provides a comprehensive analysis of the nuclear question in the region. Chakma focuses on two very important topics dealing with nuclear security in South Asia: the stability of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence mechanism and an assessment of the safety of the nuclear infrastructure in India and Pakistan. Overall, Chakma prompts the status of nuclear security in South Asia, focusing not only on the Indo-Pakistani deterrence system but also delving into the role non-state actors could play in acting as sources of insecurity for the two states in question. Thus, he uses a sub-systemic approach to nuclear security, providing an analytical lens that is different from the systemic approaches used to study the Cold War nuclear dynamics.
The author begins with an introduction that lays out the organization of the book. It includes a recap of the concept of nuclear revolution, which brought about the rise of deterrence and revolutionized statecraft (pp. 1–4). In South Asia, there exist two schools of thought on the implications of nuclear revolution. The optimists emphasize the stabilizing role of nuclear weapons on Indo-Pakistani relations, pointing to the limited number of conflicts between the two states since the 1998 nuclear tests. The pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the introduction of nuclear weapons have further destabilized the region. Due to the crisis prone nature of South Asia, addition of nuclear weapons further exacerbates the inherent instability in the region.
The nuclear evolution in South Asia was a gradual process, moving from opacity to an open system in May 1998, after both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. Initially, minimum deterrence policy was adopted; it entailed limiting nuclear warheads to a minimal threshold to prevent escalation into an arms race (p. 24). The nuclear posturing of both the states changed gradually. Pakistan’s initial minimum deterrence gave way to extensive warhead manufacturing, arguing that the concept of the minimum deterrence was not quantitative but depended on changing strategic environment pertaining to India. The Indian context depended on extra-regional considerations, particularly the 2008 civilian nuclear with the US. This deal entailed that New Delhi could free up fissile material for more extensive nuclearization of weapons, which in turn exacerbates the security dilemma with Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the dichotomy of arguments within the academe of nuclear weapons perceives these changes disparately. Optimists argue that nuclear weapons contributed to restrained behaviour in India and Pakistan due to fears of nuclear armageddon. In contrast, the nuclear pessimists fear a catastrophe in South Asia due to its increasing nuclearization. The author extrapolates the argument of the pessimists as well, including their fear of missed signals and false alarms (pp. 65–66). In addition, the nuclear command infrastructure in South Asia is still in development, without proper mechanisms for crisis mitigation. The geographic proximity of the states further adds to heightened risks of nuclear catastrophe. The author criticizes the optimists for their overemphasis on the stabilizing impact of the nuclear weapons, while paying little heed to qualitative advancements. He also criticizes the pessimists for focusing too much on origins of crises but providing little information on the outcomes; they also completely disregard some stabilizing impact of the nuclear weapons, such as restrained approaches to crisis situations.
With the premise set up for understanding nuclear security at the sub-systemic level, the author moves on to analyze the origins of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race and its consequences. The causes of the arms race are divided into internal and external factors. Internal factors include the role of institutional parochialism, particularly the military, and the integral role the possession of Kashmir has had on the security as well as the very ethos of India and Pakistan (p. 95). External factors include the role of China, which induced India to acquire nuclear weapons and which in turn led to Pakistan’s acquisition of such weapons. The plethora of causes associated with the origins of a nuclear arms race in South Asia showcase the strategic complexity of the region, particularly the role of extra-regional powers in escalating regional security calculations. China’s nuclear weapons acquisitions had ramifications in South Asia by further aggravating an already tumultuous rivalry between India and Pakistan.
The author then introduces the concept of regional deterrence system in South Asia, as part of the larger literature of complex deterrence. In Chapter 5, Chakma extrapolates on this concept of complex deterrence in the context of South Asia. Due to the nature of the sub-system, it is susceptible to external influence from the systemic players such as the US. As aforementioned, the role of external factors in the form of external Great Power projections is key in understanding the dynamics of nuclear security in the region. Chakma argues that Pakistan invited the US and the UN to mediate in the Kashmir Crisis, inviting external actors to local security dynamics (p. 108). Despite China, the US and occasionally, the UN getting involved in the region, Chakma points to the positive role played by the US in crisis mitigation as the most prominent external factor in the complex deterrence in South Asia. Regional deterrence in South Asia is not exclusively a bilateral security issue; it involves extra-regional players such as the US and China. Such players have augmented the security dilemma in Indo-Pakistani relations, as is the case for China, or dampened crises as the US did through diplomatic channels during the Kargil War in 1999 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008.
The state-level analysis of nuclear security in South Asia was no longer sufficient to understand or analyze nuclear security in South Asia after the September 11 attacks. The increasingly strident nature of non-state actors in usage of complex tactics and weaponry challenged strategic institutions designed around the premise of dealing with other states. In the context of India and Pakistan, Chakma raises the security of nuclear infrastructure and materials in those two states. While both states promulgated the criminalization of exports of fissile materials, there are problems with implementation due to the factors such as corruption and limitations of state capacity. India did not enforce the no-fly zones over the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and Pakistan gained notoriety for the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the AQ Khan network (pp. 130–134). Despite setbacks and lapses, both India and Pakistan maintain safeguards to prevent leakage of nuclear technology. The author alludes that Pakistan’s situation is more precarious given the existence of several militant organizations in the country and the rise of secessionist movements in Baluchistan. Chakma’s final analysis section deals with confidence building and arms limitations in South Asia. He highly doubts any progress in arms limitation treaties due to the intense and complex politico-strategic considerations including internal parochialism as well as the role of extra-regional powers and the formative nature of deterrence, which has not yet stabilized (p. 153).
South Asia’s Nuclear Security provides a detailed account of the nuclear security predicament in South Asia. From the perspectives of both the optimists and pessimists, Chakma elaborates on the multitude of factors that have contributed to the ever-tumultuous Indo-Pakistani security relations. Each chapter contains a rich bibliographical reference section highlighting a very detailed analysis of the nuclear issue in the region. Yet, some sections of the book do seem redundant given the repeated description of the conflicts between India and Pakistan. Regardless, this book offers readers a rich history as well as analysis of the nuclear security situation in South Asia, furthering the case for the importance of studying complex deterrence and its implications for regional as well as global security. Chakma provides an important and prominent case for the advancement of sub-systemic approaches to security, highlighting the need in understanding sub-systemic security dynamics as well.