Abstract

Applied Diplomacy: Through the Prism of Mythology is a collection of articles and lectures of T.P. Sreenivasan, a former Indian Ambassador. This book, which carries the image of the Hindu God Hanuman on its cover, is divided into 49 chapters that are grouped under seven thematic sections dedicated to seven ‘chiranjeevis’, 1 Hindu mythological characters. However, the themes and chiranjeevis are arbitrarily matched. For instance, the US is speciously compared with Ashwatthama ignoring mythological figures that better exemplify the character of the former. Ashwatthama’s story would have been a perfect frame for the chapters on nuclear power that have been inexplicably prefaced by the story of Parasurama. In any case, the division of the book’s chapters reminds about the ancients, who were obsessed with magical/auspicious numbers. They first chose a number that fixed the organization of the text and then filled in the content leading to either too many or too few entries. In the present case, the preference for ‘seven’ explains the addition of about 12 chapters unrelated to diplomacy at the end of the book. Interestingly, Jagdish Bhagwati’s foreword approves of ‘[t]his fascinating and unique experiment’ of viewing diplomacy through a mythological lens (p. x).
Sreenivasan must have spent all his life conducting diplomacy in a foreign language, using foreign concepts. Yet he accepted an Indian veneer for this collection that is unlikely to be translated into Indian languages. There are barely three references to mythology in Sreenivasan’s articles/speeches included in this collection (pp. 10–11, 39, 259). 2 Even the introductory notes and epilogue do not directly refer to the original mythological literature (except pp. xi, 1, 51–52). The mythological framing of this book is defended superficially. A random assortment of references to diplomatic situations in Hindu and non-Hindu mythologies is used to argue that ‘religion, mythology and diplomacy seamlessly blend sans barriers’ (p. xii). We are also told that the lives of chiranjeevis ‘have much in common with the art of diplomacy that is in vogue today’ (p. xiv).
This confused turn to Indian way of doing/thinking seems to be part of a larger trend. In the days to come, we should expect an increasing, even if clumsy, use of Indian lenses that cannot be explained solely by the political ascent of Hindu nationalism. 3 A number of other developments are contributing to the aforesaid trend. The modernization theory encouraged the adoption of institutions and modes of thinking of the materially advanced West. Now the tide has begun to turn and hence the interest in non-Western alternatives. The Nehruvian model of state has attracted criticism for lacking Indian roots forcing its defenders to discover its indigenous roots. The increasingly important regional elite of India are neither well-versed with Western modes of thinking, nor emotionally attached to the West. Finally, the conceptual and empirical inadequacies of (Western) social sciences have triggered interest in non-Western thought and experience.
With this introduction to the book’s organization, we can proceed to discuss its contents. The book tells us very little that we do not know already and conforms to the image of a diplomat, who ‘engages in conversations, but says nothing’ (p. 4). The book has to be read for what it tells us about how Indian diplomats think. The rest of the review is built around major issues discussed in the book. But for want of space, we will not be able to discuss Sreenivasan’s occasional observations on India’s foreign affairs bureaucracy.
Sreenivasan maintains that India’s foreign policy is driven by fundamental factors rather than the whims of ruling parties. For instance, developments related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) rather than the Bharatiya Janata Party’s ideology determined the timing of nuclear tests. Sreenivasan points out that ‘India chose to face sanctions after testing rather than face them for not signing the CTBT’ and that the test’s main proponents ‘were strategists, not politicians’ (p. 60). He rejects the charge that India lacks a strategic culture insofar as we do not see much long-term planning. He argues that even the presumably better prepared countries were thrown off guard by the upheavals of the late 1980s and India did not do worse than others in adjusting to these developments. He claims that Indian diplomacy has been relatively successful and refers to an ‘independent survey’ that ‘placed Indian diplomats just after those of the five permanent members of the Security Council in terms of influence and effectiveness’ (p. 5). But he cites only two examples of success. First, India managed to keep Kashmir out of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when it was not a non-permanent member (1992–2011). Second, India successfully contained the international consequences of the 1998 nuclear tests.
He notes with satisfaction that India has abandoned its ‘pathological attachment to non-alignment and opted for selective alignments across geographical and ideological divides’ (p. 34). However, coalition politics has added a new constraint as states actively interfere with foreign affairs and other countries’ court state leaders. India’s divided neighbourhood is another binding constraint. Small neighbours suffer from ‘built-in fear psychosis’ (p. 57) and are ‘paranoid about India’s strength and growth’ (p. 51), even though they stand to benefit from ‘the global Indian brand’ (p. 55). Sreenivasan is reminded of ‘Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan restaurants abroad, parading their delicacies as Indian cuisine’ (p. 55). He argues against India’s neighbourhood policy of unreciprocated unilateralism: accepting refugees and economic migrants, giving generous territorial concessions and agreeing to generous water-sharing agreements. Unilateral concessions cannot satisfy the appetite for more concessions among neighbours, who do not miss any opportunity to blackmail India. He concludes that India ‘cannot unilaterally impose friendship’ (p. 57) and ‘strengthen democracy’ (p. 67) in the neighbourhood, particularly, in Pakistan that treats bilateral disputes as ‘an existential anchor’ (p. 57). Among India’s neighbours Myanmar, where Sreenivasan served as the ambassador, has ‘made the least demands of us and caused us no embarrassment internationally’ (p. 85). Yet he completely overlooks the concerns of north-eastern states vis-à-vis Myanmar. The description of Ne Win’s personal relationship with the Indian leadership, which did not translate into a deeper bilateral relationship, is interesting. India’s relations with rest of the neighbours are discussed perfunctorily.
Sreenivasan’s assessments of India’s relationship with Japan, the US and China are worth reading. The natural convergence of interests notwithstanding, India should expect Japan to show ‘doggedness’ and ‘ruthlessness’ in pursuit of its national interests (p. 79). The hostile contest over a non-permanent UNSC seat in the 1990s is a case in point. The Indo-US relationship is clouded by persistent irritants such as the nuclear deal, UNSC candidature, climate change and trade. Moreover, the US views India as merely one of its anti-China cards and given India’s UN voting record it is wary of supporting India’s UNSC candidature. His hardnosed assessment of the nuclear deal is refreshing. He argues that the deal had a limited declaratory purpose and that the US is responsible for the lack of nuclear trade because Obama values his non-proliferation policy. Sreenivasan warns that there are more reasons for Indo-China conflict than in the past, even though Indian governments downplay the growing Chinese threat. His scathing critique of India’s rudderless policy towards an ‘inscrutable’ China should be read in original (pp. 68–75). He is alarmed by the Centre for Policy Research’s report Non-Alignment 2.0 that ‘covered [the Chinese threat] in subdued terms’ and ‘concedes, for the first time in Indian strategic writing, that China is already a superpower’ (p. 32). Fiji is another country that figures prominently in the collection. Sreenivasan was expelled from Fiji after the 1987 coup. In the following Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting summit, Rajiv Gandhi successfully rallied support for resumption of democracy (p. 82). India reopened the high commission ‘after repeated pleas’ (p. 42). He recalls with some ambivalence that ‘the Indian high commissioner was treated on par with the Prime Minister [of Fiji] as half the population was of Indian origin’ (p. 8).
On the issue of UN reforms, he notes the gross mismatch between popular perception in India and the rest of the world. He reminds us that ‘Pandit Nehru had once declined an offer for India to take China’s place in the Security Council, as he felt that India should take its turn in due time’ (pp. 5–6). More generally, Sreenivasan suggests that Nehru’s nuclear, Kashmir and China policies lacked the ‘determination and practical wisdom of his daughter’ (pp. 18–19, 267). In any case, at present ‘the procedure laid down for change’ cannot help reform UNSC as P5 are against expansion and coalitions of other countries are gridlocked (p. 198). India has to wait for a major crisis that will force a change. In the meantime, India need not waste much time campaigning as it diverts attention away from other achievable goals. On the issue of climate change, he reminds us of the visionary Indira Gandhi, the only prime minister to go to Stockholm in 1972, who influenced the emerging debate in favour of developing countries. She told her audience that poverty was the biggest polluter and that the West has to clean the mess (pp. 210–211). Unfortunately, India has now ‘found common cause with the worst polluters of the world, the US and China’ (p. 213) and fails to see that ‘China hides behind India’ to bargain with the West (p. 70).
To conclude, occasional mythological irritants notwithstanding, this book is worth reading as it presents hardnosed analyses of India’s foreign policy challenges such as Indo-US nuclear deal, UNSC reforms and Indo-Chinese relationship.
Footnotes
1.
Chiranjeevi refers to long-living being and is different from amartya (‘one who will never die’) and ananta/nitya (‘one who will live forever’) (p. xiii). The seven chiranjeevis include Ashwatthama, Mahabali, Vyasa, Hanuman, Vibheeshana, Kripacharya and Parasurama.
2.
Kautilya, the author of the Arthasastra, the most influential ancient Indian treatise on statecraft and diplomacy, is referred to only twice (pp. xi–xii, 77). One of these references is factually inaccurate, while the other is metaphorical.
3.
See Kissinger (
), for instance, who presents a synopsis of pre-modern Indian debates on world order followed by a discussion on the twentieth century. However, the discussions on the pre-modern and modern periods are not carefully connected. Also, there are factual inaccuracies in the discussion on the pre-modern period.
